neer enough to any Body we perceive the Motion and Going of the same we distinguish it thereby from a Tree a Column and other fixed Bodies and so that motion or going is the Property thereof as being proper to living creatures and a faculty by which they make us distinguish them from other Bodies 5 How the knowledge of any Effect may be gotten from the knowledge of the Generation thereof may easily be understood by the example of a Circle For if there be set before us a plain figure having as neer as may be the figure of a Circle we cannot possibly perceive by sense whether it be a true Circle or no then which neverthelesse nothing is more easie to be known to him that knowes first the Generation of the propounded figure For let it be known that the figure was made by the circumduction of a Body whereof one end remained unmoved and we may reason thus a Body carried about retaining alwayes the same length applies it selfe first to one Radius then to another to a third a fourth and successively to all and therefore the same length from the same point toucheth the circumference in every part thereof which is as much to say as all the Radii are equal We know therefore that from such generation proceeds a figure from whose one middle point all the extreame points are reached unto by equal Radii And in like manner by knowing first what figure is set before us we may come by Ratiocination to some Generation of the same though perhaps not that by which it was made yet that by w ch it might have been made for he that knows that a Circle has the property above declared will easily know whether a Body carried about as is said will generate a Circle or no. 6 The End or Scope of Philosophy is that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen or that by applicatiō of Bodies to one another we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our minde as far forth as matter strength industry will permit for the commodity of humane life For he inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may have for the mastering of some difficult and doutfull matter or for the discovery of some hidden truth is not worth so much paines as the study of Philosophy requires nor need any man care much to teach another what he knowes himselfe if he think that will be the onely benefit of his labour The end of Knowledge is Power and the use of Theoremes which among Geometricians serve for the finding out of Properties is for the construction of Problemes and lastly the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action or thing to be done 7 But what the Utility of Philosophy is especially of Natural Philosophy and Geometry will be best understood by reckoning up the chief commodities of which mankind is capable and by comparing the manner of life of such as enjoy them with that of others which want the same Now the greatest commodities of mankind are the Arts namely of measuring Matter and Motion of moving ponderous Bodies of Architecture of Navigation of making instruments for all uses of calculating the Coelestiall Motions the Aspects of the Stars and the parts of Time of Geography c. By which Sciences how great benefits men receive is more easily understood then expressed These benefits are enjoyed by almost all the people of Europe by most of those of Asia and by some of Africa but the Americans and they that live neer the Poles do totally want them But why Have they sharper wits then these Have not all men one kinde of soule and the same faculties of mind What then makes this difference except Philosophy Philosophy therefore is the cause of all these benefits But the Utility of Morall and Civil Philosophy is to be estimated not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these Sciences as by the calamities we receive from not knowing them Now all such calamities as may be avoided by humane industry arise from warre but chiefly from Civil warre for from this proceed Slaughter Solitude and the want of all things But the cause of warre is not that men are willing to have it for the Will has nothing for Object but Good at least that which seemeth good Nor is it from this that men know not that the effects of war are evil for who is there that thinks not poverty and losse of life to be great evils The cause therefore of Civill warre is that men know not the causes neither of Warre nor Peace there being but few in the world that have learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace that is to say that have learned the rules of civill life sufficiently Now the knowledge of these rules is Morall Philosophy But why have they not learned them unlesse for this reason that none hitherto have taught them in a clear and exact method For what shall we say Could the ancient Masters of Greece Egypt Rome and others perswade the unskillfull multitude to their innumerable opinions concerning the nature of their Gods which they themselves knew not whether they were true or false and which were indeed manifestly false absurd could they not perswade the same multitude to civill duty if they themselves had understood it Or shall those few writings of Geometricians which are extant be thought sufficient for the taking away of all controversy in the matters they treat of and shall those innumerable and huge