soule as you call it in saying that her being in a body is her being one thing with the body she is said to be in for if she be one thing with the body she hath the same essence and essentiall properties of a body which I beleeve you wil not subscribe to Sect 22. Pag. 441. c 1 1. Should a soule by the course of nature obtaine her first being without a body and be perfect in knowledge she must be a compleat substance not a soule whose nature is to acquire perfection by the service of the senses 1. You suppose what is not to be supposed for no soul can obtain her first being by the course of nature 2. If she did yet it were not repugnant to her nature to be perfect in knowledge 3. Perfection in knowledge will not make her a complete substance 4. Though the soule naturally acquires perfection by the service of the senses yet that hinders not her bringing in of knowledge with her Adams soul had perfect knowledge as it was fit being all the works of God were created in their perfection and Adam was to be the Doctor and instructor of his posterity and because he was created both in the state and place of happinesse which could not subsist without knowledge yet Adams soule ceased not therefore to be a soule or the forme of his materiall body nor did her knowledge make her a complete substance for in her substance she was no more complete then our soules are in our nativity Neither did that knowledge which Adam brought with him hinder his soule from acquiring by the service of his senses a fuller measure of understanding for hee neither had the knowledge of future contingencies nor of the secrets of mens hearts nor of every particular individuum of every species nor of every stone or sand in the world which belonged nothing to his perfection and happinesse If you 'l say that Adams soule obtained not her first being by the course of nature I grant it nor was it possible she should but by what course soever you imagine the soule to have her being shee may bring perfect knowledge with her and yet not cease to be a soule But when you say That no false judgements can remaine in a Pag. 442. miserable soule after her departure you make the damned soules in hell in farre better condition then wee are here upon earth who are subject to false judgements and erroneous opinions even the best of us but I am not of your mind for doubtlesse false judgements are a part of that punishment which the wicked soules suffer in hell But if there be no falshood or errour of judgement in them they must be in this point as happy as Adam was in Paradise If nothing be wanting but the effect and yet the effect Sect. 23. doth not immediately follow it must needs be that it cannot follow at all This inference will not follow at all for wee see many effects doe not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient and yet follow at last The fire melts not the metall presently nor the Carpenter builds the house nor the Sun produces corne grasse and fruits immediately nor doth the Physician presently cure diseases and yet all these are efficient causes and actually work the effects follow at leasure and at last though not immediately You should doe well to distinguish between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the working or operation and the work it selfe When the efficient is not only in its act of entity but of causality too there followes immediately operation but not opus the working not the work the effect in fieri not in esse Againe you must discriminate between voluntary and naturall agents the one operate freely the other of necessity The soule is doubtlesse a voluntary not a naturall agent so that the effect may follow though not immediately And if in naturall causes the effect followes still immediately it is where the effect is an essentiall property of the subject flowing immediately from the forme as heat from the fire which notwithstanding produceth not heat immediately in water or other subjects Lastly if your argument be good they are not to blame who held the eternity of the world for they reasoned as you doe that the cause being eternall the effect must immediately or eternally follow or else not follow at all But they should have knowne that God was no naturall but a voluntary agent and though from eternity hee did actually exist yet he did not from eternitie actually create The act of entity in him was eternall but not the act of causality In the conclusion of your discourse you make nature Sect 24. play the Smith for you say If the dull percussion which by natures institution hammereth out a spirituall soule from grosse flesh and bloud can atchieve so wondrous an effect by such blunt instruments as are used in the contriving of a man fifty or an hundred yeares time must forge out in such a soule an excellency above the forme of an abortive embryon You may with your Rhetorick as soon perswade me that Minerva was hammered out of Iupiters braine by the percussion of Vulcans hatchet as that the spirituall soule can by natures institution or any dull percussion of hers be hammered out from grosse flesh and bloud It is not nature but the God of nature that is the efficient cause of the soule It 's not natures dull percussion but Gods active inspiration that is the instrument It is not flesh and bloud out of which it is educed but into which the immateriall soule is introduced The soule is not framed either in or of the bodie by the work of nature but is inspired by the breath of the Almighty who in the beginning breathed into Adam the breath of life and so became a living soule Nature cannot hammer out such a piece as the soule is though shee had the help of Vulcans Cyclopes Brontesque Steropesque nudus membra Pyracmon She is of too pure a quintessence and of too sublimated an alloy to be extracted out of such grosse materialls as flesh and bloud are After the bodie is articulated the new created soule is infused accompanied with her perfections which she receives not from but communicates to the bodie and so that rude masse of flesh in the matrix becomes a man And the same soule which makes him a man makes him lord over all the workes of Gods hands by this he subdues the wilde beasts commands the earth masters the ocean measures the heaven searcheth into the nature of herbs trees metalls mineralls stones c. fore-tells celestiall changes inventeth arts and sciences and becomes the lively character and expresse image of the Almighty Can nature then hammer such a divine essence out of grosse flesh and bloud It is questioned whether God himselfe can doe it without implying a contradiction which is so repugnant to him Nature
