Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	act_n	effect_n	will_n	1,670	5	6.6468	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A63764	A discourse of natural and moral impotency by Joseph Truman, B.D., late minister near Nottingham.	Truman, Joseph, 1631-1671.	1675 (1675)	Wing T3139; ESTC R37908	117,738	238

he brings this Instance to shew in what sense they are voluntary When a man hath brought a Disease on himself by Intemperance he may be said to be sick of a voluntary Disease though he would fain be freed from it and cannot Any one may see that if the case was so you could not call them vitious habits formaliter and voluntary formaliter and properly but only sinful and voluntary figuratively originally effectivè as every punishment of sin is because voluntary sins were the cause of them If a man should say I would not at all be Covetous and chuse the world for my chief good but I do chuse it Would it not be a Contradiction And if such a thing was possible would it not be far from being sin and punishable You may see by this that such habits are only this Moral Impotency the wilfulness it self under another consideration If any should yet be unsatisfied and think Vitious habits are not Elicited but Imperated Let him reduce them to what notion he will and it will come all to one for Argument for he must then say of them as of all other Imperate things that they are subject to the will wholly or so far as they are not they are sinless and that God doth not require us to put them off If you will have them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and meerly sensitive inclinations then they are not Vitious any more than they are consented to or not enough disliked As suppose you should call a great Thirst brought upon a man by excessive drinking Drunkenness And again either they take away the Natural power of Willing i.e. make him no Rational Creature and then they would excuse or they cause that a man cannot Will good if he would pardon this Contradiction for I speak it docendi causa and this would excuse indeed A thing impossible cannot be a Moral fault Or they only hinder the effects of the Will the Imperate acts and then they so excuse that God would accept his Will without those Imperate acts But these would be irrational notions of Moral habits for let any man consider and he may easily see I think that they are not different specie from volitions that is inclinations of the Will but comprehend in their notion some kind of radication and continuance of volition that we cannot well understand Doubtless they are not a kin to other habits which only enable the subject facily and dextrously to do the act for a good man could as facily and dextrously commit a sin as another man but will not Now to let you see further a necessity of thus distinguishing consider how the Ancients were for want of this distinguishing puzled to answer the fallacious arguments for the Pelagian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or perfection in this life while yet the Orthodox Fathers held in the main as we ordinarily do as may be made fully apparent Pelagius maintained amongst his other errours this That a man in this life can keep the Law perfectly and meant it Morally in the sense wherein I oppose it his Arguments were these * Epistle Pelag. ad Demetriadem Duplici ignorantia accusamus Deum c. Tom 4. Hieron It is Pelagius his Epistle though through the Ignorance of former times placed with and read amongst Jerom's as B. Vsher and others observe which prove it only Naturally possible viz. To deny a mans power to keep the Law perfectly is to accuse God of a double Ignorance in not knowing our weakness or in not knowing what he commands us or it is to accuse him of Injustice in commanding what man cannot do Or thus as * Hierom lib. 1. advers Pelag Aut possibilia mandata D us dedit aut impossibilia Si possibilia in nostra potestate est ea facere Si impossibilia nec in hoc r●i sumus si non facimus quod non possumus Ac per hoc sive possibilia sive impossibilia D●us dedit mandata potest homo sine peccato esse Critobulus by which feign'd name Jerom represents Pelagius as by Atticus himself formes the Argument Either God hath given possible or unpossible commands If possible it is in our power to keep them if unpossible we sin not in not-doing them since we cannot And so it follows that whether God have given commands possible or impossible a man can live without sin Augustin Lib. 2. de peccat merit remiss cap. 6. endeavours to answer this difficulty and affirmed it as undoubted that God commandeth no man any thing which he cannot do Therefore he saith in Answer that a man can live without sin through Grace and by Gods help But this doth not answer the difficulty at all unless he will affirm that no man doth sin except God give him this Grace that is except God by his Grace make him that he doth not transgress the Law which is in effect to say Man doth not sin except God make him actually not to sin which would be to come to Pelagius at the back-door and to go beyond Pelagius and hold That it is impossible any man should sin at all Jerom endeavours to answer this but more palpably spoyls all for want of distinguishing He also maintains as undoubted amongst all Christians That God commandeth nothing but what man can do and yet maintaineth that no man can perfectly keep all the Commandements which is good sense if we distinguish but without distinguishing an express contradiction But he trusts to this weak Evasion to salve it Lib. 1. adversus Pelag Vides quod Deus possibilia jusserit tamen nullum posse c. His commands are possible saith he going on because some men can keep one part and some another of the commands but yet none can keep all and adds therefore it is not the duty of single men to keep them all and so God commands nothing but what we can do But Augustine is express against this of Jerom Serm. 191. de Tempore † Execramur eliaw blasphemiam eorum qui dicunt Impossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse praeceptum mandata Dei non a singulis sed ab omnibus in comuni posse servari and calls it Blasphemy to say that God commands any thing that men in particular cannot do but only men in general Neither is there I think to be found one of the Ancients accounted Orthodox that doth maintain in the strict sense opposed that God commandeth men what they cannot do but all abhorred it as an opinion laying an high Accusation on God till many hundred years after this age of Augustin But at last * Who lived 700 years after this Serm. 2. in vigil Rom. Bernard being pressed with this difficulty doth yet any one may see unwillingly fly to this that God may command what man cannot do and doth mean it of a Natural power But he doth it in these words God may command nimis too much And in giving his reason for

