and a Creature 'T is therefore more properly call'd premotion or predetermination since God makes us doe even to every the least positive circumstance of action 14. 'T is collected too out of what has been said how God is said to act in all things both by the immediation of his Suppositum or Substance and of his Vertue but an Intelligence upon one body only by the immediation of Its Substance upon the rest by the immediation only of Its vertue 15. For since the action of God is the influx of Being it self and nothing can act without Being nor Being flow from any but God God must needs immediately act upon all Substances by Creating and Conserving them and consequently in such his acting no third Substance intervenes between Him and the Creature Again the action of all bodies proceeding from Intelligences and They being made act by God the vertue of God makes every thing act and so is more immediate to the effect then the vertue of the nearest cause whence also God is by the immediation of his vertue more immediate then the next cause which produces the action 16. But an Intelligence which immediately rarifies A moves not B but by the mediation of A the Suppositum A therefore is between the Intelligence and B wherefore the Intelligence acts not by the immediation of Its Suppositum upon B But because A's being rarify'd is the cause that A moves B and A is rarify'd by the vertue of the Intelligence the vertue of the Intelligence makes B be mov'd by A the vertue therefore of the Intelligence not the Suppositum is immediate to B. 17. And hence it follows that God is said to be Immense but an Intelligence to be definitively in Place For since nothing either is or can be without Existence 't is clear neither can there be any Place upon which God does not immediately act but an Intelligence having a determinate proportion to a body so acts upon a certain quantity that it cannot together and at once immediately act upon another Since therefore incorporeall Things are not in Place circumscriptively an Intelligence must be definitively but God without end in all Place by immediate operation LESSON XVII Of the Conservation of Creatures and the Durations of Things 1. T Is clear too out of what has been said that this action of God is the conservation of things both as to their Substance and as to their intrinsecall Accidents For since the essence of created things has not of it self a necessary conjunction with Being but such an one as may of its own nature be lost 't is plain they are not conjoyn'd by force of their own notions for that time during which they may be not-conjoyn'd and by consequence as long as they are conjoyn'd they have this to be conjoyn'd from an extrinsecall they therefore remain conjoyn'd by an Extrinsecall power 2. But 't is of the same nature to be conjoyn'd and to remain conjoyn'd or to be for any duration conjoyn'd they have therefore this from the same cause and vertue and since 't is not any change but on the contrary the effect is that nothing should be chang'd by the very same action too they keep their being which is to be conserv'd The same action of God therefore is Conservation in respect of Substances And since 't is declar'd above that intrinsecall Accidents are nothing else but manners of Substance the Substance being conserv'd 't is clear that they also are conserv'd in their Being 3. Out of what has been said too we may know what Action signifies in the effect it self And if the question be of the Divine action as it immediately flows from God 't is plain that 'T is the very Substance it self not only because it cannot be subjected in a Substance which subsists no otherwise then by it nor because the existence of Things form'd out of our conceits is universally rejected but also because any intermediate action such as the Moderns feign the Making which should be put serves to no purpose 4. For either God before this action is determin'd in himself to act that is that this action should follow from Him or He is not if not this action will not follow for from an indifferent nothing follows but if He be determin'd this action has not the power of determining Him for which the Opponent requires it as necessary but the effect can as immediately follow out of Himself as this action And this same discourse holds against the like fictitious action too of Creatures 5. Again in as much as the action of God is Conservation 't is nothing but the very Being of the thing conserv'd For first the Duration of an Incorporeall thing cannot be divisible for if it were divisible 't would be continuate and divisible without end either therefore some part together and at once in an incorporeall that is indivisible thing or not if together that part will not include succession if not no part can ever be 6. And this Argument has not lesse force in a Corporeall Creature for though it be divisible in extension yet 't is indivisible in succession and consequently it cannot sustain together more parts of successive duration 7. Again if to endure be for the same thing to be the same it was is it not clear ther 's nothing requir'd but a non-mutation and on the other side that of two things which exist if one perish that 's said to be chang'd that which endures remaining still unchang'd There is therefore no novelty in permanency 8. Moreover to change the existence the Essence too must needs be chang'd since 't is the aptest capacity of existence the notion therefore of Substance will be in perpetuall change and instable and consequently out of God nothing stable 9. You 'l object Since 't is often said that a Creature may not-be and yet whilst it is it cannot not-be 't is manifest that its cannot not-be or to be whilest it is successively supervenes to a Creature Since therefore ther 's a greater necessity of indivisibility on God's part then on a Creature 's the succession is to be concluded on the Creatures side 10. 