work freely to will and not to act with liberty of will is a contradiction not only all things and operations but their different kinds and manner also fall under the decree of God who as he hath fitted necessary causes to work necessarily as the fire burns necessarily so hath he likewise fitted voluntary and contigent causes to work voluntarily that is freely and contingently Object But what God hath decreed unist necessarily come to passe other wise his decree might be frustrate Answ It must necessarily come to pass that is it must of necessity come to pass yet not necessarily that is by necessary operation but on the contrary if it depend upon a free and contingent cause it must of necessity come to pass freely and contingently here is onely a necessity of the event not of the manner of production and therefore a necessity of consequence not of the cause a necessity neither naturall nor violent and the necessity of consequence we have formerly seen must be granted or we must both deny Gods foreknowledge and make him stand under that kind of necessity which we think it an unworthy thing that man should stand under Object But may one and the same effect both necessarily and contingently come to passe Answ It may the necessity being rightly understood viz. not simple or absolute but respective or conditionall Instance 1. In the actions of God he creates the world freely it was in his liberty whether he would create a world or no whether this world or no yet upon supposition that he hath decreed it it is now necessary that it be in time created neither can it otherwise come to passe but this world must be created 2. In the actions of man when Christ was crucified his legs were not broken that the Scripture might be fulfilled which had formerly affirmed that not a bone of him should be broken God having so determined as by his Word was declared it could not be that they should be broken yet did the soldiers forbear to break them voluntarily and contingently they were neither naturally nor violently necessitated to forbear Another instance whether in the actions of God or the creature what is done must of necessity be done it is impossible that a thing should be done and not done at once yet if there be any free or contingent act in the world which is granted on all hands liberty and contingency must be granted to stand with that necessity This Objection is yet further cleared by these two following Rules 1. All effects produced by the creature are necessary or contingent according as the creature it self the next cause is in its manner of operation Natural agents are necessary causes as fire the Sun they worke necessarily the fire in burning the Sun in shining producing alwayes the same action for kind heating inlightning working to the utmost of their power therefore their effects are necessary Voluntary agents are free and contingent causes they work freely and contingently they so act one way as that they have an intrinsical power to act another way so wil as that they have a power to nil so nil as that they have a power to wil the same thing as they shal like or dislike and therefore their effects are free and contingent 2. In regard of God the first cause all effects in the world are both necessary and contingent or free in regard of his intrinsicall liberty whereby he may chuse whether he wil produce them or not they are free or contingent so for the shining of the Sun and the burning of the fire though they be necessary effects in regard of the Sun and fire their next causes yet are they contingent in regard of God in whose liberty it is to afford or with-hold his influx for their production So the Creation of the world all effects depending immediately upon the Wil of God Angels or Men are in regard of their immediate causes free and contingent all the most casuallevents as the lot in the lap in the same regard contingent yet all these upon supposition of Gods decree are necessary Thus much for the decree and the necessity thence arising 2. That the wil of man is moved by God and by that motion of his determined in its operation doth not take away the liberty of mans will For clearing this we must take notice of a twofold liberty there is the liberty of 1. Independence 2. Choice 1. The liberty of Independence where the will so acts as it is not acted by any higher cause this is peculiar to the will of God he onely is independent upon any other in the motion of his wil the wills of all men and Angels are so under his dominion as that they are moved by him this hath formerly been proved as to men that God as the great Creator and universall Ruler moves the wills of men which way soever he pleaseth many more arguments might be brought to demonstrate that the liberty of mans will must admit the effectuall motion of God upon it so acting it as acted may act especially is this cleared in the Doctrine of Conversion and Perseverance but to insist upon these would be an unseasonable digression especially the thing in hand having been already proved 2. The liberty of choice where the wil in its operation doth what it likes in the light and upon the sentence of the practical understanding there are two acts of the will to will and to nill to chuse to refuse Now herein is the liberty of the will exprest 1. That in these operations it doth what it likes it wills with liking it nills with liking yea with liking doth it nill even the object which it dislikes and therefore it so wills