by virtue of a certain Order then and there made by the said Court of Sessions as followeth Ordinatum est per Curiam hic quod Finis 40 Marcarum separatim ponatur super Edwardum Bushell and other Eleven persons particularly named and upon every of them being the Twelve Jurors then and there sworn and charg'd to try several Issues then and there joyn'd between our Lord the King and William Penn and William Meade for certain Trespasses Contempts unlawful Assemblies and Tumults made and perpetrated by the said Penn and Mead together with divers other unknown persons to the number of Three hundred unlawfully and tumultuously assembled in Grace-Church-street in London to the disturbance of the Peace whereof the said Penn and Mead were then Indicted before the said Justices Upon which Indictment the said Penn and Mead pleaded they were Not guilty For that they the said Jurors then and there the said William Penn and William Mead of the said Trespasses Contempts unlawful Assemblies and Tumults Contra legem hujus Regni Angliae contra plenam manifestam evidentiam contra directionem Curiae in materia legis hic de super praemissis eisdem Juratoribus versus praefatos Will. Penn Will. Mead in Curia hic aperte datam declaratam de praemissis iis impositis in Indictamento praedicto acquietaverunt in contemptum Domini Regis nunc legumque suarum ad magnum impedimentum obstructionem Justitiae necnon ad malum exemplum omnium aliorum Juratorum in consimili casu delinquentium Ac super inde modo ulterius ordinatum est per Curiam hic quod praefatus Ed. Bushell capiatur committatur Gaolae dicti Domini Regis de Newgate ibidem remansurus quousque solvat dicto Domino Regi 40 Marcas pro fine suo praedicto vel deliberatus fuerit per debitum legis Cursum Ac eodem Edwardo Bushell ad tunc ibidem capto commisso existente ad dictam Gaolam de Newgate sub custodia praefat Johannis Smith Jacobi Edwards adtunc Vic. Civitatis Lond. praedict in eorum Custodia in Gaola praedict existente remanente virtute ordinis praedict iidem Johannes Smith Jacobus Edwards postea in eorum exitu ab officio Vic. Civitatis Lond. praedict scilicet 28 die Septembris Anno 22. supra dicto eundem Edwardum Bushell in dicta Gaola dicti Domini Regis adtunc existentem deliberaverunt nobis praefatis nunc Vicecomitibus Civitatis praedict in eadem Gaola salvo custodiendum secundum Tenorem effectum ordinis praedictae Et quia praedictus Edwardus nondum solvit dicto Domino Regi praedictum finem 40 Marcarum nos iidem nunc Vicecomites Corpus ejusdem Edwardi in Gaola praedicta hucusque detinuimus haec est causa captionis detentionis praefati Edwardi cujus quidem Corpus coram praefatis Justitiariis paratum habemus The Writ of Habeas Corpus is now the most usual Remedy by which a man is restored again to his Liberty if he have been against Law deprived of it Therefore the Writ commands the Day and the cause of the Caption and Detaining of the Prisoner to be certified upon the Retorn which if not done the Court cannot possibly judge whether the cause of the Commitment and Detainer be according to Law or against it Therefore the cause of the Imprisonment ought by the Retorn to appear as specifically and certainly to the Iudges of the Retorn as it did appear to the Court or Person authorized to commit else the Retorn is insufficient and the consequence must be That either the Prisoner because the cause retorn'd of his Imprisonment is too general must be discharg'd when as if the cause had been more particularly retorn'd he ought to have been remanded or else he must be remanded when if the cause had been particularly retorn'd he ought to have been discharg'd Both which are Inconveniences not agreeing with the dignity of the Law There is a specious Exception to this Rule but doth not materially vary it as shall appear In the present Case it is retorn'd That the Prisoner being a Jury-man among others charg'd at the Sessions Court of the Old Baily to try the Issue between the King and Penn and Mead upon an Indictment for assembling unlawfully and tumultuously did contra plenam manifestam evidentiam openly given in Court acquit the Prisoners indicted in contempt of the King c. The Court hath no knowledge by this retorn whether the Evidence given were full and manifest or doubtful lame and dark or indeed Evidence at all material to the Issue because it is not retorn'd what Evidence in particular and as it was deliver'd was given For it is not possible to judge of that rightly which is not expos'd to a mans Iudgment But here the Evidence given to the Iury is not exposed at all to this Court but the Iudgment of the Court of Sessions upon that Evidence is only expos'd to us who tell us it was full and manifest But our Iudgment ought to be grounded upon our own inferences and understandings and not upon theirs It was said by a Learned Judge If the Jury might be fined for finding against manifest Evidence the retorn was good though it did not express what the Evidence particularly was whereby the Court might Judge of it because retorning all the Evidence would be too long A strange Reason For if the Law allow me remedy for wrong Imprisonment and that must be by judging whether the cause of it were good or not to say the cause is too long to be made known is to say the Law gives a remedy which it will not let me have or I must be wrongfully imprison'd still because it is too long to know that I ought to be freed What is necessary to an end the Law allows is never too long Non sunt longa quibus nihil est quod demere possis is as true as any Axiom in Euclid Besides one manifest Evidence retorn'd had suffic'd without retorning all the Evidence But the other Judges were not of his mind If the retorn had been That the Jurors were committed by an Order of the Court of Sessions because they did minus juste acquit the persons indicted Or because they did contra legem acquit the persons indicted Or because they did contra Sacramentum suum acquit them The Iudges cannot upon the present more judge of the legal cause of their commitment than they could if any of these causes as general as they are had been retorn'd for the cause of their commitment And the same Argument may be exactly made to justifie any of these retorns had they been made as to justifie the present retorn they being equally as legal equally as certain and equally as far from possessing the Court with the truth of the cause and in what condition should all men be for the just Liberty of their persons if such causes should
been breach'd is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum But an Opinion though Erroneous concluding to the Iudgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer Yet if a Court give Judgment judicially another Court is not bound to give like Judgment unless it think that Judgment first given was according to Law For any Court may err else Errors in Judgment would not be admitted nor a Reversal of them Therefore if a Judge conceives a Judgment given in another Court to be erroneous he being sworn to judge according to Law that is in his own conscience ought not to give the like Judgment for that were to wrong every man having a like cause because another was wrong'd before much less to follow extra-judicial Opinions unless he believes those Opinions are right The other Case is in Coke 5 Car. Salvin versus Clerk in Ejectment upon a special Verdict Alexander Sidenham Tenant in tayl to him and the Heirs males of his body the Reversion to John his eldest Brother made a Lease for three Lives warranted by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 28. with warranty And after 16 Eliz. levies a Fine with warranty and proclamations to Taylor and dies without Issue male leaving Issue Elizabeth his Daughter Mother to the Plaintiffs Lessor In 18 Eliz. the Lease for Lives expir'd In 30 Eliz. John the elder Brother died without Issue the said Elizabeth being his Neece and Heir The Defendant entred claiming by a Lease from Taylor and Points entred upon him as Heir to Elizabeth A question was mov'd upon a suppos'd Case and not in fact within the Case Whether if the Fine had not been with proclamation as it was and no Non-claim had been in the Case as there was this warranty should make a discontinuance in Fee and barr Elizabeth it not descending upon John after Alexanders death but upon Elizabeth who is now also John's Heir or determined by Alexander's death The Judges were of opinion as the Reporter saith That the warranty did barr Elizabeth and consequently her Heir because the Reversion was discontinued by the Estate for Lives and a new Fee thereby gain'd and the Reversion displac'd thereby and the warranty was annex'd to that new Fee But this Case is all false and mis-reported 1. For that it saith the Lease for Lives was a discontinuance of the Reversion thereby a new Fee gain'd to Tenant in tayl which he passed away by the Fine with warranty which could not be for in the Case it appears the Lease was warranted by the Stat. of 32 H. 8 and then it could make no discontinuance nor no new Fee of a Reversion could be gain'd 40 Eliz. Keen Copes C. 602. pl. 13. and then no Estate to which the warranty was annex'd and so was it resolv'd 40 El. Keen Copes Case 2. That Opinion was extra-judicial it being concerning a point not in the Case but suppos'd 3. That Case was resolv'd upon the point of Non-claim and not upon this of the warranty which was not a point in the Case 4. Some of the Judges therefore spoke not to that point as appears in the Case As to the second Question Admitting the warranty of Tenant in tayl doth bind the Donor and his Heirs yet in regard the Defendant Tenant in possession cannot derive the warranty to her self from the Feoffees as Assignee or otherwise Whether she may rebutt the Demandants or not by her possession only is the question and I conceive she may not as this Case is I shall begin with those Authorities that make and are most press'd against me which is the Authority of Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case in the third Report and from thence brought over to his Littleton f. 385. a. His words in Lincoln Colledge Case f. 63. a. are He which hath the possession of the Land shall rebutt the Demandant himself without shewing how he came to the possession of it for it sufficeth him to defend his possession and barr the Demandant and the Demandant cannot recover the Land against his own warranty And there he cites several Cases as making good this his Assertion In the same place he saith it is adjudg'd 38 E. 3. f. 26. That an Assignee shall rebutt by force of a warranty made to one and his Heirs only This Doctrine is transferred to his Littleton in these words If the warranty be made to a man and his heirs without this word Assignes yet the Assignee or any Tenant of the Land may rebutt And albeit no man shall vouch or have a Warrantia Chartae either as party Heir or Assignee but in privity of Estate yet any one that is in of another Estate be it by disseisin abatement intrusion usurpation or otherwise shall rebutt by force of the warranty as a thing annex'd to the Land which sometimes was doubted in our Books when as in the Cases aforesaid he that rebutteth claimeth under and not above the warranty I shall clearly agree no man shall vouch or have a warrantia Chartae who is not in in privity of Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the same Land to which the warranty was annexed And the reason is evident because the Tenant must recover if the Land be not defended to him by the warranter such Estate as was first warranted and no other unless a Fee be granted with warranty only for the life of the Grantee or Grantor in which Case the Grantee upon voucher recovers a Fee though the warranty were but for life I shall likewise agree the Law to be as Sir Edward Coke saith in both places if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession when he is impleaded may rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by dissism abatement intrusion or any other tortious way And for the reason given in Lincoln Colledge Case That it sufficeth that the Tenant defend his possession But if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession need not shew that the warranty ever extended to him or that he hath any right to it then I must deny his Doctrine in Lincoln Colledge Case or in Littleton which is but the former there repeated to be Law For as it is not reasonable a man should recover that Land which he hath once warranted to me from me what title soever I have in it at the time when he impleads me So on the other side it is against reason I should warrant Land to one who never had any right in my warranty And the same reason is if a man will be warranted by Rebutter he should make it appear how the warranty extends to him as if he will be warranted by Voucher for the difference is no other than that in the case of Voucher a stranger impleads him in
power lawfully not to abate it and us'd that last lawful power and not the first and wrong'd none in using it To this may be added That the Iudgment upon a simple Contract is the Act of the Court and compulsory to the Executor and he hath then no Election but must obey the Iudgment In conclusion though it were agreed That in the Action of Debt brought by Allington upon a simple Contract Iudgment ought not to have been given against the Defendant being Administrator but the Writ should have abated because the Administrator was not chargeable And though the Iudgment given were erroneous and for that cause reversible yet standing in force unrevers'd It is a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action But lest this should countenance Iudges abating the Writ ex officio in such Actions brought or Plaintiffs to bring Error upon Iudgments given in such Actions I conceive the Law is clear That Iudges ought not ex officio to abate such Writ nor otherwise than when the Executor or Administrator Defendant in such Action demurrs and demands Judgment of the Writ and that Iudgment given against such Defendants not demurring to the Writ is not Erroneous unless for other cause If it be urg'd further That though a Iudgment obtain'd upon a simple Contract be a barr to an Action of Debt brought after upon an Obligation or to an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay mony as the present Case is Yet it should not barr if the Action upon which it was obtain'd were commenc'd pending a former Action upon an Obligation or upon an Assumpsit for mony in which the Intestate could not have waged his Law The answer is as before such Iudgment barrs until revers'd if admitted to be reversible as it is not But the Law is setled That wheresoever an Action of Debt upon Bond or Contract is brought against a man he may lawfully confess the Action and give way to a Judgment if there be no fraud in the Case although he have perfect notice of such former Suit depending nor is there any restraint or limit of time for confessing an Action brought upon a simple Contract more than upon a Bond. And to satisfie any Debt upon Obligation 5 H. 7. f. 27. b. Moore Scarleâ— Case f. 678. Crook 38 El. f. 462. Green Wilcocks Case before a Iudgment so obtain'd is a Devastavit in the Executor or Administrator and so it is to satisfie any latter Judgment if there be not assets to satisfie the first also So are the express Books to those points of 5 H. 7. per Curiam and Scarles his Case in Moore and Green and Wilcock's Case in Crook Eliz. Yet in 25 Eliz. when an Action of Debt for 100 l. was brought against an Executor in C. B. and pending that Debt was brought against him in B. R. for 100 l. which latter he confess'd and the Iudgment there had pleaded in Barr to the first Action And upon Question if the Plea were good Fenner and Walmesley held it good but Anderson Mead Wyndham and Periam argued to the contrary and that he ought to have pleaded the first Action pending to the second Action brought The Arguments of both sides you may see in Moore f. 173. Moore 25 El. f. 173. where it is left a Quere the Iudges doubting the Case but since the Law is taken That the Iudgment is a good barr to the first Action It will be still objected That if the Law be that Executors or Administrators