'T is answer'd 'T is just contrary for as if the action of God were put by way of imagination to be successive no man would require any other succession to understand the duration of a Creature so if the action of God be put equivalent to continually successive no man can complain of the unintelligibility of Duration 11. Because therefore the action of God is conformable to His existence and His existence indivisibly comprehends the past and future it must needs be that the action as it is the internall determination of God in the same manner comprehends succession This action therefore actuates the Creature with a certain indivisibility that eminentially contains divisibility and without any divisibility makes the existence of a Creature by contradiction impossible to be taken away successively yet without any more
For a Relation being the Order of one thing to another and since between two things one may be so ordered to the other that the other may either have or not have a coordination to it it comes to passe that those things which are in the same order such as are those two first kinds have a relation on both sides but those that are of different orders so that notwithstanding the one be ordered to the other have a relation but on one side 3. Besides it often happens that the Understanding through Custome or an imperfect way of knowing expresses even things that have no ordination by a certain relative resemblance and then 't is a mentall relation by schoolmen call'd de dici not a reall one as also when the Understanding has express'd the nature of any thing by a Negation saying a Man does not see or has no hair and then gives a positive being to this Notion saying a Man is blind or bald according to the naturall Aptitude or Ineptitude of the Subject to the denyed Quality 't is call'd a Mentall Negation or Privation respectively 4. Wherefore since by these only ways the Understanding can so vary any thing which it knowes that a change may remain on the Objects side and enter into the consideration of it as belonging to the thing known there can be three only kinds of Mentall Beings For the disputes of the Moderns concerning such entities are but gay Trifles and the contemplation of an erroneous definition 5. There is a kind of Relations not unjustly call'd Intellectuall which follows a thing in the Vnderstanding in vertue of the reall quality of mere Vnderstanding and these relations are of a Logicall Nature as those Terms of Universall Predicable Subject Antecedent Consequent the like And these Relations as much follow out of things in that respect as they are in the Understanding as Likenesse follow 's a thing in as much as 't is white or Equality because 't is Quantitative This therefore is call'd Intellectuall because the Understanding is call'd Intellect and in no other respect 6. An Agent and a Patient clearly expresse two causes which yet the Understanding distinguishing finding parts differently respecting the effect Logically and to serve its turn for Demonstration divides into four 7. And finding in the Agent that it can and that it does Act the Understanding call's that whereby it does or can act the Efficient cause and that which moves or makes it to act the End Likewise in the Patient distinguishing what it is that suffers and what it suffers it call's that the Form this the Matter satisfying thus these Interrogations From what Why By what or How In what 8. Plato adds an Idea or Exemplar but 't is clear that what wants an Exemplar cannot work without it and consequently there is not yet an Efficient cause The species of these and indeed of all the last six Predicaments are little us'd and therefore omitted LESSON V. Of the five Predicables and the signification of Words 1. HEnce 't is evident there are two kinds or differences of Predications For some Predicates of the same line or Predicament comprehend others and are predicated of them as an Universall of a Particular But Predicates of distinct lines are predicated of one another as a thing superadded is predicated of that to which 't is apply'd 2. Predicates of the first kind are said to be predicated in quid or as the what being such as answer to the question what a thing is And if the predicate comprehends the full answer to that question 't is call'd a Species but if it only contains a part so that other common considerations are comprehended under it 't is call'd a Genus whose compart or partner equall to the Species answers not directly to the question What but with the addition of what kind or what in particular supposing the answer to the question What already made by the Genus and this is call'd a Difference 3. The other kind of Predication is apply'd to some things necessarily connected with the Subject which are call'd Properties and are strictly such if they appertain to it alone and alwaies but more at large if they be deficient in these conditions Sometimes 't is apply'd to things which may be both joyn'd to and separated from the Subject without destroying it and such are call'd Accidents Thus are there five commonly call'd Predicables or Porphyries five Terms 4. But since Notions are not communicated but by the means of Words and the same word sometimes is apply'd to severall Notions sometimes to one only as oft as the same word in the same signification that is meaning the same Notion is apply'd to more 't is said to signifie or be spoken Vnivocally 5. A word which serves for severall Notions has this property either by chance as when in one Language