and diastole sec. 59. Paine is not compression but the effect of it All hard things breed not paine nor soft things pleasure The heart is more active then passive because hot Feare sorrow and stupidity how they differ Passion is not the motion of the bloud and spirits but of the sensible appetite Every passion is not motion The division of passions Why birds more musicall then other creatures sec. 60. There are sympathies and antipathies in nature of which we can give no reason which is the punishment of Adams pride sec. 61. Of impressions made in the embryo and of the formative power sec. 62. Substances could not be knowne were it not for qualities No action passion and motion without qualities Alterations from them sec. 63. All bodies are not meerly passive Rare and dense not the primary division of bodies sec. 64. Aristotle not the author of atomes but Democritus sec. 65. The necessity of metaphysicall knowledge Privations and negations conceived as positive entities by Aristotelians how sec. 66. Qualities are not dispositions of parts Beauty is neither composition nor proportion Health is not temper Agility is not proportion nor strength Science is not ordered phantasmes sec. 67. Sir Kenelme modestly reproved for mocking at Aristotelians sec. 68. How and why accidents are in their subjects Accidents are entities Aristotelians vindicated from tautologies Nature aimes at unity why Of similitudes and the ground thereof How man is like to God not God to man sec. 69. The CONTENTS of the second part containing 28. Sections ARistotelians make not heat and cold indivisible qualities Not they but the Masse-Priests turne bodies into spirits sec. 1. Not the nature but the similitude of the thing apprehended is in the man apprehending and therefore the understanding is not the same with the thing understood proved by ten reasons sec. 2. All relations are not notions but reall entities proved by ten reasons sec. 3. Existence is not the property of man but of entity or rather its formality in God onely it is one with essence sec. 4. The soule is more then an active force She sleepeth not in the grave c. sec. 5. Being hath no great affinity with the soule it is neither the end nor the Idea of the soule sec. 6. Things are understood rather by way of similitude then of respect or relation sec. 7. Mans knowledge how finite and infinite God onely absolutely infinite How he is knowne by us here and hereafter How infinity can be knowne sec. 8. Things lose not their being by reason of quantity but by the privation of the forme sec. 9. Mathematicians consider not the natures of things but bare accidents abstracted from sensible matter sec. 10. All life consisteth not in motion Life is not an action but the act How motions come from without how not sec. 11. How the soule is perfect In her no privative but negative imperfections There are accidents in the soule sec. 12. Place is not a body it is neither forme nor matter Whatsoever hath existence hath ubiety even Angels and soules How soules are in their bodies They are not no-where nor are they every-where sec. 13. How time is the measure of motion Time and motion different things When the heavenly motions shall cease there will be time how understood Things below would move though the heavens stood still sec. 14. What things are in time chiefly and primarily How spirits are not in time and how in time Tempus aevum eternitie God onely exempted from time Discrete time sec. 15. The soule is no accident She knoweth not all things There is no exteriour and interiour soule Phantasmes are not bodies All soules have not the same amplitude of knowledge Life is not motion Neither the soule nor the life becomes to be a spirit sec. 16. Both Angels and soules stand in need of externall and internall helps of knowledge Memory remaines in separated soules How the species depend from the phantasie Divers habits left in the soule separated The soules in their understanding differ from the Angels What things they know not God is not understood by species sec. 17. The phantasie worketh not upon the soule but the active intellect upon the passive How the phantasie helps the understanding The phantasie workes in sleep How the soule worketh upon her selfe by meanes of her divers faculties sec. 18. In Angels and departed soules there are actions and perfective passions The want of action argues death rather then life Some actions cease after death not all All actions not corruptive Sir Kenelm contradicts himselfe sec. 19. The soule the subject of memory recordation reminiscence and of oblivion too What habits are left actually and potentially in the soule 'T is a happinesse to be forgetfull of some things sec. 20. Rhetoricall flourishes uselesse and hurtfull in Philosophicall disputes sec. 21. Perfection of knowledge makes not the substance of the soule more perfect The soule ceaseth not to be a soule though shee brings knowledge with her False