may pay debts upon simple Contracts of the deceas'd to which they are not bound and thereby prevent the payment of a debt to which they are bound It is repugnant to Reason and consequently cannot be Law for that is in effect at the same time to be bound and not bound to pay For he who may not pay being bound is not bound at all For clearing this we must know Though Executors or Administrators are not compell'd by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them For 1. Vpon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer the Estate of the dead duely which cannot be without paying his debts 2. Oath is taken to make true accompt of the Administration to the Ordinary and of what remains after all Debts Funeral Charges and just Expences of every sort deducted 3. This appears also by the Statute of 31 E. 3. c. 11. That Administrators are to administer and dispend for the Soul of the Dead and to answer to other to whom the dead persons were holden and bound which they cannot better do than by paying their debts And as this was the ancient Law and practise before in the Spiritual Court so by the new Act in 22 and 23 of the King for the better settling of Intestates Estates It is enacted accordingly that upon the Administrators accompt deductions be made of all sorts of debts This appears to be the ancient Law by the Great Charter c. 18. and long before by Glanvill in Henry the Second's time and Bracton in Henry the Third's time 4. And by Fitz-herbert in the Writ de rationabili parte bonorum the debts are to be deducted before division to the wife and children And upon the Executors accompt all the Testators debts are to be allow'd before payment of Legacies which were unjust if the payment of them were not due as appears by Doctor and Student Executors be bound to pay Debts before Legacies by the Law of Reason and by the Law of God for Reason wills that they should do first that is best for the Testator that is to pay debts which he was bound to pay before Legacies which he was not bound to give 2. It is better for the Testator his Debts should be paid Doct. Stud. l. 2. c. 11. for not payment of which his Soul shall suffer pain but none for not performing his Legacy The Ordinary upon the accompt L. 2. c. 10. f. 158 in all the Cases before rehears'd will regard much what is best for the Testator And I conceive the Ordinary may inforce the payment of Debts upon Contracts as well as Legacies or Marriage mony and no Prohibition lyes An Executor or Administrator may retain for his own satisfaction a Debt by single Contract due from the Testator or Intestate which he could not do unless the payment were lawful If at the Common Law the Executors payments of Debts upon simple Contracts were not just Why have the Iudges in all Ages given Judgment for the Plaintiffs unless the Defendant either Demurrs in the Commencement of the Plea or avoids the Debt by special matter pleaded and put in issue but he shall never in such case either Arrest the Iudgement or bring Error after Iudgment for that Cause And so it is agreed for Law in Read and Norwoods Case in Plowden where the Iudges had view of numerous Iudgments in that kind as there appears
double Costs and other Advantages as by the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 5. is provided The first Question upon this Special Verdict is Whether if any Officer in the Act mentioned or any in his assistance shall do things by colour of their Office not touching or concerning their said Office and shall be therefore impleaded Or if they or any of them shall be impleaded for or concerning any matter cause or thing by them or any of them done by pretence of their Offices and which is not strictly done by virtue or reason of their Office but is a misfeasance in Law shall have the benefit of this Act of having the matter tryed in the County where the Fact was done and not elsewhere If so 1. They shall not have the Tryal for any matter touching their Offices in the County where the Fact was done unless the Plaintiff please to lay it there and if he so pleas'd it might have been laid there before the Act of 21. which was purposely made to compel the laying of the Action where the Fact was done 2. By such Exposition of the Act the Action shall never be laid where the Fact was done for if it may be laid elsewhere at all if it be found upon the Tryal That the Officers question'd did not according to their Office there will be no cause to lay the Action in the proper County for the Iury where the Action is laid will find for the Plaintiff for the Misfeazance and if it be found the Defendants have pursued their Office wherever the Action is laid the Iury will find for the Defendants and then no cause to lay an Action in the County where the Fact was done So Quacunque via data the Act will be useless 3. If it can be laid in another County without hearing Evidence it cannot be known whether the Officer hath misdone or not How then can the Iury as the Act directs find the Defendants Not guilty without regard or respect to the Plaintiffs Evidence for then the Iury must regard the Evidence to find whether the Officer hath mis-done and not regard the Evidence at all to find the Officers Not guilty as the Act doth order Nor is there any inconvenience because by the Intention of Law whether the Officers have done justifiably or not without this Act of 21. the Action ought to be laid where the Fact was done and the Act is but to compel the doing of that where an Officer is concerned that otherwise fieri debuit though factum valet not being done The second Question is Whether upon the special points referred to the Court by the Iury they have found all the Defendants or any of them and whom Not guilty It hath been admitted at the Barr That the Defendants excepting Sir Richard Coxe cannot be found culpable by this Act of 21. and it being a Trespass that some may be guilty and not others which is true But the Question is not Whether some of the Defendants might have been found guilty and others not but whether as this Verdict is all or none must be Culpable 1. The Iury referr to the Court Si actio praedicta potuit commensari in London then they find all the Defendants culpable And if actio praedicta potuit commensari tantummodo in the County of Gloucester then they find all the Defendants by name Not Culpable So as the matter is Whether this individual Action brought joyntly against all the Defendants might be laid in London For that is the Actio praedicta not whether an Action might be laid in London for the Trespass against any of these Defendants and in that first sense Actio praedicta could not be in London for it could not be there laid as to some of the Defendants 2. Secondly they referr to the Court Whether Actio praedicta which is this Action jointly brought against all the Defendants could only be laid in the County of Gloucester and if so they find for the Defendants to which the Court must answer That this Action so jointly brought could only be laid according to Law ad omnem Juris effectum in the County of Gloucester 3. Thirdly if the Court should be of Opinion That the Action was well laid as to Sir Richard Coxe but not the rest the Iury find not him Guilty and not the rest for they find all equally Guilty or equally not Guilty 4. Fourthly That which differs his Case from the rest is That he was not assistant or aiding to the Constable for he bad that is praecepit or commanded the Constable to put the Plaintiff in Cippis But as to that the ancient Law was both adjudg'd in Parliament and allowed That it was contra consuetudinem Regni that a man should be condemn'd in a Trespass De praecepto or auxilio if no man were convicted of the Fact done It was the Case in Parliament of Bogo de Clare 18 E. 1. John Wallis Clerk entred his House and brought Letters of Citation from the Arch-bishop of Canterbury Some of the Family of Bogo made Wallis eat the said Process and Wax thereto affixed Et imprisonaverunt male tractaverunt For which and the Contempt to the King he brought his Action against Bogo who pleaded That he named no persons in certain nor alledg'd that the Fact was done by his command and demanded Iudgment thereupon and was discharged Notwithstanding by the Kings pleasure for so enormous a Trespass done in Contempt of the Church for the Contempt done within the Verge and in time of Parliament and for the bad Example Bogo was commanded to answer the King of the Trespass done in his House Et per Manupastos Familiares suos and a day given him to produce before the King and his Council those of his Family which was accordingly done but they who were said to have done the Fact were fled Et super hoc idem Bogo perit Judicium si de Praecepto missione vel assensu si sibi imponeretur ad sectam Domini Regis respondere debeat antequam factores principales aliquo modo de facto illo convincantur Whereupon Iudgment was given Et quia per consuetudinem legem Angliae Nullus de praecepto vi auxilio aut missione respondere debeat antequam factores aliquo modo convincantur Consideratum est quod praedictus Bogo ad praesens eat inde sinedie praedictus Jo. le Wallis sequatur versus factores principales prout sibi viderit expediri si voluerit six persons manuceperunt praedictum Bogonem ad habendum ipsum coram Domino Rege ad respondendum ipsi Domino Regi ad voluntatem suam cum praedicti factores de facto illo fuerint convicti si Dominus Rex versus eum inde loqui voluerit A Iudgment in Parliament at the Kings Suit That it was against the Custome and Law of the Kingdom to convict a man de praecepto auxilio aut missione in a Trespass before some who
them in Civil Tryals And how the Iury should in any other manner according to the course of Tryals us'd find against the direction of the Court in matter of Law is really not conceptible True it is if it fall out upon some special Tryal that the Iury being ready to give their Verdict and before it is given the Iudge shall ask whether they find such a particular thing propounded by him or whether they find the matter of Fact to be as such a Witness or Witnesses have depos'd and the Iury answer they find the matter of Fact to be so if then the Iudge shall declare The matter of Fact being by you so found to be the Law is for the Plaintiff and you are to find accordingly for him If notwithstanding they find for the Defendant this may be thought a finding in matter of Law against the direction of the Court for in that case the Iury first declare the Fact as it is found by themselves to which Fact the Iudge declares how the Law is consequent And this is ordinary when the Iury find unexpectedly for the Plaintiff or Defendant the Iudge will ask How do you find such a Fact in particular and upon their answer he will say then it is for the Defendant though they found for the Plaintiff or è contrario and thereupon they rectifie their Verdict And in these Cases the Iury and not the Iudge resolve and find what the Fact is Therefore alwaies in discreet and lawful assistance of the Iury the Iudge his direction is Hypothetical and upon supposition and not positive and upon coercion viz. If you find the Fact thus leaving it to them what to find then you are to find for the Plaintiff but if you find the Fact thus then it is for the Defendant But in the Case propounded by me where it is possible in that special manner the Iury may find against the Direction of the Court in matter of Law it will not follow they are therefore finable for if an Attaint will lye upon the Verdict so given by them they ought not to be fined and imprisoned by the Judge for that Verdict for all the Iudges have agreed upon a full conference at Serjeants Inn in this case And it was formerly so agreed by the then Judges in a Case where Justice Hide had fined a Jury at Oxford for finding against their Evidence in a Civil Cause That a Jury is not finable for going against their Evidence where an Attaint lies for if an Attaint be brought upon that Verdict it may be affirmed and found upon the Attaint a true Verdict and the same Verdict cannot be a false Verdict and therefore the Jury fined for it as such by the Judge and yet no false Verdict because affirmed upon the Attaint Another Reason that the Jury may not be fined in such case is because until a Jury have consummated their Verdict which is not done until they find for the Plaintiff or Defendant and that also be entred of Record they have time still of deliberation and whatsoever they have answered the Judge upon an interlocutory Question or Discourse they may lawfully vary from it if they find cause and are not thereby concluded Whence it follows upon this last Reason That upon Tryals wherein no Attaint lies as well as upon such where it doth no case can be invented wherein it can be maintained that a Jury can find in matter of Law nakedly against the direction of the Judge And the Judges were as before all of Opinion That the Retorn in this latter part of it is also insufficient as in the former and so wholly insufficient But that this Question may not hereafter revive if possible It is evident by several Resolutions of all the Judges That where an Attaint lies the Judge cannot fine the Jury for going against their Evidence or Direction of the Court without other Misdemeanour For in such case finding against or following the direction of the Court barely will not barr an Attaint but in some case the Judge being demanded by and declaring to the Jury what is the Law though he declares it erroneously Ingersalls C. Cr. 35 El. f. 309. n. 18. and they find accordingly this may excuse the Jury from the Forfeitures for though their Verdict be false yet it is not corrupt but the Iudgment is to be revers'd however upon the Attaint for a man loseth not his right by the Judges mistake in the Law Therefore if an Attaint lies for a false Verdict upon Indictment not Capital as this is either by the Common or Statute Law by those Resolutions the Court would not fine the Jury in this case for going against Evidence because an Attaint lay But admitting an Attaint did not lye as I think the Law clear it did not for there is no Case in all the Law of such an Attaint nor Opinion but that of Thirnings 10 H. 4. Attaint 60. 64. for which there is no warrant in Law though there be other specious Authority against it toucht by none that argued this Case The Question then will be Whether before the several Acts of Parliament which granted Attaints and are enumerated in their order in the Register Reg. f. 122. a. the Judge by the Common Law in all Cases might have fined the Jury finding against their Evidence and direction of the Court where no Attaint did lye or could so do yet if the Statutes which gave the Attaints were repeal'd If he could not in Civil Causes before Attaints granted in them he could not in Criminal Causes upon Indictment wherein I have admitted Attaint lies not for the fault in both was the same viz. finding against Evidence and Direction of the Court and by the Common Law the Reason being the same in both the Law is the same That the Court could not Fine a Jury at the Common Law where Attaint did not lye for where it did is agreed he could not I think to be the clearest position that ever I consider'd either for Authority or Reason of Law After Attaints were granted by Statutes generally As by Westminster the First c. 38. in Pleas Real and by 34 E. 3. c. 7. in Pleas Personal and where they did lye at Common Law which was only in Writs of Assise The Examples are frequent in our Books of punishing Jurors by Attaint But no Case can be offer'd either before Attaints granted in general or after That ever a Jury was punish't by Fin◠and Imprisonment by the Judge for not finding according to their Evidence and his Directtion until Popham's time nor is there clear proof that he ever fined them for that Reason separated from other Misdemeanor If Juries might be fined in such Case before Attaints granted why not since for no Statute hath taken that power from the Judge But since Attaints granted the Judges resolved they cannot Fine where the Attaint lies therefore they could not Fine before Sure this latter Age did
