A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ILLEGALITY OF THE LATE Ecclesiastical Commission In ANSWER to the VINDICATION and DEFENCE of it Wherein the true Notion of the LEGAL SUPREMACY Is CLEARED And an Account is given of the Nature Original and Mischief OF THE DISPENSING POWER LONDON Printed for Henny Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard and at the White Hart in Westminster-Hall M D C LXXXIX AN Advertisement THIS Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Late Ecclesiastical Commission was written when the Author of it was summoned to appear before it and was in continual Expectation of undergoing its Censure for not Complying with the Orders of it This put him upon an Enquiry into the Grounds on which it stood From whence he proceeded to search into the True Notion of the Legal Supremacy and finding it very imperfectly set down in the famous Fifth Report De Jure Regis Ecclesiastico he took the Pains to Examin it through every Reign there mentioned and upon the whole Matter he finds him and his Adversary F. P. equally mistaken But in the Management of it he hath rather endeavoured to give Light to the Thing than to discover any Mans Errors And it is hardly possible to settle the Notion of it aright without considering the Practice of other Countries as well as our own Of both which the Reader will find a short but impartial Account which I believe the Author could more easily have inlarged than have brought it into so narrow a Compass By this I hope the World will see That it was not Humor or Faction but a real and well-grounded Dissatisfaction which made those of the Church of England oppose the Proceedings of that Time and that such have as great and real a Zeal for the Ancient and Legal Constitution of our Government as those who make a greater Noise and Clamor about it and that not upon any new Notions or Phrases but upon the very same Grounds which our Ancestors made use of and carry in them the true Basis of our English Government It is possible some worthy Men may have carried some Notions beyond our Legal Constitution but the more they search into it the better Opinion they will have of it Which I think is so well setled that every Deviation from it tends to our Ruin. As to the Dispensing Power the Author hath inlarged that Part since some late Discourses have been published both for and against it He hath neglected nothing which hath been most plausibly pleaded for it but hath given a full Answer to the most material Instances which have been insisted on in behalf of it And after all I cannot but conclude That the Dispensing Power is a kind of Mental Reservation which quite alters the Meaning and Design of a Law. When the Late Ecclesiastical Commission was superseded if not dissolved the Author laid by these Papers as Useless but having communicated them to one Particular Friend whose Judgment and Authority he had a great Regard to he hath been prevailed with by him to make them Publick at this Time It being still necessary to shew with what Justice and Reason we refused to own the Jurisdiction of it And it seems to me as hard to reconcile it to our Laws as Liberty of Conscience to the Principles of Popery or the Worship of Images to the Second Commandment THE CONTENTS CHAP. I. THE State of the Question concerning the Court of the late Ecclesiastical Commission Pag. 1 CHAP. II. The King's Supremacy by Common-Law enquired into Coke's fifth Report de Jure Regis Ecclesiastico examined p. 8 CHAP. III. Whether the King's Supremacy by Law extends to the Dispensing with Laws Of the Nature and Original of that Power The Inconsistency of such a Dispensing Power with the Frame of our Government p. 25 CHAP. IV. Of the Alterations made in the Supremacy by the Statutes of Henry the Eighth with an Answer to the Objections p. 49 THE LEGALITY OF THE COURT OF Ecclesiastical Commission Stated and Argued In ANSWER to the VINDICATION and DEFENCE of it CHAP. I. The State of the Question concerning the Court of the late Ecclesiastical Commission The Case stands thus BY the Act of 1 Eliz. 1. it was established and enacted That such Jurisdictions Priviledges Superiorities and Preheminencies Spiritual and Ecclesiastical as by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Power or Authority have heretofore been or may lawfully be exercised or used for the Visitation of the Ecclesiastical State and Persons and for Reformation Order and Correction of the same and of all manner of Errors Heresies Schisms Abuses Offences Contempts and Enormities shall for ever by this present Parliament be united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm And that the Kings and Queens of this Realm shall have ful Power and Authority by virtue of this Act by Letters Patents under the great Seal of England to assign name and authorize when and as often as they shall think meet and convenient and for such and so long time as they shall think meet to exercise use occupy and execute all manner of Jurisdictions Priviledges and Preheminences in any wise touching or concerning any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction within these Realms and to visit reform redress order correct and amend all such Errors Heresies Schisms Abuses Offences Contempts and Enormities what soever which by any manner of Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Power Authority or Jurisdiction can or may lawfully be reformed ordered redressed corrected restrained or amended to the Pleasure of Almighty God the increase of Virtue and the conservation of the Peace and Unity of this Realm And that such Person and Persons so to be named authorized and appointed after the said Letters Patents to him or them made and delivered shall have full Power and Authority by virtue of this Act and of the said