it signifies one thing in others another and then 't is call'd purely Equivocall or else of set purpose 't is transferr'd from one Notion to another and then 't is Equivocall by design 6. And of this kind are those words which by necessity or upon occasion are transferr'd from one Notion to another by reason of the Connection of the two Notions or things or in consideration of their being Cause and Effect to one another As when healthfull which signifies the quality of that temper which is just fit and convenient to a sensitive Creature is transferr'd to signifie the quality of Vrine because such a quality in it is the effect of a due temper in the Creature or to Meat because it preserves and produces that fit temper Or else for Proportion sake so the expression to stand at the Helm is transferr'd from a Ship to the Governour of a City because according to proportion he does that in the City which a Pilot does in a Ship 7. And in such kind of words the later signification includes the former as if you would explicate Urine as healthfull you must say 't is such an Urine as is the sign of health in the sensitive Creature if the Governour of a City as standing at the Helm you must say 't is he that does that in a City which a Pilot does in a Ship These words are said Analogically or by Analogy to signifie more things 8. And thus the word Thing or Being is extended to those ten lines or Predicaments before explicated For since a Thing is that which has a being the first Predicament alone justly challenges to it self the title of a Thing in this signification that is as Thing signifies An individual substance which Aristotle call's the first Substance Suppositum or Hypostasis in rationall Substances the Person for these names signify the same 9. Whereas the rest have no being but are only Affections and certain determinations of what has a being for example Socrates or Callias to be Men is to have a being to be Substances but Callias 's being of the same Nature
have an universall notion which is indifferent to many 7. And compounding these former with this farther Consideration that 'T is the same thing to know One thing is another to know that Those things which are the same with a third are the same between themselves 't is plain that a Man is Discoursive and that his knowledge is deriv'd from those things whereof he 's certain to something whereof he was not certain but is rendred certain by the very derivation 8. And because of those things which are unknown either part is indifferent to the Understanding and the Understanding is undetermin'd concerning them it follows that a Man by this Discourse of undetermin'd is rendred determin'd and because the Principles of determination are in himself it comes to passe that a Man determines himself and moves himself 9. Again since 't is clear that one part of a Man is affected from another part as from a sensible object for example One hand Feels the other or whatever other exteriour part of the Body in like manner we are sensible of our selves by Smell Hearing and Sight it follows that a Man can think and discourse of himself and consequently of his actions and by consequence that he can determine himself to act or not-act the understanding descending by discourse to the good or illnesse of the action he is about to doe 10. A Man therefore moves himself to act and is Master of his action and out of the notion of good and ill differently disposes his action which we use to call being Free a Man therefore is Free 11. You 'l object that liberty according to the common notion of men consists in this that Supposing all things requisite for action yet a Man can out of an intrinsecall faculty immediately will to act or not-not-act 'T is answer'd This is not the notion of the vulgar which holds to act and not-not-act for the notion of liberty without that addition of supposing all things requisite besides the action it self nor is it the notion of the Learned that have sought in Nature it self how the notion of the vulgar should be explicated 12. But 't is an errour in Metaphysick in as much as it supposes an indifferent as indifferent to act and that to be in Effect which never was in Cause that is an effect to be without a cause 13. Again 't is erroneous in Morall Science for the Notion of Vertue would be taken away whose nature 't is to incline to will actually so that a more vertuous person is more determin'd to will just things then a lesse vertuous 14. Perswasion too and Negotiation would be taken away for if the determination of the will should proceed not out of the preceding causes in vain would be the endeavours of drawing men to follow one thing more then another 15. Out of what has been said it may be determin'd that Man by force of his Intellective vertue consider'd in it self is capable of infinite Science For since whatever is added is still a degree and disposition in the Man to farther Science 't is apparent the understanding is not burden'd but rendred more capable by former Science Wherefore since Science for its part may by addition encrease without end and is only restrain'd by uninfinitenesse of the number of the Objects it must needs be that Man is capable of comprehending all that is infinite Science together and at once that is he is of a capacity absolutely infinite in respect of bodies comprehending infinite of them as a Superficies comprehends infinite Lines and a Line infinite Points 16. Again since among knowable things those are contain'd too which are to be done by a Man to this also humane Science extends even to know what 's to be done And since Science is an active Principle a Man by Science will be enabled to direct his actions that is to govern his life and