terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
say rationalitie is the formall cause of man Now 1. Rationalitie is the intrinsecall part of man all other of his parts are more overt and better knowne 2. Rationalitie hath a force to bestow a being vpon man for when God had drawne together the dust of the earth man had not as then his being but he receiued that when God breathed the breath of life into it at that time I say and not before man became a liuing soule 3. Rationalitie bestowes vpon man a being that is actuall and determined vnto one and actiue whereby he is fit to doe the actions of life 4. There is nothing essentiall vnto man but his rationalitie bestowes it on him The body indeed doth make him a singular man by retaining and contracting the soule vnto one but in what respect he is a man that he receiues wholy from his soule and from hence the forme is truely sayd to be the beginning of difference that is hetweene one and another and not the difference it selfe Thom. 1. dist 25. q. 1. art 1. ad 2m. I say the difference of things doth flow from the forme for as vnitie in substance doth make two things to be the same as Okam doth truely teach 1. dist 19. q. 1. lit B. opinio 1a. and Aristotle meta lib. 5. cap. 15. text 20. so difference in substance makes two things to differ The forme is not the difference it selfe for a forme is a subsistence in an vnitie but a difference is a dissenting betweene the essence of two and thus much for the explication of the formall Cause CHAP. X. Of the finall Cause The end is a cause for which the thing is Ramus End By end is meant the last notion which wee haue of the effect and importeth that whereunto the thing tendeth So Aristotle telleth vs meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 9. An end is Externall Internall In The intent of the doer The thing it selfe naturally Imposed An externall end is the actuall vse of the thing to which the effect is fitted Thus the beatificall vision is mans end to which he tends An end in the intent of the doer is no more but either the fitnes it selfe of the effect thought vpon and purposed by the efficient this is the condition of every workman that deviseth and resolueth vpon the fashion and forme of the thing to be wrought Or the commoditie of the workman and others sought thereby Wee haue example of an end thus vnderstood in those words of Iohn 3.16 God so loued the world c. Where the giving of Christ is an effect wrought by God wherein he intended the glory of himselfe and his sonne and the salvation of the predestinate Thus the workman that makes an axe intends that himselfe shall get reputation and maintenance thereby An end of a thing imposed vpon it is when the efficient inioyned that vse of it which the thing it selfe doth not yeeld and this end we finde in lawes and mony the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience the other to set a price of wares I say appointed by him that hath power to doe it the things themselues doe not yeeld it as all men doe know by experience But the word end in this place doth not signifie either of these foure things The end as it is in the intent and will of the doer is a cause indeed metaphorically not properly and must be reduced vnto the efficient not the finall for in that sort it doth but moue and induâ—â—â—ice principall efficient vnto working and consequently it is an efficient that workes morally That and vnto which the effect tendeth naturally is here vnderstood and defined I haue receiued all these things from Thomas 2. dist q. 1. art 1 2. 3. 1. p. q. 26. art 3. ad 2m. Suarez de praedest lib. 2. cap. 3. no 2. vega in Concil Trident lib. 7. cap. 2. A cause Therfore the end hath an actiue and an exercised act in the producing of the effect for that is the propertie of every cause as hath beene shewed For which a thing is These words set out the nature of that force and they signifie a tendency aptitude and fitnes which the effect hath naturally vnto something without it selfe It is of the nature of a finall cause sayth Okam actually to intend and whatsoeuer doth not so is not truly and properly a finall cause in Prologo 1. sent q. 11. lit F.G. In the same sort writes Aristotle meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 8. An end sayth he is that for which a thing is made that is whose essence is not so for another that it followes that other but the essence of another followes that If any inquire how tendency c. can haue an actuall exercise vnto doing First I answer it can because that tendency flowes from the forme in as much as the forme doth determine the effect vnto an end according to its owne proportion as the forme of steele is such as best fitteth with cutting Thomas 1a. 2 e. q. 95 art 3. in cor Secondly the end importeth some good so saith Thomas 1. p. q 19. art 1 ad 1 and all men grant it therfore it hath an exercised force to constitute but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good no more this doth both constitute and diffuse good It doth constitute in as much as it is the perfection of the effect I say the perfection of it because when the effect hath attained thi her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind It is diffusiuely good in as much as it is fit and apt to