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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A41639	The court of the gentiles. Part IV, Of reformed philosophie. Book III, Of divine predetermination, wherein the nature of divine predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate mater [sic] or entitative act of sin.; Court of the gentiles. Part IV. Book III	Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.	1678 (1678)	Wing G143; ESTC R16919	203,898	236

1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore

it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of

and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in

That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ● de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the

total and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sin For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin must he not also concur to the wil that puts forth that act And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act must he not also necessarily determine the wil to that act That Gods total concurse doth not only reach the act and effect but also the wil itself is granted by Strangius lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither faith he do we say that the Concurse of God doth reach only the effect but not the efficient cause sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Energie of the second cause must be from God and the action is not lesse an effect than the work c. 2 The Vniversalitie of Divine concurse as to al effects whatsoever gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin That Divine concurse is universally extensive to al acts of the wil as wel as to al other objects by giving forces and assistances to faculties exciting and appling them to their acts and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. § 2. pag. 296 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative Yea to speak properly is there or can there be any real efficience influxe or concurse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of althings which is not predeterminative To talke of an universal general concurse of God which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts and yet doth not predetermine i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act what is it but pure non-sense and virtual contradiction 3 The Particularitie of Gods concurse as to its manner of working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin Divine concurse albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object yet it 's most particular and proper as to its manner of working Our Adversaries generally both Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists talke much of a general indifferent concurse alike commun to al effects and determinable by its substrate mater as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on But alas how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concurse Doth not this make the first cause to be second because dependent and the second cause first because independent And doth it not hence also necessarily follow that the first cause may by the indisposition of the mater or resistence of second Agents be frustrated of its intended effect What more expressely overthrows the soverain Dominion and universal Concurse of God than such a general indifferent Concurse And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under They object If God should by a particular predeterminative concurse determine the wil to act in sins intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like then the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis to which we intend a more ful answer in the next Chapter § 1. at present let this suffice 1 We say not that God is a particular cause but universal working in and by a particular concurse suitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on 2 We say not that this particular Concurse of God doth morally specifie or determine the sinful act to its object but only physically individuate or naturally modifie the substrate mater of the sinful act This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward that great Professor of Theologie in his Determination of Gods Concurse pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates That the previous Concurse of God as the first cause doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of second causes and if so then surely the substrate entitative act of sin as hereafter 3 That general indifferent concurse which our Adversaries so warmly contend for sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin as our predeter minative concurse For if it be causative and effective of the act then surely of that individual act as determined to such an object for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere in the general and not in individuo in its individual determination to its object is such an absurditie in Philosophie that al awakened Philosophers wil decrie it for what Tyro cannot informe us that al physical acts are suppositorum of individual singular substances and so without al peradventure individual and singular and if so then must not their general concurse reach not only the action in general but also individually considered as relating to its object not morally but physically And wil it not hence follow that their general concurse is causative of the entitative act as determined to its object and so makes God the Author of sin as much at least as wel as our predeterminative concurse as more fully Chap. 6. § 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 4 The Immediation of Divine Concurse strongly demonstrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of sin thereby Our Adversaries generally both Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus grant an immediate concurse to the entitative act of sin which if wel followed wil necessarily infer predeterminative concurse specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists who say That this immediate concurse reacheth not only the effect and act which the Jesuites and Arminians grant but also the very wil itself as the immediate efficient of the act Touching this immediate Concurse see Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54 c. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuites none has more acutely demonstrated this than Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton in his Philos Vnivers Disp 28. Sect. 2 3. pag. Disput 29. Sect. 1 2. pag. 323 324. where he demonstrates strongly against Lud. à Dola That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin Now hence we thus argue If God together with the human wil immediately produceth the very act of sin then certainly he must of necessitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus as they phrase it or a mere simple volition of the wil how is it possible that

God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also

of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for

is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus

Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of

2 There is also a libertie strictly so termed which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object also to act or not to act and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state as Strangius p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc p. 435. and others There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means not the end yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Libertie But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie among those who owned the Synod of Dort was Strangius who asserts a two-fold Libertie one considered in its own Nature which is essential to the wil and the other as limited to lapsed man which includes Indifference c. as in places above cited What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined distinction of Libertie unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians I cannot conjecture Certain I am that I never could find it among the ancient Philosophers Primitive Fathers Scholastic Theologues or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any libertie but what is essential to the wil and al human acts Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us that Liberty is essential to al moral acts both in the future as wel as the present state of the Soul Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie Doth not Amyraldus de Libero Arbitrio as wel as we make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be Wil it satisfie the Pelagians Jesuites or Arminians No because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not If it be supposed that Indifference be essential to libertie in this imperfect state wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians that the wil is not according to these new Methodists free in Conversion because not indifferent It were not difficult to demonstrate how invalid this new-coined distinction of Libertie is and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie we have with what studie and diligence we could inquired into and discussed the same Court of the Gentiles P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 29 32. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. § 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions 1 Natural Libertie as it denotes a power has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copiosely demonstrated in the forementioned places Hence 2 Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them 3 The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute but limited and conditionate 4 The necessitie which ariseth from the concurse of God the first cause no way diminisheth but establisheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil or is injuriose to its Libertie so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto the act is in its own power and free for as Aristotle Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing happens to such an one but what he wils 5 Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts is no way essential to natural Libertie but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection 6 The formal native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie both as to state and exercice includes no more than a rational spontaneitie This last proposition which is the principal Strangius owns and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit Thes 19. p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines even of Amyraldus Placeus and other new Methodists That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant see his Determinations Quaest 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie These Propositions about natural Libertie we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie and particularly this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie doth nothing to purpose § 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil we are to consider Moral Libertie or Free-wil as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good This moral and spiritual Libertie our Adversaries the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature they falsely charge us with denying the former therefore to remove this confusion of the termes and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse the following Propositions wil be of use unto us 1. Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts whatever act is voluntary is for that very reason free Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation as also by the determination of the best Philosophers termes synonymous and equipollent as we have demonstrated Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. § 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good that is only accidental to the human Soul it may come and go be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul or violation to natural Libertie It 's true that Moral Libertie consisting in virtuose Habits Inclinations and Exercices is the Perfection of Man yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof 2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good This is granted on both sides and therefore needs not further demonstration 3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good I cal this Impotence total and universal as it overspreads the whole soul and has stript it of al seeds of or inclinations to any

the presence of althings in Eternitie Wherein he follows the Dominicans and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the wil of God permitting it which overthrows his Hypothesis Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes Lastly cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confesseth That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision Which is al that we contend for and that which necessarily resolves Gods prescience of sin into the act of his wil permitting it Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science Thus Le Blanc De Concord Libert p 444. Thes 39. As for the fourth opinion which secketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect and in the determinate veritie of those things which are contingently future it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate Yet Thes 40. he confesseth That this opinion doth not satisfie the Question nor take away the principal difficultie For that which is here most difficult to be understood is how future contingents do from Eternitie passe from mere possibles into the nature of futures that so under that reason they may be perceived by God Which knot he endeavors to untie by telling us that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition But this is a very jejune and poor evasion as we shal hereafter shew Chap. 5. § 1. 3 Others refer Gods certain prescience of sin to the Jesuites middle science whereby God foresees that if the wil of man come under such a connexion of causes circumstances and providential concurrences the effect wil certainly follow albeit in itself merely contingent Thus Lud. Crocius Dyodec Dissert Dissert 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science which Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 449. Thes 26 c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others Le Blanc himself pag. 444. Thes 42. confesseth That it wants not great difficultie how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not nor yet change the nature of its object Whence he concludes Thes 43. That seing there is so much darknesse on al sides our safest and most ingenuous course is to confesse our own ignorance herein The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture A poor refuge indeed why then do they so daringly sift and prie into the Divine prescience and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason We easily grant that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof but this we assert that it is impossible the Divine prescience which is in itself most certain should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the futurition of sin and Gods predefinition thereof Strangius l. 3. c. 11. holds That some free acts are absolutely future and knowen of God as such without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts and yet he denies that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition Whence it wil follow that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future but what he first decreed to be absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc De Concord Libert pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching Gods concurse its immediation totalitie prioritie efficace and predetermination as to sinful acts 1 How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes how many yet denie it in realitie Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith yea repugnant thereto 2 Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total particular concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin Some grant a total concurse to the physic entitative act in the general but not in particular others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular abstracting the reference it has to its object Thus Strangius lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically which is al that we contend for Others on the contrary make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general asserting with Molina Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin So a Divine of name among us yea he asserts that God never totally permits sin 3 Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Some grant Gods concurse hereto previous though not predeterminative so Strangius but others make it to be only simultaneous asserting that God concurs with the wil of man in the same moment of nature and reason to the same act So Baronius wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians 4 Lastly the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurse as to the substrate mater of sin Some make the concurse of God to be only general and indifferent and so determinable by the second cause as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 73 74 75. pag. 142 c. where he makes Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuites more particularly Molina Concord Liber Arbitr cum Grat. donis c. Quaest 14. Disput 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our selves openly asserts that Gods concurse is determinable by the creature But Strangius albeit he too far fals in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concurse as too grosse and Pelagian So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore that God concurs only by a general concurse as the Sun concurs in the same manner to

the generation of a man and of an horse and of a mouse but we determine that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are physically distinguished specie and unto al kind of entitie but not to the reason of moral iniquitie which consistes in privation Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concurse but yet I must confesse upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficace yet he makes it be but commun and no way determinative and therefore only indifferent The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this that no man living can rationally exemt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse and assert an efficacious special concurse but what is determinative as to the subject it workes on And thence Le Blanc Concil Arbitr part 3. thes 36. p. 434. confesseth That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius Lastly Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78 c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good and to many other acts of the wil whensoever God pleaseth or need requireth yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures specially to such as are intrinsecally evil as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius the Remonstrants and Jesuites or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with of which hereafter Chap. 5. § 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin its nature and efficace 1 A Divine of repute among our selves assertet● that no act of sin no not the active selling of Joseph or crucifying of Christ was willed by God but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect yea he saith That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense but others allow that God wils the acts of sin as penal or conducible to his own glorie though not as sinful acts Thus Strangius l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction at first framed by Bellarmine and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves of active and passive vendition and crucifixion he concludes thus Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself as hereafter Chap. 3. § 2. 2 Some of our Opponents assert Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious yea idle and unactive but others allow it an efficace and energie for the limiting directing and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends albeit not about the act itself which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction for how can Gods permission limit direct and order sinful acts but by influencing the very act itself materially considered See more of this Chap. 5. § 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin its formal Reason c. Some and those of no smal repute among our selves hold sin as to its formal reason to be a positive real Being which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which they denie to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes one of good the other of evil but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin without making God the Author of sin or making mans corrupt wil independent and so the first cause of a real positive act Therefore Strangius lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues with the Orthodoxe that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation But withal we are here to note that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater of which more hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves as wel as from us namely touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil natural impossibilitie and possibilitie Gods decretive and approbative wil of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions for how is it possible that they should agree among themselves when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part Chap. 5. § 3. We procede now to shew Wherein we differ from those of the new method Strangius Baronius Le Blanc and others about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted there sprang up some Divines who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod but yet contrived a new method specially as to universal Grace Reprobation and Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie as we shal hereafter demonstrate And the principal Agent who undertook the new modelling this last head was Strangius which he has copiosely treated of according to the new method in his Book De Voluntate Actionibus Dei circa peccatum whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin We assert 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin This Proposition Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin specially the first sin and such acts as are intrinsecally evil which sufficiently proves our Proposition for we say and are ready to demonstrate that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful but naturally good What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby in which regard we peremptorily

denie that it is from God Yea Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants That God is the cause of the act though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same and then to that objection of Alvarez That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itself to al those things unto which the causalitie and efficience of God extendes he replies That God decrees althings either absolutely or respectively But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God as our Divines particularly Davenant Animadvers against Hoard pag. 226. have proved against the Arminians Lastly Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies That God decrees al sins specially the first sin which we shal in its place endeavor to prove with the solution of his objections against it Hence 2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes That it is not repugnant to the nature of God or of the thing itself that something be future which God has not predefined So c. 9. p. 628. he denies that God hath decreed al futures namely the fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc de Concord Libert Hum. par 1. thes 55 c. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert That the Decree of God and his wil is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event And he instanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God we shal examine in what follows Chap. 5. § 1. 3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious This Proposition is opposed by Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant what some affirme that the permissive Decree of God whereby he permits al sin is efficacious albeit not effective For so the fal of Adam and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree which is an hard saying Neither is that lesse hard which some affirme that God hath absolutely decreed that men do not more good than what they do and omit not more evil than what they omit This Hypothesis is so far from being hard as that I conceive Strangius's opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees as we shal shew in its place Yea Strangius himself in what follows pag. 557. grants what Lombard lib. 1. dist 47. assertes namely that the wil of God is always efficacious c. 4. Prop. Gods Prescience of things future and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees Thus Hilarie de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do those things he knows in his wil. This sentence of Hilarie Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox but yet denies that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing althings So Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes ●3 I see no reason why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis asserting That God certainly knows al future contingents because his Divine Essence which is the reason of knowing representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the prescience of sin they hold That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such yet he predefines the permission of sins in which he knows them to be future Which is orthodox and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter Chap. 5. § 2. 5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists excepting Baronius grant but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinsecally evil So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat abstracting from the object which he did eat of that cannot be Then he gives his reasons why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating abstracting it from the reference it has to its object And then he addes Moreover we denie that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence that he absolutely predefine al free acts and predetermin the Wil unto them The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shal endeavor to solve and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place Chap. 6. § 1. 6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Libertie Strangius and his Sectators grant That Predefinition and Predetermination destroyes not that Libertie which is essential to the Wil but only that which consistes in Indifference So Strangius l. 3. c. 14. p. 681 682 683 685 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is and how unapt to serve the designe for which it was coined we have already intimated c. 1. § 3. and intend more fully to demonstrate Chap. 6. § 5. 7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed do not make God the Author of Sin This is the principal point in controversie the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged though weakly defended by our Opponents Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctitie of God that he wil and decree sin to be the vitiositie to exist and that he predefine such acts whereunto the vitiositie is necessarily annexed specially the Fal of the evil Angels and our first Parents from whence al sins sprang So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission or from the Decree of God permitting or from the action of which God is the cause that sin is necessarily inferred truely the necessity of sinning is ascribed to God as the Author namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the first cause neither was that act or its vitiositie necessarily inferred from the permission of God That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false