this most perfectly because he is enabled to know what 's best to be done LESSON IX Of the Soul of the Chief Animal or of the MIND 1. OUt of what has been hitherto explicated 't is easily deduc'd that Man according to this principle is rais'd above the notions of Matter and Quantity For since Matter is a certain capacity of Quantity Quantity of Figure Figure is determin'd by Place and all these in Time but 't is clear that the intention and thought of Man in an universall conception is entertained about something indifferent to infinite Figures Places Times and Magnitudes and this not out of the nature of the thing but because 't is in the Mind of Man 'T is most evident that the Mind is something of another kind then Matter and Quantity and consequently nobler since 't is an addition to the perfectest bodies 2. Again since Thing and Existence is that which first and primely fixes the Mind and to which it seems to be a certain capacity but Thing out of what has been said abstracts from and is before great and little both in rarefy'd and augmented things it follows that the notion of the Mind is before and nobler then Quantity and its com-part Matter 3. Again since all the negotiation of our Mind reduces divisibles to indivisibility as appears in Numbers Figures Points Lines Superficies Instants Comparisons Denominations Relations Negations c. but nothing is so different as an indivisible from a divisible 't is clear on all sides that the nature of the Mind is wholy opposite to the nature of Quantity and Quantity implying a kind of undeterminatenesse and confusion that the Mind is still the nobler part 4. Nor with lesse evidence is it prov'd that the Mind is a Substantiall principle of Man For since his operations are manifestly indivisible but what is receiv'd in a divisible ipso facto becomes divisible upon the division of the subject 't is clear his operations are not receiv'd in a Magnitude and consequently that his Mind is an indivisible Substance 5. Again if the Substance of Man be wholy materiall and divisible his Mind it self and all its affections can be nothing but certain Manners and determinations of divisibility as 't is plain of the other qualities which are accessory to bodies but 't is plain out of what has been said that 't is no such thing wherefore neither that the whole Substance of Man is materiall but in part Spirituall and indivisible 6. 'T is clear too that the Mind is not another but the same Substance with the Man For since an Instrument to all things includes the being an Instrument to some wherein consists the notion of an Animal 't is clear that a Man is a certain Species of Animal and consequently that his Mind by which he is a Man is formally one and the same Thing with the rest of the Substance of Man 7. And indeed were it suppos'd a distinct Thing from the Substance of the Man it would not suffer from the body nor could it acquire any thing through its
conjunction to the body nor be at all conjoyned to it for it must be either entitatively and this cannot be otherwise then by unity of Substance for a Thing speaks Substance or some other accidentall way whereof ther 's nothing common to a body and a Spirit 8. You 'l say Since a Spirit is a Thing of another order then a body how can it concurre into the same Thing then how will it be cemented and what neighbourhood of one to the other 'T is answered that as in a Magnitude one part is fastned to another and has the power of a Subsister without division that is the propriety of a sever'd Thing without separation so the Soul also may be the same with the body without confusion of properties 9. And because in a corporeall Substance ther 's admitted a certain negatively indivisible vertue antecedent to divisibility viz. a not-yet divisibility of the Substance before the Quantity such as is the connexion and gradation from the divisibility to the negative indivisibility another like that will be apt to unite without a Paradox the Mind positively indivisible to the Substance negatively indivisible 10. And how will it unite but according to those parts in which the Substance primarily and principally resides which as 't is principally in the Heart that being a certain Fountain of the whole Thing so specially as to the notion of Animality 't is in the Brain whence Sense and Motion is deriv'd to the whole Animal which are those operations from which 't is denominated an Animal 11. Since therefore the other actions which do not affect the Heart nor the Brain strike not home to the inmost Substance so neither do they reach Mentall Knowledge or the integrity of the Soul but the changes that strike upon these Principles affect the Soul too and it comes to passe that not-the-same ordination of bodily parts especially of the Spirits and Heart follows in Man from the Brain 's being affected which would follow in another Animal but one from the propriety of the affected Substance conformable to the whole not to the body alone 12. But any other unity then that the Soul should intimely be comprehended in the definition of Man and consequently should consist of the same notion and indistinct predicates is not to be look'd for in Substance LESSON X. Of the Proficiency and Deficiency of Man and of his Essence 1. THis therefore is out of Controversie that Man as to his Soul suffers from Corporeall Agents For since the Soul it self is a certain Affection or Qualification of a divisible Substance which is introduc'd and expell'd by corporeall actions 't is clear that those actions which reach to the very Substance must of necessity affect and be receiv'd in it after its manner 2. Consequently it acquires Science For since 't is nothing but a certain Possibility to Science