Volumes of Ethicks be thought unsufficient if what they teach had been certain and well demonstrated What then can be imagined to be the cause that the writings of those men have increased science and the writings of these have increased nothing but words saving that the former were written by men that knew and the later by such as knew not the doctrine they taught onely for ostentation of their wit and eloquence Neverthelesse I deny not but the reading of some such books is very delightfull for they are most eloquently written and containe many cleer wholsome and choice sentences which yet are not universally true though by them universally pronounced From whence it comes to passe that the circumstances of times places and persons being changed they are no lesse frequently made use of to confirme wicked men in their purposes then to make them understand the precepts of Civill duties Now that which is chiefly wanting in them is a true and certaine rule of our actions by which we might know whether that we undertake be just or unjust For it is to no purpose to be bidden in every thing to do Right before there be a certain Rule and measure of Right established which no man hitherto hath established Seeing therefore from the not knowing of Civill duties that is from the want of Morall science proceed Civill warres and the greatest calamities of mankind we may very well attribute to
produced and Power in respect of the same Effect to be produced hereafter so that Cause respects the Past Power the Future time Also the Power of the Agent is that which is commonly called Active Power In like manner whensoever any Patient has all those Accidents which it is requisite it should have for the production of some Effect in it we say it is in the Power of that Patient to produce that Effect if it be applyed to a fitting Agent But those Accidents as is defined in the precedent Chapter constitute the Material Cause and therefore the Power of the Patient commonly called Passive Power and Material Cause are the same thing but with this different consideration that in Cause the Past time and in Power the Future is respected Wherefore the Power of the Agent and Patient together which may be called Entire or Plenary Power is the same thing with Entire Cause for they both consist in the Sum or Aggregate of all the Accidents as well in the Agent as in the Patient which are requisite for the production of the Effect Lastly as the Accident produced is in respect of the Cause called an Effect so in respect of the Power it is called an Act. 2 As therefore the Effect is produced in the same instant in which the Cause is Entire so also every Act that may be produced is produced in the same instant in which the Power is Plenary And as there can be no Effect but from a Sufficient and Necessary Cause so also no Act can be produced but by Sufficient Power or that Power by which it could not but be produced 3 And as it is manifest as I have shewn that the Efficient and Material Causes are severally and by themselves parts onely of an Entire Cause and cannot produce any Effect but by being joyned together so also Power Active and Passive are parts onely of Plenary and Entire Power nor except they be joyned can any Act proceed from them and therefore these Powers as I said in the first Article are but conditionall namely the Agent has Power if it be applyed to a Patient and the Patient has Power if it be applyed to an Agent otherwise neither of them have Power nor can the Accidents which are in them severally be properly called Powers nor any Action be said to be Possible for the Power of the Agent alone or of the Patient alone 4 For that is an Impossible Act for the production of which there is no Power Plenary For seeing Plenary Power is that in which all things concurre which are requisite for the production of an Act if the Power shall never be Plenary there will always be wanting some of those things without which the Act cannot be produced wherefore that Act shall never be produced that is that Act is IMPOSSIBLE And every Act which is not Impossible is POSSIBLE Every Act therefore which is Possible shall at some time be produced for if it shall never be produced then those things shall never concurre which are requisite for the production of it wherefore that Act is Impossible by the Definition which is contrary to what was supposed 5 A Necessary Act is that the production whereof it is Impossible to hinder and therefore every Act that shall be produced shall necessarily be produced for that it shall not be produced is Impossible because as is already demonstrated every Possible Act shall at some time be produced Nay this Proposition What shall be shall be is as necessary a Proposition as this A Man is a Man But here perhaps some man may ask whether those Future things which are commonly called Contingents are Necessary I say therefore that generally all Contingents have their Necessary Causes as is shewn in the preceding Chapter but are called Contingents in respect of other Events upon which they do not depend as the Rain which shall be to morrow shall be Necessarily that is from necessary Causes but we think and say it happens by chance because we doe not yet perceive the Causes thereof though they exist now for men commonly