Letters Patents to exercise use and execute all the Premises according to the Tenour and effect of the said Letters Patents any Matter or Cause to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding But in the Act 17 Car. 1. c. 11. after the recital of this latter Clause these words follow And whereas by Colour of some Words in the aforesaid Branch of the said Act whereby Commissioners areauthorized to execute their Commission according to the Tenor and Effect of the King's Letters Patents and by Letters Patents grounded thereupon the said Commissioners have to the great and unsufferable Wrong and Oppression of the King's Subjects used to fine and imprison them and to exercise Authority not belonging to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction restored by that Act and divers other great Mischiefs and Inconveniences have also ensued to the King's Subjects by occasion of the said Branch and Commissions issued thereupon and the Executions thereof therefore for the Repressing and Preventing of the aforesaid Abuses Mischiefs and Inconveniences in time to come Be it enacted by the King 's Most Excellent Majesty and the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by the Authority
own Contracts no man could trust them and consequently all Society with them would be dissolved And whatever Supreme Power may do as to such Acts as are properly its own yet where there is Jus quaesitum alteri as in all Contracts there is that cannot be taken away by it But all this was answered on the other side by the Plenitude of the Popes Power for it was a Contradiction they said to own that and to say That there was any Engagement by Oath or otherwise which he could not Dispense with For as Hank 11 H. 4. 37. says Papa omnia potest And therefore all such Oaths and Promises as limit the Popes Dispensing Power are void in themselves And as to Ecclesiastical Laws or Constitutions they easily resolved all Difficulties about them upon such Principles as these 1. That the Popes have the supreme Power in the Church 2. That the Ecclesiastical Laws were the Popes Laws 3. That it is an inseparable Prerogative in the Pope to Dispense with Ecclesiastical Laws upon Necessity and urgent Occasions 4. That the Pope is the sole Judge of that Necessity 5. That this was not a Trust given to the Pope by Councils or Conclaves but by God and St. Peter and therefore cannot be taken away from her But I shall endeavour to give a clearer Light into this Matter by shewing the several Steps and Degrees how this Dispensing Power came into the World and how it passed from the Ecclesiastical to other Laws when Princes assumed such a Plenitude of Power in Civils which the Popes practised in Ecclesiasticals The first time we read of Dispensations was with respect to the Ancient Canons of the Church and it implied a Relaxation of the Rigour of them not with respect to their Force or binding Power but as to the Penance which Persons were to undergo for the Violation of them And herein the Notion of Dispensing was very different from what the Canonists made it afterwards when they declared it to be a Relaxation of the Law it self so that it should not have that Force upon the Conscience which it otherwise had For a Dispensation with them is a Licence to do that which they cannot lawfully do without it and that with a non-obstante to that which otherwise makes it Unlawful De Jure illicitum fit ex Dispensatione licitum hic est proprie effectus Dispensationis saith Pyrrhus Corradus who gives a large Account of the Practice of Dispensations in the Court of Rome which conclude with a non-obstante to any former Constitutions or Canons of Councils But no such thing can be found in the Ancient Practice of the Church because the Popes themselves were then believed to be under the Canons But when it was supposed That the severe Execution of the Canons would rather hinder than advance the Good of the Church the Governours of it thought they had sufficient Authority to abate the Rigorous Execution of them As about the Times of Penance the Translation of Bishops from one See to another the Intervals of Orders and such like But the Popes then pretended to be strict Observers of the Canons when the particular Bishops took upon them to Dispense with the Execution of them as appears by Ivo's Preface to his Collection of Canons where he distinguisheth the Immoveable or Moral Precepts from the Canonical which he calls Moveable In the former saith he no Dispensation is to be allowed But in those things which only concern Discipline the Bishops may Dispense provided there be a Compensation i. e. That the Church's Interest may be better secured or advanced thereby as he there discourses at large And his Rule is Ibi Dispensatio admittenda est ubi rigor periculosus est But by this means the Severity of the Primitive Discipline was quite lost The Bishops of Rome observing this thought it a proper time for them to appear zealous for the Ancient Canons which gained them a great Reputation in the World and by this means the Custody of the Canons was looked on as their particular Province Which they improved so well that at last they turned the Guardianship of the Canons into a Power over them and then they found Fault with the Bishops Dispensing with them for another Reason viz. Because the Dispensing Power was a Prerogative of the Roman See and Inferior Bishops could act no farther in it than they had Authority from it We find that in S. Bernard's time the Pope did take upon him to Dispense too far to his great Dissatisfaction for by his Dispensing Power he saith he overthrew the Order of the Church Murmur loquor saith he querimoniam Ecclesiarum The Pope dispensed with the Ecclesiastical Laws in Exemptions of Abbots and others from that Subordination they stood in to their