the wood but the remote matter are the foure Elements The next forme of any thing is that which wee call Specificall but the remote formes are those of the next or of the remote Genus So the next forme of a man is to be reasonable but to haue sense is the forme of a liuing creature which is the Genus of man and by consequent also is the forme of man but remote Moreover there be causes Causes sufficient or not sufficient which are Sufficient of themselues to produce an effect As the Sunne is of it selfe sufficient to giue light and fire to burne and the favour of God to make a man happie But there are some causes which are not of themselues Sufficient must haue many together As to make a fertile soile the ground must be lustie it must be well tilled raine must moisten it and the Sunne must heat it in due season and moderately To attaine vnto learning a man must haue a good wit good instructions and be diligent and painefull So divers things are the causes of victory experience in the Generall valour in the Souldiers military Discipline necessary weapons c. but aboue all the will of God Now to argue from the causes and effects these Maximes Maximes are of vse 1. That which agreeth with the matter agreeth also probably with the thing composed of that matter As the earth is heavie and therefore terrestriall bodies are heavie This Maxime is sometimes faultie For example Ice is hard yet notwithstanding the matter of it is soft and liquid namely water 2. Where the matter is wanting there also the thing composed is wanting As where there is no iron a sword cannot be made 3. The next efficient and necessary cause being granted or denied the effect also must be granted or denied As if the Sunne shine it is day if it shines nor it is not day And this effect being granted the efficient cause is also granted 4. When divers causes are necessarily requisit to produce an effect one of the same causes being wanting the effect also is wanting 5. Such as is the efficient cause such commonly are the effects As of wicked Fathers come wicked Sonnes and strong things beget strong things and Moores haue blacke sonnes This Maxime is often false especially in remote and vniversall causes As the Sunne groweth not and yet it causeth plants to grow it hath no sent and yet causeth flowres to smell sweet and carions to stinke And God mooveth all but yet is immoovable Also in causes which act by accident As a Whetstoâ—e is not sharpe yet causeth sharpenesse the Sunne is not hot yet warmeth by accident in clearing and purifying the ayre by the reflection of his beames 6. If the selfe same qualitie be attributed vnto the agent and vnto the patient it must much more be attributed vnto the agent As the hand is warme by reason of the fire which acteth vpon it therefore the fire is hotter then the hand And the Sunne causeth the water to shine therefore it is brighter then the water This Maxime is false in the fourth species of qualitie namely in the forme and figure because this qualitie receiues neither more nor lesse As if the Seale be round it followeth not that the figure printed in the waxe be lesse round then the Seale 7. The end being granted those meanes also without which the end cannot be attained vnto are likewise granted As if you grant that a man liveth you grant also that he eats drinkes and breaths And happinesse being granted vertue and the favour of God are likewise granted 8. The meanes to attaine vnto the end being granted it followeth not that the end must therefore alwayes be granted For it is no good reason to say Philip hath bookes therefore he is learned he hath horses and weapons therefore he shall obtaine the victory So also the end being taken away the meanes are not alwayes therefore taken away For many though they haue the meanes in their hands never attaine vnto the end 9. Causes by chance or hazard are not fit to argue withall 10. If necessary effects be taken away the causes also are taken away I say necessarie For there are some causes which act not necessarily and which do not alwayes produce their effects As sicknesse brings not alwayes death 11. Causes are more excellent then their effects vnlesse the effect be a finall cause And therefore to see and heare are things more excellent then the faculties of seeing and hearing because those faculties are ordained onely for these effects namely to see and to heare 12. The causes ever goe before their effects in the order of nature but not alwayes in time Thus the Sun-beames are as ancient as the Sunne and the flame is never without clearenesse or brightnesse The Table of Causes Causes are Internall Matter of Generation Composition Forme Naturall Artificiall Externall Efficient Properly Improperly as the cause Meritorious InstrumeÌ„tall naturall artificiall Finall All causes are either 1. Next or Remote 2. By themselues or By accident 3. Sufficient or Insufficient The twelfth Chapter Of Etymologie ETymologie is the derivation of a word Etymologie in regard of the word is as a Definition in regard of the thing and serveth to argue and discourse As when we say Such a one is not a Counsellour because he giues no Counsell And Philip cannot be called a Philosopher because he loues not wisedome Thus by the Etymologie of these names Iesus and Christ wee gather what our Saviours calling and office is And wee encourage such as haue a name importing some vertue in stirring them vp to vertue by the Etymologie of their names So Eusebius and Pius may be exhorted to Pietie and Andrew to valour and Celestinus to giue himselfe to heavenly things least they belie