now mentioned It is but an Opinion against a Solemn Resolution of all the twelve Judges I find that some who had transgress'd that Act of 23 H. 6. and had continued above one Year in that Office of Sheriff soon after the making of that Act did not think themselves secure against the Penalty of that Act by any Non obstante from the King but procur'd an Act of Parliament to indempnifie them for what they had done for by another Act made the 28th of the same King Henry the Sixth it is ordain'd that the Sheriffs for the Year then last past should be quit and discharged against the King and his People of the Penalties of the 200 l. which they incurr'd by the Statute of 23 H. 6. by Exercising the Office of Sheriff longer than a Year from the day next after the day of all All-Souls on which day by the Statute a new Election was to have been made I have one great Authority more and that is of an Act of Parliament too which in my judgment clearly proves against this Resolution of the twelve Judges in the time of 2 H. 7. that the King had no such Prerogative to dispence with the Sheriff's continuing in his Office longer then a Year But that the only dispensing Power was in the King and Parliament as I have affirm'd and in the King when any Special Act of Parliament shall for a time limitted enable him so to dispence And it is an Act in the time of a wise and powerful King who would not lose his Prerogative where he had right to it It is the Statute of 9 H. 5. c. 5. in the Statutes at large this Statute recites the Statute of 14 E. 3. whereby it was ordain'd that no Sheriff should continue in his Office above a Year And it recites further that whereas at the making of that Statute there were divers valiant and sufficient persons I suppose it is ill translated valiant and it should have been men of value in every County of England to exercise the said Office well towards the King and his People But by reason of divers Pestilences within the Realm and Wars without the Realm there was not now such sufficiency of such persons It is therefore ordained that the King by Authority of this Parliament of 9 H. 5. may make the Sheriffs through the Realm at his will until the end of four Years notwithstanding the said Statute made 14 E. 3. or any other Statute or Ordinance made to the contrary Here the King is entrusted with the Power and that but for a short time in the very Case of continuing Sheriffs in their Offices longer than a Year and that in a case of great and absolute necessity and this by a Special Act of Parliament which plainly shews he could not do it by any Prerogative he had of dispensing for then he would never have taken it under an Act of Parliament What ground therefore the Judges had in the second Year of Henry the Seventh to adjudge it to be a Prerogative in that King I cannot see and that Resolution is the leading Case to all the Opinions that have been delivered in the Point since that time and the Opinions still justifie themselves by that one first Resolve and cite that for their great Authority That Opinion seems to be delivered upon a sudden Question put to the Judges by the King's Council not argued nor deliberated on nor upon any Case that came Judicially before them and the Judges there take notice only of two ancient Statutes viz. 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. both which barely forbid the Sheriffs to continue longer than a Year in their Office but no Penalty is imposed and the Earl of Northumberland's Case had a Non Obstante in it only to these two Statutes as appears by the Abridgement of that Case by Patent's Case 109. So that they did but ad pauca respicere de facili pronunciare But they do not take the least notice of the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. which makes the disability nor do the Judges in that Case give that reason for their Judgment as Sir E. C. hath since found out to justifie it viz. His Prerogative inseparable c. Something may be observed from the time when that strange Resolution pass'd Judicis Officium est ut res ita tempora rerum querere It was in 2 Henry the Seventh in the beginning of the Reign of that King who stood high upon his Title and Power if we may believe a late Historian Mr. Buck. in his History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third who in his Second Book fol. 54. discourses likewise of King Henry the Seventh and his Title to the Crown says of him That he seemed to wave all other Titles and stuck to that of his Sword and Conquest and at his Coronation he caused Proclamation to be made with these Titles Henricus Rex Anglioe Jure divino Jure humano June belli c. Which yet the Barons could not agree to tho' the King peremptorily avowed he might justly assume it having as a Conquerour entred the Land fought for the Crown and won it The Barons answered says the Historian as peremptorily That he was beholding to them both for his Landing and Victory But the more they opposed