proper Superiors He saith He could not see how this Dispensing Power could be justified You do indeed shew a plenitude of Power but it may be not of Justice you shew what you can do but it is a Question whether you ought or not and you ought to consider First Whether it be lawful then whether it be decent and lastly whether it be expedient At last he allows a Dispensing Power in two Cases Urgent Necessity and Common Good otherwise he saith It is not fidelis Dispensatio sed crudelis Dissipatio an overthrow of all Order and Government In one of his Epistles he speaks sharply against getting a Dispensation to do that which it was not lawful to do without one And he thinks he hath disproved it by invincible Reason For a Licence from the Pope can never make that Lawful which without it were Unlawful When the Practice of the Dispensing Power grew more common there were two great Questions raised concerning it Whether if a Dispensation were granted without Just Cause it were Lawful or not And Whether if it were not Lawful yet it was valid There were some who flattered the Dispensing Power so much that they allowed it in all Cases whether there were a just Cause or not These were the high-flown Canonists who resolved all Laws into Will and Pleasure But others who allowed a Dispensing Power upon a Just Cause yet thought it repugnant to the Original Design of Government for those who are entrusted with Care of the Laws to Dispense with them without such a Cause as answers the End of Government And some went so far as to deny any Validity in a Dispensation granted upon Pleasure for as an unjust Law hath no Force so said they an unjust Dispensation of a Good Law hath none Upon this Point two great Schoolmen differ Suarez whom the Lord Chief Justice Vaughan commends for his Learning in this Matter goes upon these Grounds 1. That a Prince is not Dominus sed Dispensator Legum although the Force of a Law depends upon his Authority and therefore in Dispensing with a Law he doth not act by Absolute Power but by Administration For
he is not Lord over the Community but Governour 2. That for him to Dispense in a Law made for the Community without a just Cause is not only malum quia prohibitum sed ex se ex natura rei semper malum Therefore Suarez was far from thinking a Prince might Dispense with any thing that was not malum in se for he makes it to be so for him to dispense with a malum quia prohibitum if it be prohibited by a Law made for a Publick Good and there be no just Cause for it 3. That although a Prince sins in Dispensing with such a Law yet his Dispensation holds as to the Force of the Law which he supposes to depend on the Will of the Prince and therefore his Will being altered the Obligation ceaseth as to the Persons Dispensed with 4. That although such a Dispensation holds as to the Law yet he thinks a Prince bound in Conscience to Revoke such a Dispensation because it is unlawful for him to persist in such a Will it being repugnant to the Common Good and the Obligation of his Duty 5. That if such a Dispensation be to the Injury of a third Person then it is void in it self as being repugnant to Justice Vasquez saith They are all agreed That no Prince hath a Power to Dispense with his Laws according to his Pleasure or because they are his Laws But he saith There is a Dispute Whether an unlawful Dispensation be valid or not And he thinks not and that a Man's Action after the Dispensation is as faulty as if there had been none His Reason is because a Prince is bound by his own Laws so that he cannot Dispense with himself as to the Obligation of them for if he could at Pleasure Dispense with himself he could never be bound for how can a Man be bound to keep a Law in which he can Dispense with himself when he pleases And if he cannot Dispense with himself much less with any under him Having thus endeavoured to clear the Nature and Original of the Dispensing Power I now come 2. To the Reason assigned by Sir E. Coke from the Year Books why the King may Dispense with Laws because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. My Lord Vaughan said Right concerning it That this Rule hath more confounded Men's Judgments on this Subject than rectified them Which I shall make appear by shewing I. That it alters the Frame of our Government II. That it takes away all Security by Law. III. That it contradicts the Sense of our Nation in former Ages IV. That the Rule is contrary to the Precedents in Law. I. That it alters the Frame of our Government For it goes upon a very false Ground viz. That the King may Dispense with any thing which is not Evil in its own Nature or antecedently to any Human Laws which is to suppose the whole Legislative Power to be lodged in the Person of the King For all who understand these Matters do agree That a Power to Dispense with Laws is the same with a Power to make them Dispensare hoc est lege solvere is solus potest qui ferendae abrogandaeque leg is potestatem habet saith H. Grotius Suarez saith He hath the Power of Dispensing qui legem tulit quia ab ejus voluntate potentia pendet Vasquez That the Dispensing Power lies in him qui habet Potestatem condendi abrogandi legem Pufendorf That none can Dispense with a Law but such as have the Power of making it But we need no Authorities in this Matter For to Dispense in the Sense it is here taken is to take away the Obligation of a Law and whoever takes it away must have the Power of laying it on And there is no Difference between the Dispensation with a Law and the Abrogation of it but that a Dispensation is an Abrogation of it to particular Persons while others are under the Force of it and an Abrogation is a General Dispensation that being no more than a Relaxation of the whole Law to those Persons who were bound by it before But if a part of the Law