their names by a contrary conversation And so one gathereth probably that all things in times past were common the Robe excepâ—ed because when a theft is committed we vse to say Such a one hath beene robbed and that the first Warres were against Beasts because the Latin word Bellum coÌ„meth from Bellua But these kinde of proofes are very weake because names are given vnto men before it can be knowne whether they will be vertuous or no nay sometimes names are given by contraries and by way of derision As when a dwarfe is called a Goliah Good Etymologies in the English tongue are for the most part taken from the Latin but such as are drawne from the English tongue are commonly absurd and ridiculous For example if a man should say that the woman is the woe of the man and beere quasi be heere The thirteenth Chapter Of things alike or vnlike THose things are called Alike which haue between them some Analogie and correspondencie or proportion The analogie is knowne by the end and vse As the Shepheard in regard of his flocke and the Pastor in regard of his Church are things Alike There be certain things
Therefore it neigheth not But such conclusions follow by chance and not by the force of the Syllogisme In these Syllogismes the assumption is part of the proposition which proposition maketh an entire Syllogisme And it is probable that this word Assumption is borrowed from these Syllogismes because that in them the second proposition is taken and assumed out of the first The foureteenth Chapter Of Disiunctiue Syllogismes DIsjunctiue Syllogismes are such whose proposition is compounded of two disjunctiue parts or peeces or which are separated by this particle OR As It is day or night This number is even or odd As thus This man is dead or aliue But he is dead Therefore he is not aliue Or els thus But he is aliue Therefore he is not dead Or thus But he is not aliue Therefore he is dead For those propositiōs are compounded of such parts the one whereof cannot be granted without overthrowing the other Nor can you overthrow the one without establishing or graunting the other And for this cause these two parts must be immediately opposit so as there may be no third For example this argument is not good There is peace or warre But there is no warre Therefore there is peace For there may be a truce In these Syllogismes to the end that the truth may be evident and without exception the two parts of the proposition must not be contradictorie but must be either contraries or privatiues or relatiues For example if I argue thus This line is straight or crooked But it is straight Therefore it is not crooked This argument is cleere and certaine But if I argue thus Philip is wise or vnwise But he is vnwise From thence wee can draw no conclusion that may haue any likelihood of reason ¶ The fift Booke OF THE MASTER-PEECE OF LOGICK called DEMONSRATION The first Chapter What Science is THIS word Science is somtimes taken for the whole bodie of one kind of learning Thus Ethicks Physicks Metaphysicks civill Law are called Sciences Sometimes the word Science signifieth onely the knowledge of a conclusion prooved by Demonstration And this is it whereof we purpose to treat of in this place which is thus defined Science is a certaine knowledge of a thing certaine whose proofe is drawne from the cause To haue the Science of a thing two certainties are required The one is that the thing be certaine of it selfe and vnchangeable The second is that the perswasion which wee haue of it be firme and cleare If either of these two certainties be wanting it is no Science but opinion For a man may haue a doubtfull opinion of a thing certaine As he that doubteth whether there be a God And on the contrary a man may haue a firme and stedfast perswasion of that which is vncertaine and false As those that suffer death for the defence of a false Religion And therefore it is not amisse to know the difference between Science Faith and Opinion Science is a certaine knowledge of a certaine thing by the next cause Opinion is a doubtfull or false knowledge Faith is a firme perswasion grounded vpon the Testimonie of some other If a man know certainly a thing because he seeth it or toucheth it that is neither called Science nor Faith nor opinion but sense which knoweth onely things singular but Science is of things vniversall The second Chapter What a Demonstration or Demonstratiue Syllogisme is A Demonstratiue Syllogisme is that which giveth or bringeth certaine knowledge of the conclusion If we will define it more exactly we must define it thus A demonstratiue Syllogisme is that which prooveth that the attribute of the conclusion is truely attributed vnto the subject by a Meane that must be the next efficient or finall cause of the attribute of the said conclusion These two sorts of causes were called externall in the Chapter of Causes aboue mentioned because they are no parts of the effect nor of the thing compounded though sometimes the efficient cause be in the very same subject As the soule of man is the cause of the sense in man and the thicknesse of gold is the cause of the weight of it In these examples the efficient cause and the effect are in the same subject The third Chapter What questions are demonstrable SVch questions wherein the attribute is a substance cannot bee prooved by demonstration because substances haue no certaine efficient cause proper vnto them For the will of God is an vniversall cause common to all things and by consequent it can be no Meane in a demonstratiue Syllogisme Againe such questions or conclusions wherein