judgements and erroneous opinions are a part of the punishment of damned soules in hell sec. 22. All effects doe not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient Opus and Operatio The act of entity and of causality are to be distinguished The effect which is the property of the cause followeth immediately God an eternall entity not an eternall cause sec. 23. That the soule is not a materiall but a spirituall substance infused not traduced proved by twenty arguments Of the operations knowledge and liberty of the soule in willing Of her excellency above the senses and corporeall substances this is proved by Scripture In what sense the soule is called corporeall by some Fathers She is no part of the divine essence as some hereticks thought sec. 24. The specificall perfection or excellency of soules is alike in all There may be some difference in accidentall perfections in respect of the organs and phantasie sec. 25. The neerer the Intelligences are to God the more they know The superiour have a greater similitude with God then the inferiour and stand in need of fewer intelligible species All behold Gods essence but not in the same measure Neither is their knowledge equall nor infinitely unequall sec. 26. The soule is not made complete in or by the body but rather incomplete because she is then a part of the whole sec. 27. Nature reason and knowledge are but blind guides to heaven without Christ proved by Scripture and reason What we are by nature How Christ may be called nature reason and knowledge sec. 28. The CONTENTS of the Conclusion containing 17. Sections THe immortality of the soule proved by Scripture sec. 1. The same proved by six reasons grounded on the Scripture sec. 2. That the soule is immortall of her owne nature proved by foure reasons and how this phrase is to be understood sec. 3. The soules immortality proved by thirteen naturall and morall reasons The Gentiles by natures light were not ignorant of this truth
owne bodies doe though wee were never so close shut up in a roome When the aire is inclined to raine bodies grow heavie and in a close room we see the water in weather-glasses ascend and descend as the aire changeth abroad although the water in the glasse hath no commerce with the aire abroad and so wee feele aches upon change of weather in our bodies and heavinesse of our heads after sun-set by reason of the heavinesse or gloomy heat of the aire caused not by your atomes but by vapors mists or fumes in the aire which we are continually sucking in by the lungs by which the two principall parts of our bodies are affected to wit the head and the heart and by them the rest of the bodie And as for spirits or atomes of snow and Pag. 87. salt-peter which you say passe thorow a glasse-vessell I know no such thing 'T is true that the outside of a glasse or pot being made wet will freeze to the boord though neere the fire if you put snow and salt-peter in the pot because the cold snow by antiperistasis becometh much colder in having the hot salt joyned with it and so shunning its enemy the salt fortifies it selfe which causeth the wet bottome to freeze So in great frosts the fire is most hot and scalding wells and deep cellars in summer are most cold without any penetration of atomes at all which were heretofore bodies and parts of light now by you are called spirits And as there is no concourse of atomes to presse downe the falling bullet in the aire neither is there of water to presse down the stone Pag. 88. falling in it as you say because both the aire and the water meet onely to fill up the place which the bullet and stone had that there may be no vacuity for lighter bodies presse not downward the heavier but support the lighter But it troubles mee to waste so much time and paper in refelling your Paradoxes of atomes which are as void of soliditie as the atomes themselves Hence wee see how easie it is to deviate from the truth and to lose our selves in the winding labyrinths and intricate Meanders of errour when we fall off from these knowne and generally received principles which have had the approbation of wise men for so many generations Is it not a shorter way and more consonant to reason to say that cork sinks not and iron doth because the one is porous and full of aire the other dense and more earthy because the one and the other are moved diversly according to their divers formes and the properties from them to wit gravity and levity then to devise phantomes of atomes which involve within them so many absurdities The elements doe weigh in their owne spheres for a ballone Sect. 29. Pag. 95 c. 11. stuffed hard with aire is heavier then an empty one Secondly more water would not be heavier then lesse Thirdly if a hole were digged in the bottome of the sea the water would not run into it I answer a stuffed ballone is heavier because the aire which is in it is separated from its own sphere in which it doth not weigh according to our principles Secondly more water is not in its owne sphere actually heavier then lesse for a man in the bottome of the sea feels no more weight then if hee were but halfe a yard from the superficies but potentially it is gravida est sed non gravitat Thirdly the sea would run downe and fill up the hole because it moves naturally as it is heavie towards the centre which weight appeares not actually in its sphere till it remove towards the centre Nature in her actions is not to be seen in all places and at all times There is life in seeds and fruit in trees though not alwaies actually seen So there is gravitie in water though not alwaies felt as you seeme afterward to confesse when you say that water in a Pag. 97. cap. 11. pale because it is thereby hindred from spreading abroad hath the effect of gravity predominating in it So one part