or nills the present object as that it hath power at the present to will what it nills or to nill what it wills was there an impression of liking upon it contrary to what is yet though it have this opposite power at the same time it hath not a power to produce opposite acts at the same time it being impossible that a prevailing liking and disliking of the same thing should stand together at once 2. That it act in the light and upon the sentence of the practicall understanding that is the understanding as it shewes and determines wherein is our happinesse or good for the present most desirable and what makes necessarily or mainly for it this must needs be required to the liberty of the will because the will is a rationall appetite and therefore cannot otherwise will or nill then as the understanding represents the object good or evill and therefore whatsoever it wills it wills as good cannot will any thing as evill for then it should act not as a rational appetite that is not as the wil it is true that the understanding mistakes many times good for evill and evill for good whence good is either true or apparent but whatsoever it is that the will chooseth it
of the others condition hitherto that it is not of works that it is of God that it is so of God as of his purpose of Election and Reprobation Now follows 4. It is so of the purpose of Election on Jacobs part as that it may * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abide And therefore 5ly So of God according to the purpose of Election as of him that calleth in our Call we receive faith and that renewing worke of the spirit whereby we are brought into the state of life it is then so of God according to the purpose of Election as of him that by vertue of that purpose gives faith and brings into the state of life by the renewing of the holy Ghost and thus his Election remaines firme for the issue of it eternall life to the Elect as borrowing nothing depending on nothing in man but undertaking and giving all hence it is manifest when the Apostle shuts out works he shuts out as wel works foreseen as done because expresly for Election so denyes it to be of works as that it shall be of God but if of works foreseen it was of our selves so of God as of his purpose which we shall see by and by cannot be built upon any thing but himself so of his purpose as that it may abide without change and therefore must have a surer foundation then works fore-seen or indeed any thing foreseen in man and therefore so of God according to his purpose as of him that calls therefore shuts out not works onely but faith too faith not onely acted but fore-seen 1. It is not thus not of works but of him that believeeth but not of works but of God 2. Nor thus not of works but of him that justifieth but thus not of works but of him that calleth justification supposeth faith in our call we receive faith it is then of God according to the purpose of Election not as of him that fore-sees either works or faith but as of him that gives faith and therefore cannot fore-see it antecedently to his purpose but in his purpose of giving it And now that the fore-light of evill works or of any thing in man is not the first ground of his perishing condition but in Esau's case evill works fore-seen have no more to do then wrought as to the point in hand we shall make it appear in these two Conclusions 1. That the different purpose of God electing some refusing others in the first ground of their different state who embracing the truth are saved and who rejecting the truth are damned 2. That this purpose is not built doth not stand nor depend upon any thing in man but is wholly of it self These two Conclusions as they are clearly to be made good from the Apostles discourse hitherto so will the confirmation of them make good the thing in hand For the first we have seen it in Jacob and Esau and they are speciall instances to conclude the generall question about the Jews the Nation generally refusing the Gospell and so perishing the remnant imbracing it and so obtaining life as is clear by the Apostles discourse which afterward he enlargeth to all mankind For the second setting aside that the Apostle hath carryed the purpose of Election and Reprobation in a parrallel strain let these arguments conclude it 1. Whatsoever is done God either doth it as the first worker or permits it to be done as the supream Ruler 'T is clear if God will neither have an hand in doing it nor suffer it to be done it cannot be done * Enchrid ad laurent c. 95. Nothing is done without the will of the Almighty that it should be done he either suffering it to be done or himself doing it Augustine further whatsoever is permitted to be done as the evill of sinne requires some concourse of God In whom we live and move and have our being for production of that act to which as by man done sinne cleaves inseparably otherwise second causes in producing their acts should move independently upon the first cause and the Creature should Create Therefore onely so far doth God fore-see before all time what shall be in time as he sees his owne will either for the doing it or permitting it to be done for affoording that concourse without which it cannot be done The will of God then before all time that is his decree or purpose for the being of such or such a thing in time must be the ground of his fore-sight that it shall be and therefore in order of nature before it and so his purpose meerly of himselfe