the attribute is a mutable or casuall accident cannot be proved by demonstration because these accidents haue no certaine and assured cause As Philip is rich Bucephalus halteth But those questions are demonstrable whose attribute is a proper and immutable accident whereof the next efficient or finall cause may be given For example these questions may be prooved by demonstration A transparent bodie is without colour Eunuches are never bald Fixt Starres doe twinckle The Moone suffers obscuritie Of all estates Oligarchie is the most subiect to civill warre Lines paralell never meet All bodies compounded of Elements are corruptible Vnder the scorching Zone it is very hot For the next efficient or finall cause of the attribute of these questiōs may be given The fourth Chapter What the propositions of a demonstratiue Syllogisme ought to be THe Demonstration must consist of necessary propositions among which those are the most necessarie which are called Immediate There be two sorts of immediate propositions that is to say such as are without any middle For some are immediate in regard of the subject and others are immediate in regard of the cause Immediate propositions in regard of the subject are when the attribute agreeth next of all and immediately to the subject so as a neerer subject cannot be given In such propositions the attribute agreeth with the subject because it is such a subject For example if I say that a horse hath sense this attribute agrees not next and immediately to a horse for there is a neerer subject namely an Animal vnto the which sense belongeth But if I say that a horse neigheth this agreeth next and immediately to a horse as he is a horse and not by reason of any other neerer subject Immediate propositions in regard of the cause are when an attribute is so neerely joyned to the subject as that the cause or reason cannot bee yeelded why it should be so For example here is a Demonstration Whatsoever hath a sensitiue soule hath touching Every animal hath a sensitiue soule Therefore every animal hath touching In this Syllogisme the conclusion is immediate in regard of the subject but not in regard of the cause For in this Syllogisme the Meane is the cause of the conclusion But the two propositions are immediate both in regard of the cause as also of the subject for nothing can be alledged as a cause of
salt is said of the whole Sea and of every part of it but to encompasse the earth is attributed onely to the Sea as it is a Whole and therefore it is not attributed to any part of the Sea The Table of the Whole and Parts The Whole is composed of parts Formall Materiall which are among themselues alike vnlike integrall not integrall necessary for being well-being not necessary The eight Chapter Of Definition DEfinition is a speech which expresseth the essence of the thing The perfect definition of a Substance is that which is compounded of the next Genus and the specificall difference As the definition of a Plant is to be a bodie liuing a vegetatiue life of man to be a reasonable creature There are but few such Definitions because the formes and essentiall differences of substances are not so well knowne vnto vs. God onely who made them doth exactly know them The perfect definition of an Accident is compounded of three parts namely of the next Genus of the proper Subject and of the next Efficient or Finall cause As for example death is an accident whereof the Genus is the end or destruction of life the Subject is a liuing bodie and the next Efficient cause is the extinguishing of vitall heat This therefore is the perfect definition of death namely that it is the destruction of the life of a liuing bodie by extinguishing the vitall heat Thus are defined anger griefe sicknes thunder earthquake the Eclipse of the Moone and that of the Sunne Civil-warre respiration and divers other things whereof wee shall produce some examples in the end of this Chapter Now but Proper Accidents can be thus defined For mutable and casuall Accidents or such as haue no certaine knowne cause or that depend vpon the will of man cannot be exactly defined And therefore in stead of a Definition we describe them as well as we may expressing their Genus and some certaine propertie So whitenes is defined when we say that it is a most simple and most cleare colour And light is defined to be the chiefe of all whitenesses or the whitenes of the bodie of the Sunne sending forth his likenes through transparent bodies Naturall instruments as the eye and the hand or artificiall as a hammer or ana xe are defined by their Genus and by their fitnes for that vse for which they are ordained So the Eye is the instrument of seeing and a Hammer is an instrument to knocke withall Definition serveth to discourse and to argue by the meanes of this Maxime Maxime To whatsoever thing the definition agreeth vnto that same also the thing defined doth agree And reciprocally to whatsoever the defined thing agreeth to the same the definition agreeth also The Table of Definition Definition is either of a Substance which is composed of the Next Genus Difference Accident which is Proper defined by the Next Genus Proper subject Next cause Efficient Finall Improper or casuall defined as the Substance so far as may be Certaine examples of the definition of a Proper Accident THunder is a sound in the cloud by the breaking out of a flaming exhalation Death is the destruction of a living creature by extinguishing the vitall heat The Eclipse of the Moone is the darkning of the Moone by the interposition of the earth Anger is a perturbation