he will have all condemned whom he doth condemn But then it must be understood that this distinction iâ— not applyed to the Will of God as he is meerly an Absolute Proprietary or Benefactor but as he is the King or Rector of the world and so his Legislation is his Antecedent Will and his Judgment is his Consequent Will And no man of Religion can deny either that Gods Law is the signification of his Will or his Will signifyed or that his Judgment and â—â—cution is his Will declared or that Gods Law of Grace doth conditionally give pardon and salvation to all antecedently to man's performance or rejection of the condition or that God condemneth Infidels consequently to their Infidelity The Law Antecedently to Mans part acted saith He that believeth shall be saved and the Sentence consequently to his fact saith Judas an unbeliever or impenitent shall perish And thus the distinction hath no doubt or difficulty 103. God by commanding faith and repentance and making theâ— necessary conditions of Justification and by commanding perseverance and threatning the Justified and Sanctified with damnation if they fâ—â— away and making perseverance a condition of Salvation doth thereby provide a convenient means for the performance of his own Decree of giving Faith and Repentance and perseverance to his Elect For he effecteth his ends by suitable moral means and such is this Law and Covenant to provoke man to due fear and care and obedience that he may be wrought on as a man 104. To be justifyed by Faith in general agreeth to the ages before Of Justification by Faith c. Christ's Incarnation and those since But so doth not the special kind of faith by which they are justifyed For much more is Essential to that faith which we must be justifyed by to them that are under the last edition of the Covenant of Grace than was or is to them that were under the first alone Abraham believed not all our essential Articles of faith 105. To be justified by faith in Paul's sence is all one as to be justified What that Faith is by becoming Christians To be a Believer a Disciple and a Christian are all one in the Gospel sence 106. The faith by which we are justified as is aforesaid is best understood The Controversie between the Papists and us about Justification is agitated iâ— vain till we agree of the sence of the words Justification and Remission As I said elsewhere they take not only Justification for a qualitative change such as we call Sanctification but Remission of Sin for they know not what themselves most of them talk as if it were a putting away the Sin in its essence which can be meant of nothing but the Habit for the fact cannot be infectum Others seem to take it for remitting the punishment also with that change Malderus most plainly in 1. 2. q. 113. a. 1. and p. 567. saith that Remission of Sin is Ablatio Reatus culpae At esse longe aliud quam Nolle illud punire non enim tantum facit Hominem non puniri sed etiam non esse Poena dignum Minus tamen est quam in amicitiam recipi though yet no man is in a middle state neque Dâ—i amicus neque inimicus yet cogitations possunt seterari Peccata Remittere idem est quod non imputare si hoc non accipias pro dissimulare sed pro desinere esse offensum cum per Remissionem Deo non imputante est quasi non fuerit By this you may see that these Papists hold the same with those Protestants whom they seem most to resist and cannot hide it But 1. It will be true to eternity that Peter sinned 2. To say so is to blame him 3 His sin deserv'd death 4. The Law and the nature of sin past are the same after pardon as before 5. God doth not change his mind of sin 6. Gods offence or displeasure is not a passion or mutable but his essence as denomina ed from the object to be his Velle punire and Justice that must punish 7. For God to be appeased and no more offended is but his Nolle punire peccatorem and not to be obliged in Justice to punish him but by his Covenant related to him as one that will not punish 8. This change is in the sinner becoming not punishable 9. That is not worthy of it in the Gospel-sence though worthy by the Law of Innocency 10. All this is but that the Reatus pâ—na culpae quantum ad poenam is remitted but not the Reatus culpae simpliciter in se And thus we are all agreed by the Baptismal Covenant and is essentially a Believing Fiducial consent to our Covenant relation to God the Father Son and Holy Ghost as our Reconciled Creator and Father our Saviour and our Sanctifyer connoting the forsaking of all inconsistents For it must needs be the same faith by which we have right to the benefits of that Covenant and by which we are justified because we have our remission and justification by the Instrumental donation of the Covenant it being one of the benefits given by it But Practical Faith or Believing-consent is our condition of receiving our Covenant right to all the benefits in general therefore to Justification in particular 107. The Phrases of Justifying faith and Faith justifying us are humane and not Scriptural at all And though they may be well used with explicatory caution as being well meant yet they are more lyable to mislead men than the Scripture phrase that we are justified by Faith Because the former phrases are apter to insinuate an Efficiency than the other whereas faith is no efficient cause of our Justification nor any other act of Man And the Scripture that speaketh of Justification by Faith sometime useth the phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which no more signifyeth any Instrumental efficiency of Justification than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex operibus And though sometime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be used it is to signifie no more than that God hath appointed it to be the Medium of our Justification as a condition but not as any efficient cause 108. The Faith by which we are justified as I touched before hath God the Father for its object as essentially as Christ the Saviour as the said Baptismal Covenant sheweth and that not only secondarily as Christ being the Mediator and way to the Father our faith in Christ connoteth the final object but also directly and primarily as the Father is the first in Trinity and as Creator first related to us and as the end is first in our intention Joh. 17. 3. This is life eternal to know thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou bast sent Joh. 13. 1. Let not your hearts be troubled you believe in God believe also in me 109. And as essential is it to this Faith to believe in Christ as the Purchaser of Holiness and Heaven as to
and the Collation is according to the order of his Will though the Things Given have their intrinsick difference 115. All men confess that this Moral Reception is an Act and therefore hath an object which Physical Reception is not And that thus to Receive doth suppose a Moral Gift which Gift maketh not the thing ours necessarily as physical operation doth but on supposition of our voluntary Reception or Consent And all confess that Gods Donation is by his Covenant Testament or Promise and this Covenant hath its proper nature and mode that is the Condition as imposed antecedent to our Receiving Therefore as the thing Given is made ours by the Donation so according to the order appointed by it and our Consent no otherwise maketh it ours than as the Condition of the Gift performed But Gods Covenant doth Give us Christ and Life that is Justification Sanctification and Glorification in tithe or right in one Gift to be Accepted by one entire faith as the Condition not making at all the order of the Gifts and faiths respect to them in that order to be any of the Ratio proprietatis 116. This will be plainer by humane instances A Servants Relation is founded in his consent to be a Servant a Wifes Relation is founded in her Marriage-consent to be a Wife and to take that man for her Husband simply without any more adoe Now if the Master of that Servant or the Husband of that Wife be a noble man a rich man a wise man a good man and they knew all this and by knowing it were induced to consent and are to have their proportionable benefits by his Nobility Riches Wisdom Goodness yet their title to these benefits ariseth not from the act of their consent as it respected these benefits severally and distinctly but meerly by consent to their Relation as being his Condition of Collation The Wife is made Noble by her Husbands Nobility she is made Rich by his Riches she is instructed by his Wisdom c. But she hath no more Right to his Riches for marrying him in the notion of Rich or for consenting to him for Riches than for marrying him in the notion or thought of his wisdom or goodness On her part it was not consent to be Rich by him that gave her right to his Riches and consent to be Noble by him that gave her right to Nobility but consent simply to be his Wife that gave her right to all 117. This is yet fullyer evident in that most usually men make consent to one thing to be the condition of their Receiving or Right to another And usually that which one is most backward to is made the condition of their Right to that which they are most forward or willing to have The Master doth not say If thou wilt have thy wages thou shalt have right to it But if thou wilt do my work thou shalt have thy wages The condition of Marriage is conjugal Love and fidelity q. d. I will be thy Husband and give thee right to all that I have if thou wilt be and do what is essential to a Wife and not if thou wilt have my Riches c. If a Father give a Child a free gift on any condition it will likely be If thou wilt be a thankful and obedient Child and not If thou wilt have it Or if meer consent to have it be put it is usually when it is some gift which it is supposed that the person is not very willing to have As if a Sick man will have Physick if an ungodly man will have Teaching Books or Godliness it self But to this usually they are induced by the Promise of somewhat else which they are willing of As to the Sick If thou wilt take this Physick thou shalt have health To the ungodly If thou wilt have Christ and holiness thou shalt have pardon and happiness Now in the sence of Physical Receiving He that receiveth Physick hath Physick and He that receiveth health hath health c. But in the moral sence of Receiving which is Accepting as it is the condition of a gift so He that receiveth the Physick shall have the health and He that receiveth Christ and his sanctifying Spirit shall have Pardon Justification and Salvation Not that his willingness to have pardon and happiness is the chief or only condition of his pardon and happiness But his Accepting Christ and his Spirit which men are naturally unwilling of is the condition of that pardon and happiness which men would have By all which it appeareth that to say Faith justifyeth me as it is the Receiving of Christs Righteousness and not as it is the Receiving of Christ as a Teacher Ruler c. is a confounding or seducing saying For 1. If it intimate that Faith Justifyeth us as an efficient cause principal oâ— Instrumental it is false * * * Unless by Justifying they mean the acts of Love Hope Obedience called Hâ—â—iness 2. If it mean that Faith is the Condition of Justification quatenus as it receiveth Christs Righteousness only it hath either one or two falshoods 1. If it mean that Faith 's receiving act is the formalis ratio Conditionis or that it justifyeth not qua conditio dâ—â—ationis but quae Receptio Justitiae Christi it is false Therefore qua here can signifie nothing but the Aptitude of faith to be made the condition and so Qua Quae here are all one 2. And then that only the Accepting of Righteousness justifyeth us that is Is the condition of our Justification is a falshood 118. Therefore our consent to be a Holy and obedient people or to take Christ for our Teacher Exemplar Ruler Sanctifier by his Word and Spirit and Judge hath at least as great a hand in our justification being principally the Condition of the Promise as our belief in our acceptance of Christ's Righteousness hath SECT VIII Of Justification by Christ's Righteousness imputed 119. Christ's personal Righteousness Divine or Humane habitual active How little the Papists differ from the Imputation which they quarrel with See in Bellarm. words cited and approved by Davenant de Justit And Pet. a S. Joseph Theol. Speculat l. 4. c. 10. saith Obj. Pâ—ccatum remitti non potest quamdiu homo manet conversus ad creaturam aversus a Deo At semper aversus erit a Deo nisi mutatur Resp Sufficere mutationem moralem quae per solam Dei condonationem fieri potest ut jam homo non dicatur aversus a Deo This is Antinomianism and false As if God called not him averse who is really averse Obj. 2. Si peccatum remitti potest sine actu aut habitu per solam imputationem erit quae est â—aereticorum sententia Resp Haereticos loqui de facto non de imputatione peccati remanentis vere non remissi nos de possibili de verâ— remissione qua peccatum tollatur See how the case is turned and wranglers
really all is but a Thankful Accepting of the mercy of the new Covenant according to its nature and use as it is offered 196. It is a great question whether a man may Trust to his own Faith Of Trusting in our own faith repentance holiness c. Repentance or Holiness But some men still trouble the world with unexplained words where no sober men differ No wise man can dream that we may Trust to these for more than their proper part as that we may Trust them to do any thing proper to God to Christ to the Spirit to the Promise c. And to use the phrase of Trusting to our own faith or Holiness when it soundeth absolutely or may tempt the hearers to think that they may Trust them for Gods part or Christ's part and Of which see more in my Life of Faith Tollit gratia Meriâ—um non quod omnino nihil agamus sed quia non satisfacimus legi procul absumus a perfectione Melancth in Loc. Com. de lib. arb c. 7. not only for their own is a dangerous deceiving course But that really they may be Trusted for their own part and must be so no sober person will deny For so to believe obey pray to God c. and not to Trust to them in their place that is not to think that we shall be ever the better for them is unbelief and indeed distrusting God and saying It is in vain to serve him and what profit is it that we call upon him And such diffidence and despair will end all endeavours Let every man prove Gal. 6. his own work and so shall he have rejoycing in himself and not in another This is our Rejoycing the testimony of our Consciences that in simplicity 2 Cor. 1. 12. and Godly sincerity we have had our Conversation in the world If we are Justified by faith we may Trust to be Justifyed by it But the rare use of such a phrase in Scripture and the danger of it must make us never use it without need As if we were disputing whether the Popish or Protestant Religion be that which a man may trust for his Salvation or the like And when ever it 's used it implyeth our Trust in God and our Saviour only for their part 197. To conclude this great point of Imputed and Inherent Righteousness The last objection of the mistakers of Imputation To save me that much labour of citations I desire the Reader to see in Guil. Forbes Consider Pacific the Concessions of Vega Pighius Stapleton and other Papists about Imputation of Christ's Righteousness as granting us all that Protestants mean as Bellarmine expresly doth as Davenant Nigrinus Joh. Crocius and many others have observed it may be objected that The same man may well be judged a Sinner deserving hell never fulfilling the Law nor satisfying Justice nor deserving Heaven in himself that is in his Natural person and yet be Judged one that never sinned but fulfilled the Law is perfectly holy and righteous and merited Heaven in his Legal or Civil person in and by Christ To which I answer One man is but one and hath but one person But if you take the word Person equivocally as signifying another that is made like him in some respects or that hath his Nature or doth somewhat in his stead and for his benefit as a second person say so and we will strive with no man about words If you will say we are now on earth in our Natural persons and are in Heaven in Christ or that we are Redeemed in our Natural persons but Redeemed our selves in Christ or that you are sick in your Natural person and well in your person in Christ c. I like not your language but there are scarce any words so bad which a man may not put a good sence on But we would be understood and plainly ask whether Christ was properly every sinners or believers person in Law-sence so that ipso facto God accounteth us to have been habitually and actively perfect in Him and to have merited and satisfied in him If so the Law can look on one man but as one And he that paid a debt by his Servant or any other as his Legal person cannot be required to do it again in his Natural person unless you will say that God loveth our Legal person and will save it and may hate our Natural person and damn it The Scripture useth no such contradictory subtleties as these SECT XI How faith Justifieth 198. The common saying that faith justifieth as an Instrument might pass as tolerable if too many did not strain it to a wrong sence and raise Note that when we call faith an Accepting it relateth to the Donation of the Covenant and the Donatum which is a Jus ad beneficia Renovation is effected by faith as a second cause but Pardon is Accepted by it And we fully grant the Papists that Renovation and pardon go together whatever they call them And some of themselves do speak just as we de Remissione Macula which others are confounded about Vid. Wotton's citations out of the Schoolmen de Macula de Reconcil pec And Brianson saith in 4. q. 8. fol. 116. that sin as â—emitted or guilt is Tantum quaedam Relatio rationis in quantum est objectum intellectus Voluntatis divinae Quia postquam commissit peccatum Dei voluntas ordinat ipsum ad poenum correspondentem peccato Intellectus praevidet pro omni tempore donec poena debita sit soluta Videre peceata Dei est ad â—oenam imputâ—re Avertere faciem est ad poenam non reservare August Ergo niâ— aliud est post actum câ—ssantem pâ—â—catis offâ—nsa Macula reatus nisi ista relatio rationis Sâ—d hujus Ordinatio ad â—oenam ut est disconveniens ipsi animae dicitur ejus Macula ut autem est obligatio formaliter ad istam poenam dicitur Râ—atus Et ut est divinae voluntatis c. dicâ—tur Offensa Nil n aliud est Offendi vel Irasci in Deo quam vâ—lle Vindicare ista poena But he after owneth that the culpa is another thing unwarrantable Doctrines from it and harden the Papists by unwarantable Answers A Justifying Instrument properly is an efficient Instrâ—mental cause of Justification which I have elsewhere too largely proved that faith is not either Gods Instrument or ours Physical or Moral noâ— any way efficiently justifieth us But justifying is one thing to Receive justification is another thing and to be justified is a third Faith iâ— no justifying act But faith is in its Essence the Acceptance of an offered God Christ Spirit for Life This Acceptance is by the Covenant made the condition of our passive true Reception and Possession of Right before opened To be such a Condition performed is to be a removens prohibeâ—s of the said Reception which is strictly to be Dispositio materiae recipientiâ— And so it
may be called 1. A Receiving Cause 2. And a mediâ—â— or dispositive Cause of the effect Justification as Received but not as Given As I said Dr. Twisse chooseth to call it But this causa Dispositiva is pâ—â— of the causa Materialis viz. Qua disposita A cause or more properly a condition why I receive Justification and by receiving it am Justified which is their meaning who call it A Passive Instrument that is A â—â—ceiving Instrument 199. The plain easie truth is that Faiths Nature which is to be â—â—lieving Acceptance of Christ and Life offered on that Condition being â—â— very essence is but its Aptitude to the office it hath to our Justification by which the Question is answered why did God promise us Christ and Life â—â— the Condition of faith rather than another Because of the congruity of its Nature to that office But the formal Reason of its office as to our Justification is Its Being the performed Condition of the Covenant And if God had chosen another condition a condition it would have been Now the true notion in Law being a Condition Logicians would call this improperly a Receiving cause and more properly A Receptive Disposition of the matter reducing it to Physical notions But the most proper term is the plainest We are justified by that faith which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father Son and Holy Ghost as Given us on that condition in the Baptismal Covenant because or as it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby Understand this plain doctrine and you have the plain truth 200. They that say contrarily that Faith justifieth proximately as it is an Instrument or a Receiving Accepting act and not as a Condition of the Covenant do evidently choose that which they vehemently oppose viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere justifieth For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere or the â—â—â—â— of Faith is to be an Acceptance of Christ given But if they will to avoid this say that By Faith they mean Christ believed in then they say that by Receiving Christ they mean not the receiving of him but Christ himself And why then do they not say so but trouble the world with such unintelligible phrases But to open the senselessness and coâ—sequents of that Doctrine would but offend All know that Chriâ—â—â—â— the object is connoted as essential to the act of Faith SECT XII How Repentance is joyned with Faith 201. Repentance is a Dispositio materiae recipientis too and a part of the condition of the Covenant And so far a Material or dispositive Receiving Cause But not an Acceptance of the Gift formally in its averting act 202. Faith and Repentance are words used in Scripture in divers significations Saith Malderus Gu. Amesius a parte recedit ab antiquo Calvinismo quiae requirit ad justitiam bonae operâ— tanquam conditionem praerequisitam quod â—tiam extendit ad ipsam â—lectionem See here how little the Papists understand us As Faith is sometimes taken for bare Assent as Jam. 2. and usually for Affiance or Trust and always when it denominateth a Christian or Justified Believer as such it essentially includeth all the three parts Assent Consent and Affiance but yet denominateth the whole by a word which principally signifieth One act which commonly is Affiance as including the other two so Repentance is sometime taken comprehensively for the whole Conversion of a Sinner to God the Father Son and Holy Ghost and so it includeth Faith in the narrower sence and is the same thing as Faith in the larger sence but express'd under another formal notion Sometimes it is taken more narrowly and that 1. As to the Act. 2. As to the Object 1. As to the Act and so the word Repentance signifieth only the Aversion of the Soul from evil by sorrow and change of mind And this is the strict formal notion of the word though usually it be taken more largely as including also the Conversion of the Soul to Good which is the usual Scripture and Theological sense though the word it self do chiefly signifie the Averting act 2. As to the Object 1. Repentance sometime signifieth the Turning of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God And so Repentance towards God is distinguished from Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ 2. And sometimes it signifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from some particular Sin 203. Repentance as it is the turning of the Soul from sin and Idols * The Papists take Repentance it self to be part of the Remission of Sins And let the Reader note for the fuller opening of what I have said of their darkness thereabouts that Jansenius Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. maketh four things to be inseparably conteined in Remission though distinguishable 1. The Conversion of the Soul to God 2. The abstersion of the Macula or filth 3. Reconciliation or the remission of Gods offence 4. The relaxation of the aeternal punishment That all these are then at once given us we are all agreed But whether the name Remission or Pardon of sin â—e meet for them all we disagree Is it not visible then how unhappily we strive about words wheâ— we talk like men of several Languages But all is but removation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offense is the first part And Macula is either the sin it self or the relative consequents to God is the same with Faith in God in the large Covenant-sence and includeth Faith in God in the narrower sence Repentance as it is our Turning from Infidelity to Christianity is the same with Faith in Christ in the large Covenant-saving-sence and includeth Faith in Christ in the narrower sence as it is meer Assent Repentance as it is a Turning from the Flesh to the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifyer is the same thing as our Faith in the Holy Ghost in the large Covenant sence and includeth Faith in the Holy Ghost in the narrower sence But when they are the same thing the ratio nominis or formal notion is not the same As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one by one entire single Conception so we are not so happy in our language as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by And so that is called Repentance as the Souls motion from the Terminus a quo which is called sometimes Faith or Affiance and sometimes Love from the motion of the Soul to the Terminus ad quem though the Motus be the same But when Faith and Repentance are distinguished as several parts of the Condition of the new Covenant the common sence is that Repentance signifieth the Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God which is or includeth Faith in God And Faith signifieth specially Faith in Christ as the Mediator and way
in the heart and so maketh the Creed to be more properly this Law than the Scriptures as being written only on particular occasions But though we thankfully confess that the essentials of Christianity are so plain and few as may be remembred yet the Creed is contained and explained in the Scripture and without written Records our Faith would have been but ill preserved as experience and reason prove 7. That their Law as such discovered sin but gave not the Spirit of Grace to overcome it Insomuch as though he himself desired perfectly to fulfil it without sin yet he could not but was under a captivity that is a moral necessity of imperfection or sins of infirmity from which only the Grace of Christ could as to guilt and power deliver him 8. That no man ever came to Heaven by that way of merit which they dreamed of but all by the way of Redemption Grace free Gift and pardoning Mercy Therefore their conceit that they were just in the main and forgiven their sins and so justifiable by the meer dignity of Mose's Law which they kept and by the Works of the Law and not by the free Gift Pardon and Grace of a Redeemer and by the Faith and practical belief of that Gift and acceptance of it with thankful penitent obedient hearts was a pernicious errour But the true way of Righteousness was to become true Christians that is with such a penitent thankful accepting practical belief or affiance to believe in God as the Giver of Salvation in Christ as the Redeemer and his Spirit as our Life and Sanctifier and to accept Christ and all his procured Benefits Justification and Life as purchased by his Sacrifice and meritorious Righteousness and given in the New Covenant on this condition and so to give up our selves to his whole saving-work as to the Physician of our Souls and only Mediator with God This is the sum of Paul's Doctrine on this point 363. I say again therefore for any man to say that some one physical act either assent or consent or affiance upon one particular Object Christ's Righteousness as offered us is the instrumental cause of our Justification and that to look to be justified by any other act of Faith on Christ or on the Father or Holy Ghost or on Heaven the final Object God in Glory or secondarily as subsequent parts of the condition of Salvation by Repentance by praying for Pardon by forgiving others by Obedience to Christ c. is to look to be justified by Works in the sense that Paul excludeth them this is but to abuse the Gospel and the Church by a scandalous misinterpretation of a great part of the New Testament 364. St. James therefore having to do with some who thought that Leg. Placeum in Thes Salvin de hâ—sce Vol. 1. Conrad Bergium in Prax. Cathol â— e Blank Thes de Just and our Mr. Gibbon's Serm. Of Justif in the Morning-Exercises at Giles in the Fields Paraeus de Justif Cont. Bellarm. l. 2. c. 7. p. 469. Nos imputari nobis Christi justitiam ut per â—am formaliter justi nominâ—mâ—r simus neque diximus unquam neque sentimus ut aliquoties jam ostendimus Id enim pugnaret non minus cum recta ratione quam si reus in judicio absolutus diceret se clementia judicis donantis sibi vitam formaliter justum esse c. the bare profession of Christianity was Christianity and that Faith was a meer assent to the Truth and that to believe that the Gospel is true and trust to be justified by Christ was enough to Justification without Holiness and fruitful Lives and that their sin and barrenness hindered not their Justification so that they thus believed perhaps misunderstanding Paul's Epistles doth convince them that they were mistaken and that when God spake of Justification by Faith without the Works of the Law he never meant a Faith that containeth not a resolution to obey him in whom we believe nor that is separated from actual Obedience in the prosecution But that as we must be justified by our Faith against the charge of being Infidels so must we be justified by our Gospel personal holiness and sincere Obedience against the charge that we are unholy and wicked or impenitent or Hypocrites or else we shall never be adjudged to Salvation that is justified by God 365. All this then is past controversie among considerate understanding men 1. That Works justifie us not as perfect according to the Covenant of Innocence because we have them not 2. That the Works or keeping of Mose's Law as conceited sufficient or as set in opposition against or competition with a Saviour or free Gift or any otherwise than as the exercises of meer Obedience under Christ as Mary â—â—chary Elizabeth Simeon John Baptist David c. used them could justifie no man 3. That consequently no other Works set up either in the said opposition or competition or as any thing of Merit or worth is ascribed to them which is proper to Christ or any part of the honour of Gods free Gift can justifie no man nor any other way than as meer conditions and exercises of thankful obedience or acceptance in pure subordination to God's Mercy and Christ's Merits and the free Gift But that Works are not excluded from being conditions of our justification or the matter of it in any of these following respects 1. That Faith it self which is our act and an act of Obedience to God and is the â—iducial accepting belief in God the Father Son and Holy Ghost for the benefits of the Covenant is the condition of our first Covenant-right to these Benefits 2. That this Faith is not actual Obedience to Christ as Christ at first but only to God as God But it is the Souls subjection to Christ as Christ which is our Covenant-consent to our future Obedience and virtually though not actually containeth our future Obedience in it 3. That there is somewhat of love consent or willingness of Desire of Hope of Repentance which goeth to make up this moral work of Faith as it is the condition even our first Christianity it self 4. That as the making of a Covenant is for the performing of it and subjection is for Obedience and Marriage for conjugal Duties so our said first Covenanting-Faith is for our future Faith Hope Comfort and grateful Obedience and Holiness And these are the secondary parts of the condition of Salvation And so are the secondary parts of our Justifications condition as continued or not-lost and consummate For to justifie us is as is said to justifie our Right to Impunity and Glory â— That as is said our own performance of the condition of the free Gift of Impunity and Glory by the New Covenant purchased by Christ's Righteousness is the thing to be tried and judged in Gods judgment And therefore we must so far be then justified from the charge of â—ot performing that condition of
against those things which their ignorance misrepresenteth to themselves And so Gods ordinances are made a snare to souls which are appointed for their salvation and the man that can kindle in his hearers a transporting passion against this or that opinion or form as Popish is cryed up for an excellent preacher and seemeth to edifie the people while he destroveth them 11. And by this means you seem to justifie the Papists lyes and calumnies against the Protestants by doing as they do They belye Luther Zuinglius Calvin Beza c. with just such intentions and such a kind of zeal as some over doing Sectaries belye them And is it bad in them and good in you 12. You teach the people a dangerous and perverse way of reasoning à minùs notis which will let in almost any errours From a dark text in the Revelations or Daniel or from the supposition that the Pope is the Antichrist and all Papists have received the mark of the beast you gather conclusions against the notorious duties of Love and peace which the light of nature doth commend to all Not that I am perswading you that the Pope is not Antichrist but that all things be received but according to their proper degree of evidence S. Now you open your self indeed All that revolt to Popery begin there with questioning whether the Pope be the Antichrist and telling men of the darkness of the Book of Revelations P. I tell you I will abate no certainty that you have but increase my own and yours if I could but I would not have any falsly to pretend that they are certainer of any thing than they are And no certainty can go beyond the ascertaining evidence And if all Scriptures be equally plain St. Peter was deceived that tells us of many things hard to be understood which the unlearned wrest as other Scriptures to their own destruction And if the Revelations be not one of the hardest I crave your answer to these questions 1. Why are five Expositors usually of four opinions in the expounding of it when it is those that have spent much of their lives in studying it as Napier Brightman c. who are the Expositors 2. Why will none of you that find it so easie at last write one certain Commentary which may assure which of all the former if any one of them was in the right 3. Why did Calvin take it to be too hard for him and durst not venture to expound it 4. And if you take it to be so necessary as you pretend tell me whether it was so necessary and so taken by all those Churches that for a long time received it not as Canonical Scripture Surely they were saved without believing it Though no doubt but the book of Revelation is a great mercy to the Church and all men should understand as much of it as they can But all that I blame you for here is the perverting of the order of proof in arguing à minùs notis 13. And these over-doers that run things into the contrary extreams do most injuriously weaken the Protestant cause by disabling themselves and all men of their principles to defend it and arming the Papists against it by their errors When it cometh to an open dispute by Word or Writing one of these mens errors is like a wound that lets out blood and spirits and puts words of triumph into the adversaries mouth A cunning Papist will presently drive the ignorant disputant to resolve his cause into his mistake and then will open the falshood of that and thence inferr the falshood of all the rest And what an injury is that to the souls of the auditors who may be betrayed by it and to the cause it self For instance If one of our over-doers hold that we are reputed to have kept all the Law of Innocency and merited salvation our selves by Christ or that no act of faith is Justifying but the accepting of his righteousness or that faith Justifieth only as the efficient instrumental cause or that we have no righteousness which hath any thing to do in our Justification but only Christs imputed Merits or that mans faith Love or obedience are not rewardable c. how easily will a Papist open the falshood of such an opinion to the hearers and then tell them that they may see by this who is in the right And alas what work would one Learned Papist make in London by publick disputing if we had no wiser men to deal with him than these over-doers They may call Truth and Sobriety Antichristian and talk nonsence as against Popery successfully to their own party but I hope never to see the cause managed by their publick disputes lest half the Congregation turn Papists on it at once If Chillingworth had not been abler to confute a Papist than those that used to calumniate him as Popish or Socinian he had done less service of that kind than he did 14. And it is an odious injury that these Over-doers do to the ancient and the universal Church while in many cases they ignorantly or wilfully reproach and condemn them as if they were all the favourers of Popery and call their ancient doctrine and practice Antichristian Some of them ignorantly falsifie the Fathers doctrine and upon trust from their Leaders aver◠that they held that which they plainly contradict and that which they held indeed they cry out against as Popery Such an instance we have newly in a Souldier Major Danvers an Anabaptist which I have detected And will Christ take it well to have almost all his Church condemned as Antichristian 15. And hereby what an honour is done to Popery and what a dishonour to the Reformed Churches when it shall be concluded that all the Churches heretofore even next after the age of the Apostles and almost all the present Churches were and are against the doctrine of the Protestants and on the Papists side And yet how many do us this injury and the Roman Church this honour About the nature of Justifying faith and its office to Justification and about the nature of Justification it self and Imputation of Righteousness and free-will and mans Works and Merits and about assurance of salvation and perseverance how many do call that Popery which the whole current of Greek and Latine Fathers do assert and all the ancient Churches owned and most of all the present Churches in the world And those that call all forms of prayer Popery or the English Liturgie at least when almost all the Christian world have forms and most such as are much worse do but tell men that the Christian world is on the side that they oppose and against their way 16. And it is a crime of infamy to be taken for Separatists from the universal Church And in doctrines and forms of Worship not only to avoid what we take to have been a common weakness but also to condemn them as Antichristian or as holding pernicious errours is but
the believing sinner may stand before this righteous and holy God is to affirm the eternal damnation of all the World VII The Covenant mentioned justifieth not but declareth our Justification which is the immediate proper effect of Christ's righteousness VIII Never any man in his wits affirmed that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification Give us but leave to call it the material cause or the meritorious cause immediately and properly of Justification c. Some will think that they are great and heinous errors which either these words or some of mine that seem contrary import But I must crave leave here to follow my usual method in separating the Controversies de re de nomine and then I think that even these strange words prove not him and me at so great a distance as they seem to intimate For I grant him as followeth de re 1. That God hath such a decree of Election or eternal purpose as he describeth and calleth the Constitution of the Covenant 2. That God doth wisely and graciously execute this Decree 3. That all Grace and Mercy is given by Christ And therefore so far as Mercy is common Christ is the common cause of it 4. That Christ himself is a blessing or gift decreed and also freely given by God even from his love to the World Joh. 3. 16. 5. That God's electing Act or Decree as in him hath no condition nor his purpose to give Christ as a Saviour to mankind 6. On our part no condition is required either that God may elect us or that the first promise of a Saviour be made or that Christ come into the World or that he fulfill all righteousness or that he obey or die or rise or be glorified or come to judgment or raise the dead or that he enact it as his Law of Grace that he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned 7. Nor is any condition on our part necessary absolutely necessitate medii that the Gospel or the first Grace yea the first special Grace be given us 8. That Christ by his suffering and merits hath procured to his elect not only pardon and life if they believe and obey him but Grace to cause them effectually and infallibly to believe repent obey and persevere 9. That no man can or will believe and repent but by his Grace 10. That to give men a promise of pardon and life if they will believe repent and obey the Gospel is not the whole of Christ's Grace to any but where-ever he giveth this he giveth also much means and gracious help by which men may do better than they do and so be more prepared for his further Grace 11. That if God only gave men a promise of pardon if they believe and gave them no Grace to enable or help them to believe it would be no saving Covenant 12. God did not repeal his Law of Innocency or as he had rather call it of Perfection nor did properly dispense with or relax the preceptive part of it Nor is it absolutely ceased as to a capable subject And therefore Christ was bound to perfection 13. God would not have his Law to be without the honour of the perfect performance of mans Mediator though it be violated by us all 14. No man is saved or justified but by the proper merit of Christ's perfect obedience yea and his habitual holiness and satisfactory sufferings advanced in dignity by his divine perfection 15. This merit as related to us supposeth that Christ as a Sponsor was the second Adam the Root of the justified the reconciling Mediator who obeyed perfectly with that intent that by his obedience we might be justified and who suffered for our sins in our room and stead and so was in tantum our Vicarius poenae as some phrase it or substitute and was made a curse for us that we might be healed by his stripes as he was obedient that his righteousness might be the reason as a meritorious cause of our Justification which supposeth the relation of an undertaking Redeemer in our nature doing this and in our stead so far forth as that therefore perfect obedience should not be necessary to be performed by our selves And righteousness therefore is imputed to us that is we are truly reputed righteous because we as believing members of Christ have right to impunity and life as merited by his righteousness and freely given to all penitent believers And Christ's own righteousness may be said so far to be imputed to us as to be reckoned or reputed the meritorious cause of our right or justification as aforesaid Thus far we are agreed de re And then de nomine I willingly leave men to their way of speech 1. If he will call God's Decree his Covenant in Constitution 2. If he will call the execution of his Decree his Covenant in execution 3. If he will call nothing else the Covenant of Grace or at least nothing of narrower extent but what comprehendeth God's eternal Decrees and the promise and gift of a Redeemer and so of the rest I cannot help it his language is his own But I shall tell you further my thoughts de re de nomine 1. De re 1. God's eternal decrees purposes or election give no one right to Christ Pardon or Life and so justifie no man 2. The execution of God's Decrees yea of Election hath many Acts besides Justification 3. It must therefore be some transient Act done in time ad extra by which God justifieth men 4. There are divers such acts concurring in several sorts of causality or respect 5. Christ's meritorious righteousness and satisfaction are the sole proper immediate causemeritorious of all the Grace or Mercy procured and given by him there being no other meritorious cause of the same kind either more immediate or at all co-ordinate and copartner with him 6. As Christ giveth us Holiness qualitative and active by the real operation of his Spirit though he merited it immediately himself so doth he give us right to impunity to the further Grace of the Spirit and to Glory by the instrumentality of his Covenant as by a Testament Deed of Gift or Law of Grace Which by signifying God's donative will doth not first declare us justified or to have the foresaid right to Christ and Life but doth first give us instrumentally that right and so immediately justify us And God's will giveth us not right as secret or of it self but by such instrumental signification 7. God hath signified his will to us partly by absolute gifts and promises and partly by conditional that such there are he that denieth must deny much of the Scripture Christ was absolutely given to fallen mankind for a Redeemer and so was the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace and many other mercies But he hath made and recorded a conditional Gift of Christ as in special Union to be our
Head and of Pardon and Salvation 8. It is Christ's stated Constitution that he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and be that believeth not shall be damned Mar. 16. 16. That if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead thou shalt be saved for with the heart man believeth Christ's resurrection unto righteousness and with the mouth confession is made unto Salvation Rom 10. That except you repent you shall all perish Luke 13. 3 5. That men must repent and be baptized for the remission of sins Acts 2. 38. And repent and be converted that their sins may be blotted out Acts 3. 19. So Rev. 22. 14. Matt. 6. 14 15. Ezek. 33. 14 16. 1 Tim. 4. 8. Godliness is profitable to all things having the promise of the Life that now is and of that which is to come Call these Laws or Covenants or what you will we are agreed that all this is the word of God 9. These terms of life and death are the rule of our practices and our expectations by which we must live and by which we shall be judged and therefore we may truly say that they are Christ's Law And they are God's signified determination of the conditions of life and death and his donation of our right to Christ Pardon and Life is contained herein and therefore this may truly be called Christ's Testament and Covenant in several respects 10. Though all duties be prescribed by God's Law and so each Precept is a material part yet formally or specifically the Laws to which these material parts belong must be distinguished by the distinct conditions of life and death 11. God hath made more Promises Donations and Covenants than one or two which must not be confounded 1. His Law and Covenant made to and with man in innocency is one 2. And his Law and Covenant made to and with Christ as Mediator is another 3. And his absolute promise of a Saviour to the World with the conditional promise or Law of Grace conjunct was the first edition of another And the Gospel as after the incarnation promulgate was a more perfect edition of it to pass by Abraham's Covenant of Peculiarity and the Mosaical Law as such 12. Though Christ be promised in one of these and be God's antecedent gift he may nevertheless be the Author of another and so far the foundation as well as the meritorious cause 13. That may be of free Grace which is merited by Christ yea and that which is annexed to the Evangelical worthiness of a believer 14. That may be a condition required of us to be done by the help of Grace which yet is the effect of that Grace and given us by God 15. It is a true Covenant between God the Father Son and Holy Ghost and man which is solemnly entred into in Baptism And this is a Covenant of Grace even that proceedeth purely from Grace and of Grace as given by God and by us accepted He that will confound these various Covenants Promises and Laws on pretence of their unity though there is doubtless a wonderful unity of all the parts both of God's moral signal means and his physical works shall confound much of Theology 16. The Law made to Adam never said either thou or another for thee shall obey but it bound man to perfect perpetual personal obedience 17. Therefore that Law as it obliged us is not fulfilled by the obedience of Christ but only as far as it obliged him nor can any man be justified by it as a fulfiller of it by himself or by another nor did Christ fulfil it in any other mans person though in his stead so far as is aforesaid 18. The Law doth not command any man since Adam perfect personal obedience as the means or condition of life nor promise any life on such a condition as is now naturally impossible but though it be not repealed by God is so far ceased by the cessation of the subjects capacity to be so obliged 19. The Laws obligation of us to punishment is dispenced with and dissolved by a pardon purchased by our Mediator 20. Christ's righteousness is nevertheless the meritorious cause of our righteousness or justification though he justify us by the instrumentality of his donative Covenant as giving us right to our Union and Justification and Life and though our Faith and Repentance be the condition of our Title 21. We accept two Concessions as containing that truth which sheweth that we do not much differ de re could we more happily order our organical conceptions 1. That Christ's righteousness is not the formal cause of our Justification 2. p. 596. Seeing the satisfaction was not made IN THE PERSON of the offender but his substitute it was necessary that THE BENEFIT of ANOTHERS satisfaction should be communicated in such a way as might best please that God whose Grace was the only motive to his acceptation of a substitute It is the undoubted priviledge of the Giver to dispose of his own gifts in his own way And it was absolutely and indispensibly necessary that the sinner should be duly qualified to receive such transcendent favours purchased at so dear a rate and fitted to return the glory to a Redeemer which an unhumbled unbelieving unconverted and unsanctified sinner could not possibly be He that writeth this cannot sure much differ from me hereabouts But he is charitably uncharitable when he saith Never any man in his wits affirmed it so that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification It 's too charitable to hide that which cannot be hid of so great a number whom it seems he never read for all his Commission from all the Systematical Divines of Germany c. p. 696. And it 's too uncharitable to judge so many excellent men out of their wits The truth is so many speak so that I have been doubtful I should be smartly censured for saying otherwise Forma qua justificamur est misericordia Patris perfecta Justitia filii saith Ant. Fayus in his Accurate Theses Th. 60. p. 280. And by misericordia Patris being the form you may see how he understood Imputation The number that thus speak are too great here to be recited so that even the most judicious Davenant lest he should go out of the road was fain to make this the Theses to be proved by him Imputatam Christi obedientiam esse causam formalem justificationis nostrae probatur Cap. 28. p. 362. c. de Instit habit But let none turn this to our reproach nor take all these for mad for it is but an unapt name and by him and many others soundly meant for the greater part of these Divines say but that Imputatio Justitiae Christi Remissio peccatorum are the form not of Justification as in us but as it is Actus Justificantis as Altingius Maresius Sharpius Bucanus Spanhemius Nigrinus Sohnius
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
* * * Such as are most of the sober Heathens in the world For the most religious and sober of them are Pythagorears to this day Lege Varenium de divers Relig. post Hist Japâ—n Bless Lord thy own reconciling Truths to the healing of thy Churches or at least of some dis-joynted minds And teach me with patience to bear the Obloquy and Reproach of mistaken zealous Consurers And forgive them that know not what they say or do And wherein I err forgive and rectifie me and better inform both the Reader and me The Third Part OF God's Gracious Operations ON MANS SOUL Their DIFFERENCE and the OPERATIONS OF MANS WILL. For the fuller Decision of the Controversies about EFFECTUAL and DIFFERENCING GRACE By RICHARD BAXTER LONDON Printed by Robert VVhite for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV THE CONTENTS THE Preface Pag. 1. Sect. 1. The Presupposed Principles briefly repeated p. 7 Sect. 2. The Order of Divine Operations p. 9. Sect. 3. Of the Operations and Principles as compared p. 12. Sect. 4. How far God useth Means p. 16. Sect. 5. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means p. 18. Sect. 6. Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul p. 20. Sect. 7. Of the Resistibility of Grace p. 21. Sect. 8. What is that Operation of God on the Soul enquired of in many following Questions And whether searchable by man p. 22. Sect. 9. Whether Gods Operation be equal on all p. 31. Sect. 10. Whether it be Physical or Moral p. 32. Sect. 11. What Free-will man hath to Spiritual Good p. 35. Sect. 12. More of Predetermination by Physical Premotion p. 37. Sect. 13. More of Mans Power Natural and Moral p. 43. Sect. 14. Whether the giving of Faith be an act of Omnipotency and a Creation and a Miracle p. 46. Sect. 15. Of the Sufficiency and Efficacy of Grace p. 48. Sect. 16. Of Infused Habits and the Holy Ghost even special Grace p. 53. Sect. 17. Whether Man be meerly Passive as to the first Grace p. 55. Sect. 18. Whether the first Grace and the New and Soft Heart or Faith it self be Promised or Given absolutely or on any Condition to be performed by man ibid. Sect. 19. How God may be said to Cause the Acts of Sin p. 57. Sect. 20. How far God and how far man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments p. 62. The Conclusion § 1. The Concessions of the Synod of Dort specially the Brittish Divines More of Divine Motion or Impress p. 67. § 2. The Epitome of Alvarez de Auxil drawn up by himself in Epilogo in Twenty Conclusions considered p. 70. § 3. A Censure of the other three wayes described by him viz. 1. The Jesuits de Scientia Media p. 75. § 4. 2. Durandus's Way p. 76. § 5. 3. That of the Scotists and Nominals Of Gods partial Caâ—sality p. 79. § 6. The true face and Scheme of the Dominican Predeterminant way in the Sense and Consequents in Fifty Propositions and the Reasons of my preferring any before this p. 80. A Summary of all to satisfie sober minds p. 100. Additional Animadversions on Mr. Peter Sterrey's Book of Free-will making God the Author of Good and Evil as he is of Light and Darkness p. 106. The Third Part OF GOD'S GRACIOUS OPERATIONS ON MANS SOUL AND THE SUB-OPERATIONS OF MANS WILL. For the Ending the Contentions about Sufficient and Effectual Common and Special Grace and Free-VVill The Preface THE first Part of this Treatise though largest and fullest of mens contentious Questions and opinions is furthest from the true point of the difference and difficulty which troubleth the Church And is made large by accident by way of disquisition and detection of the many ensâ—aring questions and vain or hurtful wranglings of the Schoolmen The Second Part cometh nearer our chief Controversies and resolveth many other on the by and containeth the summ of that part of Theologie which is most clear and sure and necessary This Third Part which cometh up to the main Controversie is short and troubleth you less with other mens opinions and Schoolmens Wranglings about Grace and Free-will Partly because you had enough of them by the way before And chiefly because I would not by tediousness and recitation of Contentions obscure that which I most desire to make plain nor discourage the Reader by the length I think if I can manifest that there is no real or considerable difference among the Learned and Moderate on each side such as are the Synod of Dort on one side and even Bellarmine Suarez Ruiz c. on the other besides the moderate Lutherans and Arminians who may be ashamed if they go farther from us than the Jesuites besides abundance of Schoolmen that are of a middle strain between the Dominicans and Jesuites few understanding Divines would then think that there were any considerable difference remaining about Predestination or the universality of Redemption Those differences being but respective unto this But about Perseverance I confess that there doth a real difference remain But that it is of less moment than most on both sides say and such as is no way fit to quench Christian Love or alienate Christians from each other or hinder their liberties or peaceable communion I have fully proved in the Second Part and formerly in a peculiar Treatise entituled My Thoughts of Perseverance If therefore I can truly disprove our pretended difference about the â—â—â—rations of Grace or at least prove it to be but as it is no greater not more intolerable than that of Perseverance I shall think that all is done that is thus necessary The main difference seeming or real is about the Power of Mans Will Of which I have spoken much in the First Part and purposely leave much to the Reconciling Praxis in the Second Book which shall dissipate the cloud of ambiguous words Till then it shall here suffice to manifest 1. That we are agreed with them whose conciliation I endeavour that â—â— is not the natural Powers essential to a man which we are deprived of 2. But that these Powers have by our common corruption a sinful Disposition unfitting them for a due exercise for God and against sin 3. And that all men at least at age are not depraved in the same degree 4. That this Ill disposition is called a Moral Impotency when it is such as while it remaineth the sinful Act is ever done or the commanded act is never done There is then no Moral Power 5. That the vitious sinful impotency of the will and its Habitual or dispositive unwillingness to good and proneness to things forbidden is all one 6. That he is Morally Able who without any other grace than he hath can do the thing commanded or forbear the thing forbidden 7. That there is no Power but of God 8. That Nature common grace and special grace give several powers or dispositions 9. That a moral power
Some of you will grant that as motion causeth motion by contact of bodies so the first effect on the soul can cause the second And others of you will deny it and say that Gods Actions being diversified only by the diversity of effects and objects that which causeth the second effect is to be denominated a second Action and not the same numerically which caused the first no nor specifically if the effects specifically differ And so as scholastick wits here exercise their curiosity without respect to Arminianism or Calvinism you will here fall into notional Controversies in the way § 20. 2. But granting that the first effect is that efficacious Grace which must cause the second how shall we know what the first effect is and what the second Gods Grace like the Sun is still shining though we are not still receiving it When it worketh but the commoner sort of effects these tend to more and more The first Gracious effect may be forty years before Conversion But this is not your meaning But I suppose you will say that it is the first special effect or gratia operata that is proper to the saved which you mean But to pass by that Augustine Prosper Fulgentius much more their predecessors held that sincere faith Love holiness Justification present right to Life if they so dyed are not proper to the saved but that some lose all these If you say but proper to the Justified or Sanctified or Converted or it be the first effect which is proprium Justificandis which you mean Are we agreed what that is § 21. Either the first effect on the soul or the first Gratia operata is the Act of faith it self or somewhat antecedent If the Act as many subtilly maintain then it were a foolish question to ask Whether the Act of faith be Effectual to cause it self and How Therefore it must be somewhat antecedent or we can find no matter for our Controversie de efficacia Gratiae ad credendum § 22. If somewhat antecedent to the Act it is either a Disposition or Infused Habit or an Impression Impulse or Influx which is neither Disposition nor Habit. * * * Dico 1. Non certo constare ex divinis literis esse hujusmodi Habitus supernaturales 2. At baptizatis infunditur Gratia â—o sensu quod efficiuntur Dâ—o grati consortes divinae naturae renati 3. Conceditur Dei adjutorium ut credamus velimuâ— diligamus per inspirationem infusionem spiritus sancti 4. Dei adjutorium desuper infusum est omnino necessarium ut credamus diligamus c. non tantum ut facilius credamus Medina in 12. q. 51. p. 282. See many definitions of a Habit confuted in Medina 1. 2. p. 271. and that which he resteth in is Aristotles Qualitas quâ rectè vel malè afficimur § 23. 1. A proper Habit of faith it is not Though Mr. Pemble singularly seem so to think yet he meaneth but a seminal disposition And it 's commonly held that the Habit is given by sanctification after the Act given in Vocation 2. But if it were otherwise the Habit is not alwayes sufficient to ascertain the Act. For holy men oft sin against a Habit and believers do not alwayes exercise it Habits Incline per modum naturae but do not certainly determine to the act 3. And of a Disposition it must be so said much more § 24. 2. And if it be an Impulse or Influxus Receptus as I think we must affirm this is but a general notion of which our understanding is very crude or small A meer Motus it is not For as was said in the beginning the Divine Influx is threefold viz. From Vital-Activity or Power Wisdom and Love to Life Light and Love in man Now as I said if there be no such Impulse besides the Life Light and Love produced our Controversie is at an end For these are not efficacious or efficient of themselves But if such a different Impulse there be it 's hard to know what it is in man I conceive it best expressed by all these inadequate notions conjunct 1. An inward urgency to this threefold act which is called in the Schools both auxilium concurse and Influx 2. By which Urgency the soul is more Disposed to the Act in hoc ordine than it was before 3. Which Disposition containeth in it a Moral Power to that Act so ordered and somewhat more even some Inclination to perform it If any man can tell me better what that Divine Impulse is which is antecedent to mans Act I am willing to learn § 25. Now if this be the question Whether this Divine Impulse which is the first effect of Gods spirit be of its own nature efficacious to produce According to Jansenius the first Grace is Necessary Delectation or Love in act before that which is free and full And if so then there is no grace causing this grace and so none to be the subject of this question Whether it be more or less sufficient or effectual operating or co-operating grace which maketh one man love God initially rather than another For it is no Grace bâ— Gods essential will this Love be the first Grace and no received Impulse antecedent to it our Faith Love c. as the second effect I answer 1. Sometimes Gods Impulse is so Great as propriâ vi doth change mind and will and overcome resistance and procure our act 2. Sometimes it is so strong as that it prevaileth against the contrary ill-disposition so far as to give man a Moral Power to the Act with some Inclination which yet contrary habits and temptations do overcome and the Act doth not follow which yet was not for want of Power to have done it And this is called sufficient Grace 3. We have great reason to believe that as in some Instances Gods greater Impress is the chief differencing Cause so in other Instances an equal Impulse of God on unequally disposed subjects doth produce the Act of faith c. in one of them which it produceth not in the other through the incapacity of the recipient 4. Therefore there is a double degree of efficacy or Vis One which only so far moveth and helpeth the will as that it can do the act and sometime doth it without more Another which is so strong as that the second effect alwayes followeth it 5. But whenever the Act of faith is produced by force or Impulse more or less God is the first and principal cause of it and man but the second and the praise of it is accordingly due And I think this decision accommodateth both sides of our contenders § 26. The foresaid Impulse or first effect is only the work of God and the means and not ours But the Act of Faith Love c. is Gods work and ours and ours as Free-agents Therefore that Impulse of God which is Aptitudinally efficacious on supposition of mans due reception and self-excitation
of the Holy Ghost which is specially promised in the Gospel to believers For there are 1. Many common works of the Spirit 2. And the special effect of faith it self before it § 2. This gift of the Holy Ghost unto Believers was formerly two fold the Gift of Miracles or wonders and of special Holiness of which the latter continueth to the end of the world § 3. The spirit is Given to Believers in several respects conjunct 1. In that he is Given to Christ their Head with whom by Union they are Relatively one Body 2. In that He is Given to them by the Baptismal Covenant in special Relation to their own persons to be their sanctifier In which respect they are Baptized into the name of the Holy Ghost as being now in Covenant theirs 3. In that he worketh in them the Acts and Habits of Holiness even of Love to God and to his Image and helpeth them in all duties and against all temptations enemies and sins But not that his essence is more in them than elsewhere but his Operations from those Relations § 4. This Gift of the spirit is the great priviledge of believers and of Gospel times in the eminent degree and He is the great Agent Advocate and witness of Christ in us the divine nature and name of God and his mark upon us our witness earnest pledge and first-fruits of life eternal and the great difference between Christs living members and the unregenerate world § 5. So powerful and fixed is this Habitual Holiness or Love of God for that is the summ of it that though it be no substance nor alter not mans species nor operate not by natural necessitating determination yet it strongly and constantly inclineth the soul per modum nature to the act of Love and so emulateth nature that it is called in Scripture the Divine Nature and the new man § 6. The greatest blessing in this world is to have more of this Spirit and the greatest punishment to be for saken by the spirit and deprived of it And believers themselves must fear most lest they should quench and grieve the spirit and be punished with any measure of its desertion And their great work is to cherish it carefully and obey it faithfully and constantly § 7. The word Infusion as to Habits being metaphorical is ambiguous 1. If the question be Whether Habits be so Infused as that they are caused without Means we must deny it ordinarily 2. If it be Whether they are not at all procured by any cogitations desires or preparatory duties of our own to fit us to receive them It is to be denyed as to the ordinary way 3. If the question be Whether the Act of faith do ever go before the Habit as a cause of it It must be affirmed of the ordinary case 4. If it be Whether the Habit ever go before the Act we must say that some Impulse disposing to it doth And God can cause a Habit before the Act But we cannot prove that he ever doth so much less that it is his ordinary way § 8. Whence it is plain that ordinarily All Infused Habits are so far also Acquired as that they follow means and the Act But all Acquired Habits are not such as are called Infused § 9. The difference is in this that Habits are said to be Infused when the Holy Ghost doth excite the soul to the Act and by that Act unto a setled Habit by such a special powerful Impulse as would not follow Gods ordinary operation by meer natural second Causes As the seal set home on the wax by a strong hand maketh a deep impression more than when it 's laid on lightly by a child so are sacred objects and means and motives when set home by the spirit allowing for the differences of the things § 10. Whether in every true Believer a fixed Habit of Love instantaneously follow the first act of true faith though weak or whether in many God only give after the first act so small an increase of the Disposition as is short of the true nature of a habit till increased by frequent acts is a case that I think more difficult than needful to resolve § 11. That which God worketh in Infants is a seminal fixed disposition But I cannot prove that it is a proper Habit. § 12. Whether Adams Natural sanity or sanctity antecedent to his first Act was to be called more properly a Habit or only a seminal disposition I leave to others But if his and Infants be to be called Habits you must say that they are only certain General Habits such as Health in the Body and not those particular Habits which are strictly so called § 13. The nature of a Habit is not well known to mortal men We know that it is a strong and fixed Disposition to prompt and facile action of this or that special sort But what that Disposition is we well know not That is whether it be the robur of the essential virtues or faculties of the soul Intellection Will Activity And if so wherein that second Gradus Virtutis which is not essential differeth from the first that is And whether it be any thing else than a secret constant Act in and by which the soul is excited to more sensible acts it 's hard to know But certain I am that besides those Acts which taking in somewhat of Imagination or sense are ordinarily perceived by us which are our ordinary conversation the soul hath also some deep secret fixed acts which make no use of sense or Imagination or none that is observed and yet are the ruling acts of the man Such commonly is the Intentio finis which operateth constantly without memory or observation in all use of means As a travailer on his journey keepeth on his way while he seemeth wholly taken up with the occurrences company and talk of his way and thinketh not sensibly of his end And yet had he not an unobserved Intention of it he would not go on And night and day the soul hath this secret insensible sort of Action § 14. As when a spark of fire is blown up to a flame and the excited Act doth tend to more and the more it burneth caeteris paribus the more it is strongly inclined to burn And yet no man can say that here is any new Matter that was not before existent nor that the second degree of fire is not of the same nature with the first nor that there is any thing but nature and action which inclineth it to more action And yet how the same essence before not perceived is suddenly blown up by Action to such observable appearance and effects is past the power of man to understand aright So some such thing there is in the present case allowing for the difference of natures and kinds of operation SECT XVII Whether man be meerly Passive as to the first special Grace § 1. Answ 1. THe Nature of mans soul is to
the difference seemeth to be founded 1. See what the Brittish Divines say in the Synod of Dort de art 3. 4. suffrag p. 124. Th. 1. There are certain outward works ordinarily required of men before they are brought to the state of Regeneration Rom. 10. 14. Mat. 6. â—â— Act. 13. 46. Psa 58. 5. or Conversion which use to be sometime freely done by them and sometime freely omitted as to go to Church to hear the Preaching of the Word and such like Th. 2. There are certain inward effects which are excited in the hearts of those that are not yet justified previous to Conversion and Regeneration Act. 2. 37. by the virtue of the word and spirit such as are the knowledge of Gods will the sense of sin the fear of punishment the thoughts of deliverance some hope of pardon To the state of Justification Gods grace useth not to bring men by sudden Enthusiasm but prepared and fitted or disposed by many previous actings by the Ministry of the word As in natural Generation there are many previous dispositions 1 Cor. 4. 15. before the reception of the form so in the spiritual we come to the spiritual birth by many foregoing actings of Grace If God would immediately Regenerate and Justifie a wicked man not prepared by any knowledge any sorrow any desire any hope of pardon there were no need of the Ministry of man and the Word Preached to do it Th. 3. Those that God thus affecteth by his spirit by means of the Word them he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to faith and conversion We must judge of the helps of Grace by the nature of the offered benefit and by Gods plain word and not by the abuse and event Seâ—ing the Gospel of its own nature calleth men to Repentance and Salvation seeing the excitements of grace tend to it we must not think that 2 Cor. 5. 20. 2 Cor. 6. â—â— Gal. 1. 6. Rev. 3. 2. God here doth any thing dissemblingly Nor can it be imagined that that calling by the word and spirit can make men unexcuseable which is given only to that end to make them unexcuseable Th. 4. Those whom he thus affecteth God forsaketh not nor ceaseth to promote them in the true way to conversion before he is forsaken by them by voluntary neglect or the repulse of this initial grace The talent of grace once given men of God is not taken away from any man till he bury it by his own fault Therefore we are oft warned in Mat. 2â— 2â— Scripture not to resist or quench the spirit nor to receive the grace Heb. 3. 7. Prov. 1. 24. 2 Chron. 24. 20. of God in vain nor to fall from God Yea it is plainly given as the reason of Gods forsaking men that they first forsake him Th. 5. Many lose these beginnings Mat. 13. 19. Heb. 6. 4. 2 Pet. 2. 21. Th. 6. The Elect do not so behave themselves under these preparatory workings but that for their negligence and resistance they might justly be forsaken of God But such is Gods special mercy to them that though Joh. 6. 37. â—er 14. 7. 32. 39. Phil. 1. 6. for a time they may repel or suffocate this exciting and illuminating grace yet God doth urge them again and again and ceaseth not to promove them till he fully subjugate them to his grace and place them in the state of regenerate sons Th. 7. All men resist Gods grace and God might justly forsake all Rom. 9. 18. 11. 35. Act. 28. 27. but doth not By all this it is evident that they took not man to be forsaken of God in the state of meer original sin or the corrupt mass but as a wilful resister and refuser of offered Grace and oft after the receiving of much preparing grace and that God forsaketh none till they forsake his grace 2. To the same sence our English Divines commonly tell us how ordinarily God prepareth men for conversion before he convert them and how far persons unconverted may go in common grace He that readeth Mr. Hooker of New England Mr. John Rogers his doctrine of faith Mr. Boltons instructions for comfort Mr. Meads Almost a Christian and abundance such will see that they were of the same mind 3. Hence it is plain that those persons that resisted this further work of grace and forsook God first had true Power to have done otherwise and could have gone further than they did without any other grace than they had Though quoad necessitatem sequentem vel consequentiae it might be inferred even from Gods prescience that it could not be 4. They here describe Gods effectual grace by moral titles of Gods urging them till they yield though as after they open it Gods renewing active influx maketh new creatures and is not a meer moral indetermining suasion leaving the will indifferent 5. The truth is as is aforesaid no mortal man can tell of any difference on Gods part between his common and special agency on souls but only on the part of the work done Nay it is against the doctrine of all â—orts of Divines both Papists and Protestants as to the generality that there is any difference at all For they all say that all Gods actions ad extra are noâ—hing but his essence viz. his essential knowledge will and power which is undividedly one as terminated effecting related and denominated variously E. g. by one Volition he willeth divers products but not by divers volitions See the Conclusion of the first Chapter ex parte sui either considered specifically or numerically but the specification and individuation is only in the effects and in Gods will as relatively denominated And if this be all mens doctrine what an unhappy case is the Church faln into that the very same men that say this should yet intolerably quarrel Whether this one Divine attingency or operation shall be called Creation infusion urgency excitation perswasion physical hyperphysical moral or what else when all are agreed that all are one and the same ex parte Dei And as to the effects I do my self think that a certain Impulse received on the soul is the first effect and the Act of man as faith is but a second and that of both Causes But we cannot tell well what that Impulse is And therefore must dispute in the dark about the differences of it And this is nothing to them that own nothing but Gods essence as the cause of our act as the first effect If their opinion hold true that as in Creation there was no mediate Impulse between the Creator and the Creature for there was no recipient so here there is no effect on the soul before the Act and habit of faith it self then what is that Grace whose Ratio efficaciae we can make a Controversie of Ad hominem at least I may say that it is common acts and habits overtopt by fleshly interest and concupiscence which