call that Casuall or Contingent whereof they do not perceive the necessary Cause and in the same manner they use to speake of things past when not knowing whether a thing be done or no they say it is possible it never was done Wherefore all Propositions concerning Future things contingent or not contingent as this It will rayne to morrow or this To morrow the Sun will rise are either necessarily true or necessarily false but we call them Contingent because we doe not yet know whether they be true or false whereas their Verity depends not upon our Knowledge but upon the foregoing of their Causes But there are some who though they confess this whole Proposition To morrow it will either rain or not rain to be true yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it as To morrow it will rain or To morrow it will not rain to be either of them true by it self because they say neither this nor that is true determinately But what is this determinately true but true upon our knowledge or evidently true and therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no but they say it more obscurely and darken the Evidence of the truth with the same words with which they endevour to hide their own ignorance 6 In the 9th Article of the precedent Chapter I have shewn that the Efficient Cause of all Motion and Mutation consists in the Motion of the Agent or Agents And in the first Article of this Chapter that the Power of the Agent is the same thing with the Efficient Cause From whence it may be understood that all Active Power consists in Motion also and that Power is not a certain Accident which differs from all Acts but is indeed an Act namely Motion which is therefore called Power because another Act shall be produced by it afterwards For example if of three Bodies the first put forwards the second and this the third the Motion of the second in respect of the first which produceth it is the Act of the second Body but in respect of the third it is the Active Power of the same second Body 7 The Writers of Metaphysiques reckon up two other Causes besides the Efficient and Material namely the ESSENCE which some call the Formal Cause and the End or Final Cause both which are nevertheless Efficient Causes For when it is said the Essence of a thing is the Cause thereof as to be Rational is the Cause of Man it is not intelligible for it is all one as if it were said To be a Man is the Cause of Man which is not well said And yet the knowledge of the Essence of any thing is the Cause of the knowledge of the thing it selfe for if I first know that a thing is Rational I know from thence that the same is Man but this is no
which they work is continually altered and changed For example as the Heat of the Fire encreases more and more so also the Effects thereof namely the Heat of such Bodies as are next to it again of such other Bodies as are next to them encreases more more accordingly which is already no litle argument that all Mutation consists in Motion onely the truth whereof shall be further demonstrated in the ninth Article But in this Progress of Causation that is of Action and Passion if any man comprehend in his imagination a part thereof and divide the same into parts the first part or Beginning of it cannot be considered otherwise then as Action or Cause for if it should be considered as Effect or Passion then it would be necessary to consider something before it for its Cause or Action which cannot be for nothing can be before the Beginning And in like manner the last part is considered onely as Effect for it cannot be called Cause if nothing follow it but after the last nothing follows And from hence it is that in all Action the Beginning and Cause are taken for the same thing But every one of the intermediate parts are both Action and Passion and Cause and Effect according as they are compared with the antecedent or subsequent part 7 There can be no Cause of Motion except in a Body Contiguous and Moved For let there be any two Bodies which are not contiguous and betwixt which the intermediate Space is empty or if filled filled with another Body which is at Rest and let one of the propounded Bodies be supposed to be at Rest I say it shall always be at Rest. For if it shall be Moved the Cause of that Motion by the 8th Chapter 19th Article will be in some external Body and therefore if between it and that external Body there be nothing but empty Space then whatsoever the disposition be of that external Body or of the Patient it self yet if it be supposed to be now at Rest we may conceive it wil continue so til it be touched by some other Body but seeing Cause by the Definition is the Aggregate of all such Accidents which being supposed to be present it cannot be conceived but that the Effect will follow those Accidents which are either in external Bodies or in the Patient it self cannot be the Cause of future Motion and in like manner seeing we may conceive that whatsoever is at Rest will still be at Rest though it be touched by some other Body except that other Body be moved therefore in a contiguous Body which is at Rest there can be no Cause of Motion Wherefore there is no Cause of Motion in any Body except it be Contiguous and Moved The same reason may serve to prove that whatsoever is Moved will