be taken away as to the whole Community then it is called a Derogation of it But if the Law be Relaxed only for a limited Time and under certain Conditions then it is not an Abrogation but an Indulgence or Suspension of the Law. To Dispense with a Law is more than to give an Equitable Sense or a Favourable Interpretation of a Law for he that Inteprets a Law supposes his Interpretation to agree with the Sense and Design of the Law he that Dispenses owns that which he dispenses with to be against the Intention of the Law but that he hath Power to take away the Force of it so far as he thinks fit He that saith Thou shalt not kill doth not reach to Legal Executioners of Justice interprets the Law according to Reason and Equity But when God said to Abraham Go and Sacrifice thy Son he must be supposed by virtue of his Supreme Authority to Dispense with the Law in his Case so as to make that Lawful upon his Command which would not have been so without it Some will not allow this to be called a Dispensation but an alteration of the Matter of the Law but when that Alteration comes from the Authority of the Law Makers it is the same so that to Interpret a Law is an Act of Discretion and Judgment but to Dispense with it of Authority and Jurisdiction And none can therefore Dispense in the Law of God but he that made it all that the Wisest and greatest Men can justly pretend to is no more than to give the true Sense of it and it is intolerable Prsumption for any Creature to pretend to more An Equitable Sense as to Human Law is not always that which seems to be most favourable to those who go against the Letter of it but that which most enforces the End and Design of the Law although it be not comprehended in the Words of it If a Law mentions a Crime of a lesser nature in regard of Circumstances and in regard of those Circumstances promises some Favour as Benefit of the Clergy it can be no Equitable Sense to extend it to such Acts which have worse Circumstances because the Ground of the Favour was the extenuation of the Fact by the Circumstances so that the chief Rule of Equity in the Interpretation of a Law is to attend to the Intention and Design of it more than to the bare Words The Intention and Design of the Law is not to be measured by Particular and Accidental Cases wherein some Inconveniencies are to be born but by the Publick and General Good which more than makes amends for them which is the Reason of that Maxim Better a Mischief than an Inconvenience which is false unless taken in such an Equitable Sense There are
Person and this Royal Power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament neither in Thesi nor in Hypothesi but that the King by his Royal Power may dispense with it for upon the Commandment of the King and Obedience of the Subject does his Government consist as it is provided by the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. That all Patents made or to be made of any Office of a Sheriff c. for Term of years or for Life in Fee-simple or in Tail are void and of none effect any Clause or Parol of Non-obstante put or to be put into such Patents to be made notwithstanding And further Whosoever shall take upon him or them to accept or occupy such Office of Sheriff by vertue of such Grants or Patents shall stand perpetually disabled to be or bear the Office of Sheriff within any County of England by the same Authority And notwithstanding that by this Act 1. The Patent is made void 2. The King is restrained to grant a Non-obstante 3. The Grantee disabled to take the Office yet the King by his Royal Sovereign Power of commanding may command by his Patent for such Causes as he in his Wisdom doth think meet and profitable for himself and the Commonwealth of which he himself is sole Judge to serve him and the Weal Publick as Sheriff for such a County for years or for Life c. And so was it resolved by all the Justices of England in the Exchequer Chamber ' 2 H. 7. Here the Point is resolved into an inseparable Prerogative in the King which no Act of Parliament can restrain although made with his own Consent Is there no Act of Parliament then which this great Lawyer will allow to restrain the King's Prerogative so as he cannot disperse with it What saith he to the Case of Buying Offices at Court Cannot the King by vertue of his Prerogative order his Houshold as he pleases to dispose of Offices about him as he thinks fit No. The same Lawyer saith That no Non obstante could dispense with the Act against buying of Offices And yet one would think that the King had as great a Prerogative in the Court as over the Kingdom But how comes he to say That the King can dispense notwithstanding the Disability when elsewhere he saith The King cannot dispense in the Case of a Disability by Law For the Reason he gives why the King cannot present a Man to a Living who is convict of Simony is because the Law hath disabled him Very well And yet in this Case although the Law hath disabled him the King may dispense Where are we now The King can dispense with a Disability and he cannot dispense with it This is indeed a very dark learning of Dispensations as C. Justice Vaughan well called it for we cannot yet find the way through it Can the King dispense with a Disability in Law or not If not the Case of Sheriffs is gone If he can then why not in the case of Symony Why not as to sitting in Parliament without taking the Oaths No here is a Disability in Law. What then Cannot the K. dispense with a Disability in one Case as well as the other Bu the same Person saith That in that Case because the Words amount to a Disability the King cannot dispense and here where the Disability is expressed he may But we are lately told there are two sorts of Disabilities one is actually incurred as that upon the Members who sit without taking