one kind * Dato quod voluntas sit causa actionis liberae addam si placet totalis in suo genere ergone Deus ejusdem actionis non est causa in suo genere Mr. Hickman in Br. Refut Tilcâ—i ad â—inem yet man is the cause of the same action in another kind God preserves his Creatures in their nature and properties he moves them also and applies them to act or work agreeably to their nature He affords them his concourse and so concurs with them and so immediatly influenceth the action of the Creature with his action that one and the same action is said to proceed from the first and second cause iâ—asmuch as unum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one production or work derives its existence from them both in which work if there be any thing inordinate it is from the action not as it is the Creaâ—ors but as it is the Creatures Thus the Belgick professors Ibid. Thes 13. Paganus If God as the first Cause and Author of Nature to conserve that order and manner of working instituted in second causes at their first Creation doth afford his general concourse * Deus enim â—t Author naturae tenetur se voluntati creaâ—â— paratum praebere ad concurrendum ad opposita ut ipsa uti possit sua naturali libertate Hence they say Actus pravus quatenâ—â— Ens est 〈◊〉 Deo non ut induâ—enâ—e ad illuâ— sed ut non subtrahente suum necessarium concursum volâ—ntati quae dum ad illum se determinat abutitur sua libertate influxu divino in actu primo ad opposita sibi â—blato Et id 〈◊〉 magis proprie dicitur Dâ—us congerâ— voluntati in talem actum causando quaâ— voluntas dicatur coagere Deo Vid. Greg. in 2. d. 34. 37. q 1. ar 3 ad 8. ad opposita that his Creature may have power and liberty to do good or evil and suffer the will of man to determine its self freely to the evil act and then fore-seeing it so determined upon supposition of his concourse doth yield his simultaneous influence to the production of that evil act then it is possible to conceive how a man may avoid sin notwithstanding that Divine influx for in this case man doth abuse his own liberty and the Divine concurse offer'd to him ad opposita and so doth freely determine himself unto the sin when he might do otherwise and God should co-operate with the created will as the Author of nature according to the exigence thereof rather than the will co-operate with God as its first determiner Diotrephes That opinion doth cast fetters * R. B. P. ubi supra p. 27. Hoc unum asserimus hunc concursum quicunque tandem is est male statim subordinatum aut posteriorem influxâ—â— voluntatis in actum suum quia cum Deus non â—sset causa pâ—ima omnium entium sed secunda deinde quia voluntas in primo motus sui initio non dependeret a Deo sed contra Deus a primo initio mortuuâ—â— voluntatis Râ—sp A. Wallaei ad Censur Coâ—vini pag. 103. upon the Divine Liberty and Providence for if mans will doth freely determine itself before the Divine Determination then it would follow that the power and providence of God can dispose nothing till the assent of the created will be expected and first had with which it may concur as a partial cause to produce the effect and so God should not be the first but the second cause of this act and the will should not so much depend upon him as he depend upon the first motion of the will Paganus If God preserves to his rational Creature its natural propriety and manner of working I suppose he doth ordinarily allow it the liberte of a self-determination And I understand not how this should be any derogation to Gods Power or Providence for the Creature still acts not only under the general concourse of his Providence but also under the special egressions of it and God can and doth as it seemeth good to him put in an immediate and extraordinary finger of power to over-rule and order the actions of it the Creature therefore is not exempted from the conduct of his Providence by this means as you pretend Diotrephes We look upon all created beings as so many emanations from the first cause upon which they depend in Ibid. page 2â— esse operari in their being and working as the Rayes depend upon the Sun neither is the intellectual Creature in the actions of free-will exempted from this order * Synops Pur. Tâ—col ubi supra Thes 10. for it is necessary that every Creature and every action of it and every mode and perfection of every action of it be reduced unto God as unto the first most perfect and therefore most effectual cause We conclude therefore That * Mr. Bagshaw Pract. Dâ—sc pag. 3. Our wills are tyed up so close to the will of God that like lesser wâ—eâ—ls they move only as that great mover doth guide them Paganus Methinks this Doctrine should be very apt to tempt men to believe that God doth very much promote and assist them in their most prodigiously sinful courses Diotrephes The Acts of Gods Omnipotency are carefully to be distinguished from his Legislative Acts by these last God alwayes forbids sin but by those former he secretly incites * Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitâ—t seduct traâ—it jubâ—t indurat deceptiones immittit quae pâ—ccâ—ta gravia sunt efficit Mart. in Judic 3. 9. men unto it either by moving their wills tongues and members unto sin or else by not moving them to the contrary virtue but withdrawing his grace and necessary assistance whence it comes to pass that they cannot but sin Paganus This makes God the Author of the sinful act and consequently the cause of all sin in the world Diotrephes Though it sounds ill to weak and tender ears yet Mr. Calvin * Instit lib. 1. Cap. 18. Sect. 3. mihi p. 128. hath openly avouched it Satis apertè ostendi saith he Deum vocari corâ—m omnium Authorem quae iâ—ti câ—nsores volunt otioso tantùm ejus permissu contingere I have cleaâ—ly shâ—wed that God is called the Author of all those sins which these censurers would have come to pass only by his idle permission But that we may clear God of all imputation We are taught to distinguish when we speak of sin betwixt the act and the malice Dr. Twiss ubi supra page 73. or betwixt the act which is sinful called by some the materialty and the sinfulness thereof which is called the formality God is the cause of the former but only the permitter of the latter Paganus This permission then by which you endeavour to free God from the imputation of being the Authour and Cause of sin must not be an action by which God makes us to operate but only
the good pleasure of God and not upon consideration either of works or faith And he adds As touching Reprobation that it is no more of evil works than Election is of good works forasmuch as before they were born they were equally uncapable of the one as well as of the other and the doing of evil is expresly excluded as well as the doing of good whence it followeth manifestly that Gods ordaining men unto damnation proceeds as much of the meer pleasure of God and with as little consideration of sin as Gods ordaining men unto salvation proceeds of the meer pleasure of God and without consideration of any righteousness in man Dr. Twiss ubi supra page 38. Paganus To design men to destruction or torments though but temporal without fault for ones meer pleasure is such a severity as we usually brand with the title of Tyranny when we find it in any man though he were the greatest Emperour in the world and truly I dare not entertain such thoughts of God Diotrephes We must distinguish in this Decree the Act of God decreeing and the things decreed by him saith the same great Doctor * Ubi supra pag. 41. The things decreed by Reprobation are 1. The denial of grace by grace I mean faith and repentance whereby that infidelity and hardness of heart which is natural to all is cured 2. The denial of glory together with the inflicting of damnation As touching the first of these look what is the cause of Reprobation as touching the Act of God reprobating that and that alone is the cause of the denial of grace to wit the meer pleasure of God But as touching the denial of glory and inflicting damnation God doth not proceed according to the meer pleasure of his will but according to a Law which is this Whosoever believeth not shall be damned And albeit God made that Law according to the meer pleasure of his will yet no wise man will say that God denies glory and inflicts damnation on men according to the meer pleasure of his will the case being clear that God denies the one and inflicts the other meerly for their sins who are thus dealt withall And to this Doctors opinion agrees not only the Confession of the Congregational Churches but that also of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster who chap. 3. n. 7. do declare concerning the Reprobates whom they style the rest of Mankind That God was pleased according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will whereby he extendeth or with-holdeth mercy as he pleaseth for the glory his Soveraign power over his Creatures to pass by and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin to the praise of his glorious justice Paganus Truly Sir as far as I am able to understand by the process of your Discourse the whole matter of Reprobation as well touching the things decreed as touching the Act of God decreeing is finally resolved into Gods meer pleasure to shew his Soveraign power for you say he makes a Law to bind men to repent and believe under pain of damnation and this Law he makes for his meer pleasure you affirm also that he decrees to deny sufficient and necessary grace to enable men to repent and believe and this of his meer pleasure too and from hence it doth undeniably follow that he doth ordain sin and the introduction of it as the means of damnation and that of his meer pleasure too Diotrephes That he who intends an end doth also intend the means the very light of nature suggesteth unto us saith Dr. Twiss * Ibid. pag. 73. but I confess there is a little difference amongst Divines in this Article Piscator * In Axiom de praedest c. cap. 5. saith roundly Reprobi prius ad poenam destinati sunt tanquam ad sinem deinde etiam ad peccaâ—a tanquam ad media that is the Reprobates are first destinated unto punishment as the end afterwards to sin as the means But Dr. Twiss saith We know God hath given us means of grace as for means of damnation we know none Sins can neither be called mans means nor Gods means saith he not mans means Ibid. pag. 56. or intended * Though he does not intend this directly yet indirectly and interpretatively he may and so a man is said to love death Prov. 8. 36. ch 15 32. Vid Thom. 12â— q. 79. a. 2. ad 2m Ibid. pag. 73. by him as Means forasmuch as the intention of Means ariseth from the intention of the End but no man or devil intends to bring upon himself damnation as the end whereunto he intends to sin Not Gods means forasmuch as means are intended but by him who is the Author of them which God saith he cannot be This acute Doctor therefore doth determine the Point thus The end that God aims at is his own glory for he made all things for himself And if he means to manifest his glory on any in the way of vindicative justice it stands him upon both to create them and permit them to sin and finally to persevere therein and to damn them for their sins Here saith he we have the end and the means intended by God Paganus Gods end you see is the Glory of his vindictive justice His means is to create man to permit him to sin and persevere in it c. I pray Sir let me understand what you mean by Gods Permissive Decree I should think it doth not import an absolute decree in the Will of God concerning the thing permitted but only a Negative Act whereby God is understood neither to will the being of that thing nor to nill it * Non deo vâ—lente vel nolent sed non vâ—lente â—iunâ— mala Magister 1. D. 46. F. And consonantly when God decrees to permit sin he decrees not to hinder it but to leave it in mans power that sin may come to pass or not come to pass whether it doth eventually come to passe or not Diotrephes You take the word permission in a sense too restrictive and limited For Man being created after Gods image in a state of integrâ—ty endued with free-wil and a sufficient ability to abstain from sin If God had permitted sin in that sense only that you speak of for all such a Decree it was possible * Implicat contradictionem ut aliquis effectus sequeretur infallibiliter ex causa defectibili impedibili per concursum aliarum causarum hoc est ex antecedâ—nte quae aliter atque aliter potest se habere Alvar. de Auxil cap. 7. Ames ubi infra for Man not to have sinned and then God had lost his end the Manifestation of his Vindicative Justice It stands neither with the wisdom nor the power of God to make Decrees whose success is doubtful and event uncertain * Deus enim successiva decreta incerti eventus condere non potest quia ut potentissimus est