in Religion he would have been very angry if one should have stood up and said as many now God's love kindness is to every one alike but only where Virtue or Vice makes the difference and so God either doth not love you better than other people or if these benefits have love in them then it is true God doth not love us so as to give us these priviledges and ordinances which he denyeth to other people because we were more than others for we are fewer yet however for any thing we know because we are better and not meerly from his good pleasure without respect to any good or less-hurt in us and it is true It is not for our Righteousness in a strict sence but it was for some occult quality in us a kin to Righteousness For this would have been to have said to God I either know better than Thou or Moses or if you know as well as I you conceal your meaning to engage us more to thankfulness For though you seem to speak largely yet you have not made a sufficient ennumeration for it was not merely from some special love and favour not granted to others as good as we but something God had respect to in us better than in others Again when God said Mal. 1.2 3. I have loved you saith the Lord yet you say Wherein hast thou loved us was not Esau Jacob's Brother saith the Lord yet I loved Jacob and hated Esau that is I preferred Jacob before Esau God spake this to upbraid the Jews with unthankfulness and to move them to gratitude to love and honour Him as a Father But one might have replyed here according to some This giving to him and us his posterity greater mercies than to Esau was not to love him and us his posterity more than Esau and his posterity though you call it so and so we can say for all this Wherein hast thou loved us more than Esau and his posterity or else this was not from any special love to him and us without respect to any special thing in him or us that would not have been to Esau and his posterity if as good as he or we and therefore it doth not oblige us to any special obedience and thankfulness more than them They might have defended themselves That their ingratitude was no more culpable than that of the Edomites had they been of some mens opinion thus There is only a twofold love or good-will antecedent Love and consequent Love or good-will which is a distinction † Chrysost in Epist ad Ephes cap. 1. hom 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Damascenus after him explain's more sully this Distinction Ancient and of good use and ought to be taken notice of to keep our notions clear though I dislike their saying that the Antecedent love is equal to all The Antecedent love is that which hath no respect to any good in men but doth good to all men without respect to any good in them now this say they is equal to all men alike I grant it to all men but am proving it is not equal to all men Secondly the Consequent Love called also † If we consess our sins he is faithful and just to forgive Amor justitiae being according to a Rule and Law which Consequent Love or Love of Justification is Conditional and hath essentially a respect to some good thing in men being by and according to a Law the Gospel Rule Now this say they is equal to all men alike but where their goodness or wickedness occasion's the difference And I readily grant this as apparent That this Consequent Love is to all men alike as to the main and substance of it and the effects of it as they perform the condition or not which is no more but this He that is Holy and so continues shall not perish but have everlasting Life be he who he will without any respect of Persons and He that is more Holy shall be more Happy even as he that is wicked and so continues shall be miscrable and he that is more wicked more miserable without any exception of Persons whatsoever as it is said Act. 10.34 Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons but in every Nation he that feareth him and worketh Righteousness is accepted of him Now how easily might they have defended themselves if the Antecedent-love was alike to all you have seen already And if this was to be understood as Opposers generally would have it of the Consequent conditional love that hath respect to mans goodness or wickedness they might have replyed What though Esau was Jacobs Brother and so equal in that respect Yet this is said to no purpose for they were of no equal good qualities one was a good man the other a bad You would have been guilty of at least not fair dealing if you had not done for him more than Esau What an inconsequent manner of speaking would this have been to move them to special thankfulness to greater thankfulness than was due from Edomites if he mean by Love the rectoral and conditional Love that hath respect to somthing in men If a Prince should say when one Brother of many was Executed for Treason going on in his Rebellion and the other Brethren ceased their Rebellion and became Loyal when there was an inviolable Act of Oblivion made to all on condition they would cease their Rebellion If he should say Was not he your Brother And yet I have not hanged you all what cause have you to be thankful in an especial manner that I dealt not with you as with your Brother They might reply This of his being our Brother is nothing to us we are indeed much ingaged to You for your general Love and favour in making such an Act of Oblivion upon such an easie condition but that you did not Execute us as well as our Brother is no special favour for though he was our Brother we performed the condition and he did not and had we done as he you would have Executed us also You urge a fallacious argument to impose upon us special thankfulness which is not due It would indeed be right arguing if you meant by his being our Brother our being and doing like him in every thing but then it is not true but if you mean by it only his being our Brother it will not enforce on us any special thankfulness So if two Brethren have equal Stocks given them to trade with and one hath improved well by his industry and the other is undone by negligence what a loose speech would this be of the donor Is not he your Brother what cause have you to be observant of me more than your Brother and how far more great would your ingratitude be than your Brother's What do these words here Was not Esau Jacob's Brother but stand in the place of a sufficient ennumeration to fignifie that they were equal every way