think a good thought by any help that God can give him unless he physically predetermine him to it then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination and as it is night because the Sun shineth not XVII But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin because he is under no prohibiting Law Though it be true 1. That his nature or perfection the root of all Laws is more than a Law 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it which is none of the question XVIII And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning is not at all caused by God e. g. that we hate him not nor his truth and wayes and servants that we murder not commit not adultery steal not lye not covet not blaspheme not wrong none do no evil c. we need no help of God for this Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them it is impossible for us to do them at all XIX And though we say that God willeth sin to be by his permission only and not by his efficience yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause is the principal efficiency And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum and therefore permitteth not And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin and not because he meerly permitteth it For permission is not de impossibilibus XX. God willeth not sin because he willeth it not as sin in its formale which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not XXI And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future but as he willeth or decreeth them we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale was such as it is quid futurum if it was but futura privatio And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also XXII Gods Will is his Love and what he Willeth he Loveth XXIII God willeth the futurity and existence of sin not only of the materiale but the formale even of all the sin that ever is done XXIV The existence of sin is Good and Amiable not only by accident but per se as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God XXV It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth and Loveth and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid the circumstantiated act and so the resultancy of the relative form And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all and the thing existing so far as he causeth it XXVI God Willeth Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will but God with a Divine primary immutable will Man causeth the forbidden act whence the relation resulteth with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God as the pen writeth only sâ—o modo with Volition But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause of all that the Creature doth in sinning XXVII The same must be said of God and the Devil who can no more commit one sinful act till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it by his premotion than sinful man can XXVIII God by his Law doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth And he strictly commandeth all those good acts whose contraries he thus causeth us to do XXIX Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause of which God is not the Principal cause and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin and cannot behold it and hateth all the workers of iniquity and that it is abomination to him that he is as one laden with it and wearied provoked and offended by it And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness when he will not cause them but doth cause and will the contrary XXX Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God to the Reprobate themselves on condition that they will believe and repent when God doth unavoidably as the first cause determine their wills to the contrary acts even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness XXXI The Law of God is that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire if they will not believe and repent when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence and if they will not give over those acts of sin to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them XXXII Gods executions are answerable to these Laws and all save Christians and all professed Christians saving the sanctified are to be punished in hell fire for ever only for not doing the acts of Faith Love and obedience when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary and for doing the acts of sin when God unavoidably moved them to it and made them do it so that consequently all that are damned suffer in hell for not being Gods even the first sufficient causes of their own acts and for not being above God or stronger than he that is for not overcoming or avoiding his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts XXXIII The same must be said of the Devils who sin and suffer on the same terms XXXIV Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to that is for not overcoming God when they know the case Or must we not more congruously say that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them and a justifying of themselves Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement XXXV Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice and the exemplar of all humane Justice allowing for disparities And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course And how then would they be esteemed XXXVI Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love And therefore sin better than
commonest observation 3. All other Habits follow the Acts and therefore we have little reason to say it is otherwise here C. Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or disposed to it B. Inclination is a hard word and belongeth both to Natural Inclination such as we have to Felicity and to Habits and to meer Dispositions And a pre-disposition we grant As when you spur your Horse you make him first the patient of your act and by suscitating his natural faculty you dispose him to a speedy motion though the similitude doth not quadrare per omnia because Gods influx is on the whole Soul it self But this Disposition to the present act is far less than a proper Habit or it 's another thing C. When I spur my Horse or whip my Dog I do but stir up a former faculty or slothful power But God giveth a new life and power to them that were dead in sin B. Yet I cannot take words for matter 1. It 's nothing but the natural faculty or power which you suscitate in the beast And hath not an unbeliever the Natural faculties or power Is he not a man Why do you not bury him if he be not alive 2. Death in sin is relative or real The Relative is Reatus mortis which denominateth men filios mortis and is done away by pardon The real is the Privation of a holy disposition to the act of Faith and Repentance c. or of the Act it self or of the Habit. You can name no other Now 1. the death which consisteth in the privation of the first disposition to act supposing all natural dispositions is taken away by the first influx or suscitation of the Holy Ghost 2. And by the same in secunda instanti is caused the Act and the death gone that lay in its privation 3. And in the third instant or afterward by degrees is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit is called in Scripture and by Divines Sanctification as following Vocation and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once and that by the Spirits power with and by our exercised Acts. In my youth I was so prematurely confident of the contrary that the first Controversie that ever I wrote on was a Confutation of Bishop Downam Amesius Medall de Vocat Mr. Tho. Hooker c. in Defence of Pemble herein but riper thoughts made me burn that Script C. But the spur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horse but Gods Spirit putteth a new Power into us B. I have talkt long enough to you about Power before and therefore would not turn back needlesly to say it over again Gods Spirit putteth no such thing into us as we call a faculty or natural power For that is the form or essence of the Soul and our Species is not chang'd by Grace But he giveth us that which is called a Moral Power which consisteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects and the disposition of our faculties to the act Hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 12. lib. 2. He secretly maintaineth that every man hath such a power by Grace by which he may repent if he will Concerning which Tenet of his we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power but we say it is nature rather Page 18. Truly I see no cause to deny this that even the wicked could do good if they would We may safely say with Austin Omnes possunt Deo credere ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina praecepta servanda se convertere si velint Here is posse se convertere id est velte si velit But saith Twisse pag. 170. l. 1. But such is the shameful issue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural as if there were no difference which he oft sheweth is but the want of actual and dispositive willingness Now the rod or spur may cause both a present disposition and an act of will C. But is this all the new Life and Spirit and Divine Nature that is given us Sure it is much more B. No doubt but it is much more But that Spirit Life and Nature is promised and given to Believers and is promised on condition of our accepting Christ in whom is our life And therefore it is that habitual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith and is a nobler disposition to the following acts C. Will one act of ours cause a Habit B. Not as ours only But when the Spirit will work by it it will But even that Habit I told you is weak at first and increased by degrees But proceed and tell me Quest 7. Are you sure that in the Acquisition of Habits there is no immediate operation of God on the Soul that causeth them C. We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action of every Creature natural and free but not an immediate Infusion B. What 's the difference between Influx and Infusion C. The first is an universal operation the other a particular B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all ex parte agentis sen act us ut est agentis antecedent to the effect or only in the effect it self C. I dare not say that there is any difference in God for it is against his simplicity and his very will and act as in himself is his Essence though varioâ—sly related and denominated by cannotation Therefore I must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about meer words What 's the Crimination come to then about Acquired and Infused Habits when the difference is only in the effects You confess that all proper Habits Infused are by our cogitation and use of means and so are also acquired And you confes that all Acquired Aabits are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God so that as to the Causes you can name no difference And yet the words Acquired and Infused signifie a difference in the Causes and their operation and not in the Effect by their notation Is not this deceit then C. Tell me what you take to be the difference your self B. 1. I suppose that ab uno omnia God without diversity causeth all diversity which is only in the Creatures and not in him 2. I suppose that God hath appointed natural means and second causes for common natural effects and his Will is that they shall operate according to their aptitude And that he hath appointed extraordinary means even Christ and supernatural Revelation for the production of saving Faith And it is his will that they shall work usually according to their aptitude 3. It is his command that we use these several means natural and supernatural accordingly 4. As these means are special extraordinary and for a special end
never read that any mans damnation was any whit the more increased for not performing these acts And again page 170. It is true there is a Faith infused by the Spirit of God in regeneration But who ever said that any man was damned because he doth not believe with such a Faith As much as to say that non-regeneration is the meritorious cause of damnation C. I am amazed at this especially his supposing that no man ever said that which I thought no man of us had denied B. I would think that his meaning is that men are not condemned for want of Gods infusing act but their own believing act or for the privation of Infusion but for the privation of Faith or of Faith not quatenus infused but as they ought to have believed without infusion But he was not so wanting in accurateness but that he knew how to have exprest himself had that been his meaning And then I know not how his words will consist with this sense I never read that any mans damnation was the more increased for not performing these acts where changing their own hearts is one And whoever said that any man was damned because he did not believe with such a Faith Here it is the Faith as such which is supposed spoken of the privation whereof is not the meritorious cause of damnation And indeed though the power of this Faith would have been in us had there been no Sin or Saviour yet there would have been no obligation to believe in Christ as Mediator And therefore if the Law of Innocency had stood alone even the want of an acquired Faith in Christ would have been no sin But this is the unhappiness of such as must read Controversial Writings There is no end of searching after the Writers meaning But the thing it self I think is plain c. that only an effectual special Faith will save us and it is such a Faith of which Christ speaketh Mat. 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned though he believe with any other Faith whatsoever which he calleth acquired Perhaps this his opinion hath some dependance on what he saith before ibid. He punisheth the disobedient with eternal death True but according to what Covenant Not according to the Covenant of Grace that is only a Covenant for Salvation but according to the Covenant of the Law the Covenant of Works Woful error and confusion The Covenant of the Law is almost as bad a phrase as the Covenant of the Covenant 1. Gods Law of Innocency was a Law and Covenant in several respects 2. So was the Jewish Law which Paul meaneth by the Law of Works 3. So is the Christian Law of Christ and of Grace No man is now condemned by the Jewish Law of Works as such it being ceased and never did it bind the Gentile world The Law of Nature and of Innocency indeed condemneth the disobedient but the Law or Covenant of Christ or of Grace doth condemn them to much sorer punishment Luke 19. 27. Those mine enemies that would not I should reign c. Mark 16. 16. He that believeth not shall be damned Heb. 10. 29. Mat. 25. throughout But this confounding of the Covenants I must not here rectifie But yet I hope he meant only that men suffer not for want of Gods Regenerating Infusing Act but for want of their own act of Faith The fifth Crimination C. I find Dr. Twisse ibid. alibi saepe charging it on them as holding that Grace is given according to Works which is Pelagianism For they think that God looketh at some preparation in the Receiver and giveth it to some because they are prepared for it and denieth it to others because they are unprepared whereas it is not in him that willeth nor in him that runneth but in him that of his meer good pleasure sheweth mercy B. There is enough said of this after about differencing and effectual Grace But if we must say more I ask you Quest. 1. Do you by this phrase according to Works mean to urge the Scripture that speaketh in that phrase in its proper sense or do you Vulgatum illud facientâ— quod in se est Deus non denegat Gratiam intelligitur de faciente â—â— gratia auxilie Pet. â— S. Joseph Thes Univers de auxil pag. 83. Idem pag. 90. Nequidem ipsius Christi opera fuerunt actu meretoria citra promissiâ—nem Dei usi ex se essent valoris inâ—â—â—iti which needeth explication only use the phrase in some other sense of your own C. I use Scripture phrase in Scripture sense because I rest on its Authority B. Quest 2. Are we not also saved without Works in Scripture sense And would it be contrary to Paul to say we that we are saved by Works yea or according to them in that sense that he speaketh of them See James 2. 14 c. Tit. 3. 5. Ephes 2. 5 8 9. Gal. 3. 2. 5. 10. Acts 15. 11. c. and 16. 31. Rom. 5. 10 And yet saved according to Works in another sense James 2. 14 c. Phil. 2. 12. Gal. 6. 4. Rom. 20. 12 13. 2 Cor. 5. 10. C. In several senses of Works we deny it not B. Quest 3. At least you will grant that we are not justified by Works and yet that we are justified by Faith yea in another sense by Works Quest 4. Is not believing and repenting in order to Justification and all holy obedience in order to Salvation as truly opâ—â— a work and in a far nobler sense than preparation for Faith is C. That cannot be denied B. Then you cannot affirm that the phrase not according to Workâ— which excludeth not Faith Repentance holy Obedience to justification and salvation doth intend the exclusion of all preparation in order to Conversion or Faith in Christ when by Works excluded it meaneth the same thing or sort in all C. But saith Dr. Twisse ibid. page 154. Pardon and Salvation God doth confirm only on condition of Faith and Repentance But â—â— for Faith and Repentance doth God confer them conditionally also If so whatsoever be the condition let them look to it how they can avoid the making of Grace to wit the Grace of Faith and Repentance to be given according to Works B. I know he frequently saith the same But 1. I speak now only of the sense of that Scripture and say that this goeth upon a most false and dangerous supposition that Justification and Salvation are given according to Works though Faith and Repentance be not whereas in the sense of Works there meant by Paul no man can be justified by Works And though Christ saith This is the work of God that ye believe in him whom the Father hath sent yet it is not that which Paul meaneth Let not therefore Scripture words be abused to mislead mens understandings 2. But as to the matter of the Controversie I spoke to it enough
Whether God Actually in his mind thus Compare men and prefer one before another and say I will cause this man to believe rather than that I answer 1. There is no Act in God but his Essence which is invariable and indivisible 2. But because his operations as terminated and productive ad extra are various and have objective material causes of their diversity in the recipients therefore we usually thence denominate Gods volitions as various And so when we see that one man hath Grace given him to believe when another hath not we hence say that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other when the difference is not at all in God not his Act ex parte agentis but only of and by God in the Recipients C. But come yet nearer the heart of the case and tell me plainly 1. Whether the difference of Effects be more from the will and action of God or from mens different Receptive dispositions And 2. Whether all these different Receptivities be not of God B. Order bids me begin with the latter 1. The different Dispositions are of two sorts Good and Bad. God is not the cause of the Indisposition or illdisposition of any And as to the good disposition or Preparation of Souls no doubt but he is the principal Cause of it all but not the sole Cause nor always at least the necessitating Cause but oft giveth men that necessary help by which they might have been prepared for more when yet they are not through their wilful resistance or neglect For few men will deny that men have sufficient uneffectual Grace for some preparatory acts though not for faith Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects resulteth from the Causes in both Subjects and not in one only That which maketh one a believer and the other an unbeliever maketh them differ And I have told you what these Causes are But further I suppose as aforesaid a certain established order and degree of universal help external and internal by Christ to the Soul as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies This stablished order of Grace universally affordeth such a degree of Divine Influx and help as will cause faith in a prepared Soul and will not cause it in some much unprepared Souls For if as little help would serve the unprepared as the prepared to what use is preparation quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis In this case now the efficient of Grace is God and not Man but * That even Jesuits confess in their way of scientia media that the Ratio discriminis why one person rather than another hath Grace is from God initially and principally and not from any beginning in man See Ruiz proving it at large in all his Tract 3. Disp 18. 19. De Praedest exordio So that this is no difference between us Yea more he maintaineth that ante fidem niâ—il est dispositionis meriti aut impetrationis Sect. 3. Disp 19. 24. And one would think that this should satisfie even the Antinomians But he meaneth only that this disposition is not always necessary He that will in brief see what the Schoolmen say of preparative Grace may find abundance of them cited by Ruiz ibid. d. 21. per totam and what nature can do in preparation Greg. Armin in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. speaketh most like the Reformed Aug. de bono persever c. 8. Sed cur Gratia Dei non secundum merita hominum datur Resp Quia deus miserecors est Cur ergo non omnibus Et hic respondeo Quoniam Deuâ— justus Judex est the Ratio proxima of the difference in the event and effects is the Diverse disposition of the Recipients But here mark well that it is not the good disposition or preparation of one party that is the only and I think not the chief reason of the difference but the Privative and Positive indisposition of the other party is as much if not the chiefest reason If one man shut his eyes against the light when another doth not the Ratio discriminis why one man differeth from another in seeing and not seeing is on both parts but principally on his part that shutteth his eyes because the other doth but what he was made to do and all living creatures should do But the other absurdly crosseth nature So that under an universal Influx and help the said Influx is the efficient of the action or effect but the disposition of the Recipients are the Occasions and Reasons to be assigned of the various effects but especially the incapacity of the defective party As the reason why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit and not a dead stock is because the Tree is an apt recipient of its influx but the stock or stone is not 2. But Note that in case that God operate not by such an universal Influx only but also by superadded special or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace which by a difference from the universal Influx or degree is peculiarly apt to procure the effects here the ratio discriminis is principally to be ascribed to that special Grace and not to the preparations on the Soul C. Tell me then what you think whether God works by such an universal Grace or by such a special Grace 1. How far doth he work by universal Grace 2. Is that universal Grace ever effectual of it self on prepared Souls 3. How far doth he also use the special particular Grace which you mentioned B. I. To your first Qu. I answer 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in Adam and Eve and made no difference as to the present case 2. Eve having first sinned did make a difference between her self and Adam which God made not nor altered first his universal Grace 3. Adam next without Gods alteration by Sin did difference himself from himself as he was before 4. God then set up a new universal Grace even Christ with the new Covenant and Recovering means to give out universal help suited to his Covenant and means to be the Giver of the Spirit and the Light of the world we cannot have time now to open the difference between Christ's administrations before and after his Incarnation There was at first an universal sufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace 5. Cain that could have done otherwise wilfully sinned against this universal Grace and Covenant and so made a difference between him and the rest of mankind when God made none 6. Whether Abel did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this same universal Help alone or by any special extraordinary Grace ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti is a thing unknown to us because unrevealed 7. The Posterity of Cain as of Adam at first because Seminally in him and personally from his very guilty essence were justly deprived of some of that Grace both Subjective and Objective which Cain had deprived himself of Their natures were more vitiated and so
they were made less Receptive and more disposed as to the universal means and Influx And by his secession from the holy seed he was deprived of much outward means And having forfeited the Spirit he had less also of its helping Influx And thus he and his posterity made themselves to differ as if a Generation of Sinners should be born blâ—nd while the Sun shineth as it did before 8. The Holy seed that 's not yet Apostate have great subjective and objective Grace 9. The seed of Cain are still under the same Law of Grace and universal conditional promise that If they will believe and repent they shall be saved And they have some Means and some Help of Grace yet left them which have an aptitude by degrees to bring them back again to God And if they will not use that lower degree of Grace by returning as they can they forfeit that and further help 10. But yet God hath besides this Universal Grace some special and extraordinary ways and degrees of Grace for some according to his Good pleasure But this with the answer to your other two questions will come in better anon under the next head C. Having spoke to the matter now speak of the sense of the Text 1 Cor. 4. 7. and Rom. 12. 6. For who maketh thee to differ from another and what hast thou that thou didst not receive Now if thou didst receive it why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it B. It is most evident that Paul speaketh of the Gifts or Excellencies themselves primarily and of Differing from others but as a resultancy from those Gifts And he medleth not here with the question why others have not those Gifts as well as they and so why others differ from them q. d. Are not all those things of which you glory the free gifts of God And is it not by those free gifts that you differ as more excellent than others And should you boast of that which is Gods free Gift of which you are but Receivers To pass by the common answer that Paul speaketh of Ministerial Gifts and not of special Grace what Arminian can deny any of this about the Grace of faith it self 1. He must confess that we have no Grace to cause faith but what we have received For the Act which we performed is no otherwise to be said to be received but as we receive the gracious operation which causeth it 2. He cannot deny that by this Received Grace and Faith the believer in excellency differeth from unbelievers 3. Nor that such a Receiver hath no cause of boasting as if he had not received it Who will deny this C. But they leave him to boast that by his better preparation and disposition he was a fitter Recipient than another And so all boasting is not excluded B. 1. In Paul's Case of extraordinary Ministerial gifts there is less room for that much because they are not given so much according to preparations as saving Grace is For even ungodly men may have them 2. The boasting which is excluded is a boasting of our selves as against or without the glory of Grace as if we had some excellency which we had not received But our very Receptive disposition was received by Gods Grace even from his common preparing Grace And that common Grace was freely given 3. If by boasting you would mean an acknowledgment of Gods grace then all thanksgiving is boasting Or if a Rejoycing in the effects of that Grace as Received and improved by us then Paul so boasted often yea and to the death rejoyced in this testimony of his Conscience that in simplicity and Godly sincerity and not in fleshly wisdom he had had his conversation in the world 2 Cor. 1. 12. And that he tamed his body and that he suffered for Christ and that he had fought a good fight 2 Tim. 4. 7 8. If praising Gods grace in his Servants and that holy use of it in wisdom faith love obedience and patience be boasting God so boasteth of them and praiseth them even at judgment Math. 25. Well done good and faithful Servant And Scripture throughout so boasteth of them And we that must honour those that fear the Lord Psal 15. 4. must so boast of them also But this is not the forbidden boasting And as to Rom. 12. 6. 1 Cor. 12. Eph. 1. 6 7 8. and such like its past question that God freely diversifyeth Offices and such Gifts as he pleaseth and we know of no praedisposition to which even ordinarily he tyeth himself as to many of them But saving Grace is given more under a Law and stablished course of means in the use of which we must be fit Recipients The ninth Crimination C. They make the Grace of God to be Effectual not from the Will of the Giver nor from the proper force of the Grace it self so much as from the will of man concurring For they think that Gods Grace is but universal and indifferent and leaveth it to mans will whether it shall produce the act of faith or not so that the posse Credere velle is of God but the actu credere velle is of our selves This is the grand difference which I have reserved to the last and as Dr. Twisse oft noâ—eth the question Unde Gratia fit Efficax is it which they are loath to be brought to answer B. I know that this is cryed up as the great difference And where-ever things are mysterious and hard there will be variety of Conceptions and words from whence it will be easie to pretend real differences and make them seem great But because order befriendeth Truth we must be agreed first of the subject of the question what Grace is it whose Efficacy you dispute of I take it for granted that it is such as is to work in genere Causae Efficientis But tell me first whether you Arminius confesseth Gods infallible operation thus Nihil mali caveri posse nist Deo impediente certum est Sed de modo impediendi disputatur an ille sit ex Omnipotentâ— Dei actione in voluntatem hominis agente secundum modum naturae unde impeditionis existit Necessitas an vero ex tali actione quae agâ—t in Voluntatem secundum modum voluntatis quâ— liberâ— est unde impeditionis infallibilitas Armin. Exam Perkins pag 501. Note by Necessity Arminius doth mean Necessity consequentis vel effecti and confesseth necessity Consequentiâ— which here he calleth â—nfallibility And Dr. Twisse professeth that he and all the Schoolmen hold no other And note the unde that he maketh the Infallibility to result from the operation of God and not from his fore-knoâ—ledge only confess or not that there is such a thing as Universal Grace or Help of the Spirit fixedly or ordinarily accompanying or working by the means of Grace which operateth as the Sun ad modum recipientis and will not produce the same effect on one receiver as on another C. I
finem Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not If not then besides Gods essence there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent but the said cogitation and passion And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will 2. And if they do it must be but Morally which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event And so consent or our Volition it self would be but of co-operating Grace And if there be such a middle Impulse as Gregory holdeth it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants to determine the will only to act freely and therefore not to necessitate it to consent but only to ascertain it and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt B. And then 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul 2. And so the Help though universal will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such for being universal or uneffectual to others 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall and uneffectual in his fall 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise which shall not be always uneffectual So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ which is universal but uneffectual to the unprepared is not only sometimes but ordinarily effectual I think none can prove the contrary And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth antecedent to faith the second effect besides the extraordinary means I think it past mans reach to know C. Well now tell us Unde Gratia fit Efficax B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you that the effect is from all the causes and not from any one alone It is effectual in that it produceth the effect To which each cause doth its proper part and one is not all The effect in question now is Faith Faith is caused as is said 1. By Gods will as the Original 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit and meriting Grace first 3. By the Spirit as the Operator 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita and no other Having before wrought that preparation 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita working disposition and all at once Now here 1. Gods Will doth its part without any cause Velle ex parte Dei sicuâ— agere is his essence and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient but only an Objective Cause 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes Not qua voluntas simply moving them but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect So that plainly I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world but what God forewilled and nothing which he absolutely willeth cometh not to pass what he fore-knoweth is necessary necessitate Infallibilitatis and what he absolutely willeth necessitate Imutabilitatis and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect and not only the first yet none of them operate on the first Cause and put any force into it for the act So that its force is from it self but theirs from it And having said this much preparatorily I thus resolve your great question Here are three things before us whose cause may be enquired of 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse And this is the Decree or Will of God yea and his fore knowledge This is presupposed 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating And this prime effect is not our Faith or Act but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul For the Soul receiveth its like some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth it self It doth not Receive its own Act as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it Now if the question be of this first effect Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax I answer 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation it self It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei because it is an Act If it did nothing it were no Act transient 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object It is denominatively and Relatively one Act which is on a Stone and another on a Soul de specie And it is numerically one which is on Peter and another on John If the Sun did shine in vacuo there being no other creature to be objective or passive it would still agere but it would nihil efficere quia nihil afficere So God is one Infinite act and ex parte sui never begineth to act nor ever ceaseth nor is divided But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere but first by making objects and then acting on them So that were there no mobile Gods act would not movere This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause The Effective Cause is Gods Essence that is his Active Power Intellect and Will and nothing else Supposing now that it be not Gods operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of but immediately on the Soul it self But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect which is the Impress or Influx received 3. The Secondary effect is Mans Act Faith and Repentance it self If the question Unde Gratia sit efficax mean this as with most it doth then it is all one as to ask Unde hic Effectus For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately is the sole Cause is false Therefore the answer is that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct From Gods Will or Law and Power and Wisdom from Christs mission of the Spirit before merited from the Spirits Impress or Influx from the Gospel from the Ministry usually and from the Agent Believer all these as the efficient Causes And it is from or on the prepared Soul ordinarily as the Materia disposita vel Causa Receptiva Objectiva of the Divine operation And from or on God Christ the promise
made a Janizary A third the Parents dying leave to such as educate them vitiously And some the Parents apostatizing educate in Heresie or unpiety themselves 3. He oft casteth their lot under different means for their Edification One is set Apprentice to a Godly Master and another to an ungodly one One is cast under a Holy able Minister and another under an ignorant Seducer One is cast among Godly Companions and another among lewd Seducers idle wanton voluptuous unclean malignant scornful or other such tempting persons as that a great deal more grace or help is necessary to their preservation 4. One for ought we see of equal commerit is impelled or occasioned to go to Church just when an apt Sermon is prepared for him and another occasioned to be absent A Minister or Friend is sent as Philip to the Eunuch though by ordinary means to meet with one and speak suitably to his case and not to the other 5. One falleth under some great affliction which taketh him down and awakeneth him to seriousness and another swimmeth down the violent and dangerous stream of prosperity and constant health 6. One seeth some notable Judgments on others or some convincing Providences or hath some strange deliverance himself which another never hath 7. One Nation or Kingdom of equal ill desert hath the Gospel and powerful Preachers sent to them while others are left as the most of the world without it yea as the poor Islanders Laplanders Brasilians Soldanians and Canibals A thousand ways God hath to fulfil his Will which we know not of But besides all these in point of Means we see that under the same Means or Sermon or Family helps there is not the same success Not only because the unbelievers make the difference by sinning against sufficient universal Grace but because God doth especially touch the hearts of some by such Grace as he giveth not to others Thus did he open the heart of Lidia Act. 16. C. Methinks you should lay all on this Internal changing Grace and not on the difference of means B. Certain Experience telleth us that most usually God giveth extraordinary differing means where his Grace shall work different effects Christ himself who was to bestow extraordinary Grace after his Incarnation was himself to be an extraordinary means He must work Miracles raise the Dead rise from the Dead c. as the Means The Apostles that were to do extraordinary things in calling the unbelieving world to Christ were to do it by miracles and extraordinary means The 3000 Act. 2. must have the Apostles miraculous gift of tongues to be the means of their Conversion Cornelius must have both an Angel and Peter Paul must be strucken down and blind and hear Christ speak from Heaven and after have Ananias's Ministry The Eunuch must have Philip. The Jaylor Act. 16. must have an Earthquake and so of others And to this day we see how little God doth where there is no Ministry or Means And how much the success of able holy skilful Ministers doth differ from that of wicked or Ignorant sots And how usually in all the world the success goeth according to the means and that the instances of contrary are unusual rarities Therefore separate not what the wisdom of God hath conjoyned C. But do you think that God ever ascertaineth the Effect meerly by such Moral Differencing helps or means annexed to his universal Gracious Efflux or aid without a special degree of that Immediate Efflux it self on the Soul B. 1. We little know when God worketh Immediately and how far His Efflux or Action ex parte agentis I oft tell you hath no degrees being himself The degrees are in the Received Impress on the Soul And it 's like this special differencing Grace consisteth in a special degree of Impress But when that Impress is made by the Spirit without the Instrumentality of Means we know not God can make our own Imagination and spirit and inward temperament a means undiscernably to us 2. If I have proved to you that even the universal Grace it self with common means may attain the effect and doth in many who dare question whether All yea One extraordinary or special Means added by God to that Common Influx with a will of success may ascertain the effect It were Blasphemy to say that God hath not Wisdom enough thus to attain his ends by a series of adapted means in conjunction with that Grace C. But methinks you spin too fine a thred when you talk of an Impress of the Spirit on the Soul as the first Effect of God alone or God and the Means antecedent to faith or the Act of man as the second effect of God and Man together I find not that our Curiousest School Wits do talk much of such an Impress B. 1. You will find the same sence in the Thomists and many of the Schoolmen And methinks it is clear in it self The Act of Faith is done by us Our Souls have need of some Grace to be the Cause or it The Cause goeth before the Effect This Cause must not be out of us but within us Grace therefore must be first within us as a Cause before it is within us as the effect of it Yea Action being nothing but Modus Agentis is not a fit recipient it self immediately of a vis impressa It is the Soul or faculty that must Act and to say that Gods Influx is not on the Soul or faculty as the recipient but on the Act of that faculty aloue seemeth to be unintelligible if not absurd It is our Act or our Soul that needeth help or Grace If not the Soul but the Act then we have need of none at all For the Act is yet future that is is no act and nothing and so hath no need 2. But if really you will hold to the opinion that our Act it self is the first Effect of Gods Influx or Will then take notice that all our controversie here between you and the Arminians what Grace is sufficient and what effectual is at an end And it is on your part and for the truth that I spin that thred which you account too fine C. How do you manifest that B. Most plainly For if we have nothing to enquire after between Gods agency ex parte sui and the Act of Faith it is a ridiculous question to ask what Grace is sufficient and what effectual and what difference between the one and the other and what is that which maketh efficiently the difference For either your Question is of the Cause or the Effect If of the Cause it is besides the second Causes nothing but Gods Essence even his essential Activity Wisdom and Will And do you think that Gods essence is diversifyed as little and great more or less sufficient and effectual Do you enquire for Diversity in simple unity That which worketh all effects in the world is one Cause that hath in it self no real difference of parts kinds
received But they lay the certainty of our perseverance on Gods Decree and Promise Now say they God did not decree that it should be non-possibile but only that it should be non-futurum And so that he hath promised the non-futurity but not an impossibility of falling away 3. And yet they sometimes use the term impossible here But how 1. Say they There is a logical impossibilitas consequentiae And so there is on supposition of meer prescience and prediction For do but make this one of the premises God fore-knoweth that Paul will persevere and it is impossible this conclusion should be true Paul will not persevere But yet this may be nevertheless true It is possible for Paul to fall away But this impossibility of consequence in order of arguing is nothing to the impossibilitas rei in respect to the Causes 2. And also they say that there is impossibilitas hypothetica supposing that man willfully reject not Grace Gods Power it self is so engaged to defend him against Satan and all Enemies that it is impossible for them to overcome God and destroy him But here impossible is related to the power of Enemies only It is a thing that Satan hath not Power to do to conquer Grace 3. But when the question is of the Power of the Person himself they say It is unfit to say that he is unable to fall away or that it is impossible in respect to his own Power 1. Because that to fall away is an effect of Impotency and not of Power 2. Because God will not so operate by his Grace as to make a man unable to sin but unwilling and actually to keep him from it So that Grace doth not make us impotent to resist it and make it really impossible to us to fall away but maketh us able and willing to stand and causeth us freely de facto to persevere 3. And I must tell you that your Crimination is grounded on a lame and faulty recitation of their Opinion you name but half of it instead of the whole which is That the sanctified never fall away from the due fear and care and endeavour of persevering and consequently not from Sanctification or Justification And will you infer that a man needeth not fear care or live holily if certainly he shall do so A. Yes what need I take care of that which I shall certainly do B. That is what need you take care if you certainly shall take care A. What need I trouble my own head about that which God will do what-ever I do If he undertake to ascertain it I may leave it to him B. You talk contradictions God doth not undertake to secure your Salvation whether you will or not or care or not or labour or not But to cause you to will to care and labour And you say If God will make me willing I need not be willing If God will make me think of it and care and labour for it I need not think of it or care or labour for it The Sun need not shine if God will make it shine You need not eat if God decree that you shall eat Are not these weak Contradictions A. But as weak as you make it the Contradiction is their own For they first make God to make their falling away to be impossible or certainly non-futurum and yet say that he will make them fear it that is to perform an Act without the proper Object As if God decreed that they should fear Good as Good or love Evil as Evil No man can fear that which neither is nor is taken to be fearful An impossible or certainty non-future hurt is not fearful or an Object of fear unless to a mad man B. There were much weight in what you say but for that which you leave out 1. That objective certainty may be separated from subjective certainty that is men may be uncertain of that which is certain in it self 2. Yea few of the Godly have a strong assurance of their sincerity and Justification 3. And no man in this life hath a perfect assurance no more than other perfect Graces 4. And every mans faith it self in Gods Promises and fidelity is imperfect Therefore while all these are imperfect and not only so but liable to sad assaults and interruptions and decays 5. Yea and the person liable to such hainous sins as look terribly towards Apostacy you cannot say that fear is needless For though God decree the certainty of their perseverance that proveth not that they are perfectly certain of it A. But God will not found our Duty on our Sin nor command men to fear because through sinful weakness they do fear B. God will not make our Sin to be our Duty in sensu conjuncto 1. But God will make Duty on supposition that Sin maketh it necessary If you sin God will make sorrow and confession your Duty which would else be none 2. Yea more the same Act may be a Duty and a Sin in several respects And so may fear of Hell be A. Stay there Do you not then make God the Author of Sin For if he cause the Act as a Duty when it is caused it will prove a Sin too B. You mistake Two Causes may cause two Modes and Relations of the same Act and one not at all cause that which the other causeth God causeth every Act in genere act us which is sinful and yet causeth not the deficiency or exorbitancy of it As the Rider maketh the Horse go but not to go lamely God knowing our uncertainty of our own Election and Sincerity may make it our Duty by a wise and careful fear to avoid our own danger And yet that fear may not only come also from some ignorance and unbelief in our selves but have sinful degrees and so have that in it which God is not the cause of The second Crimination A. Their Doctrine tendeth to the indulgence of all sin * One would think that the Doctrine asserting the loss of Justification by mortal sin were stricter than the Calvinists But judge by the Jesuites Doctrine who teach that a man in mortal sin or unconverted may de congrâ—o merit Justification Ruiz de praedest exad d. 19. â—ect 4. p. 242. Ad meritum congrui non requiritur personam esse simpliciter Deo gratam quin potiâ—s propter peccatum mortale fit inimica Dei nihilâ—minus actus fidei alii qui ex side procedunt secundum se grati sunt quantum sufficit ut justificationem de congruo mereantur opera namque fraternae charitatis Heb. 13. miserccordiae sunt ut sacrificia quibus Deum per mortale peccatum amissum promeremur reconciliatum accipere 1 Joh. 1. si confiteamur c. So that Gods Justice is bound to be reconciled to and Justifie a wicked enemy for an Alms or for Confession Is not this an easie cure of enmity But the promise is made only câ—teris patibus to true Believers already
faith mentioned so oft in Scripture that is Upon and by believing we are first made just by free-given pardon and right to life and true sanctification with it and we are sentenced just because so first made just But this is not without our Faith and Repentance 2. And that Faith and Repentance are a Righteousness Evangelical that is a performance of the conditions on which the Covenant of Grace doth freely give us right to Christ pardon and life and so are the Constitutive causes of that subordinate Justification Lib. But your subordinate Righteousness hath no hand in our Justification P. This is but singing over the old Song by one that will not consider what is answered Have you thought on all the Texts even now cited Hath faith no hand in our Justification Hath the performance of a Condition and the Moral Disposition of the Receiver no hand in the Reception of a Gift What think you is the meaning of Christs words Matth. 12. By thy words thou shalt be justified and by thy words thou shalt be condemned What meaneth St. James that a man is justified by works and not by faith only Are men justified by that which hath no hand in their Justification Lib. Christ meaneth before men and so doth James and not before God P. This is notoriously false as contrary to the plain Text Christ speaketh of the Account to be given of our words in the day of Judgement vers 36. And James speaketh of that which men are saved by vers 14. and that Justification which Abraham had and that in an instance where Man did not justifie him and of that which was faiths life and perfection vers 17 22. and of Gods imputing faith for righteousness as to a friend of God vers 23. And is this nothing but Justification before men Lib. This is not the justifying of the man but of his faith P. 1. You contradict the Text which saith Abraham Rahab A man is justified by Works 2. You contradict your self For if the faith be justified the man is justified to be a true believer For how could a man that fulfilled the Law as Christ and Angels did be justified but by justifying his actions And how can he that fulfilleth the Gospel conditions be justified in that point but by justifying that he fulfilled them Lib. At least I may say that this is not the great and notable Justification which is only by Christs Righteousness P. We are not contending for its preheminence but its truth and necessity in a subordinate place Indeed we have one Justification by our Judges sentence which hath many parts and causes God as Donor is one cause and God as Judge another And Christ as meriting is the only meritorious cause of the Justifying Gift and Covenant and Christ as Intercessor another cause and Christ as Judge another And our Righteousness as it is our Right to Impunity and life another and our faith and Repentance are conditions All this is sure Lib. But the Justification by faith is our Universal Justification and that can be only by Christs Righteousness And we are not to trust to a Righteousness mixt of Christs and ours nor doth Christs Righteousness need to be patcht up with our menstruous rags P. 1. No question but Christs Righteousness is perfect and ours imperfect and ours is no patch or supplement to Christs He is not made righteous by our righteousness but we by his 2. But that which is perfect in him is not made perfectly ours nor formally ours in it self as distinct from its merited effects It is not ours as it is Christs Christ that is our Righteousness is also made of God to us wisdom and sanctification And will you say therefore that we are not to be Wise or Holy by any Wisdom or Holiness of our own for fear of adding our patch to Christs 3. You use to say that Christs Righteousness is ours as Adams sin is ours and say some as Adams Righteousness would have been had he persevered But 1. Adams Righteousness would have indeed made an Infant initially just by propagation that is the innocent Child of an innocent Parent But as soon as that Infant had the use of Reason and Choice he must also have a Righteousness of his own or perish And this is no patch to Adams righteousness And indeed in his Infancy he must have a seminal Holiness of his own to justifie him as well as the relation of a Son of Adam 2. So also though we are guilty of Adams sin by propagation yet we have with that guilt 1. An inherent pravity of our own 2. And at age our actual sin And both these are our unrighteousness as well as Adams sin imputed to us Even so Christ the second Adam is a Root of a righteous seed Our Contract by faith is as to him what our Natural propagation is as to Adam that is the Condition of our Interest in his merits We have as believers an initial righteousness in our relation to Christ But we have also from him 1. Inherent habitual righteousness 2. The actual righteousness of faith and true obedience and love And these have their proper use and office without which we must perish 4. And I must tell you that the word Universal is too big to be properly given to any mans justification or righteousness but Christs Properly he only is Universally justified or righteous who hath no unrighteousness at all imputable to him and is justifyable in all things But the best believer 1. Was once a sinner originally 2. Did oft sin actually 3. Hath still sin in him 4. And for some sin may be punished by the Magistrate 5. And for sin is judged and punished by chastisements and death by God 6. And the earth still cursed for our sake 7. Yea which is worst of all we are still under the penaâ—ty of some privations alas how great of Gods Spirit and its Grace and our Communion with God And all this must be confessed And such a one is not Universally justified or just Lib. But still our own Righteousness doth but make us such as thankful persons must be for their Justification by Christ and is no part of that Justification by faith For if faith it self be that Righteousness we have not faith by faith and faith is not imputed to faith but Christs Righteousness is it that is imputed P. Of Imputation in due place 1. What need you talk against that which none of us assert Do we not all hold that our personal Gospel-Righteousness is subordinate to Christs and is by his Gift as ouâ— Wisdom and Sanctisication is Who dreameth that our faith is any part of Christs Righteousness But why do you waste time in vain cavilling against plain certain truth Is there any thing in Name or Thing asserted by us that you can deny or question Quest 1. Do you deny that Scripture commandeth us to Believe that we may be justified Lib. No. P. Quest 2. Or
but the Baptismal Covenant where sure the condition is notorious and every Baptizing Minister prerequireth the profession of it CHAP. VII Whether Justifying Faith be a Believing in Christ as a Teacher Lord c. or only a Receiving of his Righteousness P. VI. AS to this your sixth Charge I have said so much elsewhere in my Disputations of Justification and in other Books that I cannot justifie the tiring of Readers by repeating it And will say now but this little following 1. That Paul doth not distinguish between justifying faith and saving faith but excludeth the Works excluded by him from being the causes either of Justification or Salvation 2. That if Receiving Christs Righteousness be meant by them properly and physically it is no sort of faith at all but only the effect of the donation which they call Justificari or passive Justification But if it mean a moral metonymical Reception that is nothing but Consent to have the offered gift And if only Consent to have Christs Righteousness be Justifying faith then all the Assenting part is excluded in which Scripture much placeth it and most Divines in part and many in whole besides Camâ—ro and his followers And so also all the Affiance or Fiducial â—cts are excluded which almost all include even that which they call Recumbency being distinct from Consent 3. All these acts following are essential to Justifying faith as well as this Consent to be Justified 1. An Assenting belief in God in the baptismal sense 2. An Assent to the truth of Christs Person Office and Doctrine 3. A belief in the Holy Ghost 4. A belief of Pardon Sanctification and Glory as possible purchased and offered by Christ 5. A Consent that God be our God in Christ 6. And a Consent that Christ be our Teacher 7. And our King and Ruler 8. And our Intercessor 9. And our Judge and Justifier by sentence and as our Advocate 10. A belief of his Resurrection Power and Glory 11. A Trusting to the Father and the Son according to these forementioned Offices 12. A Consent to be Sanctified by the Holy Ghost 4. Plainly our Justifying and Saving Faith in Pauls sense is the same thing with our Christianity or becoming Christians And the same thing with our Baptismal faith and consent 5. To believe in Christ as Christ is in Scripture Justifying faith But to accept his righteousness only and not to believe in him as our Lord and our Teacher and Intercessor c. as aforesaid is not to believe in him as Christ 6. In my Answer ubi sup to Mr. Warner and elsewhere I have detected the fraud of their quibling distinction who say that All this is in faith quae justificat but not quà justificat as supposing a falshood that any act of faith quà talis justifieth 7. They that say that only our Acceptance of Christs Imputed Righteousness is the Justifying act of faith and that to expect to be Justified by any other viz. by Believing in God the Father and the Holy Ghost and believing a Heaven hereafter and believing the Truth of the Gospel and of Christs Resurrection Ascension Glory c. and by taking him for our Teacher Ruler Intercessor c. is to expect Justification by Works in Pauls disclaimed sense and so to fall from Grace I say they that thus teach do go so far towards the subverting of the Gospel and making a Gospel or Religion of their own as that I must tell them to move them to repentance not only the adding of Ceremonies is a small corruption in comparison of this but many that in Epiphanius are numbred with Hereticks had far lesser errors than this is CHAP. VIII Of Faiths Justifying as an Instrument P. VII ANd I have said so much in the foresaid Disputations of Justification and other Books of Faiths Instrumentality and the reason of its Justifying interest that I cannot perswade my self now to talk it out with you all over again but only to say 1. That I have fully oft proved from many plain Scriptures that pardon and salvation are given with Christ in the Covenant of Grace on Condition of a penitent believing fiducial acceptance And therefore that it is most certain that faith is a Condition of our Justification and so to be profest in Baptism 2. The name of An Instrument given to faith and its Justifying as an Instrument are of mens devising and not in Gods Word 3. But as to the sense It is certain that faith is no Instrument of our Justification Gods or Mans if it be meant properly of an Instrumental efficient cause 4. But if it be taken Metaphorically for an Act whose Nature or essence is An Acceptance of a free Gift and so by Instrumentality be meant the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere that is Faith 's very Essence in specie then no doubt it is what it is 5. Or if by an Instrument be meant A Moral aptitude or Disposition of the person to be justified answerable to the Dispositio Recipientis vel materiae in Physicks then it is such an Instrument But how well this is worded and what cause there is to contend for a word both of humane invention and metaphorical and this as if it were a weighty Doctrine I leave to sober judgements 6. But it is certain that the Accepting Act of faith is but its Aptitude to be the condition of the Gift and therefore that its being made by Christ the Condition is its Moral nearest interest in our Justification CHAP. IX Whether Faith it self be imputed for Righteousness Lib. VIII WHat do you but subvert the Gospel when you put faith instead of Christ or of his Righteousness When the Scripture saith that we are justified by Christs Righteousness Imputed to us you say it is by faith imputed P. Do you think any sober Christians here really differ or is it only about the Names and Notions Which ever it be 1. Of the name Is it not oft said that Faith is and shall be imputed for Righteousness Rom. 4. 22 23 24. James 2. 23. Lib. Yes I must grant the words but not your meaning P. Where doth the Scripture say that Christs Righteousness is Imputed to us Remember that it is only the Name that I ask you of Lib. It saith that Righteousness is Imputed and what Righteousness â—an it be but Christs P. I tell you still it is only the phrase or words that we are first trying Are these the same words Righteousness is Imputed and Christs Righteousness is Imputed If not where are these latter words in Scripture Lib. Grant that the words are not and your words are P. Then the question is Whether Scripture phrase or mans invented phrase be the better and safer in a controvertible case And next Whether you should deny or quarrel at the Scripture saying that faith is imputed to us for righteousness and not rather confute our misexpounding it if we do so Lib. Well Let us examine the sense then What
Beumler and many others And Paraeus Joh. Crocius de Justif and many more expresly deny Christ's righteousness to be the formal cause And I believe that all they that assert it mean as the rest though they speak incautelously and unaptly And what they mean by Imputation let Davenant speak ib. c. 27. p. 359. Imputantur quando illorum intuitus respectus valent nobis ad aliquem effectum aeque ac si a nobis aut in nobis essent siquis indignus aut ignavus ob paternam virtutem merita erga rempublicam in gratiam regis admittatur gratum nobilitatum dicamus per propter Imputationem virtutis paternae This is Bradshaw's sense but yet the similitude falls short So Altingius states the Question Loc. Com. part 2. p. 679. An justificatio consistaet in Imputatione Justitiae Christi hoc est in Imputationae Justitiae per Christum acquisitae And what Protestant will deny this And Maresius with him saith Cum Paulo justitiae Imputatio peccatorum remissio idem sint prout nullum est discrimen inter satisfactionem Christi illius meritum non est necesse subtilius inter haec dùo scrupulose distinguere cum remissio sit peccatorum tum commissionis tum omissionis per illam jus plenum ad vitam aeternam habeamus But this needeth somewhat more I think Loc. 11. p. 284. And the description of the effect sheweth what the Imputation is which Maresius truly thus describeth Exeg Art 23. p. 326 327. Transit reatu peccatum orig ut non amplius imputetur adhaeret quidem ei inseparabiliter Reatus potentialis sive in actu primo ut sonat intrinsecum meritum poenae sed ablatus est Actualis sive quoad actum secundum ut sonat jus voluntatem Dei de paena illa adhuc exigenda N. B. Thysius in synopsi Leidens Disp 33. p. 413. saith Mirum hic videri non debet Christi justitiam non meritoriae solum materialis imo Formalis causae rationem habere cum id fiat diversi mode nempe qua illa est propter quod in quo seu ex quo per quod justificamur So he taketh Christ's righteousness to be all three the meritorious material and formal cause of our Justification De nomine I add as to our Author 1. I hope few will follow him in calling the Decrees of God the Covenant and confounding Election and the Covenant in Constitution For my part I will not 2. Constitution signifieth 1. actum Constituentis 2. more usually passively statum seu rem constitutam God's Eternal Purpose is not properly the Covenant in Constitution in either sense 3. God's Eternal Decree is nothing but his Essence for there is nothing in God but God and nothing but God eternal denominated as related to its connoted object which from eternity was nothing And the Covenant in Constitution is not God nor shall be by me so called 4. Nor will I call the whole execution of God's Election by Christ the Covenant in Execution nor any part of it but that which Scripture so calleth 5. I grant him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is usually taken for a divine disposition and constitution but that is not meerly in God's Decree but as Grotius hath at large opened Praef. ad Annot. in Evang. as it is God's signal revealed determination of the terms of life and death or as it is a Law and a Covenant on God's part imposed on us before we consent And Jer. 33. 20. doth not call God's meer Decree his Covenant but his created course and law of nature 6. He that will but try the Texts which his Concordance referreth him to and cannot find a multitude of places where the word Covenant is taken for somewhat else than God's Decrees and their general Execution even for a Law with its premiant and penal sanction and for a free donation or promise which yet hath its proper conditions as the moralis dispositio recipientium and that cannot find divers such Covenants made by God with Christ and us that are really distinct and not to be confounded must not expect that I here trouble other Readers with such a task as his conviction 7. I fully agree that Christ's righteousnrss is fitly called both the meritorious and material cause of our Righteousness or passive Justification Though I lately read one contending that it cannot be both For we mean but that it is that Matter or Thing which meriteth it The First Part OF THE Nature Relations Knowledge AND DECREES OF GOD AND OF FREE-WILL AND PROVIDENCE As the Objects thereof Such selected Verities as are needful to reconcile the common Differences about Predestination Providence Grace and Free-will between the Synodists and Arminians Calvinists and Lutherans Dominicans and Jesuits c. By RICHARD BAXTER LONDON Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV THE CONTENTS Sect. 1. WHAT Knowledge of God is here to be expected Pag. 1. Sect. 2. Of mans Soul as the Glass or Image in which God must be seen p. 3. Sect. 3. The several inadequate Conceptions which together make up the most exact and orderly Knowledge of God p. 4. Sect. 4. The Relations and Denominations of Gods Active Power Knowledge and Will as to the Creatures p. 6. Sect. 5. Of Futurity and the pretended Eternal Causes of it and Gods Knowledge of it p. 8. Sect. 6. Of the Co-existence of the Creature with God in Eternity and of Gods Knowledge of them as existent p. 13. Sect. 7. Of the presumptions and uncertainties of many Scholastick Disputes about Gods Knowledge which should moderate our censures of Dissenters in such matters and check our sinful curiosity p. 15. Sect. 8. More of Gods knowing things future and of Permission of sin p. 24. Sect. 9. Of Predetermination Universal Causation Humane Power and the Nature of Liberty of Will Distinguished in a Table p. 27. Sect. 10. Of Natural and Moral Power and Impotency Their difference p. 36. Sect. 11. More of the same and Whether God bind man to Impossibilities p. 39. Sect. 12. Of Scientia Media p. 42. Sect. 13. Of the Will and Decrees of God in general Their simplicity and diversity supposed priority and posteriority Of Negations of Nolitions and Volitions of Negatives c. p. 45. Sect. 14. Several distinctions of Gods Will explained 1. Positive acts and non-agency 2. Positive and Negative as to the object 3. Positive and Oppositive Volitions and Nolitions 4. Immanent and Transient 5. Efficiently Transient and Objectively Transient 6. Natural and Free 7. Efficient and Permissive 8. Beneplaciti signi de eventu de debito Decretive and Legislative Where the true nature of Laws is opened 10. Absolute and Conditional 11. Effectual and uneffectual 12. Antecedent and Consequent p. 49. Sect. 15. Whether Gods Decrees must be said to be diversified and proved according to the order of Intention or Execution Whether
he is 1. The Actor or Motor of all things by his Active Power 2. The Governor of all according to their several Natures by his wisdom 3. The Perfecter of all things in their attingency or fruition of their proper End by his Goodness 33. VII As to MAN in special God is now Fundamentally Related to him as his CREATOR his REDEEMER and his REGENERATER or SANCTIFIER eminently ascribed distinctly to the FATHER SON and HOLYSPIRIT From whence floweth NATURA MEDELA SALUS or NATURE REDEEMING GRACE and RENEWING GRACE HOLINESS and GLORY that is LOVE begun here and perfected in Heaven 34. VIII From CREATION there resulteth a Threefold Moral Right and Relation of God to Man 1. He is our Absolute OWNER or LORD to dispose of us and Act us by his Power 2. He is our Supream RECTOR Morally to Rule us as Intellectual free-agents eminently by his Wisdom 3. He is our LOVER and Ultimate END as he is Goodness and Love it self To Love Him and be Loved by him perfectly for ever being Amantissimus Amabilissimus in his Goodness 35. He that leaveth out any one of these Relations of God to man to be Our Owner Ruler and Lover and End leaveth out that which is Essential to Our God as the word is Relatively used in the Precepts and Promises of the Holy Scripture SECT IV. Of Gods Relations to the Creature and denominations thereupon in his Power Knowledge and Will 36. THe Three Divine Essential Principles Related to the Creature ad extra are denominated 1. His Omnipotence 2. His Omniscience or Knowledge of them 3. His Volition and Love of them He who is Potentissimus perfectly Powerful in Act in Himself is denominated Omnipotent because he can do all things ad extra which belong to That Gods Power is Infinite quia est ipsa Infinita Essentia is past doubt But whether it may be called Infinite as respecting outward objects is disputed And some prove the affirmative by asserting Infinite Objects But Gregor Ar. n. 1. d. 43. q. 2. hath reasons too subtile to be here recited One of them Vasq useth in 1. Tho. q. 25. d. 103. c. 2. disp 104. Vid. opiniones Gabriel Scoti Thomae de ratione nominis Omnipotentia Divinae Power 2. And he who is Intellectus se Intelligens ad intra is denominated Omniscient or Knowing all Creatures from the exterior objects 3. And he who is Voluntas se Volens or Amor se Amans ad intra is also denominated willing of exterior things 37. But by the way how the Creature is called exterior to God who is Essentially every where and in all and how God is not a Part of Universal Being and how God and the Creature are no more than God alone is elsewhere somewhat explained but transcendeth mans Understanding to comprehend 38. Gods Transient Acts are of two sorts 1. Effectively Transient as Creation Regeneration c. which do cause somewhat without 2. Objectively only Transient which cause nothing but suppose the Object 39. It is a dreadful thing to be over-bold rash and presumptuous in speaking and asserting any thing without clear proof of Gods Knowledge and Will especially to reduce them to all the Modes and Methods of a man even as to the order of his Acts seeing we are forced to confess that even Intellection and Volition are spoken of God with exceeding great impropriety D'Orbâ—llis 1. d. 40. inquit â—icet in Deo non sit proprie Habitus est tamen ibl aliquid intellectum à nobis per modum habitus siquidem scientia in nobis est Habitus ad cognoscendum sicut Virtus est habitus ad operandum Cognitio Divina cum semper maneat congrue signatur per modum habitus and mans Acts which are the prius significatum are further below Gods than a Worm is below a Man Therefore were it not that the presumption of the Schools and Polemical writers hath made that Necessary as Defensive which else would not be so I should scarce dare to say this little following 40. I. The Power of God is denominated Relatively Omni-potency in three instants to Three several Objects 1. In the first instant as to All things which belong to Power And so God can do all things which are hence called Possible 2. In the second instant to All things meet or Congruous to the Divine Intellect to be willed and done And so we say that God can do All that is meet to be done and nothing that is unmeet 3. In the third instant of reason as to All things which he willeth to do And so we say that God can do whatsoever he will do And so Possibility hath various senses 41. II. Gods Intellect is Relatively denominated Omniscient in respect â—eid Rom. quodl 3. q. 3. saith That Gods speculative knowledge is before his Velle but his Practical determined ad oâ—â—s is after as we must conceive of it to three sorts of Objects also in three instants 1. In the first instant he knoweth all Possibles in his own Omnipotence For to know things to be Possible is but to know what He can do 2. In the second Instant he Knoweth all things as Congruous eligible and Volenda fit to be Willed And this out of the perfection of his own wisdom which is but to be perfectly Wise and to know what perfect Wisdom should offer as eligible to the Will 3. In the third instant he knoweth All things willed by him as such as Volita which is but to know his own Will and so that they will be 42. In all these instances we suppose the Things themselves not to have yet any Being But speak of God as related to Imaginary beings according to the common speech of men 43. These therefore are not properly Transient Acts of God because it is but Himself that is the object indeed viz. His own Power Wisdom and Will though it be de creaturis in that which is called his Idea's 44. It is usual with Divines to ascribe Idea's to the Divine Intellect after the manner of men against which I quarrel not but am my self afraid of presumption 45. From what is said you may see that the Common School distinction of all Gods Knowledge into scientia simplicis Intelligentiae purae Visionis is not accurate and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notifie the thing intended and that the scientia media added doth not mend the matter And that a fitter distinction is plain and obvious 46. III. Also the Will of God as Related to things not yet existent hath in several instants a threesold object as we may conceive of God after the manner of men 1. The Possibility of things which God is said to Will in Willing his own Power as respecting them 2. The Congruity Goodness and Eligibility of things as in his own Knowledge which is but to Will the perfection of his own Understanding 3. The Future existence of things Good and
Possible and Future we must be very fearful and not unreverent and rash in ascribing such a dance or lusus of notions to God unless as used with great impropriety after the manner of weak man 70. God knoweth his own Power Knowledge and Will And so knoweth what he can do what he knoweth to be eligible and what he will do And if any will call this knowledge of God by the name of the Possibility or Futurity of the thing known or will denominate Nothing as an Imaginary something as Possible and Future relatively from Gods Power Will or Knowledge Let them remember 1. That Nothing hath no relation 2. That properly they should but give the denomination to that which is that is to Gods Power Will and Knowledge and say God Can e. g. make a World or Will do it and not to that which is not And when they say that e. g. the world is eternally possible or future they can justly mean no more but that God can and will make it 3. And that this is but lis de nomine and not a real difference whether futurition be thus from Eternity 71. And especially let them remember that nothing in God is Caused There are no effects in God Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God and therefore possibility and futurition must needs be names of God himself or some Divine perfection or conception which is himself if they be said to be eternal so such Possibility and futurity can have no eternal cause For God hath no Cause nor any thing in God 72. If the Futurity of sin must have an eternal Cause then God causeth Pennot l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers saying that things are not future because fore-known but fore-known because future And Augustine Greg. M. Boetius Ansâ—lm Lomb. Aquin. saying the contrary And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being the first is true and in regard of free acts the second I think that in regard of sin neither is true Unless Because signifie only rationem denominationis objectivam And even if so it is dubious whether they be not simultaneous as Relations are the futurity of all sin But that is not so For none is the Cause that sin will be but he that mediately or immediately causeth the being of it when it is 73. Imagine per possibile vel impossibile that a thousand years hence a free created agent that can do otherwise will cause such an act It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cause into the notion It is called Future because it will be and not because there is at present existent any cause from whence it will be mediately or immediately 74. Though Futurity be Nothing yet this Proposition is something This or that Will be And to know the futurity of a thing is most properly to know the truth of that proposition It will be 75. God knoweth not by Propositions for that is the imperfect mode of man But he knoweth Propositions when they are existent as humane instruments or conceptions And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propositions of futurity 76. What man knoweth by Propositions God knoweth otherwise by a more transcendent perfect but incomprehensible way Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be which will be 77. There were â—o Propositions from Eternity For man that useth them was not And God useth them not though he know them as used by man Therefore this proposition Hoc futurum est was not from Eternity Because non entis non sunt affectiones 78. But if there had been such Propositions from Eternity as The world will be made Christ will be incarnate c. they would have been true And so the eternal Futurity of things as commonly disputed of can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Proposition de futuritione which was no proposition because then there was none only in time mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures who might have used propositions de futuritione rerum which if they had they would have been true 79. All Verity is either 1. Rei 2. Conceptus 3. Expressionis And 1. Ubi non est Res ibi non est Veritas Rei The thing which was not from Eternity was not a True Thing from Eternity 2. The Divine knowledge that such and such things will be was True from Eternity by an incomprehensible way above propositions 3. If there had been any Propositions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione they would have been true And this is all that can truly be said of the Eternity of futurition 80. Only this being added that so far as Gods will was the first Cause determining of any thing that will be so far he was eternally the Cause of the truth of this proposition Hoc erit when such a proposition shall be 81. But where Gods Will is not the first cause of the Thing which will be there it is not his causing the truth of the proposition that is the cause that it will be Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be 82. Moreover whatever is from eternity must be Res or modus rei or Relatio But from Eternity there is no Res futura no modus rei futurae no Relatio rei futurae * * * I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122 c. asserteth these four things 1. That aliquid potest reserri realiter ad non ens 2. Non ens potest realiter referri ad ens 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat 4. Quod Deus realiter reserlur ad creaturam ex tempore And his reasons are very considerable for three of them But as to the second which concerneth our case he faileth For 1. his first reason that relations are ever mutual or convertible I deny his proof as vain as to the reality of the relation 2. And that res non existens is causa I deny Fuit causa non est 2. And remember that he instanceth only in things as caused or foreknown Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known 3. Remember that his Master Ockam hath oft in Quodl proved that Relations are Nothing besides the quid absolution and Reason Being nothing but Comparabilitas all is but to say that God fore-knew what would be and therefore had there been such a proposition from Eternity as This will be it had been true Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav ib. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Durand 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot. ib. q. 1. Cajet Bannes Rip Zumel Nazar Molin Vasqu Arrub. c. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc 5. s 3. Alvar. de Auxil disp 16. Snarez de Aâ—xil l. 1. c. 13.
Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
Volitum is not esse existens And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter 129. Yea it is here disputed Whether there be indeed any contingency Read the dispute of Pet. Alliac Camerac m. 1. q. 11. ar 3. R. S. and Gregories and Okams and his own opinion about the possibility of Gods not knowing what he knoweth and that it is in the power of the Creature to make God not to have known them and much more such like I confess I tremble to read not the falshood but the boldness and presumption of such disputes as fearing they are prophane or not which the Doctrine of Hobs and the Dominican Predeterminants must needs exclude which make all events to be necessitated by God The Reasons against it are 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth must necessarily be but he fore-knoweth all that will be ergo 2. All things future are from eternity determined in Gods will to one part of the contradiction ergo necessario erunt 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done by the physical efficient necessitating insuperable predetermination of God the first cause ergo there is no place in such necessity for contingency which is a posse tendere ad esse vel non esse 130. Many and different answers are given to these and those of the Thomists and Dominicans are mostly shuffling and vain But plainly and briefly 1. Gods fore-knowledge 2. And his meer will when they are not joyned efficiently with power or a will de efficiendo do no whit at all Cause or necessitate the effect or event or ponere aliquid in objecto It is only a Logical necessitas consequentiae in ordine probandi that ariseth Vid. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 38. dub 1. Bonaventur and saith Dr. Twiss all the Schoolmen say the same from them which consisteth with contingency and not a physical necessity in ordine essendi as from a Cause called consequentis or effecti And 2. Gods Knowledge and Will rather prove contingency For he doth not only know and will hoc futurum but hoc contingenter futurum Therefore it will be 3. And the last argument from necessitating predetermination I shall elsewhere confute and shew their contradiction who say that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to pass 131. But it cannot be denyed but that Gods will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event And therefore that Necessitate existentiae the determination of it is eternally necessary And therefore that which we call Its Liberty is but the perfect manner of its determination as Bradwardine confesseth 132. But what is all this stir about The great business of all is to shew how God fore-knoweth sin For saith Rada It 's easie from Gods Ibid. ar 3. p. 503. Volition to shew how he knoweth things that are not sin but how knoweth he sin from eternity seeing this was never in esse volito And Vid. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. Bonav ib. q. 1. a. 3. Durand ib. q. 1. Cujet Bannez Zumel Ripâ— Gonzal Mâ—lin Vusqutz Arrub. Fasol Aluiz 1. p. q. 14. a. 10. Tanner 1. p. disp 2. q. 8. dub 8. Granad 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5. here the way of the Scotists proveth utterly insufficient Dr. Twisse and Rutherford and some Dominicans say that God fore-knoweth it because he Decreed to Cause all the Entity of the Act with all its circumstances from which the form of sin is but a resulting relation But this subverteth Religion Rada ibid. and Twiss oft say he Decreeth to permit it and that it shall come to pass ipso permittente saith Twiss Quâ— permissio saith Rada non accipitur in communi sed pro eo quod est permittere Ibid. art 3. p. 503. de facto deficere in peccatum ruere subtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus positis non foret peccatum Quare haec est bona consequentia quantum ad illationem prcaise Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic nunc de facto ergo peccat ergo valet consequentia Deus voluit ab aeterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali tali occasione oblata ergo peccabit Dixi quantum ad Illationem praecise Quia quantum ad Causalitatem non est bona illa consequentia * * * Vid. Ruiz de scient d. 17. Gr. Valent. p. 1. disp 1. q. 14. punct 7. Alarcon 1. p. tr 2. disp 3 4. But to pass by their supposition of Gods knowing consequences by argumentation I shall confute all this anon 133. And here the Thomists and Scotists have another skuffle on the Vid. Aquin. 1. p. q. 14. art 13. ad secundam Scot. â—â— 1. d. 39. q. 4. Rad. li. 1. Coâ—t 30. art 5. pag. 310 311 c. See Lychet Confutation of Cajetan and Ockam at large in 1. p. d. 39. q. 1. fol. 254. ad 268. Leg. Pennot li. 3. c. 11 12. p. 118 119 c. question Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of existency in God be Necessary in him or free and contingent The Thomists thus conclude 1. Si futurum contingens secundum se suam propriam naturam consideretur necessitas nullatenus ei convenire potest sed sola contingentia 2. Si futurum contingens consideretur secundum quod subest Divinae scientiae est necessarium absolute 3. Haec propositio Deus scivit Antichristum futurum est simpliciter absolute necessaria sed hoâ— consequens Ergo Antichristus erit non est absolute necessarium sed contingens si secundum se consideretur At ut divinae scientiae subest est absolute necessarium 4. Scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium prouâ— jam ad ipsa est terminata est simpliciter necessaria And they prove the affirmative thus 1. Gods knowledge is Immutable therefore necessary 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection therefore necessary in God 3. This Can be in God therefore it necessarily is in him 134. The Scotists thus express their sense after much explication 1. Futuro contingenti secundum suam propriam naturam consider ato nullâ— necessitas conveire potest 2. Futura contingentia etiam ut subsunt Divinae scientiae non sunt necessaria 3. Futurum contingens etiam at subest Divinae scientiae est qâ—oad esse simpliciter contingens secundum quid necessarium 4. Propositio haec Deus scivit Petrum futurum sive sit de praesenti vel de praeterito non est simpliciter necessaria sed ex suppositione 5. Praefata propositio omnia futura contingentia sunt necessaria necessitate immutabilitatis 6. Scientia Dei respectu omnium creaturarum quoad esse existentiae earum est contingens ex suppositione necessaria I recite the words of Rada only that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruse too many Authors and because no man better discusseth the differences See also his answers to the
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
de praescientia Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae Quia necessario infertur sequitur Deus praescivit hoc Ergo hoc erit Sed tamen non necessario praescit quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae sed non consequentis quia non mutat eventum rei unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum non potest falli sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert that is in arguing non potest impediri Annatuâ— de scient Med. cont Twiss de Libertate cap. 6. seemeth not to understand him as to this Necessity consequentiae which is not at all Causal of the event but of the Conclusion in arguing Leaving it out from whence the event is Ita Trigosius in sum Theol. Bonav Effectus contingentes liberi si comparentur ad scientiam providentiam Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid sive ex suppositione quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis consequentiae non tamen absoluta consequentis Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae Deus praescivit hoc futurum Ergo erit Deus vult aliquid fieri Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit quando voluerit Quia non stat dari antecedens verum consequens falsum Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis invincibilis non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta sed solum conditionata sicut de praescientia dictum est But the word effectus here is more than the rest say And more fully ibid. sect 18. pag. Vol. min. 230. Quid quod Scholastici nominatim vero Aquinas Durandus nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem N. B. non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum ratione Voluntatis Dei quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae And yet plainer ibid. sect 18. pag. 332. c. 2. At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit quod monuit Perkinsius vere quam ex suppositione decreti divini in Argumentatione scilicet quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini etenim posito quod existat actus liber necesse est ut existat 175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that fore-knowledge decree and providence inferr as to the acts of sin viz. of Logical consequence Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other and I will contradict it no more 176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth mans will to the mode as well as to the act that it be done freely as well as that it be done if Willingness and freedom were all one I would grant it on their grounds But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining efficient premotion and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel and be no real cause of the thing it self I confess I understand not what they mean nor know what Liberty is if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination 177. The same I say of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot propug li. 1. c. 23. p. 46 47 c. Scot. 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib 1. q. 16. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19. sect 6. Vasquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14. a chain of necessitating Causes viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will For all cometh to one if all sinful Volitions be necessitated Nor will it satisfie any man well that Camero doth resolve all mans sin into the Devils temptation as a necessitating cause till he know into what to resolve the Devils sin And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin and bring all sin and misery on the world much more he that saith that God did all this himself 178. As there is Libera Voluntas and Liberum arbitrium or Libertas Voluntatis Libertas hominis so there is a coaction or constraint of the Co-action in sensu composito is a contradiction and impossible but not in sensu diviso to be forcibly or by unresistible power made willing of unwilling Yet in a large sense I confess that Voluntarium quà tale est liberum Will and of the Man I should take my Will to be constrained if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit or either But the man is not said to be constrained so long as he hath his Will 179. The unhappy descriptions of free-will which I mentioned Jansenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat cap. 5. 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large As Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem id est Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera Apud Augustinum esse liberam esse aliquam hominis Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur Voluntas seu Volitio libera Voluntas idem est sicut Velle libere Velle Impossibile est ut Velle non sit liberum Lege etiam Annatum Petavium Cont. Vincent Lerinens Pennoti propugnacul haec plenius tractans 180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disp. Philos Moral qu. 4. for Gibieâ—fs sence of Liberty as not involving defectibility leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that destroyed Liberty But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining which power is called Indifferent because it is a Power to this or that and not because it is equally inclined no nor equally a Power to either For there may be inequality 181. When Dr. †††Twiss de Scient Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat de Scient Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135. Twisse with Bradwardine * * * Vid. Bradward l. 3. c. 10 11. passim about the definition of free-will which
futurition A conditional proposition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to pass as of that which will And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas shall sin if he be so and so tempted it will lay the cause of Judas sin more on God in their own apprehension than their Cause or the Truth will bear For if God Decree that unnecessary Causes shall certainly effect the thing sin let them take heed of the consequence 267. I could never see how the Doctrine de scientia media doth at all Pennot l. 4. c. 23. saith 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi posse 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis decretorum cum Libertate principaliter immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae sed solum remote quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb libertatem cum Div. decretis sed ut Deus provide sapientissime omnes actus maxime liberos disponere possit dirigere ad opt fines serve their turn seeing they use it to shew how God knoweth that Determinately which he foreseeth but in Conditionibus sine quibus non or in unnecessary and not determining causes And their own answer signifieth nothing more to the purpose but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his understanding which is most true But that he knoweth them ever the more for the supposition of circumstances they never prove Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of such Conditional propositions and contingents as so circumstantiated seemeth True materially that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge but false efficiently as if they were any Causes of his knowledge which hath no Cause but only extrinsecal denominaters of it in that act And it seemeth useless and needless to their purpose 268. For I confess I think that we need no more and are capable of no more to satisfie us how God knoweth any thing Intelligible than to say By his Infinite perfection Man knoweth by Reception ab extra but so doth not God And if the Quest How doth God know this suppose extrinsick efficiency or reception it is blasphemous And I confess I hear men dispute How God knoweth with horrour as I hear men curse and swear and blaspheme knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsick manner of Gods knowledge And I detest the very question and am but perswading others to detest it thus understood 269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute pro scientia media to say that God Can no otherwise know future contingents As Annatus de scient med p. 85. contr Ab omiibus conâ—â—sâ—â—â— est nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Diâ—inum ac proinde propositiones de fuâ—â—ris contingentibus c. Blank de Concord lib. cum Decretis 1. Thes 49 50 51 Twiss D. 1. c. Seclusa Scientia Mediâ— non remanere in Deo praescientiam absolutam futurorum contingentium Et cap. 6. Seclusa Scientia Media non posse praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones O Man O Worm Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a non posse upon the Almighty God thus in the dark 270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of Scientia Media such as some of our own and the Scotists who dare say that God Rada â—â—i â—â—pr who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before P. Clem. 8. and was against it as Pet. à S. Josiph and others tell us cannot know future contingents but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will As if we had seen into all his Powers and Acts who dwelleth in the unaccessible light Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works 271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwise know our future free acts but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth who scarce know How we know our selves 272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by Zumel Ripa Gonzal Fasol Arrub. Aluiz Alarcon Alvarez Tanner Ruiz Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin Cantarel Navar. Curiel Cabrera Mascaren Verdu Fonseca Mendoz. Lessius Diotalev Moncaeus Theophil in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink Pennottus Petr. à S. Joseph Annatus Twisse c. yea or but any two Contenders and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach Non dâ—sunt ex nostris qui scientiam mediam aliquateâ—us agnosâ—unt inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus Walaeus and Lud. â—â—ocius as also Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was doth not think reverently enough of God nor knowingly and humbly enough of man And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion casteth in the way and doth but try to solve well all Lud. à Dola's Questions Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96 97 c. and to answer well all his arguments against the usefulness of Scientia Media Part 2. and against the truth of immediate physical Predetermination Part. 3. and against Identificate Concurse as to evil actions Part 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be nothing to us and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord 273. The old doctrine of Gods Prevision and this de Scientia Media in all that is within our reach come all to one And they erre that hold it to run pari passu equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts because he willeth them or the futurity of them nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in specie which is sin But he willeth to effect that which is Good and may so far know it SECT XIII Of Gods Will and Decrees in General 274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praesentibus are in themselves the same save as to the extrinsick denomination from the divers state of the connoted objects 275. Gods Decrees are not his works in themselves considered but only That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing past and ceased but as a thing still doing Pennot li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the best notion to reconcile them with liberty But ab extrinseco Connotative they must be denominated past though without change in God Of this Dr. Twisse hath animadverted when with his executive power they operate ad extra and then his knowledge and will are his working being productive of the effects 276. As in point of simplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many that is One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Essence and yet many ex parte effecti objecti inde
Gods will hath a final cause meaneth but a final object as he confesseth A Tree is a passive recipient cause of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the â—ffect as received but not of the act ex parte solâ—â— 283. Even the Acts of Gods free-will or Decrees have no Cause even in God himself no more than those called Necessary For we must not say that any thing in God is an effect 284. Yet as Gods Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object which in man is a constitutive Cause of the Act loco materiae so extrinsick objects may be called The Causes but rather the Objects of God Will Love or Knowledge not as his Essence but only as so denominated by that Connotation of the object 285. These distributions of Gods Volitions in Number and by specifying objects and individuating objects which are called material constitutive causes of the act are all according to humane weakness in us who know God but enigmatically and in a glass But yet if any man use such words in a broader manner than we think fit before we censure and condemn him we must hear his sence explained For all that ever we can say of God is improper analogical yea metaphorical And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about Gods attributes and actions differ For as is oft said no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own he must not speak intelligibly to us unless he create another understanding in us And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself alloweth us to use it while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import 286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture and exteriour causes of them as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you because ye have loved me and believed c. * * * So Gen. 22. 16. 26. 5. Prov. 1. 24. Luke 11. 8. 19. 17. Gal. 4. 6. Eph. 5. 6. 1 Sam. 28. 18. 1 King 9. 9. 11. 34. 20. 42. 2 King 10. 30. 2 Chron. 34. 27. Psal 91. 14. But also Fear Affliction Grief Hatred Repenting Rejoycing c. Deut. 32. 27. Isa 63. 9. Gen. 6. 6. Psal 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hos 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41 c. and exteriour causes of them 287. That which is to be understood by all these is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the Effects of Divine Volitions as the Dispositio receptiva may be called a Cause And I before shewed in the instance of the effects of the Suns Influx how great a hand the various Dispositiones materiae receptivae have in the diversifications of effects 2. And that Gods Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated 288. Therefore we must say that Gods electing Peter and his rejecting Judas his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas are not in specie the same act of his will nor his Loving Peter and his Loving Paul the same Numerically As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint and his knowing Judas to be a Saint is not the same numerical act of knowledge Though as they are Gods Essence all are but one And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good and hateth another because he is evil and he justifieth men because they believe and condemneth men because they believe not that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth c. Though Gods Will have no efficient Cause 289. Those Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency but Transient Objectively are some of them to be denominated as before the thing willed and some as after The Will of effecting is before the thing willed The Will ut finis or Complacency and Displicency as also Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Existent estimation approbation reprobation of it the Will of Continuing modifying altering perfecting destroying suppose the existence of the thing willed in esse objectivo And so many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time as connoting the objects †††Pennottus li. 4. c. 24. p. 235. confidently argueth that because God can Love him that he hated or Loved not he can therefore Predestinate him whom he reprobated or change his decrees without any change in himself I answer 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a sinner before and cease hating him without any change save relative and by extrinsecal denomination 2. But his inference seemeth to me false and dangerous unless he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as existent and by such connotation are named And his fourth supposition is false that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal For the formal Act of Love is Complacency And the Velle Bonum is another thing as I think an effect of Love or at the most another act of Love And we deny that any absolute Velle bonum alicui is ever changed though displicence be changed Because it is the same with Decree 2. And the reason why the said Decree or Volition if absolute and proper may not be denominated changed is because it maketh its own object and so supposeth it not pre-existent and dependeth not on it denominatively And therefore it would inferr God to be mutable to change it But it is not so in the other which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature as doth Gods Knowledge of present existents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation And it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability so to name them than to his simplicity to name them many and divers 290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability to speak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to such Relative denominations As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it and yet is not therefore mutable Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you before and behind on the right hand and on the left So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power 291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects it is that we conceive of Gods acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature as one being before and one after another Though not as they are Gods Essence 292. Yet because the use and truth of words or names is their signification of Things as indeed they are and we should put no name on any creature but what is adapted to notifie it aright
them that which they are deprived of So that this Language is not unfit while we speak of Moral Subjects and of God after our manner But in strict speech it cannot be proved that any Nothing is the proper object of a Volition of God 309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way And subtile Albertine To. 1. princ 4. qu. 4. p. 297. saith that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Positivo velle negationes Resp Deum non See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions habere actum positivum non concurrendi sed negationem actus Volendi dare concursum efficacem â—uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo se habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu positivo sed tantum negative se habet circa concursum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum Vid. caet 310. III. The third distinction is between Gods Love and Hatred his Volitions and Nolitions And this must be used But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection than Love and Volition importing some-what contrary to us and either hurtful troublesome feared or that possibly may be so Therefore we must confess here that we speak of God with greater impropriety and must disclaim the imperfection in the sense 311. But if you would not be abused into many errors swallow not the name Love and Hatred without distinction Lest the fore-cited reason of Pennottus cheat you viz. God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked Ergo he can decree or predestinate a man to salvation whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation And all rose from this falshood that Love is nothing but the Willing of salvation to us and so the same with Decree Whereas Love is also yea most properly a Complacency in Good as Good and Hatred a Displicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is sometime Antecedent and sometime an effect of this in man 312. IV. The Immanent and Transient acts I need say no more of 313. V. But Divines use to omit the next distinction of Transient D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. Quando quaeritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam auâ—â—jus actum qui est Deus sed quantum ad transitum ejus super obâ—ectum seu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipsam Voluntatem acts so much that few of them let you know whether that which is but Objectively Transient be numbred by them with Immanent or with Transient acts Briefly 1. As Gods Will is the first efficient and with his Wisdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra it is effectively Transient though Essentially Immanent in it self 2. But as Gods Will is as aforesaid the Final Cause or End of all things and willeth things only Complacentially supposing all that is Complacent to be Existent in esse reali vel in esse cognito so is it only Objectively Transient and not effectively and therefore by many is numbred with Immanent acts And as God may be said to know and will the creature in himself and to Love the Idea of it in himself the phrase is not to be blamed But as the Creature in it self considered by fore-knowledge or present knowledge if we may so distinguish is the object it seemeth unfit to call the act Immanent though it do nihil ponere vel efficere in objecto 314. But Gods Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra is even effectively Transient as well as that which altereth qualities e. g. his Pardoning Justifying Adopting acts of Will 315. VI. * * * How far Gods Volitions of creatures are free the subtilest confess to be unsearchable Vasquez ut supra in 1. Thom. q. 19. disp 80. p. 504. Licet assignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione facta cum objectis rebus creatis tamen non assignamus sufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci reseratur ad has potius quam ad illas Siquidem Idem omnino manens in sâ— poterat eas non velle quas vult Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus difficultatem praedi â—am eâ—adere nâ—â— possumus See more of him before Gods Natural Volitions are those which ex natura rei could not be otherwise that is All his Volitions of his own being and perfections To which some number natural necessary objects in the creatures As his Volition that Contradictions shall not be true that two and two shall be four or two more than one c. His Free Volitions are those which might have been otherwise as to the nature of the thing and as to the power of the Divine will Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures 316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten and the Holy Ghost freely proceed ariseth from the ambiguity of the word free which I will not trouble you with 317. Yet all agree that Gods Volitions are all eternall and therefore eternally necessary necessitate existentiae 318. And some think it best to say that they are respectively to be called both Necessary and Free Because Gods will chose that which his wisdom saw was Best and he must necessarily choose the Best But we must not be here too bold in our Conclusions 319. VII The distinction of an efficient and permissive Will is no better nor other than that of a Volition and no Volition But to distinguish the Efficient and Permissive Act implyeth a falshood That Permission as such is an Act. 320. Yet Gods Law may be said to have a permissive Act that is He may declare This I permit you to do or leave indifferent as to political permission And as to Physical permission I have shewed before that some positive removal of Impediments are sometimes called non impedire or permission But permission it self as such is no act 321. VIII The distinction of Vol. Beneplaciti signi is old and common But not a distinguishing the Acts of Gods will but rather his Volitions from the signs of them For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there shall be such signs 322. The five signs commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibet permittit consulit implet And the older Schoolmen say that these are called Gods Will Metaphorically only yea by a remote sort of Metaphor they being not mans will properly but metaphorically Aqu. 1. q. 19. art 11 12. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. Voluntas Dei sumitur Proprie tunc signat divinum beneplacitum quod non est aliud quam ipse Deus volens 2. Impropriè metaphorice pro aliquo signo ejus c. only when applyed to man and accordingly called Gods will But some of the latter say that they are proper signs of Gods real will The truth is they that first used this distinction
be thy duty we use to say It is Gods will that we should obey him And so when we do not obey him we are said to Violate his will But this is but metonymically For that which is Gods will indeed is but that we shall be bound to obey whether we do or not And the event whether we shall or not de facto is not at all determined by the Law 351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing and command the contrary it would not prove two contrary wills in God nor is there any great shew of a contradiction in it For to say I forbid Judas to hang himself and I decree that he shall hang himself are no contradictions It is but to say It shall be his Duty to preserve his life and Eventually he shall not preserve it All that is a mans Duty doth not come to pass And to determine of Duty is not to say It shall come to pass Otherwise Gods word were false whenever man sinned Nay in reality Augustine truly judged that by Gods Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted and yet then he was a chosen Vessel and God Decreed to save him He thought that Perseverance was the Duty of some that after fell away and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away though not presently to be possessed and yet that God decreed that ipso permittente eventually they should fall away and perish 352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another and yet knoweth that a certain Traytor that hath broken Prison is like to fall into the hands of some Thieves or Enemies that will kill him If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them it is no contradiction The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill But it saith not that they shall not de eventu by way of Prognostication 353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act â—nd yet Decree that the same Act immediately commanded shall not be â—one or that the act directly forbidden shall be done Because sin is a thing â—hat God cannot decree or will of which anon 354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is sometimes said â—o be commanded or forbidden And this may be contrarily decreed of God And men that think not truly of the matter think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden and so they err by such confused thoughts E. G. Gods command is that I shall relieve a poor man and not let him faâ—ish and that I shall heal the sick c. and yet God may decree that this â—oor man shall be famished and this sick man dye And yet no contradiction For indeed Relieving in effect is but the End of the Act which is commanded me and not the act it self I am bound to offer him â—elief But if one cannot take it and another will not yet I have done my duty And so in the other instance So God commanded Abraham â—o sacrifice his Son and yet decreed that he should not be sacrificed And â—his without any contradiction For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham and made his duty was not actual eventual sacriâ—icing For then it had been a duty to resist the Angel and do a thing â—mpossible But to consent and endeavour on his part to sacrifice his Son which he did So the preservation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God and yet at the same time mens death decreed Because the thing indeed commanded is not Preservation as it signifieth the effect and success but only Preservation as it signifieth our true endeavour So the Jews were forbidden to kill Christ and yet God decreed that Christ should be killed For the thing forbidden them was their own Consent and wicked act But the thing that God willed and decreed was only the effect without any Will of their Act that caused it unless in genere actus but only a permission of it Men of gross brains that cannot distinguish and judge accurately may blaspheme God in their ignorance in a case that to a discerning judgement is very plain 355. * * * Of which see Amyraldus against Spanhem de Grat. Universali The next distinction of Gods Will is into Absolute and Conditional which some Divines use and others condemn and say that God hath no Conditional Will The common answer which most Schoolmen and other Papists agree with the Protestants in is that there are Conditions rei volitae of the event of the thing Willed but no Conditions of the act of Volition in God As Aquinas saith of Causes †††De Vol. Conditionali authoritatibus rationibus pro eadem Vide Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 20. But his assertion that Una creatura est Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale secundario ut Deus velit aliam producere is a fiction though he lay his stress on it about the ordo decretorum For movere is causare and nothing doth cause or move God to act There are Rationes effectuum eorum ordinis but none of the efficient Acts of God in him If you say It is absurd to say that God had no Reason to will the creation of this world rather than another I answer That is an Act of efficient Wisdom above all Reason But to fetch Reasons from the object and thereby to be moved to Act is the part of the imperfect creature Reasoning properly is below God much more to be moved by extrinsick objective reasons Yet on this Ruiz disp 24. layeth a great fabrick and so men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reasonings as they variously fancy Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc 1. There are both Causes and Conditions of the event willed of God 2. Denominatione extrinseca ex connotatione objecti his Will is hence called Conditional meaning but a Volition of Conditionals 356. That God willeth Conditions and Conditional Propositions and Grants is past all controversies For he willeth his own word which is his work But his word hath conditional promises and threats And as his word also may be called his will he hath a Conditional will because a Conditional word 357. Gods eternal Omniscience proveth that at no instant he had a will properly Conditional quoad actum Because he that at the same instant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not must needs have his will to be thereby absolute But yet if it had pleased God to suspend the Act of his own Volition upon a humane Condition it would not have exposed him at all to the charge either of mutability or dependence which is very clear For 1. It is presupposed his Will as Voluntas Essentia is unalterable and is not that of which we speak 2. But only his Volition as terminated on this or that object and so as haec volitio
ipsa Dei essentia quae est necessaria Alliac Camer in 1. q. 12. D. See in Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 24. how they are confounded about the ordering of Gods decrees as to the order of Intention and Execution His Solution supposeth that Unius objecti Volitio est ratio determinans ad aliorum volitionem When as ex paâ—te Dei there is but One Volition and that hath no cause and the Ratio is a deceiving ambiguous word and his Decrees are his Will and therefore are all but one 374. 4. They cannot deny but that all our conceptions of God are improper and analogical or metaphorical more or less and that what Knowledge and Will in God is formally no mortal knoweth And should we dispute then audaciously about this Order 375. 5. None can deny but that these Mysteries require the highest reverence and that it 's dreadful to take Gods Name in vain and dally with the Consuming fire And yet shall we presume 376. 6. They all confess that our Lord Jesus his Prophets Apostles or Scriptures lead them not this way and decide not these Controversies so as that they can stand to their decision alone 377. 7. They cannot deny but that desiring arrogantly to be as Gods in Knowledge was our first Parents sin that ruined them and us and that this was Satans first successful game And that our disease is like to be such as its original 378. 8. Lastly They cannot choose but know that it is the troubling of the Church with new Articles and new practices and leading them from the simplicity that is in Christ even as the Serpent beguiled Eve with the promise of more knowledge which hath been the great plague and divider of the Churches in all Ages though the Apostle foretold them that It was this that he feared of them And are we not self-condemned if after all this we will censure and reproach one another and foment divisions for that which most certainly no mortal understandeth 379. I. And first your very foundation is uncertain that God doth properly Intendere finem Nay it is certain that as Aquinas afore-cited Vasquâ—z saith that Gods own Goodness is not a final Cause of his Volition supposing that movere ad Electionem medii is final Causality Ruiz asserteth the contrary taking final Causality to be first esse primum objectum And thus men strive about artificial notions Vasq 1. d. 82. c. 1. Ruiz de Voâ— Dei d. 15. §. 1. p. 159. But that nothing is the Ratio Volendi but his own Goodness see Albert. 1. p. tr 20. q. 19. m. 1. a. 1. Alex. 1. p. q. 35. m. 3. Henric. quodl 4. q. 19. Gabr. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 2. Dried de Concord p. 1. c. 3. Vasq disp 82. Scotus 1. d. 44. Molin 1. q. 19. a. 5. saith though Vult hoc esse propter hoc non tamen propter hoc vult hoc He prescribeth Ends to Man and setteth Ends to Means which are fiâ—es operis But that he Intendeth an End Himself must be said very improperly or very uncertainly or not at all The truth is that we must say that God doth finem intendere because we must speak of him after the manner of men or not at all But it is not true in the same sense as we speak it of man and as the word properly signifieth but equivocally 380. For 1. To Intend an End is to make that End a Cause why we choose the means as most say But Gods Election or Actions have no Cause All deny that there is in God Cause and Effects or that propter hoc vult hoc 381. 2. In man to Intend an End doth imply that a man yet wanteth his end and that it is somewhat that he needeth or at least doth not yet obtain But God needeth nothing and hath no end that is desired or wanting nor but what he continually possesseth or enjoyeth as well now as hereafter 382. 3. We know no such thing as Intendere finem where the Act and the End are the same Intendere is not the same with Finis But in God they are the same He that is most simple hath no Intention which is not Himself and no End which is not Himself and so both are one 383. 4. Our Intendere finem is not the same really with Electio mediorum But God hath no Intention but what is really the same with Election though not denominatively connotatively and relatively 384. 5. Divines usually say that Nothing below God himself can be his End But where there is no means there is no End or intention of it But to God there is no Means He is not a Means of himself And no creature can be a means of him If we say that any thing can be a means ut Deus sit vel ut sit Maximus Sapientissimus Optimus it were no better than Blasphemy God then hath not an End like man 385. Yet necessity constraineth us to use the phrase but these things must still be understood when we use it 1. That no creature can be Gods End unless you will call an object as terminative an End or else an Effect 386. 2. That it is not Gods Essence and perfections that is an end as to any medium But it is his Will For his Free Will is the Beginning and the Complacency of that Will is the End of all things But if you call God his own Object and so call the final Object an End so we must consider God as Loving Himself and Himself is the End or final object of his own Love or Complacency and he himself as Loving himself is said to Act on that End or Object And indeed eternal self-knowledge and self-love which some of old ventured to call the second and third Persons are the Great Immanent Acts of the Divine Essence with the sibi vivere And it seemeth the chief Notion of Holiness in God that he Loveth Himself in primo instanti and that he is most Amiable to his Creatures in secundo instanti and that he is the Cause and End of all that is good in them Thus a final object of his own and our Love or Complacency God is past all doubt And secondarily his Will is pleased and fulfilled in all his works 387. 3. Yet by that Complacency we mean not that God is passive or receiveth any Delight from the Creature or hath any addition by it to his felicity But as he is a Communicative Good by way of Efficiency as the first efficient Cause so is he a felicitating Good to the Creature as its End and he is Love taking the creature into its nearest Communion with him which is his Complacency and the End of all things And hence it is that God is said when he had finished his works to Rest complacentially in all as very Good 388. 4. As the Complacency of Gods Will is his End in the formal notion so far as it may be said of God
a Means 2. Making one little parcel of that means to be the end 3. Inserting two acts or parts only of that which they themselves confess to be but Means For what should the names of Salvation and Damnation do in the description of the end Are they any part of the end Why is not Redemption Justification Sanctification Preservation Resurrection c. as well put in Is he not Glorified in them as well as in final salvation or damnation Yea and in Creation and the frâ—me of nature too Yea why is not the glory of Angels and all the world put in as part of the same means to his end 406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of Mercy and Justice in menâ— salvation and damnation which is the end of Redemption Conversion Preaching Ordinances Sanctification Adoption c. 1. I deny it His Power Wisdom and Goodness and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means 407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate ends than one And undoubtedly the means consisting of innumerable parts make up one perfect whole in which Gods Glory shineth so as it doth not in any part alone And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds and set up the parts as so many wholes will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture or a Watch or Clock or House or the pipes of an Organ or the strings of a Lute and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly Well therefore did Dr. Twisse reduce all the Decrees de mediis to one But they are one in their apt composition for one end And the Glory of Sun and Stars and Angels and the whole Creation is a part and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part 408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the Execution is onâ—y fit for our debate Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert And about this our Controversie is next to none at all Here we may well enquire what is prius vel posterius quid superius quid inferius c. and that to our edification 409. Seeing then that we are agreed as is said with Aquinas that * * * Ruiz de Voâ—â—n Dei disp 15. §. 4. p. 163. prettily argueth that Si non potest dari ratio ipsius â—olitionis divinae sed solius denominations extrinseâ—ae resultantâ—s ab eâ—â—â—â—lis creatâ—â— sequitur â—anas esse plurimaâ— Thâ—oâ—ogorum de ordine dependâ—â—tia vel ratione diviâ—â—â—um volitionum post quam inter illos constat quem ordinem dependentiam vâ—l rationâ—m habeant externa objecta inter se The conscquent is true They are vain indeed though he deny it And all his reasons p. 161 162 c. to prove that dantur iâ— creatâ—â—a rationes finales moventes divinam voluntatem are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word Ratio and abuses of the word Causa having before confessed that there is no Real Cause And are there Causes that are not Real 1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will and the object is bâ— some called the material cause of the act in â—â—â—â—â—â—â—â— numero 2. It is the Terminus and Recipient of the divine influx 3. It may therefore â—e causa materialâ—s of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in patiente ex diâ—ersitate dispositions 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volitions 5. And may be second Causes of other effects 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man 7. Where our acts are not causes they may be conditions sine quibus non of many of Gods acts quoad effectus as sin is of punishment at least 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects which therefore are the Ratio nominâ—â— And he that would prove any other Ratio or Cause of the first Cause the will of God or any of his acts as in himself must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least He citeth Durand Major Richardus c. But Durandus 1. d. 41. q. 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned secundum rationem as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours ut n. 7. and not â—uxta rei veritatem Richard is full for what I say 1. d. 45. Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur non est aliud Velle aliud Esse But yet his Velle hoc speaketh not his esse quà esse and therefore he addeth that when God is said scire aut velle it is his Essence but to say Hoc aut illud scit aut vult is but to say Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiae vel voluntatis quae ipse Deus est Et Voluntas Dei est prima summa Causa omnium cujus Causa non est quaerenda non est diversa Voluntas sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis And Richardus in loc p. 141. saith but this that Ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva cum realiter idem sit quod Deus Tamen Ordinationis quae est inter divinum velle ipsum volitum bene est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti Which is no more than I have said And as to Major Ruiz did ill to cite him who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but Relatio rationis denominatio extrinseca as to God And his ordo signorum in mente divina is but the Scotists assimilating Gods acts to mans Deus non propter hoc vult hoc sed vult hoc esse propter hoc that which we have to do is but to enquire 1. De re how one thing is a Cause or other means of another 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be 410. And 1. It is agreed that the Creation was Gods first work that we know of or have any thing to do with This had as to the first part no Antecedent Object but produceth its effect which some call its object But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object and also a produced effect And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work From whence by connotation that may be called his first Decree 411. That sin or the Permission of sin or other meer Negatives are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees I am anon in due place to
damnationem How near is this to the other Joh. Scotus Duns See what Bishop Usher saith of this Scotus Erigena and Goteschalcus Petavius saith Idem à Caâ—olo Calvo unice dilectus erat See to this sense the Decrees Synodi Carisiacensis contra Gottâ—chaltum in 1 Tom. Concil Gallic p. 66. more Worlds more Creatures more Names c. when it is not possible that ever they should be unless he positively will and make them Yea if per impossible there were no God Nothing would be Nothing still To feign or call for a Divine Nolition to keep Nothing from becoming something is too presuming 480. 3. All those Schoolmen and Divines who tell us that every Will of God except his complacency and displicence is effective must needs be against a Positive Nolition of Nothings For that effecteth nothing If they say that they mean it only of Volitions and not of Nolitions I answer 1. Is not Gods Nolition a Velle non What is it but a Will that this or that shall not be 2. And in man as Volitions are for some Good so Nolitions are for the depulsion of some Evil But Indifferent-Nothings that are in esse imaginato neither Good nor Evil have no Volitions or Nolitions even in man 481. 4. Gods Will is his Essence variously denominated as variously terminated on the objects But Nothing is no object and so no termination of Gods Will and so no object to constitute an act in specie velindividuo by connotation or extrinsick denomination Therefore God is not to be said to Will it or Decree it If you say that it is something in the Idea of Gods Intellect I answer It is presumptuously asserted Who can prove or ought to feign that there is in God Idea's or Conceits of such nothings as never will be any thing in the forms of somethings For Nothing as nothing hath no form to be conceived of 482. Object Thus you deny Nothings as such to be known of God For if they cannot be the objects of his Nolitions then neither of his Knowledge Answ Properly Nothing as such is not an object of Knowledge at all But a Proposition de nihilo is But of this more anon 483. 5. Certainly God doth freely suspend or limit the Acts of his Power Therefore he may for ought we know that I say not It is certain that he doth suspend or limit the Acts of his Will God doth not make more Worlds nor more Men Birds Beasts Fishes Plants Stones Sands Atoms Names c. than are and will be He doth not sanctifie more than are and will be sanctified nor give more grace to the sanctified than ever they will have when he Could if he Would And when the Principles of the Divine Nature are Co-equal why should we say that he who undenyably suspendeth the possible acts of one freely suspendeth not the acts of the Free Principle the Will itself or is it like that one should be here active and not the other 484. 6. Positive Nolitions of Evil do seem in man to come from the Imperfection of his created nature As being Passive and Capable of or obnoxious to evil or in danger of it and so needeth defence against it and his Nolitions are the defensive and depulsive principle And though we must speak of God according to our mode we must say nothing needlesly which importeth weakness or passiveness or danger in him 485. * * * Again let the Reader note that my Cause lyeth not on this but because I have said so much of it I think meet to take notice of the most that is said against me Vasquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19. a. 3. disp 79. c. 3. doth purposely confute Scotus and affirmeth that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives but that he hath a positive act of Nolition of every non-entity and non-futurum and so ut alibi hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures He himself confuteth their reason that say God is not in potentia ut velit and I need not answer it But he layeth all his cause on this as a demonstration and maketh it a very useful doctrine for the explication of reprobation that Quodcunque non esse creaturae cujuscunque referri potest ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile quod ipsa velle possit Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non esse deinde ut dicatur negative se habere opus est variationem aliquam intrinsecam esse aut in Deo aut in rebus non futuris At non c. Voluntas autem Dei non necessario negative se debet habere quia illud non esse est appâ—tibile The summ is God can Positive Will non-entity ergo he doth And this is his All to which elsewhere he oft referreth us But let the sober Reader consider 1. He confesseth that Gods Will is his immutable and simple Essence and in it self is not at all diversified to or by objects but only extrinsecally denominated diversly so that all this is but de relatione nomint 2. And is it not presumption to frame a Logick of second notions and say This and not that is applicable to God as if it were to man when their Logical notions as to man himself are so arbitrary 3. He answereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I use Nil frustra must be feigned of creatures much less of God 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right it inferreth no difference in God but in our denominations of his Will the seven cases here granted him may fully satisfie them that will so denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Physical and proper sense I deny his supposition It is no Non-entity that is properly bonum appetibile though it may be Malum Bonum as well as Unum Verum are affectiones seu modi entis Et ubi non est Ens non est modus That which is not is not Good or appetibile Morally we say improperly It is good not to be sick not to have an enemy not to dye c. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live to be well to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of and 2. That it is Evil to dye to be sick to have an enemy We say It s Good not to be erroneous wicked deprived of Heaven c. that is It is Good to know truly to be godly to be glorified and it is Evil to err to be wicked c. 6. Gods Will is considered either as 1. Efficient 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleased As Efficient it cannot Will nothing for nothing is not made or caused And impeditâ—â— ut â—â—s fiat may be by effecting the hindering Cause And as final or as fulfilled and pleased Non-entity can properly be said to be but the not displeasing of it Nothing is no object of the Will though a Proposition or in men an oppositive thought be somewhat
properest sense of created Goodness because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be But he might make it otherwise and might diversifie it and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another which is a lower sense of Goodness But in all diversifications they would be still perfectly Agreeable to his Will and so be still equally Good or Best 10. The Goodness of the third rank of beings The Acts of Free-Agents is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will. 11. God hath as Creator and Motor become the Voluntary Root or Spring of Nature and natural motion and accordingly stablished all second causes as natural agents under him and doth by them operate in a natural necessitating and constant way And this is antecedent to his Laws to free agents And this natural course of agency we must not expect that he should alter but rarely by miracles 12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to Gods natural agency or motion for else there should be something besides God and his works which he must overcome Though some natural motions may oppose each other yet all concurr to one end 13. Non-entity or Nothingness is not contrary to God as an opponent 14. Therefore seeing * * * * * * Saith Alliac Camerac 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. Reprobatio secundum aliquos est non-propositum dandi vitam aeternam Et ille dicitur Reprobatus secundum aliquos cui Deus non proposuit dare vitam aeternam Et postea Certum est de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perseverent Et non vult quod conditio impleatur Quia si vellet utique impleretur But he saith not Vult non impleri c. Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non misereri est effectus Reprobationis cum sit ipsa Reprobatio Id ibid. Nolle is not a meer Non velle but a Velle-non which is the war of the will against an opponent and the root of opposition ad extra it is an unmeet phrase to say that God doth Nil any Non-entity or any meer Natural opposition to him or that he Willeth any natural entity or motion which he effecteth not 15. But God being secondarily the Rector of free-agents and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions he doth by those Laws oblige their reason and will to restrain and resist some natural or sensitive appetites and inclinations and so to resist some natural motions of God in nature in which he is pleased to operate by second causes but in tantum and resistibly as a stronger natural motion may resist a weaker 16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external assist them in that resisting agency which he obligeth them to 17. Therefore God may two wayes be said to resist his own natural motion by his Laws and by his assisting grace But his Laws contradict not one another 18. To God as meer Rector therefore two things may be said to be opponent 1. Such sensitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be resisted 2. And all moral evil 19. And therefore as God may be said to Resist these so also first to Nill them And so to have Decrees against them 20. Gods Volitions and Nolitions here are his essential will denominated from the effects and objects And that effect of God from which he is said to Nill both these is as is said 1. His Laws 2. His grace or help And in this we are agreed 1. That he forbiddeth sin and commandeth us the restraint of appetites and senses c. 2. And that he helpeth us so to do Therefore the rest of the School-Controversies here that trouble the world are but logomachies about the Names of Nolitions and Nolitive Decrees 21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law is but the debitum the duty of the subject to do what is commanded and not to do what is forbidden 22. It is not a meer non-agency that is meant by a prohibition but a positive nolition of the subject restraining him from the forbidden act And all proper moral obedience or disobedience Good or Evil is primarily in the will and no further secondarily in the exteriour act or restraint than as they are Voluntary and in non-agency but in a third sense or instance as the consequent of nolition and the refraining act 23. If any therefore will say in this sense that God doth positively Nil the forbidden Act and so will a non-entity sub ratione mali moralis in this remote sence we will not contradict him but say as he 24. And accordingly we may say that God hath a positive Decree of non-entities or against moral evil where non-agency is loco materiae that is in tantum so far as to do all that he doth against it but not absolutè ne eveniat ubi evenit 25. But we may not therefore speak so unaptly as to say that he willeth positively all or any non-entity or non-futurity of meer naturals that are non-futura 26. Therefore we may much less say it of his own Natural Impeditions that he positively willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit For he is not to be thought of as a restrainer of himself by Law or self-opposition It is enough to say that non-vult impedire 27. Much less may we say that positively vult non velle-impedire lest we make another Velle necessary to that Velle and so in infinitum â—annes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 2â—â— confeâ—â—eth that the sense of all this question is but which way God who is one pure act unvaried about all varieties is most conveniently to be mentioned by us and that Deus respectâ— culpae quae futura â—â—at in reprobiâ— non habuit aâ—â—um voluntatis affirmatiâ—um quo voluerit esse pecâ—ata aâ—â— illos pâ—ccaturos Whence it followeth that All futures or existents are not positively willed Even the formale pâ—â—cati is quid â—uturum But he thinks it most fit to say that God positively willeth the permission of sin 1. Because it is Good Ansâ—r Nothing is â—â—â—ther Good nor bad 2. Bâ—â— ause else the difference between the predestinate and reprobate would not fall under providence Answ As if giving that grace to onâ— which is not given to another made no diffeâ—â—â—â—e 3. Because else â—n would come by chaâ—â—â—e as to Gods foreknowledge Answ As if nothing would not be nothing without a positive dâ—â—râ—e that it shall be nothing or God could not know a nothing or a crime as such so far as it is quid intellectâ—i perfeâ—â—â—â—imâ— intelligibile without positive willing it How then knoweth he the foâ—male peccati 28. It is proper to say that Deus non vult permittere peccatum ubi id non permittit and that vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem positive permissum est quia permissio ista est quid positivum 29. After the manner of men
noxious evils we must not ascribe such Imperfections to God but only such Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges Judicia have made to signifie no imperfection as being not contra nocumenta but only contra injurias as against himself contra nocumenta as against his creatures i. e. contra peccatum And now I may answer the solitary argument of Vasquez mentioned in the Margin that non entia non dare gratiam non impedire peccatum c. may have aliquam rationem boni amabilitatis and so may be Willed Loved or Decreed Answ 1. In meer Naturals Negations are not properly any way good or evil but Privations are Natural Evils and not good 2. To be occasio sinè qua non of good as sickness is of the Physicions honour and sin of Gods is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis The bonum amabile is only the good that on that occasion is done The occasion is neither efficient constitutive or final cause of any good nor any causal proper medium 3. In Morals meer Negations are neither good nor evil nor have any Morality but only Positives and Privations 4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow and he may penally non agere non dare gratiam to execute his Law and demonstrate his truth and Justice on sinners and occasion the perception of his mercy to others And here the non-agere non-dare permittere being loco materiae volitae may after our mode be said to be Volita seu decreta bona But properly it is not the non-entity that is bonum or Volitum but the positive Law and Judgement and the relatio debiti pâ—nae and the ratio poenae in the privation and the demonstration of truth justice holiness c. therein 5. But sinful privations that is sinful Volitions nolitions or non-Vâ—litions of the Creature are not properly per se or per accidens propter se vel propter aliud good or amiable or willed or decreed of God And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin because he cannot be Causa deficiens must mean as much or speak impertinently and deceitfully It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius saith Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677 678. If Scientia Media be an useless conceit how much more cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quae nunquam futurae sunt He instanceth in many and addeth De hac re Ariaga disp to 1. d. 21. sect 7. dicit non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimaera esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili c. Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest c. I know the case is not just the same with that before us but the reason is the same for both But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative I shall concurr with them that do and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow And say of them as Judicious Blank doth of Gods knowledge De Concord lib. cum decret 1. n. 64. Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quae forte scibilia non sunt quam qui negat Deum scire quae revera scit quae intra Divinae omniscientiae objectum continentur So here so be it that God be not feigned to will sin I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings and his own non-acting ††††††Bradward l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10 11. brings in too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergo's that God is the Causa prima of every nothing non esse because he is so of negations As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cause or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something viz. a Thought or a Word as well as an affirmative Such workmen make the world with words 509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here and only propound to each mans Conscience whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin be not on the far unsafer side than he that only saith Quae supra nos nihil ad nos If these be not certainly false they are certainly unproved and therefore not to be here received 510. And I say here as Buridane saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter firmiter credere volo quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibuâ— potest in actus oppositos Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles specialiter in his quae fidem tangere possunt aut mores Qui enim credit se omnia scire in nulla opinionum suarum decipi fatuus est De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter praesentata formabuntur centum rationes vel quaestiones de quibus contraris sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus erit alter ipforum vel ambo Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes solutiones satisfacere mihi ipst 511. To proceed in the application * * * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomistae qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment â—undem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in praedestinatione tenuit scil ut ante praevisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Coelorum excludere licet non ad poenam sensus destinaverit Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat Et c. 2. Parum ab hac sententia dissert Scotus qui qu. 1. d. 41. asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem alteram vocat Punitivam alteram permissivam Et punitivae dari causam ex praevisis peccatis factam fuisse Permissivae non dari causam quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum nulla ex parte illius datur causa hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare Hinc ordinem hune in mente Divina assignat c. ut alibi Scotum sequuntur Bassolis Corduba c. Objicit Bradward Privationes ut eclipses mors c. habent
positivas causas To which what I have said is a sufficient answer And 1. Sometimes they have not but only the cessation of a causation 2. They never have a positive efficient of themselves for nothing is not made but only a positive remover of the cause of that which the subject is deprived of or an interposer or hinderer of the causation of it e. g. of Light or life And death hath no cause but that which ceaseth the causes of life Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two most notable parts as called 1. Gods Reprobating men to unbelief and impenitency 2. His Reprobating men to final damnation The last of these also is considered in the execution 1. As Privative 2. As Positive called Poena damni sensus And both especially the Privative part are considerable 1. As executed by man himself on himself freely 2. Or as executed by God Concerning each of these observe 512. 1. Not to Believe and Repent is no real entity And not to Give faith and Repentance as is said is no real entity And to Permit Infedelity and Impenitency is no real entity as is proved And not to Decree the Giving of saith and the hindering of unbelief is nothing And most clearly besides these four nothings nothing can be proved either existent or needful All that cometh to pass will come to pass without any more ado Therefore 513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no such Act of Reprobation at all as is 1. Either a Decree that a man shall not eventually Repent 2. Or a Decree not to give him Repentance 3. Or a Decree to Permit his Impenitence 4. Nor can we prove an after Volition of his own former non Volition which is asserted by Scotus But the three first we have great reason to lay by and so not only to say as Davenant that this part of Reprobation is an Act negative quoad objectum but that it is no Act and there is no other Reprobation as to this part save 1. Gods not decreeing to give faith 2. And his not giving it 514. 2. And as to Damnation so much of it as consisteth in sin it self God no otherwise causeth than as he doth all sin which is properly not at all It being but the Act as an act which he causeth as the Cause of Nature and not as sinfully qualified and so no more decreeth this than other sin 515. And most men little think how much of damnation lyeth in sin it self and the privative consequents which need no other cause 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodness 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holiness and Holy persons and all the Holy employment of Heaven 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones which consist in such Knowledge Love and Employment Praise Obedience and holy Communion 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency as he that maketh himself blind is uncapable of the light or he that maketh himself unlovely is uncapable of immediate Love 5. To be defiled and diseased with all kind of sinful lusts and malignity and made like the Devil 6. To have all sorts of Lusts in violence when they can have no fewel or satisfaction and so to be tormented with these lusts To have extream selfishness and Pride when they have cast themselves into the utmost shame and misery 7. To see that no Creature can deliver them and to despair of ever being better as having no hope from God or any other 8. To see or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlasting felicity which they have lost 9. To think how easily once they might have attained it and how it was offered freely to their choice 10. To think of all the solicitations of mercy that importuned them and all the time and means they had 11. To think for how base a vanity they lost it and that misery was their wilful choice 12. To be tormented with envy and malice against God that forsaketh them and against his Saints And to feel conscience awakened setting home all their former folly All this is nothing but sin and its own effects which hath no Causation at all from God but to continue the nature which he gave them and is not bound to destroy And how great a part of hell is this 516. Nay we know not how much sensible Pain may be the consequent of their own sin without any other Act of God than his common continuation of nature it self As a man that eateth Arsnick or unwholsome meat is tormented by it without any other act of God than as the universal Cause of Nature 517. All this much of Damnation then being meerly the work of the sinner himself so far as there is no Act of God in the execution so far no man can prove any Positive Act of Volition or Decree 518. But 1. As God in these is the universal cause of Nature and so of natural acts 2. And as in other instances he actually further punisheth them 3. And as he actually made that Law which made these penalties the sinners due so far God hath a Positive Decree and Volition that these persons shall be damned And moreover as improperly or morally his not sanctifying them and not saving them is called his Act and is really their penalty even so may his not-willing to save or glorifie them be called his Decree and will to damn them if you will 519. By this time we are ready to answer our first question What are the objects of these several acta of God so far as connotatively we must call them several And 1. * * * Besides all before cited against Volitions de nihilo see Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 6. §. 1. p. 36. Antiquorum gravissimi sentiunt Deum non omnia Velle sed ea duntarat bona quae in aliqua differentia temporis existunt proinde possibilia que nunquam futura sunt non amari à Deo â—â—â—â— Mala inde Deum not esse omni-volentem nâ—llam creaturam à Deo amari necessario Ita Albertus Alexand. Boâ—â—vent Richard Gaby Bannez Zumel Molina Valentia Scotus Against which he bringeth frivolous reasons and asserteth that God willeth as a material object the Goodness which the Creature would have if it were made and this as to all Creatures which never will be What putid contradictions are here to will Goodness which is no Goodness of all Creatures which are no Creatures as material objects which are nothings God willeth his own Power whence man calleth that Possible which is nothing But was there from Eternity any Possibles not-future to be willed What was there from Eternity but God And are all theâ—e Nothings God himself Gods not giving the Gospel to any persons is no Act and so hath no object But reductively or improperly the object is Man sinning against the grace of the first edition of the Law of Grace that is These are the