For still whatsoever can be imagined fore-seen as that which shall be to move his will that it may be fore-seen as that which shall be must of necessity suppose his will that it shall be For further clearing this truth though indeed it is a truth that shines so clearly in its own light as well might forbid all further clearing consider of things that are not Some are only possible and may be God can raise up children to Abraham of the stones Some are future and shall be both knowne to God But how is this knowledge differenced All things possible he knowes in his owne power all things future in his decree Secondly if God fore-see what shall be in order of nature before his decree that it shall be otherwise then in his decree then is he dispoiled of all liberty both in his decree and for his decree 1. In his decree if he will decree he hath his rule before-hand from the creature what he fore-sees antecedently to his decree shall bee therefore because it shall be doth he fore-see that it shall be then hath he no liberty left to decree otherwise but either his decree must be frustrate or contradictions must be true Such a thing shall be and therefore God hath fore-seen that it shall be the same thing shall not be God hath decreed that it shall not be But for as much as both these cannot be true God must be content to stand under the most fatall necessity that is imaginable The sum of the Stoick fate was * Once hee commanded he obeyes alwayes Semel jussit semper paret here it is Nunquam jussit semper paret he must obey what is prescribed by the creature even there where subjection is fatall bondage in the determination of his will how unseasonably are the adversaries of the truth wont to raise clamours against that necessity which man stands under upon supposall of Gods decree That second causes should by the first cause be determined so as upon supposition of the first causes predetermination to work only to that issue which is predetermined the same conditionall necessity being undeniable upon their own supposition of fore-sight In the mean time for the manner of their workings rational free agents left free in their working the same decree that determines them to one issue determining them likewise to work freely to
for revenging justice rather then of them each of them being an act of absolute and arbitrary power favouring or refusing to favour meerly at pleasure 2. Yet there is a twofold justice in God 1. Towards himselfe whereby he doth for himselfe whatsoever his wisdome dictates to be for his owne glory 2. Towards the creature whereby he disposeth good or evill to it upon certaine conditions In the former sense Election and reprobation both are acts of justice God is to be justified in whatsoever he doth beseeming his wisdome for his glory In the latter sense they are for justice and mercy rather then of them This for the first ground of that mistake 2. A needlesse feare they are afraid to affirm that God decreed and willed the fall of Adam lest they should thereby make him the Author of sinne Answ 1. To be the Author of sinne is so to act as to stand under the guilt of sinne to be under the guilt of sinne supposeth subjection to a law against which we act Now let such a law be shewed against which God offends in â—â—â—â—â—ing that man take it of the first man and his first sin shall sin 2. Doth not God will the fall of Adam How then 1. Is it against his Will But he is Omnipotent 2. Is it without his Knowledge But he is Omniscient 3. Is it beside his Will But 1. Not one hair from the head nor a sparrow to the ground nor the issue of the lot in the lap without his disposing 2. Then did he not determine what should be the end of man when he intended to create him nor what his course by the same reason the same is to be said for the Angells nor how he would be glorified in the small state of men and Angells nor the giving of Christ nor the Gospell in the world the whole Oeconomy of mans salvation and condemnation of the Kingdome of God here and in heaven of redemption by Christ and thereupon his glory all originally beside the will of God ordered occasionally I had as lieve subscribe to that wilde Philosophie which teacheth the world to be made of the casuall concourse of Atomes as to this more wild Theologie which teacheth the whole administration of this world and that to come to come about meerly casually and occasionally We have formerly upon Rom. 9. v. 11. in the first Sermon laid down three arguments proving the purpose of God to be meerly of it selfe which will here fully conclude that both the sin of the first man and all sins whatsoever are decreed by God let us forme them to this particular 1. He decrees to permit sinne otherwise he could not so much as fore-see it as was there manifested againe whereas he in time permits it if he did not before all time will to permit it it is with him according to mans weaknesse counsells arise in his brest a new therefore he decrees that sin shall be upon his permission the permission of sinne cannot be conceived to have no further end but that it should rest meerly in the act of permission and indeed the permission of sin doth involve the being of it upon permission Further forasmuch as there is no evill but in good and in every sinfull act we have to consider the act and the sin cleaving to the act the act and that which is good he works who is the first cause the fountaine of being and goodnesse in whom we move the sin cleaving