alwayes be Moved on in the same way and with the same Velocity except it be hindered by some other Contiguous and Moved Body and consequently that no Bodies either when they are at Rest or when there is an interposition of Vacuum can generate or â—â—tinguish or lesson Motion in other Bodies There is one that has written that things Moved are more resisted by things at Rest then by things contrarily Moved for this reason that he conceived Motion not to be so contrary to Motion as Rest. That which deceived him was that the words Rest and Motion are but contradictory Names whereas Motion indeed is not resisted by Rest but by contrary Motion 8 But if a Body work upon another Body at one time and afterwards the same Body work upon the same Body at another time so that both the Agent and Patient and all their parts be in all things as they were and there be no difference except onely in time that is that one Action be former the other later in time it is manifest of it self that the Effects will be Equal and Like as not differing in any thing besides time And as Effects themselves proceed from their Causes so the diversity of them depends upon the diversity of their Causes also 9 This being true it is necessary that Mutation can be nothing else but Motion of the Parts of that Body which is Changed For First we do not say any thing is Changed but that which appears to our Senses otherwise then it appeared formerly Secondly both those Appearances are Effects produced in the Sentient therefore if they be differeÌ„t it is necessary by the preceding article that either some part of the Agent which was formerly at Rest is now Moved and so the Mutation consists in this Motion or some part which was formerly Moved is now otherwise Moved and so also the Mutation consists in this new Motion or which being formerly Moved is now at Rest which as I have shewn above cannot come to pass without Motion and so again Mutation is Motion or lastly it happens in some of these manners to the Patient or some of its parts so that Mutation howsoever it be made will consist in the Motion of the parts either of the Body which is perceived or of the Sentient Body or of both Mutation therefore is Motion namely of the parts either of the Agent or of the Patient which was to be demonstrated And to this it is consequent that Rest cannot be the Cause of any thing nor can any Action proceed from it seeing neither Motion nor Mutation can be caused by it 10 Accidents in respect of other Accidents which precede them or are before them in time upon which they do not depend as upon their Causes are called Contingent Accidents I say in respect of those Accidents by which they are not generated for in respect of their Causes all things come to pass with equal necessity for otherwise they would have no Causes at all which of things generated is not intelligible CHAP. X. Of Power and Act. 1 Power and Cause are the same thing 2 An Act is produced at the same instant in which the Power is Plenary 3 Active and Passive Power are parts onely of Plenary Power 4 An Act when said to be Possible 5 An Act Necessary and Contingent what 6 Active Power consists in Motion 7 Cause Formal and Final what they are 1_COrrespondent to Cause and Effect are POWER and ACT Nay those and these are the same things though for divers considerations they have divers names Forwhensoever any Agent has all those Accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some Effect in the Patient then we say that Agent has Power to produce that Effect if it be applyed to a Patient But as I have shewn in the precedent Chapter those Accidents constitute the Efficient Cause and therefore the same Accidents which constitute the Efficient Cause constitute also the Power of the Agent Wherefore the Power of the Agent and the Efficient Cause are the same thing But they are considered with this difference that Cause is so called in respect of the Effect already
other then an Efficient Cause A Final Cause has no place but in such things as have Sense and Will and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an Efficient Cause CHAP. XI Of Identity and Difference 1 What it is for one thing to Differ from another 2 To Differ in Number Magnitude Species and Genus what 3 What is Relation Proportion and Relatives 4 Proportionals what 5 The Proportion of Magnitudes to one another wherein it consists 6 Relation is no new Accident but one of those that were in the Relative before the Relation or Comparison was made Also the Causes of Accidents in the Correlatives are the Cause of Relation 7 Of the Beginning of Individuation 1_HItherto I have spoken of Body simply and of Accidents common to all Bodies as Magnitude Motion Rest Action Passion Power Possible c. And I should now descend to those Accidents by which one Body is distinguished from anoâ—â—er but that it is first to be declared what it is to be Distinct and not Distinct namely what are the SAME and DIFFERENT for this also is common to all Bodies that they may be distinguished and differenced from one another Now two Bodies are said to Differ from one another when something may be said of one of them which cannot be said of the other at the same time 2 And first of all it is manifest that no Two Bodies are the Same for seeing they are Two