it the more he insisted upon it Now that King that made his Title by Conquest might carve out to himself what Prerogatives he pleased And who durst dispute it with him And this probably might have some influence upon that Resolution of the Judges being so early after his Claim viz. 2 H. 7. But I find Sir E Coke a Chief Justice of great Learning and of as great Integrity taking up the same Opinion It is in the Reports that go by the Name of Sir Coke's 12 Rep. fol. 18. No Act says he can bind the King from any Prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his Person but that he may dispense with it by a Non Obstante as a Soveraign Power to Command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick-weal and he instances in that of a Sheriff and quotes the Resolution of the Judges of 2 H. 7. and urges that of Judges of Assize that they may go Judges of Assize in the Counties where they were born or did inhabit if the King dispense with it by a special Non Obstante But he gives another instance which I presume none in these days will subscribe to and if he mistook himself in this instance he may be supposed to mistake and err in all the rest Purveyance says he for the King and his Houshold is incident solely and inseparably to the Person of the King And for this Cause the Act of Parliament of Henry the Third de tallagio non concedendo which barrs the King wholly of Purveyance is says he void If this be Law what a Case are the Subjects in that have given a
Recompence by a Revenue of Inheritance in part of the Excise to the King in lieu of Purveyances It is sober Advice given by Learned Grotius in his Book De Jure Belli pacis 82. Let us not says he approve of all things tho' delivered by Authors of greatest Name for they often serve the Times or their Affections and bend the Rules as occasion requires This Resolution of all the Judges in the Second of Henry the Seventh is again cited in Calvin's Case in Sir Coke's Seventh Report and there a Reason is given to justifie that Resolution which is not so much as touch'd upon in the Report itself of 2 H. 7. but it has been studied and found out since that Resolution viz. That an Act cannot barr the King of such Service of his Subject which the Law of Nature did give him And this is the main Reason insisted on in the late Judgment given in Sir Hales's Case as I am informed which is the only Case that I find which came to be argued upon the very point yet it was but lightly spoken to for that of 2 H. 7. which is the first of the kind was not upon a Case that came Judicially before the Judges but was upon a Consultation only with the Judges and without Argument Nor in any other Authorities that I have cited grounded upon that Resolution of 2 H. 7. did the Point directly come in question Judicially And Calvin's Case is the first that I find which offers this special Reason viz. That no Act of Parliament can restrain the King from commanding the Service of his Subject but it is an inseparable Prerogative in the King and as Sir E. C. speaks in his 12 Rep. Tho' an Act makes the King's Patent void and tho' the King be restrained to grant a Non Obstante by the express words of the Act and tho' the Grantee is disabled by the Act to take the Office yet the King says Sir Edward Coke may by his Royal Soveraign Power of Commanding command a man by his Patent to serve him and the Weal-Publick in the Office of Sheriff for Years or for Life And this the King may do for such Causes as he in his Wisdom shall think meet and profitable for himself and the Common-weal of which he himself is solely Judge says Sir E. C. So tho' the King and Parliament have adjudged and declared by a Law such a person or such a sort of persons to be altogether unfit for such a Service or Office. As for Example They have adjudged Papists who own a Forreign Authority and Jurisdiction and who hold Doctrines destructive and contrary to the Religion Established in this Kingdom to be very unfit and uncapable of being entrusted with the maintaining of the Government and the Religion Established by Law in this Kingdom Yet according to late Opinions and Resolutions tho' the King himself by the Advice of his Great Council have so adjudged and declared yet he may do otherwise and he may employ a Papist to defend the Protestant Religion and he is the sole Judge of the fitness of Persons for his Service This is the Discourse this is the Argument and Reason used Will this Reason be allowed of shall the King be the sole Judge of the Persons fit to serve him in all Cases and is it an inseparable Power and Prerogative in the Person of the King I shall put a Case wherein the Judges depart from this Opinion and appear to be of another mind In the Lord Anderson's Reports the 2d Part 118. It is there said If an Office in the King's-Bench or Common-Pleas be void and the placing of the Officer belongs to the King if the King grant it to a person not able to execute it the Grant is void