subject de quo of which it is truly said They are without the Gospel 520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation called the Object is Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them 521. 3. Gods not Pardoning Justifying Adopting and Sanctifying men is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation and object of the Laws contrary sentence is Impenitent Unbelievers or the non-performers of the condition of Justification c. in the Covenant 522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men is no Act nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid is none of Gods act But the sentence of condemnation is Gods Act and no doubt some other Positive Execution And the object of these is All finally Impenitent Unbelievers and unholy ones that is who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under 523. And it being past all denyal that these are the objects of the Executive Acts we must say that these also are the objects of the Decrees accordingly where a Decree is proved and when we speak of them only juxta ordinem executionis and not Intentionis which I laid by before 524. And lest you recurr to it once more I will recite more of Davenants words de ordine Intentionis De Praed Reprob cap. 1. p. 107. 1. Sciendum tenendum est si Dei naturam perfectionem in se consideremus illum non prius unum videre deinde aliud neque prius hoc decernere aut velle deinde illud sed unico simplicissimo actu c. 2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit signa quaedam prioritatis posterioritatis distingui possunt Hic tamen observandum est inter ipsos Scholasticos non admodum certam constantem esse hanc doctrinam de hisce signis seu instantibus prioritatis Scotus qui primarius est ad haec signa fabricanda artifex videtur non-nullis non solum eadem posuisse priora posteriora secundum nostrum intelligendi modum sed etiam statuisse unum esse in ipso Deo prius naturâ alio But from this he vindicateth him Ex adversa parte Occamus noster haec signa quocunque modo considerata negavit in 1. d. 9. q. 3. Et Biel ejus sententiam amplexus haec signa oppugnavit in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub 3. Prioritates in Divinis non sunt ponendae sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum Unus est enim Actus in Divinis re ratione indistinctus qui est ipsa essentia Divina ne secundum nostram quidem considerationem talem ordinem Prioritatis posterioritatis concipi posse in decretis Divinis ut talis consideratio non sit falsa speculatio If this hold our Controversie of the order is at an end 525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomist Domin Bannes quamvis non omnino explodat haec signa cum Biele perpendens tamen discordiam Theologorum in his assignandis Animadvertendum est inquit quam pro libito in negotio praedestinationis reprobationis multiplicentur instantiae à Theologis quam parum illa conferant ad assignandam rationem differentiae inter praedestinatos reprobos Liceat itaque hic paucis monere non esse nimis confidendum aut certo dogmati adhaerendum ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum sive à Protestantibus sive à Pontificiis assignato cum difficile sit duos reperire sive inter nostros sive inter adversarios qui ad amussim per omnia consentiant in hac serie decretorum divinorum describenda Caveat it aque unâ—squisque ne talem considerationem praedestinationis reprob inducat quae vel Divinae justitiae vel gratiae gratuitae adversetur tâ—m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis c. SECT XVII Of Gods Causing and Decreeing Sin 526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods Causing and Willing sin Of too many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine de Utilit Credâ—ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde sit malum nihil reperiâ—nt nisi malum Obj. Omnis determinatio diâ—ina est immutabilis Omnia siuâ—t Deo determinante Ergo omnia siunt immutâ—hiliter Respondet Mâ—lanâ—th Ad maj Est immutâ—bilâ—s necessitate conseqâ—entiae Ad minor Dissimilâ—s est determinatio in bonis malis actionibus Mala siunt 1. Deo praesciente non impediâ—nte non autem adjuvante vel impellente Item Deo sustentante naturam suum opus Item Deo eventus certos decernente Strigel in Melancth pag. 296. Carbo Compend Thom. 1. q. 19. a. 9. Malum ut malum nullo appâ—titu potest appeti nisi per aâ—â—idâ—ns Deus â—ullo modo vult malum Culpae Deus neque vult siâ—ri malum â—â—que non vult sed permitti Ruiz de praedesin Tr. 2. disp 13. §. 3 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just ex destitutione circumstantiis And d. 16. §. 3. he tellâ—th us of many wayes by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin in form or nearest matter which is a great reason of these Controversies I shall say somewhat more particularly of that About which there are various Opinions 1. Some think as Hobbs that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated as the motions in an Engine though unobserved by our selves who see not the Concatenation of Causes 527. 2. Some Dominicans and our Dr. Twisse and Rutherford held that no act natural or free can be done by any creature without the Predetermination of Gods Physical efficient immediate Premotion as the first total Cause of that act But yet that this standeth with Liberty because God causeth contingentia contingenter fieri And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances and the totum materiale peccati and all that the sinner causeth But yet that he is not the Author of sin nor causeth the form Because 1. They say that sin hath no efficient cause but a deficient which God is not being not obliged to act And sin is nothing but a privation 2. Because God is under no Law and therefore though he do the same things that man doth it is sin in man but not in him And saith Holkot he is the cause of sin but not the Author because he commandeth it not by his Law 3. At other times they say that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced but not the relation which resulteth from it 4. And God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory or as a punishment of former sin
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
arbitrii postulat sive prius sive posterius sive simul non sequitur malitiam Deo esse tribuendam cum illa solum ex modo operandi creaturae sequatur Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. cap. 4. the general nature of action when existent hath So that this Moral specification addeth not to the natural generical entity 543. It is therefore 1. Acting 2. Not acting 3. Moral disposition which are Commanded and Forbidden by God And not any one only and these not in themselves but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively in the Law To Act on a forbidden object Not to Act on an object when commanded and to be viciously disposed to either is a sin 544. You may see then that sin is a Connotative notion yea and a Relative notion It connoteth a Ruler a Law and End a Subject and is thus variously Related 545. As Subjection is the Root of Obedience and all obedience Virtually being A Consent to obey and Love is the Root of benefits so to forsake God simply as our Rector or our End or our Owner is Atheism practical and all sin in one But to violate only a particular precept de mediis is but a particular sin 546. God is the Cause of the Law which commandeth and forbiddeth and God is the Cause of Nature and Objects and Action as Action That therefore which he hath made mans part is to Love God and Holiness and not to over-love the creature nor to love it as our End or in his stead and to do all that he commandeth and not to do the particular acts about such particular objects as he forbiddeth 547. The remote subject or relatum then of sin is the person sinning But the nearest is the Act Omission or disposition The fundamentum or ratio referendi is the said Acts Omissions or dispositions as such or such about such or such objects commanded or forbidden which is a Relation And the form of sin is the Moral Relation of Disobedience or Disconformity to the Law So that if you must needs have it in Logical notions Sin is a Moral Relation resulting from a Physical relation of Actions Omissions or dispositions of Gods subjects which are modified contrary to his Law 548. It is a Moral Relation as it is Disobedience found in a Moral agent against a Law and Rector as such It is a Physical Relation as the Act c. is prius naturâ quid naturale about an object that is quid naturale It s fundamentum of both relations And one Relation may be sounded in another is the Mode of the Act Omission or disposition as to an undue object c. as it is forbidden by the Law Of the subjects and relatum I have spoken before 549. So that the form of sin being Relative can have no Cause but that which causeth its fundamentum and cannot possibly but result when that is laid 550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make such a Law as should say Though thou hate me see that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law or I forbid thee not to commit Adultery but only forbid that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a sin For if God forbid not the act it cannot be a sin and if he forbid it it must needs be sin And so of omissions 551. They therefore that tell us that sin is nothing but a Privation speak not satisfactorily nor altogether truly It is no substance indeed nor any such Reality as Man cannot Cause without Gods Causing it supposing his Universal Natural Support and Concurse But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Dispositions as well as Omissions and the form of sin is a Moral Relation which hath so much reality as a Relation hath if that be any And that Relation hath a positive name It is not only a meer Non-conformity but also a Disconformity becaused founded in See Dr. Wallis against the Lord Brooke of this very well Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden and not only in Omissions 552. Subtile Ockam Quodl 3. q. 15. disputing Utrum rectitudo deformitas actus differant à substantia actus denyeth it and after a Confutation of the common saying that Deformitas est carentia rectitudinis debitae distinguitur ab actu quod in peccato Actus est materiale carentia justitiae debitae inesse est formale concludeth Quod deformitas non est carentia justitiae vel rectitudinis debitae inesse actui sed est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati Quod non est aliud dicere nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem But I conceive 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing else but the rectitude of its acts suspensions and dispositions 2. That Ockam here describeth only sins of omissions whereas the Rectitude of the Will is ofren also materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden And with these two animadversions I am reconciled to Ockam who addeth Ad aliud dico Quod illud dictum de Materiali Formali est falsum Quia aut est peccatum commissionis aut omissionis si primo modo est Materiale sine formali quia ibi non est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse actui si secundo modo tunc est ibi carentia quae est formale sine materiali Resp 1. To the first I add that It had been true if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden or else the species of the act as quid naturale But it being the Act not as an act in genere but as this act thus modified or specified by an undue object that Act with its Relation as quid physicum are presupposed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Disconformity And to the second I say that it 's true that Omission is not Materia Physica but it is an inadequate first conception of sin and so is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae And the Omission being considerable 1. Quatenus Non-agere 2. Qua privatio naturalis 3. Qua Privatio disconformitas moralis these three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the sins of omission 553. The same Ockam Quodl 1. qu. 20. Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem even as dependent on the Will And he denyeth it against Scotus who affirmeth it I will not trouble the Reader with their reasonings not doubting but Ockam erred and that it 's true 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily 2. But that secondarily and participatively as it is voluntary there is a morality in the acts Words and deeds and passions are under Law next to the Will and in dependance on it As the body conjunct with
the soul is a secondary part of the man so are our exterior acts of sin 554. The conceit that making sin a meer nothing doth seem to justifie God as not Causing it is a meer vanity For 1. It justifieth the sinner more who no more is the Cause of nothing than God 2. Either man is able to do that Something or Act which sin is the privation of without any other Power than he hath or not If he be then even the Act of sin is not imputable to God If he be not then every sin is like our not making of a Sun or Moon or World which if it be a culpable defect they make God the first deficient 555. He that would see more of this question of the essence of sin may read Rada lib. 2. contr 16. who first ingenuously confesseth that Tho. and Scotus differ but in words and not in sense and then layeth down eleven conclusions of little use And Marius Scribonius Cosmo disp 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent in 2. d. 35. dub 6. Henric. Quodl 1. qu. 25. Almâ—in Moral tract 3. cap. 17. Richard in 2. d. 34. ar 1. qu. 7. Alex. Aleâ—s 2. q. 94. memb 2. Durand 2. dis 31. q. 2. Medin 12. q. 71. ar 6. Specially Vasquez 12. disp 95. cap. 9. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disput Philos Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162 c. Argent in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3 c. Suarez 1. 2. tract de act hum d. 2. sect 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner 1. 2. disp 2. q. 5. dub 2. 3. disp 4. q. 1. dub 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39. li. 14. c. 13. Cordub l. 3. q. 10. Cajet Zumel Curiel alios in 1. 2. q. 19. ar 4. q. 71. ar 6. And who is usually sounder than most of them Lombard himself Dist 35. Ripalda opening him and citing others dist 34 35. But the ordinary Christian that understandeth but what Disobedience signifieth needeth none of them all 556. * * * It is not only Dr. Twisse after confuted that supposeth sin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World but even Ruiz the Jesuite de Provid dis 2. secâ— 4. p. 27. maintaineth that Minus perfectus evasisset Mundus si nulla permitterentur peccata nune autem â—â—asit perfectior occasione peccatorum and citeth Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav Richard Agid. Caiet Ferrar. Marsil for the same But 1. An occasion is no cause nor medium as such and therefore never the more willed if that were true 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both sides about this question viz. Particular Creatures would be to themselves better were there no sin but whatever possible alterations were made by God the Universe would be neither worse nor better than it is as to that proper Goodness which must absolutely denominate it For the Goodness of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creators Will which is the denominating measure of fundamentum And so they are and so they would be were they altered But sin is disform to his Commanding Will and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will He argueth Had there been no sin there had been no such exercise of Liberty no Saviour c. Answ And are tâ—e Angels worse than man And had not all this been as good if God had willed it Though the five acts of God forementioned about sin are as far as we need to go to the common Ends which we agree in yet many objections are made against this much as not sufficient but God must have a greater hand in sin And 1. They object that to make God but an Universal Cause is to put something in being viz. the Act in specie morali which God is not the Cause of And so 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that 2. To deifie man by making him a first Cause of that moral species To which I shall lay down such answers as I think will satisfie the considerate to this Objection which is indeed their All But I am sorry that the subject occasioneth me to repeat what I said before 557. 1. Remember that even an Act in genere is not a substance And that the moral specification is less as to natural entity than it indeed making no addition of Entity to it as was shewed And Dr. Twiss asserteth that this moral specification is not a proper specification of acts 558. 2. Note that few dare say that God is not Able to make a free agent with Power to choose or refuse without Gods further predetermining premotion And if God can do it we have no reason to debase his work and think he did not 559. 3. Note that for God to make a self determining agent that shall act without his predetermination is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or suspension that is To Will and Act or Operate so far and no further 560. 4. And note that this restriction of the Divine operation is not from any finiteness of his power as if he could do no more but from the freedom of his Will and the Conduct of his Wisdom who seeth it good to do no more 561. 5. Above all note that as all Divines agree that God doth not Act ad ultimum posse as natural agents do so the truth is most evident in the finiteness of the World and the effects of his Power For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he could do He doth not make every man as strong or wise or good or long-lived as he could do He doth not make every Stone or Clod or Tree as Active as he could do nor move every thing as swiftly as he could do Now all that is undone which God could do all possibles which are not existent or future do tell us plainly that God doth freely suspend the action or operation of his Power totally as to them which is much more than to suspend it but in part with free agents and to give them a Natural self-determining power without further pre-moving predetermination of them If all the World tell us that he hath the far greater suspension why should we think the less absurd 562. 6. And Reason telleth us what the Schoolmen oft say that God who sheweth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures doth very fitly thus beautifie the Universe by a middle rank of creatures that stand between Confirmed Angels and the Brutes viz. Intellectual-free-agents left to a natural Power of free choosing or refusing without necessitation in the midst of various objects to prepare them by tryal for a better state 563. 7. And note too that we say not that Gods predetermination of mans will destroyeth its best Liberty God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels as a great
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet
not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects compared with such as are not forbidden 592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many wayes to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin As for instance 1. He can do it by adding as I said before a good act to the sinners bad one As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ God can put into Caiaphas's De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra thoughts the jealousie of the Romans over the Jews and the visible danger they are in if they should be thought to have another King which thoughts in themselves are true and good So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service which was not sinful of it self The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons may find much in Episcopii Institut Theol. li. 4. sect 4. de provident in his answering all these Texts of Scripture as mis-expounded by some And his moderate opinion expressed in Conclus 2. in the end of that Section how far doctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation is laudable and his reason very good and clear viz. so far as they actually prevail with the will and practice Even as our faith is saving as effectual and practical and not as a dead opinion so is error damning I think as he doth 593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse Which is not to Will his sin But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect As if Absalom be by Pride and Lust enclined to Adultery his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution without willing his act of sin at all interior or exterior 594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way so that this object shall be solitary or most obvious to the sinner As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met God can keep Peter John c. out of his way and so Judas shall be the next 595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsick concurse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object Many other such wayes God hath which are unknown to us 596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object if God now did Cause the Act as exercised on a forbidden object compared with another it were to Cause the sin But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter this is not to Cause sin For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object is no sin For as I said God câ—â— do it only by removing Peter and Willing that he shall be preserved 597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder foreknoâ— that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey and that a Traytor broke out of Prison will go that way and so will be rob'd and kill'd He may will or desire the Death of the Traytor as a punishment He may restraâ—â— some that would travail that way before him and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber or drive him away that so this Traytor may be killed And yet only Permit and not Will at all the Robbers Will or Acâ— as it is Agentis but punish him for it and hate it and Will only the effect 598. The next Text cited is 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were appointed viz. to stumble on the rock of offence Resp 1. This hath respect to Luke 2. 34. he is set for the fall of many c. and of Christs own words that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces And no more can hence be gathered but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on iâ— their own sinful way 2. And that their opposition to him shall be theâ—â— ruine So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to is not sin but Ruine the consequent of their sin The word stumbling and falling signifying their destraction 599. The next Text is 2 Thes 2. God shall send them strong delusions or the acting of deceit that they should believe a lye Answ Here is nothing signified but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits 2. And permit wicked men to believe them which is mentioned as a permitted consequent and not as an end intended by God And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others 600. The next is Rom. 1. 24 26 28. God gave them up to uncleâ—â—ness to vile affections to a reprobate mind c. Resp Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission and no Will or Cause of sin in God 601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done Answ Here is nothing said of sin at all but of the effect of it All that was done on Christ even all the effect in passo God fore-determined should be done But the Act ut volentis agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer that God decreed Christ should dye or be sacrificed and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it It is a great and necessary truth He that willed the effect and did much himself to cause it willed not the murderers sinful act And permitting and foreseeing it was enough 602. The next is Isa 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King 11. 31. 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery and thy Children fall by the sword They that are hated of God shall fall therein David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam It was of God that he took not good counsel Pharaohs heart was hardened by God Answ The first is only a Prophesie and a penal effect of sin and nothing of Gods Willing or Causing sin And so is the second Though God can send afflicters by the wayes before mentioned without willing their sin The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object not as such
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
willing â—is at all And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law and much more against sin than mans is And that God willeth not and causeth not the sin of man And is it now come to â—his that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason but not to Gods because â—e is no subject You may next say that Holiness is meet for man but not â—or God 618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it Bonum esse ut sint mala Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur At hoc sine interventâ— mali peccati nullo modo potest Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium though not sine peccatâ— 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falshood For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy upon sinners sinners are the object And consequently you must take it as before proved for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous 619. He urgeth Oportet haereses esse ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant Answ That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks nor yet that God loveth willeth or approveth that there be heresies But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth and hateth The same is the case of all tryal by persecutions And God willeth not the sin of active perâ—ecution but only the effect or passive part So that the oportet by your own confession of it signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae which â—ore-knowledge without Volition will inferr 620. He addeth Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin and not will it Resp But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it or not If not Gods Intention may be frustrate If yea What matter is it whether God will that sin shall be he permitting or sâ— permit it as that infallibly it will be so we obtain either of these it 's all one to our cause of predestination Repl. 1. If it be all one take up with that agreement and make â—â— further difference with them that grant you enough 2. In case of veâ—â—ment Inclination to a sin it would follow upon Gods total permission but God never totally permitteth sin But in other cases it will not follow that is It is not a good consequence that This or that sin will be done because God doth no more to hinder it than that which sometime hindereth it not And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate For â—â— will infallibly come to pass from its proper cause which God foreknoweth And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge And is not that all one as to the certainty of Gods intentions 3. You phrase it as if sin followed Gods permission as a deficient cause or as that which cannot be otherwise unless God do more to hinder it and so weâ—â— necessary thence necessitate consequentis or as others call it necessitate â—â—tecedente which is false and oft denyed by your self 4. The very truth is Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity as relating to so many sorts of Impedition that it is but delusory withâ—â— much distinguishing to say sin will or will not follow it If you restraâ— it to a non efficaciter impedire as is usual it taketh not away the ambâ—guity much For still the question is What must make it effectual unless you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu whatsoever it be â—â— it self 621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect if there werâ— perfect holiness and no sin and so no pardon or punishment But â—â— giveth us no proof but confident assertion at all I need not say thâ— It would be more perfect if there were no sin It sufficeth me to say thaâ— It would be as perfect And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection that there be sin or Hell God could have freely willed the contrary And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if iâ— had so pleased him and his Holiness too without sin or Hell It 's unpleasing to me that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christs satisfaction for sin in another digression and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin As if it were more necessary to Gods Glory than Christ 622. It is very observable in all this controversie that he asserteth pag. 198. That it 's past all controversie that neither God nor the most sinful creature do will any thing but as Good And that no man can be instigated to malice or evil but only to the Act which is evil because he that is instigated is instigated to do something But to the evil of an act no efficiency is necessary but deficience only How far this is true or false I have opened before I here only note that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin which he saith God doth more than man causeth all that is causable 623. Yet p. 199. he saith Sin is of man only as the cause when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it yea as the first total cause and that as to Deficiency man can do no more than he doth without predetermination which if God withhold man can no more help it than make a World So that all the mysterie of his language is this that because man is under a Law and God is not therefore man doing the same act as moved by God must be called the only cause of sin because it is no sin in God But if we spake as plain men ought to do should it not rather be thus exprest by you God is the chief cause of sin in man but not in himself 624. Pag. 200 201. he hath the same over and over again that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad â—onum tanquam Materia scilicet non tantum idonea sed necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae misericordiae and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius than that Good which sin depriveth us of that is Holiness Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good and the other is the Creators Good Answ But as the assertion is all false so the reason is vain For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects he is quite mistaken For both is the Creatures good and neither the Creators For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not Gods Essence as in it self but his Work of Punishment and Mercy And the glory of this is but the resplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God And all this is in the Creatures
of the effects and consequents of them But doth this signifie God willed your malice or your act God did bruise Christ which signifieth that he was a concause of his death but not that he willed or Caused the Jews to will or act his death And so of the rest 629. The rest of his instances are such as I have answered before or as the former answers fully invalidate And therefore I will not weary my self and the Reader with them 630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he asserteth that Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory and that not per accidens but per se Because sin by how much the worse it is in genere mali inhonesti by so much the better and fitter means it is in genere boni utilis conducibilis to Gods glory c. All which I have before confuted and think not his defence of it worth repeating 631. Many assertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the false supposition that Sin is a medium per se of Gods glory and the unproved supposition that God positively willeth the Permission of it which is nothing whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order and much other vanity And still they confound sin in esse reali which is no medium with sin in esse objectivo which may be a part of holiness and no sin at all 632. Cap. 19. he argueth God useth men and devils in the very act of sinning as his instruments viz. to punish to try to humble c. ergo he willeth the event that they sin Resp Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words instruments and useth Properly an Instrument is an efficient cause moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue And so a sinner in and by the Act of sinning is no Instrument of God For God moveth him not to that Act as specified or circumstantiated so as is prohibited And being not at all so moved by him as David to murder Urias and to vitiate his Wife he is not properly thus his Instrument But sometimes the word Instrument signifieth a presupposed Agent whose Action another can improve to his own ends As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Instruments of turning his Mill and the spring and poise are the Clock-makers Instruments of moving his Clock or Watch and a Mastiff Dog is my Instrument to keep away Thieves and a Greyhound is my Instrument to kill a Hare and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet and a Hawke to catch a Partridge c. And yet we cause not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind or Water but we can hinder the Water nor the nisus of the spring nor the gravitation of the poise but set the recipients so as that the effect shall be done as we would have it nor cause we the fierceness of the Mastiff the inclination or motion of the greyhound ferret hawk c. but only tye them up and let them loose as our ends require But zeal maketh some men deride that God should be said to be no more the cause of sinning and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer or at least a will to use it without willing and causing the thing which he forbiddeth 2. And the word using signifieth sometime using by motion as I do my pen and sometime by ordination and adjoyning some concause or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforesaid as we use wind water dogs hawks Thus only sinners by sinning are Gods used instruments supposing his natural concurse and support And they are not his Instruments thus neither in the same sence as these creatures are ours For their fierceness craft inclination action is good and we do and may will it for our ends But sin is not good And therefore God willeth not it at all but only the consequent of it or effect And that Effect is not Good as it is the effect of sin but as God setteth in and causeth the same effect which a sinner causeth as in generation per concubitum illicitum But when God willeth and causeth the effect and foreseeth and permitteth the sinful Volition and act which concurreth to that effect such a sin is improperly called his used instrument or medium but properly is none 633. To Gibieuf and others saying that God acteth not by sin as an instrument and willeth it not but the effects he answereth that It 's absurd because the sin it self is castigatory and hath such like effects and therefore God need not will that effect as after it But all this is from the fore-noted confusion It is not only the distant effect but the very immediate effect which is the Act it self ut recipitur in passo which God sometime is said to Will As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away and that Christ were killed and that Malchus eare be cut off and that Paul be scourged and smitten on the mouth and that the Apostles were oft imprisoned c. And yet God only foreseeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent which he forbiddeth 634. And here note that when the name of the Effect or Passion connoteth the sinfulness of the Act then it is less meet to say that God willeth it As to say that he willeth that we be persecuted murdered slandered belyed c. But if any will so speak they must mean only the Passion as distinct from the action And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi 635. To those that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of sin the effect being more to be ascribed to the Principal Cause than to the instrument he first ill-applyeth some frivolous distinctions and instanceth thus The hangman as the Judges instrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge Ergo the Judge much more in revenge Non sequitur Putting in Revenge which is but a Cause as if it had been the Effect which was in question And thus The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable ergo nor the striker Non sequitur As if the question had been of the Negation of an effect and not of the position of it And thus If two servants role a stone one being commanded and one forbidden one being father to the other The Son forbidden roleth it unlawfully ergo the father commanded much more non sequitur Resp 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the same act because the effect is the same which is notoriously false unless de specie 2. Whose Instrument do you suppose the Son to be If the Fathers it is because the Father commanded him contrary to the Master And if so the argument is good The Sons act was a fault who obeyed ergo the fathers more who commanded him saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument because he can disobey But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us 636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France Amyraldus c. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions it is but the effect of the good mans overweening and conceitedness of his own apprehensions which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better But the worthy praises of Blondel Dallaeus Placeus Capellus Amyraldus Testardus c. shall survive such reproach And a thousand pitties it is to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts and reproaching the Jesuits Lutherans Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right and that Jesuites Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory 649. But to proceed his next Argument is cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendor ornament and plenitude of the Universe Eâ—go See Bonavent well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse sed bene occasio boni God willeth its existence This is answered before The antecedent is utterly unproved Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World His word is no proof 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly The Idle Permission of sin and saith that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints and their patience their gratitude trust hope fear joy alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters fighteth with Gods Wisdom Clemency Justice Providence with the Ministry of the Word the Promises Threatnings with Ministers confirming â—â—â— against sufferings and it is blasphemously injurious to God and contrary to the order of things in the world that he should permit sin and not will the being of it Resp What is it that a man yea a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit may not pour out confident words for What a case is the poor Church in when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy what way ever they go This man will tell them that they are * * * Pag. 370. blasphemous and overthrow all reason and Religion if they say that God only Permitteth sin and doth not himself will the being of it and move unavoidably all wills and tongues and hands to all the blasphemies persecutions and murders that are done and damn men for it when he hath done And others will as confideâ—â—ly say that he is a Blasphemer for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are and theâ— damning them for it and for putting God into the shape of the Devil and painting him odious to humane nature that man may not love him What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides But all his arguments are before answered when I shewed him how many wayes God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world and attain all his Ends and yet only Permit and neither Will nor Love nor Cause the sin 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us to the Act of hating God in linea meâ—â— physica non morali Meer delusory words He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him and then he maketh men hate him â—â— linea physica non morali as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act that is here from Nature it self viz. of the Man and act both which God made 652. Pag. 386. he saith that Directa expressa efficax Dei Vâ—litio qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii non facit Deum Malitia qâ—â— I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions as do many others per accidens sequitur actum authorem Resp But that per accidens is no reason of the denyal if God cause that accident also as the first cause If he make a Law and make the forbidden act the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said that God directly expresly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God viz. that it exist or be 653. And it is false that he saith that God is equally the Cause that men hate him if he will the Act hypothetically ineffectually and determiâ—ably by anothers will as if he willed it efficaciously And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concurse and Causation as guilty as â—is predetermining pre-motion As if God could not make man a free-â—iller and agent and as the spring of Nature enable him and concurr â—o his Act as an Act in genere without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie As if it were impossible for the Sun to be â—n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed without being â—he special or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy unless â—e will make the blasphemer speechless and of every villany unless he will strike men dead to prevent it This is not reverent and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all 654. The summ of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin pag. 387. passim is but this one reason God is under no Law But if this be all why do you not speak out what you mean but hold that which you dare not name viz. That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. â— 3. p. 270 271. Voluntas hominis malâ— est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis immo contra legem Dei Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum permittens defectum Causâ— secundâ— in ipso ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat which is true of the act in genere but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it he doth more than permit and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it He can do as much good without causing the evil â—nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth â—hem and that both as to the matter and form but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself because he is under no Law This is your most â—lain undoubted sense or else your Book is non-sense What need we then any further enquiry what you hold It is
delusion to pretend that you are accused for making God a sinner We charge no such thing on you But only for making him the chief insuperable cause of all the sins of men and Devils 655. Pag. 400. he plainly professeth that the Will as a physical agent is the cause of the act as physical and as under a Law and that act is against the Law so he is the cause of the Malitia actûs and culpablo So that God causing by his own confession both Act and Law there is no modest subtersuge left for his not openly professing that he asserteth God to be the cause of all sin the principal cause both as to matter and form 656. The rest of that Disputation striketh me with such horror in the reading that I confess I have not the patience to proceed any further â—n it nor shall further thus exercise my Readers patience The case is plain Either Hobbs or Free-will permitted must carry the cause in the case of sin There is no middle way He that will read Ruiz and Rutherfords answer impartially needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain responses 657. But cap. 29. p. 484. he falleth also on our most Learned and Judicious Dr. Field because in his lib. 3. c. 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion and it must move just indignation in the Reader that he addeth idque probare conatur contra reformatas Ecclesias Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches more than to the worthy Dr. Field How falsly are they interessed in your unhappy cause See the Synod of Dort where there is not a word for it Is one Twiss with his Rutherford or Maccovius or a few such the Reformed Churches Let the Reader peruse the Articles of the Churches of England Scotland France and all the rest and see where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto sin Even Jansenius himself is against it among the Papists when his Dominican Predecessors are the Fathers of it Nothing more common with English Divines than as you did before your self to explicate Gods causing the acts of sinners by the similitude of the Riders spurring a halting Horse or the Suns making a Dunghill stink which only speak the cause which we call universal and is the very thing which we assert And it is most unsavourily done to get into the Chair and magisterially say Fieldus vir alioqui doctus in his controversiis minime se versatâ—â— esse prodit Zumelem * * * Zumel in Disp 1. Thom. de Voluntat hom lib. arb pag. 219 220. Quod Dâ—â—s non sit causa peccati though he speak cautesously and as in other mens names yet concludeth plainly that God is but the Causa Universalis of sin and that man is the specifying determining cause even que universalem determinat ad speciem concursus actus ipsius sive solum determinet eam formaliter ad speciem c. Yet this is a high Thomist and defender of absolute grace non satis intelligit quippe non satis gâ—â—rus controversiarum Arminianarum scripsit dum aulam Arminiâ—â— plus aequo faventem haberent †††Thus magisterially did good Dr. Twisse censure Junius and Vossius his Son-in-law as men unskilled in Scholastick Divinity who were both most excellent men and hit upon the reconciling truth above most in their age Junius his Discourse of predetermination is one of the first that ever I found that excellency in and with his Irenicon is most worthy of great esteem But how easie is it for a man to overvalue himself and contemn another I highly value the piety in Mr. â—â—therfords Letters I am no fit arbiter ingeniorum But when I hear other men say that one Field was more Judicious than many Rutherfords I câ—â—fess by reading their several writings I find no temptation to deny it And why should Field and consequently Davenant Usher Carlton Mâ—ton Hall the Synod of Dort and I think the far greatest part of Protestants I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one who are against you be made odious by the supposition of being not far enough from Arminians rather than Maceovius Twisse and Rutherford take it for a disgrace to hold the same opinions against Gods Holiness which the Dâ—â—nican Fryars hold who have been the bloody Masters of the Inquisition and murdered so many thousand Protestants or Waldenses and Alligenses And that which he saith of Fields writing when the Court favoured Arminianism is notoriously false and such insinuations unworthy of so good a man as the speaker Fields Works were printed singly before they were printed together in Folio And his fifth Book was printed Aâ—no 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before And the Synod of Dort was called An. 1618. and sate 1619. also And King James was a zealous suppressor of Arminianism and sent five or six Divines thither to that end And long after in King Charles his dayes Pet. Heylin in the life of Archbishop Laud will tell you that the Arminiâ—â— Bishops then were but five Neale Laud Buckeridge Corbet and Howsâ—â— to whom Learned Montague was after added So that they durst not trust their Cause with a Convocation Field then shall be a most Judicion worthy Divine when partiality hath said its worst 658. And what is his error Why he saith that it 's a contradiction to say that God causeth the Act in all its state which is the Materialâ— peccati and causeth not the formale which is inseparable A foul error indeed to tell you that he that causeth the subjectum fundamentâ—â— rationem fundandi terminum causeth the relation and that he that maketh an European white and an African black causeth the dissimilitâ—de and so doth he that maketh the straight Rule and the crooked line thâ— forbidding Law and the forbidden act 659. Were it not that the necessity requireth such work because such Books are in mens hands I should think I had injured the Reader by thâ—â— much For my work is not to confute Books but to assert sure reconciling truths Otherwise the confutation of the rest of that Book for Gods willing and causing all forbidden acts in their full state and the existence of sin is most easily answered SECT XX. The old Reconciling Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius And first Prosper ad Gallorum Qu. 660. IT is a strange thing to me that when Pelagius Julian Faustus c. thought Augustine a Novelist and as Usher asserteth would have fastned the title of Predestination-Hereticks on his followers and almost all confess that Augustine was if not the first yet the most notable publick Vindicator of absolute Predestination and Grace yet the Judgement of Austin with his Disciples Prosper and Fulgentius doth not serve turn to quiet if not to end these controversies among those who profess to be their followers when as they have so copiously and plainly written upon the
was not so much as for original sin foreseen that God is said to hate Esau because then he would have hated Jacob also but it must be referred to the â—eer will of God that one was loved to salvation and the other so hated as not to be saved Just as the Synod of Dort saith 693. Francisc à Sancta Clara alias Davenport a Learned Scotist in his Deus Nat. Grat. Probl. 1. pag. 3. describing Predestination out of Augustine Arriba Scotus Suarez c. saith And with all these agreeth the description of Predestination Art 17. of the English Confession 694. And Probl. 2. of the Causes of Predestination he noteth that We mean not the Causes of Gods will ex parte actus volendi sed ex parte volitâ—rum in quantum Deus vult unum esse propter aliud And on that supposition how easie is it to agree 695. But he addeth If you had rather say as Suarez 1. p. l. 2. de praed c. 1. that also ex parte actus divini there is a Cause it must be not as Gods act is absolutely considered for so it is his essence that hath no cause but as terminated on the Creature 696. Pag. 7. he himself professeth that when the Protestants say that on the part of the Predestinate there is not so much as any meritoâ—â—ous Cause Disposition or Condition they speak but the common opinion of all the School Doctors taking it properly and in Scripture senâ—e And what Montague and the Arminians speak of foresight he disowneth as contrary to Paul August Aquin. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5 c. Scotus Bradwardine Estius Smisings Yea he rejecteth Abbot Joachim who denying any Cause of predestination in God yet asserted a cause of it by an aptitude in the Predestinate and the Reprobate one being foreseen more humble and prepared for Grace and the other more proud and unprepared pag. 5 6. 697. Yea ordering Gods Decrees after the usual presumption be Ruiz de Praedefin tr 2. disp 6. sect 2. p. 86 87. Deus pro suo beneplacito decrevit ab aeterno efficaciter causare liberas operationes honestas prius ratione quam illas praevideret ut absolute futuras Unde infallibiliter sequitur liberi arbitrii operatio necessitate consequentiae Pag. 87. 1. Scriptura fidem sanctitatem quodlibet discrimen sanctorum à reprobis reducit ad electionem gratuitam 2. Ex vi sortis c. 3. Divina electio absque meritis est causa quae discernit justos ab impiis Quamvis n liberum arbitrium sit secundaria causa sâ—ipsum discernens qua potuit resistere vel consentire Haec tamen liberi arbitrii cooperatio revocatur in Deum ut in primariam causam suaviter praedefinientem Eâ— Tr. 3. d. 18. sect 3. p. 222. Ea merita nihil obsunâ— quidditati gratiae quae tanquam ex prima radicâ— nascuntur ex prima gratid data absque ullo prorsus merito Atâ—amen quodlibet etiam levissimum remotissimum meritum de congruo si ex illo nascitur prima gratia vel propter illud datur obesse quidditati gratiae Yea he addeth p. 223. Conditio ratio vel occasio prorsus separata à merito impetratione dispositione adhuc repugnaret primae gratiae quoniam adhuc maneret debitum connaturalitatis quamvis abesset debitum obsequii asserteth that God first intendeth our blessedness as the end before he intendeth us grace faith c. as the means And therefore cannot do it for foreseen faith c. Yea that he first decreed to give us blessedness before he decreed to create us as Scotus 3. d. 7. and Ovanâ—â— ibid. q. 3. a. 2. Yea that God willeth all this before he knoweth that it will be as Scotus 1. d. 39. And that seeing all Gods Volitions of giving any good are free without any precedent Cause in man it must needs be that the Decree of glory and not of grace only must be without Merit And he concludeth p. 13. that they have no quarrel here with the Doctrine of the Articles of the Church of England 698. Probl. 3. he resolveth with Smisings that the reason why this absolute decree of God consisteth with free-will is because that God doth not only decree the event but also the mode that it shall be freely done And therefore his decree doth not only consist with Liberty but maketh it necessary 699. His feigned order of the decrees is pag. 27. that 1. God decreeeth to glorifie 2. To give grace and merits to obtain it and that definitively 3. Then he foreseeth that they will concurr with grace 4. Then he decreeth the execution that glory shall be given them by the means of their operations And of Reprobation 1. That God effectually decreeth to do so much as he doth on his part to give them glory 2. And also so far to give them grace 3. Then he foreseeth that they will not co-operate with that grace 4. He decreeth to permit them to fall into sin 5. And then decreeth their damnation I would not cite this man if he were a Thomist or Dominican who are known to go higher than the Synod of Dort though their reputation at home with their party tempt them to rail at the Calvinists But as he is a Scotist and so of a middle profession Though Dr. Twisse perceived how much their founding Gods foreknowledge in his Volitions advantaged him 700. Supposing you to remember the ordo signorum of his Master Scotus before cited I adjoyn the order Doctoris illuminati viz. Fraâ— Mayronis in li. 1. d. 41. q. 4. Sunt quatuor signa Est ergo priâ—â—â— in quo Judas Petrus offeruntur Voluntati Divinae ut neutri tâ—â— Voluntas Divina ordinavit Petrum ad gloriam nullum autem actum positivum habuit circa Judam secundum Augustinum Secundum signum esâ— in quo ordinavit Petrum ad gratiam tunc circa Judam nullum actâ—â— positivum habuit Tertium signum est in quo relinquuntur sibi ipâ—â—sâ—â— uterque cadit in peccatum Quartum signum est in quo Petrus resâ—â—git Quia non potest permanere quia praedestinatus intelligitur ex primo signo Judas autem non resurgit eo quod non habet relevantem in Deo ideo reprobatur Here you see a Reprobation that is no Act of God but a non-acting or is negative quoad actum and not only quoad objectum And he before saith out of Scotus and with him Ideo dico sicut dicit Doctor noster Quod prius Deus videt merita quam reprobum licet prius non vide at merita quam eligat which is the commonest Doctrine of the Schoolmen and other Papists as well as Augustines 701. So D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. Et dicunt quidam quod non est alia ratio quare Deus istum elegit non illum nisi quia placet Eo enim ipso quod placet ideo rectum est propter summam
power to keep rectitude so it is not equally in all For this Power is in God of Himself and in the Creatures received from God And it is more in the confirmed than the nonconfirmed and in the good than in the bad And seeing to be able to sin is a diminution of Liberty therefore according to Anselm to be able to sin is no Liberty nor part of liberty taking Free-will according to the Common Reason of it But to have power as to the Act which deformity is annext to may well be a part of Liberty not simply but of Created Liberty And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with free-will as it is a Creature or as it is of Nothing than as it is Free. Dub. 3. Can free-will be compelled Answ God can destroy it but not force it for that is a Contradiction But he can well effectually incline it and make it move it self freely to which part God will * * * But to sin he will not so incline it I think this is as high as you can desire And yet there is nothing in all this but what both parties may well bear with and it hath indeed much soundness in it But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty but how much of it the unsanctified have he elsewhere sheweth and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it 708. To conclude The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good and not to make him the Cause of sin and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves but in God is our help and our good and happiness is all from Him And if they both hold this it is not the difficulty of joyning them together and opening Gods unsearchable methods that must disjoynt us and draw us to withdraw our Love or contemn each other or disturb the Churches peace and unity 709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin as Alvarez Twisse and Rutherford say But let the Learned Reader note these things 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin yet he is but the Causa partialis I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors see Greg. 2. d. 34 35. ar 3. frequently saying that God is Causa partialis And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam id est sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat sic neganda est ista Consequentia Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali Nunquam enim talis actus fieret si Deâ—s non Causaret â—um Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret Deus non aliter causaret quam nunc de facto causat concurrendo cum Creatura Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum id est totum effectum causaus Et ejusdem possâ—nt esse plures totales Causae ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia etiam Voluntas Here note that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Solitaria 2. That he asserteth only that God causeth the Totum of the Act but not by a total Causation of it And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not which they say he freely doth and could do otherwise 710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his As if as I before made the similitude a Father to try his Childs obedience bids him lift up a Stone which he cannot do of himself and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength yet not ad ultimum posse but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength it shall not be done But who can comprehend the wayes of Divinè concurse 711. And it is to be noted that when Aureolus argueth that if God immediately concurr either he determineth mans act or man determineth Gods act or neither which are all absurd here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third and answering Neither as no absurdity But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher yet saith * * * Ubi suprae ad 8. Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis non quâ—â— determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate actâ— ejus quia primo fiat à voluntate nec intelligendo quod prius natura Viluntas agat actum quam Deus proprie loquendo de priori natura Quoniam tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere Deo non coagente Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum quia †††I think it should be Eum. cum Voluntas agit Et non ideo quâ—â— Deus agit ideo Voluntas agit ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coagerâ— Voluntati in talem actum causandi quam Voluntas dicatur coagere Deâ— You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez Tâ—isse and Rutherford And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth 712. And note that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is Lest God should be denyed to be the Cause of all Natural Entity But if you set before the will the Creator or Chief Good and the Creature or sensual pleasure the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity or modus entis But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature rather than on the Creator it hath any Natural Entity more than the act in genere or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause or not cause withoâ—â— predetermination from God or any other 713. Yea Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself when ibid. d. 34 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith Deus â—potest solus actum illum causare actâ—â— odiendi id est qui est odium Dei mendacium etiam potest causare Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum seu odium Dei neqâ—â— potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri neque potest causare actum â—â—lum Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus licet ille nunc sit Odiâ—â— Dei vel mendacium vel aliquis actus malus
naturally happy is proper to God therefore Adam was to be led to it freely by a Covenant An. To be happy necessarily and independently and primarily is proper to God But you can never prove it any contradiction or impossible for God to make a Creature naturally happy nor that there are not such § 9. Here the M. S. citeth some words of his Gibieuf making our Being in God initially and finally to be our state of amplitude and liberty and our going out from God to be our particularity and state of necessity as if we were pre-existent in God and our individuation ceased upon oâ—â— return into him as our End An. But these are Platonick Phantasms And Gibieuf who was a devout Oratorian and talketh too oft of our Deification as Benedictâ—â— de Benedictis Barbanson Baker and other Fryers that talk phanatically must be read with caution and exception and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God as the loss of its individuation so neither must it desire or hope for such § 10. M. S. An unchangeable state of Happiness in the love of God is called Eternal Life An. No doubt but that is called Eternal Life in the fullest sense which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject And so 1. The life of Glory perfectively 2. And a confirmed state of Sanctity here initially are usually called Eternal Life But 3. Whether the lossable state which the Angels fell from and Adam fell from or that measure of Grace which the ancient Fathers thought the justified may fall from be never so called also I cannot prove § 11. M. S. Adam's promised Happiness was 1. Essential in this perfect holiness or love of God 2. Complemental in the enjoying God iâ— all the sanctified Creatures in that Paradise but not to be translated to Heaven which Christ only procureth us An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago when I wrote the Aphorisms which you oppose But I now incline more to the contrary and rather think man should have been translated to Heaven as Henoch and Elias were upon many reasons which I now pass by Though I take it yet to be scarce certain to us § 12. M. S. The Holiness of God is his loving himself as his End And the third Person proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and self-love of God is therefore called the Holy Spirit An. 1. This notion of Gods Holiness that it is his Self-love is not to be contemned It seemeth to be so with this limitation that you confine not his Holiness to this but take this only as the most eminent among the inadequate conceptions of it For his whole Transcendency in Being Life and Knowledg as being adoreable by the Creature and its End and the Fountain of all created Goodness and specially of Morality is also Gods Holiness 2. But the saying that God is his own End seemeth improper though tolerable if spoken but analogically For God neither hath nor is to himself a Cause nor an Effect a Beginning nor an End 3. That the third Person proceedeth by a reflex Act of the infinite Will many School-men boldly say And so some say that he is Gods actual self-love which is â—he same that you call his Holiness And some say that he is the Divine Will or Love considered in it self as distinct from Vital Power and Intellect or Wisdom But of this I have spoken more largely else-where § 13. M. S. Adam's promised Reward was to be fixed in an unchangeable state of pleasing God by this Holy Spirit not by infusing any new quality which should unchangeably fasten him to the Rule for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling An. 1. The promise to Adam is very obscure But Happiness it must needs be and everlasting 2. But it is past my reach to conceive how the Spirit of God can fix man in perfect holiness without any fixing quality as it 's called on his Soul A constant Act the Soul must have And 1. If that Act be caused by any Divine Impulse disposing the Soul so to act then that disposition is a quality 2. And if there be not both disposition and habit then the Soul will not in Glory be habitually or qualitatively holy but only actually 3. And a habit-acting being perfecter than an act without a habit or inclination the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory than in this state of Grace 4. Operari sequitur esse God fitteth all his Creatures to their works And as when he will give Immortality he will give a Nature fit for Immortality even indissoluble and incorruptible so when he giveth perpetuity of Love he giveth a nature or habits fit for perpetual Action Christ saith A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit and an evil Tree evil fruit Make the Tree good and his fruit good 5. The Operations of Love in Glory should be ex potentia aut violentia aut neutra if there were no intrinsick disposition or inclination to them In a word it is a contradiction for a Soul to be perfectly holy and not have the perfection of inclination to its Acts. 3. But if the meaning were that no holy quality alone sufficeth without Gods Influx that were no more than what must be faid of every Creature without Divine Influx no Creature can be or operate a moment No created thing of it self without God can continue How then should it keep a man from falling But if the Soul have any more goodness of nature or inclination in it than the Devils have it must be a created thing or God himself If only God that proveth not a Saint to be himself better than a Devil as to nature or disposition but only that God in him is better His reason why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations but not a glorified Soul is § 14. M. S. that one is a natural and the other a voluntary Agent One as Gibieuf saith Non agit sed agitur the other doth agere non tantum agitur An. 1. Gibieuf and you were deceived in thinking that such naturals non agunt Passive matter doth not Act ex principio essentiali unless Dr. Glissons and Campanellas Doctrine hold true But the three Active Natures Intellectual Sensitive and Vegetative and so Fire and the Sun do ex principio Activo essentali agere but nothing doth Act without an Antecedent Influx to action from the first Cause in which it is passive For no Creature is Independent 2. Voluntas est quaedam Natura quamvis libera To move naturally only and not freely is proper to Agents meerly natural distinct from free But to move freely and yet from a fixed principle which shall infallibly determine the Soul to act freely is not a contradiction nor that which Gibieuf should deny to the glorified § 15. M. S. Man though a Creature is the first Cause of his own action He moveth and sets himself on work else he were
Will or Power as if he could do no more But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher sort are agreeable to his Perfection Wisdom and Liberty Higher action being used on higher creatures 3. Yet hath God placed and kept these free Agents not only under his Moral Government but also under his Dominion and disposal so that he will do with them as his own what he lift and none shall frustrate his disposing Will. 4. It pleased him first to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life and the contrary of Death 5. When Man had sufficient Grace to have kept this Law not sufficient to ascertain the event but sufficient Power to have stood that is as much Grace as was necessary to his standing sine qua non esse potuit cum qua esse potuit he broke it and sinned against that sufficient Grace before God either denyed him any thing necessary or withdrew any from him 6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of Man's Will is such as that it is made to use a Power which doth not necessitate or determine it self or is determined necessarily but freely And that it is no Deifying of the Will nor extolling it above its Nature to say that it can act or determine it self without Gods pre-determinating premotion or by that same measure of help which at another time doth not determine it Though its Nature and its Act as such be of God yet so is its Liberty too and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God the Will can act or not act or turn it self to this object or to that without more help than the said natural support and Concurse And this Power and Liberty is its Nature and Gods Image 7. From hence also it is evident that there is such a thing or operation of God as Grace Necessary called sufficient which is not effectual For God took no Grace away from Adam before he sinned nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to resist nor did he sin for want of necessary Grace but by that same degree of help might have overcome 8. God passing Sentence on faln Man for sin would not forgive him the temporal death nor common calamities of this life but cursed the creatures which he was to use as part of his penalty 9. But the Great evil which sin brought on man was the loss of Gods approbation and complacency and of his Spirits saving Communion and help and of Gods Image on man's Soul and of Communion with God herein and also his right to life eternal All which man 's own sin cast away and man was both the Deserver and Executioner without any change in God 10. Yet was all this privation penal in that God made Man such a creature as that his own sin should become his punishment or ruine if he committed it so that all Punishment is not determinatively of God though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cause As in argument God saith antecedently If thou sin thy own sin shall be thy torment and misery and man saith I will sin Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cause of the Conclusion My own sâ—â— shall be my torment and misery So it is in Causation God antecedently to man's sin doth resolve I will make Man such a Creature with such a Mind Conscience and Will as that his Holiness shall be his Health and Joy and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me and of his title to my spirit and Glory And that if he forsake me and his Holiness in the very Nature of the thing he shall lose all this Life Light and Love Joy and Communion and title to my Grace and shall feel the torments of his own Conscience telling him of his sin and loss This is Gods Antecedent Law Nay this is Gods Antecedent Creation to make man such a Creature Now if man sin his owâ— sin doth ipso facto become his misery and yet is not caused at all by Gods But yet that his Nature was made such as sin should prove a misery to was Gods Work And from that Antecedent Creation or Constitution the Relative form of a Punishment resulteth to the Sinner Even as God saith If thou Murder it shall be thy sin or Thou shalt not Murder And man doth Murder Here the Act that is sin is of man but that the Relation of sin belongeth to that act resulteth partly from the Law which forbiddeth it and yet God is not the Cause of sin though he Antecedently decreed Murder shall be sin if thou commit it So is it also with this sort of Punishment which is either sin it self or the effect or result oâ— sin immediately By which we see that when sin and punishment are found in one thing God is the Cause Antecedently of the formal Relation of a Punishment without being a Cause of the sin yea antecedently is some cause of the formal relation of the sin by his Law without causing any of the sin it self as the author of it As if God make man of such a temper as that surfetting drunkenness lust will make him sick and hazard his life Here God did no otherwise punish him than by making him such a man which he turned to his own destruction by his sin If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden that men may not steal his fruit and those that will shall â—rick themselves it is they that prick and punish themselves If God say He that will leap into the fire shall be burnt or into the water shall be drown'd it is they that do it that cause the evil and yet some formal relation of penalty may result to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law I say not that God executeth no other kind of punishment But these are the most common 11. Man having thus cast away Gods Image and his Innocency could beget a Child no purer holier or better than himself For he could not communicate that which he had lost So that our Nature is vitiated with Original sin and unhappy in the miserable effects Bradwardine hath a shift which serveth them that say man could do no good in Innocency without supernatural Help viz. Making that Help to be Gods Will that it shall be done But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the foundation of Nature working by natural means It 's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing 12. The promisory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceased with man's first sin cessante subditorum capacitate and so the Condition which is its modus So that no man ever since was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life