as to its perfection 't is manifest that all its change is towards Science viz. to be some kind of Knowledge either perfect or imperfect 3. Whence even they that deny the Soul acquires Science say that 't is excited and admonish't by the presence of the body but to be excited and admonish't is to receive knowledge the Soul therefore acquires knowledge from the Body 4. Nor makes against this Socrates's experiment of a Boy orderly ask'd and answering right to Geometricall propositions for this questioning was a production of Science not a renovation for 't was an application of the notion of the same Being which is between the Terms to the understanding of the Boy whereby it came to passe that the Truth to be known was by the notion of Thing knit to the Soul of the Boy and made as it were a part of it in which the vertue of knowledge and Science consists 5. Yet the Soul has not by this Science a power to move the body For we see Science is often overcome by Passion but if it had any proper activity it could not be resisted by any power of its own body Moreover it would no longer be a part of a Man but something grafted in him of a superiour nature according to that vertue 6. It follows therefore that by vertue of the Soul more motives of goods or ills are conjoynd to the singular objects by whose conjunction the Heart and the body is affected otherwise to those goods or ills then it would be had they not that conjunction So that the force of Pain and Pleasure is that which moves a Man even then when he seems to follow the firmest Reason namely because to be Reasonable to follow this and to fly that is nothing else but that more of delightfull is conjoynd with this and more of painfull with that 7. In vertue of these therefore a Man is chang'd and acts otherwise then if he had not understanding Nor is he carry'd from the very beginning by reason or any proper power to this connection of goods with ills but is prevented by some chance or obvious disposition of objects corporeall causes either intrinsecall or extrinsecall 8. Now this disposition in the Soul upon which Operation follows we call the WILL and the first beginning Volition which 't is apparent is left by precedent judgements chiefly those that are about good or ill since by such judgements 't is plain a Man is determin'd to action 9. Hence it appears how the Soul fails in Opining For seeing Objects occurre to the Soul not deduc'd and drawn-in by its own force and nerves as it were but by the agitation of bodies if the affection to any thing so presses a Man to action that it leaves not room for the objects to run in that order which is necessary for demonstration the Man must needs fall to acting before he has any absolute evidence what 's to be done 10. If this be done by reflection a Man see 's that he 's mov'd uncertainly but he see 's too that nature requires he should move upon apparences whence he does no unbeseeming incongruous thing But if it be done without reflection a Man takes an uncertainfor a certain which is to Opine for he says this is which he has no determinate cause to say 11. From this precipitation of action it happens that one Man operates better another worse according as one more frequently or more grievously precipitates his action then another And those that come nearest to evidence as far as nature will bear doe the uttermost of their power which is to operate vertuously but those that very much recede from it are call'd vitious between which a certain middle state of Men inclines notoriously to neither part 12. 'T is clear therefore whence the defectibility of Vice rises in Man-kind to wit because by too much precipitation of bodily motion false or the worse opinions are generated Whence it follows that man is not only changeable from imperfect to perfect but also from good to evil and contrariwise For if he has opin'd a falsity upon farther
notion of a Principle in respect of the act of election there cannot therefore be put Liberty in God 'T is answer'd there cannot be put in God election in fieri or to-be-made but only in facto esse or already made that is such a Will as is election already in act and to this there is not requir'd the notion of cause and effect 5. Moreover naturall inclination as 't is put in God is not any active principle but a certain common and abstracted notion by which we know God and to which that more particular notion is conformable according to which we attribute the name of election to God as for example to this Volition by which God will 's that which is best the volition of the World's Creation is conformable by which is chosen the best in particular 6. You 'l object again since God essentially has all Vertues He alwaies does of necessity that which is best and would doe against his own Essence should he doe any thing otherwise then he does 'T is therefore determin'd to him essentially to doe every thing as he does but that which proceeds out of Nature and Essence is not free God therefore does nothing freely 7. 