speake things that seeme to others offensive or to deserve animadversion and yet the house or major part punish it not they by such connivence for these men may be allowed to question still principles that the Parliament would doe dishonorably and yet come short of their malicious intents make it also this way their owne and so not these censors or any els but the Parliament as above appeared is to judge of the Parliament but such censors themselves are to be condemned by the Parliament for thus presuming or assuming to themselves the supreame power to judge besides particular charges and articles against such were to be offered to the House the accusers and witnesses to be produced and forth-comming that if they make not good their charges the parties unjustly molested and accused might have condigne reparations upon them and the House it selfe satisfaction the publique service thus causelesly interrupted and the integritie of the House called in question and the like appertaining to cases of this nature Such charges have been promised long since should suddenly appeare against the accused Members of the Parliament and by them as Justice earnestly required but appeare not all this while not so much as to the people abroad though this were not the right way which they so strive to incense against the Parliament but rather warre in stead of them and seeing so many of the very Members of the Houses of Parliament are their enemies falling off from them unjustly if none such still remaine among them were things appearing unjustifiable there said or done if it might stand with the libertie and power of Parliament not to have libertie of speech it might easily be made appeare in particular to the world and so complaint be made to the Parliament thereof if it were to any end to complaine there of that which hath already passed without punishment But seeing the Parliament hath power the case standing as before hath been shewed to doe in all things as they see cause by good consequence their speeches necessarily preparing discussing agitating concluding what is so to be done cannot be subject to any limitting questioning or accompt abroad nor in reason therefore are to be divulged in that sence this being incompatible with such power But then these haters of our Law-makers and Lawes say Many of both Houses are away and so the acts lesse valid but be the number remaining little yet the acts of the Major part of that number are still good For neither the King that called them away or countenanceth them that desert their stations may ailedge this nor the Members that voluntarily not upon trust in those that remaine or leave obteined abandon their places there and duties are to take the benefit either of their owne wrong whether negligence in such Members or worse perhaps nor of their owne unworthinesse as Cowardise to oppose what they liked not which feare admitting such could be argues still that they that feared were the lesser number though what needed they feare to speake freely a dissenting lesser number being ordinary and sometimes a very few perhaps scarce enough to make a number dissenting openly from the rest of the whole House without any inconvenience It being allowed for any to speake their minds whilst a matter is in agitation before it be settled If they say they goe away that they may not seeme to allow what would passe though they were present then the Major part concurres to what is done by their owne confession els why stay they not to oppose it If they say so many are gone without leave of the Houses as put together would make the Major part supposing this were true either such a Major part went away at once in a body and then it was their fault not to stay for then they being the Major part had prevailed or they went by little and little and then still it was a Major part of the remainder that concurred to what was done els it had not passed and so the acts still good If they fly to say that they who thus deserted the House out of feare did it not as fearing the Parliament but the people granting these men this which is not their due that such had cause to feare the people and that such base feare when as they pretend they were to stand for the King Countrey Lawes Liberties Religion and did not render them utterly unworthy their places it may be answered briefly they that remained and carried matters might feare the King as much or more but their cause was noble and good but these or the like Cavils will no more hoodwinke the people their onely course were to produce some publique act of Parliament that might certifie the world that the King and both houses have long since unanimously concurred to dissolve this Parliament else Sophistry will not carry it against the manifest truth By the premisses or rather by diverse excellent Tractates published by others to the same or the like effect I hope it is even as cleare that the Parliament is and ought to be the supreame Judge in publique matters now in question in England as what it is it hath judged and ordered touching these things by so many publique orders declarations and the like and consequently that reason wills that they be sacred in our esteeme and punctually obeyed and executed and so no need of warre and whosoever goeth against reason and truth goeth against God himselfe who is Prima summa pura ratio and it will concerne him nearely to looke to it whether he be stronger then God goeth against himselfe if he be a man and shall first finde a civill warre in himselfe before he can cause it in his Countrey upon such grounds and for his Majestie he cannot as he is a King but judge that that man thinks dishonourably of him who goeth about to perswade him that that can be for his good that is not for the good of his Kingdome and so sever what is so excellently joyned or that the great Counsell of the Kingdome is not the onely at least the very best and the onely sure and securing way without all doubt for that Prince to follow that intends the publique good and which will ever assuredly concurre with him to that end nor in opposing an arbitrary power which ill men about him for their owne private and wicked ends would induce Doth the Parliament any thing but disenable a Prince or rather those about him from doing ill or more properly from usurping such power which to what end is it in a good Prince which he will or can never reduce to act or use but the false or pretended Mother of the childe who would have it divided whom the wisdome of the King may discerne will whisper there is no thankes or glory to doe good unlesse he might have done evill and so did good freely since free will onely merits I beleeve they hold merits it seemes these malignants fetched not