perfect edition of the Covenant of Grace to those that have the Gospel And it continueth to the rest of the world unrepealed as to the substance of the mercies of it further than men deprive themselves of them by forfeitures as wicked men here do as to the mercies of the Gospel But as it is a promise of Christ's future incarnation it ceased by his coming 3. The third is ceased by performance and by the Jews apostacy Though some think still that it is in force and that a national conversion shall perform that promise to the full But Mr. Calvert a Learned young man hath lately written to prove that no such national conversion is to be expected but only such additions of particular mens conversion to the Catholick Christian Church as are of that kind which hath been more fully done on the Jews already 4. As to the rest it hath troubled Divines how far Moses's Law is abrogated or ceased partly as to the Judicials and chiefly as to the Decalogue And that we may not be too forward to call one another Legatists or Antinomians for this difference those now called Antinomians being rather Libertine denyers of the Law of Christ I will notifie to those that know it not that it is as much a difference among the Papists greatest Doctors who yet bear with one another in it and the Pope decideth it not Some say that the Decalogue now obligeth not as the Law of Moses but only as the Law of Nature and of Christ So Soto de Instit li. 2. q. 5. ar 4. concl 2. Medina 1. 2. q. 103. ar 3. quem aliqui moderni sequntur saith Suarez de Leg. l. 9. c. 11. p. 761. and Tolet. in Rom. 3. Anot. 15. Salmer ad Rom. 7. disp 6. Victor Relict de Matrim 2. p. n. 3. Barrad To. 1. li. 2. c. 21. Valent. To. 2. disp 7. q. 7. punc 7. To whom Suarez joyneth himself confessing pag. 764 765. that if as some hold Moses Law had been only a Declaration of the Law of Nature and not de novo preceptive it could not be said to cease But he truly holdeth it to be constitutive or preceptive also to those that it was by Moses delivered to And of this opinion I profess my self notwithstanding all that on other points I have written against the Antinomians Believing that Christ now is the Universal Law-giver and that the very Law of nature as Nature it self is now His Law and that he hath taken it in to his Gospel administration and so the Decalogue is materially in force but not formally as part of the proper Mosaical Law save only that as Declarative and ex paritate rationis we may collect that God who for such reasons so bound them doth bind us to the same things by the same natural Reasons But there are other Papist Doctors that hold that as to the Morals Moses Law as preceptive is still in force even as then by him delivered and that to all Christians so Bellarm. de Justif li. 4. c. 6. Lorin in Act. 15. Vasquez who with Durandus Paludan Paul Burgens And Suarez saith that Alph. a Castro and most so speak And Vasquez denyeth the Law of Nature as such to have properly a Divine Obligation saith Suarez which he confuteth de Leg. l. 9. c. 11. p. 764 765. But this controversie when examined containeth not much more than verbal disagreement and so their mutual forbearance doth confess 34. The Jews instead of excelling in Holiness proportionably to their priviledges did grow carnal and proud and 1. Much neglected the Law of Nature 2. Much over-looked the spiritual Covenant of Grace made with them and all the world 3. And misunderstood the chief part of the special Promise made to Abraham not understanding commonly the high spiritual or universal Office and Kingdom of the Messiah but dreaming that he was but to be their Monarch to make them great and to subject the world to them 4. And they misunderstood the Law of Moses or Covenant on Mount Sinai as if the design of it had been but by its special holy excellency to justifie the doers of it by and for the doing and to pardon all the spiritual and perpetual punishment of Sin upon those terms which it appointed for a Political pardon and to give life spiritual and eternal upon those bare conditions on which their Law gave them Political benefits Over-looking the great causes of Justification and life in the Messiah and the common Covenant of Grace and Promise of the Messiah made to Abraham And this is the error which Christ and his Apostles found them in Yet proudly boasting of their Law and Political priviledges and despising all the rest of the world as out-casts in comparison of them 35. Though the behaviour of all the rest of the world till Christ's coming be little notifyed to us yet this much is sure that they were commonly more Ignorant and Idolatrous than the Jews that yet they retained the common notices of nature that they remembred by Tradition those intimations of the necessity of propitiatory Sacrifice so as to keep up the custom of Sacrificing among them That many of them with exceeding diligence sought to find God or know him in the works of Nature and Providence and attained to great and excellent understanding especially in Greece and Rome And many of them lived very strict austere and laborious lives in great Justice and Love and in the practice of many excellent Precepts towards God For the Heavens declared the Glory of God and the firmament shewed his handy-work Day unto day uttered speech and night unto night shewed knowledge There was no speech or language where their voice was not heard Their liâ—e went through the earth and their words to the worlds end Psal 19. 1 2 3 4. For all Gods works do praise him and the Lord is good to all his tender mercies are over all his works Psal 145. 9 10 17. He is King in all the earth He was not the God of the Jews only but of the Gentiles also Rom. 3. 29. Because that which may be known of God was manifest in or to them for God had shewed it to them For the invisible things of him from the Creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made his Eternal power and Godhead so that they are without excuse because that when they knew God they glorified him not as God neither were thankful Rom. 1. 19 20 21. God left not himself without witness in that he did good and gave men rain from heaven and fruitful seasons filling their hearts with food and gladness Act. 14. 15 16. Seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things and hath made of one blood all Nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation that they should seek the Lord if happily they might feel
after him and find him though he be not far from every one of us For in him we live and move and have our being For we are also his off-spring Act. 17. 25 26 27 28 29. For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek For the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him For whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved But have they not heard Yes verily their sound went into all the earth and their words unto the ends of the world Rom. 10. 12 13 18. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long suffering not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to Repentance Who will render to every man according to his deeds To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for Glory and Honour and Immortality Eternal life Glory honour and peace and to every man that worketh Good to the Jew first and also to the Greek For there is no respect of persons with God For not the hearers of the Law are just before God but the doers of the Law shall be justified For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves which shew the work of the Law written in their hearts their Consciences also bearing witness and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel If the uncircumcision keeps the righteousness of the Law shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision He is a Jew which is one inwardly and circumcision is that of the heart in the spirit and not in the letter whose praise is not of men but of God Rom. 2. SECT III. Of Christ's Incarnation and our Redemption 36. In the fulness of time God sent his Son made of a Woman made under the Law to redeem them that were under the Law Rom. 4. 4. But not them only for God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life Joh. 3. 16. He was made sin for us who knew no sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in him He redeemed us from the Curse of the Law being made a Curse for us For he is the Saviour of the world and the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world He is the Propitiation for our sins and not for ours only but for the sins of the whole world 1 Joh. 2. 2. For he tasted Death for every man Heb. 2. being the Saviour of all men but especially of those that believe 1 Tim. 4. 10. For if one dyed for all then were all dead And he dyed for all that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves but unto him that dyed for them and rose again 2 Cor. 5. 14 15. 37. As the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father in his Divine nature only was the interposing Redeemer by undertaking before his Incarnation and governed the faln world by the fore-described Law of Grace so upon his Incarnation initially and upon his performance plenarily all things are delivered into his hands even all the world so far as it was defiled and cursed by Man's sin Man as the Redeemed the Creatures as his utensils and goods and Devils as his and our Enemies All Power in Heaven and Earth was given him Matth. 26. 19. Joh. 13. 1 3. and 17. 2 3. All judgment was committed to him and the Father judgeth no man but by him But hath given him to have life in himself and to raise the dead Joh. 5. 22 23 24 25. For he hath made him Head over all things to his Church Eph. 1. 22 23. And for this end he dyed rose and revived that he might be the Lord of the dead and the living Rom. 14. 9 10. For God hath exalted him and given him a name above every name that in the name of Jesus every knee should â—ow Phil. 2. 7 8. And as in Adam all die even so in Christ shall all be made alive 1 Cor. 15. 22. 38. Christ upon his Incarnation performed but what God had Decreed before the foundations of the world and had obscurely and generally promised after the fall at the first making of the Covenant of Grace Which Decree of God is after the manner of men called by some a Covenant between the Father and the Son especially because the Prophets have sometimes as Isa 53. described it by way of prediction as a Covenant between the Father and Christ incarnate If we conceive of it properly under the notion of a Decree first and a Promise after unto the world so the Will and Mercy of God the Father and Son with the Holy Spirit are the cause of mans Redemption Pardon and Salvation even the fundamental Principal total Cause And the Promise was man's security and Christ as promised was the primary great meanâ— which was to procure us the rest by doing that upon the fore-sight and fore-decree whereof God did before-hand pardon and save Sinners But if you had rather mention it as in the form of a Covenant which before the Incarnation must be improperly taken being only of God to himself or a promise of and to Christ as to be incarnate then the undertaking of the Father and the Son herein must be carefully distinguished and described The Father giveth up to Christ as Redeemer the whole lapsed cursed reparable world the several parts to several uses and especially his chosen to be eventually and infallibly saved and promiseth to accept his Sacrifice and performance and to make him Head over all things to his Church and by him to establish the Law of Grace in its perfect Edition and to give him the Government respectively of the Church and world and to Glorifie him for this work with himself for ever And the second person undertaketh to assume man's Nature to do and suffer all that he did in perfect obedience to his Fathers Will and Law of Redemption to fulfill all Righteousness conquer Satan and the world to suffer in the flesh and be a Sacrifice for sin and to conquer Death and teach and rule and purifie and raise and justifie and glorifie all true believers 39. Before the Incarnation Christ's future death and obedience being * * * Eadem suit sides in antiquis patribus modernis qui alio modo credebant in specialia alia credibilia quam nos Immo aliquid eredebant quod nunc est salsum Alliaco in 3. q. 1. not existent were no real existent Causes in themselves of men's Justification But that Wisdom which foresaw them and that Will of God which Decreed them as such and not they without that fore-sight and Decree as existent were the cause 40. Nor were they either before
person or as fully representing us all the Gospel is over-turned There is no room for Repentance none for the satisfaction of Christ none for Faith in his blood nor for Pardon or prayer for Pardon or any Grace Act Duty or Ordinance Sacraments Confession or any thing which supposeth Sin To say that Adam's Law meant Do this by thy self or by Christ and thou shalt live is a Humane fiction not found in Scripture confounding the Law of Innocency with the Gospel And to say that the New Covenant maketh us one Person with Christ and then the Law of Adâ—â— doth justifie us is a double error We are not reputed one Person with Christ nor doth the first Covenant justifie any but the Person that performeth it But we maintain as well as they that the same Righteousness of God in himself is manifested in both Covenants and the same holy love of perfect Obedience and the ends of the first Covenant are secured by the second But the tenour and terms are not the same nor the Righteousness of the subject as denominated from those terms It is not the same Law which condemneth us and justifieth us nor that justifieth Christ and us nor is it the same Habits or Acts which are the immediâ—â—e fundamentum of the Relation of righteous in Christ and in us â—ough his Righteousness be the meritorious cause of ours And thereâ—â—re not the same with the thing merited 130. The Truth which they grope after and must reconcile them â—â—â—â— is as followeth Christ in his Sufferings did stand in the room of â—â—ners as their Sponsor and satisfied Justice as was said before And â—â—d had other ends yet to accomplish It was meet that the perfection â—his Law should be glorified by a perfect fulfilling of it by Christ â—en we had failed Satan was hereby confounded God pleased and â—noured Man shewed what he should have been and yet should do â—ns nature in Christ was thus actively and habitually perfected By all â—s Christ performed his Obedience to the mediatorial Law and his Herveus Natal quodlib 4. q. 14. could speak thus much better than many Protestants Sicut meritum Christi quantum ad actum quem exercuit non transit in alios transit tamen in alios quantum ad effectum illius meriti illis qui applicantur ad Christum mediantibus Sacramentis vel mediante fide propria Qui quidem effectus est Gratia quae est câ—ntraria culpae quae reddit hominem dignum vita aeterna Ita etiam demeritum Adae licet non transeat in alios quantum ad actum quem exercuit tamen transit quoad effectum culpae originalis quae est contraria gratiae reddit dignum poenae aeterna indignum vita aeterna How doth this differ from the soundest Protestants as to the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness to us or Adam's sin â—venant of Redemption and so acquired a right first to himself of giving â—t the purchased Benefits to Sinners by a new Law or Covenant of Grace â—â—d according to it By which Covenant only as his Instrument the â—her and Son give us Right to them in an Order there established â—â—â—â— that is there given to us Christ purchased for us by performing his â—n Covenant first with the Father by perfect Holiness and Obedience â—en in his Sacrifice on the Cross and by all that he undertook to do as Redeemer antecedently The Purchase was made for this Donation â— its end and is commensurate to it just so much as Christ hath given â—â—â—â— as to matter manner terms degree time c. he did purchase and â—rit for us and no more Had he antecedently done all that he did â—â—â—â— our person and we in him in Law sense the thing it self with its separable consequents and effects had been all ours ipso facto before and â—thout the donation or conveyance of a new Law or Covenant nor â—d they been ever given us upon terms and conditions when they were â—â—â—â— own before without those terms But now what is given us by the â—ew Covenant we have title to on this account because it was purâ—ased by the perfect Merit and Saerifice of Christ and so given us by â—m and by the Father So that it is ours as sure as if we had merited it â—r selves but not ours in the same order and measure and time and â—ms as if we had merited it our selves in our natural or legal perâ—ns For then it would have been all ours at once ipso facto even â—e merit it self and the fore-said effects We deserved punishment â—nd Christ was punished in our stead that we might be forgiven not â—mediately but on Covenant-terms we had forfeited Life by sin And â—hrist merited Life for us by his Perfection not in our persons but in â—e person of a Mediator which Life was to be given to us by the said â—ovenant The antecedent benefits such as the Covenant it self he â—veth absolutely and antecedently to any act of ours God reputeth all his Satisfaction and Merit of Christ to be as meet and effectual to proâ—ure us all these Benefits to be thus given as if we our selves had done and â—ffered And in this sense Christ's Righteousness is given us and made ours â—â—â—â— that it is given for us and we have the said benefits of it Not that God doth give us the very habits of Holiness which were in Christ nor â—he transient acts which he performed nor the very Sufferings which he â—nderwent nor the Relation of righteous satisfactory and meritorious as â—â—â—â— was that numerical Relation which immediately resulted from Christ's â—wn Habits Acts and Sufferings For such a translation of accidents is â—â—â—â— contradiction But God giving us all the effects or Salvation merited â—n it self properly is said also not unfitly to give us the Merit or Righteousness which procured them that is as it was paid to God for us to procure them even as he is said to give Christ himself antecedently â—â— our Faith to the World as a Saviour And thus Christ's Righteousness Merit and satisfaction may be said to be imputed to us in that it â—â— thus given us and thus truly reputed ours 131. But when the Text saith Rom. 4. 24. Righteousness is imputed â—â— us the meaning is no more but that God reputeth or judgeth us righteâ—â—â— though we have not the Righteousness of Innocency or of the Law â—â— Works which indeed is done for Christ's meritorious Righteousâ—â—â—â— procuring it But the Text speaketh not of Christ's personal Righteousâ—â—â—â— in matter or form imputed to us as being it self our own Impuâ—â—â—â— Righteousness to us is a consequent Act after Faith of God as Judâ—â— and not an antecedent donation 132. And it is true that formaliter non-punire praemiari â—â—â—punish and to Reward are not all one And in some cases a man may â—â— freed from punishment who is not rewarded But it is as true as is aâ—â—â— said 1. That Gods Salvation and
him total resignation and use as such 2. As our Ruler we owe him â—ubjection and Obedience as such 3. As our Friend Benefactor Amaâ—â—lissimus we owe him Gratitude and Love as such which yet is part â—f Obedience too Now Sin being the privation of all this God is to â—e satisfied for it as such in all these three Relations And is pars laesa â—â— all these three Relations that is he is injured though not hurt It is â—â—ue that Government and punishing Justice formally as such belong to God only as Rector And satisfaction is made him eminently in that Reâ—ation yet also to compensate the injury done by sin to him in the other â—wo Relations also SECT IX Of the nature and distinctions of Justification 152. Justification is a word of many significations the Scheme whereof And 1. Of constitutive Justification should I give them all would seem to most Readers a troublesome diâ—tinguishing Therefore I take up with these three most notable senses â— Justification constitutive 2. Sentential 3. Executive The first is to make a man righteous The second is to judge him righteâ—us The third is to use him as righteous 1. By Impunity 2. Reward * * * The Papists are confounded in the point of Justification by sticking to confounding words They talk of Justification and remission of sin but cannot tell men intelligibly what they mean They say that Remission is a putting away the sin it self and not only the Reatum poenae and yet say many that it may be done without any physical change of the Sinner 1. By sin they mean not the Habit for that cannot be removed without a physical change 2. Nor the act For that is past as soon as done 3. When they say it is macula moralis habitualiter remanens they talk gibberish and play with a metaphor and the word habitualiter A true habit is quid physicum and what macula is they can tell no man besides a habit disposition privation â—r relation If they mean that it is the Reatus culpae or culpability that is done away and not only the Reatus poenae they hold â—he same thing which they oppose in those Protestants that go too far from them And it is not sound For the pardoned Sinâ—er will be culpable though not punishable for ever that is will be really the man that sinned and it will be an everâ—asting truth This man sinned though he be pardoned See Pet. a S. Joseph Theol. Speculat l. 4. c. 10. pag. 509 510 511. The Papists say Homo est formaliter justus per formam gratiae ipst exâ—riâ—secam non tantum per justitiam Christi illi imputatam And yet Nullus actus quantumvis perfectus sive sit contritio sive Amor Dei super omnia est causâ— formalis justificationis Patres diâ—entes charitatem esse perfectam justitiam intelligendi sunt dispositive non autem formaliter Because it is in the Habit and not in the Act â—r rather as others of them say in some internal inclination antecedent to the habits of Faith Hope and Love that they place Justification or as we call it Sanctification Pet. a S. Joseph Thes Univers de grat Hab. pag. 88 89. 153 God never judgeth a man righteous either by secret esteem or open sentence till he have made him such 154. To be made righteous is to be justified in Law-sense which is To be justifiable or justificandus by sentence 155. A man is righteous 1. Particularly secundum quid as to some particular cause that he is accusable of 2. Or universally as to all causes 3. Or eminently as to all those causes that Heaven or Hell depend upon 156. 1. No man is universally righteous really or reputatively God judgeth no Saint in Heaven to be one that never sinned And he that hath once sinned is unavoidably under the Relation of â—â—â—â— that sinned to eternity ex necessitate existentiae which Relation is the very Reatus ipsius peccati though all the ill effects be remitted 157. 2. Every man hath some particular righteousness For the worst man may be falsly accused and be righteous as to that false accusation But this will not save him 158. 3. That eminent Righteousness necessary to our Salvation though it be not universal or perfect else we should never be afficted by chastiâ—â—ments or denials of Grace or permissions to sin yet is it at least perfect as to its proper use and to our glorious perfection And may be called our universal Righteousness because it is all that we have And â—â— consisteth not of any one or two Causes but of many Of which no oâ—â— must be excluded or set against the rest As there are several Allegatioâ—â— or Accusations against us so there must be several parts of the matter of our Justification 159. Not only an actual Accusation but a possible or a virtual oâ—â— which we are liable to sufficeth to denominate Justification as its contrary in the first Law-sense of Justification 160. It is our Right to Impunity and to the heavenly Glory which is to be justified finally in Judgment and our persons as the Subjects of that Right And our Actions but mediately in order to that end 161. It is only at the Bar of Christ as Redeemer that we are to be judged and justified and not by God only as a Creator Therefore it is by the Law of Grace that we must be judged to life or death finally and not by the sole Law of Innocency 162. Therefore no man is justified by the Law of Innocency either by the preceptive or retributive part But we are justified only by the Lâ—â— or Covenant of Grace against the Accusation which may be brought against us from the Law of Innocency Against it not by it 163. We are liable to all these following Accusations which will opeâ— to us the correlate Justifications and the matter of each part 1. It may be said by the Accuser of the Brethren Thou art a Siâ—â—â—â— against the Precepts of Nature and Grace He that denieth this is a Lyar Against this Charge there is no Justification for ever But we must â—â— Heaven confess that we have sinned but Glory be to him that washed â—s from our sins in his blood by Pardon and Sanctifiation 164. 2. Next it may be said that We did deserve Hell by our Sin This also is to be confessed for ever 165. 3. It may be said that by Gods Law of Innocency Hell is ouâ— due and therefore we are to be condemned to it To this we deny the consequence because we have right to Impunity and to Glory freely given us by God our Redeemer by a Covenant of Grace merited for us by the Obedience and Satisfaction given for us by Christ our Saviour Where note that here in this first part of our Justification there are all these conjunct necessary Causes 1. Gods Love and Mercy giving 2. Christ's Righteousness and Satisfaction meriting 3. The Covenant
instrumentally giving 4. Right to Impunity and Glory by Justification and Adoption conjunct the thing given which Right is our very Righteousness against â—his Accusation that is a relation whence the other relation of just and â—ustifiable resulteth For if you will not here see relations resulting from â—elations pretend not to true accurateness in your search 166. These four Causes now were enough to constitute and so prove â—s righteous against the Charge of being damnandi if we were questionaâ—le no further But the turning point of the day is yet behind 1. Our â—llegation of Justification by Christ and the Covenant may be denied â—t may be said by the Accuser that the Covenant justifieth none but â—enitent Believers and giveth plenary Right to Glory to none but saints â—nd persevering Conquerors and that we are none such Against this Acâ—usation we must be justified or perish else all the rest will be unâ—ffectual And here to say that it is true I died an impeninent Person â—n Insidel Hypocrite or Ungodly but Christ was a penitent Believer for Of our own personal performance or righteousness how far necessary to our Justification â—e or sincere and holy for me or that he died to pardon this all this will â—e false and vain Christ's Merits and Satisfaction is not the Righteousness it self which must justifie us against this Accusation But our own â—ersonal Faith Repentance sincere Holiness and Perseverance purchased â—y Christ and wrought by the Spirit in us but thence our own acts Mr. W. Thomas of Ubley in his Book against Speed the Quaker saith pag. 42. part 2. This is an old Popish trick to make much of the Doctrine of the St. James in a mistaken interpretation and to lay aside the Doctrine of St. Paul Rom. 3. 28. when they should joyn both together and ascribe to Faith the justification of men as sinners and to work their justification as Believers This is sound and needeth but fuller explication â—e that cannot truly say The Accusation is false I am a true Penitent â—anctified persevering Believer must be condemned and perish Thus â—aith and Repentance are our Righteousness by which we must thus far â—e justified 167. But this is but a particular mediate subservient Righteousness â—nd part of our Justification subordinate to Christs Merits 168. Yet this being the Condition on our part for our Participation â—n all the free Gifts of the Covenant Scripture useth to describe Gods â—udgment as enquiring after this The great thing to be glorified in â—udgment is Gods Love Wisdom Justice and Truth and Christ's great Merits and performance in our Redemption But the great thing questioâ—ed accused tried and judged will be our performance of the Covenant of Grace as to our conditions The day is not to try God whether he be â—ust or Christ whether his Merits and Satisfaction were sufficient and whether he have done his part But to try man whether 1. He have â—rue Right to Impunity and Glory 2. Whether he have performed the Condition on which the Covenant giveth that Right and be indeed the â—rue Receiver of it The Devils hope cannot lie at all in proving Christ or the Covenant faulty or defective on their part but in proving â—s to be none of the persons that have Right This therefore is the Righteousness mentioned Matth. 25. and of Faith imputed Rom. 4 c. â—nd else-where 169. But if we will speak of Righteousness and Justification entirely â—s that which containeth all its Causes we must set all the five forementioned together giving each one its proper place and no one the â—lace or office of the rest And give leave to the self-conceited pievish â—gnorant blindly to revile you for saying that you joyn your Faith and Holiness to make one Righteousness with that of Christ as if it were not sufficient And tell him that Christ's Righteousness is not ours absolutely in it self but to and in the proper effects And that it is perfect as to its â—roper ends And that he never intended it to this end to be instead of Faith and Holiness in us nor to make them needless to our Salvation 170. No man must ascribe any thing to his own Faith or Holiness iâ— the least degree which is proper to 1. Gods Mercy or Grace 2. To Christ or his Righteousness or Merits 3. Or to the Covenant not any thing but its proper part And that must be granted it 171. It is a vain Fiction in them that think our Right to Justificatioâ— or Impunity and our Right to Salvation have not the same causes and conditions but that our own Repentance and Obedience is a condition of our Right to Salvation but not to Impunity or forgiveness Whereas ouâ— very Justification is a justifying of our Right to Salvation and the same Covenant giveth them conjunctly on the same conditions 172. But our Right to both as begun hath less for the condition thâ—â— our Right to them as continued and perfected For our believing consent to the Baptismal-Covenant putteth us into immediate Right to all the benefits of the Covenant which we are then capable of but not to all that we shall be made further capable of hereafter we are pardoned and should be glorified if we presently died But as we have more Grace to receive so we have more Duty to perform as a means yea a condition of obtaining it 173. This over-lookt by many is much to be considered both as to the case of Infants baptized and the Adult Many wonder that the What right the Covenant giveth to the after-helps and degrees of Grace Children of godly Parents prove oft so bad as if by the Baptismal-Covenant they had received nothing from God But the Synod of Dort Art 1. § 17. well concludeth that godly Parents have no cause to doubt of the Election or Salvation of their Children dying in Infancy they being holy and in the same Covenant with their Parents But the continuance of Gods Grace hath a continued condition and means to be used on our part The condition which the Covenant requireth to an Infants first Justification is that he be the Child of a true Believer by him dedicated to God And as the first Condition is to be found in the Parent or Owner so must the Condition of continued Grace as long as the Child continueth an Infant And that is the continuance of the Parents Faith and his faithful performance of his promise made to educate his Child in the way of God But if the Parents should presently both turn Infidels and so educate their Child and give him up as the Jâ—â—izaries are to an Infidel to educate I know God may nevertheless give him Grace above his Promise if he please for a Benefactor as such is free but I know of no assurance of it by Promise For in Baptism both Parties were obliged for the future and not one only And if when the Child cometh to the use of Reason he wilfully
to God And so Faith is below Repentance as a means of it 204. By this the question whether Faith or Repentance be first may partly be resolved and partly cast out as founded in confusion As they are both one thing neither can be first any otherwise than the same Motus ut a termino a quo ut ad terminum ad quem But as they signifie divers things they have each of them divâ—râ— acts and in respect of each are before each other The Assenting act of Faith in general must needs be always before Repentance as it is an Act of the Will But the consenting Act of faith is also part of Repentance and must folow that part of Repentance which is a change of the understanding But whether the Repentance as towards God or Faith in Christ be first or Love to God and Faith in Christ I have discussed as accurately as I can in my Christian Directory Par 1. cap. 3. pag. 182. and therefore thither refer the Reader 205. And how Faith and Love differ I have there also opened and therefore shall now only say that Faith as it signifieth meet How Faith and Love differ Assent differeth from Love as the act of the Intellect from Volition And Love formally taken presupposeth the Assent and doth not contain it But Faith taken largely in the sence of the Baptismal Covenant containeth in it Consent which is the Wills Volition and therefore must needs have some initial Love in it as it acteth iâ— Desire This Faith in God hath some Desire and Volition of God and Faith in Christ which is the Souls Practical Affiance in him hath some Love to Christ in it But the denomination is not from the same ratio formalis in each It is eminently called Faith when giving up our Souls to Christ to be saved in practical Affiance is the great work of the Soul though it have something of Love essential to it And it is eminently called Love morally when the Complacency of the Soul in Christ thus trusted and in God our end is the great work or business of the Soul 206. This Holy Love as a fixed habit and employment of the Soul and our Relation to the Holy Ghost to work it in us is it that is promised and Given quoad jus in the Baptismal Covenant of which Faith though it have somewhat of actual Love or Volition in it is the antecedent condition which also I have so fully opened as afore cited that I refer the Reader to it for this also And somewhat was said of it before SECT XIII Of the degrees of Pardon or Justification 207. Some men lest they should yield that Justification is not one perfect finished act done but once do feign that it is only the first act of Faith by which a man is justified Indeed it is only the first act by which he â—s changed from an unrighteous to a righteous state But to think that therefore we are never after justified by Faith and so have no actually justifying Faith all our lives but for one instant only is fitter for a Dreamer than a theological Discourser 208. Our first constitutive Justification being in its nature a right to â—mpunity and to Life or Glory * * * â—â—â—â— tells us that 〈…〉 which 〈…〉 by Regeâ—â—ra â—â— and Just â—â—â—â— on â—uâ— what they mean by Râ—â—nission they cannot tell themselves as a â—oresaid Pardon of the guâ—â— they mean not or else they mean several things in one word is a Relation which must be continued to the end and therefore must have the true causes and condition continued and would cease if any of them ceased 209. As to the question therefore whether Justification be lossable and â—ardon reversible I answer that the grant of them in the Covenant is unalterable But mans will in it self is mutable and if he should cease believing by Apostacy and the condition fail he would lose his Right and be unjustified and unpardoned without any change in God But that a man doth not so de facto is to be ascribed to Election and special Grace of which afterward 210. Though all our past sins are pardoned at our first Faith or Conversion or as the Ancients speak in Baptism yet it is most certain that Pardon or Justification is not perfect at first no nor on this side death And the saying of many that Justification is perfect at first and Sanctification only by degrees is a palpable error as I have else-where oft shewed For that is not perfect 1. Which is not continued and brought on to its end but upon continued conditions and diligent use of means to the â—ast * * * Neque enim peccati sui veniam impetravit Adam ut a morte temporali immunis esset Twiss contr Corvin pag. 343. col 2. 2. Which leaveth many penalties unremoved which have further means to be used for their removal and further Right to it to be obtained To have more and more Grace and less and less Sin and to have â—earer communion with God are blessings as to the degrees which we must by degrees attain a further Right to and the privation of them are â—ore penalties to be removed 3. We have new sins to be pardoned every day 4. Our remaining Corruption is such as needeth a continued Pardon till it be perfectly done away 5. The Day of Judgment is not come for which the most perfect Justification is reserved SECT XIV Of Justification by Sentence of the Judge 211. The second sort of Justification which is by Sentence is done by Christ as Judge and so is an act of his Kingly Office 212. Therefore were it true as it is not that justifying Faith were only the receiving or believing in Christ as a Justifier of us it would not be a believing in him in his Priestly Office only but in act For he merited our Justification as a humbled Servant and a Sacrifice He giveth it us in Right by his Covenant or Law of Grace as King and Benefactor He promulgateth it as Prophet He passeth the Sentences as King and Judge He executively taketh off the penalty and glorifieth us as King and Benefactor There is no Justification by a partial Faith 213. Though the estimation of a man as just called the Sententiâ— judicis concepta as distinct from the sententia prolata be said to be â—â— immanet act of God and therefore from eternity yet it is a mistake For though it be not transient effectivè and do nihil efficere ad extra yeâ— it is transient objectivè and doth presuppose the existence of the qualified Object For though Gods Knowledge and Will in genere or as such are his eternal Essence yet Gods Knowledge and Love of John or Peter â—â— Believers are terms which signifie not his Essence as such but as transâ—â— and terminated on those existent persons relatively So that the extrinâ—â—cal denomination from the existent Object is temporary as it is 214.
remedy is as far off and cannot be made their own and applied If any would know the very moment in which a man that had contracted guilt by a hainous sin is actually absolved Cyprian seemeth to have determined it clearly in these words When I see thee sighing before the Lord I doubt not but the Holy Ghost is breathing on thee when I see thee weeping I perceive him pardoning The like you have Judic Theol. Bremens de persever ib. pag. 233. n. 9 10 11. vid. rejecta pag. 237. 267. The Brittish Divines in that Synod Judic de perseverant p. 188. begin with this explication that it is only the perseverance of the Adult Vid. Davenant and Ward de Grat. Baptismati that are actually Believers and not of Infants which is intended For some of them as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Ward have written that an Infant state of Grace and title to Salvation may be fallen from and lost 268. They add ibid. p. 108. Thes 3. This perswasion of perseverance hath not that degree of certainty which always excludeth all fear of the contrary but is sometime lively sometime languid sometime as in greatest Temptations none The first debility ariseth from the fundamental dependance of this personal affiance which seemeth to come below the certainty of dogmatical Faith For the Articles of Faith do affect our assent as immediate and first principles But the truth of special Faith is not thence deduced as a necessary consequent but is only subjoyned by way of assumption Ergo the firmness of that conclusion which maketh this perswasion cannot be greater than that which is in the weaker of the premises But that sumption resteth on experimental signs weighed by mans private Conscience which being sometime doubted of whether they are true signs and sometimes hid by temptations that they cannot shine out to our comfort what wonder if Believers perswasion of their eternal Salvation be not always vegete and valide Besides that the very Principles of the Catholick-Faith though by revealed light clear in themselves yet being not known to us by certainty of evidence but only of Adhesion * * * Here I leave them with the School-men Adhesion as Durand confesseth supposeth or is strongest where there is evidence and such we have though not sensible ipsius rei yet veritatis testimâ—â—ii they beget not in us so firm an assent as mathematical demonstrations and common notions But in beholding them from the relicts of carnal diffidence some vapors as it were sometime arise by which the light of divine immutable verity seemeth to us to be resringed and to waver How much greater and daily is the errour of every Believer in the beholding of their own personal affiance 269. It is too certain by sad experience that a true Believer may lose much of the Grace which he once had and may die in a worse and weaker state 270. It is certain by Gods Word that the justified have need of warnings that they fall not away and of threatenings if they fall and Luk. 12. 4 5. Hâ—b 4. 1. 1 Cor. 9. 27. Heb. 12. 28 29. that they are obliged to fear it by a cautelous preventing fear that they may escape it 271. It is certain therefore that if the thing be denominated possible in relation to our own power it is not only possible that we should fall away but too certain that we should 272. But if the event be denominated possible or impossible in relation to Gods meer Decree or Fore-knowledge which as such do nihil They that are too favourable to the Dominicant predeterminants should remember how far their Doctrine of supernaturality of Grace hath carried them against all possibility of knowing not only our perseverance and Salvation but our present state of Grace For they say that nothing but Divine Revelation can assure any man that his acts are from a supernatural principle yea that only by the beatifical Vision which is by uncreated Species can the true difference between the acts of acquired and infused habits be known So Alvarez li. 6. disp 51. p. 232. Habitus virtutum Theologicalium solum divina revelatione cognoscuntur certo infallibiliter Immo Bannes addit quod non possunt â—videnter cognosci secundam suam ultimam differentiam per speciem aliquam creatam propter similitudinem quam habent actus charitatis infusae acquisitae non potest quis secusa divina revelatione cognoscere infallibiliter actum charitatis quem habet in via esse supernaturalem nec discernere certo utrum procedat effective ab habitu infuso vel acquisito aut a nuda potentia â— Besides Bannes he cites as his Consenters D. Toom p. 1. q. 62. a. 1. c. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 4. Sotus de Grat. li. 1. c. 22. corol 3. Cajet 22. q. 6. a. 1. And by this it appeareth that their very Doctrine of Infusion and Supernaturality in excess is the very ground of their denying all certainty of Justification and Salvation efficere ad extra without respect to his operative power so the Apostacy of the Elect is impossible logically or their perseverance necessary necessitate consequentiae in ordine probandi it being impossible that both these should be true Paul will apostatize and God decreeth the Paul shall not or fore-knoweth that he will not apostatize But posita nulla operatione divina ad extra it would be nevertheless possible in re in causis that such a one should fall away For all possibles are not futures Therefore as God may both fore-know and decree the nonfurity of a thing if a Negative needed a Decree and yet decree that it shall be possible So God may decree the futurity of a mans perseverance and yet decree that it shall be possible as to all Causes that â—e persevere not For he is supposed to decree only the determination of an undetermined Power but not antecedently to take it away and make it no free power 273. But if the Relation of possibility be denominated from Gods operative Grace effecting perseverance then God hath various Operations He can give his Grace by such an Omnipotent insuperable force as shall predetermine the faculty so far as antecedently to take away the moral power though not the natural ad contrarium And he can work in such a compliance with the liberty of the Will as shall only determine the power natural or moral to act and not antecedently take it away unless as determining it is a taking it away as to the contrary act at the same instant as every man taketh away his own power by acting when God operateth the first way antecedently taking away the power aâ— contrarium then the apostasie of a man is properly called Impossible in relation to the impotency of all other Causes to overcome God the cause of perseverance But when God only worketh the latter way not taking away the moral power ad contrarium but determining
Grace And how oft the Resolution of the will may change without the loss of holy habits The teâ—â—pter will say to David or Peter If once why not twice If twice why not thrice And who but God can say just how oft And yet to set no bounds confoundeth the just and unjust good and bad and maketh Sanctification but a name And to say that Peter's Faith did totally fail or that he was holy deprived of wholly love or saving Grace is rash and an unlikely thing 302. And it must be remembred that the Will is always in the time of sinning more for the committing the Sin than against it actually or else it would not be committed And in omissions it is not prevalently for the Duty else it would be done And if it were Habitually so too as to a holy or a sinful life the person were unholy And when the will known by the practice is sometime actually more for a gross Sin than against it and daily actually more for some small Sins than against them it is wonderous hard here to discern certainly that the contrary habit is our state 303. And it addeth to the difficulty that it is hard to be sure whether the Habit of Love and Holiness may not be predominant and yet the very Habit of some one Sin as well as the act be stronger than the contrary habit For a daily use of the acts seemeth to prove a prevalent Habit. As a Habit of Anger of vain jeasting c. And if a very Habit of one Sin may be prevalent though not of all others it will be hard to say either how great that Sin may be and so whether a Habit of Lust of Pride of Covetousness may stand with Grace in that prevalency or yet how many Sins may be so habitually prevalent in a sanctified man But if no one what shall those think of themselves that live in the daily act of smaller Sins before-mentioned And that they erre who tell us that all Sin is equally mortified in the Habit common experience fully proveth But such men use not to distinguish between the General habit of Love to Good and Hatred to evil which is as the trunk of the Tree to the branches which may have their particular Cankers and Diseases and is indeed Virtually a Habit of all Good and against all Evil and the particular Habits of Good and Evil which are also found in every Soul 304. Yea the difficulty is yet greater by our ignorance of the very nature of a Habit of the will or of that Inclination of it to Good or Evil which is antecedent to the Act which he that hath read the Schoolmen and Metaphysicks or ever well studyed it himself will discern to be tantum non out of the reach of our understandings That it is a Dispositive promptitude to Act we feel But whether that Disposition be it self a secret unobserved Immanent Act disposing to the more open perceptible Act for the Soul is never out of Action and certainly hath at one instant several Acts of which that de fine is oft unobserved and yet most powerful As a Traveller that is taken up with other thoughts and talk would never hold on his way if the end were not actually intended though he feel it not or whether it be the Natural Inclination of the Will corroborated and what that Inclination is whether it lie much in a Receptive disposition of the acted faculties by which they are still ready to receive the Active motion of the Agent power as the Receptivity of the fuel causeth the greatness and constancy of a flame or the opening of the window the shining in of the Sun or the composition of the adapted wheels causeth the Clock or Watch to be easily and truly moved by the poise or spring or what else it is that we call a Habit is not so easily known as unstudied confident Disputers think So that judicious Mr. Truman Tract of Impaten Nat. Mor. seemed to despair of clear understanding it And whether an Infants Principle of Holiness be Quid morale which never came from any act nor is the particular Habit of any act any more than the Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum qua bonum with abundance of other difficulties about Habits These all make our case the harder to be resolved SECT XXI The solution of all the former difficulties in part 305. Of all these difficulties I have no better solution besides what is aforesaid than as followeth 1. That a Dispositive Inclination of the Will to God and actual Holiness is like to the Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum foelicitatem saving that it is not ours ab origine in our lapsed state and that it is more moveable and separable from the Soul And so is quiddam naturae though not quaedam natura called The Divine and new nature in us and is to the Soul what Health is to the man And is the great Moral Principle within us and is acceptable to God as being the Rectitude of his noble creature * * * As to the Papists continual calumnies that we call men just whose continued wickedness is but hid and not imputed and without inherent justice we abhor both their confusion and their calumny and distinctly give them this short account 1. We hold a conditional universal pardon of all 2. But no actual pardon of the destructive punishment nor non-impuration of Sin till men are truly converted from a wicked heart and life to the love of God by Faith and Repentance 3. And then all Sin inconsistent with the prevalent love of God and a holy just and sober life is mortified and ceaseth 4. But such infirmities as you call Venial Sins continue and all our Goodness is culpably imperfect 5. Though the destructive punishment be pardoned the Reatus culpae in se continueth for ever that is It is an everlasting truth that we once sinned 6. Our pardon and our Renovation are freely given us by Grace for the sake of the satisfaction merits and intercession of Christ whose perfect Righteousnesse fulfilled that Law that man had broken 7. In which sense his perfect Righteousness is said by Protestants to be Imputed to us because he did it and suffered for us in the person of a Mediator and so it was the Meritorious cause of all our Justification Grace and Glory And what hath any Papist or other wrangler against any of this Yeâ— we reject their loose Doctrine that say as Pot. as Joseph Theol. Spec. l. 4. c. 10. p. 511. De potentia absoluta Gratia habitualis potest simul esse iâ— eodeâ— subjecto meaning in a predominant degree cum peccato mortali sive actuali sive habituali For as I said before against Okam and Scotus on that point they are inconâ—istent contraries as life and not-living light and darkness and their proofs of the contrary are frivolous See Scot. in 4. d. 16. Aliac in 1. 99. Greg. Armin. in 1.
is less than a good habit 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth and forbear more evil 11. That every man is commanded to use some means in order to his salvation which he is morally able to use 12. That God useth to bear long with the abusers of their Power before he forsake them 13. That many have many perswasions and helps to use their power that abuse it 14. That it 's just with God to forsake such 1â— And great mercy to the elect not to be so forsaken All â—â—â—â— will be made cleareâ— in their due â—â—â—â— which I shall now here offer you § 2. AS for the five Articles I. The Article of Predestination II. And the Article of Redemption contain no difference between the parties but only as they relate to the Articles of Free-will and effectual Grace as is aforesaid For all must agree that God Decreed and Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them Of which the Conditional gift of the Love of the Father the Grace of the Son and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism is a great part And many mercies teachings perswasions and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them and Christs Death procured them all that he giveth them To which add what elsewhere I have opened that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any Positive Decrees of Negations or nothings Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals atomes names words c. And remember that to Permit is not-to hinder and so is a meer negation or a doing nothing and that not-to-give faith repentance grace the Gospel c. is a negation or a nothing and so need no Decree seeing a not-decreeing to give c. is sufficient so that the whole of the Controversie about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of Grace and Free-will III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed but that Natural Free-will is part of that excellency or Image of God by which man is differenced from bruits and that it is such a faculty by which man can in some instances determine his own will to this rather than that without Divine predetermination which is certain in the â—ase of sin yea and of some good For Adam's will could without any other grace than he had have forborn his sin Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will And it is agreed on as is said before that all men can do more good than they do and forbear more evil than they forbear and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will for a man to make a good use or an ill of the same measure of grace at several times or for several men to make several uses of the same measure Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question Why did he forbear this sin to day and not yesterday or Why did this man forbear sin and not that supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace to say Because this man at this time used that power which God had given him in stirring up his own will to concurt with grace and the other man or this at another time did not what he could Not that this answer is good in all cases where more grace is necessary to the effect but in this forementioned So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent to say that it is essentially a self-determining faculty made by God in the Image of his Liberty and depending on him and not able to Act without him as the first Cause but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse and of his directions and Laws it is able to make choice hic nunc to will or not will to will this rather than that without Divine necessitating predetermination and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary All which shewing the natural power of mans will and its liberty must be readily acknowledged by all sides that will not say that Adams first sin and every sin of all men else are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions and Gods non-causation in case of omissions and into Gods will in both and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth than he can be God or overcome God or live and act without God And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents so we are all agreed except the Pelagians that mans nature is vitiated by Original sin and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation except from God who never necessitateth it to evil is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence and is not free either from the enticements of sense or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind or from its own vicious habits averseness to God and holy things and proneness to things sensual and seeming good And therefore that this Holy or Moral Liberty of the will must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it of which next IV. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace it is agreed on and cannot I speak not of Grace as it is Gods favour but the effect â—e gratia data non de gratia dantâ— with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christs own performance there is yet a three-fold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ in the measure hereafter mentioned all this is common I. The first sort of Grace lyeth in the enacting of a new Law of Grace called also in several respects The new Testament the new Covenant and the Promise And as to this it is agreed 1. That God made this Law Covenant or promise in the first Edition with Adam and Eve after the fall Gen. 3. 15. the seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head and did by Actual Remission of their sin and not-punishing them as the first Law threatned yet more plainly manifest to them the pardoning Grace of this Covenant And that he made this new Law or Covenant to all mankind in and by them And that he again renewed the same Covenant of Grace with all mankind in Noah after the deluge Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenour or sence of the
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
these following evidences § 6. 1. In that he hath made so large provision of means and that in an admirable frame which is as it were a Moral world Which he would never do in vain nor if he ordinarily workt without them that work which he hath appointed them to do It is the reason of the Brittish Divines in their suffrages at Dort Had not God decreed to work Grace by means he could have done it with a fiat § 7. 2. The Glory of this Kingdom or Sapiential Rule which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture Psal 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout and Matth. 25. As the Ship master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will Jam. 3. 4. § 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to their nature And this is suitable to the nature of man And the Causation is answerable to the effect And ORDER is a moral effect which needeth not a Creation but a moral ordering Causation § 9. 4. Experience telleth us that those prosper best in grace that most faithfully and diligently use the means And we never knew of any man 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. â— 20 21. 3. 5. 8. 13. 4. in the world that came to Actual knowledge faith or Love without means but all by the causality of them § 10. 5. We find that the greatest neglecters and despisers of means are every where most graceless and the worst of men § 11. 6. We have Ministers and people frequent and strict commands to use means most diligently constantly and carefully § 12. 7. We have abundance of promises of Gods blessing upon the Licet omnis causa secundâ— proprie dicta causet effectum ex natura rei tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei Alliac in 4. q. 1. F. use of means Act. 26. 17. I send thee to open their eyes and turn them Rom. 10. How shall they hear without a Preacher c. Isa 55. 2 3. Hear and your souls shall live Matth. 28. 20. I am with you alwayes c. Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you heareth me Psal 19. 7 c. The Law of the Lord is pure Converting the soul 1 Pet. 1. It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us Heb. 4. The word is powerful and a searcher of the heart c. § 13. 8. When God will save a people he sends them the Gospel and Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 1â— when he will forsake them he taketh it away § 14. 9. The Devil sheweth his malice to souls and grace by opposing the means depriving men of them or keeping them from them or from the faithful using of them § 15. But it is none of my meaning that the bare means of it self doth change the soul or that it is the principal cause But only that God operateth Moral effects by Moral means as he doth Natural by Natural means being still the prime Cause of all himself § 16. If we thus conjoyn all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoyned it will help us the better to escape errour in this matter But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to second causes is a derogation from God and a dishonouring of him they forsake the truth and injure him § 17. For if this were true that to honour the means or acknowledge Though God be proxiâ—uâ—â— not as in loco in all his operations yet seeing he operateth by second causes he doth it according to them as all experience tells us Therefore to end these Controversies we should consider more how those causes operate second Causes and their aptitude and efficacy is to dishonour God then God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself by making and using such causes and means And so many Creatures as there be in the world so many dishonours are cast on God and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most which sottish conceit must needs be joyned with Manichaeism that an ill God was the Maker of the World God is Glorious in all his works and shineth to us in them all SECT V. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means § 1. * * * Gerhard Tom. 2. de lib. aâ—b cap. 6. §. 1. supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man as being dead and vicious but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will but so work as leaveth it a power to resist and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual And Georg. Calixtus was of the same mind as you may see in his words de Minist Verbi p. 241. in Judic de Controvers num 33. See â—e Blank Thes de distinct Gratiâ— ALl that is Good in the Difference between man and man is Willed by God and Caused by him But nothing that is Morally Evil. § 2. As in Nature God seemeth to Cause Motion in genere by an equal universal Influx of the Sun which maketh no difference per se but per accidens But the wonderful variety of motions and effects is otherwise caused So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness affordeth by his Means of Nature which he Politically manageth an indifferent influx or help for Action as Action to the souls of men which as Dr. Twisse frequently saith well is to be called Nature rather than Grace except as the repriving of Nature is Grace so far as it is meer Power to Act because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad and to do or not do § 3. The Power of Action as such being given by an equal Natural Universal Influx it is the ORDER of Actions where we must enquire of the difference and its Cause § 4. Action it self is not a proper substantial being but a Modus Rei But yet it is such a Mode as by the Cartesians leave requireth more Causation to it than a meer non agere doth But ORDO Actionum is but a modus modi § 5. ORDO is the beauty of the World and soul the genus of all Relation in fundamento and of all morality and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments And yet we know not what to call it whether any thing or nothing The ORDO Rerum is not Res And it is Rerum status which we better know in se than we know with what Logical Notion to cloth it § 6. This excellent Nothing is the summ of Morality in its form and the business of frail man on earth and much of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven It is Gods work and not ours to make new substances It is ours to keep ORDER in our selves as Gods work yea in the Actions which God by Nature enableth us to So vain a thing is man that
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
be equal or unequal physical or moral c. is to dote § 5. But yet this Knowledge and Will of God is transient or terminated Objectively when it is not so Effectively And so God is said to know things differently as they differ and to will things differently as they are different objects But this speaketh truly nothing New or various in God but only a Relative and so denominative connotation of his simple essence from these objects whose diversity giveth divers names to Immutable most simple Unity Of this all Schoolmen for substance are agreed however the Thomists Scotists and Occamists differ about the notions of Ratio ratiocinata formalitas denominatio extrinseca § 6. II. If it be the operation of the second Causes ex parte operantiâ—â—â—n and so of God by them that we dispute of the disputes would have the easier decision But this is denyed by the Dominicans and another Infusing Immediate operation is made the subject of these Controversies § 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is only the effect as in the soul-receiving which we dispute of And if so this must be remembred that we dream not of any Controversie about Gods Action as ex parte agenâ—is in Him or between him and the soul § 8. In mans soul we know of nothing but 1. The substance in the first notion as answerable to Matter in bodies 2. The form which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One viz. The vital Power Intellect and Will which is at once Virtus Vis Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones All these are but Inadequate conceptions of the same simple essence and not compounding parts None of this is the thing in question for the soul is presupposed to be a soul 3. The Accidental and mutable Disposition of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The Impressions of sâ—periour Causes God and means in moving to the Acts. 5. The Acts of the soul themselves 6. The Habits I know of no more § 9. I. Though All Habits are dispositions yet all Dispositions are not Habits And before Habits the soul may be many wayes predisposed to the Act As 1. By former acts of another sort which yet conduce to this 2. By other habits that are preparatory 3. By deliverance from many Internal and External Impediments 4. And lastly By the Divine Impress it self in the instant of Nature though not of time before the Act. For God so disposeth the soul to act § 10. This predisposition is sometime but a Moral Power that is in so low a degree as containeth only the Necessary power to the act with which alone it is sometime done And sometime besides this Moral Power it containeth some further degree of accidental Inclination or propensity to the Act. And these degrees are various in various instances and sâ—bjects § 11. II. When God moveth the soul to believe or repent we must conceive that in the instant antecedent to the Act the soul receiveth some Impress or Impulse from the divine essence by which it is disposed or moved to act * * * Aâ—xilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impressa quoniam hoc nomen significare videtur qualitatem constituentem potentiam in actâ— primo sed proprio vocabulo dicitur motio Actualis qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera expedita facultate qua potest illum non operari si velit Alvarez de Auxil disp 23. p. 108. Mâ—tio is the proper notion he thinks between God and the Act or Habit of man as aforesaid but unaptly I think so conceived by him And though spirits especially God move not by such contact and impress as things corporeal yet in an unconceivable manner some spirit some spiritual Impress Influx or motion must be Received by which faith is caused And this Impress and the Disposition to the Act caused by it perhaps are really the same § 12. III. The Act it self by this and by the soul disposed and excited is next caused not given as pre-existent but given by causal efficacious suscitation of the pre-existent faculty or power § 13. IV. The Habit which is a Promptitude to facile acting is caused by all the forementioned causes conjunct and not by any one alone viz. by God and his Impress on a soul some way pre-disposed and by the soul it self further disposed and excited by that Impress But of Habits more anon And here because almost all our seeming difference dependeth on the question What it is that is between Gods essence and mans act which is the cause of our Act or may be called grace sufficient or effectual more or less c. I shall tell you how Alvarez handleth the question and thereby further shew you that it is a thing unsearchable and past mans knowledge and though I satisfie my self with calling it an Impulse or Impress or a Received energie or force or Influx yet these are but general notions and tell us not as to a distinct formal conception What it is And you shall see that the boldest disputers know no more Alvarez de Aux l. 3. disp 19. p. 77. tells you that there are these several opinions of it What is the previous motion by which God moveth and applyeth second causes to operate I. Some Thomists hold that It is a Quality not permanent but by way of transient disposition with operation Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar 4. dub 1. Conc. 4. n. 58. For it must be some Virtus and that must be a Quality Imperfect supernatural acts as attrition fear of hell c. are before habits and have only such transient virtues or qualities c. II. Others hold contrarily that Gods motion is nothing besides his own will or essence and mans act being simultaneous Their reasons I omit * * * So Bradwardine and many others And this would cut short most of our present Controversies if it would hold Dr. Twisse saith Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9. p. 348. Probabile esse nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem sed quia Deus velit Voluntatem creaturae Velle aliquid necesse est ut velit Ratio haec est cujus solutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis Sola Dei Voluntate factum est ut Mundus crearetur Quis enim influxus Dei potest fingi praecedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum c. III. Others hold that Gods previous motion is somewhat received in second causes in order of nature before they operate and when they are asked What it is they say It is really the very operation of the second cause e. g. man it self as it proceedeth from God And so that Gods premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really distinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth it self but is the same The same act being of God and man So that they
make this motion to be somewhat received before we act and yet nothing but our act which is absurd IV. Other Thomists hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our operations and that is Quoddam complementum virtutis activae quo actualiter agat And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to and what it is let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement And here they tell you that they speak not of Gods simultaneous concurse for that Alvarez confesseth is nothing besides Gods essence and mans act But of his previous motion which he saith is somewhat more So Amesius Antisynod de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certe posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi I now meddle not with the truth of this and Twisses argument is easily answered But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced who yet most aggravate them What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum Nothing besides Gods esse but ipsa fides Is faith effective of it self No. Is Gods essential will effective of it Who ever denyed it What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy when it is but Gods essence and the known effect of which they speak and hold not as Alvarez doth any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all Gods will then is effectual quia vult effectum and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not but could will But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth because no more or less is willed of God which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae and the several sorts previous simultaneous operating co-operating c. meerly vain when there is no such thing as any Grace besides Gods meer will and the Act of man And yet Dr. Twisse elsewhere saith that Gods Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto As if they differed in the nature of motion And he saith that this is true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits as faith hope Love and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition by which man is remotely prepared for Justification ◠which proceed not from supernatural habits but from the spirits special impulse not yet inhabiting but moving And Alvarez thus concludeth I. That which God doth in second causes by which these act is Aliquid habens esse quoddam incompletum per modum quò colores sunt in aere virtus artis in instrumento artificis It is Aliquid incompletum transiens cum ipsa operatione Are you ever the wiser for all this II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni causae secundae producitur in illa effective à solo Deo nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx◠ipsius causae secundae And therefore herein the will is passive though not in its own Act as he falsly affirmeth Luther to assert for what can act and not be active III. When second causes natural or supernatural have by their inherent form sufficient Active virtue per modum actus primi proportioned with the effect then Gods premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur Motio Virtuosa by which the universal cause maketh the second actually operate according to its proper mode Therefore it is not a Habit or disposition or natural power IV. Yea in Imperfect supernatural acts as fear of hell which go before habits and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts it is not a Quality but Motio Dei virtuosa by which they are done and is of the same sort with that which causeth acts from habits V. This previous Motion is Really distinct from the operation of the second cause and is not our act it self but is immediately from God Which he useth many arguments to prove And can all this give any man a formal conception what it is which he calleth aliquid incompletum and Motio Virtuosa We know not what the Vis projectis impressa is in corporeals And can we tell how spirits and how the God of spirits maketh his Impressions or what the word Impression or Motion here signifieth We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not And why is it called Motio Virtuosa Virtus he maketh a quality It is no quality and yet Virtuosa Omnis motio est Actio Is it Actio Increata Then it is God himself which he denyeth and speaketh of somewhat between God and mans Act. Is it Actio creata Then it is a Modus Agentis for so is every Action as such as distinct from its effect in patiente And if so it cannot be modus Dei for then it is Ipse Deus And if it be modus hominis it is either homini◠agentis vel patientis If the first then it is mans Action If the second it is formally no action For modus patientis is passio though many would confound action and passion with saying after their Masters that Actio est in patiente which is equivocation So that the plain truth is that mans understanding can reach no further than to conceive 1. That our souls are the termini of Gods Volition and Active power 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact yet we must call our selves Patients and think of the Attingency of his Active essence with its effects by some Analogie of Corporeal attingency contact and impressed moving force But truly to know how God toucheth moveth operateth on any Creature and by what Impressions or what there is indeed between Gods essence and mans Act we know not at all And if Christ had never said Joh. 3. so is every one that is born of the spirit our own experience might have told us that we know it not Boldly then tell our Church-distracting wranglers that contend about the nature sufficiency efficacy resistibility of this Act of Grace that they know not the very subject of their disputes And shall we still fire the Church by striving about words that profit not but subvert the hearers and tend to the increase of ungodliness Yea and shall bold blind zeal use the Reverend names of God and his precious Truth to colour and countenance these pernicious contentions I grant that the nature of Grace and the concord of it with Free-will may be soberly treated of But when men have followed the controversie beyond the ken of humane understanding and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown suppositions and perversly contend for them against Love and peace they do but serve Satan against God under the colour of his sacred truth and name And I think it not amiss here to tell you what Alvarez saith to this Question de Aux l. 12. disp 118. p.
