facility of their sciences For as Apelles said well vnto a Painter that bragged of his speedy workmanship when shewing his picture he said This I drew euen now Surely said Apelles though thou hadst saied nothing yet should I easily haue guessed by the workemanship that it was done in haste So may we well say to these quicke-witted mechanicall tradesmen a man that hath but a little insight into their trade may well thinke their craftes are soone learned and I rather maruell as Apelles said that they learned no more in the same quantitie and length of time But it fareth with their grosse phantasie as it doth with our eie-sight in an vnequall distance from the obiect for as being far off we conceiue of the vnmeasurable greatnesse of the most huge hilles to bee but as a point so the infinite excellencies of the heauenly Artes being too farre remooued from their grosse or rather narrow capacity come into their conceite as things of lesse moment which if their dimme or rather weake eie sight were able to beholde in their diuine nature they would soone confesse their surpassing excellency and exceeeding difficulty But to leaue them to their pleasing opinions and to come to our purpose which is in briefe to handle the differences of the Ages of Mans life as also the causes thereof together with the incident qualities to euery of them which being in some sort auaileable to the knowledge of our selues the highest point of knowledge which can be attained vnto by the iudgement of the wise Apollo as also either altogether omitted or very slightly handled by others I hope my small paines and lesse ability shall be accepted in good worth and accounted of rather according to the good intent of the author than the worthinesse of the worke In which hope of acceptation for my good indeuors and fauourable pardon of my manifold errors I come without any longer Preface to the substance of the Treatise THE DIFFERENCES of the Ages of mans Life Together with the originall causes progresse and end thereof MAN the Epitome of the whole world Lord of the creatures in regard of that perfect analogie and resemblance betweene him the great worlds frame is not vnfitly by the Learned both Diuines and Philosophers termed The Lesser world for there is nothing in the vaste compasse of this vniuersall circumference whose likenesse and liuely representation we haue not summarily comprised in man as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement For as the first-moued-sphere carieth with its motion the subiect inferiour circles so the seruile vnderfaculties as the sensuall desire appetite are by nature subdued to the dominion and guidance of the more principall and mistris-power of the soule which wee call reason And as in the middest of heauen there is situated the Sunne that enlightneth all things with his raies and cherisheth the world and the things therein contained with his life-keeping heat so the heart of man the fountaine of life and heat hath assigned to it by nature the middle part of our body for his habitation from whence proceedeth life and heat vnto all the parts of the bodie as it were vnto riuers whereby they be preserued and inabled to performe their naturall and proper functions But not to be infinite in prosecuting the particulars of this well knowen comparison as in other things we see a perfect proportion so also beside the analogie we may obserue a mutuall coexistence For as the world at the beginning was created for man so with man it shall also be abolished for it is an vndeniable principle in Philosophy that God and Nature or rather the God of Nature neither effectually worketh nor permissiuely suffereth any thing but vnto some good end For being infinitely wise nay wisedome it selfe how can we imagine so high a point of folly resident in his Godhead as to allow of vanities things so hatefull and so abhorring from all mediocrity of wisedome Wherefore man hauing a determinate date of endurance which hee cannot passe the world also which is only for mans vse and seruice must of necessity haue an end of being Now because there is as we said a mutuall coexistence of the world and man as the world is not but for man so neither is man but in and by the world For as in Nauigation those that are in the shippe haue rest and motion with the mouing cessation of the ship so we that are tossed in the rough sea of this world in our voiage vnto heauen our safest hauen when our vessell of carriage once perisheth we also perish together For as Aristotle said truely that whatsoeuer hath being hath of necessity being in some place so from thence ariseth this necessary illation that when there is once left no place to be in then shall there remaine no longer being So that intending to shew this truth as very pertinent to our purpose viz. that man hath an appointed time of being which hee cannot passe the Question of the worlds eternity is fitly incident especially seeing as is aforesaid the world is for mans sake and man by meanes of the world Now if any man shall call into question the pertinency of this question for his satisfaction and resolution in that behalfe let him consider how necessarily vpon the variation of our temperature whence the distinction of ages proceedeth a finall destructition by an vnperceiueable lingring decay of purity in our substance doth depend For as in the violent motion of things naturall we see it comes to passe that the virtue or power of mouing imprinted by the vnnaturall mouer by little and little decaying at length by continuance of mouing or rather by the resistance of the bodies about it is cleane extinguished So in the naturall proceeding toward the enemie and