bestow good vpon others Wee haue many examples that shew vs the nature of this argument Fitnes to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sunne and Moone Genesis 1.14 As a thing that followed their nature by creation thus also fitnes to accompany and help Adam is affirmed of Evah Genesis 2.18.21 as the end of her creation Man is apt and fit to loue the knowne good and that is his end this fitnes floweth from his reasonable soule or formall being whose propertie it is to judge truly and choose freely Now this fitnes hath a maine stroake in the constituting of man not by the way of motion for that belongs to the efficient nor by the way of reception and retention for that belongs to the matter but by the way of setled position as the forme doth from whence it floweth 2. By this fitnes a man is made a perfit and compleat humane creature for when he attaines vnto that he wants nothing requisite vnto his being Vntill he be so fitted we cannot conceiue him a humane creature for he would differ nothing from bruit beasts The vse of this argument is of exceeding worth to informe our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect for by it we know the formall cause and consequently the nature of the thing To conclude the doctrine of all the causes ioyntly
Creature seeth eateth sleepeth avoydeth knowne danger The plants grow vpright bring forth leaues and fruit in due season So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature when man moues himselfe vnto doing by the direction of true reason and the vnrestrained and free choyse of the will Naturall things doe worke by accident when the instinct of nature is suppressed or diverted The intellectuall creature workes by accident when the iudgement of reason is erronious and the choyse of the will carried by a previall over-ruling power and all these doe fall out in case where nature meets with defection The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption and violence of temptation Lastly the secret providence of God which the Heathen called fortune makes the creature work by accident in all Cases when he workes against meanes as he did when he brought the people through the red Sea Exodus the 14. and as he doth in all miracles or when man intendeth one thing but another thing comes to passe of this we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis and 5. vers 37. 27. verse In this place they are sayd to sell Ioseph because they would be rid of him and in that Ioseph sayth God sent him into Aegypt to preserue their liues They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving when they sold Ioseph but yet by accident through Gods secret providence that wrought contrary to their intent The Iewes likewise were the Cause of Christs glory and mans salvation when they delivered him to death but yet by accident because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse and made their evill intention serue vnto that good There be many examples wherein wee finde that the efficient cause doth worke on this manner but these are enough for this present The efficient doth worke Physically Morrally This distinction is received in all the Logick schooles and is of frequent vse in the question touching sanctification and the actuall motion of grace in mans conversion the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many other places A Physicall operation is a reall influence into the effect we haue an example of this in mans creation He formed him and that of the dust and poured life into him all these be reall influences of this kinde are the builders of the Tower of Babell they made bricke and reard a building with bricke and stone Of this sort be all workemen that labour with their hands and tooles the strength of nature doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke A morall worke is a motion offered to the vnderstanding and serues to allure and draw it on with reasons and perswasion Of this kinde bee be all such things as be obiected to the vnderstanding as namely the testimonie of God and man by commanding forbidding promising threatning perswading therefore so often as wee finde any of these attributed to God or man wee are to know that then they are efficient causes that worke morally Ramus doth call Testimonies Exhortations Commandements c. inartificiall arguments because they argue not of their owne force but by the authoritie of him that doth testifie but this is altogether vnfitly spoken for inartificiall and argument implyes a contradiction if inartificiall then no argument if an argument then artificiall for an argument is a member of Art 2. These things themselues are no arguments vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator but then they argue as properties or adjuncts and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject In this place affirmation perswasion c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth perswadeth c. which makes it very plaine that they belong to this place or seat of arguments God and his servants are the morall causes of mans holines when they command good and forbid ill when they promise good and threaten ill when they perswade vnto obedience and disswade from sinne thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things