obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
〈◊〉 an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions Also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a multitude of men which are under the same Law Whence it is added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Virtue of a Citie is the constitution of a right Politie Whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Politician or Statesman is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that understandes the constitution of a Citie or Republic Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle in his Politics 1. 5. makes a Citie to be a kind of animate or animal nature For look as an Animal rightly disposed according to nature is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually ordinate and communicating each to other as also to the whole their exercices and operations so in like manner a Citie when duely disposed and instituted is constituted of such proportionate parts for the mutual aide and assistance each of other And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sanitie such is that of a Citie or Republic and its parts as to tranquillitie And what is sanitie according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Disposition or right Order of al parts in the Animal whereby they are capacitated perfectly to exert al exercitations and operations convenient to their nature according to which Analogie or proportion the Tranquillitie of a Citie or Republic is nothing else but its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order or right Disposition of al its parts counected together by some commun Law as Marsilius Patavinus that great Politician in his Defensor pacis cap. 2. pag. 6. has wel determined Cicero defines a Republic Rem populi the Affaire of the People and he desines the People a Societie of the multitude Populus coetus multitudinis juris consensu utilitatis communione sociatas Cic. consociated by the consent of Right and communion of Vtilitie i. e. according to our English Phraseologie The people are a Societis consociated by commun consent and according to some Law for public Good This Strabo also lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitution of al ancient politic Societies as we shal shew § 5. on that head of Legislation A People is defined by Augustin de Civ Dei l. 19. c. 24. a Societie of the rational multitude consociated for concordant communion in those things they consent unto Which is by so much the better by how much the more they concord in what is best and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse And as the processe of Nature and Art is always from things lesse perfect to that which is more perfect so it hath been with al Societies which begin at first only with two Man and Woman Gen. 2.18 c. which Plato termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence this imperfect Societie extended it self to more perfect families and then domestic Societie extended it self to Pagus i. e. to the Societie of Villages for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village who dranke of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Dor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Societie of Villages at last extended it self to that of a Citie as this to that of a Republic as Aristot Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A Citie was at first instituted for the securitie preservation and wel-being of the whole Hence a Citie is defined by Augustin de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some commun bond of Societie So also de Civit. Dei l. 1. c. 15. he saith A Citie is nothing else but a concord multitude of men Thence Grotius de Jure belli pag. 6. defines a Citie a companie of men consâ—ciated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie Wherein note 1 The generic Idea of a Citie which is a Companie or Communitie i. e. perfect for it is essential to a Citie both as to Mater and Forme that it be perfect It is perfect as to Mater in that it is composed of al manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the subsistence and welfare of a Communitie It is also perfect as to Forme as it has a perfect Order and Regiment for the conservation and gubernation thereof 2 Whence follows the formal constitution of a Citie which consistes in its regular consociation of which before 3 Thence also its End is for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie of which also in what precedes Touching a Citie its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer not only of Religion but also of Philosophie Savonarola Epit. Ethicae l. 10. § 5. Legislation its Origine Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Politie and politic Bodie we now passe on to the Empire thereof which consistes in Legislation and Administration or Jurisdiction That al politic Bodies are bounded and governed by Laws has been already proved § 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo Geogr. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one commun Law appointing them what to do for otherwise that a multitude should without harmonie among themselves concur in the doing of one thing it is impossible Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and al politic Bodies is wel laid down by Plato Protag pag. 326. where speaking of the Education of Youth he saith That after they depart from under their Preceptors the Republic compels them to learne the Laws and to live according thereunto a certain Formule being framed that so none act rashly according to their own wils but as Writing-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters and strokes of the pen thereby to forme their hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. So the Republic having framed a Formule of Laws invented by good and ancient Legislators according to their prescript compels both those that governe and those that are governed to act but if any transgresse their bounds him they punish which kind of punishment they cal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Correction 1. The necessitie of Laws Touching the Necessitie of Laws we have an excellent Disscourse in Plato Leg. 9 p. 874 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that Laws be framed for men that so they may live according to Laws for if they should live without these they would in nothing differ from the savage bestes The cause whereof is this because no mans ingenie is so framed by nature as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the commun utilitie of human life or if he should know what is best yet he is not always able or willing to act the same This grand reason of State inducing a necessitie of Laws he explicates in the
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concurse we are to consider that there is a twofold Concurse of God one moral the other efficacious which some terme physic Concurse because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect but a moral Cause as dictinguished from physic is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect yet he doth so far morally concur as that the effect is imputed to him as it 's wel determined by Suarez Metaph. Disput 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent but only objectively and remotely by Commands Arguments Incentives Motives and such like moral influences which is only a metaphoric indirect remote improper and inefficacious kind of efficience But now a physic Cause is that which alone deserves and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause because it doth by a proper real direct and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good He commandes propones arguments invites persuades what is good as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them This being premissed we procede to demonstrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurse 1 From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working specially in supernatural gratiose effects The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion Conservation Promotion and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne or supernatural vocation and motion they terme it sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the operant and cooperant Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Energie Aide and Assistence of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ineffable Virtue of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the assistent Power It 's termed also by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne and Divine impulse or inclination also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of protection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Spring of Energie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self perfect and sufficiently operative Chrysostome termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insuperable Assistence But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it than Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. de Adorat Tom. 1. where he assertes That men are turned from sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only by words injected into the Soul i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion by moral suasion only but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an energetic efficacious Aide whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand Clemens Alexandr l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Inspiration of God