the Oaths and the other is a Disability annexed to the Breach of a Law as a penalty and that penalty not to be incurred before a Legal Conviction and in this Case the King's Dispensation coming before the Conviction doth prevent it by making that lawful which would not have been so without it But when a Disability is actually-incurred it cannot be taken off but by Act of Parliament I Answer That if the Law which makes the Disability doth allow of a Dispensation antecedent to the Conviction then I grant that the Dispensation before Conviction prevents the Disability As in Digby's Case if the Dispensation had come before Institution the Disability as to holding the former Living had been prevented because the Law doth expresly allow of a Dispensation in the Case But here is no such thing The Act of Parliament supposes no Dispensation but makes an utter Disability as to the holding the Office in Sir Edward Hales his Case but a dispensing Power is set up against the Act of Parliament and such a Dispensation neither before nor after Conviction can prevent a Disability If it could I can by no means see why it might not as well hold as to Members of Parliament at least as to the Oath of Supremacy if they take their Dispensation before Sitting in the House For the Disability doth not take place till they enter the Parliament 5 Eliz. c. 1. And he that entreth the Parliament without taking the said Oath shall be deemed no Knight Citizen Burgess or Baron nor shall have any Voice but shall be as if he had been never Returned or Elected The Intention of the Law for the Test was a disability to hold the Office but it allows time for Persons to qualifie themselves as appears by the Act for the Test. Is not this plain overthrowing the design of the Law for Persons instead of doing what the Law requires to take out a Dispensation for not doing it and so prevent the Disability And what doth a Law signifie when the very design of it is overthrown And what is the Power of making Laws by common Consent in Parliament if without such Consent the whole force of the Law may be taken away by a dispensing Power So that this doth not meerly make Laws to signifie nothing but according to Will and Pleasure but it makes our very Constitution insignificant which requires to every Law the Consent of the People in Parliament As for Instance By the first Constitution of the Roman Government the King had the custody of the Laws but no Laws were to be made but by the Consent of the Roman People in the Curiae thence called Leges Curiatae Would any one have thought this any Privilege if after these Laws were passed the King should claim an inseparable Prerogative of dispensing with them as he sees Cause For it is implied in such a Fundamental Contract as this that Laws when made should not lose their Force without their Consent who made them Else it is not Contractus bonae Fidei I will not dispute whether this were the Original Contract of our Nation or not but this I may say That when our Government came to a Settlement after long struglings this was one of the Fundamental Articles of it That no Laws should pass or Burdens should be laid upon the People but by their own Consent in arliament Bracton saith That a Law among us supposes the Authority of
Particular Statute made for the Security of our Religion or for a Suspension of our Ecclesiastical Laws CHAP. IV. Of the Alterations made in the Supremacy by the Statutes of Henry the Eighth with an Answer to the Objections I Now come to the Alterations made in our Laws about the King's Supremacy in the Time of Henry the Eighth 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. An Act passed for taking away all Appeals to Rome which is founded on the King 's Natural and Independent Right of Governing and doing Justice to all his People and the Sufficiency of his own Clergy for Hearing and Determining such Matters as belonged to their Function and therefore all Causes are to be Heard Discussed Examined finally and definitively Adjudged and Determined within the King's Jurisdiction and Authority and not elswhere in the Courts Spiritual and Temporal But if the King be concerned then it is referred to the Upper-House of Convocation The Preamble of this Act against Appeals to Rome is considerable Whereas by divers Authentick Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed That this Realm of England is an Empire governed by one Supreme Head and King c. with plenary whole and entire Power Preheminence Authority Prerogative and Jurisdiction c. for final determination of Causes c. so that here is an Appeal to Ancient History in this Matter and we have still sufficient Evidence of it before the Popes Encroachments prevailed The Bishops and Barons told Anselm in William Rufus his time It was a thing unheard of and contrary to the Custom of his Realm for any one to go to Rome without the King 's Leave which is after explained by way of Appeal Anselm made but a shuffling Answer to this although he had sworn to observe the Customs of the Realm and he could not deny this to be one but he pretended It was against S. Peter 's Authority and therefore could not observe it for this were saith he to abjure S. Peter From whence I infer That the Custom of the Realm was then thought by Anselm to be inconsistent with the Pope's Authority For whatever they talk of S. Peter it is the Pope they mean. In the Reign of H. 1. the Pope complains grievously That the King would suffer no Appeals to be made to him and that due Reverence was not shewed to S. Peter in his Kingdom and that they ended Ecclesiastical Causes at Home even where Bishops were concerned and very learnedly quotes the Deâ—retal Epistles against them Afterwards the Pope sent his Legate and the King denied him Entrance and the whole Parliament rejected it as