when by his obedience he deserved that God should bestow them vpon vs he by meriting I say is the morall cause of Gods gifts because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them and so much shall suffice for this distinction A Physicall efficient is Principall first second Instrumentall This distinction is very ancient in the schooles and of great vse when we desire to know how mans will is wrought vpon and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace Alvarez received it from Thomas and makes vse of it disp 68. no. 5. c. where hee doth thus describe each member of it A principall efficient is that which worketh out of its owne power or forme as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 18. art 3. in cor A first principall efficient is that which worketh onely out of its owne power Thus God only worketh of whom it is sayd hee sitteth in Heaven and doth what he will He is the vniversall cause for in him we liue and mone and haue our being A second principall efficient is that which is so moved by another that it moveth it selfe by a power of its owne Of this sort is mans mind which is moved by God yet neverth lesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning remaining in it selfe Of this sort be all those sayings in the Scripture which attribute mans good workes as his conversion and the like sometimes vnto God alone and other sometimes vnto man alone An instrument properly taken and so we speake of it here is that which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient of this kinde are all instruments without life as namely the tooles of a Carpenter or Smith c Thus hot water heateth another thing that is cold by the heate received from the fire To conclude the point touching the efficient cause wee are to know that the efficient Ramus alwayes worketh after one of these waies whether it works alone or with others whether it begins the worke or preserues it being alreadie made CHAP. VIII The matter Ramus is a Cause of which a thing is Matter This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance but it is not so taken in this place for as Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor The matter as it is a matter remaineth onely in power or capacitie to receiue many formes and therefore according to it selfe hath no being nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding 1. p. q. 15. art 3. ad 3m. In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that A cause These words doe attribute an actiue power and actuall efficacy vnto the matter wherby the effect is produced Of which These words shew the nature of that efficacy and
the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme that it resteth and remaineth in it This we see in an house wherin the timber stone c. are framed and fashioned together and made fit for habitation so doth a peece of timber receiue the picture made vpon it by a carver A thing is By thing is meant the effect produced by Is is meant essentially so as the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree or notion Wee conceiue the timber c. Of a house to be a part of it but we know that there is an other part therof more principall before that namely the forme fashion thereof A thing signifies an individuall effect so as the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto asingular or individuall being thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it The matter is the principium of individuation saith Thomas 1. p. q. 86. art 3. in cor And againe the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter 1. p. q. 7. art 3. in cor We haue an instance of this in every singular creature Peter is a singular man by his body every plant is singular by the stem that groweth vp for they inioy all other things in common with therest of their kinds The soule of Peter hath the same rationalitie with all other mens soules no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie Sanctitie makes men christians Peters sanctitie makes Peter a christian because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed vnto our cleere vnderstanding and it is of singular vse to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings Yea of absolute necessitie for that I may vse the words and reason of Aristotle Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text 11 It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls It is impossible to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit division for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings We haue a pregnant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 c. Where the Apostle doth describe and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies and saith some be celestiall as the Sunne Moone and stars Other some be terrestriall and those be spirituall as mans body that is raysed other some be naturall viz the flesh of men beasts and birds and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings doe inioy Likewise the holy Ghost Reuel 21 18. c. Makes vs know what the new Ierusalem is by the matter thereof The examples of this kinde are very frequent and well knowne to every man therefore I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause CHAP. IX Of the formall Cause A forme is a