either that God would rescinde his own Decree for their production in me or that he would separate the sinfulness from the entity of them which is impossible Diotrephes But I told you though God doth produce the act and predetermine the will intrinsecally unto it yet he doth but permit the malice or sinfulness of it Paganus You may as well say he doth but permit the burning of the flax who doth actually throw it into the fire and the Adulterer assuming the act of his uncleanness upon himself might with as much shew of Reason protest that he was but the permitter of the obliquity of it Some of your greatest Schoolmen do affirm Potest fieri oppositum ejus quod permissum est quod tamen fit secundum permissionem quia permissio respicit potentiam Thom. in 1. d. 47. q. 1. ar 2. causae ad utrumque oppositorum se habentem unde neutrum oppositorum contra permissionem est sed utrumque secundum eam That the divine permission doth not tye a man up to one of the opposites that is to evil but leaves his will at liberty to make choice of either that is of the evil act or the good one opposed to it This is impossible for him to do under the arrest of such an absolute Decree and intrinsecal predetermination and simultaneous concourse as your permission importeth Again what God permits doubtless it is in his power to hinder but admit the real entity of an act intrinsically evil freely elicited the power of God cannot hinder it but a moral praviâ—y will attend it because it implies a contradiction that an act intrinsecally evil as of blasphemy and the hating of good should be freely elicited and not be depraved with the adhesion of a moral vitiosiâ—y He therefore that is thus the Author of the material act he cannot be the permitter he must be the Author also of the sinfulness that is inseparably annexed to it Diotrephes It seems you will not distinguish Gods permission from his operation and efficiency nor allow him to be Author of any act but he must be charged with those imperfections also which it contracts through the deficienâ—y of the second Cause Paganus You are very much mistaken for I think Gods permission ought by all means to be distinguished from his efficiency but you do most shamefully confound them And I do acknowledge thâ—â—â—ome acts are of that nature that the act it self may be from God and the viâ—iosiâ—y from the Creature as in the act of Prayâ—r and Almes-giving God may stir up a man to pray or give an Almes and yet he may perform it with a mixture of vain-glory Matth. 6. 2. But in acts that are intrinsecally evil in themselves filthy and uncleâ—â— the vitiosity in those cannot be really distinguisht from the act 〈◊〉 the act so long as the Law that makes it sin stands in force be separated from the vitiosity unless it be by a meer mental abstraction as Adultery Blasphemy hating of God In these he that is Author of the act must needs be Author also of the vitiosity He that is Author of the inequality of the Leggs or of the motion in such as are lame is Author likewise of the halting He that is Author of the Antecedent is Author of that which doth necâ—ssarily follow from that Antecedent whether it be positive or privative He that is Author of the Sun is Author also of the Light He that is Author of the interposition of the Moon betwixt the Sun and the Earth is also Author of the Suns Eâ—lipse and the darkness that follows it Quod est causa causae est causa causati for that Rule holds here He that is the Cause of the Cause is Cause also of the effâ—ct or that which is caused But give me leave to put one question to you when God commands Thou shalt not commit Adultery Is this the sense of that precept Take heed lest while you produce the free act of Adultery any moral pravity or sinfulness should attend it Or is this the meaning of it Abâ—ain altogether from the free act of Adultery because the malice or pravity that deforms it is inseparable Is it the very act of Adultery Murder Blasphemy hating of God that is forbidden by the Law of God or only some defect or inordination superadded to it and distinct from it If some defect or inordination only you may do well to discover it that the Adulterer being taught to distinguish may take the pleasure of the act and yet keep himself innocent from the transgression but if the act it self be forbidden by the Law and as such an act then the Author of the act is Author of what the Law forbids which is the sin Where it is impossible to divide them in the commission as in Adultery Blasphemy hating of God why should you distinguish them in the imputation You say the first cause so concurs with the second that they produce but one and the same action that the first is the principal immediate and predeterming cause If then the sinfulness of the action produced betwixt them be as inseparable from it as heat from fire and that action be avoidable to the first but unavoidable to the second nay if the first cause ordains that action and as it is sinful too for otherwise it will not serve his turn to glorifie his vindicative justice and impells the second cause to commit it I pray consider impartially to whose account this action ought rather in equity to be imputed Diotrephes But the second cause is not compel'd but consents freely to the sinful action and takes pleasure in the commission of it Paganus Indeed though you say the will of man is Gods Amesius ubâ— supra 〈◊〉 6. p. 24 Instrument yet you add that it is not a pure and meer instrument but a free one But wherein do you place this liberty not in a free determination to produce or not produce the entity of the act wherein certainly true liberty * Causa libera potest agere non agere quiâ—quid quantum quando lubet Burgersdicii Inst Logic. Lib. 1. cap. 17. De causa efficiente Theorem 12. consisteth but in the consecution which is necessary too of that mâ—ral pravity about which the free power is conversant only by accident and through the intermediation of the entity of the act if God therefore doth premove and predetermine the will to the sinful act hic nunc and produce it in him the man cannot be made culpable by cooperating to this unavoidable production with freedom and pleasure because this is the property and manner of working which God was pleased to concreate and preserve in him Besides where there is an extrinsecal impulsion he that is insuperably acted by it is equally blameless * Quaecunque ista causa est voluntat is si non ei potest resisti sine peccato ei ceditur si autem potest
non ei caedatur non pâ—ccabitur An forte fallit incautum Ergo cavâ—at ne fallatur An tanta fallacia est ut caveri omnino non possit Si ita est nulla peccata sunt Quis enim peccat in â—o quod nullo modo caveri potest Peccatur autem Caveri igitur potest Aug. lib. 3. de lib. Arbit cap. 18. whether that impulsion be through flattering insinuations or open violence if they be equally irresistible So that this Doctrine leaves a very fair plea to excuse wâ—ckedness and inables the Malefactor when he is upbraided with the enormity of his crimes to return the exprobâ—tion upon the inavoidable predetermination and impulse of this Maker for it is not in his power to make his own wayes either good or evil He cannot perform one evil act unless God doth first apply and predetermine his will unto it and whereas there are so many several sorts of sinners in the World this difference comes to pass not more by Gods restraining of some to less than by his predeterming of others unto more wickedness Insomuch as to my apprehension you make God to have as great a hand in the production of sin as of vertue * Et vos quidem necessitatem physicae praedetermination is urgere soletis tum ex dependentia tùm ex naturali indifferentia voluntatis liberae quo posito sequitur eandem determinationem necessariam esse tam ad eliciendam actum moraliter atque intrinsecè malum quam bonum coque actum malum aequè ac bonum in Deum refundi ut primam ejus causam quam â—nâ—m voluntati naturalis sit indifferentia â—oque tam ei insit ad actus malos quam ad bonos in utriusque tum mali tum boni actus productione Deo subordinata sit ut causae primae Necesse est eam tam ad mali quam ad boni actus productionem a Deo praederminari c. Si vero ista quam vos uâ—get is praedeterminatio voluntati non debetur ex dependentia subordinatione ejus ad Deum ut causam primam Ergo nec Deus quoties eam efficit in voluntate ad actum peccatâ— toties circa eam non peragit munus causae primae sâ—d potius insidiatoris aâ— seductoris ut qui citra omnem necessitatem conditionem humanae voluntatis non modo generali influxu sed speciali quadam cura auxilto scilicet praedeterminante concurrat ad hoc ut eam ad malum actum inducat deteriorem reddat Dissert Theol. inter Amesium Grevinch 383 384. pag. seq Qâ—um Deus non praedeterminet voluntatem hominis ad actum malum ex necessitate sed ex libertate dic quamobrem ad istum poâ—ius actum ex se malum quam ad alium determinet nisi ex mera voluntate affectu complacentia in hoc actu potius quam in alio At qui malo actu delectatur ex delectatione ejus influxum suum bominisque voluntatem determinat ad actum talem is quoque illius actus causa moralis est mortaliter agit malum Vid. quae sequuntur and this is the opinion of Mr. Baxter who saith If no free Agent can act without the predetermination of God as the first immediate physical cause I cannot see why all our acts good or bad are not equally by infusion Mr. Baxter of saving faith page 29 30. Diotrephes We distinguish of things such as are naturally good God effects by a single influence * Dr. Twiss ubâ— supra p. 91 92. what is spiritually good by a double influence one general unto the substance of the act another special as touching the manner of performing it saith Dr. Twiss Or as the same Author hath it elsewhere * As Mr. Hickcites him p. 97. of his Justif of the Fathers Every good work nâ—eds a twofold help one of general influence as it is a work another of special grace as good but an evil work requires only the concourse of general influence as it is a work but that it be evil no more is required than the denial of special grace In every good work God doth not only influence the will to work but also to work well but in our evil works he doth influence the will only to work and not to work ill Paganus 1. I desire you to consider that the moral goodness of our works doth not follow the entity of them as they proceed from God but only as they proceed from the will of man working freely * Sic enim voâ— libertatem arbitrii cum decreto Dei efficaci conjungere soletis Voluit ergo decrevit actum blasphemiae libere produci -Ergo malitiam ejus voluit quippe cujus malitia sormaliter consistat in co quod tali modo nempe libere cum rationis judicio producatur Dissert Theol. inter Ames Grevincho pag. 390. according to the Rule prescribed him Hence it is that the same act for substance as it flows from a man distracted wants that moral goodness that it hath when it is produced by a sober man though God affords the like concourse and influence unto the entity of them both If therefore God be the cause of our good act because he makes us conversant with perfect knowledge about a lawful object in like manner he must be accounted the cause of our evil act because according to your Doctrine he doth predetermine us with the like advertency of Reason to be conversant about the unlawful object Object 2. I pray resolve me touching the acts of Adultery Blasph my hating of God are they therefore sinful because they want some perfection which they ought to have and will they cease to be sinful when they have all the perfection which they ought to have as Mr. Hickman * Ibid. pag. 84. disputes it Is it only Gods special influence into the manner of performing them that is wanting in them Is there any modification that can possibly hallow them Will the help of special grace separate the moral pravity from the real entity in these acts Then I wonder not so much that Mr. Baxter makes Adultery in David c. so exceedingly different from the like fact in a graceless man * Prof. to his Grot. Relig. Sect. 18. In good earnest if you know any qualifications sufficient to refine and make such acts innocent it would be much for your advantage I am perswaded to set up School and teach men how they may be Adulierers Blasphemers haters of God and yet not sinners Some of your Casuists * Amesius de conscient l. 5. c. 10. q. 1. do resolve that Social causes do communicate in the fault and guilt of those sins to whose production they contribute their common assistance Now shall he that assists or commands or perswades me to commit Adultery or Murder be faulty and he that predetermines my will to it and