as 't is there held by many of the Justices And there a Case is cited out of 5 E. 4. rot 66. where one Tho. Wynter was placed by the King in the Office of Clerk of the Crown in the King's-Bench The Judges before the King himself did declare him to be Inhabilem ad Officium illud pro commodo Regis populi sui Exercendum and he was laid by and one Roger West at the commendation of the Judges was put in Will any man presume to say the person is unfit when the King who is the sole Judge of the fitness of persons to serve him hath adjudg'd him fit yes the Judges in a Case that concerns the Courts where they sit it seems will controul the King 's own judgment and judge the person inhabilis and hold the Grant void in such case To compare our present Case with this The King and Parliament by a Law have adjudged the Papists unfit to be entrusted with the Government and with the preserving of the Reform'd Religion but says the Judges if the King without the Parliament judge otherwise his judgment shall prevail why not as well in the case of an Office in the Courts at Westminster which does belong to the King to dispose of as in an Office that immediately concerns the Safety of the King and Kingdom and the great concernment of Religion So here is one Command of the Kings set up in opposition to another Command of the King. A Command of the King upon private advice or it may be possible gained from him by surprize by an importunity or an undue solicitation against a serious solemn deliberate Command of the King upon advice with his great Council and with the Consent of the whole Kingdom this is the very Case before us This is against all reason and against the Examples of the greatest wisest and most absolute of Kings and Princes who commanded their Judges to have no regard to any Commands of theirs that were contrary to Law. Vinius the Civilian in his Commentary on the Imperial Institutes fol. 16. gives this Rule Rescripta Principum contra Jus vel utilitatem publicam Elicita à Judicibus improbari etiam ipsorum Imperatorum constitutionibus jubentur Princeps non creditur says he aliquid velle contra utilitatem publicam concedere 21 H. 8. c. 13. sect 10 11 27. Dispensations for Pluralities contrary to Act are declared to be void Hob. 82 149 146 155. The King is never by Law supposed ill affected but abused and deceived for Eadem praesumitur mens Regis quae est Juris Grotius de Jure belli pacis 112 113. Amongst the Persians the King was Supreme yet he took an Oath at his entrance and it was not lawful for him to change certain Laws made after a particular form If the King Establish the Decree and Sign the Writing it may not be changed according to the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not as we read in the Book of Daniel 6 Dan. 8. 12 15. By the Act of 2 E. 3. c. 8. it is accorded and established that it shall not be commanded by the Great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or
liberty to the Judge he is the best Judge that takes least liberty to himself Therefore where any new Law sits uneasie and too hard and heavy in some particular cases it were much safer to suffer the mischief for a time if any such happen and let it wait till those that gave the wound come to cure it Una eademque manus vulnus opemque feret The overhasty cure arising from the impatience of enduring pain makes the case the worse frequency of Parliaments is a proper cure Other ways of cure are apt to cause infrequency of Parliaments And in Matters of great difficulty which come before the Judges in the Courts of Westminster or if there be no great difficulty yet if it be of mighty concernment and not clearly concurring with the intent and words of Law-makers but the Law in the scope of it is like to be frustrated by an hasty determination it is under favour the Duty of the Judges in such Cases of Dubitaciones Judicior ' to rest till the Parliament meet and then to propose it to the Parliament for their resolution Thus it is expresly provided in the Statute of Treasons 25 E. 3. to defer doubtful Cases till the Parliament resolve them being in a matter of so high concernment as that of Treason And in Cases of much lesser consequences especially upon a new Law as that is that we have before us in several Cases cited in Blackamore's Case the Judges have sought to the Parliament for a Resolution in smaller matters 8 Rep. 158. In doubts arising before the Judges in their Courts upon the Construction of Acts of Parliament the Judges resorted to the Council which is there said to be meant of the great Council the Parliament that made the Act in the Case there cited The Question did arise upon the Statute of 14 E. 3. c. 6. which gives power to Courts to amend Misprisions of Clerks in Process in writing a Letter or Syllable too much or too little But whether these words in the Act gave power to amend where there was a whole Word too much or too little was the Question and the Lords declared 39 E. 3. 