not first discover that the Verdicts of Juries were many times not according to the Judges opinion and liking But the Reasons are I conceive most clear That the Judge could not nor can Fine and Imprison the Jury in such Cases Without a Fact agreed it is as impossible for a Judge or any other to know the Law relating to that Fact or direct concerning it as to know an Accident that hath no Subject Hence it follows That the Judge can never direct what the Law is in any matter controverted without first knowing the Fact and then it follows That without his previous knowledge of the Fact the Jury cannot go against his Direction in Law for he could not direct But the Judge quà Judge cannot know the Fact possibly but from the Evidence which the Jury have but as will appear he can never know what Evidence the Jury have and consequently he cannot know the matter of Fact nor punish the Jury for going against their Evidence when he cannot know what their Evidence is It is true if the Jury were to have no other Evidence for the Fact but what is depos'd in Court the Judge might know their Evidence and the Fact from it equally as they and so direct what the Law were in the Case though even then the Judge and Jury might honestly differ in the result from the Evidence as well as two Judges may which often happens But the Evidence which the Jury have of the Fact is much other than that For 1. Being return'd of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth the Law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in Issue and so they must though no Evidence were given on either side in Court but to this Evidence the Judge is a stranger 2. They may have Evidence from their own personal knowledge by which they may be assur'd and sometimes are that what is depos'd in Court is absolutely false but to this the Judge is a stranger and he knows no more of the Fact than he hath learn'd in Court and perhaps by false Depositions and consequently knows nothing 3 The Jury may know the Witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and infamous which may be unknown to the parties and consequently to the Court. 4. In many Cases the Jury are to have View necessarily in many by consent for their better information to this Evidence likewise the Judge is a stranger 5. If they do follow his direction they may be attainted and the Iudgment revers'd for doing that which if they had not done they should have been fined and imprisoned by the Judge which is unreasonable 6. If they do not follow his direction and be therefore fined yet they may be attainted and so doubly punisht by distinct Iudicatures for the same offence which the Common Law admits not Chevin and Paramours Case 3 El. Dyer 201. a. n. 63. A Fine revers'd in Banco Regis for Infancy per inspectionem per testimonium del 4. fide dignorum After upon Examination of divers Witnesses in Chancery the suppos'd Infant was prov'd to be of Age tempore finis levati which Testimonies were exemplified and given in Evidence after in Communi Banco in a Writ of Entry in the quibus there brought And though it was the Opinion of the Court That those Testimonies were of no force against the Iudgment in the Kings Bench The Progress in this Writ of Right till Judgment for Paramour the Defendant is at large 13 El. Dyer f. 301. n. 40. yet the Jury found with the Testimony in Chancery against direction of the Court upon a point in Law and their Verdict after affirmed in an Attaint brought and after a Writ of Right was brought and battle joyn'd 7. To what end is the Jury to be retorn'd out of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth To what end must Hundredors be of the Jury whom the Law supposeth to have nearer knowledge of the Fact than those of the Vicinage in general To what end are they challeng'd so scrupulously to the Array and Pole To what end must they have such a certain Free-hold and be probi legales homines and not of affinity with the parties concern'd To what end must they have in many Cases the view for their exacter information chiefly To what end must they undergo the heavy punishment of the villanous Iudgment if after all this they implicitly must give a Verdict by the dictates and authority of another man under pain of Fines and Imprisonment when sworn to do it according to the best of their own knowledge A man cannot see by anothers Eye nor hear by anothers Ear no more can a man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers Vnderstanding or Reasoning and though the Verdict be right the Jury give yet they being not assur'd it is so from their own Vnderstanding are forsworn at least in foro conscientiae 9. It is absurd a Jury should be fined by the Judge for going against their Evidence when he who fineth knows not what it is as where a Jury find without Evidence in Court of either side so if the Iury find 14 H. 7. f. 29. per Vavasor in Camer Scace without contradiction Hob. f. 227. upon their own knowledge as the course is if the Defendant plead Solvit ad diem to a Bond prov'd and offers no proof The Jury is directed to find for the Plaintiff unless they know payment was made of their own knowledge according to the Plea And it is as absurd to fine a Jury for finding against their Evidence when the Judge knows but part of it for the better and greater part of the Evidence may be wholly unknown to him and this may happen in most Cases and often doth as in Graves and Shorts Case Error of a Iudgment in the Common Bench Graves vers Short 40 El. Cro. f. 616. the Error assign'd was The Issue being whether a Feoffment were made and the Jurors being gone together to conferr of their Verdict one of them shew'd to the rest an Escrow pro petentibus not given in Evidence by the parties per quod they found for the Demandant upon Demurrer adjudg'd no Error for it appears not to be given him by any of the parties or any for them it must be intended he had it as a piece of Evidence about him before and shew'd it to inform himself and his Fellows and as he might declare it as a witness that he knew it to be true They resolv'd If that might have avoided the Verdict which they agreed it could not yet it ought to have been done by Examination and not by Error That Decantatum in our Books Ad quaestionem facti non respondent Judices ad quaestionem legis non respondent Juratores literally taken is true For if it be demanded What is the Fact the Judge cannot answer it if it be asked What is the Law in the Case the Jury
in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unsatisfied 92 3. It is the Defendant not the Plaintiff must take Exceptions to the Jurisdiction of the Court 93 4. Where the appearance of the Tenant upon the Summons shall not affirm the Jurisdiction of the Court 405 5. The Temporal Courts may prohibit the Spiritual Courts in Cases of incestuous Marriages and Marriages within or without the Levitical Degrees 207 Iurors See Verdict Attaint 1. Jurors must be returned out of the Vicinage where the cause of Action ariseth 148 2. What is the legal Verdict of the Jury 150 3. No evidence can be given to a Jury of what is Law 143 4. The Verdict of the Jury cannot change the Reason of the Law 101 5. The Jury and not the Judge resolve and find what the Fact is 144 6. A Jury-man swears to what he can infer and conclude from the Testimony of Witnesses by the act and force of his Understanding to be the Fact inquired after 142 7. The Jury may have Evidence from their own personal knowledge 147 8. Although a Jury find contrary to their Evidence yet they are not finable an Attaint only lies against them 144 145 147 148 149 9. Neither are they fineable where an Attaint doth not lye 145 10. A Juror kept his Fellows a day and night without any reason for assenting and therefore sent to the Fleet 151 11. A Jury was never punisht upon an Information either in Law or the Star Chamber for finding an untrue Verdict unless Imbracery Subornation or the like were joyned 152 12. Where the Judges conceive the Jury have been unlawfully dealt withal to give their Verdict they are finable 153 13. The Jury can never find Ignoramus upon a Tryal 154 King See Grants of the King Prerogative 1. No Canon Ecclesiastical can be made without the Kings license and assent 329 2. The King will not take away another mans Right against his Will 14 3. The King cannot pardon an Offence done to a particular person 333 4. Where the Suit is only the Kings for the breach of a penal Law and which is not to the damage of a third person the King may dispense 334 336 5. But where the Suit is the Kings only for the benefit of a third person and the King is entituled by the prosecution and complaint of such third person the King cannot release or dispense with such Suit without the Agreement of such party concerned 334 336 356 6. If a Title appear for the King the Court Ex officio ought to give Judgment for him though no party 299 7. Where the Offence wrongs none but the King he may dispense with it 344 8. What things the King may pardon but not dispense with 333 334 336 c. 9. Offences against penal Laws not to be dispensed with 333 334 342 c. 10. Where the King may dispense generally he is not bound to it but may limit his Dispensation if he think fit 346 11. Where the King can dispense with particular persons he is not confined to number or place but may license as many and in such places as he thinks fit 347 12. If the Kings Grant is not void in its Creation it remains good after his death against his Successor 332 13. Where the exercise of a Trade is generally prohibited the Kings license must be without any limitation to him that hath it to exercise his Trade as before it was prohibited otherwise it is no license 346 14. The Kings Confirmation of a Commendam transfers no Right to the Incumbent 26 15. Where in a Quare Impedit brought by the King his Title appears to be but a bare Suggestion he cannot forsake his own Title and endeavour to destroy the Defendants 61 16. Where the King presents by Lapse and hath then other good Title to present yet it is void 14 17. Those under the Kings power as King of England in another Princes Dominions are under his Laws 282 18. The Natives of any of the Kings Forreign Plantations are his Majesties Natural Subjects and shall inherit in England 268 in loco 278 279 Kings Bench See Courts 1. The Court of Kings Bench cannot pretend to the only discharging of Prisoners upon Habeas Corpus unless in case of priviledge for the Chancery may likewise do it 157 2. Upon the Return of Habeas Corpus the Kings Bench may if they please bayl the prisoner but the Common Pleas must remand him if the cause of the imprisonment returned is just 157 3. The Kings Bench may quash the Order of Commitment upon a Certiorari 157 4. May grant Prohibitions for encroaching Jurisdiction ibid. Lapse 1. PResentation by Lapse makes no severance of the Advowson 14 2. Where a man accepts a second Benefice with Cure without a Dispensation or Qualification the first Benefice is void and the Patron may present but if he doth not present then if it is under value no Lapse shall incur until there is a Deprivation and Notice But if it is above value then the Patron must present within six months 131 132 Law See Construction of Law 1. When a Law is given to any people it is necessary that it be conceived and published in words which may be understood for without that it cannot be obeyed and the Law which cannot be obeyed is no Law 305 2. The meaning of the words in any Law are to be known either from their use and signification according to common acceptation before the Law made or from some Law or Institution declaring their signification 305 3. A Law which a man cannot obey nor act according to is void and no Law 337 4. To do a thing which no Law can make lawful is malum in se 337 5. Where the Law is known and clear though it be unequitable and inconvenient yet Judges must determine as it is without regarding the unequitableness or inconveniences 37 6. Where the Law is doubtful and not clear the Judges ought to interpret it as is most consonant to equity 38 7. Defects in the Law can be remedied only in Parliament 38 116 132 8. Whatever is declared by Act of Parliament to be against Gods Law must be so admitted to be by us because it is so declared by an Act of Parliament 327 9. A Law not published is no more obligative then a Law only concealed in the mind of the Law-giver is obligative 228 236 10. A lawful Canon is the Law of the Kingdom as well as an Act of Parliament and whatever is the Law of the Kingdom is as much the Law as any thing else that is so 21 132 327 11. It is irrational to suppose men ignorant of those Laws for the breach of which they are to be punisht 208 12. Every thing in one sense is taken for Common Law if it be Law when it appears not to be by Act of Parliament 163 13. It is never prudent to change a Law which cannot be bettered in the Subject
put shorter than as it hath been open'd to be upon the Record It being a history of several Presentations to the Vicaridge of Burton Basset and of several suppos'd Titles so to present in the persons who presented The Questions therefore in this Case do arise from the causes of the Plaintiffs demurring to the Defendants Plea which as hath been insisted on are two 1. The first is That in a Quare Impedit Plaintiff and Defendant are both Actors and either of them as their right happens to fall out may have a Writ to the Bishop to admit his Clerk That therefore either of them must make out a sufficient Title For it will be unreasonable That a man should have a Writ to the Ordinary to admit his Clerk who hath made no Title appear to the Court why it should be granted him That the Law is clear the Plaintiff in a Quare Impedit must in his Count alledg a Presentation in himself or those from whom he claims and that therefore the Defendant should likewise so do But in this Case the Defendant in his Plea hath alledged no Presentation in any from whom he claims or in himself 2. The second cause of Demurrer insisted on is That the Defendant hath by his Plea traversed the appendency alledged in the Plaintiffs Count of the third part of the Advowson of the Vicaridge of Burton Basset to the third part of the Mannor and third part of the Rectory of Burton Basset whereas he ought to have travers'd the Presentation alledged by the Plaintiff in the Lord Wootton by whom the Plaintiff claims and not the appendency And divers Authorities have been pretended that so is the Law 1. As to the first cause of Demurrer It is true that in a Quare Impedit both Plaintiff and Defendant may be Actors and either have a Writ to the Bishop as the right falls out to be But it is not true that both are always Actors in a Quare Impedit For if the Defendant hath presented his Clerk and he be admitted instituted and inducted before the Quare Impedit brought the Defendant hath then no cause to have a Writ to the Bishop for the doing of that which is already done and consequently in such Case the Defendant is no Actor but a bare Defendant When a man hath presented and his Clerk is instituted and inducted he is at the end of his work and hath no more to do than to keep what he hath gotten for thereby he hath a full possession which is Title sufficient if there be not a better But the Plaintiff who is to recover that which he hath not must shew a good Title before he can recover or he shall never avoid the Defendants possession by shewing no Title or an insufficient which is the same with none It can be neither Law nor Common Reason for the Plaintiff to tell the Defendant you have no good Title and thence to conclude therefore I have The Plaintiff must recover if at all by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness as is well urg'd and clear'd in Digbies and Fitzherberts Case in the Lord Hobart The Defendant hath alledged in his Plea a Title pro forma and that he hath presented by reason thereof and that his Clerk is instituted and inducted which is sufficient for the present and future time if no better Title be oppos'd to it without alledging any other Presentation in himself or any from whom he claims But if the Defendant were out of possession as the Plaintiff is he must then make out a good Title as the Plaintiff now must or else the Defendant should never have a Writ to the Bishop to admit his Clerk and in such Case only it holde true That the Defendant is Actor as well as the Plaintiff And in such Case he is to alledg a Seisin of the Advowson as the Plaintiff must in himself or those from whom he claims which can never be done without alledging a former Presentation that being the only actual Seisin of an Advowson for the cause why he should present to the present vacancy So as the not alledging a former Presentation will be no objection to the Defendants Title besides the Plaintiff hath alledg'd a Presentation both in his Ancessor Sir Thomas Temple of Reignalds and in himself of Manfell for him but I make no account of that for if the Defendant will take advantage of a Title admitted him by the Plaintiff he must take it as the Plaintiff gives it which in this Case the Defendant doth not For the Plaintiff by his Count makes the Defendants Ancestor and himself seis'd in their Demesne as of Fee of 2 Parts of 3 of the Mannor of Burton Basset and of a third part of the Advowson of the Vicaridge of Burton Basset as appendant to the said 2 Parts But the Defendant by his Plea saith he was seised in Fee of 2 Parts of 3 of the said Mannor and of the intire Advowson of the Vicaridge as appendant to the same 2 parts and so presented which is another Title than that admitted by the Plaintiff 2. For the 2 cause of Demurrer which is a point of more difficulty I take it for Law and shall accordingly prove it That when the Defendant traverseth any part of the Plaintiffs Count or Declaration in a Quare Impedit it ought to be such part as is both inconsistent with the Defendants Title and being found against the Plaintiff doth absolutely destroy his Title for if it doth not so however inconsistent it be with the Defendants Title the Traverse is not well taken To prove this I shall make use of 2 Cases urg'd at the Bar for the Plaintiff but rightly understood are fully against him The first is 10 H. 7. f. 27. 