of water in its own sphere doth not divide the other Shall we then say there is no power in water to divide water Yes there is for water powred out of an 〈◊〉 into a bason wherein is water will divide the water in the bason Your reason to prove that there is no inclination in Sect. 30. Pag. 98. cap. 11. heavie bodies to tend to the centre because the centre is as often changed as any dust lighteth unequally upon any one side of it is a weak one for let the centre change never so often every houre if you will yet a centre there must be still and to that centre in what place of the earth soever it be the heavie bodie hath its inclination And no lesse weaknesse is it to confound vis impressa or a violent motion with the naturall motion of gravitie as you do for gravitie is neither the mediate nor immediate cause of a violent but of a naturall motion Neither Pag. 99. is it impossible for any cause as you say to produce an effect greater then it selfe for the flame may produce a greater heat in iron then is in it selfe May not a little man beget a tall man Oftentimes the effect exceedeth the cause both in quantity and vertue A blind man begets a son with eyes the heat of an Egyptian oven hatcheth chickens and the Suns heat begets many sensitive creatures of putrefied matter Neither must you inferre That Pag. 99. gravity is no naturall quality of earthy bodies because a bullet can ascend out of the bottome of the barrell of a gun being suck't up by ones breath for this infers the bullet to be naturally heavie in that it doth not naturally ascend but is forced by the violent motion of traction which traction were needlesse if the bullet were not naturally heavie Neither doth this motion shew That gravity is an intellective entity as you say for though the naturall properties of things have not understanding yet they have that appetite given to them by the God of nature to preserve their owne unitie and the unitie of the universe and to shun their owne destruction and this is no determining of the qualitie by it selfe which is the act of an intelligent creature to wit to determine it selfe but it is a power given by the God of nature to every thing to preserve it selfe and to shun its owne hurt So the stomack which hath no understanding receives and concocts wholsome food the meseraick veines suck the purest part thereof prepare and fit it for the second concoction and send away the excrementitious and superfluous parts to the guts and the same stomack vomits out that which is hurtfull to it and all this is nature not understanding What understanding will you give to a load-stone when it drawes iron or to those senslesse creatures which by their sympathies and antipathies
must be done by natural heat and a vegetative soule and what is this but to make salt a plant As for the weight of it which you say encreaseth I doubt of it but if it were so as you say yet that weight is not encreased by turning the aire into its substance but rather by the losse and evaporation of the aire by its long lying So paper-books grow much heavier by beating the aire out of the paper But whereas you say That the nature of the Load-stone proceeds from the Suns operation Pag. 200. c. 22. on the torrid Zone which operation is contrary to the Load-stone as being of a fiery nature and therefore the torrid lands are not so magneticall as the polar is a riddle for how can the nature of the Load-stone be contrary to that which begets it and how can the Sun beget magnetick vertue by that heat which by reason of its fiery nature hinders or destroyes it Sect. 43. Pag 215. c. 23. You say 'T is as impossible for diversity of worke in the seed to proceed at one time and in the same occasions from one agent as it is for multiplicity to proceed immediatly from unity I will not now tell with what arguments Physicians prove that the seed is the epitome of the whole body and extracted from every part thereof and containeth potentially all the parts of the body which the plastick or formative power of the seed educeth unto act by degrees but this I must tell you that naturall agents can at the same time produce diversity of works for doth not the Sun at the same time produce multitudes of divers effects according to the multitudes of bodies it works upon doth not the fire at the same time rarifie condense soften harden doth not the same liver at the same time by its heat produce blood choler melancholy and phlegme even so may the same formative power of the seed at the same time fabricate and distinguish all the parts of the body The marrow being very hot drieth the bones and yet with Sect. 44. Pag. 226. c. 24. its moisture humecteth How the same naturall agent can at the same time on the same object worke contrary effects I know not Can the fire at the same time both harden and soften the wax 2. The braine comparatively is colder then any other of the soft parts of the body and consequently the marrow which groweth from thence 3. If heat be the cause of the bones drinesse then the heart which is the hottest part of the body should have the hardest bone about it 4. What the bones are in sensitive creatures that the stones are in vegetables but the hottest fruits have not the hardest stones for the stone of a cold Peach is harder then the kernels or stones of the hot Grapes 5. If marrow were the cause of drinesse or hardnesse it would follow that where there is most marrow there should be the hardest and driest bones but Philosophers tell us that those creatures whose bones are most solid and drie have least marrow 6. That drinesse then and hardnesse of the bones proceeds not from the heat of the marrow which is held to be lesse hot then the braine but from the innate heat of the bones themselves wasting the aeriall and oylie substance thereof which heat is not fiery but temperate as the naturall heat should be yet it causeth this hardnesse and drinesse because the matter on which it works is grosse and terrestriall and because of the heats continuall working on the bones You will not have us too irreverently ingage the Almighties Sect. 45. Pag. 227. c. 25. immediate handy-worke in every particular effect of nature We offer no irreverence to the Almighty if we call him the Creator even of the meanest creatures being no lesse admirable in Creatione vermiculorum quà m Angelorum in the creation of wormes then of Angels saies S. Austine and therefore Basil thinks it no irreverence Homil. 