Cause Ramus by which a thing is that which it is Forme As I sayd of the matter so must I say of the forme If it be considered in it selfe abstracted from all matter and individualitie it is a certaine thing common vnto many so Thomas truly sayth 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor 2. Vnder the name forme sometimes is comprehended a figure which consisteth in the termination of a quantitie This also I haue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. ad 2m. But wee take not this word at this time in either of these sences By forme then wee here vnderstand the intrinsicall part of the compounded effect so sayth Suarez meta disp 10. sect 1. no. 7. that is Received of the matter informing the same Thus saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. in cor A forme saith Thomas is Generall A forme saith Thomas is Speciall A speciall forme is that which informs the subiect but it selfe is not informed by any other forme of the same nature as one colour is not informed by another colour 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 1m. Forme in this place is taken in the second sence not in the first Wee haue an example of this in the rationalitie of man and vigiditie of plants both of them are formes and distinct beings not receiving any thing from other formes of their kinde Is a Cause That is it hath actuall exercised force to inferre the effect By which These words doe shew that the force of the forme is not receptiue nor retentiue nor restrictiue as the force of the matter is but it is actiue for as Aristotle saith Meta. lib. 9. cap. 6. text 17. The forme is an act that is an actuall determinate and actiue being the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius col 467. A thing is By these words the essence of every individuall effect is attributed to the formall cause every thing that doth actually exist saith Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 2. in cor hath some forme and againe every being is caused by the forme thereof 1. p. q. 51. art 4. in cor That which These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages Each thing is that which it is by its forme thus Thomas thinketh 1. p. q 5. art 5. ad 3m. in cor The whole compound is the effect of the forme in the iudgement of Okam 1. dist 32. q. 1. 2. lit C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing for the matter doth finite and contract the amplitude of the forme and thereby it becomes the determinate forme of this or that individuall effect The forme on the other side doth perfit and determine the matter and bring it from power to act by giuing an essence thereunto in so much that by the forme the essence is termined vnto some speciall kinde And thus much wee receiue from Thomas 1. p. q. 7. art 1. et 3 in cor q. 14. art 2. ad 1m. This argument is of necessary vse to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect to which it is attributed for how can we know a thing more cleerely and certainely then when wee finde the intrinsicall primary and proper nature and being thereof It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing and to know the cause of its nature Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause in the word of God and the nature of the Creature when God would shew vs what sinne is he doth set it out by the forme thereof Sinne sayth the Apostle Iohn 1. Epist chap. 3. v. 4. Is a varying from the Law The Apostle Paul when he would set out what the righteousnesse of faith is he doth describe it in his Epistle to the Romans ch 4. v. 6.7.8 by forgiuenesse of sinnes The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples but these shall suffice In man we haue a full representation of every part of this Argument Wee
we must not forget that from this place or seat of arguments is deriued knowledge simply so called We are then thought to know a thing when we vnderstand the causes therof thus saith Ramus And to the same effect speaks Aristotle knowledge simply so called saith he poster lib. 1. cap. 4. is necessary that is when the thing cannot be otherwise then as we know it and we haue that knowledge when we vnderstand the causes so saith the same Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. Thomas also hath the same thing knowledge saith he opusc de demonst cap. 1. is to vnderstand of certainty and we doe so when we vnderstand the causes of the thing and that both as it is a cause and also as it is a cause in act of that thing and he giues a reason hereof Opusc 48. de Syllog cap. 1. viz. Then our reason doth resolue the thing caused into its causes from whence knowledge doth flow And thus much for the finall cause and all those arguments which are predicated of the essence of the subiect and which consequently doe absolutely agree therewith CHAP. XI Of Properties VVE must now prosecute those arguments which import things without the subiect and consequently consent with it after some sort of this kinde be all adiuncts as some doe call them An adiunct is that to which something is subiected Ramus and whatsoever doth externally belong or happen to any subiect An adiunct is Proper Common A proper adiunct is that which belongs vnto all alone alwaies A common adiunct is that which is not proper in that sort