to the act he permits Hence in Josephs sale by his brethren the crucifying of Christ the despoiling Job of all he had c. the will and the hand of God are owned If God had not willed the crucifying of Christ and what greater sinne how had he willed the salvation of man by Christ which yet he willed from all eternity Ephes 1.4 Again if God willed not the fall of Adam and it the mother sinne how did he will the salvation of man by Christ it being the first step making way thereto this leads to the 2. He that from all eternity wills that end which cannot be brought to passe without the being of sinne he wills that sinne shall be but God wills that end the glorifying his sparing mercy tempered with his justice in Christ in the salvation of some his revenging justice in the condemnation of others and this way of glorifying himselfe necessarily supposeth sinne there being no place for that kind either of mercy or justice without sinne therefore he wills that sin shall be and the first sinne as well as any other without which the other had not been Hence 3. Though sin be not good but evill yet that sinne should be it is good good forasmuch as it is necessarily conducible to his glory he having set downe in the counsell of his Will in such a way to be glorified but God wills all good therefore he wills that sinne shall be Sin is evil therefore it falls not under the Will of God to approve it that sin should be is good therefore it falls under the Will of God to decree it Hence * Enchirid c. 69. S. Austin It is not to be doubted but God doth well even in suffering to be done whatsoever things are evilly done for this he suffers not but by a righteous judgement and truly whatsoever is righteous is good although therefore those things which are evill in as much as they are evill are not good yet that not only those things which are good but which are evill too should be is good * Enchirid c. 100. Whence after a wonderfull and unspeakable manner it is not brought to passe beside his Will that even against his Will is brought to passe not beside his Will decreeing which is against his Will approving 4. For that Argument taken from the liberty of God both in and for his decree apply it here to his Will when he permits sinne whether the first sin or any other and it will conclude his will necessarily determined beforehand by the creature except we will grant that he freely of himselfe decreed those sins to be many other Arguments might be added As 5. Otherwise the Will of God is not the first in the order of causes is capable of motives from without both which are clearly against the perfection of the Divine Nature otherwise God is not so perfectly happy but there is a happinesse imaginable beyond his happinesse It is greater happinesse that all things whatsoever be fully according to his Will then that any thing be beside it and therefore forasmuch as God is perfectly happy to the greatest perfection imaginable it must needs be his Will that those things should be which yet he approves not as good but approves as good that they though not good but evill be Another Objection yet against this absolute power in God Did God make man to damne him and to this end decree that he should sin Answ The Scripture doth not much abhorre from such
knowes either in it selfe or in himselfe hee knowes it not in it selfe whilst as yet it is not but nothing but himselfe was before the creation of the world therefore nothing in it selfe could then be knowne to him Object But as we see what is present in certain moments of time so he in his eternity comprehending at once and together all time for his eternity is the entire possession together and at once of a boundlesse life sees before all time whatsoever is in any part of time Answ That in his eternity he may see any thing in it selfe there is required not only the existence of his boundlesse life together and at once but the co-existence of the thing it selfe to be seen and therefore as man sees not any thing in it self in one moment of time which is not in that moment but shal be in an after moment so neither doth God see any thing in it selfe before all time which is not but in time otherwise he should see time in it selfe before all time which is a contradiction and here is no shadow of imperfection in God but an impossibility in the thing and what is here said for the thing it selfe is as cleare for all created causes of the thing they cannot in themselves be seen before all time they themselves being but in time what he knowes then from eternity as that which shall be it is in himselfe that he knowes it if in himselfe in his will 1. In God there is a threefold knowledge First an apprehension of the nature of things this may be shadowed by those formes which we finde in our owne minds when we think of any thing meerly according to the simple nature of it as when a builder hath the Platforme of a house in his mind but proceeds no further either to determine it shall or shall not may or may not be built thus in the Divine Nature there is the apprehension of all things possible impossible possibilities and unpossbilities but that herein he doth not determinately know what shal be is manifest because thence it would follow that he apprehends no more then the things that are and shall be 1. The knowledge of what is possible what may or may not be determinately and this he knows in his own power whatsoever is possible to be done is therefore possible because