contrary to the Ancient Custom and Liberty of England That Passage in the Laws of H. 1. c. 5. which seems to allow of Appeals is a mere Forgery the whole Chapter being a Rapsody taken out of the Canonists H. Huntingdon saith That Appeals were brought in in King Stephen 's time by Henry Bishop of Winchester his Brother being the Pope's Legate By the Constitutions of Clarendon c. 8. the Appeal lay from the Archbishop to the King which is well expressed by Robert of Gloucester And the K. amend solde the Ercbishops deed And be as in the Pope's sted and S. Thomas it withsteed And although H. 2. in his Purgation for the Death of the Archbishop did swear That he would hinder no Appeals to Rome in Ecclesiastical Causes and that he would quit the Ancient Customs of the Realm Yet Hoveden saith The Constitutions of Clarendon were renewed in the Parliament at Northampton and the Justices in Eyre were sworn to observe them and to make others observe them inviolably And for those who went out of the Kingdom in Case of Appeals the Justices were to enquire per consuetudinem Terrae according to the Ancient Custom and if they did not return and stand to the King's Court they were to be outlawed In the Time of R. 1. the Popes complained much of Geofry Archbishop of York for slighting Appeals made to Rome and imprisoning those that made them Celestine doth it twice and in the same Words And Innocent the Third in King John's Time renews the same Complaint of him That he shewed no regard to Appeals made to the Apostolick See. But when the Rights of the Crown were given up by King John to the Pope no Wonder if the Liberties of Appeals were granted by him But yet in the succeeding Reigns we have several Instances upon Record of Persons imprisoned by the King for making Appeals to Rome John of Ibstock in the Time of E. 1. The Abbot of Walden and a Prebendary of Banbury in the Reign of E. 2. The Parson of Leighe Harwoden and the Prior of Barnwel in the time of E. 3. So that this Right was still owned by our Princes when the Matter came into Contest and therefore the Act of H. 8. against Appeals was but a just Resuming of the Ancient Rights of the Crown 25 H. 8. c. 19. A Commission is appointed for reviewing the Canons And it is observable That because it could not be done in Parliament Time the King hath Power given him by Act of Parliament to nominate the thirty two Persons to act in this Matter in these Words Be it therefore enacted by the Authority aforesaid That the King's Highness shall have Power and Authority to nominate and assign at his Pleasure the said thirty two Persons of his Subjects whereof sixteen to be of the Clergy and sixteen to be of the Temporality of the Upper and Nether House of Parliament And because the last Resort was to the Arch-Bishop in the former Act of Appeals therefore to prevent any Inconveniences thereby a new Power is granted by this Act i. e. Upon an Appeal to the King in Chancery a Commission is to be directed to such Persons as the King shall appoint who are to hear and determine such Appeals and the Causes concerning the same 25 H. 8. c. 21. After the Submission of the Clergy and the King being owned Supreme Head yet the Power of dispensing with the Canons in particular Cases did not pass by Commission from the King but by Act of Parliament The Words are It standeth therefore with natural Equity and good Reason that all and every such Laws human made without this Realm or induced into this Realm by the said Sufferance Consents and Custom Your Royal Majesty your Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons representing the whole State of your Realm in this your High Court of Parliament have full Power and Authority not only to dispense but also to Authorize some elect Person or Persons to dispense c. So that the Power of granting Faculties at a time when the Prerogative was highest was not executed by Commission from the King by vertue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal but was granted to the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury in the manner expressed in that Act. A late Author has stretched this Statute to a Power of dispensing in other
Cases besides those which depended on the Canon-Law For saith he the Pope usurped such a Power in derogation of the Authority Royal and then that Power must be originally in the King otherwise in the Construction of the Act it could be no Usurpation But this is a very false way of Reasoning The Pope usurped such a Power on the Crown therefore the Crown hath it of Right For the Popes Usurpations were many of them unreasonable his Primacy according to Canons being allowed and our Law did restore to the King the ancient Right and Jurisdiction of the Crown and not put him into the Possession of all the extravagant Power which the Pope usurped For this Law charges the Pope with intolerable Exactions of great Sums of Money in Pensions Censes Peter-Pence Procurations Fruits Suits for Provisions and Expeditions of Bulls for Arch-Bishopricks and Bishopricks and for Delegates and Rescripts in Causes of Contentions and Appeals Jurisdictions Legantine as well as Dispensations Licenses Faculties Grants Relaxations Writs called Perinde valere Rehabilitations Absolutions c. Now all these were Usurpations in Derogation of the Crown but doth it therefore follow that the Crown hath a Right to them all But to go no further than the Business of Dispensations Hath the King a Right by this Statute to dispense as far as the Pope The Pope usurped a Power of dispensing in Matrimonial Contracts in Oaths in Vows in some positive Divine Laws which I suppose H. 8. by vertue of the Supremacy never pretended to So that it is a very mistaken Notion of some Men That the King had all the Power which the Pope usurped And as to the Act it is plain by the Words of it That the Original Power of Dispensing was lodged in the King Lords and Commons and the Ministerial Execution of it with the Arch Bishop of Canterbury even with respect to the King himself But if the King had pretended to all the Power which the Pope usurped he must have dispensed with himself But this Author offers to Prove That there is a Power in the Crown to dispense with Acts of Parliament even such as concern the Consecration of Bishops because it is said 8 Eliz. That the Queen by her Supreme Authority had dispensed with all causes or Doubts of any Imperfection or Disability in the Persons c. To give a clear Answer to this we must consider these Things 1. That 1 Eliz. 1. The Act of 25 H. 8. for the Order and Form of Electing and Making Arch-Bishops and Bishops was revived as appears by the same Act 8. Eliz. 1. 