â—or conservation of the frame of the government the constitution of this Monarchy which the King declareth he admireth so much were most deficient in the most principall point of all namely the defending and preserving it selfe the very foundation and ground-work as the end of all otherwise provisions orders Laws without which what were they but folly and phantasie Nay were not the folly of the first institution rather to be as much admired as raising an instrument utterly unfit for the purpose it was meant for had it left the maine end of all that is the peoples safetie libertie happinesse in such a case as ours without all possible nay without any provision expresse or imployed by common intendment or analogie of reason or rule of Law though the true the naturall the best or the onely provision or remedie to keep Prince and people in their due temper were so at hand so facile so offering it self and if not before usuall yet used possibly at the very time of such an institution and for that very purpose namely a Parliament or other meeting of the like nature without provision I say against the greatest publick mischief of all that ultimum malum Reipublicae as divine Plato termes it arbitrary power or tyranny and that a mischief so likely to happen more so oft attempted nay actually happening But he that implores force not now to speak of what is pretended herein by words and that though but to resist the orders of that power whose part alone it is to remedie the people in our case doth in fact deny that this Monarchy hath made such provision or hath that power so necessary to help and defend it self or that the people in this case is remediable for by such having recourse to force or warre though but defensive he challengeth and assumeth all the power from the people to himself making himself supreme Judge of all upon the last resort of which somewhat more shortly But the King cannot be so in our present case in which he is a party in as much as the evill proceeds from ill counsell prevailing with him For to bring the hypothesis to a Thesis and not to stand alway on supposition taking it as a supposition that a king seduced may de facto make such attempts as are above put it is more evident of it self then that we need look on the fall of Liberty in France if not from the King nor Counsell about him consequently then whence is the remedie for our losse from the Judges what ever their will may be they want power aâ—â—â—â—twithstanding they still were present the mischief grew on 〈…〉 be then from the two Houses of Parliament onely unlesse you would have the whole Nation assemble personally as in the Vale of Jehosaphat if you suppose it possible and if possible fit for any thing but confusion except perhaps force the king having to speak with what reverence we can in this case excluded himself and the Clergie justly being excluded from such temporall distractions that it may attend the better and advance the celestiall and ecclesiastick more then enough to take up the ablest men wholly and not a little hindered and discredited by their so great greedinesse after worldly matters let them do their dutie let them teach truly live exemplarily like professors of mortification this will render the people so devoted to religion to them that they may securely trust the Parliament with all that touches them and safely make it their proxy themselves being absent and whilest thus spirituall matters are the better served and attended these and the temporall both receive the greater blessing but such diffidence and suspition in the Clergie if it should not be present in Parliament argues ill deserving since the justice and wisdom of the Parliament as principles of this government ought not to be questioned but how much more is the Clergie to receive at the hands of the Parliament that fuora i. preti i. e. Priests void the roome used by that Councel in Venice of which Bodin in the third book De republicâ the 3. Chapter then when they shall be found in life and doctrine unsound ill affected to the publick good accessarie to the evill to be remedied nay ardent to bring in or maintain either Papistry and idolatrie or at least a most scandalous symbolizing with it in temporall pride riches and greatnesse and even Antichristian domination through the breaches and ruins of their Countrey rather then even a Parliament shall question it The Parliament then and under this notion of the two Houses in these times understood being our onely remedie or rather Physitian it follows it may and is to be Judge of the danger or disease and that of power which is to remedie if it be so is to try whether it be so for without judgement or knowledge of the disease how can there be remedie or how shall the Physitian know what when and how to apply If it be the onely competent Judge of this our dangerous disease and of the meanes to meet with or expell it the knowledge of the remedie depending essentially upon the knowledge of the Maladie and receiving thence its Judications it hath consequently power to execute or act or cause to