also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words And Athanas contr Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power communicated from God Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of God hath overcome Whence the Greek Theologues termed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence And Chrysostome saith expressely that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God 2 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil. We have before § 3. demonstrated that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God but only the act of the Divine Wil which being omnipotent it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious Whence it is worthy our notice that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word as Gen. 1.3 c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil Hence in sacred Philosophie the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie both Word and Thing denoting to us that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done is done and whatever is done is but the effect of his Word or Wil every Word and Wil of God which regardes the event and issues of things is omnipotent and operative 3 From the Determination of the second cause by the first Gods Concurse is not only moral by propounding objects and persuading thereto but really operative and productive of things Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate the first and second cause cannot be coordinate but the later must be subordinate to the former and if subordinate to then it must be determined by the first Cause It 's certain that either the second cause determines the first or the first the second and is it not more likely that the first cause should determine the second than that the second should determine the first to act Can we imagine that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God and the condition of a Creature to determine that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes See Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez de Auxil l. 3. Disp 18-21 l. 4. Disput 32. Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. Gods Concurse connatural Lastly Gods concurse albeit it be most potent and efficacious yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial there is not more of force than Divine suavitie mixed therewith So Psal 110.3 Psal 110.3 Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power Willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies 1 Free ready chearful spontaneous 2 Metonymically a free gift or oblation 3 Princes who ought to be free-spirited generose liberal as Luke 22.25 4 The word is here used in the abstract which carries a great emphase for abstractes speak essences 5 It is here also in the Genitive case plural of thy willingnesses which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree So that the meaning is thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free ready willing as Noble and Free-borne Princes to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering gift or oblation unto thee Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the interne philtrum or charme by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace which is
sweetly received by Chrysostome Hom. 31. in Mat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an opportune vocation Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 12. Nihil Augustino certius est quà m in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem per quam solam operamur quicquid boni operamur nominedulcedinis suavitatis delectationis nempe spiritualis coelestis esse significatam Delectationi Dilectionem Ardorem Inflammationemque subnectit Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant Jansen August Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently for so it followeth in the day of thy power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies 1 force and strength of bodie or mind and thence 2 Metonymically richesse or militarie Forces because in them men place their strength job 21.7 Psal 49.6 We may understand it in both senses 1 of Christs powerful efficacious heart-conquering Grace which is the cause or 2 for his powerful Forces and Armies which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence with human Libertie how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes and yet how sweetly it actes so Omnipotently as if there were no room left for human Libertie and yet so connaturally and so sweetly as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence and Force in it Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace Who would not come under such a silken soft sweet violence as this is Need we then fear that any prejudice can befal human Libertie so long as this Wise Soverain Soul-physician workes upon the Wil Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae or handles of the Soul and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock yea to every ward in the lock of the wil Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ And doth not the Wil upon this Divine heart-logic infused by Christ move as freely as chearfully as connaturally as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go as he did Ephraim Hos 11.3 and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis ac dilectionem erumpere Ex quo fit consequenter ut si illa desit voluntas veluti emortua sit Jans August Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love i. e. with rational arguments and moral persuasions as Hos 11.4 Thus Esa 10.21 The remnant shal returne even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel and yet it is to their mighty God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name given the Messias Esa 9.6 Christ drawes them by a mighty power and yet they returne as freely as if there were no power and efficace put forth So Esa 11.6 10 11. The like Esa 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace he addes what followed thereon v. 5. and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace Yea may we not conclude hence that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil by so much the more connaturally and sweetly it actes For hereby it determineth confirmeth and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie both of State and Act. For what more natural to the Wil than to adhere to its chiefest Good Or when doth it act more freely than when it is most peremtorily most inviolably and most immotably determined to love and enjoy its best friend and choisest Good Thus the Omnipotence and Efficace of Medicinal Grace is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil as that it doth most effectually preserve confirme and promote the same CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in the General Creation proper to God the production of something out of nothing Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil Passive Creation what Gods Providence demonstrated The Explication of it The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence Providential means Fire the create mundane Spirit The Object of Divine Providence Its Adjuncts 1 Efficacitie 2 Immobilitie 3 Connaturalitie 4 Perfection 5 Mysterious Miracles Providential Conservation immediate and mediate Ordinary and Extraordinary § 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated effective principe and Adjuncts or various modes of operation we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause whereby he made althings at first and stil continues to make some things out of nothing What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience 1. It 's most evident that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of althings by God but he from a confined mistaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal because he could not imagine how something could be educed out of nothing But true Philosophie as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us that althings were made by God and nothing besides himself is eternal That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes touching the existence of God C. 2. § 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone l'Atheisme Convaincu C. 1. And Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates That it is intrinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal Yet the Jesuites generally grant That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual
Tryphon reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious But Plato strongly demonstrates That the Providence of God extendes to althings even the most minute So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie if he should provide for the greater distempers but neglect the lesser would the cure be successeful No surely So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships nor Imperators of Souldiers nor Masters of Families nor Ministers of State nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater Thence Architects denie that great stones can be wel cemented or joined together in a building without smal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let us not then conceit that God is more vile than mortal Opificers who by how much the more skilful they are by so much the more exquisitely and accurately by the benefit of their own Art they consider both great and smal things in such workes that belong to their Art Thence he concludes pag. 903. It seems to me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings This also the Stoics generally asserted whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus his Collections of Epictetus's Philosophie l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some saith he who assert there is no God others that grant there is a God but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he is slothful and negligent and provident of nothing I suppose he means the Epicureans a third sort who hold that there is a God and that he is provident but only of greater and celestial things not of terrene a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as wel as celestial but only in commun not as to singulars and particulars a fifth sort of which number was Ulysses and Socrates asserted that a man could not so much as move without God Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings Actions Substances Accidents Modes c. may be demonstrated 1 From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God which extendes it self to the most minute singulars 2 From the omnipotent Wil of God which gives Futurition Determination Limits Activitie and Operation to althings 3 From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings Whatever is Ens by participation must procede effectively from God who is Ens by Essence and if it procede from him it must necessarily fal under his Providence 4 From the certain Determination Futurition and Order of al effects Either althings must fal under the Providence of God or somethings must happen merely by chance without any certain cause of their Futurition 5 From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence That Gods Providence extendes to al singulars even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73 75 76. So De Potentia Dei Quaest 20. he proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways 1 By giving virtue to act 2 By continued conservation of that virtue 3 By moving the Agent to act and applying the virtue to the action 4 As he is the principal Agent in every Act and al other Agents but Instruments 5 As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed The particular Objects of Providence 1 Al natural Beings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe Yea al natural Generations Corruptions Alterations Motions and Actions are subject to Gods Providence Not only the Generic natures and Species of things both Substances and Accidents are determined by God but also al Individuals and Singulars with al their Circumstances and Modes yea things most minute Thus Bradwardine pag. 7 25 291. proves That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence 2 Althings necessary or contingent There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence as Aquinas accurately demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73. So Bradwardine pag. 271 274. What more contingent than the Lot and yet this fals under the Providence of God as Prov. 16.33 The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. 3 Althings politic Al Revolutions Alterations Advances Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence 4 Althings human Al mans thoughts inclinations interests designes and undertakements are subordinate to Providence Hence 5 Al sinful acts fal under the same 6 Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence of which hereafter In sum Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things unto which his omnipotent Wil Efficience and Causalitie extendes i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie it reacheth al natural preternatural supernatural and moral actions and events When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence Is any thing so great that it comes not within his power or so smal that it comes not within his care I am not ignorant how much some of late as wel Divines as Physicians have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie wil be more fully evident by what follows § 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence The Adjuncts of Providence as before stated there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof As 1. Providence is not merely permissive 1. It is efficacious but energetic and efficacious For 1 Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end and the ordering or disposing of means but also the assecution and attainment of the end It 's true human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient and yet by the interposition of other second causes come short of its end but Divine Providence always reacheth its end Thus Homer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled 2 Al second causes are subject unto and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes but from Divine disposition Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
ful and convictive demonstration and explication of the Necessitie and Nature of creatural Dependence we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Every Being dependent or independent Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent That this distribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate is generally confessed by such as discourse of Metaphysics And for the demonstration and explication hereof we are to consider That a dependent Being and that on which it dependes do really differ in number And the reasons are demonstrative 1 Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself 2 The dependent is in order of Nature at least posterior and inferior to that on which it dependes 3 Dependence importes subordination to that on which the dependence is Hence Divines say that the Son of God albeit he be as to Origine from the Father yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father he cannot be said to be dependent on him For he being in the forme or Essence of God thought it not robberie to be equal with God Phil. 2.6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 2.6 here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie and we may take it properly and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper sense when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him that which belonges to another Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie against God by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an independence either in Essence or Operation it may justly fal under the imputation of Robberie against God because it thereby equaliseth itself to God But our Lord Christ accounted it not robberie to be equal with God i. e. independent as God is For one person in the Trinitie is not essentially divided from the other but the Son is so generated by the Father as that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another essence or thing albeit he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another person The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father and the Spirit So that although one person be really distinct from the other yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence it implies a contradiction to say one person dependes on the other which was the great error of Origene imbibed from Platonic Philosophie as before Ch. 6. § 4. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8 9. § 2. One prime independent Being An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself as the cause of its Being and Operation This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus 1 There is one prime independent Being This is evident from the series of causes in which we find that althings obey the superior Power from which they derived their origine whence it necessarily follows that to prevent a progresse into infinite we stop in one prime supreme infinite Power which received no this Being from any other but is truely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being and Self-sufficient or Independent Again that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest because where-ever there is Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence there must needs be Dependence But now al Beings except the first Cause admit Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence as to their Essence and therefore none but the first Being can be independent Hence it follows 2 That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being as the cause of its Being For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause supposeth also Participation Posterioritie and Inferioritie which the prime independent Being excludeth Whence also it follows 3 That the prime independent Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being or from himself When we say the prime independent Being is from himself it must not be understood positively as if he did effectively produce himself for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impossible but negatively that he receives not his Being from any other Hence we conclude 4 That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause as Dependence is to second Beings and Causes As it is essential to the Creature to be defective indigent limited receptive and dependent so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite alsufficient and without al deficience indigence and dependence either actual or possible Hence § 3. Dependent Being by participation c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation finite potential contingent and defectible 1 Every dependent is Ens by participation For whatever is not Being by Essence and independently must necessarily be such by participation where there is not self-Being there must be