that insuperably he that produceth the act and that immediatly shall he be blameless What is this but to condemn an accessary and acquit the principal Diotrephes But there is a great difference betwixt Gods concourse unto our good and evil works to good works he concurs not only efficiently Ex parte Potentiae predetermining the very faculty to the work but also morally Ex parte Objecti in that he doth counsel command perswade and aâ—â—ure us unto the lawful object In sinful acts he does only the first and not the latter so that of our sinful actions he is the physical cause only not the moral but of our good he is as well the moral as the physical Paganus You should consider that moral motion doth not give God the honour of a true and proper cause but only of a Metaphorical for the influence it hath into the Agent is not ipsum agere the very act it self and consequently the effect doth not follow that motion If therefore God should move us no otherwise than after such a manner your Partizans do conclude that while we work God should not discriminate us but we should discriminate our selves from such as work not therefore though God concurs unto the good act by a physical predetermination and morally too but unto the evil act by a physical predetermination only yet there remains the same manner of working in respect of good and evil in that which is chiefly considerable and by it self alone attributes the true and proper nature of a cause to God and assigns him the first and perfect original of that determination that this act should rather be than not be But 2. What is this moral motion and from whence and what doth it work upon in its seduction of us to an evil work be it in the understanding or the will in the imagination or the sensitiue appetite if you allow it to be an act you must confess according to your principels that it is from God and of his product on seeing therefore that the total sum of Gods concurse unto the act of sin amounts fully to thus much in your own account That he predetermines man to produce the whole entity of it and the whole reality also of every other act prerequired unto it that besides he predetermines and applies the Divel * Imoâ—â—ne ipse quidem Diabolus quicquam potest nisi determinante Deo Proinde pro certo tenendum Dominum omnes actiones decâ—rnere atque agendo concurrere suo sancto modo cooperari quando peccatum est in fiâ—â—i c. Malcom Com. ad Act. 4. 24. Passio Christi in individuo fuit a Dâ—o praedefinita praedefinitione perfecta Ergo omnes circumstantiae quae concurrunt ad individuationem illius praedeterminatae sunt aeterno Deâ— decreto sed ad talem individuation in etiam concuâ—rit inâ—â—â—sio actus extensio ad tales personas Alvarez Disp 22. 19. Câ—tance approbante Amesio iâ— Bel. ener Tom 4. lib. 2. cap. 2. n. 12. p. 27. and every other cause de facto conâ—urring to propound the unlawful object and allure to it since he predetermines the will and directs the intention and provides the object and applies the Tempter and addresseth all other circumstances that concur to the individuation of the sinful act there seems to be no moral or physical causality wanting that God should therefore be said to produce mens evil works otherwise than he effects their good works Diotrephes But the efficiency of God though he be Author of the act of sin doth not reach the formal malice of it Paganus No more do Men nor Divels in their most importunate contrivances solicitations and actings towards the sins of others notwithstanding they communicate in the fault * Quatenus incredulit adhabâ—t rationem peccati Deus illam non efficit sed Diabolus juxta illud 2. Cor. 4. 4. Piscator Apol. Resp Amicae Collat. Oppos cap. 3. and guilt by impelling to them such acts as are inseparably attended with a moral pravity neither doth any man produce the formal malice of his own wicked act but inasmuch as he produceth the entity of that act * Aquin. 12ae q. 79. ar 2. 2. to which that malice is annexed If the resolution of your Casuist * Amesius ubi supra lately mentioned be authentick he doth indirectly cooperate and so communicate in the sin of others who is deficient in his diligence to prevent it and he is sufficiently diligent to prevent sin who doth predetermine the will to it Diotrephes Now I have freed God so fully from having any hand in sin by a Metaphorical distinction you endeavour to make him communicate therein by a moral interpretation but that one may be accounted the Author of sin he must be culpably deficient saith Dr. Twiss * Ubi supra p. 72. and thus man may beguilty saith he either by doing what he ought to omit or by omitting what he ought to do but this cannot be incident to God He could I confess saith he keep any Creature from sin â—f it pleased him but if he will not and doth not he commits not any culpable defect for he is not bound to preserve any man from sin Therefore all that can be infer'd from hence is this * R. B. Prid. ubi supra p. 13. That man doth necessarily fall into sin if God doth not uphold him not that God sins because he doth not give what he doth not owe him Paganus You grant then that God is the cause of mans fall though inculpable but your Doctors do acknowledge That to love God in such a measure as to contemn our selves in comparison of him and his service is above the power of nature A Dr. Twiss nbi supra p. 49. man mvst be endued with heavenly grace and the Spirit of God to enable him hereunto and that accordingly God created our first parents in a state of grace and endued them with the Spirit that in this capacity such a law of love might be justly impos'd upon them Now I would fain be satisfied with what equity God could withdraw * from his innocent creatures and such were our first parents before the fall * Si Deus hominem sibi obedientem a pietate deturbat bene currentem cadere facit ergo pro bonis mala retribuit injuste punit quod ut fiat impellit Quid tam perversum quid tam insanum dici aut cogitari potest Prosp Aquit ad 12. Gal. Object that supernatural and necessary assistance and yet being thus without any fault in them strip't off their abilities leave them under the obligation of that now become an impossible Commandment that they might inevitably fall and perish yet this he did as you concluded above out of your Divines Diotrephes We satisfie our selves in that God did this for a greater good and that we may have no cause to complain our Divines conclude *
is the first cause of it and consequently whatsoever we do we do necessarily in respect of Him This is one of the Arguments which proveth more than our Adversaries would have them and by these Rules have I formerly Answ in the second Argument proved that they make God the Author of sin for if causa causae be causa causati as doubtless it is while they make God the cause of all those actions which either are sins or the causes of sins questionless they make God according to their own Argumentation the cause of sins But they have a limitation for this Rule and say that it holdeth in causis essentialiter subordinatis as they say that God is the cause of all those things which are essentially and districtly done by our wills but sins proceeding from the depravation of our wills are effects of a cause not directly subordinate to God The limitation is sound but not applicable to their instance ye◠the limitation it self quite spoileth them For 1. While Adam's will was yet sound they teach that God decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit now at that time they cannot say but that Adam was a cause essentially subordinate to God 2. They teach that God is a cause not onely of our actions but also of our volitions as I may say then these being the causes of our sins are directly subordinate to him 3. Let us consider not onely the subordination between God and our wills but also between our actions and their moralities and we shall perceive that according to the abuse of these Rules they make God the cause of our sins For that Rule Causa causae est causa causati is infallibly true expounded thus The cause of any effect is the cause of all such events as necessarily follow that effect Now then if as they say God be a necessary cause of all our particular actions seeing our actions in reference to such and such objects must needs be sinful it is manifest what followeth For example Though to take money in general be no sin yet to take this or that money being none of our own is a sin Now then if God be a cause of this action in reference to this object as he is if he be the cause of this particular action it is impossible their Doctrine should excuse God from sin Eating in reference to the forbidden fruit was a sin but according to them God was a principal cause of eating the forbidden fruit Ergo. Minor prob They say he was the necessitating cause of this particular action Eating was a natural action the individuation of this eating by an unlawful object was a moral obliquity But God was the cause of this individual Ergo. The like may be said of all our sinful actions When I have drunk sufficiently both for the necessity and comfort of nature to drink a cup more is sin But our Opposites teach that I cannot take up this superfluous cup without Gods speciall determination Ergo. This Doctrine is enough to make ones hair stand an end making God whatsoever they say the cause not onely of our actions but also of our obliquities for what are the obliquities of our actions but the placing of them upon wrong objects If therefore they make God the principal cause of all our particular actions most of which are particularized by bad objects what do these men make of God But Recrimination is no answer Hitherto I have shewed though perhaps without method yet I hope not without profit how our Opposites are wounded with their own weapons Now I will take their weapons out of their hands and teach them the right use of them shewing how God is the cause of all things onely not the cause of sin a cause of all good things yet so as that many good things are contingent also We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordained that all sorts of Inferior or second causes should work according to their proper kinds that voluntary Agents should work voluntarily c. God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds If so then God is the cause that many things are done contingently one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily and therefore contingently which connexion we have formerly justified This being well understood will instruct us not onely that it may be so but also that it must be so That God being the necessary cause of all good things yet all such things are not necessary effects of Him For example It is impossible that man should do any thing without God therefore God is a cause necessary to the being of all things effected by him yet because many things done by the free choice of man might as well have been omitted God no ways constraining him to them these are not necessary effects of God The Reason of this is because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily having liberty to do as well one thing as another yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice for this were else ☜ to take it away and to make man an involuntary Agent For example God hath given thee strength of body he hath given thee also ability to choose in what exercise thou wilt employ it thou choosest to Ring or Dance God then the Author of thy strength is the chief cause of these exercises yet so as they are contingent in respect of Him because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased By this we may plainly see how God is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable to be a cause and yet many things are contingent in respect of him This being cleared we may with more facility conceive how and in what sense God is the cause of all we do and yet we onely the cause of sin God sustains us when we are about our sins even then in Him we live and move and have our being as well as when we are better busied God giveth that strength by which we commit any sin yet because he doth not necessitate or incline unto it but we of our selves abuse it to wickedness God hath still the part of a Creator we onely are sinful An example will make this clear Suppose a King delivereth to his Subject Men Weapons Mony and Warlike provision that he may fight for his Honor against his enemies his Subject proves a Traitor and useth all his Soveraigns strength against himself His Soveraign here is a cause that he hath the command and doth the Office of a Captain but he is no cause of his Treachery the offence is onely the Captains and the wrong is onely the Soveraigns This is just the case between God and us God hath given us many excellent faculties both of body and soul which he intended we should
did actually harden or had a will to harden any but such as had formerly rebelled against the fight abused his patience and despised his gracious dispensations * Rom. 1. 22 26 Because when they knew God they did not glorifie him as God c. for this cause God gave them up Rom. 1. 21. with 26. Psal 81. 11 12. But my people would not hear my voyce and Israel would See also Luke 7. 30. Acts 13. 26 40 41 45 46. Hebr. 2. 3. not obey me so I gave them up to their own hearts lusts We find that the Lord though he had fore-told what would be the issue of Moses Ministry to him is not said to have hardned Pharaoh till he had multiplied his Rebellions and dallied with five plagues The last whereof when Moses undertakes the removal of it he gives him a fair warning of his danger Exod. 8. 29. I will intreat the Lord but let not Pharaoh deal deceitfully any more And because he neglected to quit himself of the danger upon this hot Alarme therefore with the sixth plague this judgment came upon him also 't is said the Lord then hardned the heart of Pharaoh Exod. 9. 12. and ver 14. with the judgment following the Lord threatens I will at this time send all my plagues upon thine heart Therefore do not resemble God to a mad or â—nwise Potter that layes out his cost and skill in making up a Vessel for no other purpose but only to make ostentation of his power will and liberty to break it Perhaps the Apostle by that comparison takes upon him to demonstrate not what God will do but what he can for he saith What if God willing to shew his wrath c Besides God is compared to the Potter and men to the Mass or Lump of Clay but what men are they that are entred into this comparison not innocent men or men made guilty by imputation only as your Doctriâ—e supposes them but men corrupt through their own vâ—luntary pollutions as such This is evident from the Apostles Discourse in the three first Chapters of that Epistle He declares then that out of this Mass or Lump it is lawful for God according to his own Beneplaciture to select some unto life namely those who would believe in Christ upon his being tendred to them * Rom. 9. 30 31 32. Chap. 11. 20. See also John 3. ult and to harden the rest and reserve them to wrath that is to say those who would augment the number and mount the heap of their other sins by the addition of a wilful unbelief This to my sense is most clearly that liberty * 1 Cor. 1. 