end of nature death the preseruing meanes of life either by the toilesomenesse of their neuer-ceasing operation or by the corruption and mixture of impure moisture infecbled and disabled to the sufficient performance of their functions more and more euery day at length of force yeelds to the oppressing violence of their resisting aduersaries not able any longer to maintaine their conquering action so that the discussing of this contronersie is very homogeneous to the series of this treatise For till there be granted an end of mans life the mutation of the temperature by decay of nature may well be doubted of forasmuch as a successiuc impairing alway importeth a finall dissolution First therefore touching the continuance of the world whether as it had a beginning so it shall haue an end or rather whether it euer had beginning or shall haue an end of being Dionysius in his booke de Diuinis nominibus distinguisheth things that are according to the difference of their indurance the distinction is after this sort The whole number of things how many and diuers soeuer may be summarily comprised vnder these three seuerall heads There are some things or rather there is one thing
incident to creatures commonly called Generation the other supernaturall the priuiledge of God himselfe which we terme Creation Now euery making which is a Generation requireth a really-being subiect because it is either a motion or mutation which supposeth a matter wherein it is receiued but the making of Creation is alway without any matter subiect being desined to be A making something of nothing But these aduersaries admit of no such duplicity of making holding it a meere impossibilitie for any Agent in this sort to create Thus therefore somewhat otherwise we answer There be two sorts of Agents or Efficients the one Vniuersall the other Particular or Partiall They differ thus That the Efficient vniuersall is cause of the whole being and essence of it effect making both matter and forme and this action of this Agent is not Motion or Mutation but a bare Emanation The Particular Agent is not cause of the whole essence of that it maketh seeing it alway requireth the preexistence of the matter and the action thereof is truely called Motion or Mutation So then it is impossible for a partiall or halfe efficient as you may terme him to worke or make a thing of nothing but for an vniuersall it is not onely possible but euen easie And is it not thinke you to answer euery point of their reason an infirmitie in the maker not to bee able to make a thing without matter for why is the existence of the matter necessarie but because the efficient can doe nothing and doth not this import a defect of the workmans abilitie No say the aduersaries for it is no imperfection to be vnable to doe things impossible but we denie that this is vnpossible vnto any but vnto particular agents naturall as for God to whom nothing is vnpossible but to denie himselfe as he is the whole and sole cause of being so is he able euen from a not being to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being Secondly say they vnlesse we grant an euer-being of motion we must needs admit either of a proceeding in infinitum or els of this senselesse contradiction that before the first motion there was a motion more ancient two maine absurdities the one in reason the other in nature For the progresse in infinitum they thinke it is thus proued for before the motion whereby the first mooued body was made there was of necessity requisite some potentiall being thing because that motion is only incident vnto things of a potentiall existence If that be granted then they inferre that there was some motion wherby this subiect had it being and so in infinitum But to stop their long iourney wee may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a creation It is true indeed that there must needes bee a thing capable of motion before there can be any moouing for in euery motion there is a thing moouing and a thing mooued but there is no necessitie that this mooueable should haue its being by motion for it was made by creation which was no motion but a simple and bare emanation For there is a two-fold mediate action whereby a cause is said to worke according to which duplicitie of action they hane thus distinguished of causes efficient There is say the Schoolemen a double efficient or working cause one called Efficiens per transmutationem that is such a cause whose operation is alway ioined with some change in the thing working according as is the resistance either of the bodie betweene it and the patient or of the thing whereon hee worketh which doth more or lesse withstand his impression The other is Efficiens per emanationem as when without any repugnancy of any patient or labour of the agent the effect or worke doth voluntarily and freely arise from the action of the working cause as the shadow from the body such is God whose vnresistable power by his bare word of command euen of nothing made this admirable worke of the world as the shadow and obscure representation of his wisedome and omnipotency not changed in his nature there being nothing by Reaction to imprint any thing in the impassionable Godhead And this is the full and sufficient answer to the second argument Thirdly they reason thus There is an eternall mouer therefore there hath bene an eternall motion and a thing moued in asmuch as these relatiues cannot be but together in nature For answer whereto wee must remember that there is an absolute both consideration and being of God Absolute I say and out of relation otherwise Gods being should be onely in relation It is true indeed that relatiues are