a reception of Being from some other which connotes participation 2 Whatever is dependent is also finite and limited both in Being Virtue and Operation 1 Whatever is dependent is finite in Being because its Being is by participation and according to communication of the superior Cause 2 Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be limited in its virtue and efficace Hence 3 every dependent is also finite in its Operation For the sphere of Activitie cannot be larger than the sphere of Essence if the principe be limited the operation cannot but be limited 3 Whatever is dependent is also potential To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a dependent Being we must consider 1 that nothing is pure Act but the first most simple independent Being no Creature is pure Actualitie where there is dependence there is somewhat of Potentialitie or passive Power either physic or metaphysic Al mater hath a physic passive power or natural possibilitie of being corrupted Spirits have not a physic passive power or natural principe of corruption yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated or cast back into their primitive nothing 2 Besides the natural power which a dependent Being has there is an obediential power appendent to its nature For the explication of which we are to know that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first increate and independent Being so far as to obey it in receiving al impressions and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction Hence the Scholes distribute the power of the second cause or dependent Beings into natural and obediential their natural power of receiving influences from the superior cause or acting is that which is appendent to their natures and whereby they naturally receive or act and produce effects proportionate to their natures But the obediential power of dependent Being is that whereby they are according to the
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
Dulcius est amare quà m amari Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it The Stoic thinkes it sweeter to love than to be beloved Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective it has a violence and pain which is most sweet and delicious The Soul by loving its last end possesseth enjoys and lives in it Have not althings a desire of union and communion with what they love And the more vehement our love is if it be of the chiefest good the sweeter our fruition thereof is This love gains strength by opposition it makes the most difficult service sweet The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to it self is to have no limits Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors if it acquiesce not in God but so far as it adheres to God it feels no pain Augustine that great Doctor of Love to God comprised al Christian Morals in Love which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Dutie It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret and penetrates things most profound it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption Whence also Augustine termed al Virtue but the order of Love and its admirable efficace is seen in this that it doth lift the heart above al things create and yet at the same time depresse it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse Al the labors of this Love are ful of divine suavities and carrie their rewards in them Afflictions blunt not its edge cast it into an ocean of miserie and it swims above al it estimates its miserie only by the losse and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end Mediocritie which in other things is estimed Vertue is a Vice in Love to God which admits no excesse These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God as our last end This Communion with God the Romans in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments expressed by their Lectisternia or Beds placed in their Temples whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their Gods Of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 3. cap. 17. § 6. Lastly Delectation and Joy Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures Suavities and Delights No one properly enjoys a thing who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof Frui est cum gaudio frui August The Quietation Delectation and Satisfaction which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato in his Philebus where he treats professedly of this subject So pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that being young having tasted thereof like one overjoyed as if he had found a treasure of wisdome leaping for joy and as it were under a divine Enthusiasme or rapture he moves every discourse chearfully and orderly This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end Thence Phileb pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures There are in the minds of wicked men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 painted pleasures but such as are altogether false Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine Wicked mens pleasures are sucked from some dirtie terrene goods and therefore only imaginarie and spurious but the virtuose mans pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good and therefore genuine and satisfying But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation Joy and Pleasure which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good we shal examine and inquire into 1 The Causes 2 The proper Adjuncts 3 The Effects thereof and that according to Plato's Philosophemes 1. 1. The Causes of Delectation Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy 1 A sweet Good 2 Possession of that Good 1 A sweet Good 3 Actions consequent to that possession 1 There must be a sweet Good out of which al true pleasure is formed and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is by so much the more perfect is the delight Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the most amiable best good This Plato frequently inculcates Thus Phaedr pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whom when it shal see and instil the desire of him into it self it shal then break al bounds of modestie and having got libertie of breathing it shal cease to be exagitated by pricking dolors This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good so that it can never depart from its embraces neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good Perfect Joy cannot forme it self out of any inferior good it springs only from the best sweetest good which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul What but the first essential universal Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights 2 Another Spring of Delectation is Possession 2 Possession which as it is essential to al Fruition so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is and the possession more intimate by so much the greater is the delight Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti infiniti Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite i. e. to speak nakedly from the Vnion of the Soul with God This Plato according to his allegoric mode expresseth Conviv 206. Al men saith he in their manner conceive and are pregnant and when they have gone their time Nature desires to bring forth Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or sweetest Good it is affected with joy hilaritie and pleasure and brings forth and generates but on the contrary when it adheres to what is base and fordid it is contracted by sorrow and grief and thence being not able to bring forth it is tormented with pains and dolors By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God and to inferior Goods upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows but vexatious dolors and torments This pleasure that follows on adherence to and possession of God is wel expressed by David Psal 25.13 Psal 25.13 His Soul shal dwel at ease Heb. loge in goodnesse When God dwels in the Soul it then doth loge in goodnesse or dwel at ease where there is want there can be no perfect
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every