21. which the Apostle asserts and vindicates to Almighty God in that present juncture and current of his Providence over Jewes and Gentiles though the Jewes cryed it down with utter detestation as a violation * Rom. 11. 1. of those signal promises which he had anciently made unto their Nation For your other Allegation Matth. 20. 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own It can conclude nothing but that God may distribute equal portions of reward to those whose labours in his Vineyard have been unequal for when he that hath done most receives the utmost they did contract for why should he repine at the Lords bounty which is no injury to him though a benefit to others But what is all this to the vindication of Gods justice when he invites men to a new Covenant wherein he promiseth to proceed with them upon a gentler account and tyes them to new conditions and yet denies abilities sufficient to perform those conditions though he binds them to that performance under the commination and peril of a soarer penalty And I ask't you further in what sense this Covenant with Mankind could be properly called a Covenant of Grace which demand and I conceive it a material one you were pleased to take no notice of in your last Reply Diotrephes You must know Sir that your natural Reason without a supernatural illumination is no competent Judge of the sense of holy Scripture which contains the mind of God yet I shall not now reply to your interpretations but address my self to give you satisfaction to your lâ—st demand which is in what sense the Covenant which God hath sealed to us in the blood of Christ is styled a Covenant of Grace To this end you must understand that there are a certain number of persons predestinated unto life and glory and these are called the Elect These Elect God Almighty before the foundation of the World was laid according to his eternal and immutable purpose and the secret The Declaration of the Congregational Churches at the Savoy Chap. 3. n. 5 6 7. counsel and good pleasure of his will hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory out of his meer free grace and love without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them or any other thing in the Creature as conditions or causes moving him thereunto and all to the praise of his glorious grace And as God hath appointed these Elect unto glory so hath he by the eternal and most free purpose of his will fore-ordained all the means thâ—â— unto wherefore they who are elected being faln in Adam are redeemed by Christ are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season are justified adopted sanctified and kept by his power through faith unto salvation All these benefits are infallibly and irresistibly conveyed to those Elect by vertue of the said Covenant and upon this account I hope you will allow it to be very fitly intitled a Covenant of Grace Paganus I do readily allow of the title in respect to those Elect you speak of but I pray satisfie me in this particular what interest have the rest of mankind in Christ and this Covenant Do not the benefits you have now mentioned belong to them Diotrephes For your satisfaction you may assure your self it is the Determination and PUBLICK FAITH of the new Congregational Churches in England * Ibid. n. 6. agreed upon and consented to by their Elders and Messengers That not any other are redeemed by Christ or effectually called justified adopted sanctified and saved but these Elect only Paganus I pray to what end did God create the rest and what Acts hath he passed against them and what Providence doth he exercise towards them Diotrephes There is a Text of holy Scripture that saith thus Before the children were born and when they had neither done good nor evil that the purpose of God according to Election might stand Rom. 9. 11 1â— 13. not of works but of him that calleth it was said The elder shall serve the younger as it is written I have loved Jacob and have hated Esau Out of which words a Renowned Divine doth conclude That Gods ordaining men unto salvation proceeds meerly according to
ita sapientissimus qui decretum de fine non facit nisi decretum de mediis ei aeque sit certum Sapientiae enim non congruit ut decretum de fine quod per media exequendum est fine Mediorum certa limitatione statuatur Resp Ant. Wallaei ad censur Câ—rvini pag. 138. As the Decree for the illustration of his own Glory is absolute and irresistibl and therefore not to be defeated so the Means for the Execution of that Decree is certainly ordained and to be accomplished inevitably and therefore not suspended upon so contingent a thing as Mans Free-will is if left to its own determination Hereupon the Westminster Assemblers and the Congregational Churches treading in their steps unless it be where they thought those tread awry do tell us That Gods Providence is Chap. 5. 〈◊〉 4. extended even to the first fall and all other sins of Angels and men 3 and that not by a bare permission c. So that this permissive Decree is very pregnant and teeming it brings forth in its season as is said by the Prophet of Gods Decree concerning a temporal judgment Zeph. 2. 2. Pâ—ganus Do you think that God allows and approves of sin then for this permission as you define it imports something to that purpose as I conceive it Diotrephes No we do not speak of a moral permission which is a concession but of a physical permission which is no-impedition a not-hindring but such as doth determine the infallible futurition of sin Nam Dei decretum de permittendo pecâ—ato ponit quidem illius infallibâ—lem fâ—turitionem câ—m debeat sieâ—i evenire quod Deus decreviâ— permittere ut fiat saith * In sua Hydra Soâ—in Expug Tom. 1. p. 353. 354. Maresius and a little after he saith By the effective Dâ—crâ—e man determinately and certainly was to be â—ntire to be endued with free-wâ—ll and peâ—cable and by his peâ—missive Decree that pâ—ccable man was to sin ultro sponte of his own acâ—oâ—d and freely but yet determinately certainly and infallibly Hereupon Piscator saith Decretum Ubi supra c. 3. Ibid. permittendi pâ—câ—ata necessit at peccâ—â—a quia se us frustra â—sset The Decree of pâ—rmitting sin doth necessitate sin for otherwise it were to no purpose And â—gain Decretum permissivum etiam est cau a â—fficiens suâ—â—obâ—ectâ— â— e. peccati The permissive Decree is also the efficiâ—nt cause of its object that is of sin And upon this account the Divines of Wedderau at the Synod of Dort * De Artic. 3 4. mihi page 154. part 2. do conclude That sins do come to pass necessarily in respect of the permissive Decree And some English Divines do affiâ—m That Gods Decree is not less efficacious in the permission of evil than in the production of good * But some say 〈◊〉 as permissiva efficâ—â— est non quoad productâ—â—nem sed quoad illationem So R. B. 〈◊〉 â—ect 2 de 〈◊〉 Med. p. 30. â—per in Fol. Dr. Twiss saith That sin cometh not to pass but by the most efficacious Decree and Ordinance of God Iâ—id p 88. Paganus This doth confound Gods Decree of permission with his Decree of effection or operation Diotrephes They do but trifle * Calv. Inâ—it lib. 1. cap. 〈◊〉 Sect. 1. and play the fool that substitute a bare permission instead of Gods Providence as if God sate only as a spectator expecting the forâ—uitous and casual events of things and so his judgment should depend upon mans free-will Paganus Have you any good proof that Gods Decree doth certainly determine the futurition of sin Diotâ—ephes Our Divines do prove it out of Petâ—rs Sermon Acts 2. 22 23. where he thus bespeaks his Auditors Ye men of Dr. Twiss ubâ— supra p. 89 90. Israeâ— hear these words Jesus of Nazareth a man approved of God among you by miracles wonders and signs Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God ye have taken and by wicked hands have crâ—cified and stain In the same breath saith Dr. Twiss both convâ—cting them of crucifying Christ and withall acknowledging that he was delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God the meaning whereof is fully set down Acts 4. 28. to this effect namely That what contumelious outrages soever they committed upon the person of the Son of God in all this they did but that which Gods hand and Gods counsel had predertermined to be done Paganus * Cum ad productionem actus mali concurrit Deus eatenùs concurrit quatenús muneri auctoris naturae de patientia absolutae deesse non oult impediendo per substractionem sui concursus usum libertatiâ— creatae ac proptereà concurrit quatenùs sinit ut influxus oblatus ab ipso in actu primâ— ad opposita pâ—r libertatem creatam determinetur ad â—anc actum secundum quem quantum est ex se hoc est voluntate Antecedente nollet esse God might out of his mercy ordain that his Son should be made a Sacrifice for the sin of the World and he might freely determine his own will to deliver him up to that purpose and out of his fore-knowledge that the will of his malicious Crucifiers would fâ—eâ—ly apply and determine it self to that wicked Act of crucifying him he might as the Author of Nature and to perform the office of the first cause determine to uphold their power of acting and not to hinder the use of their naturâ—l lâ—berty by the withdrawing of his concourse but to afford the simultaneous influence thereof that they might freely act what they had most wickedly determined Diotrephes We do hold with Alvarez * Ibid. That God * Apud Ames Bel. Enervat Tom. 4. l. 2. c. 2â— 4. p. 23. by his Eternal Decree and by his Absolute and Effectual Will hath predetermined all our acts in particular and that before the prevision of them and independently to any middle knowledge of our future free co-operation upon supposition and Amesius * hath given the reason of it because the firmness of Gods Decree doth not properly depend upon the contingent and mutable will of man Paganus This overthrows the liberty of the will to my weak apprehension and turns man whose natural property it is to act freely into the condition of a necessary Agent Diotrephes No you are mistaken for seeing not only every action of the Creature but also the manner of that action depends upon Vid. Ames Bel. Enerv. Tom. 4. l. 3. c. 3. n. 4. ex Alvar. Synopsis Pur Thâ—ol Disp 11. Thes 11. the efficacy of the Divine Will it follows that the Providence of God doth not destroy the liberty of humane actions but establish it as the Belgick professors have observed for God so rules his Creatures that he suffers them also to act and exercise their own motions as Austin hath it Though God be the cause of the action in
negatio impedimenti the denial of his impedition or hinderance in respect of that operation which depends upon our free determination Diotrephes As I told you formerly concerning Gods permissive Decree so now I must tell you concerning his actual permission if there were no more in it but the bare negation of an impediment it were possible for man especially in his state of integrity to forbear the sin to which he is thus permitted and so God should fall of his means for the accomplishment of his end the manifestation of his vindictive justice To give you therefore our full sense and meaning when we speak of Gods permission of sin it imports 1. That God doth subsâ—racâ— * Polâ—n Synt. Theol. lib. 6. cap. 6. page 326. E. Maccov Cell Disp 8. de stat prim Rom. mihi page 86. or withdraw his grace and divine assistance suffiâ—ient and necessary to the avoiding of sin and that as well from the Angels and our innocent first Parents as from their lapsed posterity 2. That he doth influence the sinful act after a two-fold manner First in moving and pred terminating * For that is now the prevailing opinion Mr. Baxter of saving â—aith pagâ— 29. the will unto that wicked work by some previous reality received into it and this is that which Amesius * Ubi supra n. â—5 〈◊〉 etiam lib. 3. cap. 3. 