voluntatis à Deo elevatis suo speciali influxu consistere aiunt gratiam praevenientem excitantem Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiae praevenientis adjutum excitatum liberam habet potestatem imperandi aut non imperandi assensum fidei Quod si voluntas fidem amplecti velit actumque credendi imperet intellectui influente simul nutu gratiae praevenientis quam habet elicit in seipsa actum supernaturalem quâ— fidem amplecti vult quóque assensum imperat intellectui simúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo supernaturali voluntatis illustrationéque divinâ adjutus elicit actum supernaturalem assentiendi revelatis Gratia excitans seu praeveniens novo influxu quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in supernaturalem actum fidei sortitur rationem gratiae adjuvantis cooperantis efficacis Si autem voluntas pro sua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti gratia excitans praeveniens manet intra limites gratiae sufficientis nec est efficax quia voluntas non voluit fidem amplecti cum potuisset II. The second is Durandus's way Nullum esse necessarium Divinae voluntatis concursum ad actiones secundarum causarum sed saâ—is esse quod Deus eas produxerit in esse ipsas naturas earúmque virtutes postmodum conservet But this is a partial recitation for this sustentation of their Active Virtues is the same with an Universal Influx or Concurse to action as action which Bellarmine is for Read of this Ludov. à Dola III. * * * So Malderus in 1. 2 q. 111. a. 3. dub 1. Hic Dei concursus quod attinâ—t ad identitatem realem ex parte termini nam ex parte principii est ipse Deus aut Dei voluntas est ipsa actio Causae secundae quatenus est à Deo Nihil ponit in ipsa Voluntate sed est influxus Dâ—i in actionem seu effectum So many others The third he saith is attributed to Greg. Arim. Scotus and Gabriel great Wits if any Cooperationem Divinam se tenere ex parte effectus non Causae h. e. Conâ—ursum Dei non determinare Voluntatem nostram nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari sed immediate influere in effectum eumque producere illo ipso momento quo à voluntate nostra producitur Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntarem nec Voluntas Deum Nam uterque concursum libere adhibet si alter noâ—â—â— concurrere opus non fiet sicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem Et licet simul operentur tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur non contra But this is partially recited and it is true only of the effect And his confutation is that then Graetia est pedissequa Voluntatu And why saith he not God is pedissequus hominis because he judgeeth men according to their works I have otherwise opened the matter than is expressed here of any of these But can the sober Reader think that the IV th way which is that of the Dominicans predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad is so much surer than these three as that he dare venture on that supposition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the Grace of God and to his Providence who would gladly ascribe all to both which belongeth to perfection and are only afraid to deny Gods holiness and the Christian Religion by resolving all sin and damnation into the meer Will and Love and Irresistible Omnipotent efficiency of God SECT IX Whether Gods Operations be equal on all § 1. IF the question be ex parte Dei it is absurd to make a question of it For God is the same whatever the diversity be in his * * * Of Preparation for Grace Medina noteth three degrees of it one which Grace ever followeth which is it that our Divines mean by effectual Vocation and this he saith is never had but by Gods special help the other two are distant and common But that the Schoolmen of the other parties think otherwise he confesseth and saith In hac quaestione Durand Scot. propemodum omnes Nominales quos sequitur Adrian Quodlib 7. q. 4. tenent partem affirmativam scilicet quod homo per sâ—as vires sine speciali auxilio Gratiae potest se ad Gratiam praeparare sic ut consequatur gratiam infallibiliter ex merito de congruo D. Tho. tenet contrarium Medin ib. p. 593. But then by sufficiens praeparatio ad Gratiam he meaneth Conversion it self dimovere animum ab iniquitate st in Deum convertere sicut convertere faciem ad solem ut quiâ— illuminetur works And Gods acts as in himself are God And there is no Virtue or Efflux from God but what is a creature or effect of God § 2. If the question be of second causes and of Gods operation in and by them I answer 1. Some things God Giveth and Doth as Rector of the World by a Law or according to a Law And herein God doth equally till man make a difference as is aforesaid viz. in his Legislation though not in the promulgation and in his Judgement 2. Some things God Giveth and Doth besides as Owner and free-Benefactor and here he primarily maketh a difference So that there is a certain sort and measure of grace given equally till men make a difference And there is a sort and measure given unequally by the meer will of God as he diversifieth Natural things § 3. But if the question be of the effects on the soul those effects are 1. Mans predisposition 2. The divine Impress 3. The Acts 4. The Habits as is said And as to the first God equally disposed man at first But two Causes have filled the World with very unequal dispositions One is mans sin corrupting themselves and their posterity more than as they are the seed of Adam and this God is no Cause of The other is Gods free differencing mercy to some of equal ill desert giving them both Greater outward helps and Common Grace and fewer impediments and so more preparing them for special Grace But no man by Indisposition is deprived of special Grace but he that hath contracted more than he had from Adam only And God doth not equally repair and dispose all that have viciously undisposed themselves Though while they are here he giveth such mercy to all as tendeth to their recovery § 4. If the question be of the equality of Gods Impulse or Influx on the soul 1. There may be a diversity of further effects where the Impress is the same in kind and measure because of mens various Dispositions to receive it and their various concurse That may convert one that doth not another But yet God doth not make equal Impressions on mens souls For 1. His own free-will as a Liberal benefactor doth more for some as Paul than for others 2. Mens ill deserts may so forseit grace and quench the Spirit as
to make a difference 3. The means much differ which several men have And God usually operateth according to the means upon the soul § 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit it is no question For that were but to ask Whether all men have equal faith love and other graces which common experience denyeth § 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul in nature antecedent to Act and Habit I would have them remember that either there is such a thing or not If there be I rightly mention it If not we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would For then the question must be only about that which is past question viz. 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himself which is his simple Essence 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith Love c. in Man which all the World knoweth is not equal For all men have not faith For as for pre-disposition the question will be revolved to the same point It is certain that all are not equally disposed and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Essence SECT X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral § 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words though â— make too much stir Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before I will not repeat it here 1. If the question be de operatione ut est actus agentis before the effect it were but to ask Whether Gods Essence be Physical or Moral which is unworthy an answer § 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes as the Preacher c. if truly Acts they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agentâ— But the Acts of Laws and other objects meerly as objects on man are called Moral Acts because they are but nominal but indeed are no Acts and therefore neither Physical nor Moral For they are but signa and significare is not agere but is only an objective aptitude by which an Intellectual agent can â—difie it self All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action by being signa objectively to my active Intellect § 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul it is quid reale and therefore physicum And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits They are physical and moral accidents And they cannot be moral unless they be physical § 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale formally differ as Actus qua talis and ordo qua ordo do differ ab ordine seâ— Relatione ad Legem ad finem morum and Moralitas est actus Physici vel privationis Relatio viz. ad Regulam finem morum § 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act but the Morality of the Cause viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally I answer plainly that There is no true Cause which is not Physical A moral Cause not physical is but Causa reputata vel â—â—minalis Objects are usually said to Cause morally But if they be meerly objects they cause not efficiently at all but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie But some things vulgarly called objects as Light Heat c. are Active and so effect And he that doth proponere objectum doth indeed effect by speaking or doing But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind as it is a meer object But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation And many mercies afflictions and other means forementioned have their several wayes of active operation But it is readily confessed that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul but only Active Spirits like it self Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do largely as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical And I plainly say de nomine that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent and Physical as they are Physical effects on man and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects And that they are called Moral in two usual senses 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them 2. And in that objects being much of the Means the operation or efficiency of objects as objects is properly none at all They do but materially as it were constitute the Act and terminate it and occasion it as sine quibus non which many call a Moral Reputative Metaphorical Causation And yet diversification is much by objects § 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion I desire them to consider well 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced but a pre existent substance and faculty to be actuated 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere that is to be caused by Grace but the due ordering of acts as to right objects c. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit not indifferent between Action and cessation but as naturally prone to Act as the earth to rest and as a stone in the air to descend and as the Sun to move and shine so that it is never one minute out of Action even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath day or night Though in different manner 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature affording it that Concurse or Influx necessary thereto which in Nature he made due to it As he doth to the Sun in its action and to the souls of Brutes So that Activity as such distinct from the due order of it is given by God in Nature 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe as a wheel in a Watch where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses or superiour agents 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls do work as Voluntary Agents in Political Order though not without the regulation of Gods Law or Will 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause though whether he do so or what we know not 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts though properly they do nothing so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam occasions sine quibus non yet the reasons
of the great alterations in the World being admirably fetcht from the various Passive or Receptive dispositions of matter no wonder Cum Thomistae dicunt Deum suo auxilio efficaci physice praedeterminare Voluntatem ad actum bonum non excludunt Motionem Moralem sed eam praesuâ—â—â—â—â—â— Alvarez de Aâ—xil disp 23. p. 108. â—â— if it be so with mans soul also A spark of fire which long was unseen if you put Straw Gunpowder or other fuel to it may burn a City or Kingdom when yet the fuel is not an efficient cause save the fire that is in it but an objective Matter What work doth a Student find all his life among Books What abundance of knowledge doth he learn by them which he had none of in his Infancy And so do Travellers by viewing the actions of the World And all these are but fuel to the fire The soul only is the Agent and all these are signs and objects that do nothing really on the soul at all You may lead a Beast up and down and govern them by objects which yet act nothing on them So Satan doth by the Drunkard Glutton Fornicator Gamester Covetous c. What Reputed work do objects make on them by doing nothing Thus Verâ—m Bonum are said to work And the case is this The Active Spirit is not only Naturally Active but Essentially Inclined to some certain objects Truth and Goodness And this Inclination being their very Nature when the object is duly presented to it and it self delivered from all false objects and erroneous Action on them and ill habits thence contracted it will Naturally work accordingly And therefore duly externally and internally to bring God and Holy objects to the prospect of the soul is the way of working them to God And sure the World would never make such a stir about Preaching to get fit men and to perswade them to diligence and to keep sound doctrine c. if these objective causes as fuel to the fire did not do much by occasioning the Active soul to do its proper work 9. Yet still remember again that Jesus Christ is the Political Head of Influx if not more who sendeth forth the Spirit as he please but ordinarily upon his setled Gospel terms to work on souls by his threefold fore-mentioned influx with and by these means according to them but in an unsearchable manner As God doth in Nature by the Sun and other Natural Causes SECT XI What Free-Will Man hath to Spiritual Good c. § 1. THe understanding of the Nature of the Power and Liberty of the Will is the very key to open all the rest of the controverted difficulties in these matters But having spoken of it so much before in the former part of this Book and more elsewhere I shall no further weary the Reader with repetitions than to note these few things following § 2. If any like not the name of Free-will Libera Voluntas let them but agree about these two the Power of the Will and Free-choice * * * Nolite esse adeo delicati ut abhorreatis ab usâ— vocabuli Lib. arbit Hypocritarum propriâ—m est rixari de vocabulis Nemo offendatur hoc titulo quia August in multae Volum singulis fere pagellis ad fastidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat Melancth Loc. Com. de lib. arb c. 1. Liberum arbitrium and they need not contend about Free-will § 3. 1. As to the first It is the very Essence of the Will to be a natural Power or faculty of Willing Good and Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect and commanding the inferiour faculties either politically or despotically difficultly or easily perfectly or imperfectly according to its resolution and their Receptivity § 4. 2. The Liberty of choice is not only Libertas Voluntatis but Libertas Hominis when a man may have what he chooseth or willeth Here the Act of choosing is the Wills but the object is somewhat else either an Imperate act of some inferiour faculty or some extrinsick thing So we say truly that the unbeliever or unconverted sinner may believe may repent may have Christ and life if he will as Dr. Twisse frequently asserteth § 5. 3. But the Liberty of the Will it self is but the mode of its self-determination as without constraint it is a self-determining principle in its elicite Acts considered comparatively § 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold 1. Liberty of Contradiction or exercitii 2. Of †††Note that the Papists confess that by Christs Case it is proved that Libertas specificationis inter bonum malum is not necessary to merit So Pet. â— S. Joseph Thes Univers pag. 90. Contrariety or specification in the Act 3. Of objective specification which is Liberty of Competition 1. The first Liberty is to will or not will to nill or not nill 2. The second is Liberty to will or nill this 3. The third is Liberty to will This object or That or to nill This or That * * * Of the real difference of these three see Rob. Baron Metaphys I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of Complacence to be another sort of Liberty Though I distinguish Liberty of simple Complacence from Liberty of election as being a prior distribution And I deny not but that Liberty of Complacency specially may stand with necessity of immutable disposition yea and with some sort of necessitating operation of God as is in Christ and the Glorified And in this large essential sense Liberum and Voluntarium are all one supposing Voluntarium to be the act of a self-determining unconstrained will So that the word Free-will being so exceeding ambiguous as my foresaid Scheme sheweth we must be sure that we pretend not the Controversies de nomine to be de re But it is the Indifferency of a Viators will that we have now to do with and not that state of perfect determination or that Amplitude or advancement of the will which Gibieâ—f and such others talk of And note that by Posse agere vel non agere which we put into the definition of free-will we must not mean that Potentia moralis metaphorica which is nothing but the wills moral disposition or habit but the Potentia Naturalis And so it may be said of Christ and the glorified that their not sinning or not willing sin is not ex impotentia naturali but ex perfectione § 7. The Will hath not all these sorts of Liberty about every object For it cannot will known evil as such c. But it hath all these about several objects § 8. By this power and Liberty the Will is made of God to be a kind of Causa prima secundum quid of the Moral ORDER or specification of its own acts Not simply or strictly a Causa prima For 1. It was God the first Cause that gave man this self-determining Power 2. It is God that upholdeth it And so it
cessationem aâ— vaâ—ationem ab aâ—â—u boâ— necessitate naturaliter praecedentâ— cor p. 649. Omnia quâ— sunt fiunt aut eveniâ—â—t sunt â—â—â—â— eveniunt â—â— aliquâ— necessitate ipâ—â— naturalâ—tâ—r praecedentâ— This is just Hobbs Soâ— 5. â—â— 654 that No creature hath simple liberty of Contradiction or Contingency but only secundum quid in respect to second causes but only Gods acts of will ad extra are simply free and contingent As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good but doing it or not doing it were from Gods necessitation though not from the creatures The Dominicans the Masters of the Inquisition and Murderers of the Waldenses and Albigenses of old and therefore faulty as well as the Jesuits though there are very Learned men among them both do commonly hold that No Creature natural or free can act unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act both in the act as such which they call the substance of it and all the modes circumstances and order of it 3. Augustine and Jansenius after him with their true followers hold not this necessity of predetermining premotion to all acts natural or sinful but only to spiritual good acts which is not from the Nature but the Corruptâ—â—n of â—â—an and therefore the predetermination is not made say they by Gods Common Natural Motion but by Medicinal Grace 4. Durandus and his followers as Lud. à Dola and Aureolus partly do hold that if God do but uphold â—ll creatures as compaginate in the Universe in the Nature he made them in and so natural Inclination and media and objects all supposed this sustentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures and means is sufficient to cause an Act without another particular predetermining premotion of God As e. g. in Naturals they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air God continuing its Natural Gravity and all other circumstant Natures and Concauses this Rock if loosed can fall down of it self without another predetermining premotion of God And that a new Act of God supposing the said support of Nature is more necessary to the not-falling than to the falling of it As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confessors Dan. 3. And I am unable to see the error of this Opinion And so in Free agents they think that if God continue the Nature of a free-will with all circumstants and necessary natures it can freely determine it self without another act of predetermining premotion And doth so in each act of sin Though as Jansenius saith by accidental corruption for Conversion we need Medicinal Grace 5. The Jesuits and all others explode this Opinion of Durà ndus as singular but give so little and slender reason of their dissent as would draw one the more to suspect their cause Instead of it they scarce know what to assert But Bellarmine and the chiefest of them under a pretended opposition speak I think the same in other words Even an Universal Concurse like that of the Sun which operateth in specification according to the nature of Recipients which specifie the effect Which Universal Influx no doubt Aureolus and Durandus include in Gods sustentation of Nature For to sustain an Active Nature in all its Active disposition by a suitable active Influx is universally to cause its motion The difference they are unable to assign 6. After these come Hobbs Cartesius and Gassendus with a swarm of Epicureans a Sect commonly despised even in Cicero's time and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themselves and some of these say that Motion needeth no continued cause at all any more than non-movere But when a thing is in motion it will so continue because it is its state without any other continued cause than the motion it self And so they may as well say and some do that when a thing is in Being it will so continue till it be positively annihilated without any continued causation of its being As if esse existere were nothing more than non esse and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere and so needed no more that is no Cause For non esse non agere need no Cause When this distraction is worn out and shamed the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to understand a Confutation Some of them say that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact as Gassendus Some say that Matter and Motion are eternal and that of themselves As if there were no God but Matter and Motion Some say that there is a God who gave matter one push at first and so set it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end And some say There is no other Intellect but the wonders of wisdom and order in the World are done by such fortuitous motion But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants and saith that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition but that this Volition is necessitated by superiour or natural Causes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a necessitating efficient cause But he differs from them in his consequents and in the Notion of a Spirit acknowledging no being but Corporeal § 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods free-will but on the Necessity of the thing As if it were a contradiction which God cannot do for God to make a creature that can Determine it self ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it self unless he move it downwards besides his sustentation of its natural gravity and all other natures by his Influx or universal Concurse § 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction they must pass for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency which is to deny a God § 4. * * * Let the Reader note 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value 2. And that Dr. Twisse affirmeth that God is not alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good Now if there be no such Entity in Bonum conducibile vel Bonum Jucundum as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them tell us if you can Why there is so much entity in Malum morale as that man is not able to cause it unless God predetermine his will Yea as to Entity there is no more in Bonum honestum than in the rest fore-named His words are Nos tueri poterimus Malum fieri esse Bonum per se neâ—â—pe in genere Boni conducibilis ad certum aliquem fiâ—â—m sed arguit adversarius Ergo Deus esset non modo
permissor sed effector â—jus mali Prorsus invalida consequentia Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis N. B. Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non sit alicui conducibile Neque necessâ— est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati Nam certissimum est extra omnem controversiae alâ—am positum peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi etiam in genere conducibilis potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie An â—â—li existentia bonum sit viz. the bonum honestum utile jucundum I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion and to be so much more accurate than he as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae whose pleasure profit and honesty are distinguishable But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good and that things are first Good as related to him the Prime and Ultimate Good And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the â—creature is none of those three but the conformity of things to the Will of God the absolute Rule of Goodness And therefore when we ask An bonum sit ut sit malum we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid but an sit bonum simpliciter viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae And if they can prove that Deus velit â—â—â—â— fieri we will confess it to be Good But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile seeing it doth the sinner no good For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth and not less But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale which is sin Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum And the Doctor is quite out in calling â—ccasio a medium conducibile and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as occasio Whereas occasio as such is no medium at all no more than possibilitas est ens unless you take Medium very largely Their chief argument is that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it is to deifie that creature making it a first cause Answ 1. The comparative Order of Actions as the terminating them on this object rather than that and at this time rather than that c. is but the modus modi entis and so is no proper entity 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality 3. This power is the excellency of the creature and the honour of its Creator § 5. As for their argument that there is no effect without a cause nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect I answer 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World 2. The soul is Gods Image 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power Therefore this is but petere principium 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination As objects opportunity knowledge the removing of competitors c. § 6. Therefore Gibieufs Guil. Camerarius c. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis is nothing to our question that being no efficient but a Material objective or Moral Causation § 7. When they say that else God dependeth on the creature and is determined by it as to his Concurse I answer 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent be his dependence on it when it expresly speaketh its dependence on him without whom it cannot be nor act 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts nor his transient as to the meer Impress and first effect and so not Gods Act at all unless Terminating be Determining It is only its own Act which the creature determineth which is a secondary effect of Gods act as proceeding from the second cause Gods Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent the will determineth and is the chief determiner in Evil. § 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres 9. The second cause non agit in primam c. Hoc faceret vel volendo vel aliâ—d agendo c. Answ It 's granted God is not passive nor doth any second cause act on him as passive Who is his Adversary in this § 9. He addeth Neither on the Influx of God do we act for an Act is not the subject of an act Answ 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul it is a false supposition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Essence But if the said effect be meant I have shewed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient and a contrary Act may resist it § 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect he saith that God is denyed to act by physical action on mans will which if he did he would rather determine it than be determined by it because it cannot resist him c. Ans 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God but by Indisposition and by its own not acting when it can c. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on mans will when it is quaedam natura 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will nor reject his Impress but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect § 11. He saith ib. Doth God move only to the Act in genere or also to this species of action The first cannot be said For Suarez Hurtado say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion which is perfecter than the genus as to the genus And Gods Influx is singular and not determined to Generical nature c. Answ Gods universal motion as the Suns doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act yea necessarily continueth the soul in some Action And that Action is singular and not a non existent universal But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth And the Moral species what need soever we
have of help to it is caused otherwise not by this common Influx of God as the root of Nature but by a special Gracious Influx with and by special supernatural means And this it doth only to Good and not to Evil and not alwayes with a causally necessitating influx as to our act § 12. He addeth If the will need not Gods motion to its Act in specie it is either in genere entis or in genere moris The first cannot be said For the special Nature includeth the General and more And the species in genere moris are no species of acts but only accidents of humane acts and that only by extrinsick denomination as to the Law c. Answ 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions is a wood for you to hide the matter in You are not able certainly to define what physically specifieth an Action and what not To say that one is the species of an Act and the other is but an accident and no species is but to say that you will say what you list We use to say that Acts are specified by their objects And so when objects differ specie physica vel morali the acts do so But when the question is with Judas shall I betray my Master or not with another shall I be perjured or not with another shall I commit this Adultery or not with another shall I pray in season or out of season to another shall I love God or the creatures more shall I will or not will this shall I will it or nill it c. Here you are so much at liberty that you may please your self with saying that to betray and not betray to forswear and not to forswear to love more or less in degree c. are physical species of entity and so make physical species of Action But I will not say that non agere non ens is a species of Entity physical Nor do I believe that we need Gods Influx ad non agendum as such And as for your Accidents of Actions if you mean Relations it is their fundamentum that we are questioning The extrinsick denomination is founded in Relation or else it 's Causeless In a word Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that and also not to go and this without a further physical predetermining premotion of God § 13. But here let the Reader note that when he maketh Moral Good and Evil no species of Actions but an extrinsick denomination which is true abstracting the relation from the fundamental difference of the Acts and maketh God the Naturally necessitating Cause of all that is physical in the acts he maketh God equally the necessitating prime Cause of Good and Evil which are but relations resulting from the specified acts § 14. He addeth If God move the will it is to that same act which it doth or to another If to another why should it be said that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done when we speak not of moral but necessary physical motion Answ The Particle To doth cheat you by ambiguity 1. As to noteth the effect of God alone it is to the Impress which he maketh on the soul which effect he still obtaineth which urgeth it towards its own act 2. The same I say if to signifie an absolutely intended end 3. But if to signifie the natural tendency of Gods Impulse as to an effect possible and desirable yea and due by command from the subordinate cause mans will then it was to our act of repentance faith duty that God moved us That is he gave us that Power and necessary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us § 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to answer all these fallacies and quibbles founded in some false supposition or ambiguous word else I would answer the rest of that Digression and his Digres 5. li. 1. p. 2. contra Alvar. Only here I must take notice that in this Digr 9. he himself rejecteth Greg. Arim. and Hurtado's assertion of Gods Determining us to this or that Numerical Act as distinct from another ejusdem speciei ut merum figmentum ad curiositati hominum nimium infoelici satisfaciendum duntaxat introductum Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader I might shew that the same Reasons will hold for or against this numerical as are for or against his specifical predetermination And the species having no existence but in the individuals and himself saying that Gods motion is ad actus singulares if he say that it is not to that singular act that is done rather than that which is not done he giveth up his whole cause § 16. But to this he hath an answer that it is a fiction and unsound to say that Possibilia quae nondum existunt do differre numero cum differre numero est tantum existentium Answ 1. He may as well say that esse possibile is a fiction when possibile is terminus diminuens ad esse And is not possibile as much a fiction de specie as de numero That which is not neither is in specie nor in numero But there is a Possibilitas numeri as well as speciei Yet with this answer he oft insulteth over the Schoolmen when at another time he would have said that Possibile hath an esse cognitum in both respects § 17. And I think the good man forgat that by this he quite overthroweth his Book de Scientia Media and much of all his other Books which are animated with the supposition of Gods Will causing faturition from eternity For if only existentia differunt numero futura non sunt existentia And if the futurition of differentia numero be not decreed nor eternal as of this Sun this Earth Paul Peter and their singular acts c. then nothing is future from eternity And so we are brought to the Arminians election of species only and not of individuals in primo instanti which is rejected Sure God electeth Individuals or none And if so it is future individuals Individuation existeth not but in existentibus But if foreknowledge and Decree may be of futures and non-existents it may be of individuals that are such as well as of species § 18. Yea he proceedeth to say pag. 412. Deum scire plura esse possibilia quam sunt non est scire multitudinem rerum possibilium sed tantum scire se praestare posse ut detur major multitudo rerum existentium quam actu sit Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum est tantum existentium sive ea sit multitudo actualis sive potentialis c. And yet the soul of his Book de Scientia Media is Causa transitionis rerum è numero Possibilium in numerum futurorum And my foresaid opposition to his Eternal Causation of futurity is hereby confirmed 2. It 's
true that to know quid possibile is not to know it to be existent nor any more than to know what God e. g. can do and so to denominate Nothing quid possibile as relating to Power And so Ariminens saith Nothing may be Related But the like must be said of futurity And it holdeth equally of the species and de numero possibilium futurorum so that here we have confitentem reum about the dance and dream of notions and nothings which I have before shewed they beguile mens understandings with And hence also my former doctrine is confirmed of the non-necessity of a causal decree of Negatives or Nothings or of a Positive Volition of them § 10. The truth is an Act of mans soul is such a thing that de existentibus it's hard for any of their subtilties to make known the difference of species accidents or individuals ab objectis And to know what interruptions they must be that go to cut one Immanent act into two or hinder unity SECT XIII Of mans Power Natural and Moral § 1. I Have said so much of this also in the other parts of this Book that a little here may serve 1. Man hath no Power whatsoever but from God and therefore doth not act as a prime Cause properly because but by a derived power § 2. That which is a Power but hypothetically on Condition of something not existent especially not in our power it self is no power properly and univocally but equivocally only As to say I am able to leap to Heaven if God will Cause it I am able to lift a thousand pound with sufficient help which I have not I am able to see if I had light or to see a Phoenix if there were such a thing or I am able to will or move with Gods necessary predetermining premotion say some which I have not None of this is a true Power ad hoc But to constitute a formal Power it is necessary that I have all things without which I cannot do the act § 3. It is a contradiction to say that when a man hath the true Power to believe yet he cannot do the Act * * * As Jansenius and Dr. Twisse do in making more absolutely necessary to it without further premotion which is to say He that can believe cannot believe The Power connoteth the Possibile § 4. †††Potentia rationalis naturae humanae non potest minui extrinsicè entitativè per destructionem alicujus gradus ejusdem potentiae potest tamen minui per appositionem impedimenti quale est peccatum vel per inclinationem contrariam ad peccata quae inclinatio generatur per actus males Necesse est enim ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad â—num contrariorum quod diminuatur inclinatio ejus ad aliud Cum ergo peccatum sit contrarium virtuti ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad virtutem Alvarez de Aux li. 6. disp 45. p. â—10 Ita Thom. 1. 2. q. 85. ar 1. in corp The true Natural Power of Intellection and Volition every man hath as a man And when God Christ Heaven are brought to us with all the Conditions necessary to Objects of Intellect and Will we have formal power to understand and will them in this Natural sence What is necessary to the Being of an Object and Revelation I desire the Reader to see distinctly opened by me in a small tract called The Certainty of Christianity without Popery § 5. But the soul it self hath a vicious Indisposition to the spiritual exercise of these faculties or powers And this is the morbus facultatum And this Indisposition is called a Moral Impotency because the soul is unfitted by it to the exercise of its natural Power § 6. When this Indisposition is so great as that no man in that case doth do the act we say he is morally unable And when it is not so great but that under that Indisposition some men do the act in that state of help we say that such a man is morally able Therefore he that is yet more disposed is so More able and it hath various degrees § 7. But if a man have so great a disposition skill and will as that he is ready to the facile and frequent performance of the act that Promptitude is called a Habit and is more than a meer moral power though a power also § 8. It is certain that men can do more than they do not only that they could do more if God would predetermine them or give them more grace but that properly they can The worst hath Power to do more good and forbear more evil than he doth And so have the best § 9. Adam had true proper Power natural and Moral to have stood when he fell He sinned not for want of necessary Power to have forborn it § 10. They that deny this and resolve all sin into Gods unresistible necessitating operation or denying of power absolutely and antecedently necessary I think do make way for Hobbes his Theologie or subversion of Religion § 11. Moral Power and Impotency are primarily such in the will the first seat of morality and derivatively or secondarily in the Intellect and executive Power And therefore it is not originally and radically of physical necessity but Free as the will which is free is the Cause of it § 12. * * * Jansen de Grat. Christ l. 3. c. 15. denyeth that without effectual Grace men have a compleat power to the Acts but saith yet They have power 1. Remotissime in that they have free-will 2. By faith not joyned with Love as being the beginning c. 3. Yet more by Love as the root c. And he noteth a double Impotency Una est ex defeâ—tu alicujus quod non potest quantumlibet magna voluâ—tate vel fortiter volendo suppleri Talis est Impotentia illius qui caret rebus temporalibus ad largiendum c. This is natural Impotency De tali Impotentia verissimum est quod Dâ—us non jubet impossibilia Nam hoc ipso quo talis oritur impossibilitas vel praeceptum extinguitur vel certe ad illud implendum is cui praecipitur non amplius obligatus est Non est enim culpae Voluntatis quod non â—iat c. Altera ex defectu ipsius Voluntatis seâ— Volitionis oritur quae si adesset quanta adesse debet praeceptum facillimâ— impleretur Tantummodo enim fortiter volendo impletur Haec Impotentia nullo modo excusat cum qui non implâ—t quod praecipitur Posset enim implere si vellet Quod si nolâ—erit ideo non potuerit quis non cum dixerit pro ipsa tam perversa obdurataque voluntate culpandum Velâ—nt plenâ—que velint mox ut voluerint impleâ—untur si autem nolint ideoque non possint quis nolentibus vitio non vertat c Nam revera
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
cause Moral Good and hinder Moral Evil and by which as our Lover and End he will draw mans soul to himself in Love § 20. God as Rector though he vary his Laws in some things to several ages and places and promulgate the same Gospel with inequality on several accounts yet according to the respective Laws that they are under dealeth with all men in a certain equality which is called Justice that is His Laws antecedently to mans acts make not difference and as Judge he maketh none but what mans different actions require according to the said Laws and Justice But yet as Owner and as Benefactor he is free not against but above his Laws to make many inequalities which are no injustice they being not acts of formal Government and so he may do with his own as he list And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace yet he giveth to his Elect such proportions of Grace as he gave them no antecedent Right to by his Law or at least to many of them passing by the controversie now whether he do so to them all § 21. God could cure and sanctifie all men if it were his Absolute will but he doth not and will not being no way obliged And he will be no loser nor sufferer by the creatures sin § 22. Gods absolute will is as fully accomplished by mans free acts as if they were all necessitated and Natural And mans actions are as free as if God had made no Absolute Decree of their futurity as in Good he hath done if we may so ascribe futurity to his Decrees § 23. It seemeth that all sin beginneth in the wills omission of what it was able to have done Even when Adams appetite was to the forbidden fruit and some think that this was the first part of the sin it seemeth that it was rather in the Wills not restraining that appetite when it could have done it And then positive sins do follow thereupon § 24. There is more Brutishness in sin and consequently more privative and less positive faultiness of the Reason and Will than many do consider which Paul partly meaneth Rom. 7. For it is certain 1. That a passion e. g. anger or fear may be forced on a man suddenly as â—n a Brute without Reason As if you come behind one and affright him or strike him suddenly no Reason raised that passion and consequently no Rational Will 2. It is certain that this passion without Reason can cause despotically a corporal motion as the fearful will start and run and the angry strike without any reason or rational will but as a Beast doth 3. It is certain that it is the office of the Will to Rule this passion and these motions 4. And that it must have due information from the understanding that so to do is good and best 5. If this information of the understanding did never miss of determining the Will then man would never sin but when the understanding failed of its necessary office before the will which would resolve all sin into the will of God as much as if he directly moved the will to it by necessitating unresistible predetermination For the Intellect as such hath no Liberty but is necessitated by objects further than it is under the Empire of the Will And the Objects and Intellect are made by God 6. Therefore it followeth that there is a certain measure of Intellecâ—â—â—l true apprehension according to which the will can excite and determine it self without â—â—y thing which it hath not and yet can forbear And that this not-willing what and when it should is the beginning of all sin § 25. God is no Efficient or Desicient cause of this first Omission of the will For efficient it hath none And deficient God is not who gave man power to have done it But man is the deficient Cause § 26. Man 's not believing not knowing not loving not obeying not desiring trusting fearing c. being the far greatest part of the sins of his life * * * Which made the worthy Bishop Usher dye with these words as his last But Lord in special forgive my â—â—â— of omission we see by this are not at all of God § 27. Though multitudes of positive Acts of sin do follow such omissions and go before some of them yet they being not sinful as Acts but as Disordered against the Rule and End and upon undue objects and especially comparatively preserring the wrong object before the right it seemeth that in their first instances they are all Omissive and Positive in the second only which maketh the Schoolmen so commonly say that sin is a Privation § 28. Yet the Moral formal Relation of sin is not only Privative but a Positive Disobedience or Disconformity And so as Quid Morale formaliter sin hath as much Relative being as Duty hath viz. 1. As contra Legem significantem 2. Contra Voluntatem Dei significatam 3. Et contra Jâ—â— Divini Dominii Imperii Amoris § 29. If any be unsatisfied in this it is certain that in the Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperatâ—m there is no more physical entity than in the Velle imperatum no nor than there is in the Velle indefinitely considered as on any object Or if any deny that it is certain that there is no such addition of Entity it being but ordo modi in any such sinful Act from which as such the formal obliquity or sin resulteth but what man can do and doth without Gods causing the Act as so ordered and terminated So that God is no way the cause of formal sin § 30. †††Bradwardiâ— dealeth more plainly and maketh Gods effectual Volition to be the total immediate cause that man sinneth though it be no sin in God to do so and saith that God willeth it for good uses as the sinner doth or if he do not it is because God maketh him unavoidably do otherwise They that say He causeth all that man causeth and that as the first necesâ—itating or insuperable cause but yet is not the cause of the form of sin contradict themselves seeing that form is but a Relation which resulteth ipso facto from its fundamentam and terminus and nè per divinam potentiam cannot but do so And hath no other cause but what causeth them § 31. And they that say that yet God is not the Author of sin because he is under no Law do but sport with dreadful things And they mean that God is the chief Cause of all mens sins in the world but not of any sin of his own which is none of the question § 32. God doth neither Cause the sin nor the futurity or existence of it as some vainly distinguishing maintain especially Dr. Twisse and Rutherford For as Estius and others truly say to cause the sin is nothing but to cause the existence of it And sin as sin Dr. Twisse often
yet he commandeth it and requireth it of us But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on Gods part And if you will difference the same things as connoting divers effects you must denominate it more fitly from the effects by words that notifie the difference IX Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Causes of supernatural Consent as two drawing a Boat so as neither is premoved by the other or maketh it co-operate with it Answ True For God premoveth the will of man though through mans fault it be not ever effectual And though Gods will and mans be two Causes of the same effect the term Partial is scarce fit while man hath his whole power and activity from God X. Scientia media is not to be ascribed to God But all prescience of the future co operation of the will even from the foresaid Hypothesis presupposeth in signo rationis the free decree of Gods will by which absolutely or granting that Hypothests he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good and permit it if Evil. Answ Here come in your presumptions of things unknown or false 1. That God knoweth future contingents and conditionals is certain But I think this scientia media unfitly named and an unnecessary distribution and insufficient to the Jesuits ends 2. And your fiction of signa rationis and the necessary antecedence of a decree of Gods to his knowledge of every Volition of man is a more ungrounded and perillous figment which you have not proved It seemeth a denyal of Gods Omniscience or perfection that he cannot know an act future as future but only as decreed to be so 3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irresistible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumstances Is that but Permitting 4. To permit is Nothing no act of God but a non-agency not to hinder And how prove you that God must of necessity have a Positive Decree for every Nothing or non-agency Is not the not-willing or not-decreeing to hinder a lye e. g. supposing natural concurse or to make more worlds enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature or to the not-being of more Worlds We are in the dark and God is infinitely above us and these tremendous mysteries are not to be so presumptuously handled by unproved assertions XI There is on our part no Cause Reason or Condition assignable for which Gods supernatural providence in comparison of this or that hath the formal reason of predestination or retaineth the common reason of providence but predestination is to be reduced into the sole free-will of God Answ Most of this is about meer words The word Predestination connoteth various effects and objects and so is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cause in the Creature of any act of God But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their special denominations and these objects are the termini and called Material Constitutive Causes of those various acts as denominated various specially or numerically And so Gods Decree or Will to Justifie and Glorifie man hath something in the object as a necessary condition of it * * * That is of that object which is not â—â— the object of his decree of giving faith And that hath something in its object which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World or making the World c. if you will at all distinguish Gods decrees by their objects or effects But if not there will be no matter for any Controversie And Predestination is an ambiguous word If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing or all about man or all of Good to us then our Being is the first effect of it in us and the making of the World a preparatory effect c. And so no doubt the first effect supposed us no men before and therefore no condition in us But if you take Predestination for Gods decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only then it is presupposed that we are lapsed sinners And the decree of damning men is exercised only on them as foreknown damnable sinners And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to sinners for sin supposeth them such punishable sinners But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the absence is no privation is unfitly called Reprobation though men may talk at their own rates And we grant that some such no-decrees have no condition in the objects for they have no objects e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity to give me no faith before the Creation or before I was born or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him this were no reprobating act But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept here if he deny them necessary grace to believe it is a penal act And note that Christ and Common grace as absolutely given to mankind and offered to individuals ever goeth before mens accepting or refusing him And no man to whom he is offered refuseth him for want of necessary help till by sin against that grace he forfeit it XII God by an absolute and efficacious decree of his Will antecedently to the prescience of the future good use of free-will predetermined all good acts which are done in time specially those by which the predestinate come to eternal life Answ The substance of this seemeth true only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity which effecteth nothing till the Time I leave to them that dispute of words 2. You presumptuously determine Gods Decrees to be antecedent to his prescience herein when they are neither before nor after one another 3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition as if mans will was predetermined when it was not determined or determined before it had a being you speak contradictions But Gods own will was eternally determined if we may so say of that which was never undetermined to give all the grace that he giveth in time and to cause all the good acts that he causeth as he causeth them XIII The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace is in the predestinate an effect of predestination and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate and consequently dependeth not on the sole and innate liberty of the will Answ I think so too XIV We must necessarily distinguish of a twofold help of Grace one sufficient by which man may be converted to God or work piously The other effectual by which God effecteth that he be actually converted and act piously Answ Hold to that and contradict not the terms in your description and all 's well XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act not only by perswading alluring inviting or other
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me
to be simply necessary to motion Here the Reader must know that the Controversie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action And first let us enquire of natural action I. Fire is an Active nature as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest Yea it s Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form and this as to a threefold action viz. Motion Light and Heat If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done The whole experience of the world sheweth that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation Therefore it more concerneth us here to know what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions than in these disputes is usually observed Adrian Quodl 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi plurium aliorum certum tenet c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini to these acts and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this even an Immediate physical impulse besides the described Influx is a plain contradiction For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act And that which hath a true Power to act can act It 's a contradiction to say It hath power but it cannot And a Power naturally inclined to act will act caeteris paribus The question then is Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn if God do but as the first Cause of Nature continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses or rather Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace If you say that the Miracle was in Gods withholding his additional premotion you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature but to continue Nature as he made it and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause he continueth all its Moving Nature both Power and Inclination In the motus projectorum so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth the motion continueth accordingly And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun and all concauses yet there can be no motion unless God otherwise thrust it on or move it by some other impulse Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum or by somewhat that hindereth its descent If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock which is not only a power but an inclination to descend and if he continue all concauses and media and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone yet saith the Dominican this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down or by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it or as the Jesuits say unless God concurr with a further moving Impulse A plain contradiction That a Power of motion strongly inclined to act so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it and this in genere Agentis continued by Divine Influx yet cannot act unless otherwise moved God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes as fully proveth to us that ut prima Causa Naturae he hath decreed so to work And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone unless God otherwise thrust it down If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top unless God otherwise thrust me down If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr besides his continuation of Nature why should we fear it when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them and by him as the upholder of them II. And the case of Free-agents is here confessed to be the same The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente moto An Act is but the modus substantiae And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is for God physice influere in actum immediate non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act that doth cause the act and not meddle with and therefore not move the faculty Nor know I how an Act immediately and not the agent can be the terminus of a physical motion Though it 's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means Therefore as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues or into the moving Virtues of second Causes which being Active operate on passive matter so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere and to will good in special God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty as he doth other natural agents But having made it a Free self-determining Agent his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such And the same Influx is upholding and moving and moving as upholding seeing God as Motor also doth influere in naturam vitalem liberam Besides which supporting and moving Influx no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act that I know of But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions And here also God operateth on the faculties by right disposing them and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis his special Influx causing maintaining and actuating it he causeth the holy actions of believers I do verily believe that Durandus and his followers under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for A General Concurse to the Act as an Act And that they differ in words and not in sense And if his doctrine hold not true I cannot see how God can be said to Permit mens sinful Actions or any action at all For if neither the Inclination of natural agents as of Fire to burn a Stone to descend c. nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature would cause any act unless God otherwise cause it by premotion then there is no place for Impedition for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking or a Mountain from walking nor anything from any act which it could not as And permittere is non impedire And
therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin is not a permitting him to sin Motion being one thing and the not hindering of motion another thing or nothing §. V. III. Of the Scotists and Nominals way III. ANd as to the third way ascribed by Alvarez to the Scotists and Nominals I think that de nomine it is not a proper expression to call God causa partialis But if we agree of the sense we may bear Vasqu ubi sup taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad 1. Ronavent 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him because they say Actus nostros esse liberos quia Divina voluntas non est Tota Causa sed cum libero arbitrio quod cum sit proxima causa modificatur concursum primâ— But if this be his opinion he joyneth with these Scotists and Nominals de causa non-totali So Pet. à S. Joseph Thos Univ. de Deo saith that God is Causa totius effectus sed non tota Causa sed partialis with improper expressions about God of whom we can say nothing without some impropriety Doubtless God and man are not to be accounted co-ordinate concauses of the act but whatever man doth he doth it in subordination to God But God operateth 1. As the prime cause of Nature in a stablished way by natural causes And so he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of using it and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he alwayes doth So that Gods natural causality and concurse doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action but men freely exercise the same power sometime more and sometime less 2. And in the like manner God causeth gracious or holy acts Rectifying our Powers and fortifying them by holy habits and preserving and actuating them by the Holy Ghost Yet the Spirit is to Grace as God the prime cause is to Nature He giveth us more Gracious Power than we use and than his own concurse alwayes reduceth into adequate act So that Gods operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum posse Dei nor ad ultimum posse hominis but limited by his most wise and holy will And man as a free agent is not only Able but obliged to use his power further than by all Gods concurse or premotion it is used And in this sense I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Causae partiales in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help which God as the first Cause of Nature and Grace doth afford to man And there is moreover a certain use of Gods help and Grace beyond what God predetermineth man to as comparative to this object rather than that c. which man can do and is bound to do Not independently or in co-ordination with God but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth and affordeth him sufficient help to actuate Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty the effect alwayes followeth If he do not it may not follow though God gave him that necessary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called sufficient And when Scotus likeneth God and man to two drawing a Boat where the strength of both must concurr I believe he meant no more than I have said 1. All the Power is of God as the total first cause 2. All the Grace that rectifieth and disposeth our faculties is of God as the total first cause 3. All the Act as an Act in genere is of God as the total though not the sole cause 4. All the Holiness or Moral Goodness of the Act is of God as the total first cause though not the only cause 5. But all the sinfulness or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man 6. And that implyeth that mans free will is not so much freed from sin mutability and infirmity but that it can neglect to use well the power and helps of grace afforded But of total and partial Causality I have spoken more fully in the first Book And of their opinion that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will but only is ad actum seu effectum if it be true it easily endeth the controversie of the difference of sufficient and effectual grace as to that Act But it is to me unintelligible and the thing quite above all our understandings and very unfit for bold disputes or mutual censures §. VI. The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way as to the sense and consequents I Do readily confess that as the summ of all the Controversie is Whether man have truly any Free-will that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion I should my self be inclined also to think that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty there being nothing indeed but Volition necessitated and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free when truly there is nothing contingent in the World We that converse in the body with things corporeal are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum violent and necessitated and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so yea that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent and consequently all things necessitated by him But as Alvarez confesseth Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others by natural proofs and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof of the necessitation of all Volitions as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby And therefore whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World the Freedom of mans will and the morality there founded of which Grotiâ—s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians and excellently learned and acute Divines as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error which I shall therefore put into the Scheme lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it And remember that I
charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down but only that the reason why I my self do above all others shun their principles is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them which I must also believe if I do believe them And I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words and to have their Books at hand * * * At least that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez and Dr. Twisse and Rutherford de Prov. Better saith Joh. Racon in 1. sent d 40. art 2. Deâ—s aliqua futura non vult vâ—lie efficaci sed soluâ— permissive respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est Causa per Generalem trâ—buens agenti particularâ— facultatem agendt sic vel sit non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam istâ— modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesuppositâ influentiâ generali Del Unde ideo pecco quia volâ— pèccáre ità quod actus voluntatis mâ—ae est jam determinans me ad peccandum And Gab. Biel post Scotum Ità est caâ—sa effectiva rectitâ—dinis quod quantum est de se daret illam actâ—â— sâ— voluntas cooperaretur Universaliter enim quicquid Dâ—us dedit antecedenter daret etâ—am consequenter qâ—antum est ex sâ— si non esset impedimentum Vcluntas autem quantum est ex sâ— non dat rectitudinem actul Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub 1. Ità Okam in 1. d. 46. 38. ferâ— iisdem verbiâ— Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. q. 2. ad 4. q. 3. concl 4. Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 12. alil quamplurimi â— Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300 301 c. speaketh too plainly to this purpose with Hugâ— 1. de Sacâ— 4. part 1â— being more careful to make people think well of his Deus vult malum than to deny it Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur sâ—d quia quod bâ—ne dicitur non recte iâ—telligitur And his mollification is that God willeth sin only secundum quid for Gods Velle simplicâ—ter as it 's commonly taken is to Love and approve it as good and to reward it And because the Vulgar so take it we must not before them say that God wiâ—â— leth sin because they too much abhorr it No act is unjust simply but all just and all the consequents of it just in respect of God the Author Therefore simply in the Universe there is no sin or deordination God willeth sin as a Physicion doth poyson in his medicine for the exercise of the good the punishment of the evil the contemplation of the beauty of the world He is not the author of evil as he is of good for of that he is the sole giver of faith charity c. creating it And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably c. Is not this meer Hobbs 1. Doth God will any thing but good Is not sin good then if he will it 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it a not willing it What if he rewarded not men for loving him You feign God to will and cause all sin and then damn men for it and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it because he damned men for it 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good when you make him the total cause of all that is in them 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends and not for evil as well as God 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing than to make him so by force against his will Nay could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing Is it not a contradiction 7. Why call you it poyson which God maketh a medicine of You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not as you say more immediately than man and so that God first made it poyson and then put it into his medicine 8. And why are you afraid of speaking your opinion to the world Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature in which the vulgar are founder than your self 9. And much of this is because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin unless he cause sin What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick and that Arsenick shall corrode his bowels that eateth it c. and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout c. Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much or is not the excess from them and yet the penal relation and consequents from God And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will viz. Grace effectual without which no one sin can be avoided is Gods will that it shall be done And so no man can any more do any thing than what he doth than he can make a world And free-will li. 2. c. 1. is Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi voluntarit exeâ—quendi so that to will and freely to will is all one And so man is moved to every sin by necessitating premotion to do it freely that is he is made willing that is sinful So c. 32. In omni nonactione Deo creaturae communi prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit ideo creatura illam non agit non è contra So that all omissions of faith repentance obedience c. are fully resolved into Gods first non-agency p. 611. Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum aliam Stellam coelum majus ideo non facta sunt Ità quioquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri non vult positivé Scilicet habet nollâ— illud fieri ab ta Prius ergo naturaliter causaliter est Deum nolle positive quare non vâ—lle non facere causam secundam agere quam ipsam non agere This is plain dealing All men that Love not God and all that hate him are such because God will have it so and make them do as they do It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly But what is the Christian Religion then I. Their fundamental Principle is that It is naturally Impossible for any agent Natural or free to do any act or vary any comparatively or
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
have it not want it because they refused Preparatory grace which they were able to have better used oâ— submitted to So that the Reward is only such as a free gift which quoad ordinem conferendi rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father who at once useth Power Love and paternal Justice according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace which is founded in Christs perfect merits and is Christs own Law VIII and IX 1. That quoad eventum the good Angels grace was effectual and Adjutorium quo as well as sine quo non he granteth And Adams till he fell Let us find out the difference then To say that yet They could have sinned is a doubtful speech If could signifie Pâ—tâ—â—â—iam naturalem it is noâ— for want of Natural Power that Christ himself sinned not but because perfection caused the right use of that Power To be able to sin or not to believe or not to love God if it signifie any more than the Natural power which men abuse is an improper speech for sin is from moral impotency or indetermination and not an vaâ—t of other power But a Logical Possibility of any event but what â—ame to pass Gods very fore-knowledge will exclude and so his Decree And if the question be Whether Adam could not have stood when he fell it is agreed that he could It seemeth then that our Controversie lyeth plainly â—â— these two things 1. Whether any man now Holy or unholy have any help from God by Christ by which he is truly able to do any one good action more â—â—â—â— other than he doth or to forbear any more evil 2. Whether all Divine causation or operation â—e such as of it self alone will inferr the â—â—â—tainty of mans Volition as the Effect We gâ—ant that Divine prescieâ—â—â— doth inferr it eâ—â—â—oessitate infallibilitâ—â—â—â— Divine Volitions some think are ever efficient of all that is willed and that God hath no other operation but Volition as Bradwardine and others Others deny this 〈…〉 that God hath Power operative as much distinct from Volition aâ—â—â—tellection is and also that God willeth more than he operateth or totally causeth And of this opinion must Jansenius needs be because he held that the free-will of Adam before his fall and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation And yet â—ethinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God willed or decreed However the former is but a wordy strife For if God operate only Volendo yet his will as Immanent and a meer will as mans must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation So then the thing in question is Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause as that hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum viz. fidem charitatem humanam secuturum And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus it followeth Deus praescâ—t hoc futurum ergo futurum est so ex perfectione Voluntatis summo Imperio foelicitate Divina it followeth Deus vult hoc futurum esse ergo futurum est and that ex necessitate existentiae no doubt it is a good consequence Deus hoc fecit ergo factum est But Whether from his meer adjutorium or prime efficiency limited by his own will it be a good consequence God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition ergo man will consent or will is the doubt He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed but he thinks that now it will We grant that God giveth not only the posse velle but the ipsum velle to those that have it His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful it is so And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power and Gods grace conjunct God is the cause of both And is ever the total cause quoad effectum that is totius effecti And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification as ex vi causae will inferr the effect and is unresistible and doth not only determine the will but so determineth it as overcometh all moral power or disposition to the contrary But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Christ which giveth a power either not necessitating the act or when the act followeth not such as he calleth sine quo non I think for these reasons 1. Because else no man can do any more good or less evil than he doth which I believe not 2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin and its consequents which they had never power to avoid which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture 3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law for rejecting the remedying grace 4. And then the Conscience of the damned would have nothing to torment them with or accuse them for but original sin and its unavoidable consequents And it would give them this excuse and ease God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise 5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say I never had any help of Christ 6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin if they do but find themselves wicked and to say I never sinned against any Grace of Christ 7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival and mercy which the reprobate have from some other Cause and not by Christ And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace 8. Because God is Immutable and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government Therefore it seemeth to me an injurious fiction to say as Jansenius that God had such Laws as supposed mans self-determining will and governed so as to use sufficient Grace or adjutorium sine quo non to man and Angels at the first and thaâ— now he hath no such at all but only a moving efficiency I should sooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were than to hold as he that there were other before the fall and none ever since For as to his great argument vitiated nature I answer it 1. Man is man still And therefore God ruleth him as man And that in via And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining free-will that could do this or not do it we have reason to think it is so still Why is not grace meerly sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature supposing that it is not the
first giveth all creatures what they have and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness as the Sun setteth and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality like the revolution of day and night Summer and Winter it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise § 37. IX But let it be noted that we hold that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator Motor and Life of Nature and the Eternal Wisdom Word and Son the Glorious Ordinator Rector and Redeemer so the Eternal Love and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers even of Gods Elect and that this Sanctification and proficiency is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul or by a Quickning Illuminating felicitating Communication of Divine Life and Light and Love which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain § 38. And as to Free-will I further say that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God or Independent and as a God to himself or that God is any way a defective or idle as they call it Spectator of mans sins or free acts But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted And that he doth truly attain his ends in all § 39. Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which aâ—â—seth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works which must not be dishonoured and left out § 40. And more than so we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect it being their perfection to be suited to his own will And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry Dr. Twisse c. is not Whether God be Glorious in all his works or they be perfect For we say that though mans sin be found upon Gods works and that sin be none of his works nor any means properly so called of Pleasing or Glorifying him nor at all willed or caused by him but hated and punished yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it but notwithstanding its malignity shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works § 41. Yea more we say that men sin under his Disposing power and that he will make use of their evil unto Good and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God as sickness to the Physicion of which it is no Cause or proper Means nor of it self condâ—ceth thereunto Yea and that no Act as an Act how sinful soever is done but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature and prime Motor Yea more that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin it self are under the Causal Government and disposal of God who will attain his Ends in all § 42. Therefore we differ but in this Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth notwithstanding sin or on supposition of it as barely permitted negatively but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it rather than by sin it self as a willed designed effect of his own necessitating Negations and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated of his determining premotion Whether mans permitted sin be any of Gods works And whether Gods glory be not rather non obstante peccato and also by occasion of it supposed to be mans work only and by all the good consequents caused by God than by the sin it self as a Means conducible or a Cause § 43. For we deny not that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion or Privation as Mr. Sterry would perswade us To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will and can be willing with a decree to make many willing is much different from making the creature bad and then condemning him to Hell for being so as an act of Justice Yet we doubt not but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom Goodness and Justice of God in his Government of man than yet the wisest mortals have § 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do or not If yea then you suppose that he cannot nor ever could make any one Creature Worm or Grass more or less greater or smaller sooner or later or otherwise than he doth which few will believe It being not for want of Power but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more But if God can make one creature more or one Motion more and yet doth not I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency If not why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali or the leaving free-will to its own determination be so called Not to make more creatures or more physical motion or not to give more Grace and Glory is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. § 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against Free-will they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered § 46. I conclude with this repeated profession that I am fully satisfied that all the rest of the Controversies about Grace and Nature and Predestination and Redemption as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book nor worthy any of that stir and contention which men that sufficiently difference not Words Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination and of Free-will that is not What free-will sinners have left but Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man there was such a thing as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause or as Hobbes speaketh Whether ever a created will did act without a necessitating premotion And whether to will and to will freely be all one And whether the will except as to the kind of action be not as much necessitated to will or not will as my Pen to write or not write are we call not its acts Contingent or free either because they are what they are Volitions or though Ignorance because we see not the moving Causes § 47. And if
this hold for my part I must confess that I think the Religion which agreeth with it must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses Rutherfords Bradwardines or Alvarez's nor yet so bad as Hobbes's or Spinosa's but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonick or Stoick Philosophers I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was for I hear he was an excellent person but such as his Book though obscurely intimateth And if any of that judgement have a better or worse it is not in consistency with his own principles FINIS Catholick Theology The Second BOOK The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITES Reconciled OR AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE and MANS FREE-WILL MERIT c. If men are willing A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS and UNREVEALED THINGS and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT In a Dialogue between C. a â—alvinist A. an Arminian and B. the Râ—concâ—ler and others By Richard Baxter Tim. 2. 14 15 16. Of these put them in remembrance charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit but to the subverting of the hearers Study to shew thy self approved unto God a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed rightly dividing the word of Truth But shun prophane and vain bablings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness and their word will eat as doth a Canker LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book The first days Conference about Predestination THe need of conciliatory endeavours p. 1 2. What this undertaking is p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded the case briefly opened p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian Of eternal absolute Reprobation p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause or God's Acts have Causes p. 7. How far Gods Decrees may be said to have extrinsick Causes p. 8. The second Crimination Of God's decreeing Sin either to predetermine it or the event or his permission p. 9. The third Crimination Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees Negation of decrees opened p. 11. The fourth Crimination The pure Masse whether the object of Predestination p. 12. Decrees distinguished p. 13. The fifth Crimination Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention or of Execution p. 14. The sixth Crimination Denying all Conditional Decrees p. 16. The seventh Crimination Of absolute Election p. 17. The eighth Crimination Leading men to presumption hereby p. 18. The ninth Crimination Setting necessity and fate p. 19. The tenth Crimination Making God a Respecter of persons by unequal Decrees p. 21. The eleventh Crimination Making God and Ministers Dissemblers p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given p. 23. The second days Conference The Criminations by the Calvinist What good this conciliatory attempt may do p. 24. The first Crimination Denying election uncomfortable The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation Reprobation opened p. 29 30. Whether God will Sin p. 30. or the Act p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin answered How God causeth the effect and not the Volition p. 85 c. What God doth about Sin p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit p. 39. The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution p. 41. How God doth Velle finem The Case opened p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing and have any cause p. 48. The third days Conference Of Universal and Special Redemption The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption what all agree in p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. God so loved the world that he gave his only Son c. But to whom did he give him He gave him to the whole world that is to say to Adam and to all that should come after him O Lord what had Adam or any other man deserved at God's hands that he should give us his only Son We are all miserable Sinners damnable persons justly driven out of Paradise justly excluded from Heaven and justly condemned to Hell See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers Redemp yet living Mr. Polehill of Gods Decrees Did Christ die equally for all p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture p. 57. The Synod of Dort vindicated p. 59. The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant it self p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility or falshood the object of faith p. 62. The sixth seventh and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach leaving most men remediless teaching Infidels impenitence p. 63. The ninth tenth eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments justifying Ingratitude denying Christ's Kingdoms tempting men to Infidelity p. 64 65. The fourth days Conference The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ dye in vain for them that he knew would perish p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for p. 68. The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith p. 69. The sixth seventh eighth and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption no more for the saved than the damned Christ's sheep to know him before he know them Pardoning Original Sin to all p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent p. 72. The fifth days Conference Of Man's Sinfulness and Impotency and of Free-will The Armin. Crim. 1st Denying all free-will they deny all Morality p. 73. What Liberty is here meant largely discussed to p. 79. What Liberty we hold p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe p. 85. What Power can and cannot mean p. 86. fullier opened p. 87 c. Questions hence answered p. 96 c. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts p. 99. Habits proved p. 100. Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants Heathens and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation p. 103. Of Infants remedy p. 104. Parents sin defileth them p. 105. Of Heathens Case p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth p. 107. The sixth days Conference The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin p. 109. Original sin opened p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace p. 113.