21. that their meaning was that in such Cases the Process should be amended this shews the tenderness of the Judges in those times in construction of new Acts of Parliament and the frequency of Parliaments and the resort still had to them in case of Doubts And this was in the time of E. 3. the most flourishing time of the Law and a Case that the then Archbishop said had no great difficulty in it But I presume it will be said against me that this is a clear Case in Law which is now before us and that there was no doubt nor difficulty in it but that the King by his Prerogative could dispence with this Act of 25 Car. 2. and that all the twelve Judges but one or two was of that opinion and that the Point hath formerly been resolv'd in the Case of Continuing a Sheriff in his Office longer than one Year notwithstanding the several Acts of Parliament to the contrary and that was so resolv'd by all the Justices in the Exchequer Chamber 2 H. 7. and by the opinion of Sir Edward Coke 12 Rep. 18. and repeated in Calvin's Case 7 Rep. 14. which are the only Authorities that come home to the Case and none of them ancient Before I speak to these Authorities in the Case of Dispensing with a Sheriff to continue longer than a Year I shall make it appear that the Case now in question or the Point in Law of this Case was very much doubted if not clearly held on the contrary that the King could not dispence with this Act of 25 Car. 2. and that by no mean Judgments If the King could have dispens'd with it by his Prerogative and it had been so clear what need was there of his Majesty's proposing it to the two Houses at the opening of a Session to allow him a Power of Dispensing with this Law or that they themselves would dispence with it why would the two Houses after long debate about it excuse themselves from consenting to that which the King could do without them were there no Judges that did scruple the doing of it If it were a Prerogative in the King how came it to be so long before the King 's learned Council could start it we heard nothing of this till all other ways were tryed Let me add to this what was spoken by the late King 's own command and direction in the House of Lords before the King and both Houses and all the Judges present by a late Lord Chancelor who as he was an excellent Orator so he was a very learned Lawyer and my honourable Friend It was in his Speech made to both Houses the Twenty third of May 1678. about five Years after the making of this Act of 25 Car. 2. and it was spoken in reference to this very Act of Parliament Hath not the late Act says he made it impossible absolutely impossible for the most concealed Papist that is to get into any kind of Employment And did ever any Law since the Reformation give us so great a security as this Hereupon in the same Speech that noble Lord does declare it now a stale Project to undermine the Government by accusing it of endeavouring to introduce Popery that a man would wonder to see it taken up again This Law had so abundantly secured us against the Danger of it And yet after all this do we hear the Judges openly and judicially declaring that it appear'd to them to be a very plain case that the King alone could dispence with this Act of Parliament by his Prerogative and tho' it was acknowledged to be a Case of great consequence as the truth is yet it was pronounc'd withal to be of as little difficulty as ever any Case was that raised so great an expectation These are strong Arguments to prove the Doubtfulness of it after all these Refusals or Hesitations it might very well be accounted a Doubt or Difficulty worthy to be referr'd to the judgment of the Parliament if the Parliament had not already in effect given their judgment to the contrary As I remember it was in February 1663. that the two Houses made an Address to the last King for revoking a Declaration whereby his late Majesty had granted a Toleration and Indulgence to some Protestant Dissenters as being against Law and such a Toleration was declared illegal by the Parliament in 1672. These are two Resolutions in the point by the Supream Judicature If this Prerogative of Dispensing with Acts of Parliament were in the Crown by Prescription as it ought to be if it were a legal Prerogative it ought then to be confin'd and limitted to such cases only wherein it had been anciently and frequently excercised and there ought to be no extension of Cases where they are depending upon