10 H. 7. f. 27. in a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff declared that he presented such a one his Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted and after the Church became void and he ought to present the Defendant pleaded his Ancestor was seis'd of a Mannor to which the Advowson was appendant and presented and that the Mannor descended to him and that the Church being void he presented and traversed absque hoc that the Advowson is in gross It was adjudged that the Defendant ought to have traversed the Presentation and not the Seisin of the Advowson in gross Whence it was inferr'd that in the present Case the Presentation alledg'd ought by like reason to have been traversed and not the appendency for traversing the appendency in this Case differs not from traversing the Seisin in gross in that Case But the reason of that Iudgment when rightly understood is very clear 1. The Plaintiff in the Quare Impedit as the Case appears in the book did not declare that he was seis'd of the Advowson in gross and presented though perhaps if the Original Declaration did appear it might be he did so declare but declares that he presented and his Clerk was
said William Paul dyed at Oxford That after his death the Defendant was elected Bishop of Oxford and after and before the Writ purchased viz. the 27. of November 1665. Gilbert now Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of all England by his Letters of Dispensation according to the said Act and directed to the said Walter the Defendant now Bishop under his Seal then elect and upon the Bishops petition of the means of his Bishoprick Graciously dispensed with him together with his Bishoprick the Rectory of Whitney in the Diocess and County of Oxford which he then enjoyed and the Rectory of Chymer aforesaid which he by the Kings favour hoped shortly to have to receive hold retain and possess in Commendam as long as he lived and continued Bishop of Oxford with or without Institution and Induction or other solemnity Canonical and to take and receive the profits to his own use without Residence Quantum in eodem Archiepiscopo fuit jura regni paterentur The Letters of Dispensation not to be effectual without the Kings Confirmation That the King after the 28 of Novemb. 17. of his Reign under the great Seal to the said Church so void by Cession presented the Defendant then as aforesaid Bishop Elect and after that is the 28. of Novemb. 17. Car. 2. the King by his Letters Patents under the great Seal dated the same day and year and duly inrolled in the Chancery according to 25 H. 8. did confirm the Letters of Dispensation and that the said Bishop might enjoy all things contained in them according to the form and effect thereof with clauses of non obstante aliquo Statuto or other matter Then averrs that the cause of Dispensation was not contrary to the word of God and that the Pope in H. 8. time did use to grant the like Dispensations to the Kings Subjects which he is ready to averr c. The Plaintiff replys That true it is William Paul Praedict was elected Bishop of Oxford being Incumbent of Chymer but that after his election and before his creation he 2 Decemb. 1663. obtained Letters of the Archbishop under his seal of Faculties for causes therein mentioned of Dispensation to hold the Church of Brightwell and the Rectory of Chymer both which he then lawfully had and to retain the same with his Bishoprick after his consecration c. durant vita sua natural Incumbentiâ suâ in Episcopatu praedict quamdiu eidem Episcopatui praeesset The King 9. Decemb. 15. of his reign confirmed the Letters Patents under the great Seal with non obstante according to the Ordinary form 30. Decemb. 15. Car. 2. was created Bishop Vpon this Replication the Defendant demurs and the Plaintiff joyns in Demurrer Note the Defendant doth not shew to whom he was presented He doth not say that he enter'd by vertue of the Presentation of the King in Chymer In discussing the Case as it appears upon this Record I take it granted 1. If a person Incumbent of one or more Benefices with Cure be consecrated Bishop all his benefices are ipso facto void 2. Vpon such voidance the King and not the Patron is to present to the benefices so void by Cession 3. That any Dispensation after the Consecration comes too late to prevent the Voidance 4. That the Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can sufficiently dispense for a Plurality by 25 H. 8. I shall therefore first make one general Question upon the Case as it appears Whither William Paul Rector of Chymer and elected Bishop of Oxford and before his Consecration dispensed with by the Archbishop to retain his said Rectory with the Bishoprick and having the said Letters of Dispensation confirmed by the King and inroll'd Modo forma prout by the Record did not by virtue of the said Dispensation and Confirmation prevent the voidance of his said Rectory by Cession upon his Consecration For if he did the Rectory became not void until his death and by his death the Plaintiff being Patron hath right to present To determine the General Question I shall make these Questions as arising out of it 1. Whether any Dispensation as this Case is be effectual to prevent an avoidance after Consecration 2. Whether the Archbishop hath power with the King's Confirmation to grant such a Dispensation 3. Whether this Dispensation in particular be sufficient to prevent a voidance of Chymer after Consecration of the late William Paul 1. This Case differs from the Bishop of Ossory's Case in Sir J. Davies's Reports who had a faculty accipere in Commendam with odd power and executed it by collating himself into a Living void by Lapse 2. It varies from the Case of Colt and Glover in the Lord Hobarts Reports and the Dispensation there to the Bishop elect of Lichfield and Coventry which was to retain one Benefice which he had and propria authoritate capere apprendere as many as he could under a certain value The defects of that Dispensation are numerous and excellently handled by the Lord Hobart in that Case of Colt and Glover But in our Case there is no affinity with the defects of those Dispensations but is barely to retain what legally was had before Obj. 1 Per Thyrning The Bp. of St. Davids Case 11 H. 4. f. 37. b. 38. a. Rolls f. 358. ob 1. 11 H. 4. f. 60. B. per Hill An Incumbent of a Church with cure being consecrated Bishop his Living was void by the Law of the Land therefore the Pope could not prevent the voidance after consecration for then the Pope could change the Law of the Land and if the Pope could not the Archbishop cannot The better opinion of that Book 11 H. 4. is contrary and Answ 1 so agreed to be in the Irish Case of Commendams and Rolls his opinion is grounded only upon 11 H. 4. If an Incumbent with cure take another Benefice with cure the first is void by the Law of the Land and the Patron hath right to present therefore the Pope could not grant a Dispensation nor the Arch-bishop now can to hold a Plurality for that were to alter the Law of the Land and to prejudice the Patron But the Law was and is otherwise therefore that reason concludes not in the case of a Bishop A second reason in that case of 11 H. 4. is that such a Dispensation Obj. 2 cannot prevent the avoidance 11 H. 4. f. 59. bi per Skreen because there is no use of it until Consecration for before the Incumbent retains his Living without any Dispensation and when consecrated his Benefices are void and then it is too late to dispense as is agreed This reason is as effectual against a Dispensation for a Plurality Answ 2 for before a man takes a second Living there can be no use of it and after by this reason it comes too late for the Patron hath right to present It was in that great Case endeavoured to avoid the pressure of
Case the Executor opposed the Action by offering to demurr and for any thing appearing he did so in the first 41 E. 3. f. 13. The other Case is 41 E. 3. f. 13. where an Action upon the Testators simple Contract was brought against an Executor and the Executor of a Co-executor to him the Writ was abated for that Reason and said withal There was no Specialty shewed but the first reason abating the Writ necessarily it no waies appears the Iudges would ex officio have abated the Action for the last Cause if the Executor desired it not So as when the Executor or Administrator hath once pleaded to an Action of Debt upon a single Contract he is equally bound up for the event as in any Action wherein the Testator or Intestate could not have waged Law It is therefore an ill Consequence for the Plaintiff to say I have brought an Action upon a simple Contract wherein the Intestate could not have waged his Law Therefore I must be paid before another Creditor by simple Contract bringing an Action wherein the Intestate might wage his Law for it is in the Administrators power by omitting to abate the Writ at first to make the Debt demanded by Action in which the Intestate might have waged his Law to be as necessarily and coercively paid as the other Debt demanded by Action wherein he could not wage his Law And if the Executor believes the Debt by simple Contract demanded by Action of Debt to be a just Debt it is against honesty conscience and the duty of his Office to demurr whereby to delay or prevent the payment of it Besides though since that illegal Resolution of Slade's Case grounded upon Reasons not fit for a Declamation much less for a Decision of Law The natural and genuine Action of Debt upon a simple Contract be turned into an Action of the Case wherein a man is deprived of waging his Law It is an absurd Opinion to think that therefore Debt demanded by it ought to have precedency for payment of a Debt due by simple Contract but quite the contrary For Actions of the Case are all Actiones injuriarum contra pacem and it is not a Debt certain in reason of Law that can be recovered by those Actions but damage for the injury ensuing upon the breach of promise which cannot be known until a Iury ascertain what the damage is Therefore a man did never wage his Law for a demand incertain for he could not make Oath of paying that which he knew not what it was as consisting in damage Now although the Iury give in damages regularly the money promised to be paid yet that changeth not the reason of the Law nor the form for still it is recovered by way of damage and not as a Debt is recovered Which shew the Action much inferiour and ignobler than the Action of Debt which by the Register is an Action of property and no reason a damage uncertain in its own nature should be paid before a certain Debt by simple Contract which were the first Debts and will probably be the last of the World for Contracts by writing were much later and there are many Nations yet where Letters are unknown and perhaps ever will be And that which is so commonly now received That every Contract executory implies a promise is a false Gloss thereby to turn Actions of Debt into Actions on the Case For Contracts of Debt are reciprocal Grants A man may sell his black Horse for present mony at a day to come and the Buyer may the Day being come seize the Horse for he hath property then in him which is the reason in the Register that Actions in the Debet and also in the Detinet are Actions of Property but no man hath property by a breach of promise but must be repair'd in damages The last Exception was That a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple of 2000 l. in the Chancery is pleaded in Barr. And it is not said That it was per scriptum Obligatorium or seal'd as the Statute of 23 H. 8. requires nor that it was secundum formam Statuti Cr. 10 Car. 1. f. 362. Goldsmiths Case versus Sydnor And Goldsmith and Sydnors Case was urg'd to be adjudg'd in the point which Case is so adjudg'd by the Major part of the Court. But in that Case it is pleaded that Sydnor before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas concessit se teneri Ed. Hobert in 400 l. to be paid at Pentecost next ensuing si defecerit c. voluit concessit per idem scriptum quod incurreret super se haeredes Executores poena in Statuto Stapulae So as it appears The Recognizance was taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and that the Conuzor was to incurr the penalty of the Statute Staple and therefore a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple was there intended to be pleaded but it was not pleaded that it was taken secundum formam Statuti in general nor specially per scriptum Obligatorium under Seal as it ought to be But here it is not pleaded That the Conuzor was to incurr the penalty of the Statute Staple nor that it was taken before any person authorized to take a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple by the Statute of 23 H. 8. c. 6. for the Chancellor is not so authorized But that it was a bare Recognizance entred into in the Court of Chancery which all Courts of Westminster have power to take and that it remains there inroll'd And that the said Sum of Two thousand pounds should for default of payment be levied of the Conuzors Lands Goods and Chattels and Execution of such Recognizances are to be made by Elegit of the Lands as well as Goods And it appears by the Statute of Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. which is the Law for the Statute Merchant That such Recognizances for Debt were before the Statute Merchants taken by the Chancellor the Chief Justices and Judges Itinerant but the Execution of them not the same as of the Statute Merchant nor are they hindered by that Statute from being as before expresly And in 4 Mariae upon a great search of Presidents Br. Recognizance p. 20. Hill 4 Mar. It was resolv'd That every Iudge may take a Recognizance in any part of England both in Term and out of Term. The like Resolution was in the Lord Hobart's time Hob. f. 195. Hall Wingfields Case So as the Recognizance here pleaded is not a Recognizance in the nature of a Statute Staple nor so pleaded but a Recognizance entred into in the Court of Chancery as Recognizances are entred into in the Court of Common Pleas or Kings Bench and as they were entred before Recognizances by Statute Merchant or Staple But Such Recognizances are to be satisfied before Debts by simple Contracts and before Debts by Obligations also Rolls Executors f. 925.