he hath power to bring it to pass but herein doth he not determinately know what shall be because then he should be of power to do no more then he doth 3. It remaines then that the knowledge of what shall be is founded in his will how did he know the world should be and should be this and no other before it was in his mind are thousands of other formes and representations and he was able to have made it of annother form and other kind of Creatures so that here he could not know it should be and that it should be this but herein he knows both that it should be and that it should be this and no other because he wil'd that it should be and that it should be this that it is If God knew then from all eternity that all should not be saved and who they were herein he knew it because it was his will that all should not be saved and that these should be they which should not be saved But as hath been formerly noted the Arminians are very creperous in point of Gods knowledge of the state of man in order to eternal life allowing no determinate and certain ground of it either in God or Man Thus much for answer in generall to these Scriptures joyntly now more particularly 1. To those two Scriptures 1 Tim. 2.4 where it is said God would have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth and 2 Pet. 3.9 where it is said that God is not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance these Scriptures free themselves from that generall interpretation so he that wills that all shall be saved as he wills that they should come to the knowledge of the truth so he is not willing that any should perish as he wils that all should repent But is it the Lords will of intention or his decreeing will that all without exception should come to the knowledge of the truth and to repentance the contrary is manifest 1. From the denyall of meanes 2. From the denyall of his spirit to many who have the means 1. For the denyall of meanes 1. He affords not to all the necessary means instances of this are so evident as cannot be gain-said for the first 4000 years well nigh the world generally was over-looked the means of knowledge the discovery of the Covenant of God onely in the Church and that Church shut up first in the families of the Patriarchs afterwards in the little nation of the Jews hence that of the Apostle Acts 17.30 and 16. Rom. 25.26 hence the Jews so startled when the door of faith was set open generally to the Gentiles The Apostle Peter himself must by a Vision from heaven be taught the counsell of God for the call of the Gentiles Act. 10. Since the comming of Christ to this day is the Gospel preached in every Nation without exception are there no Pagan Nations in the world 2. He hath sometimes denyed the means to those whose hearts he hath seen less obstinate in case the means had come to them then others unto whom he hath sent the means and left them to perish in the obstinacy of their hearts against the means sent thus it was betwixt Tyre and Sidon on the one hand and Capernaum on the other by our Saviours own Testimony Object All in Adam were taken into the Covenant of Grace Ans 1. If it was true it reacheth not how shall his posterity in after generations come within the call of Grace or to the knowledge of the Gospel meerly upon that ground that Adam was once possest of it for them 2 It is utterly false for then should Adam have been a root of Gospell righteousness to his posterity whereas it is Christ in opposition to Adam that is so Rom. 5. Object They had the meanes of knowledge in their Ancestours long since who by their unworthy working have lost them for themselves and posterity Answ 1. If that was granted it would not thence follow that God would that their posterity should come to the knowledge of the truth 2 This supposeth their Ancestours a common Stock forfeiting for their posterity Gospell priviledges all the world over but it is plain that there were some Nations which never had the Gospel among them till many years after the death of Christ Object The Creation holds forth so much of God that if man would improve it so farre as he might by the power of nature God would then reveale the Gospel to him and give him preventing grace and this law he made with Christ for the merit
it is meant of all rankes and orders of men whether Kings and those in Authority or Subjects and those under Authority as in Gal. 3.28 no difference of Nation sex condition exclude from Christ and there was speciall reason from the state of those times for the Apostle to speake to this The Kings and Rulers of the world being then great persecutors of the truth and professed enemies to it it might seem labour in vaine to pray for such a deplored kind of men therefore the Apostle useth this reason that of that order of men as well as others God hath his Elect whom hee will save For the second 2 Pet. 3.9 To us-ward saith the Apostle who are these The Apostle an Elect and Believing person writing to the dispersed Jews who for the Gospell suffered persecution themselves Elect Believers and sanctified 1 Pet. 1.1 2. and 2 Pet. 3.1 The sum then is this God delayes the day of his great judgement that he might first gather in all his Elect ones not willing that any of them should perish and as this is applied to them of that generation amongst the Jewes so it looks further to that harvest of Gods Elect amongst them which in their great call yet to come is to be gathered in Rom. 11.28 c. For the other two Scriptures Ezek. 33. and 18. 