and where it is a collateral Suit not depending upon that Record An Action against the Sheriff for an Escape of one taken in Execution this is a dependant Action and is grounded upon the Record of the Judgment given against the Party that escap'd The Sheriff cannot aver any thing against that Record and examine it over again nor can he take any advantage of Error or erroneous proceeding in obtaining that Judgment Saunders Rep. 2 part 101. So in an Action of Debt grounded upon a Judgment or in an Audita quaerela to be reliev'd upon a Judgment And so in our Case this Action of Debt for the 500 l. is grounded upon the Conviction which must stand for truth as long as it remains in force not avoided by Error or Attaint A Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment is a dependant Action In error the Plaintiff may not averr any thing against the Record Mullens versus Weldy Siderfin's 1st part 94. Error was sued in the Kings-Bench to reverse a Judgment given in the Palace-Court And the Plaintiff in Error assign'd for Error that the Duke of Ormond who is principal Judge of that Court by Patent was not there It was agreed by the Court that it might not be assign'd for Error for it was contrary to the Record But per Cur. in an Action of Trespass or false Imprisonment which says that Report are collateral Actions he may falsifie and assign that if he be taken upon such Judgment So if a man be indicted and convict of an Assault and Battery and afterwards the person so assaulted brings his Action for the Battery this hath no dependance upon the Indictment or Conviction for it may be sued though there were no Indictment but is a distinct and collateral Suit. The Indictment and Verdict is no Estoppel nor can so much as be given in Evidence as is held by the whole Court in the Case of Sampson versus Yardley and Tothill 19 Car. 2. B. R. Kebles's 2 part 384. The like in an Appeal of Murder Kebele's 2 part 223. Another Penalty upon the Offender against this Statute of 25 Car. 2. is That he shall be disabled to sue in any Action Now suppose a person convict at the Assizes sues an Action may not the Defendant in that Action take the advantage of that Disability and plead the Conviction As in Case of an Outlawry pleaded in Disability there need not be set forth all the proceedings in that Suit wherein the Plaintiff was outlawed but he may plead the Record of the Outlawry and rely upon it and it shall not be examin'd whether there was any just cause to sue him to the Outlawry or not The Indictment the Defendant's Plea to it and the Verdict upon it have determin'd the matter of Fact that the Defendant is guilty of the Offence against this Act of Parliament The Act it self hath pronounc'd the Judgment which consists of many particulars one whereof is That the Defendant shall forfest 500 l. to him that will sue for it And the Action of Debt for the 500 l. brought by the Plaintiff grounded upon all these is in the nature of an Execution And all these put together are not several and distinct Suits but in effect all but one Suit and Process one depending upon the other The second Point is Whether the Dispensation pleaded by the Defendant be a good Bar to the Action of Debt And this is properly called The Matter in Law and the great Point of the Case for which I refer the Reader to my Argument at large POSTSCRIPT BEING SOME Animadversions UPON A Book writ by Sir EDW. HERBERT Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas ENTITULED A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Hales's Case SINCE the finishing of my Argument about the Power of Dispensing with Paenal Statutes a Book came to my hands touching the same subject entituled A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Edward Hales his Case written by Sir Edward Herbert Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in vindication of himself And although I am of opinion that the substance of all the Arguments contained in the said Book are fully answered in my aforesaid Discourse yet I hold it necessary to make some Animadversions upon the said Book and to point out readily to the Reader the several Pages of my Discourse wherein the Arguments of the Chief Justice are more directly and particularly treated of and answered And there being great Reverence justly due to a Person that bears so high a Character as also to a Judgment given in that Superiour Court of the King's Bench and by advice of all but two of the rest of the Judges as I now hear some short Apology had need be used for that freedom I have taken to animadvert upon it being as I am but in a private station In short therefore I have not undertaken it out of any vain conceit of my own Abilities but out of a sincere desire to inform such as in the approaching Parliament are like to have this great Case in Judgment before them and some may possibly not be at leisure as I have been to study the Case the matter being of a mighty importance Nor have I entred the Lists upon any contentious humour or taking any advantage of the late Happy Change of publick Affairs I am I thank God more inclin'd to commiserate the Distress that may befal any persons by the change of the times it having been my own case so lately although they differ from me in Judgment or Interest I am very far from insulting over any whatever hard usage I my self have met with Nemo confidat nimiûm secundis Nemo desperet meliora lapsus My Apology is this 1. I was engaged in the Argument