That Hugh Ivy Clerk the Tenth of May 22 Car. 2. at Wringlington demis'd to the said William One Messuage Twenty Acres of Land Twenty Acres of Meadow Twenty Acres of Pasture with the Appurtenances in Wringlington And also the Rectory and Parish Church of Wringlington Habendum to the said William and his Assigns from the Fifth day of May aforesaid for the term of Five years next ensuing By virtue whereof he entred into the said Tenements and Rectory and was possess'd until the Defendant the said Tenth day of May in the said year entred upon him and Ejected him to his Damage of Forty pounds The Defendant by words of course pleads he is not Culpable and Issue is joyn'd and the Verdict was taken by Default of the Defendant and the Jury find specially Upon the Special Verdict the Case appears to be this John Higden the Defendant was lawfully presented admitted instituted and inducted into the Rectory of Wringlington in the County of Somerset and Dioces of Bath and Wells in February 1664. being a Benefice with Cure of Souls and of clear yearly value of Fifty pounds per Annum and in the King's Books of no more than Five pounds yearly and that the Premisses demis'd were time out of mind and yet are parcel of the said Rectory That the said John Higden being lawful Incumbent of the said Church and Rectory of Wringlington the One and thirtieth of March 1669. was lawfully presented admitted instituted and inducted into the Rectory of Elme in the said County and Dioces being a Benefice with Cure of Souls also of clear yearly value ultra reprisas of Forty pounds per Annum and of the value of Ten pounds per Annum in the King's Books and subscribed the Articles of Religion according to the Act of the Thirteenth of the Queen 13 El. cap. 12. and was lawful Incumbent of the said Rectory of Elme but after did not read the Articles of Religion within two Months after his Induction in the Church of Elme according to the Act of 13 Eliz. Primo Maii 1669. Hugh Ivy Lessor of the Plaintiff was lawfully presented admitted instituted and inducted into the Rectory of Wringlington as suppos'd void and performed all things requisite for a lawful Incumbent of the said Rectory to perform both by subscribing and reading the Articles of Religion according to the Statute of 13 Eliz. And that he entred into the said Rectory and Premisses and made the Lease to the Plaintiff as in the Declaration That the said Higden the Defendant did enter upon the Plaintiff the said Tenth of May 1669. as by Declaration The Questions spoken to at the Barr in this Case have been two 1. Whether the Rectory of Wringlington being a Benefice with Cure and of clear yearly value of Fifty pounds and but of Five pounds in the King's Books shall be estimated according to Fifty pounds per Annum to make an Avoidance within the Statute of 21 H. 8. by the Incumbents accepting another Benefice with Cure But that is no Question within this Case for be it of value or under value the Case will be the same 2. Whether not reading the Articles according to the Statute of 13 Eliz. within two Months after induction into the Church of Elme shall exclude Higden not only from the Rectory of Elme but from the Rectory of Wringlington which is no point of this Case For whether he read or not read the Articles in the Church of Elme he is excluded from any right to the Church of Wringlington For this Case depends not at all upon any Interpretation of the Statute of 21 H. 8. of Pluralities but the Case is singly this Higden being actual and lawful Incumbent of Wringlington a Benefice with Cure be it under the value of Eight pounds yearly or of the value or more accepts another Benefice with Cure the Rectory of Elme and is admitted instituted and inducted lawfully to it be it of the value of Eight pounds or more or under The Patron of Wringlington within one month after admission institution and induction of Higden the Incumbent of Wringlington to the Rectory of Elme presents Hugh Ivy the Plaintiffs Lessor to Wringlington who is admitted instituted and inducted thereto the same day and after as by the Declaration enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff who is Ejected by the Defendant Higden The Doubt made by the Iury is if Higdens Entry be lawful It hath been resolv'd in Holland's Case and likewise in Digby's Case in the Fourth Report and often before since the Council of Lateran Anno Dom. 1215. Under Pope Innocent 3. Digby's Case Vid. Bon. C. pur Pluralities Anderson 1. part f. 200. b.p. 236 Vid. Moore 's Rep. a large Case to the same effect viz. Holland Digby's Case That if a man have a Benefice with Cure whatever the value be and is admitted and instituted into another Benefice with Cure of what value soever having no qualification or dispensation the first Benefice is ipso facto so void that the Patron may present another to it if he will But if the Patron will not present then if under the value no lapse shall incurr until deprivation of the first Benefice and notice but if of the value of Eight pounds or above the Patron at his peril must present within Six months by 21 H. 8. As to the Second Question Whether the Defendants not reading the Articles in the Church of Elme within two months after his induction there have excluded him not only from being Incumbent of Elme but also from Wringlington The Answer is First His not reading the Articles in the Church of Elme according to the Statute of 13. is neither any cause of nor doth contribute to his not being still Incumbent of Wringlington though as his Case is he hath no right to the Rectory of Wringlington since the admission institution and induction of Hugh Ivy the Plaintiffs Lessor into it as hath already appear'd Secondly As for the Rectory of Elme although it doth not appear that the Patron of Elme hath presented as he might have done or perhaps hath any other Clerk or that any other is admitted and instituted into that Church yet Mr. Higden can be no Incumbent there nor can sue for Tithes nor any other Duty because by not reading the Articles he stands depriv'd ipso facto For clearing this certain Clauses of the Act of 13 Eliz. are to be open'd The first is Every person after the end of this Session of Parliament to be admitted to a Benefice with Cure except that within two Months after his induction he publickly read the said Articles in the same Church whereof he shall have Cure in the time of Common-prayer there with Declaration of his unfeigned assent thereto c. shall be upon every such Default ipso facto immediately depriv'd There follows relative to this Clause Provided always That no Title to conferr or present by lapse shall accrue upon any deprivation
the matter proceeded upon in such Courts might as well be prosecuted in the Common Bench But if a priviledg'd person in Banco were sued in the Ecclesiastical Courts or before the High Commission or Constable and Marshal for things whereof the Common Pleas had no Conuzance they could not Supersede that proceeding by Priviledge And this was the ancient reason and course of Priviledge 1. Another way of Priviledge by reason of Suit depending in A Superiour Court is when a person impleading or impleaded as in the Common Bench is after arrested in a Civil Action or Plaint in London or elsewhere and by Habeas Corpus is brought to the Common Pleas and the Arrest and Cause retorn'd if it appear to the Court That the Arrest in London was after the party ought to have had the Priviledge of the Common Pleas he shall have his Priviledg allow'd and be discharg'd of his Arrest and the party left to prosecute his cause of Action in London in the Common Pleas if he will 2. If the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be a lawful cause but which cannot be prosecuted in the Common Pleas as Felony Treason or some cause wherein the High Commission Admiralty or other Court had power to imprison lawfully then the party imprison'd which did implead or was impleaded in the Common Bench before such imprisonment shall not be allow'd Priviledge but ought to be remanded 3. The third way is when a man is brought by Habeas Corpus to the Court and upon retorn of it it appears to the Court That he was against Law imprison'd and detain'd though there be no cause of Priviledge for him in this Court he shall never be by the Act of the Court remanded to his unlawful imprisonment for then the Court should do an act of Injustice in imprisoning him de novo against Law whereas the great Charter is Quod nullus liber homo imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae This is the present case and this was the case upon all the Presidents produc'd and many more that might be produc'd where upon Habeas Corpus many have been discharg'd and bail'd though there was no cause of Priviledge in the Case This appears plainly by many old Books if the Reason of them be rightly taken For insufficient causes are as no causes retorn'd and to send a man back to Prison for no cause retorn'd seems unworthy of a Court. 9 H. 6. 54. 58. Br. n. 5. 14 H. 7. f. 6. n. 19. 9 E. 4. 47. n. 24. 12 H. 4. f. 21. n. 11. Br. If a man be impleaded by Writ in the Common Pleas and is after arrested in London upon a Plaint there upon a Habeas Corpus he shall have Priviledge in the Common Pleas if the Writ upon which he is impleaded bear date before the Arrest in London and be retorn'd although the Plaintiff in the Common Pleas be Nonsuit essoin'd or will not appear and consequently the Case of Priviledge at an end before the Corpus cum causa retorn'd but if the first Writ be not retorn'd there is no Record in Court that there is such a Defendant The like where a man brought Debt in Banco and after for the same Debt arrested the Defendant in London and became Nonsuit in Banco yet the Defendant upon a Habeas Corpus had his Priviledge because he had cause of Priviledge at the time of the Arrest 14 H. 7. 6. Br. Priviledge n. 19. The like Case 9 E. 4. where a man appear'd in Banco by a Cepi Corpus and found Mainprise and had a day to appear in Court and before his day was arrested in London and brought a Corpus cum causa in Banco Regis at which day the Plaintiff became Nonsuit yet he was discharg'd from the Serjeant at London because his Arrest there was after his Arrest in Banco and consequently unlawful 9 E. 4. f. 47. Br. Priviledge 24. and a man cannot be imprison'd at the same time lawfully in two Courts Coke Mag. Chart. f. 53 55. The Court of Kings Bench cannot pretend to the only discharging of Prisoners upon Habeas Corpus unless in case of Priviledge for the Chancery may do it without question And the same Book is That the Common Pleas or Exchequer may do it if upon Retorn of the Habeas Corpus it appear the Imprisonment is against Law An Habeas Corpus may be had out of the Kings Bench or Chancery though there be no Priviledge Mic. C. 2. Coke f. 55. c. or in the Court of Common Pleas or Exchequer for any Officer or priviledg'd Person there upon which Writ the Gaoler must Retorn by whom he was committed and the cause of his Imprisonment and if it appeareth that his Imprisonment be just and lawful he shall be remanded to the former Gaoler but if it shall appear to the Court that he was imprisoned against the Law of the Land they ought by force of this Statute to deliver him if it be doubtful and under consideration he may be bayl'd The Kings Bench may bayl if they please in all cases but the Common Bench must remand if the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be just The Writ de homine replegiando is as well retornable in the Common Pleas as in the Kings Bench. All Prohibitions for incroaching Iurisdiction Issue as well out of the Common Pleas as Kings Bench. Quashing the Order of Commitment upon a Certiorari which the Kings Bench may do but not the Common Pleas is not material in this Case 1. The Prisoner is to be discharg'd or remanded barely upon the Retorn and nothing else whether in the Kings Bench or Common Pleas. 2. Should the Kings Bench have the Order of Commitment certified and quash'd before the Retorn of the Habeas Corpus or after what will it avail the Prisoners they cannot plead Nul tiel Record in the one case or the other 3. In all the Presidents shew'd in the Common Pleas or in any that can be shew'd in the King's Bench upon discharging the Prisoner by Habeas Corpus nothing can be shew'd of quashing the Orders or Decrees of that Court that made the wrong Commitment Glanvill's C. Moore f. 836. 4. It is manifest where the Kings Bench hath upon Habeas Corpus discharg'd a Prisoner committed by the Chancery the person hath been again re-committed for the same Cause by the Chancery and re-deliver'd by the Kings Bench but no quashing of the Chancery Order for Commitment ever heard of 5. In such Cases of re-commitment the party hath other and proper remedy besides a new Habeas Corpus of which I shall not speak now 6. It is known That if a man recover in Assise and after in a Re-disseisin if the first Iudgment be revers'd in the Assise the Iudgment in the Re-disseisin is also revers'd So if a man recover in Waste and Damages given for which Debt is brought especially if the first Iudgment be revers'd before Execution it destroys the Process
be of an universal Prohibition of Carnal knowledge in all the Degrees there specified though such Prohibitions might be to the particular Nations mentioned in Leviticus and Deuteronomy to be therein defiled but that is most improbable too 2. The defiling there mentioned may be intended of Sodomy Buggery Incest with the Mother the Fathers wife the Soror uterina Adultery agreed by the Jews to be universally prohibited which they term Leges Noachidarum and which are the Offences last mentioned in the Eighteenth of Leviticus before vers 24. before cited 3. The marriages of many persons eminently in Gods favour before the Mosaical Law as Abrahams marrying Sarah his Sister by the Father Jacob's marrying two Sisters Amram's Moses his Father marrying Jochebed his Fathers Sister Marrying the Brothers wife as in the Story of Onan before the Mosaical Prohibitions Nachor's Abrahams Brother marrying Milcah his Brother Harams daughter and the strong Opinion that Judah himself married Thamar his Daughter in law as well as he had Coition with her c. permits not to believe many Copulations mentioned in Moses his Prohibitions to have been before universally prohibited 4. If among the Nations cast out before the Jews as defiled in these things Humane Laws had been made among them as in every Nation of the Gentiles was usual to prohibit some marriages for nearness of Cognation and those Nations had not observed but transgressed their own Laws as is usual in all places to offend against their known Laws God might therefore punish them as daily he doth and did always the Gentiles for not keeping their own Laws vid. Paul to the Romans per totam Epistolam 5. Though men cannot justly make people suffer but for transgressing Laws which they might have kept yet the Numen who is just when he exerciseth absolute Dominion over his Creatures may inflict sufferings upon a Nation for doing things he likes not and therefore call such things abominable as there is an Ill which begets the making of Laws to obviate and prevent it as well as an Ill in transgressing Laws when they are made And he which doth contrary to natural prudence and his own perswasion of what is best may incur the displeasure of the Numen as well as for transgressing a Rule or Law which he might have kept And though this way of punishing is not proper to men it is as proper as the other to the Deity to whom mans thoughts purposes ends and means are open That the abstaining from Incestuous marriages according to Moses his Law was a part of the Mosaical Law precepted to be observed by the Gentiles at that Council I think can be little doubted and not the abstaining from what is accounted simple Fornication which even by Moses his Law was often satisfied by marriage of the woman and often by mony But it seems difficult How that Precept or the observance of it could either cause or preserve Communion between the Jews and the Gentiles as those others did concerning abstinence from Meats prohibited to the Jews and not to the Gentiles For first Alliance and Affinity between the Jews and the Gentiles before and by the Law of Moses was absolutely forbid though the Gentiles as many of them did for many prohibited marriages had abstained by their own peculiar Laws from all those marriages prohibited the Jews Therefore their Communion by Alliance or Affinity had received no advancement by abstaining from Mosaical Incests in that respect But besides the general Interdict of Alliance with the Gentiles the Iews were interdicted in a special manner any alliance or conversation with the Nations whose Land they were to enjoy and inherit and who were cast out before them as being defiled in all those Copulations of Kindred prohibited the Jews Lev. 18. v. 24 c. as appears from Verse the Four and twentieth to the end of the Eighteenth Chapter of Leviticus and which Iniquity was visited by making the Land vomit out the Inhabitants 2. Verse the Thirtieth the Jews are charged not to commit any one of those abominable Customes committed before them and if they did they were punished by death as appears Leviticus the Twentieth This was enough to cause a particular detestation and abhorrency in the Jews of such who accustomed themselves to such marriages or any of them above others of the Gentiles 3. The Nations cast out of their Land for committing those things Deut. 7. v. 1. appear to be Seven The Hittite the Girgashite the Amorite the Canaanite the Perizzite the Hivite and the Jebusite whose names they were commanded to destroy from under Heaven Verse the Four and twentieth of that Chapter accordingly it appears they did so Deuteronomy the Second and Third Chapters The Amorite and those under Og King of Bashan were Man Woman and Child destroyed Chapter the Seventh Verse second and third no Covenant was to be made with nor marriage between them Of the Cities of these people which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance Deut. 20. Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth but thou shalt utterly destroy them which shews their destruction was not for transgressing a Law given them by God as their Law maker for they were destroy'd which had not offended against the Law as well as they which had But it was an Act of Gods absolute dominion over his Creatures as the Potter may do what he listeth with his Clay which must not say why hast thou made me thus Whereas they had differing commands concerning Cities far from them As 1. To offer them peace 2. If they accepted it to make them Tributaries 3. If they refused it to kill the Males with the Sword but to spare the women and children Deut. 20. from verse 10. to vers the Fifteenth It is hence not improbable the Jews had great aversness to the Communion of such whose mixtures in marriage were alike to these Nations though they were not of these Nations for the vengeance ordained against them appears not to be for other causes than for those incestuous Copulations which were not common to all other the Nations of the Gentiles as well as to them that is Idolatry And for this reason The Apostles might direct the Gentiles to abstain from marriages that would render them odious to the Jews and which the Christians ever after continued as most conformant to Gods will in the fitness of marriage But this is not reason enough to make all these marriages to be prohibited to the Gentiles absolutely by Divine Institution as unholy in themselves without relation to the communion with the Jews so as to make it absolutely unlawful to change them by any Humane Law upon any occasion But it is never prudent to change a Law which cannot be better'd in the subject matter of the Law Accordingly if we examine well perhaps dispensations will be found given by the Christian Churches for marriages within most of those Mosaical Degrees and particularly in those