1. The Lord wills not their death by his declaring will for as much as he hath commanded them to return and given them means for it 2. For his decreeing Will the Lord by it wills not their death according to the purport of their charge against him to which here he answers They charge the Lord first as unjust punishing the children for the Fathers offences the children themselves free Ezek. 18.2 Secondas unmerciful as though inexorable against repentant sinners this the Lord shewes to bee charged against him in his answer to them chap. 18. mentiening so often that the wicked returning shall find mercy and both these we find charged upon him chap. 33. unmercifulnesse v. 10. injustice v. 17. had this charge been true the Lord had delighted in the death and torments of perishing sinners as a Tyrant delights in the blood of his Subjects had not willed their death as a righteous judge wills the death of a Malefactor The Answer then is That God doth not so will the death of a sinner as that he is liable to the Charge of Injustice condemning without fault or to the charge of unmercifulnesse inexorable against repenting sinners but for their just and true incouragement hath he so fully expressed himselfe not to will the death of a sinner no not of him that dies in the meane time upon immovable grounds formerly laid downe the Lord wills the death of those that die for the glory of his own power and justice seen in their condemnation The like Answers in generall are to be given to those Seriptures so frequently alledged and as often perverted for Vniversall Redemption which Scriptures the adversaries are wont to object against the Doctrine of Predestination Further and particular answers 1. The main Texts alledged by them do of themselves together with the Context afford 2. The Analogie of Faith in many fundamentall Doctrines clearly taught in the word of truth amongst which this of Predestination hath the leading place in which whosoever is truly instructed is surely anchor'd against that windy error Hitherto we have answered these two last Scriptures Ezek. 18. and 33. upon supposition that eternall death was there spoken of whereas it is indeed temporall judgements which they there complaine of and about which the Lord cleares himselfe as is manifest Ezek. 18.2 with Jer. 27. to the 31. vers and Ezek. 33. from the 24. to the 30 vers where it is evident the desolation of their Land was the matter of their quarrel and complaint they were so far from complaining that God had given them over to hardness of heart ordering them thereby to eternall death as that they justifie themselves as suffering undeservedly That was indeed the complaint of an humble and repenting people Isai 63.17 but these were quite of another straine To this the sum of the Lords answer is That they are the Authors of their own wo he is so far from taking pleasure in their undeserved sufferings that would they be righteous they should be free from miserie to this end hath he commanded them to turne from their iniquities and afforded them means for the same that obeying they might live A great stir the Arminian Nation is wont to make with these Texts of Scripture disputing all the while upon a false interpretation and meerly perverting the question here held forth THE SIXTH SERMON ROM 11.7 The Election hath obtained it and the rest were hardned WE come now to other their maine Objections which tend upon supposall of the former Doctrine either to accuse God or excuse Man Object 1. Say they according to this Doctrine of Reprobation God must be the Author of sin and so be guilty of sin and this they urge upon three grounds especially 1. In that he decrees it thence there is a necessity of mans sinning 2. In that he acts in it producing as the first cause those acts in and by man to which sinne cleaves inseparably 3. That unto Adam he denied that grace without which it could not be that as to the event be should persevere in working righteousnesse Answ What is here alledged as the grounds of this Objection is owned by this Doctrine but the charge of the Objection is denied as having here no footing 1. For the decree 1. That God decrees that sin should be hath formerly been proved but that hence he cannot be concluded the Author of sin is evident because the decree as such is an act immanent in himselfe not immanent upon the creature it being the property of immanent acts to put nothing in the object 2. There is upon the decree of God a necessity of mans sin as * Lib. 6 de Genes ad literam c. 15. Austin saith well The Will of God is the necessity of things But 1. It is a necessity not absolute but upon supposall or conditionall not of compulsion but of consecution for as much as God hath so decreed it cannot otherwise come to passe but man shall sin yet doth he sin freely chusing so to do acting neither by constraint nor from a principle of naturall necessity but of this we shall speake more in answer to the third Objection which chargeth this necessity as inconsistent with the essentiall liberty of mans will 2. There is a necessity of the same kind for mans sinning if we grant that God fore-knowes his sinne if God fore-knowes that man shall sinne then must it needs so come to passe otherwise God fore-knowes that shall be which shall not be but this clearly involves a contradiction We must then either grant a conditionall necessity of mans sinning or deny Gods prescience 3. Upon supposall