alway together in nature beginning to be and finishing their being in one and the same moment For instance a father is not a father vntill he haue a sonne nor is he a father longer than he hath a sonne And yet for all that those things which are Relatiues may haue being one before another thogh not as Relatiues yet as things really subsisting in nature For example who can deny that Adam was in nature before either conception or birth of his bloody sonne Cain yet was he not a father vntill God had blessed him with that after-cursed-ofspring And who seeth not that the Carpenter had being in Nature before he builds the house although he be no actuall builder till the house be in making So God that was from euerlasting before all times had his being without motion though not as a mouer yet as a thing really and perfectly existing but when in fulnesse of time according to the free determined purpose of his will he began the frame of the world then also began he to be a Relatiue a builder in respect of this goodly house and palace the world a Father that is the Beginning of being vnto the childe of the creation the image of his greatnesse and indeed in these and such kinde of controuersies we must warily vse these termes of relation especially in regard of the creatures lest wee binde God onely vnto a relatiue being and so make his existence dependent on the creatures Their fourth argument is in substance this If God so long before had being without being a Creator there was doubtlesse some defect in the foregoing time the supplie whereof in the moment of creation moued him to make the world rather at that time than any other For there is no new action but presupposeth some new incitement which moued the Agent to vndertake the worke more then before but there could bee nothing at this time more than before that could moue God the principall and perfectest workeman to take in hand this busienesse and worke rather now than before for then how could he be the primary and principall cause But this in short may be the answer Indeed there was all this time an impediment forasmuch as God would not actually create vntill the time foreappointed in his secret purpose was accomplished Nay but say the aduersaries God vntill this time
and such like which procure rather our annoiance than serue any way for our vse and benefit For to say they are chanceable or of a voluntary selfe procreation is in our Philosophy absurd especially seeing we extend Gods power and prouidence vnto verie flies and such like creatures But we may answer first that there is nothing so cumbersome which is not some way seruiceable Or if now disobedient yet not so created but for mans rebellion against God permitted or rather directed to arme themselues against him for whose vse and helpe they were created like vnto that sword which Hector gaue Aiax which so long as he vsed against men his enemies serued for his helpe and defence but after that he began to vse it or rather to abuse it to the hurt of hurtlesse beasts it turned into his owne bowels For vntill the transgression Adam liued as Lord of the creatures hauing the now most dangerous and pernicious creatures vnder him in subiection For the diuell that subtle seducer was not so simple a sot as to make choise of the serpent to beguile him wth inticements if he had knowen or but suspected any resident feare in man of the serpent by some foregoing remembred mischiefe for that had beene rather to terrifie him from all attention then any way to allure him to follow his counsell So that all things which now are vnto corrupted man most cumbersome as punishments of his disloialty were by creation ordained for his furtherance Nor need they wonder that Gods power and knowledge should stretch it selfe vnto flies and such diminutiue creatures as they tearme them nay it is far more insensible that the estate of flies should bee vnknowen vnto him for that were to bound the infinitnesse of his knowledge But to leaue the professed Atheist who though from Aristotle his schoole he sucked his noisome error yet went farre beyond Aristotle in impiety For Aristotle at least in words confested Gods being an infinitnes which also hee went about to prooue and confirme by reason whereas these godlesse Heretikes doe not onely deny both in their works and by consequence of words but euen shamelesly with direct speeches not only his omnipotency but euen his very being let vs therefore come to Aristotle and his lesse profane followers The Peripatetickes principall and most subtle argument which also they vrge with greatest vehemency is briefly this say they either the world was from euerlasting or else made anew proceeding from not being vnto this being which now it hath But it was not made a new for then either it proceeded from a power and fitnesse which it had to bee vnto this actuall being or else it was made of nothing If before it was actually subsisting it had a being potentiall from euerlasting seeing things that are potentially though in the basest degree of being yet are not meerely nothing it followeth that it alwaies was at least potentially and so eternall If we say that it was made of nothing that is in their Philosophy an absurd impossibility For it is with them a principle not questionable That euery making presupposeth a subiect Now if wee obiect that the necessary presence of a reall subiect dependeth only vpon the Makers infirmity and imperfection they answer that the disability of doing impossibilities is not defect or imbecillity To which said argument of theirs as they would haue it there may bee a double answer giuen For first wee affirme that the world proceeded from not