7. 2. That by another Act 1 Eliz. 2. The Book of Common-Prayer and Administration of Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England which were in use in the time of 6 E. and repealed by Queen Mary were re-inforced 1 Eliz. 2. 2. and the Repeal annulled But by the Act 5 and 6 E. 6. c. 1. § 5. the Form and Manner of making Arch-Bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons was added to the Book of Prayer as of like Force and Authority with it 3. That the Act of E. 6. being revived with the express mention of the Alterations and Additions made to it there was ro Necessity apprehended 1 Eliz. to make a distinct Act for that which was in force already by the Name of Additions therein added and appointed by that Statute And this I conceive was the true Reason why a Bill did not pass 1 Eliz. to that purpose For I find by the Journals of the House a Bill was prepared and read the third time in the House of Lords but upon Consideration it was laid a side as superfluous 4. That the Popish Party took Advantage of this and pretended That the Book of Consecration c. was not established by Law being not expresly mentioned and therefore the Bishops made by it were not Legal Bishops And upon this Bonner resolved to stand the Trial against Horn Bishop of Winchester as may be seen in Dyer R. f. 234. So that the Papists then stood upon it That the Crown could not dispense with Laws otherwise Bonner's Plea signified nothing For if there were such an Inherent Right in the Crown to Dispense with Laws in Ecclesiastical Matters then these were Legal Bishops having all the Queen 's Dispensing Power for them 5. The Clause in the Queen's Letters Patents for Dispensing with Imperfections and Disability was put in out of abundant Caution and not for any Necessity that we can find But it was Customary in the Popes Bulls to put in such kind of Clauses and therefore they would omit no Power in that Case which the Pope did pretend to which the Act faith was for avoiding all Ambiguities and Questions 6. But after all lest there should be any Colour for Disputing this Matter left according to the express Letter of the Law therefore it was declared 8 Eliz. 1. 3. That not only the Book of Common-Prayer but the Form of Consecrating Archbishops Bishops c. which was set sorth in Edward the Sixth's Time and added to the Common Prayer shall stand and be in full Force and Effect And all Acts done by it are declared to be Good and Perfect to all Intents and Purposes So that this Act of Parliament doth rather overthrow a Dispensing Power for if there were then such a Supreme and Absolute Power in the Crown as to Ecclesiastical Matters what need such an Act of Parliament to Confirm and Ratifie what our Author supposes done by virtue of it But to return to the 25th of H. 8. In the same Act of Parliament care is taken for the Visiting Exempt Places as Monasteries Colledges and Hospitals by a particular Commission under the Great Seal But that which comes nearest to our Business is That 26 H. 8. c. 1. another Act passed wherein the King's Supremacy is acknowledged and a Power given by Act of Parliament for him to Visit Redress and Amend all Errors Heresies Abuses Contempts and Enormities whatsoever which by any manner of Spiritual Authority or Jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be Reformed in any Usage Custom Foreign Laws Foreign Authority Prescription or any Thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding If the King had this Power by virtue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal can we imagin H. 8. so weak a Prince and so little a valuer of his own Prerogative as to have that given him by Act of Parliament which was acknowledged to be in him before But the Words are express And that our Sovereign Lord c. shall have full Power and Authority from Time to Time to Visit c. From whence it follows That in the Judgment of H. 8. and the Parliament such a Power was not personally inherent in him but that it did belong to the Legislative Power and therefore an Act of Parliament was required for it so that the Supremacy as then setled by Law lay in a total rejecting any Foreign Jurisdiction