and our Hypothesis most true it remains on us to demonstrate Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and ful state of our Controversie which by reason of the subtile evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscuritie and confusion and indeed it is to me a deplorable case and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cause that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena and yet never explicate the termes or state the Question in controversie I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my self the more trouble in this part of our Province that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Scriptural Demonstration 1 That God is the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. 2 That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Joseph's vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. 2 The Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10 11. Acts 2. 23. 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off 3 That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People Esa 10. 5 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal 105. 25. Job 1. 21. 4 God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin 2 Sam. 12. 11. 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. 1 Kings 22 23. Rev. 17. 17. 5 Gods efficacious permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17 20. 6 Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. 69. 22-27 Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. 29. 10. 19. 11 14. 44. 18 19. 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions 7 Gods ordering Sin for his glorie Exod. 9. 14-16 Rom. 9. 17 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis namely That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men to al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them we now procede to the Demonstration hereof And because al demonstration must be grounded on some first principes which give evidence firmitude and force thereto and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie but what are originally in the Scriptures we are therefore to begin our Demonstration with Scriptural Arguments which we shal reduce to these seven heads 1 Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed that God is the first Cause of al natural actions and things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 2 Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate That God doth predefine predetermine and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed 3 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt 4 Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent 5 Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin 6 Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration 7 Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glorie § 1. We shal begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such Texts as universally affirme That God is the first cause of al natural Actions and Things and more particularly of al even the most contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things are many and great we shal mention some as Esa 26. 12. Thou hast wrought al our works in us or for us This Text is urged by Strangius p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurse to al actions of the creature though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men which have much sin annexed to them Again this universal prime Causalitie of God efficaciously influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. 11. 36. For of him and through him and to him are althings Of him as he frames althings By him as he operates in and cooperates with althings and for him as the final cause of althings Thus Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme energie as Cyril stiles it reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects and if so then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them Is there any sin so intrinsecally evil which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof And if althings are of God and by him and for him must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil be so Strangius p. 342. replies thus Al that God workes must tend to his Glorie But what Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God blasphemie c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make 1 Was there not much Hatred of God and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this Yea 2 Doth not Strangius himself and those of his partie grant that God directs disposeth and over-rules al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil so as that they conduce to his glorie And how can God direct dispose and over-rule them unless he concur yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act Again Strangius p. 561. answers to this Text thus None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins as if sins were of God by God and for him c. 1 Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered 2 But must we thence necessarily conclude that the entitative act whereto sin is only accidentally appendent is not from God nor by him nor for him Yea 3 May we not say with Divines that sin formally considered although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient yet it is for him i. e. conducing to his Glorie as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates as De Genes ad liter lib. Imperfecto cap. 5. For God is not the Author of our sins yet he is the Ordinator of them c. And thus much indeed Strangius p. 860. confesseth Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is Ephes 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al

of Soul and self-Dominion yet he grants that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom 2 By the Heart we must understand according to the Hebraic mode the whole soul and al its movements imaginations ratiocinations contrivements purposes and undertakements 3 In the hand of the Lord i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations it 's usually put in Scripture for the energetic potent and predeterminative Concurse of God So Hab. 3. 4. He i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light had hornes i. e. beams as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes coming out of his hands i. e. most potent wil the spring of al his efficacious operations whence it follows and there was the hiding of his power i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power So Solomon saying That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse whereby he applies the heart to its acts conduceth and guideth it therein and determineth it as he pleaseth So it follows 4 As the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God to turne the hearts of men and al their natural conceptions products and issues which way he listes Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence whereby God doth bend impel and incline human wils which way he please not by proper compulsion but by sweet inspiration and motion For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil yet he doth at times and when he please efficaciously move and impel the wils of men and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart Prov. 21. 1. that very same may on a greater account be affirmed of the heart of every man So Augustin de Grat. Liber Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected it shews that not only the good wils of men but even the bad are so in the power of God that where he wil and when he wil he causeth them to be inclined either to performe benefits or to inflict punishments by a most secret yet just judgement So again August de Corrept Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men more than they themselves without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart even such as have intrinsecal evil as they cal it appendent to them Yea Strangius lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes but also to natural and civil as oft as it seems good to him to performe certain ends which he has preordained So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him And how so Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities Exod. 11. 2 3. 12. 35 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple Ezra 6. 1 c. 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies Jer. 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius whence we argue That it is impossible but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions for al these actions being exerted by wicked men had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people yea they were ful of hatred against God To these Scriptures we may adde Act. 17. 28. For in him we live and move and have our being Not only Being in general and Life which implies more than simple being but also al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets for we are also his off-spring As if he had said Do not your own Poets tel you that we are the off-spring of God Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions Doth not Aristotle Phys 8. also strongly demonstrate That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions even such as are intrinsecally evil be reduced unto God as the prime Motor I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say If the Lord wil we shal live and do this or that There were a number of Free-willers who proudly conceited that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions whom James rebukes and tels them they ought to say If the Lord wil c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God as the original Cause and Principe But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith Who ever understood these words if God wil i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that Then he addes his own glosse But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition IF GOD WIL than this if God shal permit or wil permit as it is elsewhere explicated Act. 16. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder that a person of so great reason and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion which not only Reason and Scripture but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict For 1 it is most evident that James here as Luke Act. 16. 7. and Paul 1 Cor. 16. 7. speakes not of a mere permissive wil but of an efficacious influential concurse arising from the wil of God which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse for al actions both natural civil and supernatural

much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his effica●… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he w●… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods

of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de G●…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who

God to al and singular actions of the wil The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain persuade us namely That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination yet Aquinas is not c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge 1 Was not Thomas Aquinas himself a Dominican of the Order of Dominic And are not al the Dominicans sworne Thomists Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions even such as are sinful and yet Thomas their Master against it 2 Take the character of impartial Writers and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's sentiment See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward Professor of Theologie at Cambridge his Determinations pag. 117 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of Thomas But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversie namely to Le Blanc and Baronius Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. par 3. thes 10. pag. 430. assures us That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans teach for the explication of Divine Concurse That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require For according to their mind God is therefore said to be the first Mover because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations c. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein Thus also Baronius who in his Metaphysics Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas as the principal Founder thereof So § 79. pag. 147. And § 82. pag. 149. he urgeth That from the opinion of Thomas it follows that God is the Author of sin The like § 85. pag. 151. But 3 to let passe the testimonies of others if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses and the reflexions of our own reason thereon it is to me most evident that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries Thus 1. 2. Quaest 79. Art 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act and in both regards it is from God for it 's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being c. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend that this includes immediate concurse but not predeterminative it is most evident that Aquinas owned no concurse but what was predeterminative For what is predetermination of the wil but the application of it to its act as Strangius pag. 244. grants And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil What more commun with him than this grand Effate That God applies al second causes to their act Thus in his sums par 1. Quaest 105. Art 5. he layes down this conclusion That God actes in every Agent finally effectively and formally yet so as they also act And then in the explication hereof he saith 3 That it is to be considered that God doth not only move things to work as by applying the formes and virtues of things to their operations as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the axe but also gives formes to creatures acting and preserves them in being and because the forme is in the thing and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings which among althings is more intime it follows that God workes intimely in althings and for this reason in sacred Scripture the operations of nature are ascribed unto God as working in nature according to that Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me c. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis He saith 1 That God actes in every Agent not only finally and effectively but also formally 2 That God moves things to worke by APPLYING i. e. predetermining the formes and virtues of things to their operations Yea 3 That God applies the second cause to act as the Artificer applies the instrument to worke Whereby he makes al second causes the wil not excepted but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience For the wil albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts yet in regard of the Divine concurse which it receives and in virtue whereof it actes it may safely be termed a vital Instrument 4 That God acting most intimely in althings the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him which notes predetermination in the highest point So also Aquinas Quaest Disp q. 3. de Potentia art 7. speakes fully of this predeterminative application of al second causes by God And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him So that I cannot but wonder that any learned man should urge Aquinas's testimonie against us We descend now to Scotus the Head of a Sect opposite to the Thomists yet who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis I am not ignorant that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus's name to patronise his Antithesis and I shal not denie but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than Thomas yet this I no way dout but to make good that as to our Hypothesis touching Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Scotus is fully of our persuasion This wil appear evident 1 if we consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them as Le Blanc de Praescient thes 33. pag. 443. confesseth And certainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 2 Scotus and his sectators generally hold That God efficaciously concurs to al second causes and their acts not by any influence or impression on the second cause which the Thomists assert but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act Which we judge to be the very truth as it hath been demonstrated by us Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination but only as to its origine and principe the Thomists making it to consiste in a physic intrinsec influxe impressed on the creature

what follows touching Bradwardine I now come to Thomas Bradwardine our pious learned and profound Bradwardine whom might I be allowed my libertie I should rather reckon among our first Reformers than among the Sons of Antichrist for indeed he was a zelose Patron of and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion specially efficacious free Grace which he with so much courage strength of argument and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days This Thomas Bradwardine borne at Hartfield in Sussex flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations which in his first studies he greedily drank in even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures because they favored not of a metaphysic style as he himself informes us in his Book de Causa Dei When saith he in the state of my unregeneracie I came into the Scholes and heard Lectures on Pauls Epistles of free Grace c. it did no way relish with me quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum because it savored not of a metaphysic style It was with me as it was with Augustin of old nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil c. But after his Conversion he was as another Augustin the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace Balaeus de Script Brit. cent 5. cap. 87. tels us That John Baconthorp that famose Divine and English-man returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Prescience and Predestination to whom at last Bradwardine assents in al those points as the same Baconthorp declares in Sent. lib. 4. Dist 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury without any desire of his own thereto He was indeed a good Mathematician a great Philosopher and excellent Divine being communly stiled Doctor profundus the profound Doctor Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God against the Pelagians which he defended with great fervor as wel as acumen of spirit which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei specially lib. 1. c. 30 31 32 33 34. He demonstrates 1 That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence cap. 30 31. p. 271 c. 2 That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them and not merely permitting Which he demonstrates many ways as 1 Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. 2 Because otherwise the whole Vniverse would not be disposed in the best manner 3 Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names Thus cap. 32. p. 288. 3 That about whatever Gods Permission is his actual Volition is also employed about the same And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good yet it is good that there should be not only good things but also evil For unless it were good that evils be the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be as Cap. 33. Hence 4 He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversie How God wils sin and how he wils it not 1 He proves p. 294 295. That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin because he permits it also God doth voluntarily provide for yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil with al their positive circumstances which necessarily import sin Again This Proposition Sin is is true and therefore there must be some cause of its truth which can be no other than the divine wil from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination Again ` Whatever is good must procede from the first good but that Sin existe is good according to Augustin So Hugo saith That God wils that sins existe because this is good Moreover he brings in Hugo speaking thus which deserves a great remarque If it be said God wils sin this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear and therefore some pious mind doth refute this not because that which is spoken is il spoken but because that which is wel spoken is il understood 2 Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard who asserts That God wils sin as a punishment not under this reason as it is sin i. e. materially or entitatively considered which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes by shewing That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin so that if God wils sin as a punishment he must necessarily wil the existence of sin Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined and wils that they should be so conjoined and knowingly and rationally wils one the same person wils also the other specially if about both he employ an act of his wil But now God knows and wils that those two Sin and Punishment be conjoined together and rationally wils the one namely the punishment of sin therefore also the sin Again he that wils an Antecedent wils also the Consequent at least in an universal albeit not in a particular for he that wils a whole wils al the parts necessary thereto 3 Thence he procedes p. 300. to shew how God wils sin God saith he doth no way wil Sin simply but only in some limited respect For to say that God wils something simply is according to the commun manner of speech to say that he loves it and approves of it as good Yea addes he may it not be said that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination Deformitie or Sin simply considered but only Sin in some respect Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause al Beings both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdome beautie and justice Whence 4 He gives us the difference between Gods Concurse to sinful acts and to such as are good p. 302. God saith he is not the Author of sin as of that which is done wel For of this he is the Author so as that he alone doth supernaturally create and give to the wel-doer Faith Hope and Love c. But it is not so as to sin i. e. As to good God produceth not only the natural act but also the moral Bonitie but as to Sin he produceth only the natural entitative Act. 5 He thence p. 302. explicates how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied that God wils Sin When saith he Augustin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin the cause of this negation seems