〈◊〉 Ex Alvar. approves of in Alvarez when he saith Dâ—us motiâ—ne praevia â—fficaciter applicat voluntatem c. God doth by a previous mâ—tion effâ—ctually apply the creâ—tâ—d will to work freeâ—y and infâ—llâ—blâ— as he also applies othâ—r seâ—ond causâ—s to wâ—rk naturâ—lly And he gives it us in his own words thus Dâ—um non otiosa aut merè negaâ—iva pâ—rmissione circa eâ—câ—ti existentiam versari Ibid. n. 3. That Gâ—d is convâ—rsant about the existencâ— of sin not by an idle and meer negative permissiâ—n but permissione vâ—luntatis eventum ipsum praesinientis by such a pâ—â—mâ—ssion of will as 〈◊〉 fore-determine the very event it sâ—lf And this is not all for secondly * Pet. aS Jos in Evan. Concord p. 597. God hath his influâ—ncâ— together with the will into the same wicked work by a concomitaâ—t or astâ—ey call it a simultaneous concourse To this purpoâ—e Mr. Calvin saith that man doth effect Instit lib. 1. cap. 18. sect 1. Ibid. Sect. 4. mihi p. 130. nothing Nisiâ—aâ—canâ— Deinâ—tus arâ—arâ—â uâ directione but by the secret direction and motion â—f Almighty God nay that he does that which is not lawful justo illius imâ—ulsâ— by the just impulse of God Paganus If this be the nature of Gods actual permission I cannoâ— see how it frees him from the imputation of being the Author and Cause of 〈◊〉 for whatsoever sinful act a man commits 't is â—bsolutely unavoidable because God applies and predetermines his will unto it aâ—d that insuperably and produceth the act and that â—mmedâ—â—tly otherwise the man according to your Doctrine is not able to commit it Diotrephes I perceive you have little skill in the Metaphyphysicks Therein we are taught that Ens bonum convertuntur every thing that hath a being is good and from God and of his production and therefore we must as I said distinguish betwixt the act and the sinfulness of it For example in Adultery Mr. Hickman Sodomy Bestiality Murder Treason Blasphemy the hating of God though the obliquity and malice be foule and heinous and therefore from man only yet the act it self is very good and therefore from God and of his determining and production Paganus Is there any good in Adultery c why then do good men generally pray against it and declaim Censores nobis dati qui libidinem intemperantiam caetâ—ras animi pestes è Civitate profligent qui certe intolerabiles essent si haec omnia essent bona Nunquid enim stipendia conducendi qui bonitatem c civitate proscribant Tho. Raed Pervigil Metaphys in Perv Jovis against it before the commission of it for if it be good 't is desirable and to be commended and after commission why are the criminals enjoyned penance rather than obliged to give thanks that God hath prevented them with such sweet mercies And amongst men why are such severe Laws continued against Adulterers to cut off the spurious brood from their fathers inheritance Diotrephes This severity is practised in detestation of so foul a sin and to deter men from it Paganus If the act of God be principal in the production as I must needs conclude from your Doctrine that it is I hope that it is very clean and innocent else a holy God would never have made such an ineluctable Decree about it much less would he predetermine mans will without any prescience of his own free and previous inclination to it And forasmuch as such an absolute predetermination makes the act unavoidable that inevitability makes the penalty unjust that is inflicted to deter from it Diotrephes It cannot be unjust to inforce the observation of the righteous Laws of God and we know though he doth predetermine the will of man to the production of the act it self yet he forbids the sinfulness of it under a severe penalty Paganus By this Doctrine you will make as well the commands Nunquam ad hoc Deus potuit praedestinare quod ipse disposuerat praecepto prohibere Fulg. lib. 1. ad Moâ—im of God as the prayers of men against the foulest sins to be unjust irrational and absurd for according to this Doctrine God tyes men to impossibilities of his own making he tyes them to divide things that are inseparable either of their own nature or by his divine constitution In blasphemy and the hatred of God for example the formal malice and the material act are inseparable let the real entity of these acts be determined by the will acting with judgment and liberty it is impossible even to the absolute power of God but that the formal malice or sinfulness should follow it If therefore God doth absolutely and effectually foâ—e-â—rdain and intrinsecally predetermine the will of man to the real entity of the act of blasphemy or the hatred of God and yet tye him to avoid sin in these acts he tyes him to absolute impossibilities nay he tyes him to do that which is impossible to his own Omnipotency because it implies a contradiction that in these sins the act should be without the pravity the entity without the malice for these actions are evil antecedently to any positive Mr. Hickm p. 9â— Law evil ex genere objecto intrinsecally and essentially evil And this opinion makes our prayers against sin no less irrational and absurd than Gods commands for what God does in time that he decreed to do from all Eternity Suppose then that God hath decreed to produce the act of Adultery Blasphemy hating of God in me in praying against these I must pray
be part of their duty What shall they say to the Lord when he comes to check them for these oblations of their blind zeal saying Who hath required these things at your hands In short therefore seeing such as play the Voluntier's in Gods service find so little acceptation from him 't is a madness in any man to trouble himself about any spiritual performances till he finds sufficient grounds to convince him that God prescribes and requires them as conditions subordinated to his salvation If they be not of faith they are sin Rom. 14. 23. Diotrephes Why I wonder Sir you can find none of these when God hath chosen Faith with the fruits thereof a diligent prosecution of holy duties to be such conditions and accordingly you may find them indispensably required in every page of the Holy Ghost Securus Whatever be the judgment of your private spirit the Synod of Dort hath resolved otherwise and their Authority I hope you will yield to and that Authority hath rejected it Cap. 1. de Divina praedest Reject 3. as a pernicious Errour That the good pleasure and purpose of God from among all possible conditions or out of the order or rank of all things did choose as a condition unto salvation the act of faith in it self ignoble and the imperfect obedience of faith and was graciously pleased to repute it for perfect obedience and account it worthy of the reward of everlasting life Diotrephes I presume the Smod intended to explode it as an Errour that there was no election of persons but of qualities and methinks their words seem to incline towards this sense for they reject in that Article the Errours of those who teach That the good pleasure and purpose of God whereof the Scripture makes mention in the Doctrine of Election doth not consist herein that God did elect some certain men rather than others but in this viz. that among all possible conditions God did choose the act and obedience of faith as a condition unto salvation c. Securus If this were all they aim'd at in that Rejection to reject it as an Errour in those that taught there was no Election of persons but of things they rejected just nothing for it was an Errour so far from troubling the Belgick Churches that it was never taught by any man amongst them that which they rejected therefore was this That faith and the obedience of faith were chosen by Almighty God as a condition unto salvation and the following proof makes it evident For by this pernicious Errour they add the good pleasure of God and merit of Christ is weakned and that of the Apâ—stle is out-faced as untrue 2 Tim. 1. 9. God hath callâ—d us with a holy calling not according to our works but according to his purpose and grace which was given to us through Christ Jesus before the World began Diotrephes I will not spend time to vindicate the sense of the Synod in that Article of Rejection but this is the plain truth in few and easie words if I am not mistaken That Faith which is an effectual acceptance of and affiance in Christ as Christ was chosen and ordained by God the condition of justification and Mr. Baxter life By this faith so constituted the condition we are actually justified as 't is the performed condition of Gods promise Disput of Justific p. 312. To the same sense the Brittish Divines delivered their Suffrage at the Synod in these words Non negamus esse ejusmodi beneplacitum Dei in Evangelio patefactâ—m qâ—o statuit fidem eligere in conditionem confâ—rendae salutis id est quo actualem salutis adeptionem saltem respectu adultorum ex fidei praecedentis conditione suspensam esse voluit We do not deny say they such a good pleasure of God to be revealed in the Gospel whereby he determin'd to choose faith for the condition of conferring salvation that is whereby he would have the actual obtaining of salvation at least in respect of the Adult suspended upon the condition of fore-going faith and this is that joyful and salutary tydings that is to be promulgated in the Name of Christ among all Nations Thus those Divines Securus Methinks this is repugnant to that inference of the Apostle So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that shâ—weth mercy Si divinae misericordiae exerendae seu exertae causa sola sit liberrima Dei voluntas saith Rom. 9. 16. Mr. David Dicson If the sole cause of the exertion or egression of the divine mercy be the most free will of God then the Ad locum cause thereof is not in the will of man nor in his good works or actions but in God alone It is not of him that willeth saith he therefore it is not of the free-will of man It is not of him that runneth saith he therefore it is not from the actions or endeavours of man that any man is beloved elected or that he obtains mercy and the blessing and consequently it depends upon God alone who sheweth mercy And Deodati his Note upon the place is this Seeing that the Election is of pure mercy it cannot be attributed to any will or endeavour of man Diotrephes To my apprehension * Mr. Baxter's Treat of Convers pag. 295 296. the meaning is not that our salvation is not in him that willeth or in him that runneth the Apostle talketh of no such thing but it is about the giving of the Gospel or the first special grace to them that had it not For * Mr. Baxter ib. pag. 296. 〈◊〉 if you ask the reason of mens salvation it is not given in Scripture barely from the will of God but from the faith and obedience of men for it is an act of rewarding justice as well as of paternal love and mercy And therefore we must distinguish very warily betwixt the Decree of God and the execution of it Election unto salvation is absolute it respects no condition or qualification in the person to be elected but salvation depends upon the condition of faith and obedience Securus If unbelievers disobedient and rebellious persons be chosen to salvation and it be not in Gods power to revoke that Election as the Hassien Divines concluded at the * De persevâ—r Aph. 5. p. 215 par 2. Synod at Dort I can see no necessity of faith and obedience for if God chooseth us unto salvation that is if he wills to have us saved being disobedient what reason is there why he should not be able to make us partakers of salvation being disobedient Is not Election the Decree of saving and doth not God execute his Decree for the same reason for which he made it If so why can he not actually save us without faith and obedience as well as Decree or will to save us without them Diotrephes He decrees to save us meerly for his good pleasure but he will actually
save us in a way of justice mingled with mercy and therefore he hath chosen * Eph. 1. 4. us in Christ now * 2 Cor. 5. 17. he that is in Christ is a new Creaâ—ure Securus It seems then that the exâ—cution of the Decree is not exactly conformable to the Decree it self but contains something else besides it and then how is that true of the Apostle * Rom. 9. 11. That the purpâ—se of God according to the Election doth stand not of works but of him that calleth I am afraid you have gotten a tang of the Remonstrants Doctrine by your expressions * Vt enim Electio ad gloriam absoluta in Christo facta dicatur quatenus Christus Deus est unios cum Patre Spiritu Sancto absurdum est quiaâ—â—sic Electio etiam in Spiritâ— S. quatenâ—s unus cum Patre Filio Deâ—s est facta fuerit quod contra Scripturae stylum est For can any man be in Christ but a believer I am sure none but a bâ—lievâ—r can be a new Creature in affirming therefore crudely as you do that God hath chosen us in Christ and adding upon it that He that is in Christ is a new Creature you do plainly imply that the object of Gods Election are the faithful and sancâ—ified which the Synod at Dort will tell you is a pernicious Erroâ—r The Bishop of Winchester delivering his judgment about the second Lambeth Article as it was amended by the Bishops and other Divines there whereas the Article saith Causa moveâ—s aut efficiens praedestinationis ad vitam non est praevisio fidei aâ—t persevâ—rantiae aut bonorum operum aut alîus reâ— quae insit perâ—onis â—â—tic Lamb. p. 13. praedestinatis sed sola voluntas beneplaciti Dei The moving or efficient cause of predestination unto life is not the fore-sight of faith or perseverance or good works or any other thing which is in the persons predestâ—nated but the sole will of Gods good pleasure Bishop Andrews makes a Quaere concerning that Particle Sâ—â—a Voluntas benepâ—â—citi the sole will of Gods 〈◊〉 pag. 23 24. good pleasure whether it doth include Christ or seâ—luâ—e him that is whether the Act of predestination be aâ—solute or relative For my part saith he I think it is relative neither do I think there is any good-will of God towards men that is a will whereby he is well-pleased towards men but in his Son in whom he is well-pleased nor that any one is predestinated either befoâ—e or without reâ—â—ect to or intuition of Christ But as the sacred Scriptures have it Christ is â—ore-known in the first place 1 P. t. 1. 20. then we in him Rom. 8. 29. Christ predestinated Rom. 1. 4. then we by him Eph. 1. 5. And not we in the first place as some think He in the last and for us for we cannot be predestinated unto the Adoption of sons but in the natural son nor can we be predestinated that we should be conformable to the image of the Son unlesâ— the Son be first appointed to whose image we should be made conformable hereupon that Bishop would have it added to that Articleâ— the good pleasure of Gâ—d in Christ And though in King Edward's Articles of 〈◊〉 Articulo cuperem addi Beneplacitum Dei in Christo ibid. 1553. the 17th Article runs thus Constantèr decrevit eos quos elegit ex hominum genere * Which words are mistaken by Mr. Beâ—â—anus à malâ—dicto exitio liberare Yet in those of Queen Elizabeths and King Jame's 1616. we finde this addition In Christo quos in Christo elegit And consonantly hereunto those Articles of King Charls of blessed Memory whereunto He prefixed His Declaration 1631. do run thus He hath constantly decreed to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind But this you see overthrows absolute election to avoid which the Synod though it saith elegit in Christo hath establish't the good pleasure of God towards sinners on this side or before Christs Mediatorship and Reconciliation * Act. Sys 〈◊〉 cap. 1. de prâ—d Art 7. 