by the Verdict 7 Car. afore the Act by which it is found he died seised of the Rectory of Kingston in Reversion and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge and died without Heir and that the same escheated to the King and if all the lands in question were held of the King it being found he died without Heir the proviso will save all to the King 3. Whether Nicholas Ramsey under whom the Plaintiffs claim be the person who had title to the lands in question if any had Because 1. The death of Robert the elder Brother is not sufficiently found before the Act of Naturalization for then he and not Nicholas was heir to John 2. Because if Robert the elder were dead before yet he left Issue three Daughters who were naturalized as well as Nicholas by the Act and are the heirs to the Earl being the Issue of his elder Brother If Robert had died after the Irish Act made this Verdict had been as true as now it is Therefore it is not sufficient to find him dead before the Act. Et Juratores ulterius dicunt quod praedictus Robertus filius primogenitus natu maximus praedicti Roberti patris postea obiit tempore mortis suae habens relinquens tres filias de corpore ipsius Roberti filii legitime procreatas viz. Margaret Isabel Janam Alienigenas natas in Regno Scotiae ante accessionem praedict Quae quidem Margaret Isabella Jana primo die Octobris Anno Regni Domini Caroli nuper Regis Angliae primi quarto decimo in plena vita fuerant habent exitus de carum corporibus exeuntes modo superstites in plena vita existentes apud Kingston super Thames praedict As to the second part in the Case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Descents but Defectus Nationis as Bracton terms it Therefore that being taken away by naturalization they shall inherit as if it had not been and then the eldest Brothers Issue had inherited before the second Brother 1. It is admitted and will easily appear That one naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 2. Ireland then differs from Scotland in a common difference with Gernsey Jersey Isle of Man Berwick and all the English Plantations for that they are Dominions belonging to the Crown of England which Scotland is not 3. If this difference which was never discussed in Calvin's Case alter not the Case from a naturalizing in Scotland it remains whether by Act of Parliament of England though not extant Ireland in this matter be not differenc'd from other Dominions belonging to England 1. He that is priviledg'd by the law of England to inherit there must be a Subject of the Kings 2. He must be more than a local Subject either in the Dominion of England or out of the Dominion of England for meer Aliens when locally in England or any other Dominions of the Kings are local Subjects 3. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents of the King can make him 7 Rep. Calvins C. f. 7. a. 36 H. 6. Tit. Deniz Br. 9. Therefore a Denizen of England by Letters Patents for life in tayl or in fee whereby he becomes a Subject in regard of his person will not enable him to inherit in England but according to his Denization will enable his Children born in England to inherit him and much less will his Denization in any other Dominion Whence it follows That no Laws made in any other Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the King's Lieutenants Substitutes Governours or People there by vertue of the King's Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit For what the King cannot do by his Letters Patents no delegated power under him can do by his Letters Patents It follows likewise upon the same reason That no tenure of Land by Homage Fealty or other Service in any other Dominion of the Kings acquired by Conquest or otherwise by any Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit Calvins Case f. 6. b. for that is not Homagium ligeum but Feodale as is rightly distinguished 4. A man born a Subject to one that is King of England cannot therefore inherit in England for then the Antenati in Scotland had inherited in England they were born Subjects to King James who was King of England but not born when he was King of England 5. A Subject born in any Dominion belonging to the Crown of England is inheritable in England as well as native Englishmen So the natural born Subjects of Ireland Gernsey Jersey Berwick and all the English Plantations inherit but the specifique reason of their inheriting in England is not because they are born in Dominions belonging to the Crown of England for if so none could inherit who wanted that and then the Postnati of Scotland should not inherit for Scotland is not a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England but to the King of England It remains then according to the Resolution and Reasons of Calvin's Case That the specifique and adequate cause why the Kings Subjects of other his Dominions than England do inherit in England is because they are born his natural Subjects as the English are he being actually King of England at the time of their birth when their subjection begins Cok. Rep. Calvins Case and so are born Liege-men to the same King But then since all Liegeance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law for a man owes no liegeance excluding all Civil Law but a man is said a natural Subject because his Subjection begins with his birth that is as soon as he can be subject and a King is said to be a mans natural Prince because his Protection begins as soon as the Subject can be protected and in the same sense that a Country where a man is born is his natural Country or the Language he first speaks is his natural Tongue why should not an Act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of law 1. The Reason is That naturalization is but a fiction of Law and can have effect but upon those consenting to that fiction Therefore it hath the like effect as a mans Birth hath where the Law-makers have power but not in other places where they have not Naturalizing in Ireland gives the same effect in Ireland as being born there so in Scotland as being born there but not in England which consents not to the fiction of Ireland or Scotland nor to any but her own 2. No fiction can make a natural Subject for he is correlative to a natural Prince and cannot have two natural Soveraigns but may have one Soveraign as a Queen Soveraign and her Husband in two persons no more than two natural Fathers or two natural
this difference holds in offences by penal Laws 22 Car. 2. c. 8. So a Mayor or Bayliff of a Town or other Toll-taker who is penally bound to provide true Market measures and doth not cannot be pardon'd by the King because the fault still continues but the punishment inflicted the King may pardon But by a Law all these offences may be pardon'd So it is generally true that malum per se cannot be dispensed with but thence to inferr as many do that every malum which the King cannot dispense with is malum per se is not true Nor is there in that Case any sufficient designation of what is malum per se and why to prevent error in disquisition concerning it though some instances thereof mala per se be very right I shall therefore endeavour to in stance in several kinds of mala per se which cannot be dispens'd with and in some mala prohibita by Acts of Parliament and otherwise which the King also cannot dispense with and to give the reason why he cannot in both thereby to make the conclusion I drive at less confused which is to differ penal Laws dispensable from those which are not Murther Adultery Stealing Incest Sacriledge Extortion Perjury Trespass and many other of the like kind all men will agree to be mala per se and indispensable All which are prohibited and by Statutes Nor is it much to say those are also prohibited by the Common Law and therefore cannot be dispens'd with if that were the reason nothing prohibited at the Common Law could be dispens'd with which is not so 2. Where the Suit is only the Kings for breach of a Law which is not to the particular damage of any third person the King may dispense but where the Suit is only the Kings but for the benefit and safety of a third person and the King is intitled to the Suit by the prosecution and complaint of such third person the King cannot release discharge or dispense with the Suit but by consent and agreement of the party concern'd As where upon complaint of any person a man hath entred into Recognizance to keep the Peace against such person the King cannot discharge such Recognizance before it be forfeited but the party whose safety is concerned may though the King only can sue the Recognizance Some more such Cases may be As the Laws of Nusances are pro bono publico so are all general penal Laws and if a Nusance cannot be dispens'd with for that reason it follows no penal Law for the same reason can be dispens'd with Therefore the reason is because the parties particularly damaged by a Nusance have their Actions on the Case for their damage whereof the King cannot deprive them by his dispensation And by the same reason other penal Laws the breach of which are to mens particular damage cannot be dispens'd with 3. Nusances and Ills prohibited by penal Acts of Parliament are of the same nature as to the publique 4 E. 4. f. 31. 22 E. 4. f. 22. 3 H. 7. f. 1. Br. Leet n. 2. 19 25 26 30. although as the Law is now received the mala or nocumenta prohibited by Acts of Parliament are not presentable in Leets or the Sheriffs Torn as Nusances at Common Law are of which some questionless cannot be dispens'd with As obstructing the High way diverting a Water-course breaking down a Bridge breaking the Assise of Bread and Ale for as to these the parties particularly damaged by them have their Actions which the King cannot discharge 4. Other ancient Nusances are by which no man hath a particular damage or action for it as if a man buy provision coming to the Market by the way which is a Nusance by forestalling the Market and sells it not in the Market forestall'd no Action lies for a particular damage to any man more than to every man but the King may punish it So if a may buy Corn growing in the field contrary to the Statute of 5 E. 6. c. 14. he is an Ingrosser So selling Corn in the Sheaf is against the Common Law by Robert Hadham's Case Cok. f. 197. c. 89. Hill 25 E. 3. coram Rege cited in Coke's Pleas of the Crown and punishable by the King but no particular person can have an Action for such ingrossing more than every man yet these are Nusances by the Common Law but so made by prohibiting Laws beyond memory As by a Law of King Athelstans Ne quis extra oppidum quid emat Sax. Laws f. 49. c. 12. Will. the firsts Laws f. 171. c. 60 61. Cok. Pleas Coron 197. forestalling was prohibited And by several Laws of William the First Ne venditio emptio fiat nisi coram testibus in civitatibus Item nullum mercatum vel forum sit nec fieri permittatur nisi in civitatibus regni nostri And no way differ from publique evils now prohibited by Parliament and may by it be permitted for the Statute of 15 Car. 2. c. 5. 15 Car. 2 c. 5. gives leave to ingross without forestalling when Corn exceeds not certain Rates Nor see I any reason why the King may not dispense with those Nusances by which no man hath right to a particular action as well as he may with any other offence against a penal Law by which no third person hath cause of Action Whence it follows That if an Act of Parliament call an offence a Nusance from which no particular damage can arise to a particular person to have his Action the King may dispense with such a nominal Nusance as with an offence against a penal Law for which a man can have no Action for his particular damage 5. The Register hath no Writ of Ad quod damnum upon any Licence to be granted but for alienation of Capite Land or in Mortmain or for diverting or obstructing a Water-course or High-way in which Cases the Writ is directed to the certain Sheriff or Escheator of the County where the Land-way or Water-course lye but for Licences for other things as Exportation or Importation of prohibited Commodities a Writ of Ad quod Damnum cannot be directed to any certain Sheriff or other Officer to enquire Nor is it enough to make a thing malum per se because prohibited at Common Law But the reason is The word Murther ex vi termini in the Language it is us'd in signifies unlawful killing a man The word Adultery unlawful Copulation Stealing unlawful taking from another Perjury unlawful swearing and Trespass ex vi termini an unlawful imprisonment or unlawful entry or the like upon anothers House or Lands and so do the other mala instanced If these mala might be dispens'd with in regard a dispensation as I said makes the thing to be done lawful to him who is dispens'd with it follows that the dispensation would make unlawful killing which the word Murther imports vi termini to be lawful unlawful