be executed or acted what it hath or shall judge or ordain necessary for the cure else such power to judge were vain and it would still return that the people were remedilesse But WISDOM or Judgement and POWER as they are divine coincidents and all one really and naturally where they are supreme and essentiall as in the Divine nature it being but our weaknesse of understanding to conceive them disjoyned so for principles of one facultie questioned are to be enforced from an higher facultie even in this supreme power on earth which as farre as frail mortalitie can bear imitates and represents that above they ought not to be by us apprehended separate but mutually presupposing or inferring one the other Let us adde to make up this terrestiall trinity Goodnesse which last may be understood in our present case a doing no unjust or dishonourable thing but wholly intending the publick good according to the peoples trust And it were an arch heresie in the policy of this Monarchy to disjoyn in our beleef or opinion the third from the two former And the Law saying no dishonourable thing is to be conceived of the Parliament it seems all one as to have said in other termes that it is the supreme Judge of the last resort and that even without the king if he hath excluded himself as above which is more then if he were far personally absent or otherwise casually disenabled and as much as if no king at all were for the time where all appeals are to rest and determine all men to acquiesse binding all from questioning what is there done and inferres the supreme power there to reside as being the whole kingdome in which it is radically and fundamentally
by representation such power to be exerted and used when it judges necessarie and that if the nature of the occasion so requires with the suspension of the power of the supreame ordinary Delegate or Magistrate during that parenthesis of state for the kingdome having entrusted the Parliament with all it holds precious the effect of the Commission upon the matter being that it provide ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat it hath consequently trusted it with its power which is the supreme that it may be enabled to perform and execute the trust when it judgeth this cannot be made good without using that power But to return the Law saith also That the King can do or doth no wrong but it denieth not but ill Counsell about him may or perhaps the Law intends the king as he is in his great Counsell where he is as Sol in Leone or any Planet as they say in his proper house of farre greater vertue and power then otherwise But however Reason tells us that a Prince or a few of his Cabinet counsell may far more easily erre in judgement or possibly in point of will then the multitude of a Parliament so many whereof are selected out of the whole Kingdom by the people in point of Judgement much more of will or well willing to the publique whereof themselves are so great a part and this much the rather in that it is to be feared that oftentimes those privadoes of the Prince finding out cunningly the Princes will inclination or humour before they advise and further to ingratiate themselves seconding it much that there is agitated becomes to be upon the matter the judgement or will but of the Prince alone Well I hope we are now come safe to this passe that the Parliament may and ought in our case to defend the people or kingdoms rights use the peoples power which is the supreame as others have proved to cleare passionate men rather then to satisfie any judicious man who will not require proofs in a point plain enough of it self ever resident in the people and so in the Parliament though dormient till it be by the Parliament thought fit to be wakened which should it not now be done such a seeming-secure and supine sleep might have proved a mortall lethargy But here these Sophisters think to enter upon us and to take the benefit of their own wrong for seeing they have brought the Kingdom to this passe that unlesse the Parliament take the power of the kingdom into the kingdoms or its own hands it cannot defend it self or the kingdoms rights or rather rescue them they would cunningly prepare those whom they intend to make slaves by first making them such fools as to beleeve that the Parliament intends a change of the Monarchicall form of government and to oppresse King and people by I know not what new kind of Arbitrarie tyrannicall government I beleeve the King and Parliament will soon be attoned if any can shew the Parliament by what other way it can discharge its trust and dutie in this constitution of the times without the power it hath assumed But what if it shall appear I should make scruple to use the word shall as if it did not appear alreadie without these weak offers had we not to do with such as seem to have found out some new kind of reason or having antiquated the old which differenced man from irrationall creatures to have substituted passion or idle phantasie in the roome of it the best method indeed for them afterward on as good or the same proportion of reason to advance the power of the King into the place of the power of the whole people or Kingdom it is their own manner of speech and practise as sound and good as their own Method to make such distinction and difference betwixt King and kingdom what if it shall appear time bringing every day truth to light and perhaps even to there men some dilucida intervalla that there is not the least probabilitie that the Parliament can have such a thought of usurpation as these men would impose or seem to suppose much lesse was it ever heard that any free Parliament actually made any the least attempt to that effect so far is it that ever it effected it Whereas on the other side ill Counsell about Princes have attempted oft and de facto sometimes performed the turning of a well poysed or tempered Monarchy into an arbitrarie