of the mind arising from the opinion of a sustained wrong Civill warre is the trouble of an Estate arising from the discord of the parties Baldnes is the losse of the haire of the head through the want of radicall humour Respiration is the drawing in of aire into the lungs to refresh the heart Sicknes is an Indisposition of the bodie caused by the distemperature of the Humours The Earthquake is the stirring or moving of a part of the earth through the violence of winds therein enclosed Blindnes is a privation of light in the eye by the corruption of the instruments of seeing Sorrow is a griefe in the irascible facultie through the griefe of some evill The Eclipse of the Sunne is the darkning of the aire by the interposition of the Moone The ninth Chapter Of Division THere are divers sorts of Divisions For either we divide the Genus into the Species or the Whole into the Parts or the Substance into divers Accâ—dents or an Accident into divers Subjects or a Word into divers significations 1. First we divide a Genus into the Species As a liuing creature into man and beast Actions into naturall and voluntarie 2. Or els we divide the Whole into Parâ—s So man is divided into Soule and bodie A house into the foundations walls and roofe Which division is made either in thought or in deed 3. Or els we divide the Subject into divers Accidents As when we divide men into free and bond into males or females into fooles or wisemen 4. Or els we divide an Accident into other Accidents As when we divide Physicians into rich and poore ones souldiers into great or little ones strong or weake 5. Or els we divide Accidents into divers Subjects As sicknes into the sicknes of the bodie and sicknes of the soule So we may divide corruption into the corruption of simple bodies or into the corruption of mixt or compounded bodies 6. Or we divide an Aequivocall word into divers significatioÌ„s As the word linke which signifieth a Sausage a Torch and a linke of a chaine Rules for Division 1. A good division must haue but few parts and those opposit if it may be As animal is divided into reasonable and vnreasonable Number into even and odd A line into straight and crocked But that is not alwayes possible As when we divide the externall senses into fiue And France into seventeene governements 2. In a Division nothing must be either superfluous or wanting As if a man should say that the senses are hearing seeing smelling and the two eyes there were in such a Division something wanting and something superfluous 3. The parts of a Division must not over-reach one another As who should say that all cloathing of the bodie is either garments or habillements or gownes Or that Iustice consisteth in three things to liue honestly to hurt no bodie to giue every man his owne In these divisions the parts are but little or not at all differing and are in a manner the same thing The Table of Division Division is of the Genus into the Species Whole into the Parts Subject into Accidents Accidents into divers Subjects Aequivocall word into divers significations The tenth Chapter Of things Coupled called in Latin Conjugata COupling is considered either in Words or in Things Words coupled or conjoyned are such as come from the same beginning and differ in termination As iust iustice iustly white whiting to white whitenes The linke and affinitie of which words is grounded vpon some affinitie which is in the nature of the things signified by these words But there are certaine things coupled in
Nature which are not coupled in Words As the sleepe and to slumber There are also certain words coupled which notwithstanding for matter are not of necesâ—â—tie linked together As buckle and a buckler Now for argument and discourse the coupling and affinitie which is in words is of no vse except there be also affinitie in the thing but where the affinitie of words proceeds from the affinitie in the thing we vse this Maxime Maxime To whomsoever one of the Coniugates or things coupled doth belong the others also belong vnto the same As he that lyeth is a lyar And to whomsoever it belongeth to doe a iust thing to him also belongeth iustice and to liue iustly And seeing thou art a knaue thou must be given vnto knavery This Maxime is not without Exception As may appeare by the example of Cambyses who being very vnjust did notwithstanding some just actions As in that he covered the seat of justice with the skinne of an vnjust Iudge whom he caused to be flâ—ad as a warning to all that should sit vpon the said seat And so there may be a Prince loving treason who notwithstanding hateth the traitour The eleventh Chapter Of Causes and Effects A Cause is that which bringeth forth an Effect or that by which or for which any thing is There be foure kinds of Causes the Materiall the Formall the Efficient and the Finall For example the matter of a house is stones wood and tyles the forme is the structure and manner of building which ariseth from the placing or ordering of the parts the efficient cause is the Master-builder the finall cause is for dwelling or habitation The efficient and finall causes are called Externall because they are out of the thing and are not parts of it As the builder is no part of the house for suppose the builder were shut vp in the house which he hath built yet were he still an externall cause by reason that he is not of the essence or definition of the house nor any part of it But the matter and forme are Internal causes because the thing is composed of them The cause Materiall Matter is that whereof the thing is composed As leather