movetur It 's a great Saying of the Platonists That one free is moved from infinite to infinite upon infinite i.e. a virtuose man in al exercices of Virtue is moved 1 From God as the first Cause and original Spring 2 To God as the last End and infinite Good 3 Vpon or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices Whence also they tel us That the motion of a free Soul is circular from God as the first Cause to God as the last End and by God and his divine Wil as the measure Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement either in regard of Principe or End or Rule but partakes in its measure of that Amplitude which its Principe End and Rule rejoiceth in For such as a mans first Principe last End and Exemplar is such is he as to libertie or servitude Quantò finis altior tantò actus volunâ—â— est libeâ—â— By how much the more ample and sublime the end is by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement Whereas sin being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End puts fetters chains limits and confinement on the Soul 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations Affections and Motions Plato in his Timaeus 〈…〉 persuades us That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 its proper diet and exercices and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies than to give it its proper virtuose exercices When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful than when it is most in virtuose exercitations Althings are purified by perfective fermentation and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections Thus Rom. 12.11 Rom. 12.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fermenting or boiling in spirit Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is spoken of boiling waters Job 41.22 So Job 30.27 LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 My bowels fermented or boiled The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices the more free they are to serve God and lesse obnoxious to the service of sin By how much the lesse we serve sin by so much the more free we are And who serve sin lesse than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices Plato Tim. pag. 89. tels us That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice And doth not this hold true as to the Soul Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie but its grand and perpetual activitie Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure whiles the standing Pool gathers mud Are althings in Nature purified by motion Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices It 's true virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force as Physic purgeth out il humors but by the divine promisse concurrence and benediction By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent Virtuose Exercices are most stable firme and permanent Therefore most free Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude stabilitie and permanence of such exercices Whence Plato in his Cratylus pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is always in fluxe or motion whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facile and expedite progresse For saith he it always flows in an equal stable manner The Soul according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ever-moving Principe and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be always in action Now it is most certain that no acts of the Soul are more stable firme and permanent than virtuose acts Thus Arist Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtuose exercices are most permanent And he gives this reason of it Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts without tediousnesse or oblivion And Plato in his Cratylus tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul which obstructs al virtuose exercices The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End and by how much the more the Soul departes from these by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World argues great moral libertie as to exercice and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End if not in virtuose exercices 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue and so by consequence moral Libertie Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. assures us That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy they are rendred more infirme and impotent but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals as wel as Naturals Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous than virtuose exercices So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by labors and exercices And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative Thence saith Seneca Labor nourisheth generose minds O! Generosos animos labor nutrit Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse or twofold motion of the heart so is Virtue by its exercices It 's a trite Saying in the Scholes Cessation from acts diminish habits but continuance therein emproves the same It 's true there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits and virtuose which come by infusion because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts but given in by God of mere Grace God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue or Grace and that of mere Grace So Mat. 13.12 Mat. 13.12 For whosoever hath to him shal be given 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dâ—st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne
object it cannot be more certain than the object is whatever contingence belongs to the object wil also influence the Science and make it contingent whence if the divine Science be certain as without al dispute it is then it cannot depend on its mutable contingent object but must be absolute and independent Is it lesse than blasphemie to conceive that the infinite Science of God should depend on any finite object or finite mutable conditions appendent thereto Yea is not such a conditionate Science altogether impossible as to God For must not the object as such be before the act And may we suppose any created object or condition appertaining thereto in any regard to be before the divine Wil and Science Is not the futurition of althingâ— both objects and conditions the effect of the divine Decree â—â—â—refore in order of Nature subsequent to the divine Wil And if so then are not al objects and the conditions appendent thereto foreseen by God in his divine Decrees without the least dependence on the things themselves or their contingent conditions Indeed a conditionate Science to speak properly is that which as yet never existed but wil follow on the position of the condition whence truely such a Science cannot existe even in men before the condition be performed and therefore where the condition is never performed it can never existe How impossible then is it that such a Science should be found in God who no way dependes on externe objects for his Science We must therefore conclude that God in the absolute and efficacious Decree of his own Wil hath predetermined al futures both contingent free and necessary in particular and thence certainly and infallibly knows them to be future both as to their substance and circumstances As for sins future God certainly and infallibly knows them both as future and present in the determination and permission of his own Wil whereby the create Wil is determined to the entitie of the sinful act as a real act and permitted as to the moral pravitie of the act as before in the object of Divine Prescience Hence 6. The Divine Science is eternal Thus Plato 6. Divine Science eternal both in his Timaeus and Parmenides makes his Divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eternal and sempiterne And the reason is most evident because the Divine Science is the same with the Divine Essence If God should begin to know any thing that he knew not before his Intellection should depend on the object known which is impossible Again if God should begin to know what he knew not before then he should be composite or compounded of Act and Power and so not a pure Act then also he should not be most perfect and most blessed for every Act addes to the perfection of the habit or power Al the successions and vicissitudes of time or things in time are foreseen by God in his Eternitie by one simple intuitive Act. Thus Maximus Tyrius Dissertat 1. pag. 10. The Divine Intellect is not perfect unlesse it be added to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to understand Thus also Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 14. Art 13. God knows al contingents not only as they are in their own causes but as they are each of them actually in themselves And albeit contingents are brought into act and existence successively yet God doth not know them successively as they are in their own Being as we do but al at once because his knowlege is measured by Eternitie as also his Being but now Eternitie being existent al at once doth compasse about al time whence althings that are in time are present to God from al Eternitie not only as the reasons of althings are present with him but because his intuition is from Eternitie cast on althings as they are in their presentialitie This presentialitie must be limited to the Divine Wil which gives futurition to althings and so makes them present to the Divine Understanding Hence 7. The Divine Science is infinitely perfect 7. Divine Science infinitely perfect Thus Plato ascribes to God Parmenid 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most exquisite perfect Science otherwise he could not be Rector of the Universe So Maximus Tyrius Dissert 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That he be most perfect who understandes both at al times and althings and at once Psal 147.5 God knows althings always and at once therefore most perfectly Thus Psal 147.5 Great is our Lord and of great power his understanding is infinite or of his understanding there is no number i. e. his Understanding is every may perfect he knows althings and that in the most perfect manner And it is observable that the Psalmist grounds the Infinitude of Gods knowlege on the Magnitude or Infinitude of hsi Essence and Power whereby we are informed that Gods knowlege dependes not on the objects known but ariseth from his own omnipotent Wil and Essence The perfection of the Divine Science may be considered essentially intensively extensively 1 Essentially as Gods knows himself perfectly in himself and by himself and althings else in himself God knows althings distinctly in the claritie of his own Essence those things that are diverse and multiplied in the Creatures are most simply and unitely in God Man according to the diversitie of objects has diverse notices or apprehensions of things As he understandes first principes so his knowlege is stiled Intelligence as Conclusions flowing from