they are in two places at the same time as that which is the Same is at the same time in one and the same place All Bodies therefore differ from one another in Number namely as One and Another so that the Same and different in Number are Names opposed to one another by Contradiction In Magnitude Bodies differ when One is greater then Another as a Cubit long and two Cubits long of two pound weight and of three pound weight And to these Equals are opposed Bodies which differ more then in Magnitude are called Unlike and those which differ onely in Magnitude Like Also of Unlike Bodies some are said to differ in the Species other in the Genus in the Species when their difference is perceived by one and the same Sense as White and Black and in the Genus when their difference is not perceived but by divers Senses as White and Hot. 3 And the Likeness or Unlikeness Equality or Inequality of one Body to another is called their RELATION and the Bodies themselves Relatives or Correlatives Aristotle calls them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first whereof is usually named the Antecedent and the second the Consequent and the Relation of the Antecedent to the Consequent according to Magnitude namely the Equality the Excess or Defect thereof is called the PROPORTION of the Antecedent to the Consequent so that Proportion is nothing but the Equality or Inequality of the Magnitude of the Antecedent compared to the Magnitude of the Consequent by their difference only or compared also with their difference For Example the Proportion of Three to Two consists only in this that Three exceeds Two by Unity and the Proportion of Two to Five in this that Two compared with Five is deficient of it by Three either simply or compared with the numbers different and therefore in the Proportion of Unequals the Proportion of the Lesse to the Greater is called DEFECT and that of the Greater to the Lesse EXCESS 4 Besides of Unequals some are more some lesse and some equally unequall so that there is Proportion of Proportions as well as of Magnitudes namely where two Unequals have relation to two other Unequals as when the Inequality which is between 2 and 3 is compared with the Inequality which is between 4 and 5. In which Comparison there are alwayes four Magnitudes or which is all one if there be but three the midlemost is twice numbred and if the Proportion of the first to the second be equal to the Proportion of the third to the fourth then the four are said to be Proportionals otherwise they are not Proportionals 5 The Proportion of the Antecedent to the Consequent consists in their Difference not onely simply taken but also as compared with one of the Relatives that is either in that part of the greater by which it exceeds the lesse or in the Remainder after the lesse is taken out of the greater as the Proportion of Two to Five consists in the Three by which Five exceeds Two not in Three simply onely but also as compared with Five or Two For though there be the same difference between Two Five which is between Nine and Twelve namely Three yet there is not the same Inequality and therefore the Proportion of Two to Five is not in all Relation the same with that of Nine to Twelve but onely in that which is called Arithmetical 6 But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an Accident differing from all the other Accidents of the Relative but one of them namely that by which the Comparison is made For example the likeness of one White to another White or its Unlikeness to Black is the same Accident with its Whiteness and Equality and Inequality the same Accident with the Magnitude of the thing compared though under another Name for that which is called White or Great when it is not compared with something else the same when it is compared is called Like or Unlike Equal or Unequal And from this it follows that the Causes of the Accidents which are in Relatives are the Causes also of Likeness Unlikeness Equality and Inequality namely that he that makes two Unequal Bodies makes also their Inequality and he that makes a Rule and an Action makes also if the Action be congruous to the Rule their Congruity if Incongruous their Incongruity And thus much concerning Comparison of one Body with another 7 But the same Body may at different times be Compared with it self And from hence springs a great controversie among Philosophers about the Beginning of Individuation namely in what sense it may be conceived that a Body is at one time the same at another time not the same it was formerly For example whether a Man grown old be the same Man he was whilest he was young or another Man or whether a City be in different Ages the same or another City Some place Individuity in the Unity of Matter others in the Unity of Form and one sayes it consists in the Unity of the Aggregate of all the Accidents together For Matter it is pleaded that a lump of Wax whether it be Spherical or Cubical is the same Wax because the same Matter For Form that when a Man is grown from an Infant to be an Old Man though his Matter be changed yet he is still the same Numerical Man for that Identity which cannot be attributed to the Matter ought probably to be ascribed to the Form For the Aggregate of Accidents no Instance can be made but because