is the matter of a shoe because a shoe is made of leather Matter is of two sorts the one is called matter of Generation as the seed is the matter of the Generation of a tree slime is the matter of the Generation of frogs so water is the matter of ice The other is the matter of Composition As the foure elements are the matter wherof a bodie is composed wood and stone are the matter of a house Sometimes matter is taken improperly for the subject whereof we speake or write Thus battails and loue are the matter of the booke of Ariost And sometimes for the occasion and subject whereabout man doth labour and occupie himselfe As numbers are the matter of an Arithmetician and dangers and troubles are the matter of prowesse and patience Forme is that which giueth being to a thing Formall Of Formes some are Naturall As the forme of an Animal is the sensitiue soule and the forme of the eye is the facultie of seeing Others are Artificiall As the forme of a statua of a house or of a clock Naturall formes are part of the substance and are multiplied by generation But Artificiall formes are qualities and no parts of the substance neither are they multiplied by generation or propagation If we engraue the image of Caesar vpon a nut that nut being planted will bring forth fruit and nuts but not the image of Caesar And thence it is that children are not heires of the learning or piety of their fatâ—ers The Efficient Efficient cause is that by which a thing is As the Sunne is the efficient cause of the day and the fire of burning and sicknes of death and the interposition of the Moone the cause of the eclipse of the Sunne Vnder the Efficient cause we comprehend the cause which is called Meritorious As murther is the cause of punishment Likewise vnder the Efficient cause we comprehend the cause which is called Defectiue As the want of sight is the cause of going astray and the absence of the Sunne is the cause of night howsoever by nature it be the cause of day All instruments both naturall as the eye and the hand and artificiall as an Axe and a sword are in some sort Efficient causes For though they act not by their owne proper power yet they helpe the action and without them the naturall action would either be weake or altogether hindered The Finall Finall cause is that for the which a thing is done So the end of Physick is to heale the sick and the end of Studie is to get learning We must warily distinguish the scope from the end As the scope of walking is health but the end is the last step the one is the end of the intention the other the end of progression The finall cause may also be the formall and efficient cause but â—n divers respects As the forme of the house is the end of the builder and the forme of a horse engendred is the efficient cause of the operations of the same horse and also the finall cause of the horse engendring And that which is the final cause iâ— commonly an effect As to see is the finall cause and also the effect of sight Of causes the finall is the best and most excellent because all the other tend vnto it and serue it The finall cause as it is the last in execution so it is the first in the intention Efficient and finall causes bring forth their effects Causes of themselues or by accident either of themselues and of their owne nature or by accident Thus the Sunne giueth light of it selfe and of his owne nature but by accident it blindeth Owles And the neighing of Darius his horse was the accidentall cause of his raise to the kingdome And thirst may be an accidentall cause to saue a man out of the battaile if being thirstie and gone out of the armie to drinke it so happened that whilest he was a drinking the armie was suddenly discomfited So a Musician that buildeth a house is not the cause of the building as he is a Musician but as he is an architect or builder It is the same of the finall cause For example healing is the proper end of Physick but the gaine of the Physician is an accidentall end the one is the end of the Art and the other of the person Causes next or remote Againe there be some next and some remote causes For example the next end of the art of a souldier is warre and the remote is victory and the end more remote is a happie peace So the next efficient cause of death is sicknes of sicknes excesse and of excesse bad company The same may be said of formes and matters The next matter of a Table is
of the two contraries For if blacknesse be visible it followeth not that whitenesse be invisible because to be visible belongeth to the Genus of whitenesse and blackenesse namely to colour We must also except such causes as doe act by accident As if a white man buildeth his owne house it followeth not that a black man must pull downe his and if heat doth harden the ground it followeth not that frost must soften it 4. The selfe same cause may bring forth certaine effects when the action of the cause dependeth from the disposition of the matter against which it acteth So the Sunne giues a sweet smell to flowers but it makes a carrion stinke and fire hardens the earth and softens waxe 5. Every subiect that is capable to receiue the one of the contraries is also capable to receiue the other Thus whatsoever may be heated may be cooled and whatsoever may be hardned may be softned 6. One of the contraries being granted the other is overthrowne Thus he that is not free is a bondman But it followeth not that if one of the contraries be denied the other must be granted except they be such contraries as haue no meane between them As if the bodie be not white it followeth not that