first Principes so his knowlege is called Science as the highest Cause so Sapience as things practic and moral so Prudence But al these God comprehendes by one simple Act of Intuition in his own Essence 2 Gods knowlege is most perfect intensively For every Intelligent is so far perfect as to degrees of knowlege as he partakes of Immaterialitie Brutes have some degree of apprehension as they have spirituose Souls but these their animal Spirits being but the purer parts of mater therefore their apprehension is most imperfect and not reckoned among the species of true knowlege Mans apprehension depending very far upon his senses and material objects it 's therefore more imperfect than that of Angels yea the Angelic Intelligence being made up of act and power which is a kind of metaphysic mater hence there is much of imperfection mixed therewith if compared with Gods Intelligence which being pure Act and exemt from al mater as wel metaphysic as physic hence it is most perfect intensively as to al degrees of knowlege 3 Gods Science is most perfect extensively not as to kinds or parts of Science for it is most indivisible and simple without al extension of parts but as to objects because it extendeth unto al objects God by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes al particular things with al the particles of time in and by himself God being in the highest degree immaterial it necessarily follows that his Science is most ample and extensive as to its object for
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most soverain Cause and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of al second Causes which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ministerial instrumental Causes of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
thou wilt thou canst make me clean as elsewhere whereby not only the Deitie of Christ is acknowleged but also the Identitie of his power with his wil that his power is as extensive as his wil or that his wil is omnipotent This Hypothesis touching the Identitie of Gods executive Power with his Wil has been avouched and defended by the most acute Scholastic Theologues Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves That Gods Wil is of it self operative neither may we place in God any other executive power And his reasons are cogent For 1 if there were any thing more required to the production of an effect than the Divine Wil it would thence follow that the Divine Wil is not of it self sufficient to act contrary to the forecited Textes 2 It 's evident that the Wil of God is in some manner operative of it self even as our wils are in moving our own bodies And if the Divine Wil be in one degree operative why not in every degree Doth it need any executive virtue for the supplie of its deficience Is it not omnipotent 3 If any such executive power be placed in God it must naturally mediate between the Divine Wil and effect but this cannot be because the effect necessarily follows upon the Divine Volition The same Hypothesis is defended by Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. conclus 1. We may not place in God besides his Intellect and Wil any third executive power eminently or formally distinct for the production of things But of this more in Gods Efficience Sect. 4. § 3. Prop. 2. § 5. Prop. 4. The object of Gods Power is every thing possible The object of Gods Power every thing possible For every power must have some object adequate thereto and by how much the higher and more universal the power is by so much the more universal is the object and is not the active power of God the first Cause most supreme and universal Must it not then comprehend under its object al possible Entitie And the more fully to understand this we are to understand that a thing may be said to be possible two ways 1 Positively and so that is possible which may be produced by a power Things possible are not said in this sense to be the object of Gods power for then the same thing would be explicated by it self for to say the power of God is extended to althings positively possible is the same as if we should say it is extended to al such things as are by it denominated possible Wherefore 2 a thing may be said to be possible negatively in a way of non-repugnance as it implies not any repugnance of existing and so althings are possible which implie not a contradiction And in this sense things possible are said to be the object of Gods infinite Power What things are impossible which extendes it self to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing For in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens Ens and non Ens being contradictories it thence follows that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehension of Ens possible possible Being but must be simply and of it self impossible God cannot verifie contradictions because they have not a passive power or possibilitie of being verified for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other they cannot be both true because they should not be contradictions if the truth of the one did not necessarily make the other false That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of Gods power is not from any defect of power in God but because the thing has not in it self any possibilitie of existing or of being reduced into act for no power can be denominated such in relation to a terme or effect which implies an impossibilitie of existing as what is contradictorie doth Al power extendes it self to that which can be actuated thereby as al sensitive power is conversant about sensible objects so far as they may be actuated thereby so the power of God is conversant about al possible things so far as they are capable of being actuated thereby Whence it appears that the impossibilitie of contradictions ariseth from the incapacitie of the mater not from any defect in the power of God Now the impossibles which implie a repugnance of being done by God are either such as regard God himself or the Creature or both 1. The Impossibles that regard God himself are either absolutely such or only in some limited sense 1 The Impossibles which regard God himself absolutely are al such as are simply repugnant to the Divine Essence As God cannot deceive or be deceived he cannot sin or be the moral cause of sin he cannot condemne or punish though he may afflict yea torment the innocent or justifie the wicked without a satisfaction 2 The Impossibles that regard God in a limited sense are such as implie a certain mode of acting or a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence 1 Such as implie a certain mode of acting as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal bodie he cannot eat drinke speak c. in that mode we do c. 2 The Impossibles under a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence are such as these not to do what he has decreed or promised 2. The Impossibles which regard the Creature or the externe object of Gods power are such as destroy the essence of the object Thus God cannot make a Creature independent or not to depend on himself both as to Being and Operation For dependence is essential to a Creature and therefore to suppose a Creature not to depend on God as wel in Operation as Being is to suppose a Creature not to be a Creature as Suarez strongly demonstrates against the Hypothesis of Durandus who denies Gods concurse to the material act of sin Again to suppose that God in the Eucharist should Transubstantiate or commute the Bread into the Bodie of Christ and yet the Quantitie and visible Accidents of the Bread stil remain implies a contradiction because Quantitie or Extension is essential to a bodie Besides this Popish Hypothesis of Transubstantiation implies other contradictions in that it supposeth two bodies to be in the same place or space and the same bodie of Christ to be in two places at once c. In like manner we say God cannot according to the Lutheran Consubstantiation make the bodie of Christ to be at the same time in the Heavens and circumscribed thereby and yet in and with and under the Bread 3. Things impossible both in regand of God and the Creature are such as are repugnant to the Essence of both Thus God cannot by his infinite Power produce an effect equal to himself infinite in Essence For by making an effect infinite he should make his own Essence finite it
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