tyrannicall power and publique oppression by which change such ill instruments appear the onely gainers and the malignant spleen swels in a miserable consumed bodie the head not exempt and yet the very swelling a dangerous disease even to the spleen it self at last Unlesse such monstrous times did priviledge it were high presumption to think it were not all sufficient to stop such mouthes to say it is a Parliament and it were dishonourable for it to do as they calumniate and therefore not to be imagined This maxime or ground being no more to be denied or questioned in this Monarchy then that the earth is round in naturall Philosophy as neer as morrall Philosophy may arrive at naturall in point of certitude though should we grant them that a Parliament may erre nay do wrong to Prince people or particulars yet that would not follow upon this which they would maliciously inferre and ayme at for none but it self or another Parliament were to correct or rectifie what a Parliament should have done amisse and not the King or any other persons any way whatsoever much lesse by force or warre for he that is allowed to judge or correct is allowed thereby at least an equall if equality for such an intent can be conceived sufficient possibly but such equality of power in two distinct Magistrates for so we must distinguish King and Parliament here of different natures and touching one and the same point or matter in controversie cannot be in one and the same state then such a corrector must be allowed superiour and the corrected subordinate but such the King cannot be in our case as above is partly shewed and shall be further afterwards How then can force or warre on his side for this cause be rationall and just nay though it should be but defensive much lesse if offensive or inferred Since even bare resisting the ordinances of the Parliament is or presupposes an assuming of the supreme power to judge and condemne such resistance being the execution of the sentence But we shall not carry it away so easily that the Parliament will not be unjust to any holding such power strong temptations of profit corrupt too oft where one or a few are ordinary Judges as a little water standing sooner is putrified but multitude of these Judges are like the Sea incorruptible But moneys received profits and emoluments accrewing it were a shame not without a certain mixture of presumption to insist on such base imputations here had not frontlesse and monstrous
malice been so incredibly audacious as actually to raise them may make a dividend sufficient to draw to some uniust act each man or the maior part of such a multitude very likely and to draw the more matter of profit we see how by frequent orders they invite private causes and do they give any publique account of the moneys they receive from the people more then the Malignants could have done for Ship-money But we erre they give publique account but it is to get credit onely with the people that they may be in their sinister practises and machinations the lesse suspected and better served But stay how can they have ill ends at all on foot or in agitation since of all their particular actions and proceedings of most moment from time to time they by their Declarations or the like give no lesse then of the moneys an account to the world except they be evident of themselves Should they do that they cannot give reason for but such malicious vigilance as we deal with when it might in particulars charge them and article against them upon truths would never be driven to the base and miserable shifts of these generals and the like most ridiculous impudent transparent calumnies for want of matter to work on and did not the people see clearly they have reason and that their ends are meerly the publique good it would desert them loosing patience upon the sence of the present evils which like the sicknesse which even the best phisick before it can induce a finall setled state of health works in a patient chiefly if disorders during the cure also foment the peccant humours through the malignant traverses of our Calumniators both people and Parliament are of necessitie to passe through and were it not so though the King cannot dissolve the Parliament yet the people possibly might recall their elections in each County since the Parliament doth but populo volenti imperare which if then it doth not do what ever some few inconsiderable and inconsiderate particulars may have attempted here and there it appears the major part at least approves what passeth and that sufficeth but let us take heed we traduce not these traducers they have a more honourable conceit of the Parliament it is not base profit onely but places of honour such as are mentioned in their Propositions to the King or the like they look at and travail for but there may be hope that these that direct correct the Parliament in all things will here tell them that they are out of their way and that their nearest way had been to have complied with the King which seeing these would seem to imagine the Parliament so unjust and dishonourable they need not doubt they would follow and by this course bringing in an arbitrary government in which case as before is said the ill Counsellors especially being authors or instruments of the change carry away the advantage or the gain and spoyls of the people those their places would be farre more imperious absolute arbitrary on the oppressed people we may instance in the Starre-chamber or more beneficiall as lesse obnoxious to strict syndications then they can be the other way they now hold in everie regard so accountable the King in all presumption like to be eagerly vigilant over them and these Malignants themselves grown yet more malicious and venemous if possible by seeing the tables so turned and what they have been thus enormously wicked to compasse possessed by those they hate that may be the instruments