'T is answer'd Even in us after we see any thing to be better 't is against Nature to doe the contrary neither are we free because we can decede from nature for so Liberty would not be a perfection but an imperfection since all perfection is according to nature but Liberty consists in this That among many which at the beginning seem indifferent we can find which is more according to nature and embrace that because 't is conformable to Naure 8. Therefore in God too Liberty is so to be put that it be understood He has arriv'd by his Science and understanding to act what is conformable to his nature and though after He 's suppos'd to have arriv'd to that 't is against His essence to doe another thing or not to doe this yet His Liberty is not thence diminisht as there is not lesse liberty in a constant Man that changes not his judgement once establisht then in a Fool that at every little appearance of reason alters his opinion but a greater for a constant Man therefore changes not because he alwaies exercises his wisely-made choice that is the better whereas a light person exercises now the worse now the better 9. Again for the most part those things that are-not-chosen are not against the nature of the chooser in themselves but from some Accident or complex of circumstances whence the terms precisely consider'd the chooser may doe them according to nature but because of some circumstance he cannot And even thus Liberty may be attributed to God for to doe some particular thing which he does not is not against the nature of God precisely compar'd to this Thing but when the other circumstances are collected it appears another thing is better and then 't is against the nature of God to doe this yet this prejudices not His Liberty which consists in this that He rejects that which in it self is according to His nature because by accident 't is against it which we experience in our selves to be the track and path of Liberty 10. You 'l say that God is determin'd by the very Being of his Essence and so in Him can be understood no indifferency to the utmost circumstance 'T is answer'd this hinders not but that we are necessitated to conceive That perfectly-determin'd Essence by divers abstractive notions in one of which this determination is not so precisely and by design exprest as in another and so to us the more particular of them becomes the determination of the more common and of both is compounded the notion of liberty exercis'd in God 11. You 'l object thirdly If God were free he could not-doe what he does therefore 't were possible for him not to have the Volition and Science which He has 't is possible therefore there should not-be the same God 'T is answer'd by granting God can make that which He does not but by denying the consequence that He could have another volition then he has for when we say God can make another thing then He does we compound the Power of God or His fecundity with the Object whereof we speak but when we speak of his Volition we speak of his Vnderstanding compleated to action and This proceeds to action upon the consideration of all accidents out of which as 't is said it happens that this object is not made because 't is not-best and against Nature 12. 'T is therefore to be deny'd that there can be in God another act of volition or that his Will is indifferent to this and another act though his effective power taken abstractedly is indifferent to more because it respects the only notion of Being or Thing in them And thus 't is evident how there is not thence inferr'd any possible mutability in God 13. You 'l say His Will abstractedly taken is indifferent too to more acts 'T is answer'd we speak not of the Will as it means the faculty to be abstracted in God but of the Will as it signifies the act or Volition and that alwaies imports that the last determination is made though it expresses not what 't is whence the notion of it is different from his Omnipotency which because 't is referr'd to things without does not of necessity imply the second act LESSON IX Of the Divine Names hovv they are improperly spoken of God 1. OUt of what has been said hitherto of God we find farther that the Names which we attribute to God are all imperfect and not one of them all has any notion whose formall object is in God For since God is a most Simple Entity precontaining in one most simple formality the whole plenitude of Being that is the objects of all our notions the significations of all our Names 2. And is too Existence subsisting but we have but one only name and notion of existence which signifies nothing besides 'T is clear that our names do infinitely come short of the most simple essence of God both in their genericall notion because God is in none of our Predicaments in their integrity because no name of ours represents all that is in God and in their form because none of our apprehensions have a formall likenesse in God Whatever therefore we pronounce of God must needs be apply'd to Him improperly and by an accommodation of the name 3. Whence again 't is clear that all the names which are spoken promiscuously of Created things and God are spoken analogically and their primary signification is that in which they are spoken of the Creatures For 't is evident that men first impos'd it on created things and of them they have in some manner perfect notions and consequently names attributed according to those notions are in some sort proper but they are infinitely far from explicating the Divinity whence
divide the Waters from the Waters In the Hebrew an Expansion Either word is properly taken since it was a Space unpassable for its vastnesse and expansion and by consequence fixed and fixing the division of the Waters 7. But those words in the midst of the waters are to be noted which teach that no Substance was made a new but only between the waters and the waters which is evident too from the word Heaven which name he gave the Firmament by which very word 't is express'd that before God created the Heaven The Etymology also of the word is to be noted which both in the Hebrew and Greek Idiom signifies as much as whence the waters or whence or where it drops that it may be evidenc'd even from the name that the Aire it self is the Firmament CHAP. V. A Philosophicall discourse of the vvorks of the other four days 1. FArther by the operation of this vast Fire not only the Water but much of the Earth too with the Water