being to being To the proposition of their prosyllogisme we answer by deniall thereof and reiect their distinction as sophisticall putting contrariety the greatest opposition betwixt things not only agreeing but euen all one For there is a potentiall being incident to things that are not at all and therefore doe the Schoolemen distinguish of the potentiall being after this manner A thing say they may bee said to haue a potentiall being two waies first that is said to bee potentially which is not yet either in whole or in part subsisting in nature which hauing no reall or actuall cause of being may notwithstanding afterward haue a true cause of its essence and existence So that it is not any thing in or of it selfe but is vertually contained within the ability of some thing that may afterward bring it vnto a true and reall being As for example there is a potentiall being of moe worlds then one inasmuch as God by his vnresistable vndecaied power is able as well to make more worlds as hee was to create this one world which wee behold and inhabite yet who will say that there are more worlds then one either totally or partially really and truely now being in nature Indeed it is a thing within the compasse of Gods omnipotencie to bring in a multiplicitie of worlds and therefore we may not vntruely say that this multiplicitie of worlds hath a being potentiall So likewise who will denie that a man sound and without maime or lacke of his limmes that neuer set foot ouer his threshold hath power with supposition of health and strength to trauell ouer the whole circuit of the countrey yet is it absurd to say that this iourney of his is any way in nature either wholly or in part Secondly that may iustly and is more properly said to be potentially that hauing an actuall and reall subsisting euen separate from it efficient cause wherein it was before vertually contained yet lacketh somewhat which by nature it is capable of As for instance hereof a childe altogether vnlettred may iustly be said to be potentially disposed toward the receit of learning inasmuch as it hath a reasonable soule which is alway accompanied with a capacitie of learning To applie this distinction vnto our purpose we say that to be potentially in the first degree is indeed to be nothing because this potentiall being is a meere not being so was the world from euerlasting hauing such an abilitie and capablenesse that I may so speake of being forasmuch as God by his omnipotency was from euerlasting powerfull enough to create the world as in time hee did actually make the same Now for that other kinde of potentiall being incident vnto things onely that haue receiued an actuall being from their causes it was in that rude Chaos created by God the first day of the begunmaking of the world and was afterward perfected in the worke of distinction as the Schoole-men call it when God out of that confusion or rather vpon that rude lumpe brought this admirable varietie and difference of creatures for the ornament of the world for that the world was in this sort potentially onely at the creation of the first matter which was in the time by Moses mentioned Secondly we answer that it is not impossible for God of nothing to make things really and truly subsisting as we before proued To their Axiome or principle which they call Vndeniable we answer that there is a twofolde faction or making One naturall
was indifferent to create or not to create therefore there was in the instant of the creation some thing that restrained this his indifferency But we may answer That there was no such indifferency as they talke of God hauing from all eternity purposely determined at this time to beginne the worke of the creation So that vnto the fore-mentioned demand of the Atheist why God deferred the creating of the world vntill this moment of time we may answer that of the choise of this time rather then any other for this his worke there can no other reason be giuen but his most free-will that in his decree of creation restrained and bound it selfe to this time rather than vnto any other Now if they shall reply that we are not to imagine Gods will vnreasonable and therefore no doubt there was some reason that mooued him to this limitation of his will we may answer That we doe not deny but God had some reason though not without himselfe of this his prorogation Nay we may without offence goe so farre as to giue some reason of this dilation in generall That God would not from euerlasting create the world to shew the independency of his existence in regard of the creatures as also to giue vs vnderstand that not for any hope of benefit which should proceed to him from the creatures he vndertooke this worke but rather as it is the property of goodnesse to communicate it selfe out of the ouerflowing fountaine of his indefectiue goodnesse to deriue some commodity vnto vs his creatures for hee that could so long be without vs might without any inconueniency vnto himselfe for euer haue continued in that state of lonelinesse So that of the deferring of the creation in generall there may be a reason giuen but why hee began at this time rather than at any other either before or after there is no other reason but his owne free-will knowen vnto vs. But heere ariseth a doubt whether God could haue begun sooner or put off longer this worke of creation The answer is that he could by his potential and absolute power he could not by his actuall and conditionall For Gods power hath a two-fold consideration the one absolute without regard of any his decrees whatsoeuer whereby he is able to do all euen those things that he will not the other conditionall ioined with the consideration