to punish them for such their wickednesse besides the Parliaments ever hanging over their heads and so highly interested in the demeanors of those they have made choice of and perhaps the next Parliament may consist of other Members then this present doth and so as strangers to those so chosen lesse subject to favour them if this were any thing to satisfie the insatiate malice of those who under colour of seeming suspicious of the integritie of this Parliament would through the sides of it strike at the heart and authoritie of all future Parliaments so upon the matter by this course the Parliament now holds in such their propositions the people and kingdom are like to be the onely gainers as these publique mischiefs grew from ill Counsellours and Officers But have not some of the principall Worthies of this Parliament quitted or indangered places of greater moment besides the generall losse common I fear to the most or all of them through the neglect of their private affairs whilest they are thus wholly taken up with the publique as their Countreys confessors if not Martyrs then they can any way expect by the course they hold are not examples of such as suffering themselves to be taken off from such services on which they purposely seemed the more sharp that they might be so taken off have grown almost as much in greatnesse thereby as they lost in goodnesse are not such instances as vulgar as the spirits that furnish us with them More might be said and much better herein by better Judgements but a weak one may suffice so strong a cause there being good reason to be short and slight in an argument or point that could afford no just reason to have begun at all did not such monsters of men urge it Lesse can it be conceived that hope intention or fruition of uncontroulled dissolute licentiousnesse or pleasures by means of the capacitie they now stand in or as they are a Parliament can be a motive to them to continue the power or place they have longer then the publique necessitie or good requires or convert it to any other use then it for which they were and are by the people entrusted with such power supposing they were no better then our Calumniators that where there were a motive or cui bono it would prevail with them to do evill had intention of such licentiousnesse been one of the principles that moved them what meant they without any necessitie not onely to give publique significations that they meant to induce a strict reformation of manners but even amid so great and dangerous distractions to begin to set it on foot not without some further danger from those that hate it As for any pleasures they may hereby pretend they seeme to be no other then their indeficient and admirable pains dangers and indignities let me adde and base ingratitudes a blessed condition to fain teares and dangers that they may continue in it their noble constancie judging pro Deo patria dulce periculum for all which whereas it appears they have no earthly reward propounded to them the like may be said of all those that adhere to the Parliament but the conscience of having done nobly in serving God and their Countrey and defending it did the Kingdome give what it could afford it were short of them and it must be an higher kingdome that can indeed equall them and such a change of the kingdome and
no such as our Malignants would have us fear they appear to ayme at and affect and could they would they ayme at a tyranny for themselves what need they have laid such a block in their own wayes as a voluntary oath generally taken for the conservation of the Kings just authoritie and so many Declarations and publique protests to that purpose which they desist not from upon all occasions yet to do when as had not their resolutions been thus fixed divers free late declaring themselves to that effect specially since matters of difference have arrived at this height and the Parliament so strong and so many other circumstances â—itting might have been forborn But to leap over all these barres in imagination for in Reason we never can suppose the Parliament may effect a change of the Monarchy what form of government could they bring in instead of it for they will not say Anarchie nor I deny a mixed government for such is our Monarchy reduced to his right temper Democracy Then through perjury great injustice and danger they pursue their own ruine For Democracy where the people or multitude governs is enemy to the Nobilitie and Gentrie whereof chiefly or solely the Parliament consists bringing all to a parity and making all men alike in power or rather taking away eminent persons quite as envious or jealous of them whereas such have priviledges over the vulgar in a just Monarchy What then doth the Parliament affect Aristocracy where the Nobility or chief govern but the multitude or people whom the Parliament hath been charged to court in which multitude resides or consists the maine strength and who choose the Commons House and must execute chiefly what the Parliament orders without which their orders are nothing after Democracy or Monarchy before Aristocracy And doth not the Parliament as above is said from time to time give particular accounts of their actions to the world doth there appear any previous preparing the way or disposing the people for such a change which were necessarie were it intended at least after so long a time they would have begun to carry their designe outward and the people having found it would more and more have fallen off but we see the contrary and the people every day more and more satisfied and assured of the integritie of their intents But were the two Houses a subject possibly capable of Aristocracy would the Lords of the upper House concurre to it which would reduce each of them to a parity in power with each Member of the House of Commons as Democracy would equall them both with the multitude for unlesse the