before the coming forth of this Book and it happening into my hands before my publishing of my Discourse I could not decline the observing something upon it without being suspected to have given up the Cause 2. The Lord Chief Justice himself hath by his Book given fresh occasion fairly to discuss the point again by declaring that he expects as we all do that it will receive a disquisition in Parliament 3. And as the Chief Justice hath endeavour'd with as much as can be said to give the World satisfaction in the justice and right of the Case to maintain the Judgment given so he is well known to be of that ingenuity and good temper and candour as willing to receive a satisfaction if any further Argument to the contrary may be so happy as to convince him The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 6. gives us the Definition of a Dispensation out of Sir Coke's 11th Report fol. 88. viz. Dispensatio mali prohibiti est de jure Domino Regi concessa propter impossibilitatem praevidendi de omnibus particularibus And again Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxacio utilitate ceu
1 Hen. 4. num 91. that Judgment against Sir Thomas Haxey was revers'd As for the distinction pag. 30. of a Disability actually incuri'd before the medling in an Office and where the Disability is prevented by the coming of a Dispensation I answer That its being so prevented is but Peticio Principii and a begging of the Question And to this Distinction I have I think fully spoken in the foregoing Argument fol. 40. The late Parliament in making this Act of 25 Car. 2. had no doubt a prospect that probably the Crown would discend upon a Popish Successor and they levelled this Act against the Dangers that might then befal our Religion and Liberties and they thought it a good Security But it is all vanished and come to nothing by occasion of this Judgment in the Case of Sir Edward Hales And that must be justified by a Fiat Justitia As to the Objection that the Chief Justice fancies might have been made against him or advice given him that he should rather have parted with his place than to have given a Judgment so prejudicial to the Religion he professes pag. 33. This I say that for my part I should never have advis'd him to have parted with his Place much less to have given a Judgment against his own Opinion But let his Opinion be what it was yet seeing the clear intention of the Makers of the Law contrary to that his Opinion and knowing the desperate effects and consequences that would follow upon dispensing with that Act for we were upon the brink of destruction by it and taking notice as this Chief Justice and the rest of the Judges needs must that the King had first endeavour'd to have gain'd a Dispensing Power in thismatter from both Houses which was the fair and legal course and that yet that very Parliament which out of too great a compliance with those times had over-look'd so many Grievances and conniv'd at the King 's taking and collecting of the Customs though in truth the Collectors and all that had any hand in the receiving of them incurr'd a Praemunire by it not to mention the ill Artifice used in gaining the Excise yet that Parliament of the King 's boggled at the Dispensing with the Act of 25 Car 2. knowing the mighty Importance of it And though they could not but take notice that so many Judges at once had been remov'd because they could not swallow this Bitter Pill and others brought into their places as might be justly suspected to serve a Turn and the King 's Learned Councel could not at first find out this Prerogative to do his work with till so many ways had been attempted and all proved ineffectual sure in such circumstances it had been Prudence nay the Duty of the Judges to have referr'd the determination of it to a Parliament and the rather because it was to expound a Law newly made and the consequences so dreadful and the intent of the Law-makers so evident And this hath been frequently practis'd by Judges in Cases of far less difficulty and concernment This I have also enlarged upon in my Argument page 26. Object But it might have been a long time before any Parliament had been called Answ. We ought to have Parliaments once a year and oftner if need be and eadem praesumitur esse mens Regis quae Legis and we then stood in great need of a Parliament even for the sake of this very Case And these hasty Judgments are one ill Cause why Parliaments meet no oftner the Work of Parliaments is taking out of their hands by the Judges And it is the Interest of some great Officers that Parliaments should not be called or else be hastily prorogu'd or adjourn'd As to the point of the feigned Action which the Lord Chief Justice seems to justifie I conceive he mistakes the force of the Objection Feigned Actions may be useful but this Action against Sir Edward Hales is suspected not only to have been feigned and brought by Covin between him and his Servant and Friend but it was