7. in Gen. to say That God in the beginning did not only create Fishes in the sea but Frogs also in the pooles nay Gnats and vermine Whose immediate handy-work were the Lice that were procreated of the Egyptian dust at the stretching out of Aarons and Moses his Rod Did not the Sorcerers acknowledge that the finger of God was there If it be no disparagement to the Almighty that the excrementitious haires of our head are the objects of his providence neither can it be any dishonour to him if we say the meanest creatures are the effects of his omnipotence The worke of generation you say is not effected by the Sect. 46. Pag. 231. c. 25. formative power except we meane by it the chaine of all the causes that concurre to produce this effect When wee speak of the proximate or immediate cause of things we exclude not the remote causes for Causa causae est causa causati He that saies that Isaac was begot of Abrahams seed denies not that Abrahams seed is begot of his blood and he that saies a man is a reasonable creature saies also that he is a sensitive vegetative corporeall substance but what ever the remote causes be the formative facultie in the spirits of the seed effects the work of generation which spirits are derived from all parts of the body otherwise how could they frame all the distinct parts and members in the seed but the grosse or materiall part of the seed is onely from the vessels You hold the heart to be first generated This is probable Sect. 47. Pag. 225. c. 24. but it may be doubted because whatsoever liveth must be nourished but nourishment is from the blood and blood from the liver therefore Galens opinion was that the liver is first generated which he also proveth by the umbelicall veine But indeed Hippocrates his opinion is most likely to be true that all the parts are formed at the same time by the spirits in the seed However it be this is certaine that fearfully and wonderfully are we made The touch converseth with none but with the most materiall Sect. 48. Pag. 244. c. 27. and massie bodies What think you of the aire the winde the flame are these masfie bodies and yet they are the objects of our touch the instrument of which is not only in the hands and fingers but diffused also through all the skin and if the flame touch your skin you shall as soone feele it though it be no massie body as you shall a stone But whereas you call heat and cold wet and drinesse affections of quantity you confound entities and the predicaments as you use to doe If by affections you meane properties then heat and cold are not the properties of quantities but of elementary bodies which are substances If by affections you meane effects much lesse can these be the affections of quantity for quantity is not operative Neither are rarity and density out of the degrees of which you will
nothing else but the power Sect. 51. Pag. 262. which a body hath of reflecting light into the eye Then immediately you say Light is nothing else but the superficies of it and shortly after Colours are not qualities but tractable bodies With the same breath you contradict your selfe for you deny colour to be a qualitie and yet you will have it a power in the bodie to reflect light Are not naturall powers or faculties qualities Is not the power that water hath to coole a qualitie but in this you are also mistaken for colour is not such a qualitie as you make it to wit in the second species where only those powers are which can naturally produce their owne acts As in the eye there is a power to see a power I say which it can produce into act when occasion serves for the eye doth not alwaies actually see but colour is no such power for it cannot produce its owne act primarily as the former power did but in the second place For first it must affect the subject in which the colour is and secondly work upon the eye and so colour is in the third species of Qualitie Now if colour be a qualitie how can it be a superficies which is a quantitie The essence of colours is not in extension though they may be extended according to the extension of the subject in which they are Extension is the essence only of quantitie If colour then be not a quantitie but qualitie how can it be a tactable bodie Colours cannot subsist of themselves they admit degrees therefore cannot be substances You are angry with vulgar Philosophers who force you Sect. 52. Pag. 275. c. 22. to beleeve contradictions in that they say life consisteth in this that the same thing hath power to work upon it selfe Aristotle then and his learned Peripateticks are with you but vulgar Philosophers who teach us that those which move themselves by an internall principle have life in them and so because quick-silver seemes to move it selfe and fountaines or springs of water seeme also to move themselves hence the Latines call the one argentum vivum the other aquas vivas And because these created entities which wee call living actuate themselves either by perfecting themselves or by representing something within themselves by their knowledge or by enclining themselves to the things which they know by their appetite hence it is that