Lords would loose by granting this should the Commons get any thing if this yet be any thing by this imaginary if possible change yet how could they continue or hold it without the consent of the multitude or people And should the people unanimously concurre to the erecting of this or any other forme of government who should oppose it But how foolish were it for a people to feare that which can never be unlesse it selfe will and the Parliament hath found it a long time strangely infatuated insensible unwilling to stirre till time and experience had given too good attestation to the Parliaments next to divine foresight even when it hath made appeare to them their owne rights liberties and implored defence and could the Parliament presume to finde them to concurre actively to an unjust and unreasonable thing the erecting a new tyranny not without great danger over themselves contrary to the oaths and perpetuall Protestations of the Parliament And the Scots in the like occasion we see did not bring in any of these new governments nay were the Parliament possibly capable of such tyranny yet it being in the hands of such a multitude and that against the good will of the people for so we must here suppose they were easily divided and so the tyranny dissolved especially there never wanting a minor part contrary to the rest and contrarietie being the cause of dissolution but so were not a tyranny in the hands of one and in him established by the good will of a potent faction of malignants unitie which chiefly makes a Monarchy duely tempered the best forme of government as above was said making the arbitrary or tyranny of one upon the same reason as the worst of all so most hardly dissolvible Wee may adde to all that this Parliament having pressed for and obtained trienniall Parliaments whereby their actions and demeanours in this present Parliament are subjected to frequent and certaine examens should or could they give cause and that perhaps by Parliaments consisting of other members then these not to speake of other accidents that may procure such a change should the people not be satisfied with what these doe in this present Parliament it plainely argues that out of the clearenesse of their intentions actions and consciences they are content nay desire to leave their actions to the censure of any their persons as concerning future elections to the opinion of the people upon their demerits if the King please not to come among them and looke to their doings as they desire If then upon these reasons and much more that might be offered the Parliament cannot have any such end of establishing in themselves any arbitrary tyranny or of their owne private emolument with the hurt of their Countreys What can their ayme be all this while but the publique good the just defence and asserting of their Countreys rights and honour by the just regulating and reducing the Monarchy to the due temper which is all the change of the government they seeme to affect the same holds in all those that adhere to the Parliament and in it desert not themselves from which it had especially through want of due Parliaments exorbitated so dangerously that had not this like another Moses beene sent by our gracious God to redeeme or rescue us rather then to defend us and that with an out-stretched arme forcing the malignants to it who as they ever shunned it by all meanes now deadly hate it as fearing it and in that feare confessing tacitly that same politick omnipotence of it which is now asserted a worse then Aegyptian servitude in humane probabilitie had overwhelmed us and consequently the true principle or end that moves the malignants cannot be a true feare of any arbitrary power to be established in the Parliament though they so pretend to divert us by foolishly fearing an imaginary impossible danger from looking to and timely opposing the true reall danger imminent and evident nay to draw us to concurre to the bringing of it in with our own hands which is an arbitrary government at discretion which the malignants themselves would establish and that by a civill warre to the ruine of all that is precious with honest men or men of honour They have had such power in manner already in their hands and that which the King is induced by them to
made those knowne Lawes never heard of so never provided against But by proportion of reason this Parliament may and ought as well provide by new Ordinances or orders for such new evills as they encounter as the former did for what they then met with for they had their originall also ex malis moribus bâ—nae leges and had those times had such causes offered as these have they would have provided remedies of a nature like those this Parliament hath done the power and generall intentions of all times or the universall ground being still the same that is to defend and vindicate or procure the publique good and to tye them to the knowne or old Lawes in this case where the letter might kill were irrationall for so the first breaker of the Lawes might take the priviledge of the Lawes and advantage of his owne wrong and under the colours of the Lawes fight against and overthrow them or the rule reason or intention that caused them at first If it be said nothing was done by the King of publique consequence but by advice of the Judges it may be answered that the Parliament is the onely competent Counsell Judge in cases neerely concerning the publique and people in generall which the King is entrusted upon such occasions to call that the whole people may not but upon extraordinary causes be troubled to elect for Parliaments and attend that service But in such a case as ours by virtue of the legislative power residing in the Parliament it may make new Ordinances at least for the time as it sees occasion and judges to be in order to that supreame and immutable Law or Law of Lawes and end of them all Salus populi suprema