and respect of his will whereby he is able to doe all things which hee will and onely those things which he will God therefore respected without his decree was able sooner or later to create the world but if we consider him together with his purpose hee could not either haue preuented or deferred this his intended worke of the creation Nor do we heereby robbe God of his freedome or binde him to any part of the contradiction but if hee bee bound sure hee hath bound himselfe hauing this law onely prescibed him that he denie not himselfe that is indeed to take away his Godhead But if God would not from euerlasting make the world how is he not changed in his will The answer is that God would from euerlasting make the world but he would not make the world from euerlasting that is in plainer tearmes God had from euerlasting a will and purpose to create the world but it neuer was his will that the world should haue a coeternall being with himselfe so that Gods will is stil the same altogether vnaltered But they farther vrge this argument demanding how God by an euerlasting and old action of his wil could in time create the world anew remaining himselfe vnchangeable To which we may answer that a continued action of his will how ancient soeuer executing onely that which he before intended may well stand without admission of alteration as for example If the purpose of my will to day be to iourney toward London the next weeke which also according vnto purpose I performe will any man say my will is changed In like sort God from euerlasting decreeing to create the world at such a time if at the time purposed this his decree be put in execution is not thereby changed Nay rather he is thereby to be thought more vnchangeable for as much as he performeth that which before he did determine Why but say they God is not freed from alteration because that of a Non-creator hee was made a Creator The answer is That God was not heereby changed albeit there was indeed some change though improperly so called when as the world proceeded frō not being vnto being for the succession of a being after a not being importeth some alteration thogh not in the author of the new being but rather in the thing that receiued that being we shall make it plaine by this supposition Let vs imagine a vault or other close place so fenced from the Sunne beames that no light not the least glimmering can pierceit which afterward by digging or some such meanes may haue passage made thorough it for the Sunnes accesse would we say that the Sunne were by this meanes altered because it inlightneth a place which before was full of darknesse Euen so and much more so God the fountaine of Light whose Spirit moouing vpon the waters whereas before there was darknesse vpon the face of the deepe enlightned that darknesse distinguishing those things which before were confusedly mixed or rather bringing them from nothing to this their perfection is not at all altered but still remaineth the same euer vnchangeable And indeed if euery new worke of God should make him changeable how should hee not be often changed creating daily the soules of now liuing men For to say they haue being before their ioining vnto the body is plainly hereticall and Origen was in that behalfe accused of a verie grosse error Nor is it likely nor yet indeed possible they should come by traduction or propagation from our parents For our soules being as the Angels are Spirituall substances are as farre from that abilitie of procreation as the Angels are those supernaturall celestiall creatures and there is the like reason for both The Angels by reason of their spiritualitie are void and vncapable of procreation mens soules also being no lesse spirituall than the Angels are also vnfit for procreation therefore one soule begets not another much lesse comes it of a corporall seed it selfe being spirituall It remaines therefore that they are then anew created by God and so coupled vnto their bodies Neither is God for this cause changed seeing as is aforesaid he doth now onely put in execution that which before he had in intention and therefore to conclude this whole argument with that saying of Hugo de Sancto Victore Gods will was eternall and the worke of his will was temporary for alwaies euen from Eternitie he had a will to create the world yet neuer was he purposed to make the world from euerlasting but his purpose and will was to make that in time which hee purposed
cause of life nor the best moisture in euery quantity there are one or two requisite conditions annexed first concerning the qualitie that it be not too thinne and fluid such as is the naturall disposition of water but more cleauing and fat such as may resemble the nature of oile for its better preseruation from putrefaction secondly that it haue some competent degree of heat to keepe it from congealing last of all that it be pure not mingled with excrementall superfluities forasmuch as all mixture of superfluities is against nature enemie to good digestion and sound nutrition Those things thus obserued our moisture shall be sufficiently qualified for our liues maintenance Touching the quantitie in a word as is before said it must neither bee excessiue lest the too great quantitie oppresse our heat as wee see infusion of too much oile oftentimes put out the lampe nor yet defectiue lest the deuouring action of our heat too soone consume it but in a competent mediocrity such as the heat may neither ouer-hastily vanquish nor with the violence of excessiue inequalitie too suddenly be extinguished Where briefly wee may see the reason why man is longer liued than other creatures of more vast bodies for though