we attribute life unto God in that hee actuates himselfe at least negatively so that hee is not actuated by any other and in that hee understands and wills himselfe and all things in himselfe But here is the difference between the life of the Creator and of the creature that our life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle sayes the abode or mansion of the vegetive soule in the bodie or naturall heat Or as Scaliger another of these vulgar Philosophers tells us unio animae cum corpore the union of the soule with the bodie And our life hath a dependance from a higher cause and our vitall actions depend from a causality as Understanding and Will from the essence of the soule but the life that is in God and his vitall actions are the same identically with his essence having no dependance or inhesion or connexion at all Tell us then where the contradiction lieth when wee say that the living creature can move it selfe Doth the Scripture teach contradictions when it tells us that Saul killed himselfe that Iudas hanged himselfe that we should accuse our selves condemne our selves convert our selves and many such like Neither doe we say that life consists in this that a thing can work upon it selfe as you would have it for wee make not the essence of life to consist in this wee only make this a propertie of life for the living creature to move it selfe Neither doe wee say that life is action but that life is the principle of action therefore we act because we live actiones sunt suppositorum Though the forme work upon the matter yet the suppositum or compound is the subject of action or motion The form worketh originally or as principium Quo the suppositum worketh subjectively denominatively or as principium Quod. The forme is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the suppositum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the act not the action but the efficient cause of five actions to wit of understanding sense motion nutrition and generation For if life were an action it should be the cause of these actions but actionis non datur actio Lastly life is in the soule originally in the bodie by participation and in the compound subjectively You challenge also Philosophers that they hold sensation Sect. 53. Pag. 275 ca. 32. to be a working of the active part of the same sense upon its passive part and yet will admit no parts in it but will have the same indivisible power work upon it selfe Philosophers distinguish between the organ the faculty and action of the sense The organ is a substance the faculty a qualitie which is properly called sense of which ariseth the action which is properly sensation The forme is the cause of sense God is the supreme cause of the forme and consequently of sense too for dans formam dat consequentia ad formam and sense is the cause of sensation And so they hold that there is in the sense an action and a passion but in a different respect for the passion is in respect of the object the species of which is received by the sense but reception is passion yet in the sense there is an action too but that 's in respect of the soule working by the sense its instrument which it animates and by it judgeth of those objects which are convenient or inconvenient not only for the bodie but for the soul too For the two noblest of the senses were made principally for the soule that by them she might gaine knowledge and in the second place for the bodie Now out of all that 's said tell us where this indivisible power workes upon it selfe or who holds any such thing The power of the soule in actuating the sense the power of the sense in receiving the species is not the same power no more then the power of the soule in moving the hand and the power of the hand in receiving a blow the one being an active the other a passive power the one being from the soule the other from the disposition of the matter whose propertie is to suffer as the formes is to act Therefore wee hold not active and passive parts in the sense but that the whole sense is passive in respect of the object the whole sense is active in respect of the soul working in it So the whole water is passive in regard of the fire which hears it and it 's wholly active in respect of the hand which is warmed by
cannot be a notion for Metaphysick tels us that identity is reall And what will you say of that similitude which Adam had with God or which a regenerated man hath consisting in righteousnesse and true holinesse Is this image of God in man which by us was lost and now by grace is repaired a bare notion then will our happinesse and joy and hopes and religion consist rather in conceit then in reality Dii meliora piis erroremque hostibus illum Sect. 4. Cap. 1. p. 360. BEING or a thing the formall notion of both which is meerly being is the proper affection of man This anigma would trouble Oedipus or Sphynx himselfe for in your margin by this word being you understand existence But is this the proper affection of man what becomes of other creatures have they no existence If they have then it is not proper to man quarto modo If they have not then they are but entities in possibility for existence is the actuating and restraining of the essence which in it selfe is indeterminate and in possibility to actuality which we call existence therefore existence is not the proper affection of man but of entity as it is in act or rather the formality of actuall entity Besides if existence be the proper affection of man what shall we say of Angels and other spirits nay of God himselfe Is there no existence in them Againe existence is not an affection or propertie for it is no accident but the very essence of the thing actuated which before was in possibility and therefore by Philosophers 't is called actus