it is black But in contraries that are without meane this consequent iâ— good As if this line be not straight it is crooked 7. Of two good things whereof the one is lesser and the other greater the contrary to the greatest good is the greater evill As vertue and health be two good things if vertue therefore be a greater good then health vice must be a greater evill then sicknesse Except when one of the two good things is comprised in the other As to haue the skill of reading and the skill of Philosophie For though the skill of Philosophy â—e a greater good then the skill of reading yet it followeth not that not to be skilfull in Philosophie is a greater evill then not to be skilfull in reading because the skill of reading is comprehended vnder the skill of Philosophie 8. Contradictories cannot stand together and one of them must of necessity be As there is nothing that is not either man or not man and it is impossible to be both the one and the other at the same time The fifteenth Chapter Comparison of things THings are oft compared according to their goodnesse and excellency and then the comparison is made by these Rules or Maximes Maximes 1. Whatsoever is desired in regard of it selfe is better then that which is desired onely in regard of some other thing As life is better then money and sight is more to be desired then spectacles and health then Physick 2. That which is good to all is better then that which is onely good to some and which is vsed but seldome and for certaine respects Thus light is better then darknesse and to haue two armes is better then to be maimed For darknesse is of vse onely for theeues and debauched persons and to haue but one arme is of vse onely to beggars who thereby set forth their misery 3. That which is good of it owne nature is better then that which is good onely by accident or which is of vse onely to avoyd a greater evill Thus health is better then Physick and to haue our wares in our ship is better then to cast them into the Sea and prudence is better then chance 4. One good which when we haue wee need not the other is better then that which when we haue we haue yet need of the other Thus to be loved of God is better then to be loved of men and to haue the perfect knowledge of an Art is better then to haue it written in a booke 5. Of finall causes the last is ever the best Thus happinesse is better then vertue and the skill of managing a horse is better then the skill to make a spurre 6. Permanent goods are better then the transitory As vertue is better then money But in generall without any respect to the goodnesse or excellency of things they may be compared by these Maximes following 1. Other Maximes That which is such of it owne nature is more such then that which is onely such by participation Thus the Sunne is cleerer then a looking glasse when the Sunne shineth on it 2. That which is such of it selfe is more such then that which is such onely by accident As exercise and good nourishment is more healthfull then the cutting off of an arme and the death of the Sonne of God hath beene more beneficiall to salvation then the treason of Iudas howsoever God vsed it as a meanes for our good 3. That which is most remote from his contrary is more such then that which is lesse remote And therefore the cold in Norway is greater then that in Italy because it is more remote from the South from whence the heat commeth 4. That which acteth more forcibly is commonly more such then that which acteth more weakely As that which hurteth more is worse then that which hurteth lesse and that which pricketh more is sharper pointed then that which pricketh lesse This rule hath exceptions Aire and water are equally moist nay Aristotle holds the aire to be moister yet water moistens more then aire So the flame is hot or rather hotter then the hot iron and yet a hot iron burneth more then the flame doth The sixteenth Chapter Comparison of Probabilitie or Likelihood THings are compared in probabilitie when we question whether of the two is the more credible And this is done when to proue some one thing wee bring in another equally or more or lesse probable then that which is in question This comparison may bee made three manner of wayes 1. Probable alike For First when we will proue a thing in question we may bring in another thing as probable as it For example if a Prince hath granted something to one Citizen another Citizen may pretend that the like grant ought to be made vnto him also because he is a Citizen as well as the other and nothing inferiour to him So a fault which is pardoned to some one in regard of his youth must be pardoned to another as young as he This reason is grounded vpon this Maxime Maxime Of two things equally probable or equally iust the one being granted makes the other to be easiâ—y beleeved 2. More probable Secondly to proue a thing in question wee may bring another thing more probable then it arguing thus If that which is more probable is not much lesse shall that be which is lesse probable For example if a Father will not haue his children goe richly apparelled much lesse will he suffer it in his servants And if the Apostles were not without sinne how much lesse are wee This is called arguing from a more probable to a lesse and grounded vpon this Maxime Maxime If that which is more possible