bono populi complicati as the King in his discretion shall think fit to order them for the good of the whole In this notion the estate of every Pater familias may be said to be pro bono Communi of his Family which yet is but at his discretion and management of it and they have no interest in it but have benefit by it Offences not to be dispens'd with There are other penal Laws by Acts of Parliament and punishable at the Kings Suit by Indictment or Presentment the transgressing of which is to the immediate wrong of particular persons and for which the Law gives them special Actions with which the King cannot dispense As he cannot licence a man to commit maintenance to make a forcible entry to carry distresses out of the hundred 8 H. 6. c. 9. Stat. 1 2 P. M. c. 12. contrary to the Statute which yet are no Mala in se for it is no Malum in se to maintain in a just cause to enter forcibly where the entry is lawful to carry a distress farther or nearer but are mala when prohibita and non when permissa as they would be wâ—re the Laws repeal'd and were before they were made From whence it is clear there are mala prohibita by Acts of Parliament with which the King cannot dispense And next it follows not that a Malum with which the King cannot dispense is a Malum in se which are the exceptions I took to the receiv'd Rule out of the Case of 11 H. 7. No non obstante can dispense in these Cases 8 H. 6. f. 19. The Chancellor of Oxfords Case Br. Pat. n. 15. and many the like for that were to grant that a man should not have lawful Actions brought against him or be impleaded at least in certain Actions which the King cannot grant For the same reason the King cannot licence a Baker Brewer or Victualler to break the Assise of Bread or Ale Stat. de Pistoribus c. 7. 31 E. 1. nor a Miller to take more Toll than the Law appoints nor a Taverner to break the Assise of Wine nor a Butcher to sell measled Swines flesh or Murrain flesh nor any man to forestall the Market by a non obstante of the Statute de Pistoribus which prohibits all these under severe penalties Nor can he licence Butchers Fishmongers Poultrers or other sellers of Victuals nor Hostlers to sell Hay and Oats at what price they please Stat. 23 E. 3. c. 6. 13 R. 2. c. 8. 9 Car. 1. Cam. Stell by a non obstante of the Statute of 23 E. 3. c. 6. and 13 R. 2. c. 8. which require that the prises be moderate And it was so resolved and decreed in the Star-Chamber by opinion of all the Judges 9 Car. 1. and that the Iustices of the Peace in the respective Counties were to ascertain the prises of Hay and Oats He cannot licence a Labourer to take more wages Regist f. 190. a tit de Servientibus In the Table of the Register the Title is de Laborariis nor any Officers to take more Fees than the Law allows nor to distrain a mans Plough-Beasts where there is other distress for in these and multitudes of like cases the damaged person hath his Action equally as for a Nusance to his particular hurt And even in the Case of a Common Informer who cannot sue but in the King's Name as well as his own when he is once intitled to Action which he never is but by commencing Suit for then the Action popular is become his proper Action the King can neither pardon release or otherwise discharge his right in the Suit as is fully resolved 1 H. 7. 1 H. 7. f. 3. and in many other Books much less can he discharge or prevent the Action of any other man The Statute of 12 Car. 2. c. 25. upon which this Case ariseth hath examples of penal Laws in both these kinds 12 Car. 2. c. 25 1. Every man is prohibited to sell Wine by retail contrary to the Act upon forfeiture of Five pounds for every offence from which offence no third man can possibly derive a particular damage to himself for which he can have an Action upon his Case 2. If any man should have an Action because another sold a pint of Wine without licence every man should have the like Action which the Law permits not Whence it follows That the offence wrongs none but the King and therefore he may as in like Cases dispense with it By a second Clause in that Act the mingling of Wine with several Ingredients therein mentioned is penally prohibited as by another Clause the sale of Wine at greater prizes than the Act limits He that shall offend either by unlawful mixtures or by selling dearer than the Law admits doth a particular wrong to the buyer for which he may have his Action and therefore the King cannot dispense with either of those Offences Dispensations void against Acts of Parliament for maintaining Native Artificers The Case of Monopolies the eleventh Report If Forreign Manufactures or Forreign Corn as by the Acts of 3 E. 4. c. 4. â— 3 E. 4. c. 3. be prohibited for support of those Artificers and the Husbandmen within the Kingdom a Licence to one or more to bring them in if general is void by the Case of Monopolies notwithstanding a Non obstante 1. All penal Laws when made and in force are equally necessary and in things necessary there is no gradation of more or less necessary 2. If any penal Laws were possibly less dispensable than others but upon the differences already given those capitally penal were less dispensable than those less penal but it is not so 11 H. 7. f. 11. for coyning mony of right Alloy in imitation of the Kings Coyn is capitally penal without licence but it may be licenced 1 H. 7. f. 3. If transporting Wooll were Felony yet the King may licence it It is capital to multiply Gold or Silver by the Statute of 5 H. 4. c. 4. but may be licenc'd Cok. plac Coronae f. 74. c. 20. as was done to John Faceby tempore H. 6. the Dispensation with a non obstante of that Statute may be seen Coke's placita Coronae f. 74. c. 20. If an Ad quod damnum issue to enquire ad quod damnum vel praejudicium a licence for a Mortmain will be One Inquiry is Si patria per donationem illam magis solito non oneretur c. Though the Retorn be that by such licence patria magis solito oneretur yet the licence if granted will be good which shews that Clause is for Information of the King that he may not licence what he would not and not for Restraint to hinder him to licence what he would Fitz. Nat. Br. Ad quod damum f. 222 b. Letter D. For by Fitz-herbert the usual licence now is with Et hoc absque aliquo
brevi de Ad quod damnum And when the King can licence without any Writ of Ad quod damnum he may if he will licence whatever the Retorn of the Writ be Though it be said in the Case of Monopolies That in the Kings Grant it is always a Condition expressed or implyed Quod patria plus solito non oneretur but that seems but gratis dictum So if the King will ex speciali gratia licence a Mortmain Dyer 9 10 El. f. 269. a. the Chancellor need not issue any Ad quod damnum for the King without words of Non obstante is sufficiently appris'd by asking his licence to do a thing which at Common Law might be done without it that now it cannot be done without it And that is all the use of a Non obstante But whether in such Cases licences limited to certain quantities of the Commodities to be imported be good as some collect from that Case as it is reported which appears not by the Iudgment nor in what Cases licences may be general or ought to be limited is not now properly before us 1. If Exportation Importation of a Commodity or the exercise of a Trade be prohibited generally by Parliament and no cause expressed of the Prohibition a licence may be granted to one or more without limitation to Export or Import or to exercise the Trade For by such general Restraint the end of the Law is conceived to be no more than to limit the over-numerous Exporters Importers or Traders in that kind by putting them to the difficulty of procuring licences and not otherwise and therefore such general licences shall not be accounted Monopolies 2. In such Cases the Law implies the King may licence as well as if the prohibitory Law had been that no such Importation Exportation or Trading should be without the King 's express licence in which Case the licence requires no limitation to a certain quantity 3. It is apparent That if the exercise of a Trade be generally prohibited the King's Licence must be without any Limitation to him that hath it to exercise his Trade as before it was prohibited else it is no licence at all 4. Where the King may dispense generally he is not bound to it but may limit his Dispensation if he think fit 5. If to avoid a Monopoly his Dispensation upon all prohibitory Laws generally must by Law be limited his limited Dispensation may be for greater quantities than were Imported or Exported before the Restraint because the quantity in the Dispensation is left indefinite and may be any quantity certain and consequently the end of the Restraint equally frustrated and the Monopoly as effectual as if the Licence had been general though it be limited 6. If a Commodity be prohibited to be Exported or Imported because too great quantities of it is carried out or brought in the Licences ought to be limited to answer the end of the Act. 7. If Importation of a Commodity be prohibited to maintain the Native Artificers of that Commodity in the Kingdome with livelyhood and so of Exportation no Licence either with stint or limitation or without it seems good by way of Merchandise for both of them may equally frustrate the end of the Act in the support of the Native Artificers for the former reason but such a Licence may be good to Import for a mans private use though in the Case of Monopolies it is said Such a Licence without any Limitation is a Monopoly which is as much perhaps by implication as to say that such a Licence with a Limitation is no Monopoly quod non credo As to the second Question Admitting King James might have dispens'd with particular persons for selling Wine by Retail as the constant course hath been since the Statute of 7 E. 6. Whether he could dispense with a Corporation or with this Corporation of Vintners and their Successors as he hath done having no possible knowledge of the persons themselves or of their number to whom he granted his Dispensation which is the Reason insisted on why his Grant is not good As to that 1. First That the nature of the offence is such as may be dispens'd with seems clear in reason of Law and by constant practice of licencing particular persons 2. Where the King can dispense with particular persons he is not confined to number or place but may licence as many and in such places as he thinks fit An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to divers particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons But that Case touches not upon any inconvenience from the largeness of the Kings dispensation in respect of persons place or time which the Law leaves indefinite to the pleasure of the King as the remedy of inconveniences to persons and places by the penal Laws some of which may be very inconvenient to many particular persons and to many trading Towns others but to few persons or places and the remedy by Dispensation accordingly must sometimes be to great numbers of persons and places and sometimes to fewer If the wisdome of the Parliament hath made an Act to restrain pro bono publico the Importation of Forreign Manufactures that the Subjects of the Realm may apply themselves to the making of the said Manufactures for their support and livelyhood to grant to one or more the Importation of such Manufacture without any limitation non obstante the said Act is a Monopoly and void 3. It is admitted a Corporation is capable of a Dispensation as where the King hath an Inheritance in the thing concerning which the Dispensation is so it was express'd and therefore he may dispense with a Corporation of Merchants or with a Town Corporate not to pay Custome for some Commodity as he may with particular persons This seems to end the Question For if the offence in its nature may be dispens'd with and a Corporation be capable of a Dispensation the King 's not knowing the persons or numbers which is the pretended reason will not avoid the Dispensation in the present Case of the Vintners For by the same reason dispensations to Corporations and their Successors would be void in all Cases as well as in this for their persons and numbers must be equally unknown to the King in every Case as in the present Case That a dispensation may be granted to a Body Corporate or Aggregate as well as to private persons Suarez de Legibus which Mr. Attorney cited in this Case and is in truth a most learned Work is very express Suarez de Legibus l. 6. c. 12. f. 416. Dispensatio autem per se primo versari potest circa personam privatam quia solum est particularis exceptio à Communi Lege potest etiam ferri circa
Wine for that Objection reaches to Dispensations with single Persons as well as Corporations 2. The reason why the King cannot dispense in the Cases of Answ 2 buying Offices and Simoniacal Presentations is because the persons were made incapable to hold them and a person incapable is as a dead person and no person at all as to that wherein he is incapable For persons entred in Religion and dead in Law were not to all purposes dead but to such wherein they were incapable to take or give 3. A Member of the House of Commons is by 7 Jac. persona Answ 3 inhabilis and not to be permitted to enter the House before the Oath taken A particular Action is given by 2 H. 4. for such Suit in the Admiralty and such Licence gives the Admiralty a Iurisdiction against Law 4 5 P. M. Dyer 159. Domingo Belatta's Case A third Objection was That this general Dispensation answers Obj. 3 not the end and intention of the Act of 7 E. 6. but seems to frustrate and null that Law wholly And though the King can dispense with penal Laws yet not in such manner as to annihilate and make them void If this Objection held good in fact it is a material one Answ 1 but the Act of 7 E. 6. intended not that no Wine should be sold nor that it should be with great restraint sold but not so loosly as every man might sell it And since it is admitted that the Act of 7 E. 6. restrains not the King's power to licence selling Wine which perhaps was more a Question than this in hand it is clear the King may licence as if the Act had absolutely prohibited selling Wine and left it to the King to licence as he thought fit not abrogating the Law And if so The end of the Act being only that every man should not Answ 2 sell Wine that would as they might when the Act was made and not to restrain convenient numbers to sell for the Kingdoms use The King could not better answer the end of the Act than to restrain the sellers to Freemen of London To the Corporation of Vintners men bred up in the Trade Answ 3 and serving Apprentiships in it And that such should be licenc'd without restraint is most agreeable to the Laws of the Kingdom which permits not persons who had served Seven years to have a way of livelyhood to be hindred from exercising their Trades in any Town or part of the Kingdom Taylors of Ipswich C. Report 11. as was resolved in the Taylors of Ipswich Case in the Eleventh Report And therefore the King had well complyed with the ends of the Law had he licenced such to sell in any part of the Kingdom which he did not but confined them to Towns Obj. 4 It hath been said to the Case of Licences to Corporations for purchasing in Mortmain That the Laws against Mortmain are not penal because they may be dispens'd with without a Non obstante and so cannot penal Laws be Answ 1 It is durus sermo that those Laws are not penal which give the forfeiture of the Land 2. By the Statute of 1 H. 4. c. 6. and 4 H. 4. c. 4. the King is restrained in some Cases from granting as he might at the Common Law Therefore without a Non obstante of those Laws it cannot appear that the King would have granted it if he had been appris'd of those restraining Laws Therefore a Non obstante in such Case is requisite But when a man might by the Common Law purchase without licence as in the Case of Mortmain before the prohibiting Statutes or might Export or Import a prohibited Commodity before restraint by Statute a Licence ex specialia gratia is sufficient without a Non obstante For by petitioning for a Licence the King is sufficiently informed the Law permits not the thing without a Licence which is all the use of a Non obstante This enough appears by the Case in Dyer 269. where a Licence ex speciali gratia is good without issuing any Ad quod damnum in the Case of Mortmain 3. The Writ of Ad quod damnum in that Case which regularly issues informs the King better than a Non obstante would do Obj. 5 Next it hath been said in the Case of Mortmain the King dispenseth only with his own Right and concludes not the mean Lords It is true for the King in no case can dispense but with his own Right and not with anothers Answer hath been offered to the President of Waterford by Obj. 6 which the King dispens'd with the Offence of not bringing the Staple Merchandise from Ireland to Calais being so penal which was an Offence by 10 H. 6. c. and 14 H. 6. c. to the universal hurt of the Kingdom and therefore much greater than selling of Wine contrary to the Statute of 7 E. 6. c. but that was as hath been said Because those Merchants were to pay Custome to the King which was his Inheritance and with which he could dispense Answ This put together sounds thus The Merchants of Waterford were to pay Customes to the King for their Staple Merchandise for which he might dispense if he would but never did for any thing appears The Merchants of Waterford were upon penalties to bring their Staple Merchandise to Calais with which the King could not dispense had no Customes been due from them yet he did dispense with them for that which he could not viz. bringing their Goods to Calais because he did not dispense with them for that which he could viz. their Customes there is no Inference nor Coherence in this Answer But it also appears by the Statute 27 E. 3. c. 11. of the Staple for the reason therein given that the Merchants of Ireland were to pay their Customes in Ireland and to bring their Cockets of their payments there to the Staple lest otherwise they might be doubly charg'd Therefore the Customes which were paid in Ireland before the Goods brought to the Staple was no cause for dispensing with the Corporation of Waterford for not bringing their Merchandise to the Staple according to the penal Laws for that purpose The Licence of Edward the Third pleaded by the men of Waterford was perhaps after the Statute of 27 E. 3. when they were not to pay their Customes at the Staple but however the Licences by them pleaded 1 H. 7. by Henry the Sixth and Edward the Fourth were long after they were to pay their Customes in Ireland and not at the Staple I must say as my Brother Atkins observed before That in this Case the Plaintiffs Council argue against the Kings Prerogative for the extent of his Prerogative is the extent of his Power and the extent of his Power is to do what he hath will to do according to that ut summae potestatis Regis est posse quantum velit sic magnitudinis est velle quantum potest if therefore the King have a will