must needs have been rais'd up For Chymists know that the intense heat of fire can raise up and carry away crasse Oyls and Oyntments nay even Salts and very Gold it self Since therefore the Earth before the operation of Light was dissolv'd in minutest parts and Dust as void of all Moisture it must needs be that the Heat mix'd every where the Water with Earth and thus all muddy carry'd it up into the Aire but most of all about those parts over which the Fire perpendicularly hung 2. Whence 't is plain two Effects must needs have risen one that the Earth in that Circle should become more hollowed and low then in the rest of its Superficies the other that the Water from the remoter places should flow into these hollownesses whether by the attraction of the Fire or by naturall connection or by some power of Gravity which through the operation of the Fire by little and little attain'd a force 3. 'T is plain therefore that since the motion of the Earth was of necessity by the greatest Circle the Earth by the course of the foresaid causes must be drain'd and dry'd first about the Poles of that Circle and the waters gathered together in the empty hollownesse under that Circle 4. I said by the course of the foresaid causes for if we consider what was likely to be done by accident this consequence will not be universally necessary For 't is clear that the Earth by the boyling of the water being unequally mixt and remixt with continuall agitation must according to the law of contingency have produc'd by the meeting of different parts as many kinds and species of Earths as we see diversities of Fossils which we divide generally into four kinds Stones Metalls Mold and concrete Iuyces 5. And since from the varieties also of those great parts of that masse now tempered with water a notable variety must needs follow the Earth yet cover'd with Waters may easily here and there have boyl'd up into Excrescencies as Islands have often grown up in the Sea By this irregularity therefore some Mountains growing may have appear'd before the Polar Regions of the Earth 6. From the same principles it follows that the Earth did not appear wholly squallid and desart but already impregnated with the Seeds of all things nor with Seeds only but with Plants too those especially which either require or can endure more moisture the rest by little and little as the dryer Earth grew more apt and fitly dispos'd for their birth they too sprung out 7. And because an Animal is nothing but a more-compounded Plant by the same reason the Earth then most aptly tempered and dispos'd brought forth perfect Animals as it now being barrener of its own accord produces such as we call insecta as Mice and Frogs and sometimes new fashion'd Animals 8. But because the waters must needs have been very muddy even They before the Earth must have sprung into Animals fit to inhabit them viz. Fishes small and great as also into certain middle Animals which might fly up to the higher parts of the Earth that is Birds as even now we see all kind of Birds that are bred of Putrefaction by the Sea shores and Lake's sides grow out of the rottennesse of wood tempered with water 9. 'T was necessary too that by the force of that mighty Flame parts of Earth and Water of a vast bulk carry'd up above the Aire should by naturall attraction and the power of the baking Fire coagulate into many vast Bodies whereof some should more abound with fiery vertue and therefore both conceive and belch out abundance of Flames so that being entirely lucid they should be apt to enlighten other bodies too within a fit distance and that others lesse abounding with fiery parts should be fit in a congruous order and method to be concocted and enlightened by Them and themselves too be able to reflect light from the former to the rest 10. Wherefore were they set moved in a convenient site to the Earth now inhabited they might alwaies more or lesse enlighten it nor would there be any longer need of that vast light made by the Angels And this formation of things the Aegyptians Aethiopians Empedocles and other naturall Philosophers as it were by the conduct of Nature out of the very steps and order of Generation which they still observ'd in nature have emulated and attempted though not throughly attain'd CHAP. VI. An Explication of Genesis concerning the same 1. THe sacred Commentaries concerning these things tell us thus And God said let the Waters which are under the Heaven be gathered together into one place and let the dry Land appear Here is the first mention made of gravity whose effect is said to be to congregate into one place that we may see Gravity is not a motion towards any particular Site but towards the unity of a body and that it was made out of the Order of the Universe now establisht after that between the acting Light and the Earth upon which it acted a great distance full of Aire was interpos'd wherein the motion of things ascending and descending might be free 2. Iob 38. 't is said that the Sea flow'd as it were out of a womb whence 't is understood that the Earth throughly moistned with Water sweat out on all sides into the lower Vaults and increas'd the Water where by the extreme force of the light it had been too much suck'd out and so left the Earth in its due temperament Whence ther 's evidenc'd another cause too besides what we have explicated of the Earths appearing viz. because by the permixtion of hot water it swel'd into a far greater bulk 3. It follows and God call'd the dry Land and the gathering together of the waters he call'd Seas For it was not Earth in the same sense wherein at the beginning 't was said God created the Heaven and the Earth for there the Element of Earth was call'd Earth but