and more probable be not much lesse shall that be which is lesse probable and possible The conclusion of such arguments must alwayes be negatiue Lastly 3. Lesse probable we may proue a thing in question by bringing in another thing that is lesse probable saying thus If a thing lesse probable and harder to be beleeved is notwithstanding or hath beene much more ought we to beleeue that which is more probable and easier to be done So if one at twelue yeares of age can carry a waight of a hundred pound by a stronger reason one may carry the same weight at the age of twentie yeares And if Alexander tooke Tyre much more easily might he haue taken Ierusalem which was weaker then Tyre if he had besieged it This is called arguing from the lesse probable to the greater grounded vpon this Maxime Maxime If that which is lesse probable and lesse possible may be much more shall that be which is more probable and more possible The conclusion of such arguments must alwaies be affirmatiue Wee must warily distinguish between the greatnesse of the thing and the greatnesse of the probabilitie For greatest things are oft lesse probable and more difficult For it were no good argument to say thus If birds can flie how much more bulls And if a threed can goe through the eie of a needle how much more a cable And if Michael Angell could paint very excellently how much more the Emperour Charles the fift The seventeenth Chapter Of Testimony TEstimonies are often vsed to argue and proue a thing Testimonies are of force and doe perswade when they be such as may not be denied by reason of the qualitie authoritie sufficiencie or multitude of persons Testimonies are either divine or humane Divine testimonies are Oracles and all that is called the Word of GOD likewise dreames visions miracles be they true or false if they be delivered as true Also rules to liue well derived from nature Humane testimonies if the question be about matter of right are humane lawes customes the testimonies of Ancestours or such as are skilfull in their owne art the consent of nations But if the question be of fact then are to be produced schedules acquittances confessions eye or eare witnesses Such witnesses Maxime as doe not affirme or denie a thing to be or not to be are of no force For there is a great difference between these two sayings God saith not that such a thing is and God saith that such a thing is not The latter is a good proofe but the former hath no consequence or sequel And likewise this proofe is of no effect Aristotle hath not said so therefore it is not so Or the Word of God saith not that man is a reasonable creature and therefore man is not a reasonable creature Notwithstanding if it be a thing which cannot be knowne but by the testimonie of one alone then this kinde of arguing is good and firme Such a one said not â—o and therefore you cannot maintaine that it is so For example if we had no knowledge of China but by the report of one man onely whosoever would affirme any thing without the warrant of such a one without question would be prooved a lyar or iâ— he spake the truth it were but by chance and not knowing himselfe whether he spake true or no. So likewise seeing that nothing that is necessary to salvation can be knowne without warrant from the Word of God whosoever in things necessarie to salvation affirmeth any thing not contained in the said word of GOD ought not to be beleeved affirmes that which he knowes not The eighteenth Chapter Of the vse or Practice of the precedent Doctrine THis Doctrine contained in the sixteene precedent Chapters is called the doctrine of Places because it shewes the places whence matter is drawne for argument and furniture for proofes For example if wee vndertake to proue that Death is not to be feared of a vertuous man wee must runne over these sixteene places and take notice of such as will best furnish vs with matter To make this plaine we will runne over the said places and apply them to this example The Genus of Death Death is the end of mans life Now the end is to be desired when it is not onely the end but also the scope that wee must ayme at such is death vnto which a wise man ought to prepare himselfe every day as being the end of his hope The difference This death comes by the separation of the soule from the bodie now wee must not feare the separation of such things as being ioyned doe hurt one another the soule consumeth the bodie with cares like vnto a knife that cuts its sheath the bodie is to the soule as a burden or a prison God separateth them to reioyne them againe in a better estate and condition The Species There be two kindes of death the one naturall caused through age the other violent which happens by sicknesse or when a man is killed Philosophers say that death which comes through age is without paine because it is without combate or resistance and who would liue when all his strength is spent violent death is not also to be feared of a vertuous man for what matter is it whether I dye of an ague or by the sword Whether by the distemper of humors or by the distemper or commotion of people Whether I yeeld vp my soule by the mouth or by a wound so it may goe to God The properties and accidents of Death Death makes all alike both great and small It dismasketh and discovereth thoughts then dissimulation hath no more place The words of the dying are serious and of great weight their prayers are fervent their confession humble their admonitions to their children are received with attention the spirit of God comforteth them within the Angels guard and assist them without and Iesus Christ reacheth them out the crowne Of things conjoyned with Death If we must not bewaile the dead why should we then feare death The causes of Death The efficient cause of death is the will of God which wee were better to yeeld vnto willingly then by compulsion why should we resist Gods will seeing it is iust and vnevitable Againe the law of nature vnder the which we are borne is the cause of death plead not therefore against your owne hand writing Wouldst thou haue the lawes of the world changed for thee The finall cause of death in regard of the world is that we may giue place one to another thy father hath given place to thee giue thou place to thy children The finall cause of death in regard of every vertuous man is to put an end to all his miseries and to bring him home to God For all these causes of death a vertuous man ought not to feare it Causes wherefore a thing ought not to be feaâ—ed A thing is not to be feared first if it is vnevitable secondly