primus to distinguish it from properties and operations which are called second acts for a thing is first actuated by its existence and then by its properties and operations But what you meane by the formall notion of both Pag. 361. which and of their meerly being I know not Sibylla's leaves are not more obscure to which you may adde your stock of being and the grafts inoculated into it for Pag. 361. with such mists of metaphors you involve your Philosophy against the rules and custome of Philosophers and so you leave your Readers as Sibylla left hers unsatisfied thus Inconsulti abeunt sedemque odere Sibyllae I wish M r. White had helped you here whose aid hath not beene wanting to you at a dead lift hitherto I should trifle away too much time and paper if I should insist or name all your fancies of the tribes as you call them of predicaments whose office you will have to comprehend all the particular notions that man hath and how you will have all entities to be respective and all notions to be grafted on the stock of being c. Abundance of such stuffe with which your booke is fraughted I passe over as being not worth the expence of time and indeed they refute themselves As likewise that you make essence and existence the same whereas they are one and the same in God onely but not in the creatures in whom the essence and existence differ for whilst a thing is in its causes it hath an essence but no existence till it be produced by its causes and as it were quit of them All the knowledge we have of our soule is no more but that Pag 368. c. 2. it is an active force in us I hope you know more of the soule then this to wit that it is an immortall immateriall substance infused by God into the body created of nothing consisting of the intellect and will capable of beatitude You know also I hope that the soule had no being till it was infused into the body and that it is not in a place as bodies are by way of circumscription and that it is all in all and all in every part of the body and that after death it immediatly goeth to hell or heaven not lingring about the grave or sleeping in the dust till the resurrection But it seemes you have not very great knowledge of the soule when you say that a thing apprehended by the soule becomes a part or affection of the soule for neither hath the soule any parts nor can that be an affection of the soule which comes from without In your 5. Chapter you make 1. Being to have a very Sect. 6. Pag. 395. c. 5. neere affinity with the soule 2. To be the end of the soule 3. To be the soules patterne and Idea For the first there is small affinity betweene the soule which is a substance and Being which is neither substance nor accident but a transcendent Being or existence is the generall affection of entity so is not the soule the body hath existence before the soule is infused and when the soule is gone it hath existence still the body hath no more existence from the soule then the soule from the body 2. If being be the end of the soule then it moved God to create it for the end moveth at least metaphorically but sure nothing moved God except his owne goodnesse and glory and how can that existence which God gave to the soule in the creation be the end of its creation Is creation the end of creation and the giving of being the end why being is given what can be more absurd And wereas being is internall and essentiall to the soule how can it be the end which is an externall cause 3. Being is not the patterne or Idea of the soule for Being is intrinsecall to the soule so is not the patterne or Idea but extrinsecall As the Idea or patterne of a building is in the mind of the builder but not in the house which is built and if being is the end of the soule how can it be the Idea for the end excites the action of the agent but the Idea determinates that action and these are very different You will not have the understanding to be the objects it Sect. 7. Pag. 404. c. 6. understands by way of similitude but by way of respects Understanding is by way of similitude not of respect for your son who hath a neere respect or relation to you doth not the more for that understand this your Booke I beleeve he understands books written by strangers to whom he hath no respect better then these your intricate mysteries There are relations and respects between inanimate or senslesse creatures and yet no understanding it is not therefore the respect but the reception of the species into the intellect and its assimilation or similitude with the intellect that makes understanding Besides there are some respects grounded upon similitudes then I hope there are some things understood by way of similitudes I may truly say all things for nothing is understood but what is in the understanding and nothing can be there but by way of similitude every thing is intelligible actually if its similitude be in the intellect actually The amplitude of the soule in respect of knowledge is absolutely Sect. 8. Pag. 405. c. 6.