and Absolute may be proved by these invincible Reasons 1 From the Independence of the Divine Wil the first cause of althings The first cause according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause and dependence Thus Plato Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God under the notion of the chiefest good and the first cause of althings he gives him this character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is not mere essence but somewhat more august than essence transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme effective cause of althings and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumental causes Yea he wil have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being it self and Eternitie it self and thence no way dependent on second causes And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential and so most independent And alas how absurd and monstrose is it that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings the same with the Divine Essence May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. 2 From the pure actualitie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power therefore no dependence 3 From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God solely being without Principe or independent he is the Framer of althings c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence For where there is dependence there is inferioritie and subordination And may we presume that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause What! can it be first and yet subordinate What is this but to be first and yet not first but second For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause as independence of the first 4 As the concurse of the first Cause is independent so also absolute yea therefore absolute because independent for that which dependes on nothing without it self must needs be absolute That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject or object it workes upon specially as to gratiose effects is most evident from sacred Philosophie Eph. 2.8 9 10. So Ephes 2.8 9 10. He saith v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith and that not of your selves it is the gift of God It 's true it workes through faith but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul the whole is the Gift of God and why v. 9. Not of workes lest any one should boast As if he had said Alas if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us then there were indeed room for boasting which Christ wil not allow of Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free independent and absolute communication of the spring Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in or by Christ Jesus unto good workes i. e. look as God created and formed the first rude confused Chaos not for any foreseen goodnesse in it but out of a pure nothing so Christ frames the New Creature not for any foreseen conditions it can performe but unto al conditions or good workes as Esa 19.25 We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace in Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace which enables us to act if we wil there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil such as Adam had and Angels now have and thus Christ hath died in vain for the proper Grace of Christ which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities Gratia medicinalis non est talis quae dominatrici samulando voluntati vel influit vel non influit prout imperanti sese determinare vel haerere placet sed prorsus talis quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia repugnantémque domat voluntatem tollit omnem ejus resistentiam rapit eam secum ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit Jansen August Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil expecting when our Wils wil move but it enables us to wil for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil. That the influxe and concurse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurditie yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God How absurd is it to conceit that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil Yea how impossible is such a conditionate influxe For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurse then he concurs to the working of that condition or not if not then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse If God doth concur to that condition then absolutely or on some other condition if absolutely then his former concurse is not conditionate for he that requires any condition of his act and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition why not also to the former act If God concur to the second condition conditionately then also to the third c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite which Nature but much more the God of Nature abhors Hence 3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent Gods concurse previous and antecedent For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause for therefore the second cause cooperates because the First cause operates The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects Thus Isidorus Pelusiota lib. 2. Epist 72. Edit Commelin 1605. pag. 121. An evil tree saith he cannot bring forth good fruit Mat. 7.18
the supreme infinite Being than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial social coordinate cause 2 This also is inconsistent with the Subordination Dependence and Inferioritie of the second cause For al social partial causes are as such coordinate and equal the effect dependes on each but they depend not each on the other To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first what is it but to make it a first cause 3 This also is inconsistent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurse for a partial causalitie is only simultaneous which has been already refuted 4 The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and approved a Totalitie of Divine concurse So Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It 's manifest saith he that the same effect is ascribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Efficace not as if it were partly from God and partly from the natural Agent but the whole effect is from both in a different mode as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument and yet totally to the principal cause The like Alvarez Disput 85. The Totalitie of Divine concurse as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Esa 43.7 Esa 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name for I have created him for my Glorie I have formed him yea I have made him Here Christ assumes to himself as the sole total principal Agent the Creation Formation and Consummation of the New Creature As in the old Creation God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing then out of the rude Chaos he formed the several species of the Universe and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the dust of the Earth which was Formation thence in the last place he breathed into Man a Rational Soul which gave Consummation to him So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concurse and each total in the framing of the New Creature he saith 1 I have created him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have educed or called him out of nothing as I did the first rude Chaos The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence But if this be not enough to expresse the Totalitie of his efficacious Essicience he addes 2 I have formed him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This also is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed The sense is I have not only given him some first lines a rude masse or shape of a new Creature but I have fashioned and formed him as I at first formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay For so the word signifies to forme or shape a thing as the Potter doth his Clay to this or that forme And if al this wil not suffice to demonstrate that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature he addes yet farther 3 Yea I have made him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. I have perfected and completed the whole worke I have made him such as I would have him conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him he has no part wanting or misplaced not a finger or little toe defective he is a complete perfect new Creature and that by virtue of my Creation Formation and Consummation Thus the whole of the new Creature as wel as of the old is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator Fictor and Effector thereof And here we are also to note that it was usual with the Hebrews to expresse the workes of the interne new Creation under the symbol of the externe old Creation The Totalitie of the Divine concurse is also we expressed Esa 63.5 and Psal 94.17 5. Gods concurse particular not general only The concurse of God as the first cause is particular and proper not only general This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel but really it is not so Before we come to the demonstration of it we must premit some Distinctions and Limitations 1 We must distinguish between a general providence and general concurse we denie not but that Gods Providence as it extendes to althings universally may be termed general which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concurse i. e. such as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby as the concurse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on Such a general concurse is unworthy of the first cause who determines al effects but is determinable by none Bradwardine de Causd Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurse which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers ' specially the Astrologers who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies which they supposed to be Gods on al subjects or maters 2 We must distinguish between a particular cause and a particular concurse We do not affirme that God is a particular cause but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to al second causes and their effects And here Heereboord Select Disputat Vol. 1. Disput 10 and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgersdicius for denying Gods concurse to be particular he himself false into this easie mistake of making God a particular cause For the obviating of which as also for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged against our Hypothesis we say that God is an Vniversal Cause and yet his concurse as to the mode of its operation is particular God is said to be an Vniversal Cause in regard of the extent of his causalitie as it extendes to al objects effects and second causes universally and yet his concurse is particular as it is not like that of the Sun determinable by its object but doth in a particular manner according to the exigence and condition of the subject determine the same These things being premissed we procede to demonstrate that the concurse of God is not general but particular as to its manner of working with al second causes 1 From the nature of a General concourse which is of it self indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes on So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent because modified by the mater it workes on as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow as also by the opposite effects it has on the waxe and clay To suppose Gods concurse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the first cause which determines al second causes but is determined by none To assert that the concurse of God is in the power of the second cause or mater it workes on what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second 2 From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God For if