a man Therfore he is not a living creature For such arguments are against the rules of Hypotheticall Syllogismes set downe in the thirteenth Chapter of the fourth Booke The seaventh Chapter The fallacie whereby a thing is taken for a cause which is none THe fift fallacie is when you alledge a Meane which seemeth to be the cause of the conclusion but indeed is not Such was the answer of a certaine Pyrate to Alexander the great who having asked of him what had made him a Pyrate he answered that he was a Pyrate because he had but one Fregat or small Barke but if he had two hundred Gallies as Alexander had that then hee should be a King Such also are these proofes The Church of Greece is the best because it is the greatest Or This man is learned because he hath many books Or that Charles hath a grey-beard because he was not hanged ten yeares agoe Here the ordinary fault is when the occasion is taken for a cause For causes doe act but occasions act not but are onely the subject and matter of acting Thus truth breeds hatred not of it owne nature but by occasion So the Law of God hardeneth the hearts of wicked men that oppose thēselues against it It is not the cause of the hardnesse but onely the occasion The eight Chapter Of the fallacie which mingleth many Interrogations as if they were but one SOmetimes many Interrogations are cunningly entermingled that an vntruth may be crowded in amongst many truths As Cyrus Alexander Caesar were they not valiant Kings Or these qualities to be bay olde tall one-eyde are they not in this horse Some will be ready to grant all this not marking that Caesar was never King and that to be one eyde is a privation and not a qualitie and that to be olde is not a qualitie but a quantitie or length of time past Therefore such Interrogations must be answered by distinction The ninth Chapter Of the fallacie which is committed by the Ignorance of that which contradicteth the Question THe fallacie through the Ignorance of that which contradicteth is when he that argueth against me brings a conclusion which he alledgeth as contrary or contradictorie to my position which notwithstanding is nothing prejudiciall vnto it and may be granted For example if I say that God is no lyar a Sophister will goe about to conclude that God saith not all the truth which notwithstanding agrees very well with that which I affirme neither doth it from thence follow that God is a lyar To the end therefore that these be not taken for contradictorie or contrarie Enuntiations which indeed are not we must vnderstand that if we will make two Enuntiations to be cōtradictorie the termes must be vnderstood in the same sense in both and without equivocation Therfore these two Enuntiations Every Cocke is living and Every Cocke is not living are not contradictorie if the one be meant of a living creature and the other taken for the cocke of a Gunne Againe the attribute must agree with the subject in the same part according to the same time Therefore these two Enuntiations Man is mortall and Man is immortall are not contradictorie if the one be vnderstood of the body and the other of the soule of man And The Grecians were valiant contradicteth not this The Grecians were not valiant for both are true if you consider them at severall times Againe the attribute of the Enuntiation must not be vnderstood in divers respects For Cicero is of great stature and Cicero is not of great stature may both be true if Cicero be compared to divers persons little in comparison of a giant and great in comparison of a dwarfe The tenth Chapter Of the faults in Syllogismes GEnerally all Syllogismes may be faultie either in the forme or in the matter They are faultie in the Forme when the rules of the figures are not observed committing a fault either in the quantitie or qualitie or the propositions or in the placing of the Meane or if there be more then three termes The Syllogisme is faultie in the Matter when one of the propositiōs or both are false either in the whole or in part This faultinesse happeneth sometimes through simplicitie and without cunning bu◠sometimes it is fraudulent and with cunning such as are the fallacies aboue mentioned If a Syllogisme be faulty in the forme it must be brought to the true forme If it be faultie in the matter that proposition which is false must be denied And if it be doubtfull or true in part onely it must be distinguished But if the fault be neither in the forme nor in the matter but onely in the fallacie of the ignorance of that which contradicteth the question by the which the adversary maintaineth a thing which doth not prejudice the question in such a case wee must grant all that the adversary saith and shew him that in thinking to contradict vs be doth it not The end and scope of these fallacies is not to teach vs how to deceiue but how to avoide deceipt FINIS