than a local Subject ibid. 286 5. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents can make him ibid. 6. The Natives of Jersey Garnsey Ireland and the English Plantations c. are not Aliens 268 in loco 278 279 7. Those which are born in the Kings Forreign Plantations are born his Natural Subjects and shall inherit in England 279 8. A Natural Subject is correlative to a Natural Prince and a man cannot have two natural Soveraigns no more than two Fathers or two Mothers 280 273 in loco 283 9. The several ways by which men born out of England may inherit in England 281 10. An Antenatus in Scotland shall not inherit without an Act of Parliament because he is an Alien 274 in loco 284 287 11. Who are the Antenati Postnati and the difference between them 273 in loco 283 12. An Act of Parliament in Ireland shall never Naturalize an Alien to England to make him inheritable there 274 in loco 284 13. No Tenure by Homage c. in any of the Kings Dominions acquired by Conquest or by Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inheritable in England 279 14. No Laws made in any Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the Kings Governor or people there by virtue of the Kings Letters Patents can make an Alien inheritable in England 279 15. One Naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 268 in loco 278 279 280 285 16. A man born a Subject to one that is King of another Country and who afterwards comes to be King of England is an Alien and shall not inherit in England ibid. 285 286 17. An act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject shall not work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of Law 280 18. An Alien hath issue a Son and afterwards is Denizen'd and he afterwards hath another Son here the youngest Son shall inherit 285 Allegiance 1. All Allegiance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law the subjection begins with the birth of the Subject at which time the Kings protection of him likewise begins 279 Appendant 1. Whatsoever is appendant to the Land goes to the Occupier thereof naturally 190 2. An Advowson may be appendant to a Mannor 12 Apprentice 1. The Law permits not persons who have served Seven years to have a way of livelyhood to be hindred from the exercise of their Trades in any Town or part of the Kingdom 356 Arch-bishop See Ordinary Dispensation 1. The Arch-bishop may dispense for a Plurality 20 Assets 1. The manner of pleading Assets ultra 104 Assignee and Assignment 1. Offices or acts of personal Trust cannot be assigned for that Trust which any man may have is not personal 180 181 2. An Occupant becomes an Assignee in Law to the first Lessee 204 3. If a man Covenants against himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns yet if his Assigns do a tortious act it is no breach of the Covenant because he may have remedy by Action for the tort 118 to 128 Assise 1. An Assise will not lye for a Rent issuing out of Tythes barely 204 Attaint See Title Statutes 3 11. 1. An Attaint lies only in Civil not Criminal Causes 145 146 2. Jurors are not finable for a false Verdict an Attaint only lies against them 145 Attorney 1. An Attorney cannot bring Debt for Soliciting but Case only 99 2. The Defendant cannot wage his Law for Attorneys Fees ibid. Attornment 1. By the Common Law an Attornment was requisite to entitle the Lord the Reversioner the Grantee of a Remainder or of a Rent by Deed or Fine to distrain for Rent in arrear 39 2. By a Grant and Attornment the Grantee becomes actually seised of the Rent 40 3. Attornment and power to distrain follows the possession and not the use 43 4. An Attornment cannot be for a time 27 5. An Attornment of the Tenant doth not disclaim but affirm his possession For it is the act of the Tenant by reason of his being in possession 193 6. A mans Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new attornment or privity requisite to such alteration 44 7. Attornment is requisite to the Grant of an Estate for life but to a Confirmation to enlarge an Estate it is not 44 45 46 8. A Rent-charge is granted to Commence Seven years after the death of the Grantor Remainder in Fee Attornment must be made in the life time of the Grantor 46 9. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of a Rent to uses the Cestuy que use may distrain without Attornment 50 51 10. Where a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain without Attornment 51 11. Where a man is seised of a Rent-charge and grants it over to which the Tenant attorns and he afterwards retakes that Estate here must be a new Attornment for the former privity is wholly destroyed 44 12. Where an Attornment shall be good to a contingent use 52 Bargain and Sale See Intollment 1. WHere a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain for the Rent without Attornment 51 Baron and Feme 1. The man after the marriage hath the deduction of the woman ad Domum Thalamum and all the civil power over her and not she over him 306 2. The Interdicts of carnal knowledg in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted but by a consequent for the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 Bishop See Ordinary Archbishop 1. What Bishops were originally 22 2. A Parson is chosen Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 3. It is not at all inconsistent for a Bishop to be an Incumbent 22 4. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 5. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by a Dispensation 25 6. No Canon Ecclesiastical can be made and executed without the Kings Royal assent 329 7. Bishops in Wales were originally of the foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 Canons Ecclesiastical See Title Ecclesiastical Court 1. WHat Canons are good and binding and what not 327 328 Capias ad Satisfaciendum See Execution Certiorari 1. A Certior lies out of the Chancery to Ireland to certifie an Act of Parliament but it doth not lye to Scotland 287 2. A Certiorari doth not lye to Wales to certifie a Record to the Courts at Westminster to the intent that Execution may issue out here upon it 398 Certificate 1. There are many things whereof the Kings Courts sometimes ought to be certified which cannot be certified by Certiorari 288 Chancery 1. The Chancery may grant a Habeas Corpus and discharge a Prisoner thereupon as well
matter of the Law 239 14. A man hath no Right to any thing for which the Law gives no remedy 253 15. The effect of Law can do more than an act of Law 280 16. How things become natural by custome 224 17. What natural Laws are 226 227 18. Of transgressing Natural Laws and in what sense that is to be understood 226 227 228 19. It is not safe in case of a publick Law as between the Spiritual and Temporal Jurisdiction to change the Received Law 220 20. The Law of the Land cannot be altered by the Pope 20 21 132 21. Many Laws made in the time of the Saxon Kings are now received as Common Law 358 Lease Lessor Lessee See Title Statute 23. 1. A Demise having no certain commencement is void 85 2. In what cases the Lessee shall bring an Action against his Lessor for breach of Covenant upon a Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment without the lawful disturbance of himself c it being a full exposition of that Covenant when it is either by Law or Express and general or particular from 118 to 128 3. A Demise of Tythe with Land is good within the 13 El. but a Demise of Tythe barely is not good 203 204 4. A man leases Lands for certain years habendum post dimissionem inde factum to J. N. and J. N. hath no Lease in esse the Lease shall commence immediately from the Sealing 73 74 80 81 83 84 5. A power is granted to Demise Lands usually letten Lands which have been twice letten are within this Proviso 38 6. Which at any time before have been usually letten that which was not in lease at the time of the Proviso nor twenty years before is not within the Proviso 34 35 by the Demise of the Farm of H. the Mannor of H. will pass 71 7. Proviso that the Plaintiff may lease for One and twenty years reserving the ancient Rents so long as the Lessees shall pay the Rents these are words of limitation and the Non-payment of the Rent determines the term without a Demand 32 License See Title King Dispensation  Limitation 1. A Limitation determines a Lease without demand of the Rent 32 2. What words shall be taken to be a Limitation and no Condition 32 Livery and Seisin 1. Where a Rectory is granted Una cum Decimis de D the Tythe which alone cannot pass without Deed doth pass by the Livery of the Rectory and without Livery the Tythe will not pass because it was intended to pass with the Rectory by Livery 197 198 London 1. The Customes of London are confirmed by Act of Parliament 93 2. How Declarations are in London according to their Custome ibid. Marriages See Title Statute 16. 1. Incest was formerly of Spiritual Conizance 212 2. The Judges of the Temporal Courts have by several Acts of Parliament full conizance of Marriages within or without the Levitical Degrees 207 209 210 3. They have full conizance of what Marriages are Incestuous and what not according to the Law of the Kingdom and may prohibit the Spiritual Courts from questioning of them 207 209 210 305 4. The Interdicts of Marriage and carnal Knowledge in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted by a consequent For the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 5. A man married his Grand-fathers Brothers wife by the Mothers side and held lawful 206 207 6. A man married his first Wives sisters daughter and held unlawful and after a Prohibition a Consultation granted 247 321 322 7. For a man to marry his wives sister is a Marriage expresly prohibited within the Eighteenth of Leviticus 305 8. What Marriages are lawful and what not 210 218 219 305 306 307 308 309 9. How the words No Marriages shall be impeached Gods Law except shall be understood 211 10. What Marriages are prohibited within the Levitical Degrees 214 215 306 307 308 11. What Marriages are by Gods Law otherwise prohibited 220 221 12. Marriages contrary thereunto ought not to be dispensed with 214 216 13. Marriages with Cosen Germans lawful 218 219 14. All Marriages are lawful which are not prohibited within the Levitical Degrees or otherwise by Gods Law 219 240 242 305 15. In what sense any Marriages and Copulations of man with woman may be said to be natural and in what not 221 16. Marriages forbidden in Leviticus lawful before 222 17. Marriages lawful after restoring the world in Noah ibid. 18. Concerning Universal Obligation to the Levitical Prohibitions in cases of Matrimony and Incest 230 19. What Marriages were usual in old times 237 20. How simple Fornication was satisfied in the time of Moses ibid. 21. Who shall be said to be the near of kin which are prohibited Marriage 307 308 309 310 311 22. What Marriages are by the Matrimonial Table of England interdicted 315 316 317 318 23. Marriages within the Levitical Prohibitions were always unlawful but Marriages within the Levitical Degrees were not always unlawful 319 320 321 24. How the Levitical Degrees are to be reckoned 320 25. All Marriages prohibited by the Table are declared to be within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law 328 26. In what the Parochial Matrimonial Table used in England agrees with the Karait Rabbins 311 312 27. The primitive Christian Church could punish Incestuous Marriages no otherwise than by forbidding them the Communion 313 28. By what Law the primitive Christian Churches conceived themselves obliged in the matter of Marriage to observe the Levitical prohibitions strictly and indispensibly 314 29. Amongst the Hebrews there was no Divorce for Incest but the Marriage was void and the Incest punished as in persons unmarried 313 Master and Servant 1. Although there is no Master or Servant originally in Nature but only parity yet after Laws have constituted those Relations 242 2. A Father cannot be Servant to his Son 243 Metropolitan See Arch-bishop Ordinary  Misrecital See Lease 1. Where a Lease is misrecited in the date and the habendum is to be from the date which is misrecited there the Lease shall commence from the Sealing 73 Monopoly 1. If Exportation or Importation of a Commodity or Exercise of a Trade is prohibited generally by Act of Parliament and no cause thereof expressed a license may be granted to one or more persons with a Non obstante for by such general Restraint the Law intended to limit the over-numerous Importers and Traders and such general Licenses shall not be accounted Monopolies 345 2. To avoid a Monopoly the Kings Dispensation upon all prohibitory Laws must generally be limited by Law 346 Naturalization See Title Alien  Non obstante 1. IT is a license to do a thing which at the Common Law might be done without it but now being restrained by some Act of Parliament cannot be done without it 345 356 2. Where a
Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 Right See Title Action 1. Where there can be presumed to be no remedy there is no right 38 Seisin 1. THe profits of all and every part of the Land are the Esplees of the Land and prove the Seisin of the whole Land 255 2. In an Entry sur Disseisin or other Action where Esplees are to be alledged the profits of a Mine will not serve 254 Spoliation 1. The Writ of Spoliation lyes for one Incumbent against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 Statute See Recognizance 1. A Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 Statutes in general 1. Where an Act of Parliament is dubious long usage is a just medium to expound it by and the meaning of things spoken and written must be as hath been constantly received by common acceptation 169 2. But where usage is against the obvious meaning of an Act by the vulgar and common acceptation of words then it is rather an oppression then exposition of the Act 170 3. When an Act of Parliament alters the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in cases of publick utility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the words themselves 179 4. Secular Judges are most conizant in Acts of Parliament 213 5. When the words of a Statute extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening but doth to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they will reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt 373 6. But where the words of a Law do extend to an inconvenience seldom happening there it shall extend to it as well as if it happens more frequently 373 7. An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon a penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to diverse particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons 347 8. Whatsoever is declared by an Act of Parliament to be against Law we must admit it so for by a Law viz. by Act of Parliament it is so declared 327 9. Where the Kings Grant is void in its creation a saving of that Grant in an Act of Parliament shall not aid it 332 10. How an Act of Parliament may be proved there hath been such an Act where the Roll is lost 162 163 404 405 407 11. An Act of Parliament in Ireland cannot effect a thing which could not be done without an Act of Parliament in England 289 12. Distinct Kingdoms cannot be united but by mutual Acts of Parliament 300 13. A repealed Act of Parliament is of no more effect than if it had never been made 325 Statutes 1. Merton cap. 4. The Statute of Merton which gave the owner of the Soyl power to approve Common did not consider whether the Lord was equally bound to pasture with his Tenants or not but it considered that the Lord should approve his own Ground so as the Commoners had sufficient 256 257 2. The inconveniences before the making of the Statute and the several remedies that were provided by it 257 1. Westm 1. 3 E. 1. The Antiquae Custumae upon Woolls Woolfells and Leather were granted to E. 1. by Parliament and therefore they are not by the Common Law 162 163 1. Westm 1. cap. 38. Attaints in Pleas real were granted by this Statute 146 1. Westm 2. cap. 24. The Quare Ejecit infra terminum is given by this Statute for the recovery of the Term against the Feoffee for an Ejectment lay not against him he coming to the Land by Feoffment 127 Statute of Glocester 1. Restrained warranties from binding as at Common Law 366 377 2. Before this Statute all Warranties which descended to the Heirs of the Warrantors were barrs to them except they were Warranties which commenced by Disseisin 366 3. The reason why the warranty of Tenant in Tayl with assets binds the right of the Estate Tayl is in no respect from the Statute de Donis but by the equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the Warranty of the Tenant per Curtesie barrs not the Heir for his Mothers Land if his Father leaves not assets to descend 365 4. If this Statute had not been made the lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis with assets descending than it doth without assets ibid. Westm 2. De Donis 1. All Issues in Tayl within this Statute are to claim by the Writ purposely formed there for them which is a Formedon in the Descender 369 2. it intended not to restrain the alienation of any Estates but such as were Fee-simples at the Common Law 370 3. This Statute intended not to preserve the Estate for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all Warranties but against the alienation with or without Warranty of the Donee and Tenant in Tayl only 369 4. Therefore if Tenant for life alien with Warranty which descended upon the Reversioner that was not restrained by the Statute but left at the Common Law 370 5. By this Statute the Warranty of Tenant in Tayl will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion ibid. 6. The Donee in Tayl is hereby expresly restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands entayled may not revert to the Donor for want of issue in Tayl 371 7. See a further Exposition upon this Statute from fol. 371 to 393 1. Wales Statute de Rutland 12 E. 1. after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annext to England Jure proprietatis and received Laws from England as Ireland did Vide postea 9 17 18. and had a Chancery of their own and was not bound by the Law of England until 27 H. 8. 300 301 399 400 2. Although Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice there in other manner than now they have with the Barbadoes Jersey c. all which are of the Dominions of England and may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament 400 See for a further Exposition 401 402 c. Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. 1. Recognizances for Debt were taken before this Statute by the Chancellor two Chief Justices and Justices Itinerants neither are they hindred by this Statute from taking them as they did before 102 28 E. 3. c. 2. concerning Wales 1. Tryals and Writs in England for Lands in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for Lands within the Principality of Wales Vide ante 7. pòstea 17 18. for the Lordships and Marchers were of the Dominion of England and held of