9. Christum pro iâ—â— quos Deus summè dilexit ad vitam aeternam elegit Mortuum esse dicunâ— Cap. 2. Reject 7. Christus est causa meritoria salutis sed non causa electionis Causa quaerenda est 〈◊〉 Dei beneplacito amore gratuito qui ordine antecedit intercessionem filii P. Molin Consess inter Act. Syn. Dord par 1. p. 290. for Election is resolved by them to be the first benefit and the fountain of all the rest upon which depends the designation of the Mediatour himself Diotrephes Sir I am perfectly of the Synods judgment in this point however you mistake me I do not say Christ is the cause or foundation of the Decree but of the things decreed not of Election as to be established but as to be executed not of election to be decreed through him but of salvation to be obtain'd by him he comes under the Decree not antecedently but consequently not as the cause of that love wherewith God hath embrac'd us unto salvation but as a means underlayed to that love and therefore Christ was not given to men that they might be elected by him but then when they were elected he was given ut siâ—e justitiae suae dispendio nos ad gloriam adduceret as Sphanhemius * Disput Inaâ—gur Thes 5. hath it That God might bring us unto glory without any detriment unto his justice Securus You do acknowledge then that God hath elected us unto glory without any regard to faith or any good work whatsoever in us and that upon the intervention of Christ he may bring us into the possession of that glory without any detriment or impeachment of his justice therefore as I said from the beginning of our Discourse there is no need at all of our endeavours after good works or after a course of holiness and righteousness Diotrephes Sir you must not mistake us here though God do not choose us for this antecedent reason because we were hely yet he chose us to this consâ—quent end that we should be holy so the Synod have determined in these words This said Election was made not upon fore-sight of faith and the obedience of faith holiness or of any other good quality or disposition as a cause Cap. 1. Art 9 or condition before required in man to be chosen but unto faith and the obedience of faith holiness c. And therefore Election is the fountain of all saving good from whence faith holiness and the residue of saving gifts lastly everlasting life it self do flow as the fruits and effects thereof according to thaâ— of the Apostle Ephes 1. 4. He hath chosen us not bâ—cause we were but that we should be holy and without blame before him in love Securus Sir I hope you understand that
of Consolation he had given down in those Theses for soon after he puts in his excepâ—ions and enters such a Caveat against the greatest part of Mankind See Thes 16 c. as doth infallibly keep them out of possession of the benefit for saith he this universal Redemption must be very circumspectly handled as to point of satisfaction and merit and a double exception he propounds to limit them One respecting the things another the persons Christ he saith hath not satisfied for a permanent impenitency much less for a persevering contumacy and hence it comes to pass that the wrath of God abides upon unbelievers and all their sins original actual against Law and Gospel are imputed to them And yet O strange subtilty he hath merited grace for all even for the impenitent and unbelievers But what grace why Remission of sins and Eternal life under the condition of faith and repentance but not grace sufficient and necessary unto that faith and repentance From hence you will conclude that he must put in another exception a Caveat against persons too and it is this That although Christ hath promiscuously so satisfied for all men that their sins may be remitted viz. if they repent and believe that is when they are invited to take Christs easie yoke if they perform an impossible condition yet in truth he hath procured the sins of the Elect only in whom that condition is effected by an irresistible grace and operation to be remitted eventually So that Christ having made no satisfaction for the sin of final impenitency and having decreed to let them fall inevitably into that state by withholding grace sufficient and necessary to keep them from it what advantage I beseech you do these poor wretches receive from his merits and satisfaction Diotrephes But the Synod declares their sense more fully in this Article That many being called by the Gospel do not repent nor believe in Christ but perish in infidelity this comes not to pass say they through any insufficiency of Christs Sacrifice for that is a most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for Chapt. of Redempt Art 3 4 5 6. sins of infinite price and value abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole World and that 't is therefore of so great value because the person that was offer'd up was the only begotten Son of God and because his death was joyned with a feeling of Gods wrath and of the curse which we had deserved by our sins and they declare this to be Gospel That whosoever believes shall not perish but have life everlasting Desolatus 'T is true if they believe upon that condition Mr. Baxter's Preface to the Grot. Relig. sect 9. Syn. Dord ib. A t. 8. But did God purpose* to cause in men this condition or not In the Elect he did upon whom only it was the most free counsel gracious will and intention of God the Father that the efficacy of that Sacrifice should stream â—orth to the production of faith in them by an irresistible operation as that Synod hath more at large declared So that a man must have the work of special grace wrought in him and the Spirit of Christ abiding with him before he can have assurance of his interest in Christ Diotrephes 'T is very true They that have not the Spirit of Christ are none of his * Rom. 8. 9. but you could not so much as say That Jesus Christ is the Lord but by the Holy Ghost * 1 Cor. 12. 3. yet this I know is your stedfast profession and because ye are sons God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying Abba Father Can you not pray to God too as well as profess to believe in him Desolatus 'T is most certain we should not have believed Christ to have been the Messiah and the Son of God if the Holy Ghost had not sealed the Revelation to us and confirm'd it with a world of miracles But having this Revelation by us Christ may be acknowledged to be the Lord without the special inhabitation of his Spirit to prompt us to it and his influences may be sufficient to move us unto prayer when they are insufficient to renâ—w us unto salvation and therefore not every one that saith Lord Lord not every Supplicant shall enter into the Kingdâ—m of heâ—ven but he that doth the will of the Father which is in heâ—ven Mâ—â— 7. 21. Diotrephes Hold you close to this principle that heaven shall be alotted for a portion to him that doth the will of God for the Lâ—rd loveth judgment and forsakâ—th not â—is Saints or his Psal 37. 28. that be godly they are prâ—served for ever Desolatus 'T is not enough to do Gods will for the substance of the work that may be done by the unsanctified But it must be done after a spiritual and gracious manner also * Dr. Twiss ib. p. 48. and so â—one but the Saints and truly godly do it and they are called his by a peculiar â—â—â—le of Election and are sure to be preserved for ever Diotrephes I remember you have been look't upon as a person eminent for godâ—â—ness and forward not only to do the will of God but when the will of God requir'd it to suffer also for your well-doing Now St. Peter tells you and he prefixeth a kind of Oath to his Asseveration saying Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons but in â—very Nation he that feareth Acts 10. 34 35. him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him Desolatus Sir the sense of that Text must admit of a limitation for as the Synod at Dort hath declared God hath chosen in Christ unto salvation a set number of certain men Cb. 1. Art 7. with 15. neither better nor more worthy than others but equally lost and lying in the common misery with others whom he passed over unto everlasting destruction And therefore Deodati tells us in his Annotation upon that Text that Peter speaketh not here of that Original of the will and pleasure of God by which he taketh into favour one who of himself is as unworthy as the other Rom. 9. 11. 1 Cor. 4. 7. * Do these Texts serve the interests of the Sullapsarians or Supralapsarians or both or neither But of that consequent degree of his love toward the work of his grace in what Nation or quality of person soever it be found to maintain increase and make it up This is his sense Diotrephes But that learned man does conclude you see that where God hath begun his work of grace he will not fail to maintain increase and make it up and this is that very thing whereof the Apostle is so confident That he which hath begun a good work in you will perform or finish it untill the day of â—esus Phil. 1. 6. Christ Desolatus This perswasion of the Apostle is but the result of his charity towards those Philippians as
to follow Gods example in disposing of his own But God as his own most gracious * Micah 7. 18. nature abhors it so his Law forbids all such intolerable cruelty And as a good man regards the life of his Bâ—â—st * Prov. 12. 10. Jonah 4. 11. so doth our good God too But unto men he is a faithful Creatour 1 Pet. 4. 19. Who will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth 1 Tim. 2. 4. Not willing that any should perish but that all should come to Repentance the end and means too Salvation and Repentance And extendeth the riches * Rom. 9. 22. with chap. 2. 4. of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering to lead them to it And * Hebr. 6. 18. that by two immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie we may have a strong consolation in flying for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us He hath confirmed his promise by an Oath Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O House of Israel Gods goodness or equity makes him have a desire to the work iâ— his own hands 'T is Job 14. 15. the extream provocation and incorrigible obstinacy of sinners that makes the Prophet denounce such a fearful doom against some of them Isaiah 27. 11. For it is a people of no understanding therefore he that made them will not have mercy on them and he that formed them will shew them no favour Desolatus Doth God cast off none but such as cast off him first and dâ—spise his goodness See 2 Kings 13. 23. Samaritanus Not a man that I can find according to the Holy Scriptures * Imo divinae dereliction is eae apertissimè designatur ratio quod Deus ab hominibus peius descratur Prov. 1. 24. Theol. M. Britt â—â— 3. 4. Artic. Thes 4. vide sequent inter Act. Syn. Nat. Dord pag. 129. par 2. for so the Lord hath declar'd himself 1. In the Old Testament Prov. 1. 24. to 31. Because I have called and yeâ—r fâ—â—sâ—d I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded but ye have set at naught all my counsel and would none of my reproof I also will laugh at your calamity c. And to the same purpose Ezek. 24. 13. In thy filthiness is 〈◊〉 because I have purged thee and thou wâ—st not purged thou shalt not be purged from thy filthiness any more till I have caused my fury to rest upon theâ— 2. In the new Testament Acts 13. 26. The Apostle addresseth his Ministry unto them in these That the displeasure of God is only against the refractory and disobedient see Heb. 10. 38. 1 Cor. 10. 5. Heb. 3. 17 18 19. expressions Men and Brethren Children of the stock of Abraham and whosoever among you feareth God to you is the Word of this salvation sent And he gives them warning Ver. 40 41. Beware therefore lest that come upon you which is spoken of is the Prophets Behold ye despisers and wonder and perish and because they did despise contradict and blaspheme the Gospel and reject * Luke 7. 30. the Counsel of God against themselves therefore the Apostle took the boldness to tell them Ver 46. It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you but seeing ye put it from you and judge your selves unworhly of everlasting life â—â— we turn to the Gentiles The Talent * Talentum gratiae a Deo semel concessum nemini eripitur nisi qui prius suo vi tio illud sepelivit Matth. 25. 28. Hinc monemur â—â— Spiritum resistamus nâ— Spiritum extinguamus nâ—gratiam Dei frustra recipiamus ne deficiamus a Dâ—o Hebr. 3. 7. Theol. Britt ibid. vide is never taken away till it be first abused or at least neglected hence Hebr. 2. 3. How shell we escape if we neglect so great salvation Reprobation is therefore thus defined by the Learned and Orthodox God 's immutable Decree whereby he hath determined to leave them under wrath for their sin and unbelief and to damn them eternally who will not repent and believe in Christ This Deâ—â—â—iâ—ion is most exactly true if God reprobates such only as he damns and if he doth otherwise there is not an exact conformity betwixt his Decree and the Execution of it which is absurd and the Scriptures express it in See Mark 16. 