lex and that power even of making new Lawes is ever upon the matter in both Houses of Parliament and that even when the King keepes himselfe within his due bounds and is assistant in Parliament how much more then as before is shewed if he shall by exorbitating dangerously bring himselfe within the compasse of our case and that the Kings consent to what the Parliament propounds to him to be enacted for Law ought not to be denyed may appeare by comparing this following part of the Oath which the Kings of England at their Coronation take or ought to take cited in the Remonstrance of the 26th of May in haec verba Concedis justas leges consuetudines esse tenendas permittis per te eas esse protegendas ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas vulgus elegerit secundum vires tuas Respondebit Rex Permitto concedo Comparing this part of the Oath with the clause of the preamble of a Statute there also cited intimating that the King is bound by his oath to remedy by Law such inconveniences as the Kingdome may suffer in the future as well as to keepe and protect Lawes already in being for then either those Latine words here cited or some part of them and that the latter namely Quas vulgus elegerit are to be understood of Lawes futurely to be made or else it cannot be shewed by what part of the Oath as the said preamble affirmes the King is bound by Law to remedy the mischiefs that happen from time to time to his Realme Nor will the Lawes of Grammer or use of speech or custome of phrase tolerate that Elegerit without the conjunction Si or the like preceding or regulating it though we passe not by unconsidered the rude speaking of those times can ever be taken for Elegit the preterperfect tense but as it stands in the fore-cited place must of necessitie participate a future nature and signifie precisely shall have chosen that is that the King assumeth to confirme such Lawes as the people shall have chosen it being to be conceived that the people or Parliament first amongst themselves must have debated of chosen and agreed upon them before they present them to the King to be confirmed Besides if those cited words Et permittis per te esse protegendas ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas populus elegerit should not referre to future elections but to past onely they were superfluous and vaine the words precedent Concedis justas leges consuctudines esse tenendas which presuppose necessarily and cannot be understood without a precedent election and consent of the people to them expressing sufficiently Lawes and customes elected already confirmed and in use And the Kings answer to these cited words being bimembris or two-fold Concedo permitto all the other answers of the King to the other Questions in the Oath cited in the said Remonstrance because the questions are meerely simple and single conteined in one word only as to one question onely Servabo to another onely faciam being also single and in one word argues the question to be double as is said And that the King is not bound onely in generall thus to remedy the particular wayes or meanes left to his choice see the said Remonstrance folio 8. which ought to have it selfe sufficed without such poore gleanings as these or the like If then by these and other better reasons which others have presented the Parliament hath such a legislative power even where the King dischargeth his office as upon the matter to make such Lawes as it judgeth best for the publique good where through the prevalence of ill men about him it is not done but the contrary and so the danger is from him shall not power be in them to make new Ordinances or provisionall Lawes for the timely remedying such publique mischiefs at least for the time and to suspend some of those in being if they judge fit How much more then to judge of declare or interpret those that seeme dubious ranging and making all to be subservient to the supreame Law Salus populi the rule and reason of all Lawes as was ever intended at the making of all particular Lawes Hath not even the Lord Chancellour a little touch of such a power upon the Common Law What then may we thinke a Parliament hath and that when the very publique is in danger And if the whole people unanimously consenting upon a Princes not performing what he is bound unto may possibly change the very forme of that limitted government which it first instituted how much more may it conserve or defend that temper or kinde of government which it hath erected by regulating the enormities of the Prince by maintaining and holding what they have reserved out of that which was all theirs at the first or their owne rights How many degrees then are they off from being bound to become themselves the instruments to overthrow them how strongly are they bound to the contrary And indeed were not the Parliament the supreame Judge in all the said questions or of like nature if we may call it a Parliament at all not having this power it could not possibly save the people when ill men
prevailing upon the King would oppresse it for while they carry on by degrees and mature by little and little such their mysticall and pernicious designes which must be met with betimes in such tender and jealous matters before they advance and grow strong when caution comes too late and opposition out of season doth but exasperate and increase the evill they will cause the King by fit instruments for the purpose to pronounce judge or interpret each such degree or gaining a new and further point still lawfull and not subject to question however dangerous to the people in it self and of worse consequence till the mysterie at last unmask and all be desperate It may be superadded that should the Parliament be more jealous of the Prince then there were reason which yet as I hope hath appeared is not to be imagined of the wisdom and Justice of the Parliament yet it were the farre lesse