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and
God knoweth all Names Notions Propositions and Syllogisms with their modes as they are the measures organs or actings of Humane Understandings 8. †I refer the Reader to Blank de Concord lib. cum â—ecretis 1. Thes 25. c. where by citing their own words at large he proveth that the most famous and resolute Antiarminians were for this scientia media conditionata viz. Fr. Gomarrus Arminius's chief Antagonist in Mat. 11. 21. Antonius Walaeus loc com de sctent Dei pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholast Orth. vindic p. 203 209 210. Besides Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect 12. disp 2. num 55 56. who in his last days was nearest to the Arminians as appeareth in those Metaphysicks And Jo. Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth also Lud. Crocius Dyodecad dis 7. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians that the thing which they call * Could Alvarez and his fellows well prove that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation as the word is used in a fit and ordinary sense they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de scientia media circa malum than is yet done But they fail in their attempts of proving this Of which after scientia media is as certainly in God as is the scientia simplicis Intelligenâ—iae Purae visionis that is that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions and knoweth what would be done by such and such causes or upon such and such alterations if they were put Doth any Christian doubt of this 9. Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine and that of no great importance and not at all de re 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversie is a question only about the order of argumentation as long as the thing it self is confessed to be true 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter do go as far from you as the Jesuites and Arminians who use it As you may see at large in Ludov. à Dola and Durandus himself 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God and dread the taking of his Name in vain And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters But as the truth of the thing is confessed so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation as it is commonly called and not at least always to the Doctrine of Election I see no untruth that it inferreth nor no real difference that it will prove between us The fifth Crimination C. They deny absolute Reprobation at least and say that God reprobateth no men but upon fore-sight of sin And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin nor that he will permit them to sin nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart the sin of Sihon of Rehoboam of the Jews in killing Christ c. B. 1. I told you before Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts You dare not but grant them that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin and as a Sinner And this is the same thing that they mean 2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will for a meer negation where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace will do as much 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency which saith Be perfect and live sin and die for ever And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation He subverteth Scripture and all experience that denieth this Therefore all must grant that God denieth no special Grace to any but the abusers of this common Grace And he decreeth to do but what he doth * Thus our Brittish Diviâ—es at Dâ—rt in their suffrage on Ar. 3. at large Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to are none but the abusers of common Grace or the rejecters of that special Grace when offered 3. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will Because permission being a negation or nothing needs it not but will be as certainly without it upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from sin 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it For he * Arminius himself expresly professeth that in case God permits a man velle pâ—ccatum necâ—sse est ut nullo argumentorum geneâ—e persuadeatur ad volendum Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 70. saith with you That God decreeth his own permission 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin or not-giving Faith Negative Unbelief is meer not-believing And so none of us did believe from eternity or before we were born He that is not believeth not nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us Our unbelief is not sin or privative but on supposition that we are men and have reason and have a Law and Object of Faith And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative but only a negative permission For God did from eternity so permit me to be no man and no Believer and yet this was not Reprobation So God did negatively not hinder Adams first sin but not privatively because not penally for any evil done nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation But when the New Covenant of Grace and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men and they are obliged to believe then sometimes God penally denieth them Grace and that is all which the Arâ—inians put against absolute denial because this denial is only for mens fore-going sin But he also still negatively only and not privatively or penally denieth some Grace to some yea to all And that is only such Grace as is neither morally their due nor naturally due or necessary to them And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation 4. If by Reprobation you mean meerly Gods Preterition that is his â—â—t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace 1. Not to Will or Decree is nothing And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional These are the modes of Acts and not of not-acting or of nothing All grant that Gods non-agency non-volition not-decreeing hath no cause much
less a cause in man least of all in man when he is no man 5. The word Condition either respecteth 1. The thing or event willed 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self I opened this before but think of it again for the reason of the distinction is very plain And 1. God damneth no man but for sin nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace but for sin Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional that is dependeth on a condition God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently and not else 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly may be called A conditional Act or Will But if any think otherwise it is but de nomine 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition * Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas that is in respect of the punishment willed thereby this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis And unless we understand the Fathers thus we must charge them with an Opinion which Aquinas is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm c. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 49. But 1. The actus reprobantis as really distinct from the effect is nothing but Gods Essence And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence 2. And the effect of Reprobation as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement Ruiz de praedef d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis praedâ—finitus suit reproborum numerus Dr. Twisse denieth none of this 6. That God willeth or decreeth not sin formally all the Christian world almost confess And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing that should tempt good people to father it on God or attribute the being of it to his Will or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise 7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general but with all its modes and circumstances he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of sin or the immediate necessary cause of it which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear C. God willeth not the Form that is sin as sin and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumstances B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will sin in matter and form and yet not will it as sin To will it as sin is to take the form of sin as such to be good and so to be the ratio volendi which few if any Sinners ever do But to will both matter and form in one not as the formal reason of Volition but making total sin the matter chosen as a means to some other desired end this is possible for a very wicked man to do But I think the ordinary case of Sinners is not at all to will the form of sin but cast that by and to will the matter of it for the carnal pleasure or inferior good which it seemeth to tend to Now this excuseth not their will from wickedness that they will not malum sub ratione mali or sin because it is sin but for another end And shall we charge God of willing sin as the wicked do C. God willeth it to a good end and they to an evil end B. As evil must not be done that good may come by it so neither must it be willed to that end Man may need such a * Sure Arminius granteth enough and that which â—theâ—us and many School-men deny and for my parâ— I cannot grant when he saith At per accidens bonum est ut malum siat propter Det saptentiam bonitatem potentiam secundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae suaeillustrandae sumit Est ergo peccatum isto respectâ— non medium per se illustrandae Gloriae Divinae sed occasio tantum non data in hunc finem neque natura sua ad illum accommodata sed a Deo arrepta horsum mira arte landabili abusu usurpata Armin. exam Perkins pag. 508. An occasion it is indeed but I will not grant that ex peccato God setcheth matter for his Glory nor that by accident it is good ut fiat Caeterum peccata etiam secundum rationem malitiae moralis objecta sunt seu materia circa quam divina praedestinatio versatur â—o modo quo versatur poenitentia Vasqu in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. dâ—sp 93. c. 2. means to his ends but so cannot God Yea men have oft good ends for evil Acts Many lye to glorifie God and sin for his Cause and Church and for their own and other mens Salvation Much of the Blood and Cruelties and Superstitions in the World have had good ends which yet excused not the things from sinfulness C. God is under no Law and therefore cannot sin But man is B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner but not that he causeth or willeth not the sin of man 2. Gods natural essential Perfection is his Law and more than a Law to him And from that Perfection all Laws in the world that are just and good have their Original that is Gods own Laws are the expressions of his holy perfect Will and Nature and Mans Laws are authorized by and subservient to and derived from the Laws of God in Nature and Scripture So that when the Apostle would describe a man best and likest unto God he saith That the Law is not made for the Righteous 3. If Gods Holiness and Wisdom make man a Law forbidding sin on pain of Hell the same Wisdom and Holiness with his Justice and Mercy will not will the sin so forbidden nor cause it nor consist with so doing C. It is not the form or essence of sins that God willeth but the existence and futurity or event not sin but that sin be B. I many a year studied thinking to prove that true But I doubt it is but a game at words and groundless distinguishing for a false conclusion For 1. Sin is a Relation formally even a disconformity of an Act or disposition and so of the person to Gods Law It can no otherwise be caused but by making the Law and causing the Act in the circumstances disconform God maketh the Law and God maketh man and his faculties and God causeth the Object and God permitteth the tempter If God also cause the Act in the prohibited circumstances he doth all that can be done in the causation of sin And so of his Volitions or Decrees As for the essence of sin in notion without the existence more
may be said that God indeed is some cause of that without culpability yea by his Holiness and Power For as the Relations of Curvitude and Dissimilitude result from the Relate's fundamentum as compared to the Correlate or terminus so he that causeth any of them hath some hand in causing the Relation as a Relation And so God by forbidding Adultery Lying c. by his Law doth by Institution make those acts to be sin that is He layeth down the rule from which they are so denominated when committed That Adultery is committed is long of man that it is a sin when committed is long of God and man God by his Law and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the essence but the existence or futurity you are so far out as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him as to the existence than the essence 2. But what is the existence but the essence existing or extra causas And what is it to cause sin but to cause it to exist And what is it to cause it to exist but to cause it or give it a being And what is it to will that sin shall exist but that the essence of it shall exist And what is it to will the event or futurity but to will that sin shall be And what more can man will or do about it to shew himself to be bad as Estius and others fully manifest C. I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is sin so he do not will it * Twiss Vind. li. 2. Digress 4. p. 201. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab hominâ— ut est peccatum Licet sit peccatum ut fit ab homine non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum hoc est sub ratione peccati Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit cum hoc â—â— in humanam voluntatem competat as sin and so may cause it Quod peccatum but not Qua peccatum B. Here are three things before us 1. The common substratum or â—atter of the sin which is the Faculty and the Object and the Act only in genere act us or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances 2. The Act thus circumstantiated 3. The Relative form of sinfulness 1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first the Faculty Object and the Act as an Act e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder and Peter's denying Christ God gave them the Faculty by which they did it He â—pheld their natural power and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act But 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither caused nor willed but permitted only that is that David should hic nunc lust after her that was another mans wife that he should vitiate her that he should choose out Uriah to the Sword that Peter should speak those particular words c. In the first sense God willeth the Act which is sin and the Faculty which is sinful but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated And as for your Qua peccatum I tell you again few Sinners if any will it qua peccatum C. What say you to this undeniable Argument If God will not that Act which is sin he willeth almost nothing that men do For we sin in all someway or other And so God hath little to do in the world B. The last answer fully serveth to this If we sin in every Act yet all that is in every Act is not sin or prohibited All that is good in the Act is of God and willed by him But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act which God doth not cause or Will which morally specifie it as sin As when I pray I sin in praying coldly unbelievingly with wandring thoughts God causeth not these though he cause the Prayer Or to come from compound Acts to simple Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts but as they are upon an undue Object A lye is not a sin as it is a word but as this word which is false And so in all others C. But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves and not only in their circumstances Therefore if God there cause the Act he causeth the Sin B. No Act as an Act is forbidden but as circumstantiated by Object Time Mode Place c. Mr. Capell * Lib. of Tempt chooseth lying only as an instance of prohibitum per se But I answered before that all the Act in lying is Volition Intellection and Speech And these as such are not forbidden But only these particular words which are false The common instance is Odisse Deum But here hatred in it self is not the sin but â—s unduly terminated on God as the Object And this God willeth not C. By this you deifie man For you make him the cause of something which God is no first cause of And so man is made a first cause that is a God For the particularizing of the Object and the circumstantiating of the Act is aliquid something and must have some first cause B. The truth is this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the Dominican Predeterminants Which I have answered in due place and here briefly tell you 1. That when two Objects are before me a commanded and a forbidden one there is * I have noted after that Dr. Twisse saith Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile neque necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati And these have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale Armi. dic Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile jucundum in many instances And God maketh the Object e. g. Honey or Eves fruit and God maketh the Appetite so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity that is that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee But whether thou wilt eat it he hath left free so that if God also caused that determinate act he caused all And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law the Object and the man and thereby maketh that if thou wilt cause such an Act so disordered it shall be thy sin and misery so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin And they that ascribe the Act in suo modo to him ascribe all to him But as to Bonum utile he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile For it may be Conducibile ad malum interitum But it is not utile unless it be conducibile ad bonum yea ad finâ—m ultimum For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will And God is the Author
of all true profit to us no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one than in my choosing the commanded one To hate God and love sin hath no more natural entity than to love God and hate sin To speak an Oath or Lye than to speak Truth and Holily To will a forbidden Act than to Nill it and to will a good one So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause of that which hath no natural entity that is of an Act not as an Act but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised And Dr. Twisse hence saith That moral specification of Acts is no true specification of them And it 's true that it is not a Physical specification 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety Even to will or not will do or not do And in this case to do or will when forbidden is more than not to do or will I answer 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power and it is as natural to it to be in act as to a stone to lie still And the Cartesians will tell you that Action needeth no more cause than Rest But I rather say that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul but only this or that Action upon this or that Object at an undue time So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such whether Vital Intellectual or Volitive The Action which God commandeth he willeth The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object Adam had this liberty of contradiction to will or not to will this particular Act of eating the forbidden fruit but not to will or not will simply Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit instead both of nilling it and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it had no more natural entity in it than if he had not willed it but willed somewhat else at the same time 3. An Action it self is not properly Res but modus Rei and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature that supposing God the cause of its Power continued shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power he saith that which no mortal man can prove The Glory of Gods Works is their likeness to Himself And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness we know not just how far God can go in such Communications I see no contradiction in it to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force with necessary though not determining concurse can determine it self without any more causation And if it be not a Contradiction God can do it 4. But this is all prevented by considering that mans Soul is never out of Act. It s active force is never idle though it act not always the same way nor with the same extension or intension so that to reduce it into act is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum but from a power acting one way or slowly to act another way or more intensly 5. Yea this is all answered by considering that as I said while God continueth the Soul in its nature it continueth a naturally active force or power inclined essentially to activity So that though I say that Action needeth more cause than non-action that is here done in God still causeth the active disposition But supposing that upheld I say that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action than to cause it to act Whatever the world talketh against Durandus they are never well able to answer à Dola though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed as a threed supposing God to continue the nature of it and all things else there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling than to make it fall when the threed is cut It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action which is but modus rei that is in question but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action so that it is but modus modi rei 7. And lastly The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion Now whether any man should deny all our Religion and certain necessary Truths for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this that God is not able to make a Creature that can cause a modus modi in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that without Divine predetermination let sobriety be judge C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts without Gods determination as well as of the evil B. Jansenius is in the right in this we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse But we cannot do good especially spiritual saving good unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace To the specifying of good actions there must ever concur Gods natural help Gods gracious help and mans free-will or self-determination It is not two or three determinations of the Will which are made by these several Causes but one determination So that under God man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good or else he were not a Believer nor rewardable or punishable And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will for with that such a determination was consistent but from its Pravity or Corruption But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. Vol. minoris hath a full digression 4 to prove that God willeth that sin shall come to pass he permitting it and saith Nostri Theologi affirmanâ— Arminiani â—ontificii negant * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book His Friend Alvarez de Aux li. 11. disp 110. p. 442 c. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis and concludeth that Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam et permittere peccatum eorum non est conditionata sed absoluta nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nuâ—la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum
is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world judge by their confuted words in the former Book 1. They deny not nor can do that Love and Volitiâ—â— in God are all one Gods Love is not a Passion but his Will 2. They say that God willeth that sin exist 3. And that as summè unicè conducible to his Glory 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being so is he in the greatness and power and efficacy of his Volitions 7. And that man loveth not nor willeth not evil as evil or sin as sin but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory for which he willeth its existence And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is C. Yet it sticks with me that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World and all Sin which is the common work of the World should be without or against his Will Providence is wronged by this B. You mistake the matter 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will under moral Government was not from impotency as if he could have made man no better or more necessary an Agent But of his Wisdom and Freedom by which he made the Bruits without Reason and Stones without Sense 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God which determineth only of Duty and not directly of Event But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first â—ook that Gods Providence doth about mans sin and then you will â—ot say that he is Idle or neglecteth his Government unless he cause Sin I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image and the Lord of his own Acts as a Creature morally governable by Laws And so all his free power is of God who still upholdeth it II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin And I do not believe that Aureolâ—â— Duraâ—d or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise though they differ in expressing the mode of concurse III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions as in generation c. even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect And that by all the ways fore-named and many more V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor maketh mens sins the occasions of much good and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events so as not to miss of any of his ends But will attain all his ends while the Sinner seeketh his own VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do And all that Sinners do he fore-knew And neither his Wisdom Goodness or Power is ever over-come by sin or defective in any thing about it And is not all this enough for you but yet God must be the chief willer of sin C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much B. Take in but one thought more which I afterward suggest Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in it self distinct from that of the Will I have told you my Opinion of his tenet But this is granted him that no outward Act hath any sinfulness but secondary and participative as animated by the Will and that sin is primarily in the Will alone Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of but seemingly of the Act indeed of the Effect Now God cannot be the cause of any mans sin unless he cause the sinful Volition But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed And therefore when we come thither you must excuse me from repeating it or pardon what you put me to do The sixth Crimination C. My next offence against them is that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional and so make God dependent upon man B. This is opened in the Second Book * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp 91. c. 1. Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis quatenus est ipsa essentia divina res increata sic notant scholastici omnes clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra atque causam aliquam totiuâ— effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus In Deo 1. Ipsa essentia Dei 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas Hic nascitur ex objectis Ejus igitur possunt esse causae Indeed they differ not from the Synodists or Dr. Twisse himself I think in this That is 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations Promises and Threatnings in his Word 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word and all that is in it with its conditional mode 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse and all say Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non hoc vult esse propter hoc Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition but Gods Will is that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition When the Condition is performed it is not a medium of Gods Volition but of the Effect 4. But yet this all must confess that as to the bare extrinsick denomination from the Object as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past present and future so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises which you will not deny but God hath made 5. And in case of sin and damnation sin fore-seen is an objective condition disposition or qualification sine qua non of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on as they confess at the Synod at Dort and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large C. But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man maketh God to follow the Creature and depend upon it B. It maketh him no way dependant at all For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do It is
diversity of quantity quality distance c. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity quality distance c. But I must not write a Logick for you I am by this much remembred that as David saith man walketh in a vain shew or Image when multitudes of nothings go for somethings and fill up so much of his thoughts and life and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in C. But you have said nothing yet of the fifth which is Modus Entis And futurition may be reduced to that B. A true modus entis is quid absolutum reale and the same that we call an Accident And Gassendus chooseth to call Accidents Modes or Qualities And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents as quantity quality action c. But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part but yet conceptions of quid entis so that an entire perfect conception of the thing would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens speak not always so good sense as they think they do But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing as Cloaths to the Body Servants Lands Riches Honours are not properly Modes and Accidents at all but Adjuncts C. Apply this to the point in question of Futurity B. If Futurity as is said be an eternal Being it is God If nothing it hath no cause If it be called Quid medium the very Quid is a contradiction to it To begin backward 1. If it be Modus Entis from eternity it must be Modus Dei For there was no ens ab aeterno but God If it be Modus Dei it is Dens For all in God is God 2. If it be Relatio it is absoluti alicujus relatio If so either of some real Being or of nothing If of a Being from eternity it must be a Relation of God to the thing future in that he either willed or fore-knew â— For nothing was eternal but God And if so that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing If something it is God himself and so hath no cause If nothing it is no effect and so hath no â—â—â—â— But if it be the Relation of nothing viz. of the thing future to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future than it is nothing it self For the Relation of nothing cannot be something a real accident without a real Subject 3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis it was Rationis Divinae for there was no created Reason ab aeterno And if so either Aptitudinal or Actual If Actual it was God For all his Idea's and entia rationis for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God must needs be God himself and so have no cause If Aptitudinal and not yet in mente divina but objecta possibilia either they were something or nothing If something then there was something eternal besides God which is not said by any of us If nothing to call them future signifieth no more but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were which is true But futurity it self being nothing hath no cause 4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations it is something or nothing that is denominated future I know you will say It 's nothing If so quatenus extrinsical to God it was from eternity nothing which you call a Denomination But if you mean the Act of God denominating it was quid reale that is God himself who hath no cause But yet this is the true foundation of the notion Because Gods Knowledge of all things and his Will of all good things extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be and a Will which willeth all that he will do And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity And so from an extrinsick Denomination of Gods Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings and then talk and write and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams as if they were somethings And this is the work of the fantastical World And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia Species Entia rationis Universalia And with Aristotle Themistius c. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth c. O what work have vain notions and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World but in the Church and among those that call themselves Orthodox and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures The notion of Privations I need not here apply C. But things future are future whether any one think of them or not B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others what-ever is said to them It is certain that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes negantes quoad existentiam That which only will be is not Therefore the name signifieth nothing but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it but it implyeth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say It will be And there needs no more to that but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect But I have said more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more C. But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be by his permission B. I abhor the question and supposition That such worms as we who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it yea unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it When it is a wiser way of arguing to say This is the way that man knoweth by and that man can comprehend Ergo it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge But remember one thing that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter For is not the form future C. Yes B. And is not Gods Will his Love C. Yes B. And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin which yet you say that no wicked man loveth C. No It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth B. O excellent distinguishing He willeth not the form of Sin but only willeth that it be or exist The form is the Essence He willeth that the Essence exist but willeth not the Essence which is nothing but as existing But do wicked men will any more or so
much as that the form exist C. Dr. Twisse saith No. B. And if it were but the Act that existed doth not Gods Law make it sin by forbidding it and so cause the Essence C. Yes B. And if you say that God willeth the existence of the form of Sin why say you that he doth not cause it Is not his Will effective or is it any more contrary to his Holiness to cause it than to will or love it C. He causeth the existence but not the form or existence B. What jugling is this in such tremendous matters 1. What is it to cause the form but to cause that it exist To cause it to be is all the causing that it can have 2. And you confess that Gods Law by forbidding it maketh it sin in specie when it existeth Remember that you say that it is not only the matter but the form of sin which God willeth and causeth to exist And is it not a contradiction to call it evil and yet say that God willeth it when his Will is the Rule of Goodness C. It is not evil to God but to us B. So Dr. Twisse saith And to be evil to us even mans sin or damnaâ—â—â—n is not evil to God And so God is the great Lover of Sin and Damnation But why then is he said to hate it And is it not an Enemy to God and contrary to his Holiness Why did Christ die for that which God so loved C. Sin is nothing and therefore God causeth it not B. 1. Relations and Privations have their Causes and so hath Sin 2. Else man cannot be condemned for causing it The Synod of Dort and Reformed Churches teach no such Doctrine But it â—â— such as you that tempt the Arminians to revile them and say that you describe God in the shape of the Devil and much worse as loving and causing sin and misery more than he that so the love of God may be extinguished C. I think we must leave these Mysteries to God B. But good Brother though I have stopt your mouth and censures of your Brethren in this and such matters do you expect that every â—onest Christian must be able to discuss all your Logical Fallacies or else go with you for unsound and heterodox And have you dealt fairly by the Church of God to borrow from the School-men such snares for mens Consciences And must every man be perswaded that God is the greatest lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act that is not able to answer your smoaky Sophisms about futurition and its eternal cause with such like I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as Eve and turned men from the simplicity that is in Christ C. I pray briefly give me the sum of what you drive at B. The sum is That though every Party and almost every person of each Party have odd notions of his own and peculiar weapons to wound his Brothers Reputation with and militate against Love and Concord and manifest the Pride of his self-conceited Understanding yet all sober Christians I think are agreed in all this Controversie of Gods Decrees in all that is truly necessary to our brotherly love and peace That is All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth and to give all the Grace and Mercy which at any time he giveth whether to all or some And that he absolutely and properly decreed no more But improperly he may be said to will an event in tantum when he willeth only to do so much or so much which naturally conduceth towards it though he know that it will never come to pass But what it is that God actually doth or giveth in time is all the controversie which is to be spoken of in the third Chapter And were it not for your tenaciousness of contentious notions I needed to have said no more than these few words here of Gods Decrees THE Third Days Conference With an ARMINIAN of Universal and Special REDEMPTION A. The second Article of our Difference is so fundamental and â—omen tous and our distance so great that I cannot believe that you can say any thing sufficient to reconcile us B. They that study Controversie as such are apt every where to finâ— matter of Quarrel and weapons of Contention but they that seeâ— peace do find out the terms and means of peace as sure and easie in them selves which Contenders cannot see Tell me in a word Are not all Parties agreed that Christ by his Merits and Sufferings procured for men all mercies which he giveth them â—â—â—â— and no more but as he may be said to procure them that which he offereth and bringeth to their choice which is properly to procâ—re them that offer or the benefit as offered A. Yes I think both sides will grant this that he purchased all that he giveth and absolutely or fully no more B. Why then all the Controversie is what he giveth men and that belongeth to the third and fourth Articles And so I might dismiss this at the beginning but for your expectations But what is it that maketh you think the difference so great The first Crimination A. 1. The Calvinists and Synodists deny Christ's very Office as he is the Saviour of the World and the second Adam the Redeemer of Mankind and the Mediator between God and Man And all this they confine to a small part of the World * Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 5. m. 1. p. 487. Non existimo opinionem illam Calvinisticam quae negat pro omnibus singulis Christâ—m mortuum esse tolerandam esse nec inter studiosos varitaris debere obtinere locum opinionem qui non perinde admittunt quod omnibus in Adamo lapsis iterum sit via salutis facta possibilis per Christum quod habeant per Christum in actu primo paratum vel in actu secundo datum sufficiens auxilium gratiae quo saltem media'e salvari possint c. B. Have you never read what Musculus hath written in Loc. Commun and Bullinger in his Decades for universal Redemption Have you not read the plain words of Calvin cited by Amyraldus in Defens Doct. Calvin though Petavius rail at him for it most furiously Have you not read the writings of Joh. Bergius Conrad Bergius Lud. Crocius Calixtus of Camero and his Followers at Saumers of Testardus Dallaeus Blondel's Preface c. for Universal Redemption Have you not read in the writings of Bishop Rob. Abbots Bishop Carelton Arch-bishop Usher Bishop Hall Dr. Sam. Ward c. their judgments for it Have you not read Bishop Davenant's excellent Dissertation for it de morte Christi Know you not that it was the judgment of Dr. Preston Mr. W. Whateley Mr. W. Fenner and many excellent Divines among us Know you not that Dr. Twisse himself I believe twenty if not forty times over in his Works saith That Christ so far died for all as to procure and give them
I pray you tell me A. It is an idle question For that is but necessitas existentiae He that is ungodly is necessarily ungodly while he is so B. II. VVe hold moreover that the same man will certainly all that time omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly A. That 's but the same else he were a godly man B. III. VVe hold also that yet this man may forbear many acts of sin and do many things commanded and so is not under a vicious necessity of committing all Sin or omitting all Duty IV. VVe hold also that his vicious necessity of disposition is curable and not remediless and desperate V. VVe hold also that it is not curable without Gods saving sanctifying Grace proportioned to his disease or pravity VI. VVe hold also that God hath appointed every man certain Duties and Means to be used in order to his cure VII VVe hold that he giveth much outward help and some inward commoner Grace antecedent usually to sanctifying Grace by which much of these Duties and Means may be used VIII And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty or which man hath not sufficient encouragement to use with hope of success and is not unexcuseable if he neglect Do you differ from us in any of this Or is there any thing more that we must have to be capable of your love and concord A. Though I granted you a necessitas existentiae that a wicked mans life while such be wicked in the main for that is but to say that a wicked man is a wicked man yet I grant you not a necessitas effecti as if his pravity made his wicked life unavoidable or necessary as a necessitating cause B. His wicked life is considerable 1. As to his inward actings or to his outward 2. As to the immediate or next Acts and as to the remote 3. And the necessity is voluntary or involuntary And so I say 1. He is under no natural or involuntary necessity but under a * Etsi Amor ille non excedat vires physicaâ— voluntatis humanae per se spectatae eas tamen superat si spectentur difficultates quae occurant Unde fit ut sine speciali auxilio non possit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio Dâ—um super omnia diligendi Non potest homo credere mysteria â—fidei â—t oportet ad salutem sine gratiae auxilio etiam quum sufficienter sunt proposita probatum a Deo esse revelatum Non potest homo servare quoad substantiam ullum praeceptum affirmativum supernaturale de interno actu sine auxilio gratiae etiam de singulis Pet. a S. Joseph Thes general de aux p. 81. 82 83. vicious inclination or habit which will produce some effects certainly and others uncertainly 2. The certain effects of the habitual privation of the love of God and enmity to him and to holiness is that his Soul will not in statu praesenti immediately nor till it be cured or over-swayed by a superior cause â— love God above all nor love holiness nor live a holy life Because the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination without somewhat to over-power that habit An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cause 3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to sensâ—ality is that it will live a sensual life constantly as to the bent of inward Volitions and ordinarily as occasion serveth in outward actions 4. But being not so necessitated to every Sin nor against every Duty and means of Cure this Soul is not under a necessity of so continuing uncured Now if it be the present voluntary ascertaining Disposition which you deny then 1. You must hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all and live a holy life 2. And that there is some cause in a man most habitually sensual by which he can forbear both the inward desires and outward acts of sensuality which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cause that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without Gods Spirit of Grace or else have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an instant at command And if all a mans Original Sin and contracted habits be so easily laid by at any minute the cure seemeth much easier than the depravation which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that strength which is contrary to all the Worlds experience As it is easier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it and to catch the Plague or any Disease than to cure it or to wound the Body than to heal it or to pull down a House than to build it to drown a Ship than to make it c. So all Ministers Tutors Parents Christians yea persons find how wofully hard it proveth to cure one Sin To cure the Ignorant the Unbelieving the Hard-hearted the Proud the Lustful the Covetous the Passionate much more the malignant Enemies of God and holiness What need of the sanctification of the Holy Ghost or the medicinal Grace of Christ if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of it self and depose its enmity A. You speak to me as if I were a Pelagian I am not for any of this But will rather yield to what you say B. II. And as for your second Charge * Vid. quae haâ—â—t Ruiz de praedefin tr 2. d. 8. per tot de necessitate vaga consistentâ— cum libertate secundum quid Et a. 9. p. 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God proved and multitudes cited that defend it that they assert unresistible necessitating Grace I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article which is its proper place to avoid repetition But here let me remember you by the way 1. That not to love God not to believe not to repent not to live holily are no Acts and therefore no Effects of power but a privation 2. That therefore Gods causing a man to love him to Believe to Repent to be Holy is not to deprive him of any power but to give him act and power 3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty For true Liberty is the Liberty of some faculty or power 4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciousness by the name of a free-power then God taketh away such Power by giving us Power and such Liberty by making us free But proceed to the next Crimination The second Crimination A. * The Arminians say that God giveth a supernatural power even to the Will it self and that by immediate operation Synod art 3. 4. p. 15 c. And they add Mente illuminata voluntati concessa supernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem partim per virium immediatam insusionem
usu ut in auditâ— verbi cum attentione meditatione virâ—ute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime sine coactionis impulsu raptâ— nova luce accensa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata c. Qui assentiuntur obsequâ—ntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt non tamen sine actione motu annixu Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able so do they to sufficiency of Grace Malderus in 12. qu. 111. â— 3. d. 3. saith Recte quidam eruditus annotavit neque praedicationem aut excitationem externam neque internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem quamvis in sâ—o genere quaeque sufficiens dici potest c. sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est Our Bradward shortneth all the Controversie li. 13. cor p. 208 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future and so of the future form of sin and that if there were no God there would be no Impossibile Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossibles For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be But there would be no propositions de impossibili Nay he talks of a non-posse esse impossibile and calls this mirum corrollarium Adrian Quodl 3. fol. 16. Quis duplicitur potest crederese a peccatis abstinere non posse 1. Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia adjutorio sic non errat 2. Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccata aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetraâ—â— etiamsi fecerit quod in se est Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juste pie miscricorditer mundum gubernare Illi-enim manifestissime repugnat apud nunquemque sanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est medium helps concauses c. B. You say true But remember still that this is from no change in the natural faculty as you confess For it was never in any man a power e. g. to act without dependance on God nor to act without an Object in Specie nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object nor without a due medium and necessary concauses Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties but on the Objects Medium Causes c. that men do not love God while unholy you are notoriously mistaken For it is Sin that hindereth And God is the same God and Christ the same Christ and the Word the same and oft the preaching the same to a Believer and an Unbeliever So that though outward helps and hinderances do much the inward cause is most considerable And if all were right within it were no sin in us to be disabled by outward changes It is no sin not to hear without a Preacher or not to see that which is invisible or not to understand that which is not Intelligible or not to love that which is not Amiable or that which is by distance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts no more than not to touch the Moon or not to see into the bowels of the Earth Therefore though it 's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects yet the change that is made on it self by Sin and Grace doth not make it no power and a power in this natural essential sense It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty and another thing that is called Aright disposition or habit Therefore as to the first the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent believe and love God and they omit it not for want of natural power but of something else A. Call it then a moral power if you will B. We must so call it But you must know what that is It is not a power of the same sort with the natural power The very word Power is equivocal or analogous to them Else Grace should increase the Essence of the Soul or make a man to be more a man than he was before And Dr. Twisse derideth the Arminians for saying that potentia fundatur in potentia viz. Moralis in naturali which were very just if it were powers of the same kind that were spoken of but now being otherwise it is unjust for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali as health is in the Body Quest 4. But I further ask you Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate state love God above all and live a holy heavenly life yea or effectually and savingly believe by the meer power of their natural faculties till they are changed A. No that 's a contradiction to be unholy and holy I am none of those Pelagians that make Grace unnecessary to mans cure B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is existent something is wanting without which the acts of Holiness will not be performed Tell me then what that is A. That which is wanting to a man that hath sufficient Grace is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will For without any special Grace differing from sufficient he can believe But that which is wanting to them that have it not is sufficient Grace it self for believing which they want for abusing the antecedent Grace sufficient for preparation B. We speak not now of Grace as efficient ex parte Dei agentis But of Grace as it is in us or an effect of the former what is it in man that is wanting to believing Is it a natural Power or a right Disposition or what A. Till a man have sufficient Grace to believe it is proper strength or power it self that he wanteth and sufficient Grace is such a power But when he hath it he wanteth nothing but the Act which he can excite and doth not B. I confess I find Arminius Arnoldus Corvinus and others granting that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them and more than so saith Arnoldus There is more strength or power necessary now to believe in Christ than was necessary to Adam to keep all the Law partly because of the mysteriousness of Faith and partly because we must first be restored to a new ability which requireth more power than to keep what we had A sly equivocation turning the question from the potentia operata to the potentia operans If it did require more power in the efficient so to renew us it followeth not that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had But Gods Power hath no degrees
arbore scientiae boni mali transgressus est propter quod nos omnes peccatores constituti sumus rei facti condemnationis mortis B. 1. Mark that he expresly maketh us by Adam's sin to be Peccatores rei constituti 2. So in the next Thesis An peccatum Originis sit tantum carentia justitiae Originalis sanctimoniae primaevae cum inclinatione ad peccandum quae antea in homine fuit licet non ita vehemens aeque inordinata ut nunc est propter amissum favorem Dei maledictionem ejusdem amissionem ejus boni quo in ordinem redigebatur An vero contrarius quidam habitus justitiae sanctimoniae infusus vel ingressus acquisitus post peccatum perpetratum Dub. Here he confesseth also a positive Original Sin in the inordinateness of the sensual inclination 3. When he denieth Adam's Act to be our Original 1. He denieth not for no Christian denieth it to be the Original Sin that is the first sin and the cause of ours 2. And he seemeth but to mean that Adam's Sin individually was not ours which is most certain For the same Accident cannot be in two distinct Subjects If our persons be not every one Adam's person it is impossible that the same individual sin or guilt should be his and ours any more than the same individual Soul If God did arbitrarily meerly because he would do it impute Adam's fact to all Mankind and to every one personally this would make it as many sins as there be persons One mans Original Sin would not be anothers and none of theirs the same quoad formam numericam with Adam's Adams is Adams and yours is yours and mine is mine We cannot therefore be heretick men for such doubtful forms of speech in which we differ among our selves The plain truth is the matter is not so well opened commonly among us as to allow us to condemn others till we have better done our own parts My thoughts are these 1. That we were seminally and virtually really in Adam having the very essence of our Souls derived from him not being in him only as the House is in the head of the Architect but as an essential form is in the generater though we call both esse in causa 2. That we were not personally in Adam though seminally that is we were not natural persons in him when he sinned 3. God supposeth no man to have been what he was not or done what he did not For he erreth not 4. God is not the Author of Sin Therefore he doth not by arbitrary imputing of Adam's act and reputing us to have done what we did not make all men Sinners which Adam could not do 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been seminally in Adam and to have no Essence but what is really derived from his Essence And as when a man is guilty no part of him is innocent neque semen neque sanguis though they have not a distinct guilt but participative qua partes rei so we were Sinners in that act and guilty of that act so far as we were partes Adami and in him 6. This was not to be at that time guilty as distinct persons for we were not such 7. But we that were then only seminally inexistent after became real distinct persons and then that guilt even of Adam's fact adhering still to us became reatus personae because the Subjects of it are personae Even as if Eve had been made after the Fall of Adam's Rib that Rib at first was guilty not by another but the same numerical guilt that Adam was as part of a Sinner For it was a capable Subject of no more But when that same Rib was made a person it would be a guilty person For it lost not the guilt by that change But then it is not only or chiefly our Bodies which are from Adam which are from the elements in our daily food but our Souls And therefore the adherence of the guilt to a rational spirit essentially flowing from anothers essence is more easily understood and defended than that of the corporal Rib could be 8. I do contrary to excellent Jos Placeus suppose that in primo instanti this our participation in Adam's guilt is in order before our qualitative pravity And that God doth therefore deny us his Spirit first to make us originally holy not only because Adam but because we in Adam as aforesaid did forfeit and expel it 9. I think that mens assertion of a Decree or Covenant of God that if Adam fell any more should be imputed to his Off-spring than they were thus really guilty of themselves is the bold addition of mens invention of greater audacity than the addition of Ceremonies to the Worship of God which yet some are more sensible of 10. I think that if Adam had not sinned that same first sin but had sinned another sin the next hour or day or moneth or year or any time before Generation it would have been equally ours as this first was because we were equally in him and no Scripture-Covenant makes a difference 11. I think that whereas Adam's sin had twenty particular sins as parts of the whole we were guilty of all as well as of the first act or part else we should not be guilty of his eating the forbidden â—ruit for doubtless that was not the first His incogitancy and non-Nolition and sinful Volitions were before it Yea I doubt not but we are guilty of all the sin that Adam committed from his first sin till the making of the New-Covenant at least 12. I doubt not but if Adam had never sinned yet supposing the same Covenant to stand if his Sons after him had sinned we should have been guilty of it as we are of his sin yea had it been but our nearest Parents 13. I doubt not but that we are still so guilty of our nearer Parents Sins further than as the introduction of the new pardoning Covenant and the oft pardons by it and the incapacity of nature to bear any more punishment may make a difference This is not a place voluminously to prove all this But if any Arminians be tempted to speak doubtingly of this Original Guilt while they confess Original sinful pravity 1. Blame your own additions to Gods Covenant and your obscure writings of the thing 2. And say not that they deny Original Sin but express the matter as it is It seemeth that Arminius by Peccatores rei constituti sumus meaneth as we do C. I must confess your explication is rational and concilatory But how can you excuse Corvinus B. See but how he defendeth Arminius against Tilenus as holding our Original Sin to be truly Sin and a punishment for Sin and you will think that he denieth it not himself See also what Twisse supposeth him to grant Cont. Corvin p. 253 254. Indeed he doth two much obscure and extenuate the formalem rationem peccati in
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
of common Grace 2. And Reason as specially illuminated and the Will as freed from Sin are special Grace But now you see the injury of your Charge will you search and fear lest even by contending it 's you that have run into worser than the Error which you declaim against as other mens Is it not you that call a great deal of Gods Grace by the name of Nature yea sometimes of Wrath and as I before evinced deny much common Grace to be any Grace at all And who wrongeth God more He that honoureth his Works of Nature with an undue title of Grace or he that utterly dishonoureth his Grace and saith that it is no Grace The third Crimination C. They make Grace to be but a moral Operation or swasion and seem to deny that physical operation which is eminently Grace or at least take it to be but a physical use of moral means And indeed I doubt whether some of them confess any other Grace than the Gospel and other means of Grace And so the Spirit must work only on the Preacher or on the sound of words if he work not immediately and physically on the heart * The untruth of this common Charge appeareth in the following citations Vocatio ista tum externa est tum interna externa per ministerium hominum verbum proponentium Interna per operationem spiritus sancti illuminantis cor afficientis ut attendatur iis quae dicuntur fidesque verbâ— adhibeatur ex utriusque concursu efficacitas vocationis existit I st a distributio non est generis in speciâ—s sed totius in partes hoc est totalis â—ocationis in partiales actiâ—nes c. Armin Disput Privat Thes 42. Sect. 10 11. Remonst Synod art 3. 4. p. 15 c. Si quaeratur ex nobis an Dei convertentis actio tantum moralis sit suadendo proponendo inviâ—ando Respondemus Plusquam moralem esse si excitantem spectemus gratiam dicimus in ipsam voluntatem quoque potentiam supernaturalem insundi distinctam ab illuminatione si vero co-operantem dicimus cam physicam vocari posse realem ac propriam habere efficientiam Note here their plain profession of physical and infused Grace Si quaeratur an praeter mentis illustrationem â—ffectuum excitationem voluntatis invitationem nihil faciat Gratia per modum principii vel antecedenter ad conversionem Respondemus facere Id. ibid. B. Still I fear that you are guilty of striving about words to no profit but subversion of the peoples Charity 1. Moral hath usually three different senses 1. Moral is as much as Reputative As he that concealeth or encourageth a Traytor or Murderer or defendeth not the assaulted is ex lege morum reputed and judged as guilty of the Treason or Murder And thus causa moralis is usually but causa ex lege morum reputata 2. Moral is oft taken for Ethical or that which is ex genere moris either Good or Evil Virtue or Vice which contain all morality 3. Moral is oft opposed to meerly natural forced bruitish c. and meaneth the action of a free Agent as such In which of these senses or what other do you take it C. I mean the first that God doth but operate ut causa moralis per modum proponentis objectum which Dr. Twisse saith is but in genere causae finalis and so is but operatio metaphorica B. It 's pity that Christ's Disciples must be troubled with such uncertain arbitrary notions without necessity But what remedy 1. I know no Law that forbiddeth me to dissent from Dr. Twisse or you in Logick or Physicks I do not believe that objectum qua tale is causa finalis And no wonder For 2. I hold that to be no proper cause which you call commonly causa finalis And instead of advancing each Object to the dignity of a final cause I take down the final cause to the order or rank of the prime Object of Volition or Intention To be optimum is the Ratio objectiva primaria it being most suitable to the Will To be medium ad optimum is the Ratio objectiva secundaria Bonum qua tale non agit in voluntatem sed voluntas in bonum cognitum Though the cognitio boni doth dirigere voluntatem When it is commonly said Ob finem amatum volo medium the preposition deceiveth us as if the causalitas sinis were upon the Will But it meaneth no more but that the Aptitude of the means ad finem is the Ratio bonitatis and so the Ratio objectiva medii I will or choose it because it is apt or conducible to the end or chief object that is That it is Goodness for which I will it Which speaketh no more but Rationem objectivam 3. And all objects of the intellect and will are causes indeed of the act in specie but what causes Receptive and Terminative such as we must call Material so far as an act may be said to have matter of which more anon And if the object be no other than a material or receptive cause constituting the act in specie then the proposer of the object who operateth but in subservience to it can be no other than a preparer and offerer of the matter But how great a hand this receptive cause hath in the mutations and diversities in the world is little considered by the most 2. But I pray you tell me How many and whom do you find that hold that God doth no more but proponere objectum I remember none C. What say they less when they call it Moral suasion when suadere is but proponere objectum B. So then your accusations are your own Inferences and not their words But do they not commonly tell you of an inward suasion by the Spirit and Conscience as well as an outward by the word C. Yes they do so but that inward is but suasion still B. But are you sure that by suasion they mean nothing but proposing the Object to the Intellect and by it the Will C. What else can they mean if they speak congruously B. As far as I can understand them they mostly differ not from the Synodists at all in their meaning much less do the School-men and Lâ—therans who use not the word suasion so much as they For the thing that they mean is 1. That Gods Spirit worketh on the Intellect by objective means though not only propounding that object but also assisting and exciting the mind 2 That by the apprehension of the Intellect the wills object is offered to it And as Camero copiously pleadeth the act of the will is ever excited by the act of the Intellect Or indeed the object is so aptly presented as that the will shall or may either by Natural or Gracious Inclination excite it self supposing Gods assistance But that the will is not moved to any but an Apprehended Good 3. And that God doth this work on the will in
a sweet connatural manner like as an effectual perswader doth not forcing the Will but preserving its liberty and as the Arminians speak not irresistibly or by necessitation leaving the act to be contingent 4. But withal it is most certain that God operateth on the Mind and Will it self and not on the Preacher of the Word only 5. But no mortal man knoweth how nor is able to comprehend his way of operation 11. But next tell me what you mean by Physical which is the other branch of your distinction C. What should I mean but Natural by Real Contact attingency or influx on the Recipient B. 1. God is above Nature and not included in your Physicks How then do you call his operations Physical ex parte agentis No Physicks pretend to treat of God 2. Contact and proper attingency belongeth to Bodies But God is not a Body and therefore the Contact or Influx by which he operateth is utterly unknown to mortal man any farther than that it is by his Essence 3. God is immense and essentially every where and therefore such a Metaphysical Attingency or Contact as may be spoken of him he hath to all things in the world and therefore must do all that he any way doth in such attingency C. Explain it and resolve it your self if you like not my Explication B. Gods operations are called Physical or Moral 1. In regard of God the Agent 2. In regard of the means or second causes 3. Or in respect of the effect I. In respect of God the Agent they are not properly either Physical or Moral but transcendently they are above both for they are his Essence The Papists who are most for meer moral operations in this Controversie yet have such strange opinions about the physical operations of Sacraments e. g. Baptism on Infants as that they make them to be instruments of Miracles the Miracle being first wrought upon them e. g. the water and then on the receiver Yea they seem to make God to operate miraculously with every Sacrament and Will which is the transcendent Head of all operations and causes Physical and Moral II. As to the Means or second Causes those acts of God that have no such means or causes are not here concerned And as for all those that have such means no doubt but they are to be called both Physical and Moral for Morality is but Modality or Relation ex rerum ordine And all Order Mode and Relation is Alicujus entis ordo Modus Relatio And e. g. preaching the Gospel is such an act of a Physical and Moral Agent as is it self both Physical and Moral Man is quaedam natura and yet Intellectual and Free And his act is quid physicum in genere entis and yet quid morale in genere moris imputanda juxta lâ—egem morum III. And as to the Effect it is no doubt both quid physicum for Faith is actus realis and quid morale For it is morale bonum ita reputanda And will any Arminian deny any of this that understandeth words Where then is your difference in this C. But when you dispute about Pre-determination you can say it is not Physical what mean you by it then B. We marvail that men should say that God physically pre-determineth the Will to all acts of sin in the specifying circumstances when as he pre-determineth it not really to them at all either physically or morally So that it is here a Real efficient motion of God to the evil act which we deny C. And it is a Real efficient motion of God to the act of Faith and Repentance which we assert and mean by the word Physical B. And this your Adversaries will not deny and so you are in this agreed The fourth Crimination C. I doubt they hold not Faith to be infused but acquired whereas Arminius professeth Faith and Repentance Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse Exam. Perk. pag. 57. and that both of them are denied to the Reprobates by the Decree of Reprobation See his own words At Deus statuit Dâ—ereto reprobationis reprobis fidem poenitentiam non dare concedo lubens illam assumptionem sed recte intellectam Twisse against Hord p. 70. l. 1. Dr. Twisse sheweth the difference to be so great that an unjustified person may have an Acquired Faith about the same objects when yet only an Infused Faith will justifie B. 1. Tell not me what you Doubt but what you Prove unless you mean no more than to tell me of your injustice and uncharitableness I find the Jesuites and Lutherans commonly asserting an Infused Faith and I have met with few Arminians if any that deny it though the word be not so much in use with them 2. But because you that are the Accuser are supposed to understand what you speak against I pray help me to understand it Quest 1. What mean you by Acquired Faith C. That which we our selves get by our use of means and consideration B. Quest. 2. Is there any man in his wits that denieth Faith to be the effect of consideration Do you not think what and why you must believe and even believe in and by Thinking or Considering Do you believe and not think what or why C. No but it is by Infusion that we have those thoughts B. Infused Faith then is by Infused Thoughts Be it so but then it is not without Thoughts or Consideration But further Quest 3. Is there any Christian that denieth that Faith cometh by hearing and the use of the means which God hath appointed us I pray you hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 169. God in his Covenant of Grace requireth obedience to salvation but of his Free Grace undertakes to regenerate them and work them to obedience But how agreeable to their rational natures that is by admonition instruction exhortation that is to work Faith and Repentance by exhorting and perswading them to repentance All this he performs by his Ministers Do you not believe that the Apostles were sent to open mens eyes and turn them from darkness to light and from the power of Satan unto God Acts 26. 17 18. And that Ministers must The Schoolmen-men and even the Jesuites ordinarily profess the necessity of infused Grace yea many of them in a higher sense than many Protestants dare own Even Molina himself asserteth the supernaturarality of Grace thus Ut consensus liberi arbitrii Deo excitanti vocanti per gratiam praevenientem nihil in re sit qd non supernaturale quod non simul a Deo emaâ—et non solum tanquam ab allicâ—ente excitante invitante ad id arbitrinm sed etiam tanquam a co-operanee per auxilium gratiae And he pronounceth Anathema on them that affirm Consensum arbitrii nostri Deo excitanti vocanti per auxilium Gratiae praevenientis esse actum naturalem aut posse elici sine auxilio co-operatione ejusdem praevenientis Gratiae
And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts and the first motion of the affections before deliberation and choice or liberty as Vasquez also saith which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam Buridane and the rest of the Nominals who call it Complacency as antecedent to Election yea and Intention To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem But converting Grace it self Molina takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it Influit Deuâ— in â—easdem notitias inâ—luxâ— quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat tum ut res melius dilucidius expendatur peâ—etret â—umâ—etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis c. Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites Arminians Lutherans and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour thoughâ—hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired save themselves and those that hear them 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death James 6. ult And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again and which remaineth in us Are you now in doubt of this C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word and another thing to work by the Word The first we confess But if God work by the Word then he must operate first on the Word which is the Preachers act and so by that Word on the soul and not immediately Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear Do you not know that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills and how he maketh use of instruments except secundum quid in some particles revealed 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture which I omit lest I be tedious tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause to God of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls And it 's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but co-ordinate with the first cause and not subordinate to it And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration but also to God as efficient operator 3. God can work two ways by the Word which are within our reach besides others 1. As it is the act of the speaker by exciting and illuminating him 2. As it is the species as they call it received by the senses and imagination which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect 4. And yet I know not any or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the VVord God hath another immediately on the soul exciting it to operate upon the VVord as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties whether the VVord heard be only objectum intellectus or also causa efficiens as light is both to the eye And whether it be operative on the intellect or only terminative with other such like C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith as to the act is Acquired But all Acquired Faith not Infused but infusion is added to our own endeavours like the creation of the humane soul B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion Is it not a Metaphor C. Yes and we mean that immediate perswasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word and by our Cogitations Even a Creation of an act or habit B. Quest. 5. Is it the name Infusion or the thing that you plead for C. The name though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes is yet convenient but that I leave indifferent B. Quest 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own Intellect and Will or Soul and that immediately C. Yes that cannot be denied B. If so then when you say that our act is Infused I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest and you only mean that Gods Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith it self but the vis impressa facultatem before described by which the act is caused And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused but not most immediately C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it C. You know that it is a Controversie among our selves Mr. Pemble saith it is before and the common opinion is that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble ignorantly But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit when as Amesius well saith it is fitter called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam than a Habit of Faith For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit and therefore none should assert it 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians but no Christians as having not yet believed in Christ is not probable according to our
the production of Faith and Holiness So it is the will of God that they shall have answerable noble special effects which effects besides his operation on and by the means the said Volition of God it self produceth immediately operating on the Soul not as a meer volition alone but as conjunct with his Wisdom and Vital Power or Activity by which he operateth all in all I could here say that God doth concur with these supernatural means on his Elect with a stronger greater special energy force or influx But I am loth to deceive you with bare words for this force energy or efflux is either God or something created God operateth by that Wisdom Will and Power or Activity which are his Essence therefore there are here no degrees in any operation And in the effects the degrees are not denied The sum of all is then but this natural effects are natural effects and Faith is Faith the difference we partly perceive the means also are various but in God the operator there is no diversity And so you may see what the stir about Infusing and Acquiring is come to C. I dare not deny this because it is agreed on by all Philosophical Divines and I should be called a Blasphemer if I affirmed any real diversity in God at least besides the Trinity of Persons called by the School-men Real Relations and by some real modes of being But it surpasseth mans understanding to conceive that the same cause no way differing ex parte sui should produce variety of effects By which it seemeth that when there was nothing but God his love to Jacob and his hatred to Esau his decree to save and to damn his will to make the world and to destroy it his fore-knowledge of good and evil had no real difference at all And is it not somewhat of a lye then in us to call those acts different or by different names which really have not the least difference at all But of this before B. God were not God if mans shallow wit could comprehend him All this must be confest unless you will be a Vorstian But if our conceptions be not false our diversity of names here is no lye because we intend but to denominate Gods knowledge and decrees or will but by the relative connotation of the things known and willed And though those things were nothing before the Creation and so the difference between Gods Decrees c. was really none at all and the esse cognitum was nothing but Gods simple Essence Yet as Greg. Armin. hath disputed there be some kind of Relations which are nothing themselves and consequently denominations which may be terminated on nothing as praeteritu futura are But if your understanding rest not here do as I do rest in a necessary and willing ignorance and be but so wise as not to trouble the Church with that which you know not nor imitate them that can shew the valour of their raging zeal by Writing or Preaching against them as the enemies of the Grace of God which dote not as confidently as themselves C. But what say you to Dr. Twisse 's words against Hord l. 1. p. 156. Albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infusa yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Gospel fide acquisita which depends partly on a mans Education and partly on Reasons considering the credibility of the Christian way by light of natural observations above all other ways in the world B. 1. * Pet. a S. Joseph Thes univers de Grat. habit p. 86. Datur aliquod donum Gratiae Divinitus infusum quod post operationem in anima nostra habitualiter permanet Dari gratiam habitualem jam videtur esse de fide post Concil Tridentiâ— antea tamen non erat habitus gratia sanctificantis realiter a charitate distinguitur which others deny Gratia habitualis constituit hominem in statu supernaturali c. The Reader that will peruse Casp Peucer's Hist Carcer pag. 692 693 c. may see that the Luthorans were more for Infusion and miraculous operations of Grace and may see a handsom explication of Conversion and the operation of the Word and Sacraments and pag. 698. De viribus humanis in renascentibus renatis dum fit conversio deinceps ad sinem Credo quod gratuiti beneficii ac meriti Christi salvatoris applicatio naturae mortuae vivifitatio in regeneratione non fit actione physica brâ—ta aut raptu Enthâ—stastico aut Stoica coactione aut Magico affâ—atu verbi Sacramentorum sp sancti Neâ— mutatione Physica aut Mâ—gica hyperphysica substantiâ— temperamenti viriuâ— seu facultatem hâ—minis sentientis quidem nec moventis se nec quiâ—quam agentis sed sustinentis tantum impressionem ut subjectum pations sicut ranâ— reviviscunt a tepore solis c. By this you may see what this excellent man Melanâ—â—hons Son-in-law suffered his ten years cruel imprisonment for by the instigation of Schmidelinus and other Lutherans to their perpetual shame and who was then as the Papists still are most for Physical infusions ex opâ—re operato in Word and Sacraments Not only he but all the School-men distinguish acquired and infused Faith But though the names sound otherwise the difference meant by them is in the effects only and the means and not in God He meaneth that a slight ineffectual belief may be performed by that disposition or moral power which is found before special Grace as excited by good Education and helps But an effectual saving Faith must be the product of a special impress of Gods Spirit on the Soul which is a special disposition and moral power to that act And this is true And no more can be truly meant or said 2. But I will tell you a mystery added oft by Dr. Twisse which may much moderate your judgment about the cause of mens condemnation if it be true He holdeth that no man is condemned for want of an infused Faith C. How why no man is condemned at least that hath the Gospel but for want of it For if it be only an infused Faith that justifieth then it is the want of an infused Faith by which men are unjustified And if as you say Infused and effectual or special Faith be all one sure men are condemned for want of special effectual Faith B. His words are these against Hord l. 1. p. 156. Neither have I ever read or heard it taught by any that men shall be damned for not believing fide infusa which is as much as to say because God hath not regenerated them but either because they refused to believe or else if they have embraced the Gospel for not living answerable thereunto which also is in their power quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills and change their hearts any more than it is to illuminate their minds Yet I
other and giveth real Grace to both But because the intellect is in the natural order the first in acting and the will but second and because the act is commonly and reasonably supposed to go before the Habit though not before all Divine Influx ad actum therefore men are uncertain whether God who first acteth the Intellect do not by its act first operate on the will But this dependeth much on the Physical Controversie whether the Intellect determine the will ad speciem actus or at least really and efficiently move it or rather only present the object to it and so work but in subserviency to the material cause which is constitutive indeed of the act in specie but not efficient and the perception of it goeth to the conditio objectiva without which it is no object to the will This I incline to with Scotus and suppose that the Intellect moveth not the will per modum naturae by necessitation But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own souls how shall we know the unsearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghost The seventh Crimination C. They make Gods Grace a resistible thing which man can frustrate and so God worketh at uncertainties * Mans ignorance of the way of Gods operation on second causes told us by Christ himself Job 3. should end such quarrels and teach us all with judicious Davenant to prosess uncertainty and with judicious Jos Placeus de lib. arb p. 174. speaking of the dependance of the second cause on the first and the Papists digladiations about concurse and predetermination to say Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima Nobis sufficit modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat non posse nimiam statâ—i To which also the very judicious Lt Blank subscribeth Thes 51. de concursu c. The Remonstrants Syn. ar 3 4. p. 15. c. do profess that Gods operation of the Intellect Affection and Will do thus differ that the converting work on the will is more resistible than the other And to the question An conversâ—o contingens sit et in certa an vero necessitate causae aut eventus insallibiliter sequatur in â—o qui convertitur Respondent conversionem esse contingentem quia Libera est nec tameâ— Dâ—o incertam quia praecognita est nec sequi necessitate causae sive consequentis quia resistere poterat homo sed necessitate consequentiae c. Et pag. 17. Declarat Quare dicimus hominis voluntatem ad volendum bonum non necessitari sed hominem posse resistere hoc est non-velle et saepe actu non-velle et resistere gratiâ— sufficientis operationibus B. I have said so much of this before that I need not tire you with much more Quest 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of success if Grace be resistible C. I will not say so I know what you have said to this before B. Why then do you speak that which is not valid in your own judgment Quest. 2. Dare you undertake to justifie all the world against the accusation of having resisted the Grace of God C. No I dispute not on such hard terms B. Quest. 3. Did you never repent your self for resisting Grace C. Yes in some sense but not as I now mean it B. How is that C. To resist the Gospel and Ministry is a resisting of Grace and the Holy Ghost Acts 7. and so I have done But I speak of immediate resisting God B. 1. Remember that here you confess that the Gospel is Grace even to them that resist it 2. God himself cannot be resisted immediately where he worketh not immediately 3. But where he doth so he is said to be resisted 1. Not by any repelling of his strength 2. Much less by opposing a greater strength 3. Nor by acting by any strength but what he giveth 4. Not by causing any difficulty to him 5. Not by frustrating any absolute will of his But 1. Passively by being ill disposed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth and that operation which else might effect it 2. And actively by doing that which rendereth us yet more ill-disposed both naturally and morally by commerit 3. As also in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect When he moveth us to hear read meditate pray love trust c. and we do the contrary this may be called a resistance C. If God intend the effect it will be done but if he intend it not how is he resisted in that which he never intended to do B. You know the Scripture speaketh not at these rates but when men will set their silly wits against Gods Word thus they will seem subtiler than he But it 's but a dream 1. God may be resisted when he intendeth not the effect in that his Law is resisted and with it that necessary measure of Grace by which the effect might have been wrought Though his Decree be not resisted yet his Law and his Grace and help which had a tendency to the effect and a sufficiency on its part may be resisted 2. And he is ordinarily resisted in that which he doth both intend and do For he seldom doth us any good without resistance though he overcome But he that overcometh resistance is resisted C. But I mean by Resisting Overcoming B. Why then did you not speak as you meant None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater strength much less by the derived power of us worms But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook C. Let me hear your explication of it B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able His Wisdome hath diversified Creatures and his Wisdome hath appointed even in the works of Grace a stablished order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect And his Wisdome and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse suitable 1. To the nature of man 2. And to the nature and use of all those means 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished Even as in nature he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their stablished nature and use Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity and Gods suitable concourse e. g. to a healthful body which hath strong appetites and also a congruous proportion of Gracious means and concurse and helps of Grace by which he can rule the foresaid appetite may yet by neglect of that help and by wilful indulging of that appetite make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help and so overcome the Grace of God though he overcome not Gods Omnipotence or Decrees