in the large capacitie of their great receiuers they haue a greater quantity of this naturall moisture than is incident vnto mans small body yet haue they it not so well tempered and proportioned to their heat which may well bee gathered by their slowe and seldome breathing So that it is true which the Philosopher hath that the great or little quantitie of the bodie is no sufficient cause of long life And yet this is withall most true that where there is greatest store of humiditie with a competent proportion of heat there is greatest fitnesse naturally for long life And that is the reason why those that in their infancie are most subiect to a languishing diseasednesse are afterward most healthfull and for the most part longest liued For the abundance of their naturall moisture hindreth the too speedy preuailing of the heat by resisting its action and so is it the lesse mingled with forren impurities For as we see the Smiths fire by the moderate sprinckling of water though at first for a time its force is somewhat abated yet it at length hauing ouercome its weake aduersary as in triumph burneth the cleerer and lasteth longer so fareth it in our bodies for our heat not able on the sudden to ouersway our multitude of moisture is the longer hindred from consuming it whence proceedeth long life and after it hath gotten the vpper hand performeth with more facility its naturall functions whence commeth healthfulnesse where wee may also explane that Probleme why children that are too ripe witted in their childhood are for the most part either shortest liued or els toward their old age most sottish according to our Prouerbe Soone ripe soone rotten for hence wee may gather that from the beginning they had but little moisture ouer which their heat soone preuailed for much humiditie is cause of blockishnesse and folly whence is that of Galen that fleame being a cold waterish humour is of no force for ornament of good conditions and Plato doubted not to say that looke how much moisture there is in vs so much also is our folly and thereof it is as the same Plato obserueth that children and women are for the most part most foolish For the glorious light and Sunne-like splendour of the soule is therwith as with a cloud obscured and intercepted which is an euident proofe of the small store of moisture in these quicke witted forward children ouer which the heat so much the sooner obtaining dominion and in processe of time drying the braine the subordinate instrument of vnderstanding either quite destroieth it and so bringeth death or els so corrupts it that it is altogether vnable and vnfit to steed the inner senses in their functions whereon the vnderstanding in this prison of the boby principally dependeth which may no lesse fitly serue for answer vnto that consequent demand why those infants for the most part are soonest able to walke to talke to conceiue to remember and such like the reason is taken from the little quantitie of moisture which may bee gathered by the contrary disposition in the otherwise affected subiects as also by that which we see in daily experience in creatures of other kinds For whereas man by reason of his fluid vnsetled substance hath for the better strengthning of his ioints his bodie swathed and is a long time before he is able to stand or walke or performe any such like his vitall functions we see other creatures almost in the same moment borne and inabled to stand walke and such like for their vnequall quantitie of heat preuailing ouer the little store of moisture soone sitteth them for the performance of vitall actions that being the soules chiefe instrument in the discharge of her duties Now if any man shall aske what this iust proportion is and when they are tempred so as may best be auaileable for long life the answer is that heat and moisture are then well proportioned when neither the moisture with its too great quantity deuoureth the heat nor the ouermuch heat too suddenlie consumes and eateth vp the moisture Yet must the heat haue a kind of dominion ouer the moisture else can it not be able to nourish the bodie For in nutrition the thing nourished by reason of the instrument ordained for that purpose must actually worke vpon that whereby it is nourished And because that euery Agent must be proportioned vnto the patient in the inequality of excesse therefore must the heat being the soules sole actiue instrument of nutrition haue dominion ouer the moisture the subiect matter of that facultie Touching the complexions the question is which of them is best disposed and fitted for length of life To take that for granted which Fernelius doubteth of namely that there are foure if not onely yet chiefely notable complexions we answer that those of a sanguine constitution are by nature capable of the longest life as hauing the two qualities of life best tempred And therefore is compared vnto the aire which is moderatly hot and in the highest degree moist Yet not with that too thinne and fluid watrish moisture but more oily oile it selfe resembling the true nature of the aire Therefore the sanguine complexion is fittest for long life For choler is an humor like vnto fire extreame hot and moderatly drie and so vnsufficient to make supply of moisture to the deuouring operation of that firie heat which is in it In the flegmaticke the copiousnesse of that humour resembling water oppresseth the heat and so hindreth good digestion whence proceed crudities in the stomacke and liuer from whence they are diffused into the veines and so vnto all the parts of the body and at length the body is ouergrowen with corruption Lastly melancholy resembling the earth and its qualities