16. John 3. 36. Acts 13. 46. Rom. 11. 20. every page but especially we may take it from the words of our Saviour Christ John 3. 18 19. He that believeth not is condemned already because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God And his is the cause of condemnation that light is come into the World and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil In which words we have not only the way but the cause also of condemnation propounded viz. unbelief and the love of darkness proceeding from a custom of evil-doing Desolatus My Friend I am afraid you forget your self in this point for you know Divines do distinguish here and make a wide difference betwixt the Decree of Reprobation and the Execution of it Although say they God doth destine whomsoever he please to hatred and destruction without any respect to any quality in them yet he is not unjust because betwixt his Eternal Decree and the Execution of it sin and infidelity are subordinated as the cause for which he justly damns them Samaritanus I remember this distinction very well but I cannot allow it for currant because it doth not free God from injustice for if the execution be therefore just because it supposeth a cause or ground for the infliction of that evil upon man which was destinated to him by the Decree the Decree therefore for the infliction of that evil is unjust because that excludes such cause or ground for if it be not lawful to inflict evil without cause neither is it lawful to will the infliction of it for the injustice we know is not first and principally in the insliction but in the will to inflict for rectitude is primò per se in itself first and chiefly in the will in the execution only by extâ—insecal denomination But 2. If there be such a diversity in the execution from the Decree this Execution is not the Execution of that Decree but something else as was intimated before Besides how is sin subordinated to that Decree and by whom Is it by Almighty God Why then whether that subordination be by a positive or privative action that sin is intended of God as a means inservient to that Execution and this will double the injustice of iâ— for what is this else but first to will
yet find fault For who hath resisted his will This was enough to stop the mouth of such a bold person but not all the Apostle had to say by way of Answer for he gives a clear decision of the point vers 30 31 32. Not according to that principle of an irrespective election and Reprobation but upon the account of Faith and Vnbelief respectively For such as were now rejected from the lâ—t of God's people were broken off because of their unbelief and such as were elected to it did stand by faith Rom. 11. 20. And this is to be resolved wholly into the Arbitrement of God's Will who was freely pleased thus to determine and ordâ—in touching the sons of men That whosoever believeth shâ—uld have eternal life He that believeth not should be câ—ndemned Joh. 3. 16 18 36. So that if you ask a cause of this Constitution it is the sole Will of God Therefore he chose Peter and Paul c. whom he fore-knew would believe because out of the meer pleasure of his gracious Will he would save Believers He reprobated the Jews whom he fore-saw would not believe because according to the pleasure of his own Will he determined to condemn Vnbelievers The prescription of Faith unto salvation is therefore of the free-will of God alone who did so appoint it Desolatus I have been taught That we are chosen to salvation and glory not as holy or believers but to the end we may be made such Our election doth not presuppose Faith or Holiness in us but procures them for us according to that of the Apostle Eph. 1. 4. He hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love And the same Apostle tells us that all men have not faith and he makes Faith a Propriety calling it 2 Thes 3. 2. Tit. 1. 1. the faith of God's elect Samaritanus We may consider a twofold election one to grace and another to glory but the more profoundly learned have observed that throughout the whole book of Scripture there is not one single Text wherein the word election or chosen signifies without controversie Election or Chosen unto glory And because in that of Eph. 1. 4. The Apostle saith God hath chosen us in Christ and that we should be holy They think it most agreeable to interpret it of God's choosing us through Christ unto the state of grace to the end we may lead a holy life to his praise and glory according to the 6 verse And because 't is said in the Praeterperfect tense He hath chosen us before the foundation of the world therefore they understand it of God's decree of election by a Metonymie very frequent in Holy Scripture which assignes the name of the effect to the counsel or decree it self as you may further observe in those Texts 2 Tim. 1. 9. Titus 1. 2. Ephesians 2. 5 6. Whereas you alledge out of the Apostle Tit. 1. 1. That faith is appropriated to the Elect That if rightly understood is no way opposite to our pretensions For by Faith in that place we are not obliged by any cogent Argument to understand Faith properly so called Fidemquâ Creditur The virtue of Faith whereby we do believe but Metonymically that Faith quae creditur The Doctrine of Faith which is believed and thus it is to be understood according to the usual style of holy Scripture as you may see in the 4 verse of this very chapter and Jude ver 3. Act. 6. 7. Rom. 1. 5. 2. By the word Elect we are not bound to understand in that place such persons as were from all eternity chosen absolutely and by name to glory For that word elect is not alwayes a Participle but sometimes a Noun and such a Noun as doth as well in the Old as New Testament connote some excellent and remarkable quality by reason whereof a thing is said to be elect As v. g. elect or choise Trees for their tallness Jer. 22. 7. Ezek. 31. 16. Elect or choise men for their valour 1 Sam. 26. 2. Jer. 48. 15. Elect or choise Cities for their strength and beauty 2 King 3. 19. And it is very agreeable to this sense of the word to say that men are called elect or choise-men in regard of their Probitie of mind and their promptness of assenting to the Revelation and following the conduct of the Gospel and the denomination of the elect of God may be given unto them in regard of their constancy of faith and their eminency of obedience amongst the rest of the Faithful To which purpose you may consult those Texts of holy Scripture Matth. 24. 31. Mark 13. 27. Luk 18. 7. 2 Tim. 2. 10. Rom. 8. 33. Col. 3. 12. Apoc. 17. 14. If by the elect in that place you understand elect to glory yet it doth not follow therefore that they were so elected unto glory before they did believe For then by the same reâ—son it would follow that sanctity goes before faith because we read Apoc. 13. 10. Here is the patience and faith of the Saints and in S. Jude's Epistle vers 3. Contend for the faith that was once delivered unto the Saints And we might conclude with equal Authority that vocation doth precede election because Apoc. 17. 14. they are sâ—id to be called and chosen and faithful But by elect in that place we may understand such as are elect to grace or called unto the faith by a gracious divine election and obey that call In short then the faith of God's elect may very well be expounded of the Doctrine of faith which was willingly imbraced and entertain'd by such as did yet retain the docile and honest heart and so were choice men and fearing God But profane and perverse absurd and unreasonable men are said not to have that faith because they reject the counsel of God against Luke 7 30. 2 Cor. 6. 1. Heb. 12. 15. Jude ver 4. themselves receive the grace of God in vain and turn it into lasciviousness Desolatus It is Dr. Twiss his observation That a man may hear the Word of God with a purpose to oppose it either Ubi supra p. 84. in general or some particular truth thereof Yet this humour of opposition cannot hinder God's Word and the operation of his Spirit where he will in spight of their conceits who thought the Apostles were filled with new wine when three thousand were converted that day and Austin acknowledgeth that God converteth not only aversas à vera fide but adversas verae fidei voluntates We read in the 7 of John that some who were sent to take Christ were taken by him Samaritanus You must consider that there may be more secret opposition in the heart to the word of grace upon the account of interest prejudice or false principles passionately espoused where the life is less scandalous and the opposition is the more obstinate and consequently the more hard
to be conquered according to the ground upon which it is made How Joh. 5. 44. can ye believe saith our Saviour to the Jews who seek honour one of another And he tells the Scribes and Pharisees That the Publicanes and Harlots entred into the Kingdom of heaven before them And Solomon invites us to this observation saying Sâ—est thou a man that is wise in his own eyes there is more hope of a fool that is a wicked man than of him Prov. 26. 12. The dispensâ—tion of the Gospel which is the Ministration of the Spirit goes forth doubtless with a mighty power of conviction but how farre it works upon particular persons affected under the influences of it is not so easie to be resolved There are in the conversion of sinners cases extraordinary which must not he drawn into example nor prejudice the general Rule as in S. Paul Austin c. But ordinarily that there is some disposition and temper of spirit more apt than others to receive the effectual impressions of it is most certain Such is the honest and good heart in the Parable such are the humble and meek Psal 25. 15. Joh. 3. 21. Joh. 7. 17. Mat. 11. 18. Joh. 10. 28. Mat. 11. 25. 1 Pet. 2. 2. Joh. 8. 47 1 Joh. 4. 5 6. Joh. 6. 45. and the pâ—or in spirit such as do the truth and the Will of God so farre as their information serves them such are the weary and heavy ladâ—n and the like They are resembled to sheep and to babes and are sâ—id to be of God to have learned of the Father and to know him These are said to be ordained that is disposed and in a sit posture for eternal life Acts 13. 48 and of this ingenuous and noble temper were those Bereans Acts 17. 11. They were as it were in the Suburbs or Confines not farre from the Kingdom of God and upon the first call by the word of grace they obeyed and stept into it Desolatus But by what means may a man obtain to be thus disposed or qualified for faith and conversion Samaritanus Mr. Baxter tells you very truly that common grace is truly preparative and dispositive to saving grace so Of Saving Faith p. 39 41 46. that if we employ and improve the first we may be confident we shall obtain the other Not by any merit or causolity force or efficacy of our work or by any natural connexion but meerly Dr. Jacks p. 3109 c. by God's grace by the counsel of his holy and irresistible will by which it hath pleased him to appoint the one as a necessary consequent of the other Desolatus Have you any grounds for this assertion Samaritanus Yea that ground so often laid down by our Saviour in the Parable of the Talents Habenti dabitur To him that hath made use of grace shall be given and he shall have more Mat. 25. 28 29. abundance Desolatus That is he shall have more of the same kind if he employes his Talents of common grace he shall have an addition of common grrce if he employes talents of saving grace he shall receive a greater measure of saving grace Samaritanus Nay God's bounty will be extended further a Mat. 25. 21 22. Thou hast been faithful in a little I will make thee ruler over much upon the emprovement of common grace he shall receive saving grace for to him that had emproved his talents he saith Be thou Ruler over so many Cities b Luk. 19. 17 19 The remuneration is in a matter of a higher nature And this God doth vouchsafe not of debt or condignity or congruity but of grace * Praecedaneorum illorum recâ—â—or â—sâ—s causae rationâ—m non habet qua Deus tanquam justus Judex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impulsus est ad majoâ—em gratiam communicandam sed tanquam mitissimus pater c. 〈◊〉 col inter D. Tilon Camer p. 35. and mercy still Desolatus Suppose two persons alike affected in mind and body exposed to the like temptation and attended with equal assistances of grace whether is it possible for one of these to stand impregnable while the other miscarries under this tryal And if he may whence is this difference in the issue and event of this combate Samaritanus Take the Totum Complexum together and there can be no other cause assign'd but the liberty of the will for grace cannot be the cause why any man doth fail of his duty but the will assisted by grace is a Partial cause of that man's standing in his integrity and the total cause of this man's falling from it Thus S. Austin hath determined the question Si aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo corpore videant unius corporis Lib. 12. de civit cap. 6. apud Grevinch pulchritudinem quâ visa unus eorum ad illicite fruendum moveatur alter in voluntate pudica stabilis perseveret quid putamus esse causae ut in illo fiat in illo non fiat voluntas mala Respondet si eadem tentatione ambo tenentur unus ei cedat atque consentiat alter idem qui fuerat perseveret quid aliud apparet nisi unum voluisse alterum noluisse à castitate deficere unde nisi propriâ voluntate ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis animae affectio amborum oculis paritervisa est eadem pulchritudo ambobus pariter institit tentatio Of two persons alike affected in soul and body alike assaulted by the temptation of the same beauty why one of them should prostitute himself to the temptation while the other perseveres in his chastity Austin could assign no other reason but their own will the one would the other would not violate his Sacred chastity 2. If you take the Case apieces Prosper * De vocat Gent. l. 2. c. 26. answers distinctly to the several parts and renders the cause exactly well Quod gratiae opitulatio à multis refutatur ipsorum est nequitiae quod autem à multis suscipitur gratiae est divinae voluntatis humanae That the assistance of grace is rejected of many 't is solely of their own naughtiness but that it is embraced of many 't is both of the divine grace and the humane will Desolatus But Sir that good use and that cooperation of the will are pious actions and savingly good and therefore should be ascribed wholly to the grace of God and not at all to the will of man Samaritanus That good use and that cooperation of the will are to be ascribed to Grace as the Principle and Primary cause but yet as they are moral actions they do derive their efficacy and vertue from the will and not from grace wholly which may be clearly evinced by this Dilemma of the Remonstrants Examen censuraep 180. b. Usus ille bonus gratiae aut est actus officij nostri qui virtuosus dici meretur Aut non est Si