this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this

point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative

with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina

futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree

possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil

Sin Yea let them but grant as they do Gods certain prescience of sin and the same black Imputations which they lode us with wil al fal with as much weight on themselves as before Chap. 5. § 2. 2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin which he predetermines men unto we answer 1 That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act 2 The wil doth in the very same moment wherein it is predetermined by God voluntarily and freely as a deficient depraved facultie elect the very act it is predetermined unto so that it doth as freely deliberately and fully espouse the act as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part and what more just than that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert 3 Here is in this objection a poor Sophisme which they cal No-cause for a cause For Gods predeterminative Concurse is not the cause of mens sins albeit mens sins be a necessary consequent thereof 4 The same difficulties which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice return on them who assert an immediate previous Concurse to the Mater of Sin neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto 3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mercie of God in that predeterminative Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature and this two ways As 1 In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their Sins 2 In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto as Baron Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorne and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy as they pretend and for our confusion Yet we no way dout but to make it appear that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun Therefore to answer 1 to the first branch of the Objection That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment without regard to their sins 1 We grant that the Decree of Reprobation is and must be according to our Hypothesis absolute because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination as our Adversaries also maintain of which before Chap. 5. § 3. 2 Yet we peremtorily denie that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins Divines say that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at last condemn men It 's true the Supralapsarian Divines who make man as labile the object of Reprobation differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian perswasion who make the corrupt masse or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation yet they both take in the consideration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect as Davenant Animadvers on Gods Love p. 84. proves That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way But 3 Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice which regards the object as already constituted and not the constitution thereof This is incomparably wel observed by judicious Davenant in his answer to Hoard Animadvers p. 229. For those Inferences therefore That if absolute Reprobation be granted God may be properly called a Father of Crueltie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I marvel how he trembled to thinke of them and how he never trembled to utter them That wherein he perpetually is mistaken is the making of Non-election or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation the conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie of committing Sin with such like monstrous fansies which he takes for Principles needing no proof whereas they are such grosse errors as need no confutation 2 The second part of the Objection which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes § 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse and wil also come under consideration in what follows 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the Sanctitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature in that by asserting Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves who in the confutation of Twisse argues thus If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission 1 He willeth Sin Yea 2 God wils sin as much as man Yea 3 This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness Yea 4 Then God takes complacence in Sin Answer These are high charges indeed and if they could be made good against us we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State for what more inconsistent with civil Government than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holinesse But these Calumnies and Reproches are not of yesterday but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concurse and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them § 1. of this Chapter Thus Bradwardine De Caus l. 2. c. 28. p. 572. When it is argued saith he that the sinful act doth please God Wel 1 The Adverbe Wel may determine the Verbe to please God in regard of the Divine complacence and so there is no dout but that as the evil Act entitatively considered doth please him so it is highly wel-pleasing to him or 2 in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing and that either in regard of the substance of the act or in regard of its vitiositie 1 If we regard the act naturally so it 's true that it is wel-pleasing to God but if we regard it morally so it 's false 2 If we regard the vitiositie of the act so it is not properly effected by man nor yet by God it being not properly an effect but pure

the act but also to the goodnesse thereof 16. Sin is committed against Gods wil of complacence and approbation but not against his wil of natural permission 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very wel consistent with the natural libertie of the wil and its natural passive remote power of receiving Laws and obeying the same 18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very wel be reconciled with his wisdome veracitie and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin 19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another yet without being guilty of the least sin 20. Sin by Divine wisdome is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it 21. Al Gods invitations comminations exhortations and promisses argue in God a real wil of approbation and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live albeit they never repent 22. Gods physic complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie The false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on the Predeterminants by Molinists Arminians and New Methodists 1. GOds absolute Decrees which give futurition to things take away al power from the creature of acting contrarily yea make the contrary naturally and simply impossible 2. The futurition of sin is from the effective wil of God yea very God Str. 631 632 635. Le Bl. Concord Libert par 1. Thes 55 c. p. 454. as before c. 5. § 1. 3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin 4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof 5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fal Baron Metaphys 150 151. 6. Gods efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin 7. God wils and decrees sin as sin yea simply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners 8. Gods absolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to sin 9. In acts intrinsecally evil the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature 10. Predeterminative concurse brings men under a fatal and Hobbian necessitie of sinning 11. In acts intrinsecally evil God predetermines the wil to the act as sinfully relating to its object Strangius pag. 206 234 240 c. 12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin Strang. pag. 341 342. Baron Metaph. 150 151. 13. The Sinner doth not determine himself to any sinful act any other way than God Strang. pag. 242 243. 14. God doth more than temt men to sin in that he predetermines the wil thereto Strang. pag. 269. 15. Predeterminative concurse to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best Strang. pag. 277. 16. God doth not only permit sin but approve of it yea take complacence in it 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin destroys the libertie of the wil introduceth a fatal necessitie and makes the mater of al Gods Laws to Adam and his posteritie a natural simple and absolute impossibilitie Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150. 18. Gods predetermination to the entivative act of sin is irreconcileable with his wisdome and sinceritie in prohibiting and punishing sin Baron Metaphys pag. 151. 19. God in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin becomes guilty of sin 20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glorie 21. That Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by al his invitations promisses comminations and exbortations to repent 22. God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act but moral complacence in sin by predetermining the wil to the entitative act thereof § 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries we now procede to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants and more particularly of the New Methodists and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants 1. THE Futurition of althings is not from the Divine wil and decree Strang. 628 631. 2. The futurition of althings is not simple but complexe Strang. 640. 3. The futurition of althings is not eternal 4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it 5. The futurition of the entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but the wil of man Strang. 585 628 631 632. Le Blanc 454. 6. Whatever God wils he approves or complacence is essential to al acts of Gods wil Strang. 546 548. 7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which sin is intrinsecally appendent Strang. 562 587. 8. There is a twofold Decree in God one absolute the other respective conditionate and consequent Strang. 546. 9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular but some general only Strang. 558. 10. Reprobation is not absolute but conditional dependent on the prevision of mens actual sins 11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional and dependent on mens free-wil not on the Decree of God Strang. 642 647. 12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious Baron Metaphys 157 158. 13. God wils only his own permission of sin not the existence of sin by his permission Arminius 14. There is a twofold Concurse of God the one predeterminative the other only general 15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil Baron Metaphys 147. Strang. 568 584. 16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature Strang. 584 630. 17. God predetermines to what is good but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsecally evil 18. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossible 19. Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers 20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the entertainment of Grace 21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin 22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human libertie 23. Some human acts are indifferent in individu● and so neither good nor evil 24. Some human acts are so intrinsecally evil that the vitiositie cannot be separated from the entitative act The dangerous Consequents of those Antitheses 1. NOthing is certainly and infiallibly future 2. Complexe Propositions are in order of Nature before their simple termes 3. God did not from al Eternitie foresee althings future 4. Nothing is future before it is existent at least in its particular causes 5. The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingence to God 6. There is in

God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quàm vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quàm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ● Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.

at an end The sum of al is this That the determination or predetermination of Divine concurse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act or a contrary act a simple or most strictly natural impossibilitie as some would persuade us but only infers a necessitie of the consequence the wil having stil in sensu diviso i. e. on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concurse an habitual indifference to act or not to act though in sensu composito as predetermined by Divine concurse it cannot but act Or summarily thus The wil has at that very time when it is predetermined by God to this or that act an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act or to the putting forth a contrary act So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act not the radical power to that act Thus also Davenant Animadv against Hoard p. 240 333 341 360 402. proves strongly and accurately That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events Of which more hereafter § 5. The next terme that fals under consideration is the Wil of God its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures under which our Opponents concele themselves and their misrepresentations of our sentiments The ancient distinction of the Divine wil which they say Hugo de S. Victore first formed was into voluntatem signi voluntatem beneplaciti Gods significative wil and his beneplacite wil. 1 Gods significative wil they make to consiste of Precepts Promisses Prohibitions Permissions Counsels and Admonitions By Permissions here we must understand such as are moral not natural which as to sin properly belong to Gods beneplacite wil as anon This significative Wil of God some Divines terme his Reveled wil from Deut. 29. 29. others terme it his Legislative or Preceptive wil others his Approbative wil whereby he declares what he approves and what he disapproves of which see Davenant Animadv against Hoard pag. 222 356 391 399. Lastly learned Chamier and Daillé out of him terme this significative wil of God his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of complacence or complacential wil whereby he declares what is most agreable to him and what not Our judicious Davenant makes use also of this terme as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of Gods Approbative wil. These several notions of Gods significative wil albeit they may differ in some formalitie yet they agree in substance and import denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie and that which is most agreable to his holy wil and nature 2 As for Gods Beneplacite wil commonly ●…iled his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of good pleasure it is that whereby he decrees effects or permits al events and effects whence it is distributed into effective and permissive Gods effective beneplacite wil is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and supernatural effects Gods permissive beneplacite wil is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin This distribution of the Divine wil is greatly opposed by the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists 1 The Jesuites whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians do what they can to baffle this distinction so Molina the Head of that Faction in Thom. Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 12. tels us That these signs of the Divine wil signifie properly and formally some nolition or volition in God and therefore Gods significative wil cannot be contradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil. The same is urged by the Arminians But the Orthodox both among Papists and Protestants replie that Gods reveled significative wil is only equivocally analogically figuratively and improperly termed his wil as the Edicts of Princes and Laws of States So Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiae Praelect 4 sect 20. tels us That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie constituted with himself what he wil do his significative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law by signifying what he wil have done by us Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God but this later improperly and analogically so called The like Davenant Animadvers pag. 392. It 's true Divines grant that this significative wil of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil answering thereto for the wise God decreed that this or that should be mans dutie but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the same with his decretive wil touching events 2 Our Adversaries pretend that by this distinction of the significative and beneplacite wil we make two opposite wils in God and such as clash each with other This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction as of no use in our present case But Divines answer that these wils are not opposite in God but only disparate and diverse the things decreed and the things reveled and constituted by Gods significative wil may oppose each other but the decretive and reveled wil never oppose each other The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands or approves with an intention that it shal be mans dutie and rewarded if performed but not alwayes with an intention that it shal be effected 3 Our Opponents and particularly the new Methodists confound Gods Beneplacite Decretive Wil with his Wil of Complacence and Approbation and under this confusion endeavor to secure their opposition against Gods willing the Permission of Sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. None can be said to wil what he doth not approve Thence others make Love of complacence essential to al acts of the Divine Wil and thence conclude if God wil the permission of Sin he must necessarily take complacence therein But the replie hereto is not difficult we say that God takes complacence in al his own Acts but not in al the objects they refer unto but now love of complacence is not so termed from the act but object about which it is conversant which must be some good either natural or moral Whence it is evident that God may wil the permission of Sin and its existence as a consequent thereto and yet not take complacence in or approve of sin See more of Gods Wil and its various Distributions Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 3. § 6. The last terme that needs our Explication is Divine Concurse its Immediation Efficacitie and Predetermination Strangius l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. distinguisheth Concurse from Influxe thus 1 Influxe is more large than concurse for the causality of every efficient is termed Influxe and therefore the Influxe of God is seen in many things in which his concurse is not as when he acts without the concurrence of a second cause Thence 2 the terme Influxe is absolute not denoting the respect of any other cause but that of concurse is relative I have no mind to

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who efficaciously worketh althings The like v. 11. of which hereafter This efficacious concurse as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concurse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Lord cooperating or efficaciously concurring So elsewhere that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose efficacious and predeterminative concurse in and with althings is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work readily It 's rendred by the Syriac sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse but a particular present certain efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurse exerting it self in al individual acts and effects Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by the Syriac Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work to act with diligence to be efficacious as Boderianus And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to act to work to perform to effect as Boderianus Lastly it is rendred by the Syriac Ephes 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who hath efficaciously wrought althings Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of Gods concurse as to al second causes and acts Hence 2. This efficacious Concurse as it determines and applies the second cause to act is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a terme or limit 1 primarily and properly signifies to termine set bounds or limits to any cause effect or thing So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man Nation and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life So Arrian Epictet lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Virgils Song is remarquable Stat sua cuique dies Every ones day stands fixed or determined which Servius understands of the fixed determined period of human life So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie but the very Pagans by their dim light asserted a fixed period of Divine life as determined by God albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the bounds or the position of termes for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause action effect or thing God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes their actions effects and events there is nothing so contingent in nature but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places as wel as to causes and acts So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines or limits a day Thence in the Glossarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I termine or limit as to place Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gives terme or limit Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine determine or constitute termes to any place or thing Num. 34. 6. Josh 13. 27. 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition which is the terme or boundary of an essence according to Cicero who renders it the circumscription of a thing 2 From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary namely to decree destine to a certain end predestine predetermine In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine and so it is transferred to predestination predetermination or the decree and purpose of the Divine wil even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it was determined or predetermined decreed Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil and yet lo as to the substrate mater or entitative act predetermined and decreed by God The same Acts. 2. 23. Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by that defined determined or predetermined counsel of which more Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree deliberate determine is expounded by Theodotion Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. 1 of things appertaining to salvation 1 Cor. 2. 7. 2 of persons elect Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. 3 of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin yea that which was intrinsecally evil So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before or predetermined to be done For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine predestine predetermine to set limits bounds termes to persons or things Thence as to this present text and point when it is said here that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act which was predetermined by God as in what follows Chap. 3. § 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal constitute or make firm any thing which is rendred by the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to order dispose constitute institute The Divine Wil and Decree gives order constitution limitation determination yea predetermination to althings al persons and things times and places ends and means receive termes limits destination and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to foreknow 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to propose or purpose Rom.