feignedly and faintly prosecuted and not heartily and stoutly defended Like the practice of common Fencers who play for a Prize they seem to be in good earnest and look very fierce but agree before-hand not to hurt one another Qui cum ita pugnabat tanquam se vincere Nollet Aegre est devictus proditione suâ This solemn Resolution was given upon a few short Arguments at the Bar and without any at the Bench and upon other Reasons as I have heard which were then made use of are now given by the Chief Justice but the Times will not now bear them After all I intend not by this to do the Office of an Accuser nor to charge it as a Crime But as I think my self bound in Duty on the behalf of the whole Nation of my self though a small part and member of it and of my Friends I humbly propose That the Judgment given in Sir Edward Hales his Case may after a due Examination if there be found cause be legally Revers'd by the House of Lords and that Reversal approv'd of and confirm'd by a special Act of Parliament FINIS Declaration Plea. Order The Act of 25 Car. 2. Of the Law in general Of a Dispensation Of this particular Act of 25 Car. 2. Dangers from Papists to the Protestants The Test. Judgment given by Parliament The Pishop of Winchester's Collections Of Law in general Laws made by consent of the People * Grotius de Jure Bell. pacis f. 151. †King James the Firstin his Speech to the Lords and Commons at White-hall 1609. f. 531. 25 H. 8. c. 21. ‖ Leges nulla alia causa nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae sunt Ulpian de Lege 32. Tum Demum Leges humanae habent vim suam cum fuerint non modo institutae sed etiam firmatae approbatione Communitatis Sir Wal. Ral. in his Hist. of the World 245. * Fol. 531. Mr. Hooker Fol. 17. Non eget Mauri jaculis nec Arcu The original of Dispensation Instances of Dispensation The Definition of a Dispensation The Original of Dispensation * Marsilius Patavinus in the 14 Cent. of Padua in his Defensor pacis It s Antiquity ‖ Dr. Barrow of the Pope's Supremacy 316. See there the unreasonableness of Dispensations †Anno 1215. Pag. 646 647. Mat. Paris p. 677. * Sir Cotton's Abridgment of the Records of the Tower amongst the Petitions of the Commons 51 E. 3. Numb 62. Dispensations from Rome are said to be the chief Grief Prinn's Second Tome Fol. 504. Ibidem 760. Innocent 4th * Dr. Barrotti in the Pope's Supremacy 31. L. 3. c. 3. sect 10. Fol. 39. * Sir Ed. Coke 2 Inst. 27. No Law or Custom of England can be annul'd but by Act of Parliament Selden's Dissertatio ad Fletam 539. Fol. 775. The King and Parlialiament have the Power of Dispensing The Statute of Dispensation The Preamble No Prescription The time of Limitation in a Writ of Right is limited to the time of R. I. Where the true Power of Dispensing resides 15 R. 2. nu 8. 2 H. 4. nu 26. R. 2. nu 22 17 R. 2. 34. 2 H. 4. nu 63. * Hob. 157. at the lower end It is the Office of Judges to advance Laws made for Religion according to their end tho' the words be short and imperfect †Sir Ro. Cott. Abridg. 1 R. 2. nu 95. 2. Inst. 408. * 39 E. 3. 21. 40 E. 3. 34. Objection * 12 H. 7. 19. Plowden 319 322. * Sir Moor's Reports 239. Warram's Case A Prerogative that tends to the great prejudice of the Subject is not allowable Croke Jac. 385. The same Case * 14 E. 3. c. 7. That by their trusting to tarry in their Office by procurement they are encouraged to do many Oppressions to the People 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. 1 R. 2. c. 11 †Sir Cotton's Abr. 18 E. 3. nu 54. Objection Answer * 1 H. 4. c. 6. †11 E. 3. c. 1. 13 H. 7. 8. by Daver 's Letter B. Answer * See 13 H. 7. 8. by Daver's Letter B. Election of Sheriffs by the County Fol. 174 175. 28 E. 1. c. 8. chap. 13. See the Reports of E. 2. in t ' Memoranda Scac ' fo 28. * Sir Rob. Cot. Abr. 18 E. 3. nu 54. See the Stat. of 6 H. 8. c. 18. in the Statutes at large concerning the Under-Sheriff of Bristol 9 H. 5 c. 5. * Palmer's Rep. 451. Dr. Burnet's Hist. of the Rights of Princes 239. K. James in his Promonition to all Christian Monarchs 298. Objection Answer Objection Answer 8 R. 20. Answer Argument Answer Or Tributary L. 1. C. 5. †K. James 1. in his Speech to both Houses 1609 in his Works fol. 533 says the King with his Parliament are absolute in making or forming of any sort of Laws Sir Rawleigh's Hist. of the World fol. 245. ‖ Archbishop Laud too did the like Seld. Dissert 539. Seld. Dissertat ad fletam fol. 537. Pryn's Second Tome fol. 290 292 299. 301 302. 46 E. 3. Rot. Parl. nu 7. 8. Object Estoppel Answ. Object 2. Here is no Estoppel Answ. A Stranger may take the advantage of this Estopp 7 E. 4. 1. Br. Estoppel 163. Knoil Heymor's third Kebk 528. by Chief Justice Hale That a Stranger cannot falsifie a Verdict Rol. Abr. first part 362. Dr. and Stud. 68. à ad fin b. Object 2. Answ. A dependant Action An Action dependant or collateral * Jaques versus Caesar. And Dr. Drury's Ca. 8 R. 142. And Mackaelly's Ca. 9 R. 68. 1 H. 4. c. 6. Pag. 10.