decreed that I shall or I shall not use the means to escape it So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoâ—câ—l dream of fatal necessity at the heels are inseparable attendants of this Opinion For I may not onely say If I shall die of the Infection I shall if I shall not die I shall not and therefore I need not use means to avoid it But also if I must use means I must if I must not I must not Seeing Gods decree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means as to obtain or lose the end For if their opinion be true all things whatsoever end or means of little or great moment come to passe necessarily and unavoidably by reason of Gods eternal Decree Here they have two Evasions The first is this A beit say they God hath most certainly determined what shall or what shall not be done concerning us Evasio 1. yet his Decree is hid from us and we must use lawful and ordinary means for the obtaining of such and such good Ends keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealâ—d to us See the vanity of this shift our Opposites teach that whatsoever God hath decreed shall be dâ—ne and whatsoever is omitted Confutatio shall be undone If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means it is impossible for us to use them iâ— he hath decreed that we should it is impossible that we should omit them And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say that although God in his secret will hath determined that we should not do such a thing yet we are to do it seeing his decree though it be sâ—cret yet it will have its effect and it is absolutely impossible we should do that which God hath determined we shall not do Howsoever say our Opposites our opinion is far from Stoicism for the Stoâ—cks thought that all things came inevitably to pass by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Evasion 2. causes but we teach that all events are irresistably necessary by reason of Gods everlasting dâ—crees and His Omnipotency daily executing them This reason is so poor a one and yet so much made on by some worthy men that I am more troubled to wonder at it Confutation than to confute it yet that I may satisfie it distinctly I will divide the opinion of the Stoâ—cks into two particular Tenets 1. They hold that all things come to pass inevitably 2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes Our Opposites stifly maintain the former of these Tenets Now let the Reader observe that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error follow the first part of their opinion though sequestred from the second For if all things come to pass unavoidably what need I care what I do yea if I shall care I shall care whether I will or no and a thousand the like horrid conceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day that all things are done unavoidably and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha It s too apparent therefore that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence both of Stoicism and Turcism Again if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion we shall perceive that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced but that it will be compleat Stoicism The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events its true but what did they think to be the connexion of causes doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature which they supposed to be a Deity It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws but whatsoever they meant by the Fates its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta Parcarum Leges c. Yea the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree as Edictum from Edicere so Fatum from Fari Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod Deus de unoquoquâ— fatur saith Minutius Well then to apply Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together one necessarily following in the neck of another Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree Do they not defend compleat Stoicism What part of Stoicism do they disclaim Do they not maintain inevitable necessity Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this connexion Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point unless we will give them leave to grant the prezmises and deny the conclusion I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities as accounting those to be Deities which are not whose decrees they made the causes of all things but they were the common errors of Paganism and are beside the point in hand And truly these set aside I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks I have prosecuted this Argument more copiously because it includeth many others I mean all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with against the error of the Stoicks and they are many for I think verily there are few opinions which have a greaâ—er retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences than this of the unavoidable necessity of events Some of them may make one laugh and some of them may make one tremble I omit the former because they are obvious to every mans conceit and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter Of the last sort I will specific one in a second Argument That opinion which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin is gross and erroneous that I may say no worse but so I Arg. 2. speak it with horror doth the Opinion of our Opposites I know they are renowned Christians and as they abhor Stoical errors so they hold this damnable doctrine which is worse than ever any Heretick held which transformeth God into a Devil to be most accursed yet so the case standeth that as the See this Argument confirmed in the Answer to the 4th Objection error of fatal necessity so this of the cause of sin fatally followeth their opinion which I prove thus They teach That nothing is done in the world nor can be done but what God hath decreed to be done Now it 's too certain that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are
use to his Glory in obedience to his commandements and resist His and our enemy the Devil we most traiterously siding with Satan have abused His gifts to His Dishonor God did the part of a Creator we of Rebels A man lives intemperately God gave him not strength to this purpose he necessitated not the man to this intemperancy Man therefore onely sinned God is dishonoured The King made his Subject able to rebel against him by delivering his military furniture unto him the verier miscreant he that did rebell against him So God made Adam indeed able to sin but he never intended that he should sin with that ability God then is the cause of all those things in which we sin and yet whatsoever he doth is exceeding good he is not the cause that we intend any sin but the cause that we are able to commit those sins we intend and yet he intended not our abilities for sin but for his Service Of all our good actions he is the first cause we are the second of all our sins we are the proper cause he is onely the Conditio sine qui non But here some man may say That choice or election of an unlawful object upon which we misplace our actions is that which maketh us sinners now this being an act of our will it must suppose also the concourse of God how then doth our opinion clear the point The same Answer abundantly sufficeth God made Adam able to be willing to sin but he made him not to will sin God set before him life and death that he did choose death it was by the strength of will given him of God but God did not bind him to choose death for that were a contradiction a necessitated choice Briefly whatsoever we choose we do it by the power by which we are voluntary Agents yet if we choose death God is Object ult not to be blamed for he made us voluntary and therefore it was as possible for us to have chosen life If the nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed this point will be most evident The last objection is this Gods fore-knowledge of all futures is most infallible and necessary Ergo All futures in respect of him fall out necessarily otherwise it is possible God may be deceived yea if many things fall out contingently Gods fore-knowledge of them can be but contingent depending after a sort on mans free-will This Argument is plausible at the first view but if it be touched it falls to shatters It is one thing to know that a thing will necessarily be done and another to know necessarily that a thing will be done God doth necessarily and certainly foreknow all that will be done but he doth not know that those things which shall be done voluntarily will be done necessarily he knoweth that they will be done but he knoweth withall that they might have fallen out otherwise for ought he had ordered to the contrary So God necessarily knew that Adam would fall and yet he knew that he would not fall necessarily for it was as possible for him not to have fallen It was the antient and is still the true opinion That Gods Praescience is not the cause of Events he fore-knoweth all things because they will be done things are not done because he fore-knoweth them The infallibility of his knowledge consisteth not in the immutability of his decree but in the prerogative of his Deity it is impossible therefore that any man by his voluntary manner of working should delude Gods fore-sight not because God doth necessitate his will to certain effects for this were indeed to take it away but because his fore-knowledge is infinite Let our hearts therefore be never so full of Mazes and Meanders turning and winding yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to use the Poets language the al-seeing Eye of God cannot but espy them long before not because he himself contrived them for then it were no wonder if he were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but because to Him who is every way infinite all things cannot be but present and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the significant word of the Author to the Hebrews signifying open by a metaphor or similitude drawn from a word that signifies having the faces laid upwards because such as lye so have their face exposed to the sight of all men FINIS Books Printed or sold by William Leake as the sign of the Crown in Fleetstreet between the two Temple-gates Yorks Heraldry fol. A bible of a very fair large Roman Letter 4. Orlando Furioso fol. call is learned readings on the Statute 21 H. 8. Cap. 5. of Sewers Perkins on the Laws of England Wilkinsons Office of Sheriffs 8. The book of Fees Parsons Law 8. Mirror of Justice 8. Topicks in the Laws of England 8. Skene de significatione verborum 4. Delamans use of the Horizontal Quadrant Mathematical Recreations Wilbeys second Set of Musick 3 4 5 and 6 parts 4. Coâ—â—â—â—ius in English 8. Dr. Fulk's Meteors Nyes Gunnery and Fireworks Cato Major with Annotations by William Austin Esquire Mel Heliconium by Alex. Ross 8. Nosce te ipsum by Sir John Davis 8. Animadversions on Lillies Grammer 8. The History of Vienna and Paris The History of Lazarillo de Tormes Hero and Leander by George Chapman and Christopher Marlow Mayer's Catechism 8. Exercitatio Scholastica Bishop Andrews Sermons Adams on Peter Posing of the Accidence Amadis de Gaule Guillims Heraldry fol. Herberts Travels fol. 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An exact Abridgment of the Records in the Tower of London from the Raign of K. Edward the second to K. Richard the third of all the Parliaments holden in each Kings raign and the several Acts in every Parliament by Sir Robert Cotton Kt. and Baronet An Apology for the Discipline of the antient Church intendep especally for that of our Mother the Church of England in answer to the Admonitory Letter lately published by William Nicolson Arch-Deacon of Brecon and now Lord Bishop of Glocestet Le Prince d'Amour or the Prince of Love Wa collection of several Ingenious Poems and Songs by the Wits of the Age. 8. A learned Exposition of the Apostles Creed delivered in several Sermons by William Nicholson Archdeacon of Brecon and now Lord Bishop of Glocester