Grace but also in others that are commun according to his own pleasure he determines it with the preservation of its own native libertie sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature See more on this argument in what follows c. 3. § 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts without any violence offered to its Libertie why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts without prejudice to its Libertie The force of this consequence is so strong that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination See Chap. 5. § 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts even of such as are not intrinsecally evil This Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works it may peradventure be said that God doth determine their wils yet it seems more incommode to say that God moves and predetermines to al other acts as to acts of hatred of God blasphemie c. So that he yieldeth that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts and indeed it cannot be rationally denied sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful When I say that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful As here must not yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively but only Specificatively as it specifies one and the same Act and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil So that the meaning is no more than this that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good as our Adversaries grant he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis Of this Argument see Chap. 5. § 4 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature whereof God is not the efficient cause This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being So Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie and no action as it is an action or has any realitie whereof God is not the cause or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God as the first cause on whose concurse and influxe it dependes So a Reverend Divine Cathol Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain that as motus vel actio is quid naturale it is of God as the first cause of Nature and so when a sinner acteth it is not without the first Universal Cause One would think that this concession if well stated and prosecuted would put an end to our controversie For al that we demand is that the real positive act whereunto sin is annexed be from God as the first cause of Nature But yet what our Opponents grant as limited by them wil not answer our expectations For some hold with Durandus that the action is from God but not immediately others that it is immediately from God yet not by a predeterminative concurse Hence 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense yet by others it is Thus Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person For as God himself so his virtue is every where present and energetic For the proof whereof he cites Isa 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and efficace of God whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself so that whatever they are or do act they essentially depend on him in both respects Whereby he seems to evince that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act but also immediately reach the very act even that has sin annexed to it The like he addes l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be said and men are wont so to speak That God is the cause of vitiose actions albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said it may in some manner be understood how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin when yet he is void of al sin specially if these things be observed 1 That it be not understood that God moves or inclines men to sin in general 2 Neither that it be said that God moves to al sin but only to such in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works 3 Neither that it be understood that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken or sin as sin but only to the material of sin i. e. not to the sin of the Action but to the Action as substrate to the sin so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie which he only permits but of the substrate Act and of his own direction and ordination which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action c. Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful he seems to grant that the Act as it is a physic or natural Being is from God So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil such as the hatred of God perjurie c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil That God concurs to the physic action but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius which if he were candid and uniforme in granting us would put a period to the controversie 1

That in Actions intrinsecally evil there is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vitiositie 2 That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions even such as are intrinsecally sinful is immediately from God as the first cause of Nature But I must confesse I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted For 1 He sometimes asserts that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsecally evil as that the vitiositie cannot be separated from it Again 2 albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby he doth too much verge unto if not wholly espouse Durandus's mediate concurse as to acts intrinsecally evil Thus also Amyraldus as it is wel noted by Le Blanc Thes Conciliat Arbitrii c. Thes 48. p. 436. 9. Prop. That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie This most of the new Methodists grant albeit some seem to denie it at least in part Our Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God if man doth that which God permits sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth God must foreknow and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. ` Furthermore it must be observed which we have oft mentioned that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin yet he doth advisedly permit direct and ordain it in the best manner to execute his righteous judgements and illustrate his glorie The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin formally taken or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily annexed yet we acknowledge that God doth so rule and order the sinful wils of Men and Devils that by permitting tentations offering objects subministrating occasions denying Grace which he owes to none letting loose the reins to Satan removing impediments or by operating in any other secret manner the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows and specially that that work be performed for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it Doth he not say here as much as we abating only the terme Predetermination and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted 10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries both Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists to fasten the Antithesis on us namely That we make God to be the Author of sin Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse as we shal shew in what follows Chap. 4. § 2. Having laid down the general Propositions wherein our Opponents generally though not without some variation concord with us it follows that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves Indeed so great is the difference of our Adversaries specially the New Methodists Amyraldus Baronius Strangius Le Blanc and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution suspension and hesitation of mind as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true Placeus Tractat. de Liber Arbit p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question with this modest concelement of his mind Truely we according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first is It sufficeth us that too much dependence cannot be asserted provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins Which we readily close with renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin So Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomists previous predeterminative concurse namely that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God and efficaciously i. e. irresistibly moved first to act and then to act this rather than that before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us In the mean while we professe these two things 1 That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men which are Patrones thereof 2 That we are ready if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith to reject it Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. Thes 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversie yet Thes 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But Thes 57. he confesseth That provided God be not made the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted c. And Thes 58. he concludes That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about sinful acts is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse but that God doth many ways procure promove direct and moderate sinful events So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries Yea how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurse immediately influencing al natural acts and yet elsewhere denie the same to acts intrinsecally evil And so in other points controverted by us But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars 1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as to Gods Prescience of sinful acts Al the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts but yet they are at a great difference yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it 1 Strangius lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated that seems the most probable which is taken from

Actions and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts 1 We may consider the object althings i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie althings must be here taken distributively into al singulars there is no Being that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God 2 Here is to be considered the Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who worketh energetically or efficaciously for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to work with an invincible efficace and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie as before c. 1. § 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse working in and with althings according to their natural propensions Thence 3 follows the original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the counsel of his own wil. Which notes that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings there is no executive power in God distinct from his Wil his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition as we have largely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. § 3. Whence also it follows that Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil has one and the same Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects even such as have sin appendent to them Strangius p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus From this place nothing more can be collected than that God has decreed those things that he worketh as it is certain that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute not that God worketh sins c. 1 This Text speaks more than what Strangius allows it to speake namely that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh but also that he works by his Decree or omnipotent Volition for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil as Scotus Bradwardine and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate 2 Who saith that God worketh Sins surely none but Marcion or Manes or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being 3 But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture that God worketh that entitative natural Act whereunto sin is appendent for otherwise how can he be said to worke althings Is this good sense or Logic to say God workes althings not only according to their generic or specific distribution but also according to their distribution into each singular for so the Syncategoreme Al is here taken but yet he worketh not al singular entities namely the substrate mater of Sin Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction He workes althings but yet doth not worke althings What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions 2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to al human actions and effects even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man Thus Psal 33. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike he considereth al their works 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who fashioneth formeth frameth as the Potter doth his clay it notes not only yea not so much the first Creation of the human Soul as its actual figments frames imaginations and thoughts this is evident from the scope and contexture of the words for what is the Psalmists intent and undertakement but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience and its perfect comprehension of al the figments frames thoughts intentions and affections of the heart as vers 13 14 And how doth he prove this Why because he fashioneth their hearts alike i. e. puts al the first thoughts inclinations intentions and movements of the heart into what forme frame or fashion he pleaseth There is also a great Emphase and significance in that terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render alike but may be as properly rendred together as it is by the Latine simul neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth but to the object Hearts and so it notes an universalitie distributive into al singulars without the least exception of any And then the sense wil be who fashioneth formeth or frameth the hearts of al mankind in al their very first motions conceptions imaginations resolutions end interests contrivements ebullitions affections prosecutions and fruitions or other actions whatsoever Whence he addes He considereth al their works what works doth he mean Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands but also the workings movements and figments of their hearts and how can God consider them if he did not forme frame and fashion them Yea there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts namely that Gods forming framing and fashioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cause of his considering their works For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of mens hearts unlesse he be the former framer and fashioner of them al as to their real entitative acts al the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us So that Gods Science of Vision or Prescience as to the figments of mans heart ariseth from this that God is the framer former and fashioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements which also implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its first motions inclinations and affections So then to forme and sum up our Argument from this Text Doth God indeed fashion forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions imaginations and affections And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins though never so intrinsecally evil What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts if he be not the former and fashioner of them al as to their natural entitie I must confesse the validitie of this argument from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great as that should it be baffled I see no way left but to turne Socinian and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the contingent imaginations of mans heart which implies much Atheisme Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse as to al human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water he turneth it whithersoever he wil. 1 He mentions the Kings heart as the measure of al other mens because Kings generally have a greater Soveraintie and Dominion over their own hearts than other men if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse surely Kings may specially such as Solomon was who obtained from God such an amplitude

must be resolved into the wil of God as their prime cause so that If God wil here is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elsewhere if God concur if he assiste if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil without which we can do nothing concur And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans Bensyra that ancient Hebrew Sent. moral xi thus speakes Let man never say he wil do any thing before he hath prefaced this If the Lord wil i. e. assiste or concur not permit So among Pagans Hom. Iliad B. vers 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The like Demosth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. But none speakes more fully to this point than Plato Alcibiad pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse Socrates replies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil and in his Laches But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. Whence it 's evident that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens as wel as Jews and Christians noting not only a permissive or Directory but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood Act. 18. 21. If God wil and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If the Lord wil. Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires Again 2 Gods permissive wil is either natural or moral it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil because that regardes only sin which there is no mention of in these Textes neither is it necessarily included Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word It remains therefore that this phrase If God wil be understood of Gods efficacious wil whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined § 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations namely That God doth predefine predetermine and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed I shal mention only two Actions The Selling of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord whereof the former was but a Type of the later 1. I shal begin with the Selling of Joseph mentioned Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with your selves that ye sold me hither for God did send me before you to preservelife Joseph here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin the one regards their hand in the sin which he out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love passeth by the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin which he admires and adores in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil which no finite power could do men may make good use of what is in it self good but who can bring so great good out of so great evil but a God omniscient and omnipotent 1 Let us remarque their Sin in selling Joseph and of what a black Idea it was 1 It sprang from Hatred yea a deliberate rooted hatred as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him Yea 2 There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him c. 3 There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty yea intended Murther in this sin as v. 20 21 22 24. 4 There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin v. 32 33. 5 That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions when God began to awaken their Consciences as it is conjectured about fourteen years after Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required 6 By al which it is most evident that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinsecally evil For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsecally evil I know not what sin doth Hence 2 We are to demonstrate that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte Gen. 45. 5 7 8. compared with other Texts 1 Joseph saith v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sent me forth by his efficacious predeterminative hand which conducted me hither The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to send forth with a mighty hand as Captives into Libertie Luke 4. 18. also to send forth with commands autoritie and power Mat. 10. 16. 11. 10. as elsewhere again to send forth executioners Mat. 2. 16. lastly to direct the course of a Ship In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in sending Joseph into Egypt is necessarily included This also appears 2 by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life Note here that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and Josephs being sold into Egypt which he intended to turne for good even for the preservation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect seed in him Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Wil And Strangius grants this that where there is Predefinition there also follows Predetermination Must we not then conclude that this Vendition of Joseph was both predefined and predetermined by God Yea 3 Joseph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither but God c. You see here Joseph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin and that for their as wel as his good And he tels them plainly that it was not they that sent him but God As if he had said You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt but did not God send me to be a Ruler over Egypt You sent me to destroy me but why did God send me but to preserve both you and me You sent me out of Hatred and Malice but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this It was not you that sent me hither but God Why doth he use this manner of speech was it not they that sold him Yes but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwifes

gives to this distinction of Bellarmine thus However it be in the Text there are two things to be observed 1 That Joseph there cannot distinguish the Action from the Passion as if the Passion were to be ascribed to God not the Action for it 's plainly said and repeted in the Text according to the Hebraic veritie Gen. 45. 5 7 8. that God sent him 2 Thence c. 50. 20. he doth plainly distinguish between the good work of God and their evil in the same mater from the diversitie of the Intention You designed evil against me but God designed that for good Then he addes Here the various operation and provident administration of God is seen that he might bring to pass what he had presignified before by the dreams of Joseph c. And p. 773. he subjoins There is no incommoditie if it be said that God elected and also procured the Vendition of Joseph as a means to the end fore-ordained by him and that may be understood not only of passive Vendition but also of active which truely can never be separated For if God willed that Joseph be sold he willed that some one should sel him and that no other should sel him but his brethren For neither was that Vendition a thing in it self evil if it be considered apart from the vitiositie and defect of the second Causes Then he concludes The Permission of God here was not otiose but an efficacious operation in the tradition of Joseph subministration of occasions out of the concurse which he made both by the direction of al circumstances and moderation of the wil of his brethren that their purpose of killing him being changed they might do no other than what God intended And the same efficace and force of Divine providence shines brightly in working disposing and directing al other things that relate to this Historie This Answer of Strangius to Bellarmine I have been the more prolixe in reciting 1 because the fore-mentioned Divine of so much repute among us makes great use of this distinction touching active and passive vendition or crucifixion endeavoring thereby to solve al our Arguments from the vendition of Joseph and crucifixion of Christ whereas Strangius one of his own partie rejectes it as spurious and frivolous 2 Because the concessions of Strangius in this his Answer to Bellarmine do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cause For if the active vendition of Joseph was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing the same then actions intrinsecally evil are as to their entitative act or substrate mater naturally considered from God albeit their moral vitiositie is to be ascribed to no one but the sinner 2. I now passe on to demonstrate That God doth predefine or foreordain and predetermine such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed from the Crucifixion of Christ And the Textes that confirme this part of our demonstration are so great and illustrious that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Christian that assentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture can evade the evidence thereof or dissent from our Hypothesis 1 I shal take the Scriptures as they lie in order and begin with Mat. 26. 24. The Son of man goeth as it is written of him but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed 1 Note here that Christs death was infallibly predicted or foretold so much as it is written of him necessarily infers Now how could the death of Christ be infallibly predicted if it were not predefined and preordained by God Yea if the death of Christ were not necessarily predefined and preordained by God how could God infallibly foreknow the salvation of any one elect soul which necessarily dependes on the death of Christ So that it remains most certain that the death of Christ was predefined and foreordained by God and that in every the least circumstance thereof the whole series of intentions and actions in Judas's betraying his Lord and the Jews malitiose and bloudy crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God 2 Hence also it follows that al the bloudy contrivements barbarous and cruel executions with al the particular circumstances in the betraying and crucifying of Christ were predetermined by God Thus much reason strongly evinceth and Strangius with others grant that eternal predefinition or predestination and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine Predetermination what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil whereby God predefined or preordained al persons actions and effects to existe in such or such a period of time So that to speake truth predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe albeit we may out of compliance with the Scholes put this difference between them by understanding Predefinition Preordination or Predestination of the eternal active Decree of God and Predetermination of the execution of the Decree or its passive Attingence in regard of the effect But take predetermination in what sense you please it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and al the most minute circumstances thereof And so much indeed is implied in those words The Son of man goeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where or to what Surely to die and how without al peradventure as efficaciously conducted moved yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the least step he took to the Crosse the least intention action or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christs Crucifixion as wel active as passive but was predetermined by God But 3 note also hence that this Crucifixion of Christ although it were predefined and predetermined by God yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminish the guilt of those bloudy instruments who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood This is particularly specified in those words but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed Judas neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination as an excuse for his treacherie No his own conscience told him that he had voluntarily yea malitiosely betrayed innocent bloud neither could the Jews plead the same in as much as their own malitiose and bloudy wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion as if there had been no predetermination which doth no way diminish the libertie of the wil. Hence 4 it is most evident that this Crucifixion of our Lord was a sin intrinsecally evil For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it Did there not much blasphemie attend their wicked deeds Is not the shedding innocent bloud yea the bloud of God as it is stiled Act. 20. 28. a sin intrinsecally evil And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate that the substrate mater of an act intrinsecally evil is predefined and

greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them as Act. 2. 23. And 2 we denie with him that the wickednesse and malice of those acts was from God 3 He also grants That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin Whereunto we retort That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin But 4 he concludes But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsecally evil c. Whence we argue That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsecally evil and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice yea malice blowen up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them And was not in this good work of crucifixion the good action of God and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act This pincheth Strangius closely and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews For he saith Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action and therefore their wickednesse and malice was not from God Here we grant 1 his consequence or conclusion That their malice was not from God 2 We thus far also grant his Antecedent That the good action of God considered both naturally and morally was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally for the malice and vitiositie which formalised the action as theirs is no way imputable to Gods act considered either naturally or morally 3 But yet we stil avouch and no way dout but to demonstrate in its place that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially naturally and entitatively was one and the same with Gods act So much al these Texts clearly evince so much also reason dictates For if there were two acts the one primarily yea only from the wicked instruments the other from God the prime Efficient then how could they be said to be the instruments of Gods Efficience Must we not then also suppose two Crucifixions one from God and the other from the Jews What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered entitatively materially and naturally was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively materially and naturally But to conclude we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin Epist 48. ad Vincentium thus When the Father delivered his Son and Christ his own Bodie and Judas his Lord why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty but because in one and the same thing which they did the cause was not one and the same A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind Wherein note 1 That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner 2 That the difference sprang from the Causes God delivered his Son to Death thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for their Salvation but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death with wicked hands out of an avaricious humor malice c. Hence 3 The Action was most just and gloriose on Gods part but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part This answer of Augustin is so great that it might serve to answer al the objections against our Hypothesis were not men bent to cavil against the truth § 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments namely such wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt I shal divide this Head into two members 1 Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people 2 Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments 1. We shal begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people So Esa 10. 5 6. O Assyrian the rod of mine anger I will send him against an hypocritical Nation The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people and every stroke of this rod was from God his hand guiding ordering and actuating the rod in al its motions And yet how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel How little did he intend to serve God herein were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action Thence it 's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so neither doth his heart think so c. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin So that it 's evident this sending of the Assyrian by God mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concurse and Providence of God ordering what should come to pass So Jer. 16. 16. Behold I wil send for many fishers saith the Lord and they shal fish them and after wil I send for many hunters and they shal hunt them from every mountain c. Note 1 That these words contain not a promisse but threat begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. 2 By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews To fish and to hunt is to take and destroy War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting which is a kind of war against bestes as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men whence Nimrod the first Warrier after the Floud is stiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter i. e. of men Ay but more particularly 3 Who are these fishers Why as it is supposed the Egyptians who are called Fishers Esa 19. 8. 4 And who are the Hunters The Babylonians as it is generally said But 5 Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters It is God I wil send c. 6 Why doth God send for them To punish his sinful People and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided and to whom they had so much conformed as is intimated v. 17. And what more just than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments as have been the ground of their confidence and the exemplars of their sins 7 How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters Surely not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them but providentially by exciting their minds applying their wils and drawing forth yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews whereunto there was

efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act which is as sinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter Chap. 5 6. Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predeterminative concurse in the entitative act of Sin is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei That the Lord said unto him Curse David And v. 11. Let him curse for the Lord hath bidden him Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei which must be here taken either morally for a divine precept and injunction or physicly for an efficacious Concurse and influence 1 That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word is most evident because had God commanded Shimei to curse David he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin 2 Therefore it remains that it be here taken only physicly for Gods efficacious Concurse secretly and powerfully inclining and applying Shimei's wil to the entitative act of this cursing And in this sense the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture namely for his efficacious predeterminative concurse in the Creation Conservation and Gubernation of things Now what doth Strangius replie to this Why l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he saith That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsecally evil we may not say that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as they were determined to such an object but only as directed by God to his just judgements and that most certain direction of God with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Precept In which Response note 1 That he grants that Shimei his cursing was an action intrinsecally evil which is a great concession and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis and prove ours That God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if Shimei's Cursing was an action intrinsecally evil then surely such also was the Vendition of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God But 2 he denies that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions as determined to such an object In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of al his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin which we intend more fully to examine Chap. 6. § 1. at present we say 1 That Shimei was not the instrument of any moral but physic influence from God the precept or bidding here specified was not moral but physic and real God did not morally command Shimei to curse David but physicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him which was as a Precept this Strangius grants in the close as to Gods direction 2 Hence if we consider Shimei's cursing as physicly determined to such an object it was not morally evil but good and so from God It 's true as it was morally determined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David so it was intrinsecally evil but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God for the punishment of David so it was both naturally and morally good and from God 3 He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act in directing his Actions to his just judgements c. To which I answer 1 How could God direct these actions of Shimei specially the immanent acts of his wil which were the worst part of his malediction but by an efficacious predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts 2 He grants that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious if so then certainly predeterminative and if the direction be predeterminative is not Gods concurse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively predeterminative 3 If Gods directive concurse be predeterminative as Strangius must by his concessions grant wil not those ugly consequences which he lodes our Hypothesis with be al retorted on him Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on Shimei's cursing as determined to such an object namely David And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction Baronius Metaph. S. 8. Disp 3. p. 158. answers this Text thus To that malediction of Shimei it is answered That God commanded Shimei to curse David not by bending his wil but by opening to him the way to this evil and by shutting it to al other evils i. e. by permitting him to act this only whenas he was ready for many other evils A poor evasion indeed and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Waxe 1 Doth not David say categoricly that God bid i. e. not morally but physicly Shimei to curse And what can this implie but the bending his wil to the substrate mater or entitative Act 2 Can it be imagined that David could mean only a mere otiose and speculative permission and not an active concurrence to the act it self entitatively considered 3 Doth not Baronius confess that God opened to him the way to this evil And if so must he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it Did not the main act of malediction arise from his wil And if that were not opened to the entitative act would the way to this evil have been ever opened Again Gods immediate predeterminative hand in those acts whereunto sin is necessarily appendent may be demonstrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel and he moved David against them to say Go number Israel and Judah Here it is expressely said that God moved David to number the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and he moved or excited i. e. efficaciously determined and applied his wil to the substrate mater of this command to number the people Hence Strangius pag. 790. answers 1 That the He here must be meant of Satan who is said 1 Chron. 21. 1. to stir up David to number the people And he cites for this Comment Junius with others But alas what poor subterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light Doth not Grammatic construction as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject such a glosse The Particle He here is not a distinct Pronoun as our English Version reads it but included in the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part and the anger of the Lord was kindled so that if the passive was kindled belongs to the Lords anger then also must what follows and he moved Neither is this sense aliene from other Scriptures for 1 Sam. 26. 19. David saith That God had stirred up Saul against him i. e. efficaciously moved him to the entitative act of persecuting David Thence 2 Strangius fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another thus But if

ours 2 How doth God judicially punish one sin by another but to use his own words by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error And if so then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God Of this hereafter § 6. But 2 I passe on to his second answer whereon he seems to lay the most weight though indeed most feeble But saith he because those words Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which points out the reason of that which next follows namely that those ten Kings having changed their opinion should destroy the Whore and Antichrist it seems to me more commodious if in that vers 17. there be a reason given of this famose change that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him namely because God hath put this into their heart And the first words of vers 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition But what is subjoined That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste until the word of God should be consummate I should think ought to be expounded negatively c. Thus Strangius A strange comment indeed let us a little inquire into it 1 How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make what follows the fulfilling of Gods wil to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse and more particularly to the last clause until the Word of God shal be fulfilled and so it notes that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil 1 In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste and 2 When the words of God were fulfilled i. e. Antichrists reign expired then to hate the Whore c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to and enemies against Antichrist 2 As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste certainly if such glosses should be admitted we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities Why may not the most profane debauched wretch when he is pressed with those Commands Thou shalt not commit adulterie Thou shalt not kill c. replie that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively Thou shalt commit adulterie c But Strangius saw ful wel that the affirmative sense of those words That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words and therefore he saw no way left but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words But 3 being after al his glosses sensible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this response he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge telling us That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient but that beyond it there must be also signified that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste I have no mind to contend about this mater sithat the sense is sufficiently sane which ever way the words be understood In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil but of the substrate act and punishment or Judgement which is annected to the sin but in good works not only of the substrate act but also of the moral Bonitie c. Who of us denies this would our Adversaries but stick here how soon would our Controversie be ended But here lies the sting even in this plausible concession Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie § 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious Permission of sin The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin but this sin in its formal nature Our Adversaries the Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists al grant Gods permission of Sin but only such as is otiose speculative negative and naked without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act or direction of it to its proper ends But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive efficacious directive and ordinative permission of sin arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it So it 's said of Eli's Sons 1 Sam. 2. 25. They hearkened not to the voice of their father because the Lord would slay them The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God The Soverain Lord had by an absolute peremtorie decree predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine and thence it 's said they hearkened not because the Lord would slay them the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be I am not ignorant that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft as they phrase it Version and among these some make it conclusive and so render it ideo idcirco quapropter others render it quamvis as Turnovius others otherwise But certainly our English Version which renders it causally because seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions So the LXX who render the words thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them In willing willed i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome peremtorily efficaciously immutablely and absolutely willed Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions with some later Munster Pagnine Arias Montanus Junius and Tremelius Osiander Piscator Malvenda with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions yea Castalio not excepted render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally because according to our sense and interpretament Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809 c. He answers 1 That the sons of Eli were for their flagitiose impieties destined and devoted by God to ruine 2 That the punishment of death here mentioned seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal not eternal 3 That however it be as it is manifest that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting

of punishment so it 's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God of damning and inflicting punishment whether temporal or eternal 4 That the particle Quia Because here used doth not alwayes denote a proper cause but a reason of consequence which may be taken from the effect and other arguments besides the cause c. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text but to answer briefly 1 We say that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination but the Soverain God destined by an absolute decree to leave them to those flagitiose sins and for them to destroy them What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation we intend more fully to shew hereafter c. 5. § 3. 2 That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath Yea Strangius confesseth that they merited eternal wrath and how then could they be exemted from it who had rejected the Merits of their Messias 3 What he addes touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins yea of final Impenitence be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men then it wil by a paritie of reason necessarily follow that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men for if Reprobation be conditional Election must be so also as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate Davenant in his Animadvers against Hoard invictly proves p. 226. and elsewhere That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows c. 5. § 3. 4 As for the Particle Quia Because 1 We grant that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause but a reason of Consequence and that taken sometimes from the effect But 2 that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text is most evident because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them 3 Take notice that we do not say that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine but only that the later was the consequent of the former God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins as should prove the cause of their ruine both temporal and eternal and hereupon their sin and ruine followed as Darknesse is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere Again Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates I understand this not only of false Worship but also of al errors that are committed every where although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed where God stirs up some who draw others into error that they might follow their fallacious counsel and enter on a perniciose course for their own dammage God therefore impels and draws some into error not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto God not only merely permitting but also ordaining c. Whence it 's added v. 17. He leadeth counsellers away spoiled and maketh the Judges fools spoiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of their wisdom and counsel as it follows So it 's taken Psal 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart i. e. deprived of their courage And maketh the Judges fools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 infatuat or ad insaniam adigit as Mercer He infatuates them Again v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty and taketh away the understanding of the aged 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement Discretion Counsel Prudence Sense Hebr. the savor or experimental tast So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth and causeth them to wander in a Wildernesse where there is no way The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa 19. 11 12 13 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto It must be observed saith he that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so ordering things that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously nothing without his destinated counsel that nothing is done but what he wils either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it as August Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good and also wisely foreknowing the future event doth permit sins which he directs to good ends ordained by him Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes that it is from Divine Providence that some erre and draw others into error and that both as to maters of Religion and in other maters of this life not that is he the Author of seduction and errors but because God for the contemt and abuse of his light delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement and presenting objects and occasions opens a way wherein they wander c. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis and subvert his own Antithesis For 1 he grants That nothing happens casually without Gods destinated counsel according to that of Augustin That nothing is done but what God wils c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. 2 He grants that God wisely foreknows al future events even the sins of men and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same neither Strangius himself nor any of his sectators could ever yet make out 3 He grants also That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts and permission of the vitiositie 4 He yet further grants That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement

Concurse to the entitative act of sin is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it which he wiped off with this answer That the same action which is sinful in regard of man is not so in regard of God because he is not under the same Law with man Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 87. pag. 152. The third mode saith he is peculiar to Zuinglius who teacheth that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin because God hath no Law set to him but man hath To which Baronius answers That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature not to deal injustly or cruelly with men This replie although borrowed from Bellarmine is now become commun with our Adversaries yet without the least shadow of reason for they do but beg the question in saying That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei cap. 6. tom 1. of his Workes pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man he always sins when he actes against the Law albeit he neither be nor live nor operate but in God and from God and by God But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin but not in like manner to God for man is under a law but God is free Therefore one and the same wickednesse suppose adulterie or homicide as from God the Author Motor and Impulsor it is a work not a crime but as it is from man so it is a crime and wickednesse for God is not bound up by law but man is condemned by law Thus he procedes to illustrate by many exemples of David c. Thence pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh c. wherein note 1 That he cals God the Author Motor and Impulsor of the act which must be understood not morally but physically as he excites and applies the wil to its act 2 That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin because he actes not against any law a distinction which was valid in his time albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines yea Calvinists Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade but in use long before Zuinglius by Scotus Ariminensis and other scholastic Theologues who followed Augustin herein Thus Scotus in Sent. 2. Dist 37. Quaest 2. saith The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil but not as to Gods concurse quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere Deus autem non debet because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law to give rectitude to the action but God is not as before How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313 c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God he saith 1 That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God Thence he procedes 2 to demonstrate That albeit God wil and know and decree althings in the world yet that he is not the Author of sin So pag. 315. 3 He proves That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative This he demonstrates pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph the robbing of Job the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto Shimei's cursing of David the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam c. 4 He procedes pag. 319. to the fal of Adam which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God c. The same Controversie he manageth against Castellio de aeterna Dei praedestinatione p. 360. where he proves That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God The like pag. 401. where he proves That God doth not compel men to sin or infuse sin into them but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators but also by that of Arminius who objectes the very same things against them as are objected against us namely That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose by which opinion saith he God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin of which see Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes in this as in other points which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession and signed by their Ministers and Professors for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus and others in the French Churches That not only the German and Helvetian but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis is most evident by the most elaborate acute and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier the greatest light that ever France Reformed had Calvin only excepted who in his Panstrat Cathol tom 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose distinct and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists He titles this Book Of the Author of sin and proves cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin Martyr and Beza therewith Thence cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines namely That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David Absoloms incest c. Whence cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin which they make to be only by speculative idle permission as some new Methodists Cap. 4. he procedes to prove That God wils the existence of sin Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists namely that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God Thence cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration Whence cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument from Gods energie in sinful acts which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally And thence cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins

herein Whence in the following Chapters 9 10 11 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists whereby they endeavor to prove That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists We may adde hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius Professor at Breme and a Member of the Synod of Dort who in many points specially that of middle Science and universal Grace follows the new method yet in this of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine So in his Duodecas Dissertat Exegetic De voluntate Dei Dissert 8. thes 74. pag. 415. where he tels us That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin namely of the action and the vitiositie which is in the action for that not this he wils and decrees and this not that he permits And his reason is invincible for otherwise there should be an action independent as to God and the efficacious providence of God should be denied which is Epicurean And then thes 99. pag. 426. he tels us That as to the act of the Divine wil about sin the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves in that some Scriptures assure us that God doth not wil sin but hate it with those that commit it as Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say that God wils creates and effects sins as Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions by distinguishing between the act and the vitiositie of the act also between the act as it procedes from God and as from the Creature lastly between the decreeing wil of God and the preceptive wil of God Whence he concludes thes 100. thus ` For God both wils and produceth the act as an act of it self indifferent to moral bonitie and evil c. And he addes thes 101. ` That this act in itself essentially good even as it is contaminated by the creature God wils it as a punishment and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends The like thes 112. p. 430. where he shews how God wils sin not as sin but as a punishment c. of which more fully hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. These sentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuse to cite because he in other points follows the new method and is cried up by some of that partie As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypothesis it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point both whiles they sate and afterwards I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimonie in favor of their Antithesis but this is so false an imputation as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point than their stout defence of absolute Reprobation of which see Davenants Animadversions on Gods love pag. 242. We might adde almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed Divines Churches and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis but in what remains we shal confine our selves to the Doctrine and Testimonie of the Church of England and those renowned Professors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed even in her first Reformation the sentiments of Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France Holland Helvetia and Germanie albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction This is evident by that noble designe of Cranmer and our first Reformers to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confession I shal here only cul out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis We shal begin with Davenant a great Master of Reason and one that went as far as he could and I think as far as any ought in compliance with those of the New Method yet he stil asserted and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Thus in his Determinations when Professor of Theologie at Cambridge Quaest 22. In evil acts saith he God hath decreed to permit the event to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo de sacr fid lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be and yet he wils not sin i. e. with a wil of approbation So Quaest 25. pag. 118. he grants That Gods decree to permit sin is efficacious so as to extract good out of it But he speakes more fully for the defense of our Hypothesis in his Animadversions on Gods love to mankind pag. 72. But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cause and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente ordinante are in no error at al. But if any shal go about to set mans wil at libertie and to tie up short the decreeing and determining wil of God as if this had not the determining stroke amongst al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be and which shal infallibly not be he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicisme and Manicheisme but he wil hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheisme For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil than by Gods What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis He here alsertes 1 That the existence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them 2 That Gods decreeing wil doth determine or predetermine al possible evil actions or events which shal infallibly be And do or need we assert more than this And frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates That the decree of Reprobation is absolute determining sinful acts and events yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin So pag. 253. he saith Gods decrees carrie with them a necessitie of infallibilitie as to the event but not a necessitie of compulsion as to the manner of acting And elsewhere he frequently inculcates That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and the same libertie to the Agent So pag. 333 340 341 351 360. Yea he proves That the Arminians must and do grant immutable absolute decrees which admit the same objections and difficulties as those of the Antiarminians So pag. 354 400 418 419. Lastly he proves

other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the

Sun Whence 4 That as to the substrate mater of Sin immediate Concurse doth no way determine the wil or applie it to its act but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference and libertie of acting or not acting Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuites wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists Thus Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul c. 14. p. 58. where he proves That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create power c. which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandisme albeit the avouchers of it oppose Durandus with great vehemence But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola a Capucine Friar yet learned and acute who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties the Dominicans and Jesuites His book he termes A Quadripartite Disputation touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants as also against the Assertors of Middle Science His first part is general stating the controversie between the Jesuites who assert a Middle Science and the Dominicans the Assertors of Predetermination and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse His Second Part is against the Jesuites to demonstrate That a next immediate and identific concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans proving That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked by a physic Predetermination and moreover by an identific and simultaneous concurse In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit the Hypothesis of Durandus That the general Concurse of God to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked is not proxime immediate and identific but remote mediate and really distinct from the act of the creature This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point that it is impossible for our Adversaries the New Methodists or any others to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with it self or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola and therefore I do no way wonder that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus it being the only refuge to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation Among the Reformed Churches the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants communly stiled Arminians from Arminius their first Founder Professor of Theologie at Leyden who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat publica Thes 7. § 8 9 10. p. 193. but more fully Thes 9. de justitia efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning progresse and consummation of Sin 1 As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into 1 Impedition both sufficient and efficacious whereby God puts an impediment to sin and 2 Permission which is contrary to Impedition the suspension of al impediments which might hinder the execution of Sin The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil 2 Gods Efficience about the progresse of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination 1 Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth passing on from one extreme to the other mightily and yet disposing althings sweetly according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome c. 8. v. 1. 2 Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God puts measures to his Permission and termes to sin that it run not into infinite according to the pleasure of the creature 3 Gods Efficience about the consummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition and Remission As for Gods Concurse to the Act of Sin as naturally good he doth craftily according to his wonted mode in such cases wave that difficult point Yet in his Articles De Peccati Causa Vniverse p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists to prove That we make God the Author of Sin But to sum up Arminius's Sentiments in this point Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments which is no way influential on the Act yet in that he allows also a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hypothesis that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin of which hereafter Chap. 5. Arminius's Sectators usually stiled Remonstrants from their Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort Grevincovius Vorstius Episcopius Corvinus c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland gave themselves the confidence but those poor Churches the peste of divulging their Pelagian Poison which by the interposure of King James who was a professed enemie to that faction occasioned the Synod of Dort An. 1618. where Divines out of England France and Germanie resorted to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod writ their Acta Scripta Synodalia Dordracena wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation and Gods Providence in sinful Acts falsely charging on our Divines 1 That they held the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie Impietie and Sins as the Means and Causes of Damnation 2 That they made God the Author of Sin and the like of which see Acta Synodalia Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica p. 40 41. I shal here only adde what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc Conciliat Arbit Humani Thes 32. p. 434. That

these Arminians and Remonstrants directly follow the Jesuites and Molinists in asserting a general simultaneous indifferent Concurse such as is determinable by the cooperation of the human wil. These Remonstrants from a spirit of Cabal to fortifie themselves against the Calvinists who overpowered them in the Synod fel into a league offensive and defensive with many German Anabaptists who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Arminian Dogmes particularly that of Free-wil which Infusions have been since diffused throughout some yea whole Churches of that Perswasion in England I am not ignorant that a great number not only of Professors but also Churches who are for Rebaptizing do yet keep themselves unspotted and untainted as to these Arminian Notions and with these I have no controversie but particular love and kindness for many of them albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptisem But as for those of that persuasion who fight under Arminius's banner they seemed most forward after the breaking up of the Synod of Dort to oppose the Calvinists in their sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin And that which deserves a particular remarque the very arguments that are now urged against us by the New Methodists were urged against the Synod of Dorts determinations in this point by them and that in the same forme Which is to be seen in a Dialogue of the Anabaptists intituled A Description of what God hath predestinated concerning man c. wherein pag. 16. they have this very expression which they impute to the Calvinists as our Adversaries impute the same to us namely that they say That God punisheth man with Hel-torments for doing those things which he himself hath predestinated ordained decreed determined appointed willed and compelled him to do and that which a man cannot chuse but must needs do by the force and compulsion of his predestination Are not the very same forged calumnies charged on us now-adays See an excellent replie hereto as to the rest of their false imputations by pious and learned Ainsworth in his Censure upon this Dialogue pag. 2 4 5 c. But we descend now to our principal Antagonists such as would passe under the name of Calvinists and yet are professed yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypothesis Thus Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. Thes 34. pag. 434. But of those Reformed Divines which subscribe to the Synod of Dort some in this part agree with the Molinists and Remonstrants neither do they acknowlege any other general concurse of God with second causes than what is simultaneous and indifferent whereby God doth not influence the cause itself but its act c. He instanceth in Baronius Strangius Amyraldus c. And what terme or title to give this new Sect of Adversaries more proper than New Methodists I know not this being the softest title and that which they seem to recreate themselves in some terme them downright Arminians and albeit I conceive their Principes directly issue from and tend to Ariminianisme yet I dare not lode them with this reprocheful style because they generally assert efficacious Grace I think we might terme them without injustice Semiarminians as the Semipelagians of old who refined Pelagianisme because they assert conditionate Reprobation and al the consequents thereof But yet because nothing more becomes an opponent than candor and ingenuitie therefore to let passe al Titles that may carrie any thing of reproche I give them only this of New Methodists because they affect and attemt to give us a new Method or Scheme of Predestination efficacious Grace Divine Concurse c. The first that opened the way to this New Method was John Camero a person of excellent naturals and those wel improved by acquired literature but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Gospel which he could not dissemble but too oft made profession thereof as in a Letter to Ludovicus Capellus where he saith That many things occurred to him which neither his own mind nor the reason of the times would permit him to publish He too much abounded in his own sense and words with too great contemt of such as differed from him though more deserving than himself as Chamier There were few Theologic Questions professedly handled by him specially such as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Free-wil but he divulged something of Novitie therein among which novel opinions this was one That he denied every real positive Being to be from God immediately as the prime efficient cause as Epist ad Thom. Rhaedam oper edit 1642. p. 526. and Epist ad Jac. Gallovaeum pag. 528. Which sentiment of Camero laid the foundation which Baronius and Strangius his Country-men afterward built their Antithesis on Camero had for his intime Camrade Milleterius who after his death turned Roman Catholic and publisht many Antichristian Errors which he professed to have received from Camero But Camero's principal Sectator was Moses Amyraldus who succeded him in the profession of Theologie at Saumur and indeed much out-went him in his propensions and closures with Durandisme and the Arminian Dogmes particularly with this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin And that I may not be thought falsely to accuse so learned a man one that passed under the name of a Calvinist I shal faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. par 3. thes 48. pag. 436. There are not wanting saith he among the Doctors of the Reformed Schole some who touching the general Concurse of God necessary to al the acts of creatures seem to have the same sentiments with Durandus and Ludovicus à Dola Doctors of the Roman Schole For that illustrious man Moses Amyraldus seems not to acknowlege any other general Concurse of God by which he concurs with al second causes besides that continued efficace whereby he doth preserve and sustain the nature of every thing and the forces given by nature Whence he gathers that such a concurse belongs not to libertie So Amyrald de Lib. Arbitr sect 4. pag. 246. Make saith he nature and its abilities able to consiste without the aide of such a concurse and they wil truly act freely Therefore let there be granted a concurse which performes nothing else but that these abilities which would otherwise flag and vanish consiste and be preserved in their natural state Libertie wil thence receive no detriment He had been speaking of Gods concurse to sinful acts and as Le Blanc wel observes by these words sufficiently indicates that in this part he has the same sentiments with Durandus Wherein note 1 that Amyraldus grants that sometimes it is sufficient for God to preserve the subject and render its faculties habile or capable of acting without immediate concurse to the act which is also the opinion of some among us 2 That this opinion according to Le Blanc fals in

Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a

is such a supreme Rule of Justice as that whatever he wils is for that very reason because he wils it to be accounted just So Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez de Auxil Disput 109. 3 a Conclus The positive act whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome was not conditionate but absolute antecedent in a moment of Reason to the il use of Free-wil And it is proved 1 Because there can be no cause of Reprobation 2 Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil elect some to life eternal and by a positive act wil not to admit others And our Divines generally grant That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation than the absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God But none is more categoric and positive in this than judicious Davenant who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis 1 That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled preceptive complacential wil as pag. 221 349 376. 2 That Gods reveled complacential approbative wil is the measure of our dutie but not of Gods decrees or operations pag. 222 356 391 399. 3 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil pag. 392. 4 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself pag. 375 376. 5 That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death pag. 241 332 375 387 398. 6 That God may be said according to his wil of complacence and approbation to intend the salvation of sinners yea Reprobates by providing the means of grace conducing thereto pag. 271 376 394. 7 That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means not the unknowen wil of God pag. 353. 8 That God by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands pag. 329 393 394 401. 9 That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of salvation pag. 256 257. 10 That Gods evangelic providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated p. 377 381 387 388 395. 11 That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events pag. 240 333 341 360 402 253. 12 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God with its difference from that of men pag. 232 321 336 339 342. 13 That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse pag. 240-272 14 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercie of God pag. 277-310 15 That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Independence pag. 226. 16 That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth pag. 349-362 17 That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts pag. 374-404 18 That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessitie or compulsion to sin pag. 253. 19 Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents pag. 333 340 341 351 360. 20 That the Arminians grant an absolute immutable fixed Decree of Reprobation which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists p. 302 332 333 340 351 354 400 418 419. 21 Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation pag. 418 419 442 462. 22 Lastly he shews us What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees pag. 454-526 These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents of which hereafter Chap. 6. § 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from Divine Concurse its Principe Nature and Efficace the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonstration of our Hypothesis which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars 1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful may be demonstrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurse What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse but the Divine wil Doth not sacred Pagine expressely speak so much So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it 's said Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord did acte but what Gods hand or wil and counsel predetermined to be done of which before And Strangius himself grants us lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse as to its prime act is in God and the same with God Now such is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil that althings must necessarily be done which he wils to be done and in that manner as he wils them as Aquinas wel determines How then is it possible but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe it must necessarily existe and in that manner as he wils it Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its Totalitie Vniversalitie as to effects Particularitie as to manner of working Immediation Antecedence and soverain absolute Independence 1 The Totalitie of Divine concurse sufficiently demonstrates its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods concurse to al second causes acts and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Thus much is also granted by Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. where he assertes That the whole action dependes on God as also on the creature otherwise God should not concur immediately Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us as also of the same partie with Strangius denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total yet because he is singular therein and different from his own partie I shal take it for granted that Gods concurse is

is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged and that with as great color of Reason by the Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination to gracious acts I must confesse I could never neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin be admitted as valid 2 The like may be said of that other objection or reason why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin namely That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible c. Is not this very objection and the reason urged to enforce it as much urged by Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side What reason do the new Methodists give that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible but that it takes away the Wils Indifference and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference and its power to act or not to act 3 Our Adversaries urge That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises Invitations and al evangelic offers of Grace and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners in making offers of Grace and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers Is not this very objection with its reason urged and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewil without a predeterminative Concurse are not al gracious Promises Invitations and offers of Grace to Sinners who fal not under this Predetermination vain and uselesse Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally some few excepted denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace as by the predeterminative Concurse of God 4 Our Adversaries object That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin supposeth God to compel and force men to sin and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good and that with as much color of reason For say they If God predetermine the wil to what is good then he compels and forceth the wil to be good so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act which destroyeth al moral good c. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it as we shal demonstrate c. 6. § 5. To conclude this argument I am very confident our Opponents the new Methodists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin which is naturally good for al or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later may and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former and that with equal force And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes though lesse friendly to divine Concurse to denie al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. n. 66. c. p. 136. § 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin its substrate mater and formal reason 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin we have demonstrated Ch. 1. § 2. 1 That al human acts considered in their natural entitie abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil 2 That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law 3 That no human Act considered physically or according to its natural entitative substance is intrinsecally evil but only morally in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object Hence 4 That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes we hence argue That God must necessarily concur to yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil morally are according to their substrate mater physically good doth it not necessarily follow that God the first cause must concur thereto yea predetermine the same Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first necessarily demonstrate not only its dependence on but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited defined and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being which is such by Essence May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries who grant that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act So Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse saith he that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act for then every act would be sin also that it doth not follow as the act procedes from God for then every act that procedes from God would have sin Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius that Breme Professor who was a member of the Synod of Dort and there began the New Method Duodecas Dissert de Volunt Dei Dissert 8. Thes 99. p. 426. As to the Act saith he of the Divine Wil about sin the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves whiles that some expressely affirm That God nils and hates sins and those that commit them Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say That God wils creates effectes them Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree if the distinction be rightly observed 1 Between the Act and the Vitiositie of the Act. 2 Between the Act as it is from God and as it

the contrary as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do of which hereafter § 8. 2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection From the Promisses and Invitations of God which are made uselesse and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin we answer 1 That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations which are but branches of the Covenant of Grace are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation to whom they are many ways useful notwithstanding Divine Predetermination For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature by its own free-wil to accept of these offers or performe the Condition on which the offers depend but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul for the inabling of it to performe the Condition So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect for whom they are primarily designed operative of Grace albeit as to others they are only exactive of dutie whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace 2 Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invitations uselesse as to Reprobates for 1 They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein namely Life and Salvation And to make this more clear we are to remember that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only their necessary connexion that in al conditional Propositions on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent is evident from that of our Lord John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth c. Whence it is apparent that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible The God of al grace has by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation so that this Proposition is infallibly true If thou believest thou shalt be saved and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Mankind neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief for the sinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination as Davenant wel observes Animadvers on Gods Love p. 377. where he shews That the Decree of God permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature So p. 387 388. he demonstrates That Divine eternal Decrees whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered do not crosse the end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected And he gives this reason for it p. 352. God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the infallible event or successe of the Means Gods meaning when he offers any Grace unto men is that they should performe such actions whereunto such grace conduceth and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man if he believe and persevere is truely to performe it if he so do But it is not always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to their own good If the Remonstrants wil have nothing termed Gods meaning but his absolute Wil in their opinion as wel as in ours it wil follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glorie Lastly p. 392 393 394. he proves That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to albeit he decree the contrary event Hence 2 These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates that it leaves them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe and withal an expectation that they accept his offers yea his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life with a provision of al means necessary thereto what excuse can men have for unbelief Wil they say that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention Take the Replie of Davenant Animadv p. 271. We answer that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events than by providing orderly means for the producing such events Non-election provideth no means of making men sin and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin though it include a prevision of sinful Events and a Decree to permit them c. 3 The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination to what is good and Divine Prescience of sinful acts doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours For 1 In that they assert none can performe the condition required and so embrace the evangelic offer made without efficacious predeterminative grace do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Believing as we do Are not al offers for want of this predeterminative Grace altogether uselesse to them for whom it never was intended 2 So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins did not God according to their Concessions certainly foreknow that they would never yea never could accept of the offers made to them without predeterminative Grace which he decreed never to give them Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie as our predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin This is wel argued by Davenant Animadv p. 242. His Hoard's nibbling at the Synod of Dort and charging them with mantaining a fatal Decree is to little purpose If he cal that fatal which is certain and immutable we are not afraid to affirm that al Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of mens final impenitence is as absolute and immutable and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend Thus also p. 332. The Remonstrants we adde also the New Methodists dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated according to their decree founded upon the prevision of

12. 11. 2 Sam. 16. 22. Shimei ' s cursing David how from God 2 Sam. 16. 10 11. 2 Sam. 24. 1. 1 Sam. 26. 19. 1 King 11. 31 37. 12. 15 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. 10. 30. Answer 1 Kings 22. 23. Rev. 17. 17. Gods efficacious Permission of Sin 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16 17. h. e. Justo judicio permittit errare seduci Vatablus Esa 63. 17. Gods judicial hardening Sinners Psal 81. 12. Psal 69. 22. Rom. 11. 10. Esa 6. 10. Esa 29. 10. Rom. 11. 8. Esa 19. 14. Esa 44. 18 19. Esa 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thes 2. 11. The false comments of Adversaries refuted Gods Concurse to the individual act which is sinful How God judicially hardens men without being the cause of sin Gods efficacious ordering mens sins for his own glorie Exod. 9. 14 15 16. Vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator August Rom. 9. 17. Rom. 9. 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Jude 4. The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin Augustin Si ergo servi sunt peccati quid se jactant de libero arbitrio August libr. de Spirit lit c. 30. Prosper and Fulgentius Such as succeeded the Fathers Anselme Hugo de Sancto Victore * Malum esse vult Deus tamen malum non vult vult esse malum quia bonum est malum esse non vult ipsum malum quia bonum non est ipsum malum Deum malas voluntates praesidendo occultâ invisibili operatione ad suum arbitrium temperare inclinare Aquinas Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. Scotus Scotistae nihil hujusmodi physicum intrinsecum creaturae inditum esse volunt sed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinsecum absolutum efficax ad agendum applicari ac determinari Carleton Philos Disp. 30. sect 1. pag. 327. Gregorius Ariminensis Object 1. Object 2. Holcot Altissiodorensis Thomas Bradwardine his character and zele for efficacious Grace His zele for efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin How God wils Sin Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur sed quia quod bene dicitur non bene intelligītur Hugo How the entitative act is from Gods Predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans sentiments Alvarez The Doctrine of Jansenius concordant with our Hypothesis C. T. p. 3. p. 93. The Jansenists sentiments The Roman Catechisme Non solùm Deus universa quae sunt providentiâ suâ tuetur atque administrat verùm etiam quae moventur agunt aliquid intimâ virtute ad motum atque actionem ita impellit ut quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat praeveniat tamen cùm ejus occultissima vis ad singula pertinear Sapient 8. 1. Act. 17. The sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid quod Deus non vult Rursus fieri posse ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ quod Deus vult bonâ Calv. ix August Zuinglius Umim igitur atque idem facinus quantum Dei est Authoris Motoris ac Impulsoris opus est crimen non est quantum autem hominis est crimen ac scelus est Ille enim lege non tenetur hic autem lege etiam damnatur Zuing. prov cap. 2. pag. 365. Beza Chamiers Difence of our Hypothesis The Testimonie of Lud. Crocius Illam scil actionem non verò hanc scil malitiam Deus vult ac decernit hanc non illam permittit The Synod of Dort The Church of England Davenant Ward George Abbot Dr. Holland Prideaux Barlow Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sin Dicebat Pelagius Deum collato semel libero arbitrio ulteriùs nobis ad operandum non esse necessarium Hieronym ad Ctesiph Durandus against Gods immediate Concurse The Jesuites and Molinists Lud. à Dola his following Durandus Arminius's Sentiments The Remonstrants and their Sectators The Anabaptists of Germanie that fel in with the Remonstrants The New Methodists John Camero Quod negem omne ens est à Deo tanquam à causa efficiente immediata Ep. ad Jac. Gallovaeum Moses Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodists fel into their new Model Who of the new Methodists may be estimed orthodox Arguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of al sin 1. Arg. from the futurition of althings Objections against this Argument solved 2 Arg. from the Certitude of Divine Prescience 3 Arg. from the Decree of Reprobation Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation 4. Arg. from Divine Concurse 1. It s Principe Cùm voluntas Divina sit efficacissima non solùm sequitur quòd fiant ea quae Deus fieri vult sed quòd eo modo fiant quo Deus ea fieri velit Aquin part 1. 2. It s Nature 1. Totalitie Adeò ut tota actio pendeat à Deo tota à Creatura 2. Vniversalitie 3. Particularitie 4. Immediation 5. Prioritie 6. Absolute Independence 3. The efficace of Divine Concurse proves predetermination Nos autem eo nomine sc influxus communis non determinationem seu praedeterminationem intelligimus sed vim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficaciam Dei quâ causas secundas sibi subordinat c. Strang. l. 1. c. 11. 1. Efficacious Concurse as to natural acts Non solùm sunt ea quae Deus vult fieri sed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266. Act. 2. 23. Et sic quantum ad concursum attinet dicimus Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio adulterio quia physicè eadem est specie utrobique actio Strang. l. 2. c. ● p. 254. 2. Efficacious Concurse as to supernatural Acts and Effects 5. Arg. from the Nature of Sin 1. It s mater Fatemur quidem malitiam non sequi actum peccati ut est actus alioqui omnis actus esset peccatum c. Strang. 2. From the formal reason of sin 6. Arg. from Gods Permission of Sin Mars's his parallel with Nimrod Vulcan the same with Tubalcain Gen. 4. 22. Vade nisi à Tubalcain Vulcanus Sandf de Desc l. 1. §. 21. Gen. 4. 22. Silenus the same with Silo. Gen. 49. 10. Nysa where Silenus reigned the same with Sina or Nissi Silenus's Genealogie as Silo's unknown Heb. 7. 3. Silenus and Silo agrees in offices Gen. 49. 10. Silenus the great Doctor as Silo is stiled Silenus's riding on an Asse from Silo's Gen. 49. 11. Silenus's being filled with wine from Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's meat Cows milk from Gen. 49. 12. Silenus's parallel with Balaam Num. 22. 28. Num. 22. 5. The Theogonie of Pan and his parallel with the Jewish Messias Josh 2. 9 24. Josh 5. 1. Pan the same with Silenus Pan the same with Faunus Satyrus the same with Pan and Silenus Pan a falle of the Messias Pan Abel Pan Israel Israel Patriartha verus sortē Pan Gentilium Park ex Sandf Pan Cham. Prometheus his Theogonie and parallel with Noah 2. Prometheus's parallel with Magog Neptune the same with Japhet Unde etiam Japetus nisi à Japhet Sandf Desc l. 1. §. 22. The parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune Gen. 9. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same origination with Japh ● Neptune the God of the Sea from Japhets possessing the Islands Janus's Theogonie and Parallel 1. With Noah 2. With Javan Of Aeolus his Origination Grecian Goddesses of Phenician and Hebrew extract 1. Rhea from Gen. 29. 20. 2. Minerva 3. Ceres 4. Niobe 5. Sirenes The Theogonie of the Phenician Gods Hebraick Of Baal from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Bel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hos 2. 16 17. The Supreme Baal stiled Beelsamen The Theogonie of Baalzebub 2 King 1. 2. 2 Kings 23. 24. 2 Kings 1. 2. Mat. 12. 24. The Theogonie of Baal Peor Hebraick Num. 25. 2 3 6. Hos 9. 10. Psal 106. 28. Num. 25. 1 2 3. Psal 106. 28. Moloch amongst the Ammonites the same with Baal 1 King 11. 7. Lev. 18. 21. Lev. 20. 2 3 4 5. 2 Kings 23. 10. Amos 5. 26. Act. 7. 43. Ps 106. 37. 38. Adramelech and Anamelech 2 King 17. 31. Job 17. 6. Esa 30. 33. 2 King 23. 10. Jer. 7. 31 32. The Samothracian Cabiri Phenician Gods 2. From Divine Justice 3. From Gods Clemence and Mercie 4. From Divine Sanctitis Object 3. From Gods word ● Preceptive 2. From Gods Promisses and Invitations 1 Al Promisses primarily intended for the Elect. 2 The use of evangelic Promisses as to Reprobates 3 The Antithesis of Antipredeterminants destroyeth the use of Promisses c. as much as our Hypothesis 4. What Power we allow to Reprobates Object 4. From the overthrow of Religion Object 5. From the libertie of the Wil. The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this objection and its inconsistence with their own sentiments The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants with their consiquents