will in the use of such Power as he hath is a condition sine qua non ut dispositio Gratiae receptiva ordinarily 8. But that God is not tied to this but may extraordinarily do otherwise 9. But that this * Ruiz de praedif tr 3. d. 18. p. 222. Resp dispositiones proximas proâ—ertionatas ad gratiam nâ—â—il ob esse quidditati gratiae quoniam ex prima radice nascuntur ex prima gratia quae absque ulla dispositione quasi creata est a Deo sine materia At pugnabit cum quidditate gratiae quaelibet dispositio etiam remota si ab illa sumit initium gratia ita ut prima gratia detur intuitu talis dispositionis Iâ— not this enough pre-requisite disposition and the concurse of mans will is only the use of a power freely before given of God with all necessary helps to use it 10. And therefore that God is from first to last the first cause of all that 's good in man though not the only cause and that of himself man can do nothing Have I not taken your meaning right B. Yes so far as you have recited it C. But methinks yet you answer not the great question which Camero baffled Tilenus with It is not why Paul believeth Nor why Nero believeth not as singly considered But comparatively why Paul believeth rather than Nero Speak to that B. Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits But if you can forgive the Truth I must add that which they said nothing to which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness might have shortned or better ended their dispute It is the Comparatio personarum that is now the subject of that Controversie why this man rather than that as compared Here then we are to consider 1. The Comparabilitas 2. The Ipsa Comparatio 1. The question as to the first is either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such ratio comparandi in them as might be a reason or motive to God himself quoad actum ex parte agentis why he should decree to give or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be Ratio discriminis ineffectis the reason why one received or had Faith and the other not II. And then quoad actum comparandi the question is whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently and say not only I will cause this man to believe and say I will not cause that man to believe or not say I will But also said I will cause this man to believe rather than that To these several questions then I answer 1. Negatively to the first For Gods acts ex parte agentis are his essence and as he hath no cause but is the cause of all things so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God He willeth because he willeth or rather without cause II. To the second There are in the Creatures different capacities for terminating Godâ— will and action objectively and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variously And so this question must be divided into three 1. Whether always 2. Whether ordinarily 3. Whether sometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another as to the effect of believing or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that To which I answer Ad primum 1. There are nearest Reasons in the immediate aptitude of the receiver Such as is the highest degree of preparing Grace in one which another hath not And there are remote reasons or aptitudes As e. g. A man of great learning wit and zeal or some other remote aptitude will be a fitter person for Gods work than another when he believeth 2. It is not known to any mortal man what different aptitudes in both these kinds God the only heart-searcher seeth which no man can see And therefore this question cannot certainly be answered as to both sorts 3. But as far as our blind eyes can reach it seemeth most probable to us that God doth not always effect Faith according to the degrees of receptive aptitude of either sort Because we see that sometimes he suddenly calleth very great sinners and also some that are silly and little serviceable in the world But yet what special aptitudes God may see in them we know not Ad secundum Qu. I answer That it is Gods ordinary way to give Faith according to the first sort of predisposition alone were there no difference in the last that is To those that have the highest degrees of moral preparation or Common Grace I take to be a certain truth 1. Because in all Gods Works we see that he operateth by degrees in order and on predisposed matter and that efficit juxta dispositionem recipientis 2. But specially because he hath himself appointed a course of means for the obtaining of his special Grace to be used by all men And he cannot be thought to do all this in vain nor to set men on doing their part in vain And all practical Divines who preach so much for the souls preparation are of this mind that such preparation is the ordinary predisposition Ad Qu. 3. I answer That at least sometimes it is so is past question with any sober man For it is a contradiction to call it preparing Grace or Disposition and yet to say that by it no man is made ever the more receptive or nearlier capable of Faith or special Grace So much to the two questions de Comparabilitate * Mark what Bannes himself saith of Common Grace in q. 23. pag. 274. Pie credi potest quod omnibus venientibus ad usum rationis Deus opem aliquam ferat supernaturali quodam auxilio secreto instigante ad operandum bonum 2. Si vera est opinio Thomae c. necesse est dicâ—re quod omnis qui justificatur receperit gratiam praeparantem saltem prius natura quam praeceptum naturale adimpleverit 3. Quotiescunque aliquis pecâ—at speciale peccatum contra supernaturale praeceptum vel fidei vel pâ—nitâ—ntiae c. necesse est ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inspirationem illuminantis Dei dut vocantis aut incitantis ad fidem c. Immo necesse est hominem tangi aliqua supernaturali inspiratione ut nullam â—abtat excusationem Possibile est seâ—undam legem ordinariam quemlibet dum est in hac vita salvari Dâ—us paratus est dare omnibus quamdiu sunt in hâ—c vita auxilium quo fiant potentes converti immo auxilium specialius quo convertaâ—tur si velint I cite this because for his Doctrine of Predetermiâ—ation Protestants much value Banâ—es a boasting Author who thanketh God that their King burneth Protestants Indeed the Dominioâ—â—s commonly confess sufficient Grace which is not effectual III. But as to the third question
Glory as the materia objectiva actus humani where I conclude the Causa finalis as the chief object Thus I have shewed you truly and plainly unde fit fides as that is all one as unde hic effectus and that is all one as unde Gratia fit efficax as to this secondary effect C. But I conceive that the sense of the question rather iâ— which of all these is the chief cause or reason of the existence of the effect B. Pardon my impatience of Confusion The chief cause and the chief reason are not always the same There is no question but God is the only and total Causa prima from whom all the rest have all their power and force But by the Reason of the existence is often meant that which in discourse must be assigned proportionately in answer to the question Why is one converted rather than another supposing Gods Influx on them both And this is oft the Receptive disposition as is said for Reciptur ad modum recipientes C. Well But the question recurreth what is the chief Cause and Reason that one not another hath that preparatory Receptivity B. The chief Cause is God why one hath it The chief Cause why another hath it not is himself that is the Moral deficient cause The Ratio differendi I opened to you before The most notable if we suppose Gods Influx to be of it self universal and equal is the Indisposition of the Sinner whence he doth difference himself from those that God causeth to receive even preparing Grace But the true Ratio effectus is from all the Causes conjunct C. But you must come at last to some prime difference And if you will say that the reason of our Preparatory effect or degree of Grace is because I used a former well or did not refuse it or was prepared for it what will you say of the first degree B. I say that the first preparatory Grace or help was given to Adam and all in him as the first natural goodness was C. But where came in the first difference B. By Cain's wilful Sin against God and his Grace C. But though you do with Augustine hold a communicated guilt of the sins of other Parents than our first and so a difference between persons yea and Kingdoms thence arising yet some Children as Esau and Jacob born of the same Parents must have in them some other cause of difference even as to preparatory Grace B. Suppose Gods fixed equal Influx universal there are two Causes of difference herein 1. One is the meer sinful wilfulness of one party that doth not do what that Grace enabled him to do by which a difference is made C. You mean that Jacob better used his help than Esau B. Not so but that Esau more abused it than Jacob. Suppose Jacob had slept out his youth or done no good and Esau had rebelled against God also and done much mischief Esau had hereby made a difference which is assignable without commending Jacob. C. Well what is the other Cause B. 2. Gods own free differencing Will and Grace who is a free Benefactor and may do with his own as he list and therefore freely loveth Jacob with the electing special love and decree which he hath not to Esau For though I have all this while discoursed with you of the Ratio Efficaciae of an Universal Grace I say not that there is no other C. O Now you come to the matter indeed B. II. The Question Unde fit Gratia efficax * Blank de Dist Grat. Thes 79. Naturam Gratiae efficacis Thomistae ponunt in motione quadam virtuosa quae est in voluntate per modum quo impetus in re quae impellitur Jansenius in â—ffectibus Amoris desiderii boni coelestis spiritualis quibus suaviter sursum rapitur animus humanus Discipâ—li Cameronis in potâ—nâ—â—ssima mentis illuminatione persuasione quae voluntatem â—ffectus secum rapit Alii in omnipotenti efficacissima Dei operatione qua novum principium spiritualis vitae Cordi hominis vocati inditur homo simâ—l excitatur ad actus eliciendos quae hic plerique vâ—i docti proferunt componenda potius quam opponenda videntur Even they that are for Physical praedetermination are not agreed what it is some make it a transient quality passing with the act Some say it is only mans Act it self as from God the first cause Some with Alvarez say It is Aliquid quod habet esse incompletum as colours in the air that is They know not what and yet venture on hot contentions about it And Jansenius who maketh it to be Delectatio or Complacentia saith it is Actus vitalis indeliberatus animo quidem amoris desiderii praecedentis consensum ac delectationem illam quae quies animi gaudium dicitur De Grat. Christi l. 4. c. 11. Much like to Vasquez save that Vasq calls it but an indeliberate prime motion of the affection and Jansenius calls it Indeliberate Delectation or Complacency which certainly is an Act of man and the Scotists say that all the Wills Acts are free though not all its inclinations But thus we strive about that which none of us understand viz. How God moveth his Creatures and our Wills in special being put of Gods special Grace by which he arbitrarily maketh a difference and is more than his Universal Grace must be thus resolved That though other Causes concur to the effect the Great over-ruling differencing and ascertaining Cause is the very quality and aptitude of Gods operation it self as proceeding from an absolute volition of the effect and in the Means and Influx fitted to ascertain the effect C. Wherein consisteth this differencing special Grace B. Deceive not your self No mortal man can know in what it ordinarily constantly or chiefly consisteth We know 1. That though God as Rector per Leges keeps one even and constant course yet as Proprietor and Benefactor he may vary as he please And that a Benefactor may give unequally to men of equal merits And that God really doth so de facto And that his Will hath no Cause 2. We know that God hath innumerable ways to fulfil his Will and make a difference between man and man which are beyond the search of Mortals 3. And though we can name divers which he can take we know not de facto which he doth take hic nunc C. What differencing free acts of Grace do you observe B. None which violate Gods established order or diminish his universal Grace But such as are superadded specially to some As 1. To Children of the same Parents he giveth to divers a temperament of Body as in one much more conduceth to thoughtfulness tenderness meekness sobriety chastity zeal honesty c. than in the other He is a stranger to man that knoweth not this 2. He sometime giveth them various Education One is piously educated Another is snatch'd away and
just but needing a particular remission For if a man cannot fall away however he live he may give up himself to lewd carnality and say I cannot fall away B. This is the same shameless self-contradicting Accusation and needs no other Answer As if you said If a man cannot fall away he may fall away To give up himself to carnality is to fall away And you say that he may do this because he cannot The Doctrine of your Adversaries is That God will certainly keep the godly from turning from him to an ungodly fleshly life And how doth this conduce to ungodliness A. The conceit of safety will make them careless B. Not if they conceive that their safety and their carefulness are equally decreed The bad and ignorant will abuse any thing But I am perswaded that very many live the more holily for this belief 1. Because as Prophecies conduce to their own accomplishment in that what men believe will certainly come to pass they all promote and will not oppose So it is in part in this case 2. And when they believe that God will have it be it greatly animateth their endeavours by hope and taketh off their discouragements 3. And when they find that God hath in his Decree conjoyned their care and labour to the end and hath no more decreed their perseverance than that they shall carefully avoid sin and temptations it maketh them fear that they are not Elect when they find these signs of Election to be doubtful and so preserveth them from presumption and security The third Crimination A. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable in two respects 1. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his present Justification Pardon and Adoption who is not sure that he goeth further yea that he is not quite in another statâ— than any man that ever fell away which it is not possible that many if any one at all should be 2. In that it alloweth no man to be sure of his Justification and Adoption till he have so much Grace as that no Temptation how great soever would turn him from Christ if he were tried by it B. Wherein is the uncomfortableness of these A. I. I have known my self some fall to Socinianism Arrianism yea Infidelity denying Christ or his Godhead which is his chief Essence and the Scriptures and therefore sure had no saving Grace then and died so who had forty years lived in as eminent Piety Humility diligence in all religious Duties charity to others neglect of the World and patient suffering for their Religion oft times as almost any men that ever I knew And that they did not dissemble not only their constancy suffering and whole Conversation shewed but my own intimacy with them assured me by which I knew the very thoughts of their hearts Some of them were not of judgments clear and strong enough to discern the fallacies of Deceivers Others of them were naturally too hasty in judging And some were carried away by the advantages of the constant company of extraordinary able and insinuating Seducers But divers of them even after they apostatized did continue so much strictness of life and charity to all men and religiousness in their Theism and Infidel way and neglect of the World as convinced me that it was more the insufficiency of their judgments than the hypocrisie of their hearts which was the cause of their Apostacy Now by the Calvinists Doctrine none of these men were ever in a state of Grace And of the strictest Professors round about us there is not one of many hundreds that goeth so far as they did And all these must be left uncertain of their Justification till they are certain that they went beyond them all yea and certain that they are unjustified while they are certain that they came short of any one of them B. The case that you describe I have known and it is sad But we know not the hearts of other men There might be more sin and hypocrisie in them than we know of A. Though God only be the searcher of hearts yet long intimacy and near experience may make us so confident of some mens thoughts as that I confess to you you will never change my mind if you plead against so great experience I know their judgments were insufficient But I will never believe that their hearts were false as to what they knew B. God hath made his Word and not other mens hearts the rule for us to judge our selves by A. But if you think that his Word tells us that we are the Children of the Devil till we go beyond any that ever fell away we must look both to that Word and to such Apostates B. The truth is assurance of Justification and Salvation is not easily nor commonly attained And it is not Opinions alone that will procure it And while we have that sin and weakness which is the cause of doubts which Opinion soever we hold we shall find occasion for our doubtings But let us hear your second part of the Accusation A. II. They hold that if any man fall away by what temptation soever it is because he was never sincere And consequently that he is not sinâ—ers that would fall away by the strongest temptation that possibly may assault him So that every poor weak Christian whose Infant-strength is not proportioned to the greatest temptations must needs take himself to be still but an Hypocrite B. We stand not by our own strength of habitual Grace but by the upholding Love and Will of God * Carbo ex Aquin. 1. 2. q. 137. a. 4. Si persevâ—rantia sumatur pro ipso habitu indiget dono habitualis gratiae ut caeterae virtutes infusae si autem accipiatur pro actu perseverantiae durante usque ad mortem non jolum indiget habituali gratia sed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conservante hominem in bono praedestinatis per gratiam Christi non solum datur ut perseverare possint sed ut perseverent ut Augustin Per se potest perseverare in malo non autem in bono Bradwardine who holdeth that no temptation can be overcome without special help that is a divine Volition or Decree doth yet hold that the same Will of God which saveth one man by overcoming his temptations saveth others by keeping temptations from them A. 1. When we dispute against their Doctrine it is from the immortal quality of the seed of God abiding in them that they plead for certainty of perseverance 2. Who findeth not by constant experience that God worketh on all things according to their Natures And so on man as man and so on Saints as Saints and on the weak as weak and on the strong as strong Do we not see that he giveth men wisdom and all Intellectual abilities before they speak and do as such abilities must fit them to do When did you see Gods Grace make ignorant injudicious fools or weak persons judge speak and live in
equality with the wise Do we not see that as man is so is his strength and work operari sequitur esse The strong do as the strong and the weak judge and do as the weak Why else doth God give men strength of Grace sure they that think the habit of Grace must needs be before any act will not hold that all our lives after the Acts from immediate divine production go beyond the degree of the habits We know that God is the chief cause of our perseverance and all our works that are good But he causeth them by disposing and quickening strengthening illuminating and sanctifying our faculties to do them which is habitual Grace B. What is your own judgment in this point A. Our judgment is 1. That he that truly at the present preferreth the pleasing of God and his Salvation before all this World is sincere and justified 2. That of these some have well setled apprehensions and resolutions but others have such shallow Conceptions and weak Resolutions as that a very strong Temptation would change their minds and overcome them 3. But if they escape such Temptation and be not overcome they shall be saved For God will not damn men for possible Sin and Apostacy which they were never guilty of but only for that which they did commit 4. And that it is no certain sign of hypocrisie that they would have fallen away had their Temptations been great but only a proof that they were weak 5. Else to pray Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil should be rather discover not our sincerity or hypocrisie by temptation 6. Therefore God useth to proportion mens trials to their strength And that young and weak Believers may persevere he exposeth them not antecedently to their provocation to great Temptations as he doth the strong Even as while a young Tree hath little rooting it hath also but a little top else had it the top of a great Tree and but the roots of a Plant the first great Wind would overturn it 7. Even strong Christians might possibly have some Temptations which would over-match their strength and turn them from Christ if God should not keep them from such Temptations 8. Therefore there are some Temptations so far above the very nature of man by such Grace as is not a meer Miracle to be overcome as that God doth not suffer Mankind to be tried with them As to be most exquisitely tormented many moneths or a longer time And in that unusual trial of the poor Christians in Japon though many endured those torments many weeks yet nature could not sustain them to the last but when they had suffered as much as many Smithfield burnings to death at last almost all denied Christ so that Christianity is now there extirpated Now if Rogers Bradford Hooper shewed sincerity by suffering death why should we not think that these did so that suffered far more than they though afterward the degree was greater than their strength 9. We hold that Gods Punishments and Mercies to men in this World are very much exercised in either permitting or not permitting great Temptations * The same Bradwardine l. 2. c. 16. holdeth that the cause of the damneds obstinacy in sin is not only themselves and Gods not-willing to cure and save them but also Gods positive Will by which their obstinate wills are for ever continued in the act But I see not why we should assert Gods positive Will of Sin in Hell or Earth when his not-effectual willing to cure it is enough And that for great sin he oft delivereth men up to Satan and giveth him the greater power over them Yea that the nature of sin it self is such as giveth greater advantage to the Tempter As he that will with Achan look on the wedge of Gold or that will please his tast with delicious Drinks and Meats or that will permit his eyes immodest Spectacles hath thereby let in the Devil into his Imagination and will not easily thence cast him out And on the other side he that pleaseth God and conquereth one Temptation obtaineth that Grace by which he is much saved from the next and the Tempter is the more disadvantaged and restrained 10. Lastly We therefore hold That seeing Temptations do not only try our sincerity or hypocrisie else we should desire them for self-examination but also tend to change mens minds and make them worse the way to persevere is to pray against and avoid Temptations and resist those that cannot be avoided This is our judgment In which you see that we hold that all weak Christians that are sincere may have assurance of their present Justification though they are not strong enough to stand the greatest trials And that they may well hope that God will save them from over strong Temptations while they sincerely do his Will B. But Christ saith That he that forsaketh not all that he hath and hateth not his own life cannot be his Disciple And what greater trial can there be than the loss of life it self A. Though some taking it to be hard that none are true Christians that would not be Martyrs were they tried have said that this Text speaketh de necessitate praecepti non medii You must grow up to this at last if you will be my Disciples yet I will not so force the Text but say as you do But 1. There are far stronger Temptations than the love of Life Though not from Interest yet from false reasonings which may deceive the judgment And one that would die for Christ while he believeth in him may possibly have so strong Temptations to unbelief as shall exceed in danger his fear of death 2. And all men that at the present would forsake Life and all for Christ yet have not the same fixedness of Resolution nor the same degree of Faith and Love No doubt but the Martyrs in the same flames had various degrees of Grace Now a less firm and fixed measure may be loosened by degrees or shaken by Seducers and mutable man may after be overcome by that same Temptation which once he could have overcome So that I accuse their Doctrine as utterly inconsistent with true Christian Comfort on both these account And such is the success of those men that will overdo and devise means of their own for extraordinary comforts which God never gave them B. The comfort of poor Christians it seems standeth but on slippery terms in the Opinion of both sides while each Party thinks that there is no true comfort in the others way * Whether we may be morally sure of our present Justification the Papists Doctors agree not among themselves Bellarmine and many others affirm it and others deny it as Aureolus cited by Brianson in 4. q. 4. fol. 36. and others that say no man can know whether his Habits are infused But doth not experience confute you Do you not see that many have true Christian comfort that are not of
have followed thereupon The just Extenuation of this last Controversie IN all these things following the parties are agreed for the most considerable 1. That Adam fell from true Righteousness and Holiness and lost the Spirit 2. That therefore we cannot argue from the Nature of Holiness alone to prove that it cannot be lost 3. That as the word Possible relateth to man's Power to do evil and omit good it is not only Possible to fall away but too easie yea it is not opus potentiae sed Impotentiae except as Natural Power is exercised in the meer Act with Moral Impotency 4. Yea without Gods preserving Grace it is not possible to persevere 5. God hath appointed us much duty to be done that we may not fall away And among the rest to discern and fear the danger of falling away and in that fear to depart from evil and temptations 6. God hath promised us Salvation on Condition that we persevere 7. God oft threatneth the faithful with damnation if they fall away and describeth to us the sin and misery of Apostates 8. The Justified may lose many degrees of true Grace and dye with far less than once they had and so become uncapable of that Greater Glory which they were morally capable of before 9. It 's too possible for them to fall into heinous sin They are not certain that they shall never commit Adultery Incest the Murther of Parents Wife or Children c. nor certain just how oft they may so fall or not 10. Such Sins make them so far morally uncapable of Glory as that See the Brittish Divines Suffrages at Dort of perseverance a sound Repentance for them and from them and a renewal of Faith are necessary to full right or moral capacity 11. God doth not decree any man's perseverance let him live never so securely negligently or vitiously For those that do so are faln already It is a contradiction to persevere in holiness and to live unholily But Gods Decree is ever entire that such a one shall fear danger fly temptations live holily in the use of means and therein persevere unto the end He never separated these in his Decrees 12. Except Hierome truly accuse Jovinian with it there is not that I know of any Father Christian or Heretick that hath written that Lege Vossi Histor Pelag de Perseverant no truly Justifyed persons fall finally away from Grace and perish for above a thousand years after Christ And it 's commonly granted that generally they held the contrary Even Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius not excepted 13. It is confessed to be a sad clog to the contrary opinion that it is held against the Judgment of the Universal Church for above a thousand years and so seemeth to bear the imputation of novelty and singularity Though that be not a sufficient confutation of it 14. It is confessed that the Greek and Roman Church the Lutherans and Arminians and most Anabaptists are against this Doctrine 15. It is confessed that all these Fathers and Churches of old and all these Churches and Christians of late are not void of the Christian comforts of the Gospel even of faith and hope of Glory 16. It is confessed that the Scripture hath many passages so much seeming to favour both the opinions as hath made the controversie thus difficult to so many Learned Godly Men And what the Scripture is it will be to the worlds end 17. It is confessed that none can be sure of Salvation or perseverance who are not first sure of their Sincerity and Justification 18. And to be uncertain whether one be a true believer and justified is more uncomfortable than to be sure of that and uncertain of his perseverance 19. No man can ordinarily be certain that he is Sanctified and Justified that is not certain of the truth of the Gospel and hath Grace somewhat strong and active not clouded by great Soul-wounding Sins nor frightful or melancholy passions nor any that through Ignorance is uncertain of the true Nature of the conditions of the Covenant of Grace 20. Certain experience of the defect of these qualifications and of mens own Consessions assureth us that not one of a multitude of the strict Religious sort have that which we call proper certainty of their Sincerity Justification and Salvation though they hold against the Arminians that certainty of perseverance must be asserted as that which may be attained by them that are first certain that they are in a state of life 21. Yet the fore-mentioned knowledge of Gods Mercy Christ's Love and Covenant with experience and many evidences of great probability may cause even such as are uncertain of their Justification to live in some good measure of true Christian peace though mixed with some doubts and fears Because their Probability is much greater than their cause of fear And much more may they do so that doubt only of their perseverance 22. It must be confessed that the Doctrine that none fall from Justification hath its temptation also to discomfort as in the two or three fore-mentioned particulars which I 'll not repeat 23. It is confessed that if God should condemn those whom he before Justified it would argue no change in Him or his Word but in them alone 24. It is confest that some Justified persons who live in as much sin as will stand with sincerity are at present unfit for assurance of perseverance and salvation For it would not stand with that humbling correction which they are then most fit for 25. Lastly it is confest that this point is no Article of our Creed nor is an agreement in it necessary to Church-communion or Christian Love but difference in it must be accounted tolerable In all this the moderate are commonly agreed On the other side 1. It is commonly granted that all that are elected to salvation shall persevere though how far that election is upon foresight they quarrel Cur ergo id quod Apostolis tunc fecit Christus non concedemus pro omnibus praedestinatis fecisse ut peculiari modo sua merita illis applicaret perseverantiam eis obtineret nam si multi sancti pro aliis orantes conversionem eorum perseverantiam impetrarunt cur dicemus Christum pro omnibus praedestinatis non orasse peculiari suâ oratione tantam gloriam gratiam illis obtinuisse Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 94. c. 3. 2. It 's granted by all that not only such election but fore-knowledge of salvation and perseverance maketh it Logically Impossible quoad consequentiam not to persevere that is It Necessarily followeth God foreknoweth it Therefore it will come to pass 3. It is commonly granted that God forsaketh none till they forsake him 4. And that so great is his Goodness that no willing â—oul that solidly understandeth the Grounds of the Christian faith and hope and is in Love with God and Holiness and willing to use means and avoid temptations hath any
true a translation as Worthy and Worthiness when it is the very same thing that is meant Nay when Merit of Condignity is the highest kind which the Papists themselves mention and are reproved for do you not hereby imply that Condignity is a bigger word than bare Merit Quest 2. And I ask you Whether all the antient Teachers of the Churches since the Apostles whose Writings are come down to us do not familiarly apply these names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Meritum to believers And if you perswade men that all these Teachers and Churches were Papists you will perswade most that believe you to be Papists too But such is the success of over-doing Quest 3. And I would know Whether in common speech Reward and Merit or Desert be not Relatives as Master and Servant Husband and Wife are Is there any Reward which is not Meriti Praemium the Reward of Merit What mean you your self else by the word Reward Lib. I mean Gods free Gift without respect to merit or desert P. Doth not the usage of the World distinguish between a meer Gift and a Reward What if you give money to the next man you meet without respect to any thing in him will you call it a Reward Review all the Scripture Texts that speak of a Reward and see whether they have no relation to any foregoing act in man God gave Christ himself to the lapsed world Was this Gift of Christ a Reward God gave some Prophets some Apostles c. and giveth the Gospel to Infidel Nations Is this Gift a Reward or ever so called Your humane nature is Gods Gift but is it a Reward Nay will you say that the first Grace is a Reward which is said to be Pelagianism Lib. Well but Rewards are Gods second Gifts as they follow the former without respect to Worthiness or Merit P. That cannot be neither If God first Give the world a Saviour and then give them the Covenant of Grace and Pardon through him is this a Reward If Christ first heal the sick man and then cause him to walk or if Peter and John first heal the lame man and then cause him joyfully to leap c. is the second a Reward If an Infidels Life be first preserved and then the Gospel given him is this a Reward Lib. No but a Reward supposeth only our Fitness to receive a free gift which is called our worthiness and not our Merit P. Do you mean our Natural fitness or our Moral A man is Naturally fit for his food when he is hungry Will you say therefore that his food is his Reward for being hungry Lib. Well Let it be then his Moral or rather his Spiritual fitness P. Your explications are but darkning Spiritual is either Natural or Moral as well as corporal The soul as a Spirit is in its nature fit to understand common things here in the body Is this understanding its Reward for being a Spirit But Heaven is a Reward Lib. Well Call it a Moral fitness if you will but what is that to Merit P. It is so much to it as to tell the world that such as you do revile others for holding the same which you are forced to profess your self and wrangle about meer words and know it not For by Merit is meant nothing else but A moral aptitude for Reward or that Rewardableness which consisteth in Moral Good or Evil as freely done and had and so acceptable to God as our Governour But tell me next what word will you choose to serve instead of Merit that we may agree in it Lib. I know not what words to use that please you when we are not agreed about the thing signified I hold not any Reward in proper sense but only free gift and therefore how can I tell you what word to use instead of merit I think the word Reward is used but figuratively P. Christ saith Matth. 6. 4 6. Your Father which seeth in secret shall Reward you openly Col. 3. 24. Ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance Heb. 10. 35. Cast not away your confidence which hath great recompence of reward Heb. 11. 26. He had respect to the recompence of reward v. 6. He that cometh to God must believe that God is and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him Mat. 16. 27. He shall reward every man according to his works I ask you again What is meant here by Rewarding Lib. I tell you again the meaning is that as men shew their liking of a thing that pleaseth them by a proper Reward so God sheweth his liking of our duty by a free gift of some greater good which therefore after the manner of men he calleth a Reward P. If it be a Metaphor I ask you but the Meaning and Reason of the name If it be because it followeth our duty then every gift that followeth our duty is a reward without any further respect to that duty but the order of time but that you denyed before Else Christs Incarnation and the Apostles and the Gospel and all that ever followeth our duty should be a Reward But if you mean that it is called a Reward as it is a sign of Gods approbation of our duty only then if God should tell men that he Approveth of their duty it would be a reward though he immediately annihilate them or should never do them any good which I think you will not say If you say that all three must concurr viz. that it be 1. A Benefit or Gift 2. Following duty 3. Signifying an Approbation of it you come almost up to all that is asserted by them that you quarrell with If God should by some benefit to one man signifie that he approved the duty of another or of a thousand more and should annihilate them all this were no reward to them Therefore when you have talkt all that you can devise to say you must say that there is some Fitness in the duty for that approbation and benefit and that the Relation of the Gift to that Fitness is it that denominateth it a Reward And that though there be no Cause in man of any Acts of God ex parte agentis yet are there Causes in man of our Reception and of the effects ex parte recipientis And so that mans Rewardable duties are his Moral aptitude cause or condition why he rather than one that doth otherwise receiveth that Gift which is called the Reward But we are gone from our question de nomine and have already dispatched also that de re Have you any more to say of any Matter besides words in which you confess we speak as the Scripture doth in which we differ Lib. Seeing you like not my explications tell me fully what you hold your selves and then I shall better know whether we differ in sense or words only P. It 's great pity for the Churches sake but you would have understood that first before you reviled us as Legal
or Nay to these two questions 1. Do you allow of the use of the word Worthy Lib. Yes because it is in Scripture P. 2. Do you deny it to be true in the sense I have opened that is that we have that worthiness which is nothing but a Moral aptitude for that promised Reward which as to the worth of it is but Gods free gift merited for us by Christ and is only a Fathers Reward as to the ordering of it as our Governour even a Reward of grateful Children Lib. No I cannot deny this sense to be sound P. Then you grant both Name and Thing And are not you ashamed then to have so long traduced and reviled such as hold and say but that which you are forced to justifie and to make poor souls believe that works are cryed up and Christ is injured and mens salvation hazarded by it when yet you confess that all is true in word and sense Lib. But when the Papists abuse such phrases to error though the Scripture use them we must do it sparingly and with caution P. 1. But is that a good reason for you to revile those that use them in the Scripture sense 2. And if you will forsake Scripture words as oft as men misuse them it will be in the power of any Hereticks to drive you from all Scripture phrase by abusing all 3. And how can you more effectually promote Popery than by forsaking Scripture language and leaving it to their possession and use Will not men think then that the Scripture sense is liker to be with them than with you Were it not better for you to hold to the Word of God and only detect and disclaim mens ill expositions of it CHAP. III. Whether our own Righteousness be any way necessary and conducible to our Justification before God Or Whether we are any way justified by it and how far Lib. BUt if I grant you that salvation is the Reward of our own faith and holiness I shall never grant you that we are Righteous by it before God or that it is any part of that Righteousness by which we are justified for that is only the Righteousness of Christ P. I hope you are not willing to wrangle about words not understood Quest 1. Do you think that the words Righteous Righteousness and Justification have but one sense in Scriptures and in our common use Lib. No you proved more before P. Quest 2. If the Devil or Men or a mistaking Conscience should say that you or any Saint is an Infidel or hath no faith how must you be justified against that charge Lib. By denying it and by maintaining that I do believe P. Very good Then faith it self as faith doth so far justifie you And Quest 3. If you be charged to be Impenitent and never to have truly Repented how must you be justified against that charge Lib. By denying it and averring that I did Repent P. So then your Repentance it self must so far justifie you And Quest 4. If you are charged to have been an ungodly person to the last or not to have loved God or your neighbour not to have called on God nor confessed Christ before men nor to have fed clothed and visited him as you could in his members or not to have mortified your fleshly lusts but to have lived after the flesh in murder theft whoredom drunkenness c. What is your righteousness against this accusation Lib. I must defend my self against a lye by denying it to be true I must be so far justified that is vindicated against Calumny by my innocency in those points P. Very good so far then you must be justified by your godliness love obedience mortification innocency and works And what if you be charged as an Hypocrite to have done all that you did in meer dissimulation how must you be therein justified Lib. By denying the charge and appeal to God that I was sincere P. So then your sincerity is so far your justifying righteousness And what if you are charged with Apostasie that you fell from Grace must you not be justified by pleading your Perseverance Lib. These are none of the Justification which the Scripture speaketh of which is only against true accusations and not against false ones P. Say you so What if one be truly accused that he hath no part in Christ and that his sin is unpardoned or that he is under the guilt of damnation by the obligation both of the Old Covenant and the New or that he never truly repented or believed or that he is unsanctified and never sincerely obeyed Christ c. Is this man justifiable Lib. No I say not that all men are justifyable But who ever is Justified in Scripture sense is justified only from a true Accusation P. What is that true Accusation Lib. That he is a sinner and deserveth damnation according to the Law and that he hath no righteousness of his own P. Must he not confess all this to be True if it be True And is not confessing the Guilt which he is accused of contrary to justifying him Do you not see here what Confusion you cast your self into for want of noting the various senses of Justification If by Justifying we mean Making an unjust man just then it is true that he is justified from his Guilt that is he is pardoned and he is justified from the Laws condemnation that is a man condemned by the Law is pardoned and he is justified from his reigning sin that is he is sanctified But this Justification is not opposite to Accusation but to Being unjust But if you speak of Justification by Plea or Sentence it is contrary to Accusation of Guilt And so no man is justified that is not Just or Guiltless in the point of which he is accused God will by no means clear the guilty or justifie the unjust Exod. 34. 7 8. nor say of the wicked Thou art Righteous Prov. 24. 24. 1 Pet. 1. 17. 2. 23. Jer. 11. 20. Rom. 1. 32. 2. 2. But that you are quite mistaken in saying that Scripture never mentioneth Justifying man from a false accusation these and many such Texts shew Rom. 8. 33. Isa 50. 8. Prov. 17. 15. 1 Kings 8. 32. James 2. 21 24 25. Rom. 2. 13. Luke 7. 29. Matth. 11. 19. 12. 37. Isa 43. 9. 26. Luke 10. 29. 16. 15. Deut. 25. 1. Exod. 23. 7 c. And how widely differ you from most Protestant Divines who say that Justification is a Judicial Sentence of God as Judge Though indeed it is of divers sorts Lib. But it is not Scripture Justification unless it be perfect And all that we do is Imperfect To justifie him in some one thing is not Justification by faith but another thing P. 1. No doubt but Scripture mentioneth both particular Justification as to some particular causes and a more large Justification from all things that would damn him in Hell And this latter is the Great Justification by
that we are commanded not only Thankfully to Accept but Thankfully to obey our Lord Redeemer and Saviour Lib. No. P. Quest 3. Date you deny that life or death eternal dependeth on this as a Condition or Moral means and that we shall be judged according to it Lib. No. I deny it not P. Quest 4. Is it not a Law that thus commandeth us and by which we must be judged Lib. Yes If it were no Law there were no duty and sin in belief and unbelief P. Quest 5. Is not a man so far just and justifyable by that Law as he keepeth it and justifyable against the charge of being one that must be Damned by producing the Condition of pardon and life performed Lib. Yes I deny it not P. Quest 6. And doth not the same Law virtually justifie the performer now whom it will justifie as the Rule of Judgement at last Lib. Yes no doubt P. Quest 7. And is not the Name of Righteousness many score times given in Scripture to our own actions done by Grace and measured by the New Covenant Lib. Yes I cannot deny it P. Why then while you deny neither Name nor Thing what wrangle you about And let me plainly tell you that such men as you by indiscreet ever-doing are not the least of Satans instruments to bring the Gospel under scandal and harden the world in Infidelity and the scorn of Christ while you would so describe the Christian Religion as if this were the very heart and summ of it Believe that all the Elect have fulfilled perfectly all Gods Law by another and that Christ did it as personating each of them and therefore no crime of their own is imputable to them nor any kind or degree of Goodness or Righteousness in and of themselves is at least required of God as any means or condition of their present or future justification by their Judge or as having any hand therein As if God were become indifferent what we all are so that Christ be but Righteous for us when as it was Christs grand design to restore lapsed man to God which he doth not only by Relative benefits but by Renewing them to his Image in love and holy obedience Lib. Have you not lately and oft been told that holiness and obedience are necessary now but it is to other Ends than to justifie us as for Cratitude c. P. 1. We easily grant it is for other Ends than Christs Merits were and not to justifie us as they do nor in that Causality They are not to purchase for us a free gift of pardon and life nor the Holy Ghost c. as Christ did 2. But again tell me Hath not Christ a Law that commandeth our obedience to those ends as Gratitude which you mention And is not the keeping that Law a thing that the same Law will so far justifie us for Yea a Condition that life dependeth on And if the Cause in Judgement be Have you kept it or not must you not in that be accordingly Justified or Condemned Give over cavilling against plain necessary truth Lib. By this you will fall in with the Papists who take Justification to be partly by Christs Righteousness and partly by our own and partly in pardon and partly in faith and holiness P. Tell not me of the Names of Papists or any to frighten me from plain Scripture truth 1. Why may not I rather say Why go you from all the antient Writers and Churches even Augustine himself by your new and contrary opinion Was true Justification unknown for so many hundred years after the Apostles 2. The most zealous Antipapists do confess that some Texts of Scripture do so take the word Justification And multitudes of Texts so take the words Righteous and Righteousness And he that will impartially consider them may find that more Texts than are by us so confessed do by Justifying mean Making us Just and so Accounting us on all these causes conjunct 1. As being Redeemed by Christs Merits 2. And freely pardoned 3. And having Right to life 4. And renewed to Gods love and Image 5. And so justifyable at the Bar of Grace by the Law of faith and liberty 3. And the reality of all the Matter of this Doctrine is past doubt if the Controversie de nomine Justificationis were not so decided CHAP. IV. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ Lib. III. YOu bring in your doctrine of personal Righteousness to Justification by feigning Christ to have made a new Law whereas the Gospel is but a Doctrine History and Promise and not a Law and so no Rule of Righteousness and Judgement And this many Protestants have asserted P. I have read some such sayings in some men And some I think meant no more but that Christ did only expound and not add to the Law of Nature called by them the Moral Law And these I have excused for their unhappy kind of expression But for the rest that mean as the words sound universally they subvert Christianity and as the Arrians denyed Christs Godhead so do they his Office and Government and are somewhat worse than the Quakers who say that the Spirit within us is the Law and Rule of Christ which is better than none I pray answer me Quest 1. Is Christ the King and Ruler of the Church Lib. Yes P. Quest 2. Is not Legislation the first and principal part of Government Lib. Yes P. Quest 3. Do not they then that deny Christs Legislation deny his Government Lib. Yes P. Quest 4. Is it not essential to Christ as Christ the name signifying Relatively his Office to be King Lib. Yes P. Quest 5. Do they not then by this deny Christ to be Christ Lib. No for they confess that he hath a Law but not that he made any since his birth P. We grant 1. That the Law of Nature now is His Law 2. And that the first Edition of the Law of Grace to Adam after the fall was his Law 3. And Moses Law was partly his But you will not say that we are under this last nor I hope that he hath no other than the two first Lib. Why what other can you prove P. It is the Name or the Thing that you deny for you use to confound the cases 1. Whether the name be fit judge by these Texts Gal. 6. 2. Bear ye one anothers burdens and so fulfil the Law of Christ James 1. 25. The perfect Law of Liberty Rom. 8. 2. The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus c. Rom. 3. 27. Boasting is excluded By what Law Of Works Nay but by the Law of faith Mic. 4. 2. For the Law shall go out of Zion c. So Isa 2. 3. 8. 16 20. 42. 41. The Isles shall wait for his Law 1 Cor. 9. 21. We are under the Law to Christ Heb. 8. 10 16. I will put my Laws into their minds and hearts James 4. 12. There is one Law-giver c. Isa 33.
imputed to us for righteousness If it be only the object and not faith why is it so often called faith believing being perswaded c. Will you say that It is not faith as an act of ours only Whoever dreamt it was For à quatenus ad omne If as an act then every act even plowing and walking and sinning would justifie us Will you say that It is not Faith as a Moral Virtue or Good act only Who saith it is For then every moral good act would justifie men Do you say that It is not by faith as faith in genere It is granted you For else à quatenus ad omne any act of faith would justifie even believing that there is a Hell Will you say that it is not any other species of faith besides our baptismal faith We grant it you But if you will also say that It is not this species even the Christian faith neither that is meant but only the object of it then 1. Why say you that it is Faith as connoting the object contradicting your self for if be not faith at all it is not faith as connoting that which is not doth not connote 2. And why say you that it is not faith it self essentially Is not the object essential as an object to the act in specie Is it not essential to our Christian faith to be a Believing in Christ 3. But what sober unprejudiced Christian that readeth the Text throughout and hath not been instructed to pervert it can choose but see that it is Faith it self that the Apostle speaketh of and that it is our personal Relation of Righteousness that it is said to be imputed for And who can believe that this is the sense Abrahams faith was imputed to him for Christs Righteousness or this either His faith that is Christs Righteousness and not his faith was imputed to him for Christs Righteousness Undoubtedly by faith is meant faith and by Righteousness is meant our own Relation But it is most easie to discern that the plain sense is Christ being presupposed the Meriter of our Justification and Salvation which he hath given the world conditionally by a Law of Grace or Covenant Donation by which now he ruleth and judgeth us all that this Covenant Gift or Law requireth on our part to make us Righteous and entitle us to the Spirit and everlasting life is that as Pâ—nitent Believers we accept Christ and life according to the nature ends and uses of the gift and this also by his grace Reader hold close to this plain Doctrine which most of the lower sort of Christians know who have not faln into perverters hands and youâ— will have more solid and practical and peaceable truth about this point than either Dr. Thomas Tullie or Maccovius or Mr. Crandâ—â— or Dr. Crispe or the Marrow of Modern Divinity * Written by an honest Barber Mr. Fisher as is said and applauded by divers Independent Divines or Paul Hobson or Mr. Saltmarsh or any such Writers do teach you in their learned Net-work Treatises by which being Wise or Orthodox overmuch being themselves entangled and confounded by incongruous notions of mans invention they are liker to entangle and confound you than to shew you the best method and grounds for the peace of an understanding dying man Christs Righteousness is Imputed or Reckoned to be as it is the total sole Meritorious Cause of all that Grace and Glory given us in and by the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace and of our Grace for performance of the Conditions and it needeth nothing at all of ours to make it perfect to this use nor hath our faith any such supplemental Office But this condition of our part in Christ and of our Right to his Covenant-gifts must be performed and the sentence of Absolution or Condemnation life or death must be passed on us accordingly it being not Christ but we by this very Law that are to be Judged Justified or Condemned And this is the Condemnation that light is come into the World and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil But to as many as Received him he gave Right to become the Sons of God even to them that believe in his name And there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus who walk not after the Flesh but after the Spirit For being perfected he is become the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him And it is not they that cry Lord Lord that shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven but he that doth the will of our heavenly Father For Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is and of that to come CHAP. X. Whether Gods justifying those to day that were yesterday unjustified signifie any change in God P. IX OF this also I have said so much in my Apologie to Dr. Kendall and in the two first parts of this Book before that I shall now put you off with this short notice 1. There is nothing changed or new in God That which on his part is in God the Cause of our Justification is his eternal simple essence 2. But Gods Essence Understanding or Will considered simply in it self is not to be called Mans Justification But the effect produced by it And partly the extrinsick object as terminating Gods act and so by extrinsick denomination or connotation Gods Essential Intellect and Will is said de novo to justifie But it is only man that is really changed 3. The New effect in man from which God is said de novo to justifie him is 1. A new Right or Relation to Christ pardon and life and to the Father and the Holy Ghost 2. A new objective termination of Gods estimation acceptance and complacency And 3. A new heart hereupon at the same instant given us I think none of this is from eternity And that as God did de novo make the world and judge it existent and love and order it as existent without any change in him as also millions of creatures proceed from his simple Unity so is it here And this needeth no more words with knowing or teachable men And to others there is no end CHAP. XI Whether a Justified man should be afraid of becoming unjustified Lâ—b THis fear of losing our justification which you teach men is most injurious to Gods free grace and immutability and a rack for Conscience to destroy mens peace P. I have said so much of this before about Perseverance and Assurance as forbiddeth me tedious repetitions Here needeth no more but this explication of the matter which you confound 1. Fear is either Causeful or Causeless 2. Fear is either such as hindereth comfort or such as helpeth it 3. Fear is either a Duty or an unavoidable natural passion or a sin of unavoidable infirmity or a more deadly or heinous sin 4. It 's one thing to cause and cherish Fear and another thing to teach men that cannot avoid
into on the pretence of avoiding and abhorring Popery Between S. A Sectary and P. A Peacemaker P. NEighbour I understand that you are one of those that divulge your desamatory Lamentations of me as inclining to Popery for some passages which I lately Preached in the City I pray you speak that to my face which you so freely speak behind my back S. Sir the City ringeth of you as one that greatly wrongeth the cause of God And my own ears heard you say that the difference between us and the Papists is little more than in ambiguous words and points unsearchable P. And this I hear you are one that have divulged and so it is by such as you that the City is made to ring of it But if this be an untruth of great aggravation do you then deserve the title you assume or are you a fit defender of the truth or can your Conscience tolerate you herein That which I said was this I distinguished the Controversies between us and the Papists into such as depend on a Carnal Interest and Mind and such as do not but arise from the meer difficulty of the subject In the former sort I said our difference is very great and like to be so and such are the differences about their Papal power and Church state their Government and worship as fitted hereunto and many doctrines as that of Purgatory Indulgences Auricular Confession abused by them Transubstantiation c. But the other sort of doctrinals are made by many the matter of greater difference than there is cause such as I named Predestination Providence the cause of sin mans power and fre-will Grace certainty of salvation and I might have added Justification and Merit as held by their Church and most of the Schoolmen not that here is no difference indeed but that long study hath made me certain that it is more in words than is commonly conceived And this Truth is fit to be spoken though the mistaken be offended by it Yea in these matters the Papists differ among themselves as much as with us Dare you deny that these were my words If you do you are a falsifier S. When you speak so clowdily who can remember every word you say P. Is not this plain English Peruse it and consider And dare you carry false reports abroad on pretence of pious zeal and then say You cannot remember Why would you report that which you cannot remember Why would you not stay till you had helpt your memory by speaking with me or some one that could have informed you But are not we in a hard case with such hearers as you when we must look to be as oft belyed as your understanding or your memory faileth because your loose Conscience faileth with them which is very oft S. I am not alone in judging thus of you City and Countrey ring of it what company can one come into where you are not talkt of I daily hear good people lament you and the best they say is that God useth to let those men fall fouly in some things who have been extraordinarily serviceable that men may not idolize them P. They that know me but half as well as I know my self will know that I have enough to abase me before God and man But will that warrant a course of lying and backbiting in others Do you partly receive and partly make and propagate false reports and then plead the Commonness for your excuse He that set London on fire might so have excused himself because the flame was common when he had caused it The effect and prospering of your sin should humble you and not seem to justifie you But yet I must tell you that Backbiting Sectaries are not the greater part of London There are many sober people that are ashamed of your sin and folly I will make this friendly motion to you Instead of backbiting Let us here to one anothers faces so friendly admonish each other of that which we take to be sin as may help to bring each other to repentance And do you begin Tell me of all the evil that you know by me S. I have nothing to accuse you of but that your Principles are too large and you vent them too freely and thereby you harden Papists and dishonour the Protestant cause and wrong free grace and the Righteousness of Christ by your doctrine of Justification and mans Righteousness And by coming so near Conformity you grieve the hearts of good people and may bring persecution on those that cannot do as you can P. 1. About Conformity forbear me here for I must deal with you of that by it self elsewhere 2. As to my doctrine of Justification if I have not fully justified it elsewhere I shall not now on this occasion 3. But whether you or I be righter about Popery let us now debate Have you read my Safe Relig. and my Key for Catholicks and my Treatise of the Certainty of Christianity without Popery and my late Dialogue and my Treat against Johnson of the Visibility of the Church and others against Popery S. I have somewhat else to do than read all your Writings P. Why have you not then somewhat else to do than hear me and backbite me and judge of things which you have not leisure to understand Do we not still deal on hard terms with such men as you that neither speaking nor writing can make them know our minds Have all your party that revile me done more each one against Popery than I have done But if this be all that you have to call me to repentance for I have a great deal more to say against my self And now I will deal faithfully with you I beseech you try whether it be not necessary that you speedily repent of all these following sins 1. What a shame is it for one that would be taken for a Religious man to be so Ignorant as you are and no better know the truth of Christ from the errors of Popery than it appeareth you do 2. What a sin for one so Ignorant to be so rash and bold in venturing to judge of that which he understandeth not 3. What a sin is it for one so Ignorant to be so proud of his pretended knowledge as to venture to defame his Teachers for contradicting him in his erâ—oneous conceits Have you studied these things as long and hard as I have done or are you sure that you have done it more in partially and that God hath illuminated you so much more as your confidence would import 4. What an unchristian crime is it to make lyes and carry them abroad of your Teachers and then be forced to confess that it was the failing of your memory as to what you heard 5. What a sin is it to be a backbiter Neither you nor any one of your quality did ever come to my face either to know my meaning or to hear what I had to say nor to reprove my sin or convince
to sin entertained we must go as far from sin as we can But poor deceived souls run into it under the conceit of going far enough from it and sometimes into greater than they avoid S. What sin have such Protestants run into in their opposition to Popery P. I will tell you some I. In Doctrine and II. In the consequentâ— and practice I. It is more than one injudicious Protestant Divine that hath printed such unfound Opinions as these in opposition to Popery for want of judgement 1. While they plead against the Romish false Tradition they have weakned faith by denying that necessary use of Historical Tradition of Scripture which Christianity doth suppose As others have denyed the necessary use of Reason unto faith 2. They have wronged the Church by undervaluing the Tradition of the Creed and the Essentials of Christianity by many means besides the Scriptures 3. They have much wronged the Protestant Cause by denying the perpetual Visibility of the Church and almost given it away as I have shewed against Johnson 4. And their dâ—nyal of its Universality and confining it long to the Waldenses and such others is an exceeding injury to the Church and Truth 5. And so is some mens over-doing as for the Scripture who teach men that they can be no surer of Christianity as delivered many years in Baptism before any of the New Testament was written than they are that there is no one error in all the Bible by the carelesness of the Scribes and Printers nor any humane frailty in the phrase 6. And also their feigning the Scripture perfection to consist in its being a particular determiner of all those circumstances of which it is only a general rule 7. And those that make every form of prayer or Ceremony to be Antichristian 8. And those that make Justifying faith to be a certainty or full perswasion that we are elected and pardoned and shall be saved 9. And those that say that To believe that I am justified is to believe Gods Word or â—ides divina either as most say because one of the premises is in Scripture or as excellent Chamier saith because the Witness of the Spirit is Gods Word 10. And those that say All that have true faith are sure they have such as Keckerman and too many others 11. Those that deny Christ to have made any Law 12. And those also that assert Imputation of Christs Righteousness in that sense which I have proved to subvert the Gospel 13. And those that deny Faith it self to be Imputed for righteousness 14. And those that deny that there is any personal Evangelical Righteousness in our selves that is any way necessary to our Justification 15. And those that lay all the stress of Faiths Justifying us on the notion of Instrumental efficiency 16. And those that say we are Justified by no act of faith but its receiving Christs Righteousness and all other acts of faith are the Worâ—s by which none is justified 17. And those that say that Evangelical obedience is not meritorious as it signifieth only Rewardable in point of Paternal Evangelical Governing Justice and as all the antient Fathers used that word because we merit not by Commutation 18. And those that say that man hath no free-will at all of any sort to spiritual good 19. And those that say that Christ was in Gods reputation the greatest sinner or wicked man Adulterer Murderer hater of God in all the world 20. And those that say that he suffered in soul Pain altogether of the same kind with those that the damned suffer in Hâ—â— 21. And those that in opposition to the Popish Government Confession Austerities and several acts of Worship do run into the conâ—rary extream against due Government Confession Austerities c. And those that from dark uncertainty or à minus notiâ— do gather many conclusions against known truth I pass by such as the Antinomians who as I have proved subveâ—t the Gospel it self by running into the contrary extream from Popeâ—â—â— S. You are as â—ad as Parker or the Debate-maker that thâ—s lâ—y sâ—â—ndal on the Reformers themselves If these were their faults you â—â—â—â— cover them and not open them This had been enough for â— Romish Râ—bshakeh P. You know not what it is that you say This is to aâ—hoâ—â—â—â—â—â—tance and to preferr the honour of man before the honour of God yea to let the shame be cast on Gods Word and Religion lest the erroâ— of â—â—â—â— be shamed But all men are lyars that is fallible and God is â—â—â—â— He that confesseth and forsaketh his sin shall have mercy but he that hideth it shall not prosper Are there not with you even with you also saith the Prophet sins against the Lord our God Why hath God recorded in Scripture the faults of so many of his servants and fomeâ— them to such open Confessions Did Paul wrong Peter and â—â—â—â— Gal. â— or the Ministry when he said All seek their own thingâ— and noâ—e the things of Jesus Christ or did the Evangelists wrong all â—he Disciples by saying that They all forsook him and fled or James all Câ—â—stians saying In many things we offend â—ll I think the Prouâ— Impeâ—itence of many Professors that will not confess sin nor endure to be â—â—led to it lest Religion be dishonoured is that great dishonour to Religion which God hath been long punishing us for When such evils have â—â—â—â— held and done as our age hath known either it must be said that they are not evil or that they are If we deny it and say they are God â—â—â—â— and mâ—ns duty we feign God and Scripture and Religion to be for all that evil which is to blaspheme If we say It is evil we must saâ—â— that we are the guilty causes of it God will teach Ministers and Professors instead of Pharisaical self-self-justification to take open shame to themselves that he and Religion may be vindicated before he will deliver us from shame and sorrow And he that will save his honour against this shame shall lose it and he that will thus lose it and cast it away shall most effectually recover it S. I think you would fain perswade us that Protestants are as bad as Papists and perswade us into the Roman Tents P. That is but your pievish inference But little do you know how much of Popery it self you have while you think that you hate it more than I. S. You would make me believe any thing if you make me think that I have more of Popery than you P. 1. Do not you agree with them in consining the Catholick Church to one Sect or Party only They to their Sect and You to yours 2. Do you not agree with them in your vehement condemnation of dissenters only they excommunicate and burn them and you deny them your communion and reproach them But their charity extendeth much further than yours and you condemn more dissenters than they do 3. Do you not agree with them in
side and rejecting hating forsaking on the other side And electing implyeth that some are not elect 458. About the object of that which many call Reprobation be sure to distinguish between a true object of any Act circa quod versatur and which is subjectum inhaesionis and a meer object of speech or subjectum praedicationis Else you will with many be ensnared to think that every subject or object of a predication which in the series of Gods judgements you meet with is the object of some positive act of God 459. And though we would quarrel with no man about meer words yet lest words deceive you I add that as the word Reprobation seemeth to signifie a positive Act and yet a great part of the desertion of the Reprobates is by Gods preteritions and not-acting and privations therefore it is not the whole series that the word Reprobation aptly expresseth but only some particular Acts. 460. The word Predestinate used Rom. 8. 29 30. and Ephes 1. 5. The presumption of the Schoolmen in defining the Act of predestination is tremendous See Ruiz de provid disp 3. sect 9. ad 11. who concludeth that Predestination is an Act of Gods Intellect and a Practical act and is Actus affirmans Dâ—i volitionem libere decernâ—ntâ—m de finibus rerum mediis c. q. d. Volo Petrum beatificare per talia media c. It is not this will but the knowledge of it 1 Cor. 2. 5. it 's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 though not spoken of persons Act. 4. 28. translated fore-determined when applyed to persons is ever taken in Scripture as an act of mercy And the ancients Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius use the words Praedestinati Praesoiti the predestinate and the fore-known as of late men use among us the words Elect and Reprobate 461. Though men differ as their opinions lead them in the exposition of such texts as * * * Vid. Bezam in Rom. 8. 28. de proposito Rom. 8. 28 29 30. Ephes 1. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11. and some take them to speak of predestinating Individuals and others only of species that is of believers sufferers Lovers of God c. yet as to the matter it self none that is judicious can or doth deny but that God eternally Predestinateth Individuals The Jesuits commonly confess it though they differ on the question how far it is on fore-sight of faith But that foreseen Believers individually are eternally elected to salvation thev cannot deny And the Learnedst Jesuits maintain that God giveth faith in time and electeth Individuals to faith it self from eternity That is eternally decreed to give them faith or to give them that Grace by which he fore-knew that in the advantagious circumstances in which he decreed to put them they would freely and he deereed should infallibly believe 462. The conceit and supposition of many that Election and Reprobation are such perfect contraries as that they run pari passu and that God willeth in the one just as he doth in the other End and means for matter and order is a gross mistake Augustine Prosper Eulgentius and Davenant of late with many more have shewed that God predestinateth Leg. Dauen Dissert de Praed Reprobat copiose haeâ— probantâ—m Et Zumel Disput 5. §. 5. p. 335. â—â—â—â— objecâ—o elect pag. 367 c. men to Faith and perseverance and to Glory and not only to Glory upon the foresight of faith and perseverance But that he pâ—edestinateth or decreeth men to damnation only on the foresight of final impenitence and infidelity but not to Impenitence or Infidelity it self 463. The Grand difficulty that occasioneth all our Controversies herein is How to discern that God is the Author of all our Good and yet not the Author of Sin nor of Damnation saving for sin And both parties are very desirous to hold and see that both these are true Nay both believe them But they differ only in the way and method of manifesting it 464. There are three opinions about Reprobation 1. One is that â—od Positively decreed from eternity to glorifie his Justice in the damnation of the most and to that end to occasion and permit their hardning and unbelief so that Reprobation is Positive both as to the Act and Object 2. The other is the opinion of the Synod of Dort as expressed defended at large by Davenant and many others that Reprobation is Gods Positive Decree not to give saith and and repentance to the same men and to damn them for impenitence and infidelity and so is Positive quoad Actum but Negative quoad Objectum as to the first part not giving faith 3. The third is the Opinion of subtile Scotus and his followers that in primo instanti Reprobation is Negative quoad Actum Objectum So Albertine before cited that is It is no Act of God at all but only a Non-election or preterition which is I suppose the meaning of Dr. Sterne of Dublin Coâ—ledge who hath written a Latin Tractate maintaining that God Reprobateth none that is by any Act. 465. The method laid down by Scotus is this Offertur Voluntati sâ—â— hunc peccaturum vel peccare Primo voluntas ejus circa hunc non habet Scot. 1. d. 47. Vid. Signa Mayronis in fine Against Scotus his foundation that God knoweth future contingents only ut Volita saith Alliacâ—in 1. q. 11. N. Sed ista propositio non est intelligibilâ—s 1. Quia talia instantia prioritatem posterioritatem esse in Deo noâ— est verum 2. Quia impossibile est quod pro aliquo instanti talis complexio de futuro sit neutra Alias pro tune daretur medium in contradiâ—â—ione 3. Quia ponâ—â— aliquid esse medium rationem cogâ—oscendi in Divino intellâ—â—lu Velle Velle â—nim ipsum habere peccatum non potest 2. Potest intelligere Voluntatem suam non volentem hoc tunc potest velle Voluntâ—tem suam non velle hoc ita dicâ—â—ur Volens sinere vâ—luntarie permittere sicut ex alia parte praesentato sibi Juda primo Deuâ— habet non Velle sibi Gloriam non primo Nolle potest tunâ— secundo reflectere super istam negationem actus Velle eam ita Vâ—lens sive voluntarie non eligit Judam finaliter peccaturum non nolitioneâ— gloriae sed non-volitionem gloriae 466. It is notable that both Dr. Twisse and Bishop Davenant do disclaim this opinion of Scotus without offering us any one argument against it which is so unusual a course with one of them as would perswade one to think that they had not much to say against it but what they intimate the harsh sound of the words that God should be here a non-agent 467. The truth seemeth to me that as Davenant saith Scotus was the first artifex of this ordering of various Acts in the mind of God So here he saith too much and is
too bold and feigneth a subsequent Volition of a former non-volition without cause or proof meerly to scape the censure which yet he now incurreth of making God too little active 468. So far was Scotus from being the first Author of this Opinion of a Negatio volendi peccatum in God that their common Master Lombard Lombard 1. d. 47. most expresly asserteth it and that more plainly and soundly than these over-subtile men Upon which his Commentators copiously dispute An in Deo pâ—ssit esse purâ— omissio absque volitione nolitione positiva of which besides the Scotists and Nominals you may see Aquin. 16. a. 2. Durand 1. â— 47. q. 1. Ruiz de Volunt disp 8. sect 3. concl 2. Albertin To. 1. princip 4. q. 4. dub 2. Vasquez 2. p. 1. disp 79. num 17 c. Suarez Metaph. disp 30. sect 9. n. 59. Fonsec Metap li. 7. c. 8. q. 5. sect 3. Aluiz Tract 2. disp 6. sect 3. Montepil 1. p. disp 33. a. 8. c. 1. 3. Durandus distinguisheth of contra praeter Voluntatem and saith that Voluntas etiam beneplaciti antecedens quae est solum quaedam Velleitas may be such as many things are praeter contra eam But Voluntas beneplaciti consequens is such as nothing is contra eam but sin is praeter eam etiam mala fieri Neque enim vult fieri nec vult non fieri I like not what he addeth Idem forte diceret aliquis de quibusdam bonis quae fiunt merè à libero arbitrio sed non de omnibus viz. quae fiunt à praedestinatis c. 469. And it is to be noted that Durandus with other Schoolmen argue that if sin were willed by God God would be the Author of it Gods Volition say they being efficient And Estius a yet plainer Schoolman than Durand saith Quicquid sit Deo Volente fit Deo authore who also citing Aquinas's consent saith Omnimode tenenda est in hac parte doctrina magistri mala nec esse nec fieri Deo Volente And against the vain distinction of Aquin. 1. q. 19. ar 9. ad 1. 3. Deus non vult malum sed vult malum fieri sen eventre he saith that Velle mala velle mala esse seu fieri idem est Voluntas enim adrem simpliciter est ad rem ut sit Qui vult virtutem vult virtutem esse Qui vult peccatum vult peccatum esse neque aliud sit velle mala velle mala esse aut fieri 1. d. 47. sect 7. pag. 228. It seemeth there were some then of Dr. Twisses and Rutherfords opinion 470. And that you may see Estius mind further in this and also see all the Objections now used answered I will here annex though out of place his answer to them Obj. 1. Sin is not committed Deo nolente ergo Deo volente fit Resp Neque nolente neque volente Deo fiunt sed permittente 471. Obj. 2. Mala esse aut fieri bonum est 1. Ad perfectionem universi Aquin. 1. q. 1â— art 9. ad 3. answereth in the same manner 2. Ad decorem c. Ita August Enchir. 10. 11. c. 96. Bonum est ut sint mala Resp Neg. Major Et 1. Mala sunt Universi non ornatus perfectiones sed id deformant c. 2. August non dliud vult quam Bonum esse mala permitti 472. Obj. 3. They cannot be unless God will them to be August Enchir. 95. Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipoâ—ens fieri velit Resp The reason assumeth a falshood And Augustine is interpreted as speaking only of the Permission as willed and not the Event 473. Obj. 4. Omne verum est à Deo esse fieri malâ—â— verum est Vid. Aquin. 1. d. 47. q. 2. ad 1. Ergo. Resp Non Hugonis sed sophistarum est Nam verum qua verum est à Deo De rebus malis sunt conceptus mentis veri Indeed malum qua objectum scientiae non est malum 474. Obj. 5. Aug. Enchir. 100. Peccatum non fit praeter Dei voluntatem quod fit contra Resp Loquitur de permissionis voluntate non ipsius mali Albertinus words To. 1. Princip 4. q. 4. dub 2. pag. 297. I cited before for a Negation of Will 475. Suarez distinguisheth of Gods Will Voluntarily determining to go Metap disp 130. sect 9. num 59. no further and a will suspended without such a determination And the first he denyeth not but the latter he denyeth in God as imperfection But upon reasons so weak likening God to man that I think them not worth the reciting 476. No mortal man can prove that God must needs have actual Volitions of Nothings as such And consequently that he hath any such And Yet let the Reader note that though I hold that no man can prove a Positive Volition or Nolition of Nothings ordinarily at least and so would shorten the Controversie yet my Conciliation doth not at all rest on this but will proceed sufficiently if you say that God Positively willeth his Not-willing and his Permissions that his perfection excludeth them not 477. Yet I grant that he willeth the Truth of humane Negative Propositions For those are something though about Nothing 478. That such Decrees or Volitions de nihilo are not necessary appeareth in that 1. Either they are necessary in All instances de nihilo or only in some Not in All Ergo not qua tales For if only in some it must be from some singular accidental reasons A quatenus ad omne valet consequentia That they are not necessary in all is granted in that no man that I know of ever asserted it And to assert it is great presumption For then there must be infinite Negative-Positive Decrees As e. g. that there shall not be innumerable more Worlds more Suns more Atoms that this and that and every particular atome or sand shall not be a Sun a Star an Earth a Man a Dog a Fish c. And infinite Decrees about every Stone as many about every pile of grass and as many about every creature what they shall not be And infinite Decrees about infinite or innumerable Possibles that they shall not be existents that they shall not be thus or thus named c. Who can prove or dare affirm that all these Infinite Nothings have Positive acts of Decretive Nolition from Eternity in God 479. 2. We must not feign unnecessary Acts in God But such Positive Nolitions of Nothings seem unnecessary For Nothing will be nothing without a Nolition as well as with it What need God Nill the Being of Petavius Vol. 1. li. 9. Theol. dogmat de praedest cap. 16. pag. 656. thus describeth the old opinion of our Countrey-man Johan Erigena Scotus Docuit uâ—icam tantummodo pradestinationem esse in Deo qua electos ad aeternam foelicitatâ—m destinat nullam outem ad aeternam esse
an Infinite effect But the world is not Infinite § 4. As to the second question it is either de nomine or de re If the former let every man speak as he list for me rather than I will contend with him whether Creation of faith be a fit name As to the matter 1. It is agreed on that faith is not a substance 2. Nor an Accident con-created with a substance 3. Nor a composition of substances into one done by secondary Creation Generation or Art 4. But that it is the right ordered Act of a substance whose natural power which performeth it was pre-existent though without that act and the moral disposition Therefore it being a Modus entis or modus modi that we talk of the common name is Alteration and suscitation actuating and ordering But if men sober sometime call it a New Creation as indeed the whole frame of holiness together is called the New Creature in the Scriptures and sometimes the Divine nature sometimes Regeneration sometimes a Divine Artifice Alteration Conversion Sanctification c. it is the same thing that is meant by all their several names § 5. As to the third Question Whether it be a Miracle * * * Justificationem non esse proprie Miraculum Vid. Malder ib. p. 578. Et Brâ—anson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 2. fol. 144. confessing it above the power of a Creature to justifie us but not properly a miracle p 1. As a Miracle signifieth a wonder a thing is wonderful either for the Rarity or for the Great appearance of Gods power in it In the first respect faith is not so Rare as to be a miracle In the second the Sun and Heavens are a greater wonder than faith 2. But as a Miracle signifieth that which is done by second Causes but unknown to us and out of Gods ordinary way of working so it is no miracle 3. And as some men call that a Miracle which exceedeth the power of the second causes so all things would be Miracles that God doth For they are effects of his power as exceeding the power of second causes 4. As a Miracle is that which is done by God without any second causes †††Many good people would never be so much against the acknowledgement of second Causes if they understood the matter But they ignorantly think it derogateth from God the first cause so some think that the propagation of souls is a miracle But of souls and faith it is much unknown to us how far God useth second causes But that Generation as to one and Preaching and all other means to the other are some sort of second causes * * * We have no reason to think that God useth no second cause in working faith It is much to be noted which Pet. de Alllaco saith in 4. q. 1. E. Plus facit Deut faciendo aliquem effectum mediante causa secunda quam si faceret euâ—dem effectum se solo Quia in prima factione sunt plures termini divina actionis quam in secunda For as he said before Quandocunque Deus facit aliquem effectum mediante causa sceunda ipse non solum facit illum effectum sed etlam facit causam secundam esse causam illius effecti Marâ— this well is sure 5. And lastly if by a Miracle be meant that effect which God produceth both above the power of second causes and by a more glorious exertion of his own power than in his Course of Nature and Government he useth by and with second causes so it is not a Miracle because in the way of his ordinate co-operation with his Gospel he ordinarily produceth it § 6. So that as all Christians must confess that we had never believed if God had not wrought it in us by that spirit of Wisdom and Love which is Omnipotent so to contend any further whether it be a Miracle and a proper Creation or an effect of Omnipotency as such c. are such questions as presumptuous Schoolmen heretofore and hot-headed Sectaries in our times have used to afflict the Church of Christ with and to tempt their ignorant zealous followers into such employments as most effectually destroy their charity and injure others and scandalize the world SECT XV. Of the sufficiency and efficacy of Grace § 1. I Have said so much of this before as that lest I be tedious by repetition I must be but brief * * * Malderus against the Synod of Dort and 1. 2. q. 111. art 3. dub 8. bestirs himself with special industry to tell what Gratia efficax is And he concludeth that it is afflatus gratiae praevenientis sub genere gratiae excitantis quae non respuitur cum respui possit rather praeparans voluntatem quam adjuvans rejecting Valentia who placeth it in the Habit of Grace caused by excitation and à Lorca who takes it to be adjuvant and those that make it co-operant and those that place it in praedetermination physical of which he confuteth four opinions p. 502. and saith Probabilior sententia est quae negat omnimodam gratiae infallibilitatem adeóque efficaciam sumi posse ex sola reali aliqua differentia considerata ex parte gratiae praevenientis And that Just and unjust have effectual grace and therefore it differeth not from sufficient really And he resolveth all per scientiam mediam that Grace is effectual because ex proposito convertendi Deus it a hominem trabit sicut aptum novit ut sequatur certissime secuâ—urum and so that Grace iâ— effectual er natura sua and not so called only ex eventu I. By sufficient Grace is meant that which is necessary to the effect and without which it Cannot be but with it it may be though it sometimes be not § 2. That there is such a sufficient Grace not alwayes effectual to mans act is before proved by Adams Case And that no man hath such now for any means or duty in order to his recovery as Adam had to stand when he fell is not to be asserted or received And that no prepared soul hath such sufficient Grace to believe that yet believeth not is a thing that is past our reach to know § 3. This sufficient Grace consisteth in a Power to the act when the Indisposition of the natural power is so far altered or repressed as that by the means and helps vouchsafed by God the act is Morally possible to be done For he that truly can do it all things considered is well said to have such necessary grace § 4. But God of his bounty usually giveth men more than such a meer moral possibility by many additional helps and urgencies to the act which I mentioned before § 5. But by sufficient is not meant As much as is useful yea or needful to the Ascertaining of the Event much less to the meliority of the act § 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect And
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.