the mind are not one with those of the body and so in the ninth and tenth Chapters of his Ethicks we may see how he affirmes the immortality of the soule by her desire of beatitude And whereas some think that he held the soule mortall because he saith she depends on the phantasie in her operation they are mistaken for he speaks of the soule as she is united to the body and so she depends on the Phantasie but yet onely objectively instrumentally and occasionally as the Philosophers speake and not efficiently or formally for it is true that the Intellect receives its species from the phantasie and therefore in the body depends antecedently from the phantasie otherwise the Intellect is meerly inorganicall and no waies depending on the phantasie as a proper mover and of it self but onely the passive Intellect thus depends on the active and the act of understanding is altogether independent And so when he sayes that the passive Intellect is corruptible he meanes nothing else but the phantasie or cogitative faculty which because it is in some sort capable of reason he cals the Intellect as he cals the passive Intellect sometimes by the name of phantasie because it is moved by the superiour Intellect And so when he sayes that remembrance and love perish in the soule he meanes that their dependence the one from the phantasie the other from the appetite perisheth because these are corporeall faculties and perish with the body but otherwise recordation and love in respect of their entity remaine in the soule as in their subject So likewise when he saith that the Intellect is in the possibility of the matter he meanes that it is in the possibility of the matter in respect of introduction not of eduction as the matter is capable to receive it when by a superiour power it is thither induced The soule then is in the possibility of the matter by way of reception but not by way of extraction So likewise when he sayes that the dead are not happy he meanes the happinesse of this life which consisteth in operations flowing from the compositum of which the soule is not capable And lastly when he sayes that all have ending which had beginning he meanes of those things which had beginning by generation and so it is true but the soules originall is by creation Out of all then that wee have said it is apparent to any man who is not a wilfull Saducee or Arabian that the soule is every way incorruptible both in respect of grace and in respect of nature both in respect of externall and internall agents both in respect of annihilation and dissolution There is onely an obedientiall power of dissolution in the soule as there is in Angels and in the heavenly bodies by the infinite power of the Almighty and that rather by the negative act of his influx then any positive act of resolving that into nothing which he made of nothing so that the soule hath no parts principles or causes in her selfe of corruption nor of annihilation Such reasons and arguments I take to be more evincing then these far-fetched notions of Sir Kenelm's which he hath clothed with too many words whereas Philosophicall arguments sort not well with Rhetoricall flourishes and Tullian pigments Now let us see what hath of old been or can of late be objected against this knowne and generally acknowledged truth by the impugners thereof Sect 6. Object 1. First they say that the soule is immortall by grace not by nature To which I answer that shee is immortall by both by grace in that the soule hath her dependence from God the first and sole independent entitie of whom and by whom she is what she is and so by that entitie as I said shee may be deprived of that being which of his bounty she obtained for though she be free from subject and termination yet she is not free from the causality of the first agent Shee is also immortall by nature in that there is nothing either in her owne or in the universall created nature that can destroy or dissolve her Our bodies are destroyed either by externall agents or by internall the naturall heat wasting our radicall moisture as a candle that is either wasted by the wind or by its owne heat but in the soule which is a spirit there is no such thing Secondly they alledge Solomons words for them Eccles Sect. 7. Object 2. 3. 19. where hee saith There is one end of man and beasts as man dieth so doe they Answ. Here is no comparison between mans soule and that of beasts but between the death of the one and of the other so that both are lyable to death and corruption and to outward violence and inward distempers which procure death in both and both are so lyable to the law and dominion of death that from thence there is no redemption or returning by the course of nature So that it 's no more possible for man to avoid death or its dominion of himselfe then it is for a beast Secondly Solomon speakes not this in his owne person but in the person of the Atheist who will not forgo his earthly pleasures because hee beleeves not any heavenly or any life after this Thirdly they would make Iob plead for them when Sect. 8. Object 3. he sayes there is more hope of a tree cut downe then there is of man Iob 14. Answ. Iob speakes not there in his owne person but in the person of a wicked man Secondly though hee did speak this as from himselfe yet this will not availe our moderne Saducees for by the course of nature man cannot revive againe though the tree may sprout again after it is cut which the Poet intimates when he sayes Pomifer autumnus fruges effuderit mox Horat. lib. 4. od 7. Bruma recurret iners Damna tamen celeres reparant coelestia Lunae Nos ubi decidimus Quò pius Aenaeas quò Tullus dives Ancus Pulvis umbra sumus Thirdly man shall not returne againe to live that life or to performe those functions which he did in this world when he lived here but hence it will not follow that man shall not be raised by that power which gave him being at the first or that he shall enjoy no life because he shall not enjoy this life Fourthly they would faine draw in Austin to their Sect. 9. Object 4. side because sometimes he doubts of the manner of the soules production whether it is by creation or traduction Answ. 'T is true that sometimes hee doubted of the manner how the soule entered into the bodie because he doubted of the manner how originall sin is propagated but will this prove that therefore hee doubted of the soules immortalitie which hee strongly maintaines throughout all his Workes And so hee doth also the soules creation and infusion although in a few places he speaks doubtfully of traduction so farre as it hath relation