Aristotle dissents from Ramus in these precepts Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 77. art 1. ad 5m. Not every thing that is without the essence may be called an accident Aristotle hath not the termes of proper and common adjunct nor the thing compreheÌ„ded vnder them but the contrary he sayth Top. lb. 1. Cap. 5. An accident cannot be proper otherwise then by relation as when one sitâ—eth and others stand then sitting is proper to him Lastly Aristotle and others with him doe make a thing proper and an accident to differ formally as we shall presently finde Aristotle teacheth Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. that Arguments which are without the subiect be properties and accidents That is sayd to be proper that is reciprecall with the thing but yet doth not declare the essence nor come into the definition thereof And of these he sayth also Top. lib. 5. cap. 1. They are properties by themselues alwayes and doe separate and distinguish from all other things Porphyrie also doth distinguish and describe these arguments as Aristotle doth A propertie saith he cap. 4. is that which doth concurre vnto all onely and alwayes And againe cap. 9. A property is that which is in the whole kinde to which it is proper and onely and alwayes so as if that speciall kinde be taken away presently the propertie thereof is taken away also And Thomas doth so set out the nature of this argument that he giues a reason of all this alledged out of Aristotle and Porphyrie A thing proper sayth he 1 p q 77. art 1. ad 5m. is not of the essence but is caused by the essentiall principles of the species Aristotle and Porphyrie giues instance of properties in this sentence He that is apt â—nto laughing is a man He that is apt to learne Grammar is a man In this proposition aptnes vnto laughing and Grammar-learning is predicated of man This aptnes floweth from his reasonable soule and that is the principall thing in his nature I say it floweth therefrom not as a Contingent motion but as a naturall emanation therefore this aptnes agrees vnto all men onely and alwayes No man wants it none but man hath it and all men haue it alwaies and consequently it is proper vnto man and proper by it selfe and the nature thereof and not made proper by any outward efficient so as in necessary consecution it is convertible with man we may truly argue thus If man then apt vnto Grammar skill If apt vnto Grammar skill then man An accident sayth Aristotle Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. is neither definition Genus nor a propertie and is in the thing but so as that it may be and may not be in one and the same thing and Porphyrie recites the same in his fift Chapter Thomas also in the place last alledged doth so set out the nature of an accident that he giues also a reason of Aristotles Doctrine An accident sayth he is onely that which is without the subiect and not caused by the essentiall principles thereof Now this doctrine of Aristotle is certainely true therefore we ought to leaue Ramus and follow him I say it is certainly true that there be some things proper that be not accidents namely all naturall actions as the act of seeing is proper to all living creatures the act of discoursing to man The bearing of leaues and fruit to plants and the outward workes of holinesse vnto him that hath the habit of holinesse These are proper because they are necessary emanations from nature in the one and grace in the other so as when all requisite circumstances be present man cannot but see and worke the plants cannot but bring forth fruit and leaues wherefore the holy Ghost doth thus reason He that doth righteousnesse is righteous 1. Iohn 3.7 Where the holy Ghost doth necessarily ioyne righteous actions vnto a man that is habituated with righteousnesse as proper vnto him Properties be not adjuncts for adiuncts doe out wardly befall the subiect and so much the word importeth and Ramus expresly affirmeth Properties doe not outwardly befall the subiect but they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature Heat and light doe not outwardly befall the Sunne and fire neither doth swimming of timber in the water outwardly befall the same such is the condition of properties To this seat or place of arguments the other seven set downe by Aristotle must be referred viz. Quantitie Qualitie Relation Where When The place To inioy For all of them doe outwardly befall the subiect and are not caused by the principles of nature as a little labour will shew for Quantitie imports no more but Geometricall measure or Arithmeticall number Qualitie signifies the manner how a thing existeth or worketh Relation is no more but the reference or respect of one thing to another Where importeth the generall place wherein the subiect is as in this or that Country When expresseth the time and duration as this yeare this moneth c. The place signifies the particular place as this stoole this chayre c. To inioy signifies all indowments as Honour Riches Clothes c Some man perhaps will require me to set out the nature of quantitie and the rest and alledge Aristotles authoritie for it I answer that ought not to be done in this place for that belongs to other Arts as to Geometry Arithmeticke naturall and morall Philosophy This