acts considered in their generic physic Entitie or natural Being abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil but morally indifferent Al moral Beings or Acts are scated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in proper nature as Cyril neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat it 's true there may be nature where there is no moralitie yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same Now al human nature as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea albeit capable of virtue or vice yet are in themselves morally indifferent Al thoughts words and actions considered physically and abstractly without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God are neither good nor evil For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsecally inherent in human acts but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law The very acts of loving and hating God considered in their generic physic and entitative nature as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object are morally neither good nor evil because moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant Thus much Strangius frequently grants as pag. 158. he saith That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions So pag. 875. The action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice Hence 2 Al Moralitie and moral Acts whether good or evil receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus and other Scholemen and that on the highest reasons For the Divine Wil is the supreme measure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie Things are therefore just and good because God wils them and whatever God wils is for that very reason because God wils it good and just Therefore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men That the reasons of good and evil are eternal is of dangerous consequence albeit it hath somewhat of Truth as other errors have mixed with it we grant that in things morally good there is a natural condecence or congruitie to human nature even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution As on supposition of mans being created he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God hating sin c. These are duties naturally congruous yea morally necessary to human nature Whence it is that Divines usually determine That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam i. e. most condecent congruous and morally necessary to his Nature Yet all this hinders not but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament which God has spread over the rational world whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts and by which they shall be at last day judged whence it necessarily follows that al moral constitution must procede hence as we have more amply demonstrated Court Gentiles P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 2. Thus also Voetius Disput Theolog. Par. 1. de jure justit Probl. 10. p. 351. proves That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness So much also Strangius grants us p. 89. namely That as whatever is true is therefore true because conform to the first Truth so whatever is good is therefore good because conform to the first Goodness and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect so Goodness to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al created Justice and Holiness is such i. e. good for goodness is their essence because Gods efficient wil made them so Hence 3 The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination or Transgression of the Divine Law This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie as we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 1. and Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration Hence 4 Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive real Being but privative This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians excepting some few Marcion and Manes with others It 's true the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being and they took up principes suited thereto namely That there were two first Beings or Causes one of good the other of evil But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments Simplicius on Epictetus c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Good which we have largely explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 § 4. § 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us that Sin must necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without nature without subsistence So Greg. Nyssen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is an insubsistent Being or privation And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Scholes that sin resulted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the absence of good as darkness from the absence of light Thus also among the Latins Augustin asserted that Sin was not Nature but the evil of Nature Again the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin And Strangius who is our principal adversary in this controversie yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97 c. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation This I conceive deserves a particular remarque because some late Authors and those not of inferior note make great use of this Antithesis namely That Sin is as to its formal nature positive as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful They tel us that Sin as to its forme is not a mere privation but a moral Relation which has so much Realitie as a relation But to obviate al mistakes and verbal contests we grant 1 That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation or rather relative privation as it is a transgression of and so must have relation to the Moral Law 2 That Sin is not a mere nothing but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition as we have more fully shewen Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 2. But 3 We may not yield that Sin is a moral positive Relation much less a positive act or real Being such as

is the term of a natural production For such a perswasion wil necessarily force men to grant that God is the Author of Sin or to hold with the Manichees that there are two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 4. Touching the kinds of sinful Actions that which principally concerns our present controversie is the distinction of sinful Actions into such as are modally only or such as are intrinsecally evil 1 By actions modally evil they generally understand such as are substantially good yet have some modal accidental vitiositie or sinfulness appendent to them Such are al the sincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect state which have an evangelic perfection and goodness in them yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection For such is the profunde mysterious wisdom of God that he permits a mixture of sin even with the best good works on this side Heaven thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illustrious so that the same Act which is in evangelic estimation sincerely good is also modally sinful and imperfect Thus Strangius l. 2. c. 9. p. 205. Sithat al transgression of the Law is sin men sin both by doing what is forbidden as also by doing what is commanded if not in that manner as commanded Again both by not doing what is commanded as also by abstaining from what is forbidden if they abstain not in a regular manner Thus oft it comes to pass that the action may be good according to the substance of the work and yet evil as to the mode of acting As for example to give Almes to the poor is a work substantially good yet if it procede not from Faith and Charitie and respect to the glorie of God it is evil as to the mode of acting Thus Strangius But I adde that the best works of Unbelievers are substantially evil in that they have nothing of sincere good in them but ful of hatred of God and the best works of pious souls in this imperfect state are modally evil because they have a tincture of vitiositie appendent to them 2 By Actions intrinsecally evil they generally understand such as being referred to and determined by such or such an object carrie in them an intrinsec vitiositie and malignitie so that whiles under such a reference and determination they can never become good And the commun instance is in hatred of God and Blasphemie Not that those acts are in their physic material entitie or substance sinful but only in their moral constitution and formal determination or reference to their object Thus much is also acknowledged by Strangius l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. When according to the commun sentence it is said that some also are in themselves or intrinsecally evil the acts are not understood as abstracted from their Object but as they refer to their object in regard of which they have their vitiositie It seems to me that the vitiositie which is in the hatred of God doth not belong to the material but formal of Sin Which is an ingenuous confession and wil be of much use to us in what follows At present we shall only remarque that this notion of Acts intrinsecally evil if duely examined wil be of no use to our Opponents albeit they seem to lay the most stress on it For 1 They grant as Strangius here that the vitiositie which is in the hatred of God and so in all other acts intrinsecally evil doth not belong to the material but formal of sin so that Gods concurse to the material or substrate mater of sin doth not suppose his concurse to the formal obliquitie of sin 2 In acts sincerely but imperfectly good and modally evil the substrate mater or material act which is both good and evil is one and the same now our Adversaries grant Predetermination to the material act as good how then can they denie predetermination to the same material entitative act which is evil though not as such But of this more hereafter c. 5. § 3. The next terme to be discussed by us is the Natural Freedom or Libertie of the Wil which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controversie turns as our more intelligent Opponents confess A reverend Divine Cathol Theologie Part 3. p. 80. saith I do readily confess that as the sum of al the controversie is Whether man hath truely any free-wil c. I do readily concur with him in this That the sum of al the controvesie must be resolved into this notion of free-wil and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here we must necessarily fal under the efforts of our Antagonists And I must confess this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts for twenty five years or more that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian controversie centers in this point touching the Libertie of the Wil and he that endeavours to remove those maladies but overlooks those Pelagian infusions that lie hid in the heart of Free-will doth act but like the unskilful Physician who to remove an Hectick Feaver endeavoured to cure the Itch. What made Durandus drive Gods immediate Concurse to human acts but this perswasion that it destroyeth the Libertie of the wil and so makes God the Author of sin And what makes the Jesuites denie Predetermination but the like groundless perswasion So also Baronius in his Metaphysics Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 79. p. 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuarie and under the shadow of this terme Free-wil conceled al their venimous Infusions here by their sophistic logic and ambiguous cloudy distinctions they fortified themselves against the Defenders of Efficacious Grace Thus Jansenius August de Natur. Laps Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of Augustine that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philosophic hallucination about natural free-wil which they placed in Indifference but Augustine in a rational spontaneitie Herein they are followed by the Jesuites and Arminians who indeed differ not scarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians Yea Baronius whom Rutherford rangeth among the Arminians with confidence maintains Bellarmines definition of Libertie as justifiable and orthodoxe Metaphys Sect. 12. p. 285. But other of our Antagonists Strangius Le Blanc c. perceiving that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Libertie in a Rational Spontaneity and so presumed that voluntary necessitie is very wel consistent therewith hence they have found out an artificial distinction for the reconciling the Calvinists with the Jesuites Pelagians and Arminians They distinguish Libertie into that which is largely or strictly taken and they confess 1 That Libertie taken largely as it is a perfection of the Soul so it has one and the same notion with Rational Spontaneitie and such is the Libertie of glorified Souls This Libertie they make essential to the wil of which see Strangius l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. also p. 691 702 703. But adde they

predetermining the free causes to those acts as Learned Strangius yet denie that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurition as Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 11. His reason is because nothing can be certainly known but what is certainly true but nothing is certainly true but what is necessary either absolutely or conditionally Whence he collects that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science which is infallible and most certain unlesse there be included the condition whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred But if this reason prevails God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future but what he before decreed as absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not who confesseth that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God Thus Le Blanc of Strangius's self-contradicting Hypothesis And indeed to speak the truth nakedly there seems so much force in Strangius's reason whereby he proves That al Gods Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurition namely from the certainty of divine Prescience that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same albeit to the subversion of his own Phaenomena And I am very bold yea confident in asserting and demonstrating these following Propositions 1 Prop. That God can have no certain Prescience of things future but from his own decree the only certain determinate cause of their futurition And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent denie also Gods Prescience to be certain as Le Blanc De Concord P. 3. Thes 1. p. 438. and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree Hence 2 Prop. There is an hypothetic or consequential necessitie that ariseth from Gods certain Prescience This is wel urged though in the defense of an hell-bred Hypothesis by the Socinians and cited by Le Blanc as a knot not easily untied de Concord Par. 3. Thes 22. pag. 441. There is saith he much of difficultie here which in times past has exercised the ingenies of Doctors For seeing it is impossible that the Prescience of God may be deceived it cannot be but that those things must happen which God foresees wil happen and therefore that althings happen necessarily and it is impossible but that the very wil of man must produce those acts which God from eternity foreknew it would produce This Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Adversaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis See more of this Chap. 6. § 5. Hence 3 Prop. The same arguments that are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Wil to the substrate mater of sin may be as they are by the Socinians urged with as great force against Gods certain Prescience of Sin For our Adversaries Strangius Le Blanc c. granting the certain futurition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God fal under al those Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us who assert the predefinition futurition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree This Proposition is incomparably wel demonstrated by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods Love to Mankind p. 418 419 442 462. where he proves That Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the Wil as absolute Predestination and Reprobation Of which more in our next Argument also c. 6. § 5. Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adversaries take Sanctuarie in to secure themselves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Prescience And here at what a miserable losse and confusion are they among themselves How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving this argument Some flie for refuge to the Molinists Middle Science telling us That God foresaw that men being placed under such hypotheses and circumstances would sin against him c. Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 12. Disp 2. n. 55 56. p. 326. where he professedly defendes Fonseca's conditionate Science making God to have a conditionate Science of the first sin if Eve seduced by the Serpent should temt Adam c. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among us But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more fober of this new Method particularly by Strangius who l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervo●… That there can be no such thing as a Middle or conditionate Science in God because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible or Knowable and this he proves because an object cannot be certainly knowen unlesse it be certainly true which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not Thus also Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 1. p. 452 c. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion have recourse to the Dominicans real presence of things future in Eternitie whereby they make God by his Science of Vision to behold the sins of men Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded saith he to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision c. But more fully l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie because the Eternitie of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible The same he inculcates p. 595 596 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie is greatly opposed by some of his own party the New Methodists who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof So Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 37. p. 443. First saith he as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternitie to eternitie it self it appears to be a mere figment for that one thing coexiste to another it is necessary that both existe c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves who has espoused Strangius's Hypothesis fals soul on the Thomists for asserting Althings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali c. Lastly others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Prescience Thus Le Blanc De Concord Par. 1. Thes 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable c. Yet he grants Thes 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth yet it doth not satisfie the Question nor remove the main difficultie namely How things passe from a state of