evill that the Prince being but for the people should somewhat suffer by such the Parliaments jealousie which were but peccare in meliorem securiorem partem then that by the Parliaments too much security and beleeving in the Prince the people or whole kingdome should be endangered or oppressed for whose good they both are ordeined as means for the end Besides that the authority and politique infallibilitie of the Parliament must be by all that love their Countrey not blemished but held sacred and inviolate as supreame The King indeed saith he will defend and maintain the Laws Liberties properties of Subjects just priviledges of Parliament but even in saying this he seems to violate them if the thereby assume the supreame Judgement of them to himself which as already partly hath appeared and further hereafter may do cannot be Admit this Trojan horse into your walls allow this all of them may easily resolve into nothing Consider well what Judgement hath been made of the Laws the libertie the property of the Subject before this Parliament whilest a future Parliament was doubted and feared and therefore kept off as long as these Malignants could but their fear and hate shews what we ought ardently to desire and love whilest so many Monopolies Loane Conduct Coat Ship-money and the like grievances were brought upon us our persons not going Scotfree as consisting well and compatible with our laws liberties properties and adjudged lawfull which yet what did they or ere long going on at least would they have wanted of making them all meerly at discretion pleasure and will the meer names of such things remaining and used indeed as Trophees of their Conquest and monuments of our quondam felicity and at leasure to be lamented folly and eternall shame The danger of our Religion is not forgotten because not ranked in mention with the rest it shall have a better place by it self as a Queen sitting alone The Judgement made of priviledges of Parliament during this Parliament seem to have come little short of the Judgements made of our liberties properties c. and if it be duely weighed First that they will have the King to be judge of them then what Judgement hath been lately made both in fact and in words or Declarations of them a man meanly penetrant will find them resolved by the positions of these Malignants into next to nothing and all this while the Parliament was and is in vigour vindicates and asserts them and likely to call these men to account what will they make of them should they through the authority and reputation of this Parliament which is the essence of it peirce at once the heart of all future for a Parliament not free were no Parliament and if the King be allowed judge of priviledges of Parliament where any new case happens which may touch the very essence of it if it be any thing else then the priviledges will it not come to this that the Judges he appoints or rather such instruments as the Malignants about him please to set over us shall upon the matter judge the Parliament which is to Judge their Judges making it and the Laws what they please and to restrain the power and freedome of it as of the Laws as they think fit whereupon would follow even the same inconveniences which were before mentioned supposing the King the supreame Judge of the Laws namely that the Parliament should be disenabled to defend the people or indeed it self if incroached on or oppressed upon the same reasons in that place expressed But it seems more rationall that since the Parliament is to be Judge of the Laws as is above shewed nay even may make them at least in some cases it may judge as well of its own priviledges neither appears it in the Kings power to make them what he pleases save onely thus if he doth not exorbitate nor innovate any thing against them neither can the Parliament desire any alteration of them in any point betwixt it and the King concerning them But in case of extraordinarie emergents of never-before-heard of attempts on his part whither by any verball declaration or by fact whereby the priviledges authority or very being for it may trouble a good School-man to distinguish clearly betwixt these three it self of the Parliament is indangered it is reason that the priviledges now become any thing that the Parliament judges fit for the conservation of it self For the maine end and intent of the first ancient ordinary and usuall priviledges of Parliament being to enable and qualifie it for the due attending defending or advancing the publique good for which purpose they were judged sufficient by the first Institutors not suspecting such new invasions or attempts on them or on Parliaments as since have happened in more corrupted times but thinking them rather secure as part of the Laws or customes which Kings are bound to keep inviolate why should not the same end and intent which ever remains in equall force immortall and immovable work and move as well to the instituting even of new ones if new causes happen and without such new ones the Parliament shall remain disenabled to procure the publique good for which it was ordained and if the Parliament may in extraordinarie times as now make new Ordinances for the conservation of the people it may make if need require new Ordinances or Priviledges which are but the private Laws of or concerning the Parliament for its own conservation without which they cannot defend or conserve the people and in vain had it power to make new Ordinances upon new occasions for the publique good if it have no inherent power to make new priviledges or ordinances upon new emergent dangers to save it self Posse naturally and necessarily presupposing Esse as grounded on it Qui dat finem dat necessaria ad finem the priviledges being to defend and maintain the Parliament as the Laws the people and as Salus populi is lex suprema as before so it may as well be said Salus Parliamenti supremum