Land c. 43. and therefore the Feudists say That Felony is delictum Vasalli adversus Dominum From the Gothick Fell or Fehl which signifies in general a Fault And in this Case the Breach of Trust towards his Lord Of which sort of Felonies the Feudists reckon up some twenty some thirty any one of which makes a Forfeifeiture So that here is no such mighty Difference that the poor Clergymen must only have Conditional and Attendant Freeholds as though other Men's were Absolute whereas Sir Thomas Smith affirms all in England are Fiduciary i. e. Conditional Freeholders beside the King. It is easie enough for any one to frame such a Distinction of Freeholds and to say That these who have but such a Freehold may be ejected without any Trial at Common Law But he ought to have shewed That Magna Charta or the Ancient Laws made such a Difference between Ecclesiastical Freeholds and others which he hath not preended to do and therefore such a Distinction ought not to be allowed especially since I have produced an Act of Parliament 14 Edward 3. c. 3. which saith That Clergymen shall not be ejected out of their Temporalties without a True and Just Cause according to the Law of the Land This was none of those Statutes which are in Print but never enrolled for Sir Robert Cotton owns the enrolment of it and that it was made into a Statute and Mr. Pryn himself had nothing to object against it But now it seems their Conditional Freholds may be taken from them without any due Course of Law. II. There is more to be said concerning the Rights of Ecclesiastical Persons in Colledges because they are Lay Corporations For in Appleford's Case it was declared to be the Opinion of all the Judges in Pattrick 's Case That a Colledge was a Temporal Corporation And therefore some notable Difference in Point of Law must be shewed Why Men may be deprived of some Freeholds without due Course of Law and not of others for I cannot imagine That Colledges being founded for the encouragement of Learning should lay Men more open to Arbitrary Proceedings than any other Legal Societies are However Deprivation in Coveney's Case was agreed to be a Temporal Thing and for that Reason his Appeal was rejected as not relating to a Matter of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which was only provided for 24. and 25. Henr. 8. But it was allowed That he might bring an Action at Common Law. Our Author several times mentions this Case but puts it off till he comes to Treat of Appeals i. e. to the Place he knew it to be improper in For the Question is not Whether an Appeal doth lie to the King in Chancery in a Case of Deprivation but Whether there be not a Remedy at Common Law if a Person be deprived of a Free-hold without due form of Law And after a great deal of Impertinency about the manner of Appeals he at last concludes The Remedy had been at Common Law only which is clear giving up the Point For then in case a Person be deprived without due course of Law of his Free-hold he grants that he is to have his Remedy at Law and consequently that a Deprivation of such a Free-hold without due Course of Law is not sufficient For the Law provides no Remedy where there is no Injury done nor just Cause to seek for Redress And so I come to the second Objection which is this 2. That to deny the Jurisdiction of this Court is to deny the King's Supremacy and that is a dangerous thing by the Law. The Case was this Dr. F. of Magdalen College in Oxford being summoned before the Commissioners denied the Authority of the Court and persisted in so doing which our Author saith in another Kings Reign perhaps might have been interpreted a Questioning the very Supremacy it self which how fatal it was to John Fisher Bishop of Rochester and Sir Thomas Moor is worthy to be considered both as a Demonstration of our Kings Clemency and that the Doctor hath not so much reason to complain of his hard Usage The Meaning whereof is this That if they had proceeded in Justice against him he ought to have suffered as Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas Moor did This is more than a bare Insinuation That to deny the Jurisdiction of this Court is to deny the Kings Supremacy and that it is meer Clemency not to deal by them who do it as H. 8. did by Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas Moor. But 1. It is by no means evident That those two Persons suffered meerly on that Account For their Attainder in Parliament was for refusing the Oath of Succession and King James I. mentions the Words of Sir Thomas Moor to that purpose which he spake to the Lords when he was condemned And their Attainder if I mistake not was in the same Parliament which made it Treason to deprive the King of his Dignity Title or Name of his Royal Estate and therefore could not be by an Act not then passed But 2. Suppose that they were at last proceeded against on the Act then passed what is this to the present Case when Coke saith This Act was twice Repealed And it is no extraordinary Clemency not to be proceeded against by a Law that hath no force 3. The Statute in Force 5 Eliz. c. 1. is against those who defend or maintain the Authority Jurisdiction or Power of the Bishop of Rome or of his See heretofore claimed used or usurped within this Realm or by any Speech open Deed or Act advisedly wittingly attribute any such manner of Jurisdiction Authority or Preheminence to the said See of Rome or any Bishop of the same for the time being within this Realm So that it cannot be denied that there is occasion for his Majesties Clemency but it is to another sort of Men. 4. It is very hard straining to make the denying the Jurisdiction of this Court to be denying the Kings Supremacy when a Person hath done all which the Law requires him to do towards owning the Supremacy If he had said Dr. F. had taken Possession of his Fellowship there without taking the Oath of Supremacy which the Law requires he had then indeed given ground to suspect him for denying the Kings Supremacy but to take no notice of those who refused to do as the Law requires and to talk thus of what Severity might be used to one that hath done it looks in him neither like Clemency nor Justice 5. It was always looked on as a Legal Right to make Exception to the Jurisdiction of a Court especially when newly established without Act of Parliament and to any ordinary Understanding in flat Contradiction to it It is very new Doctrine that in a Legal Government Exceptio Fori shall be interpreted a Denial of supreme Authority which was not only allowed by the Canon and Civil Laws but by the most Ancient Common Lawyers we have