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
there are many things considerable 1. It includes an eternal Wisdome and Counsel as the origine thereof Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 3. c. 29. explicates the precedent definition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Butaf al Providence be the Wil of God it 's necessary that althings ordered or made by Providence be according to right Reason best and most becoming God and that nothing may be better done In the Scholes Providence according to its generic Idea is said to be the Reason of Order whereby al means are duely disposed towards their end what then is the Providence of God but a Divine Reason eminently subsisting in the supreme Rector of althings whereby althings are most wisely disposed to their last end by most apt means Thus in sacred Philosophie the Providence of God is described as invested with infinite wisdome and counsel Psal 139.1 2. So Psal 139.1 O Lord thou hast searched me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thou hast sounded me and penetrated into my most intimate parts Whence he addes and known me i. e. most intimately Thence he procedes to particulars v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and up-rising c. Of which before in the Divine Science Ch. 5. § 2. We find Gods providential knowlege as to Celestial bodies wel illustrated Psal 147.4 5. Psal 147.4 He telleth the number of the stars he calleth them al by their names Termes borrowed from Generals mustering or taking an account of their Soldiers or else from Masters of Families taking account of al their Domestics or from Kings numbering their Subjects And what mean these expressions but to illustrate and expresse the most particular Providence of God founded on his infinite knowlege of althings which are in apparence innumerable as the Stars in the Firmament Gen. 15.5 So v. 5. his understanding is infinite Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his understanding there is no number The reasons of his Providence are more in number than the things he provides for yea every way infinite These infinite Reasons and Intelligences of Divine Providence are expressed by Plato under the terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Intelligence Thus in his Philebus pag. 28. Al the wise consent in this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Divine Mind it King of Heaven and Earth So in his Phaedo pag. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It is the Divine Mind that disposeth and directes althings according to their due orders and is the cause of althings And that this providential Intelligence and Wisdome extendeth to althings even to the most minute and least Beings Plato assertes Leg. 10. pag. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To conceit that God who is most wise and both wil and can provide for his own creatures should take care only of greater maters but not of the least whereof the care is more facile how absurd is this But to treat more accurately and philosophically of the infinite Reasons and Wisdome of Divine Providence The eternal Law of Providence we must run it up to the Spring-head of that eternal Law consisting in those Divine Ideas loged in the mind and wil of God The Scholes philosophise much of the eternal Law whereby althings are governed to their respective ends yet they speake so confusedly as that it is difficult to understand what they mean thereby whether the Law of Divine Decrees or the Law of Nature inherent in the things governed Plato seems to speake more intelligibly than many Scholastics touching this eternal Law making it to be no other than the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees according to which God frames and governes althings So in his Timaeus pag. 28. he saith That God in the framing the World had his eye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the eternal Law or Exemplar Hence Plato cals Fate whereby the Ancients expressed Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie which Cicero interpretes the eternal Law And Apuleius a great Explicator of Plato saith Fate was that by which Gods inevitable cogitations and undertakements were accomplisht And Pindar sang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the eternal Law was Queen of althings both mortal and immortal This eternal Law as it regardes Providence is nothing else but that order method purpose or counsel which the most wise God hath from al eternitie determined with himself in his Divine Decrees as the rule of his Gubernation and Disposition of althings for his own Glorie Have not althings that are some operation and that not violent or fortuitous but regular and orderly And can any thing exert any regular operation but in order to some end preconceived by some intelligent Agent And what is that which directes moderates regulates and orders althings to their respective ends but the eternal Law Thus Augustin The eternal Law saith he is nothing else but that increate Divine Reason or Wil of God commanding that the natural order be conserved Every action wil not serve for every end therefore there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Rule or Law to suit actions to their ends Do not then althings so far as they tend to their last end act and move by some Law And what is the supreme Law whereby al the Divine operations of Providence are regulated but the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees It 's true every particular singular Creature has a Law impacted and impressed on its Being which is an irradiation or beam of the eternal Law and therefore called by some though improperly the eternal Law by others more properly the Law of Nature For the eternal Law properly respectes the workes and operations of God who is both Worker and the Law of his working the perfection of the Divine Essence and Wil gives perfection and measure to al his workes al Gods providences and workes own him not only for their Worker but also for the Law whereby they are wrought his Divine Wil and Decrees being the measure of al his Operations So that by this eternal Law althings are bounded and limited not only in their Essences but also in their Operations and al the Divine reasons of Providences are to be resolved into this eternal Law which is ful of infinite Reasons Wisdome and Counsel albeit our shallow capacities cannot comprehend no nor apprehend the same alwaies in al workes of Providence Hence it follows The Wisdome of Providence active that the Divine Reason Wisdome and Counsel that attendes the Providence of God is not merely speculative but practic and active for al Laws properly and primarily tend to action Whence in sacred Philosophie the wisdome of Divine Providence is illustrated by that of a wise Builder skilful Physician expert discreet Master of a Familie c. Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 902 c. istustrates the same by much the same ressemblances namely by the wisdome of a skilful Physician also of an expert Gubernator of a Ship of a prudent
extraordinary Impressions which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them 6. Prop. Gods Gubernation by second Causes The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments yet so as it actes immediately in and with them yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation saith That albeit God takes the care of the whole Vniverse himself yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And over al these parts of the Universe are set Rulers and Moderators who constantly governe althings even the most minute parts that so by these they may governe al even to the last part unto their end By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation I presume he understandes al second Causes made use of thereby Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes but these include subordination to Divine operations Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors Corporals by Spirituals and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes Touching the Executions of Divine Providence see § 3. Prop. 4. 7. Gods Gubernation reacheth althings Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 903. proves That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable but it fals under Divine Gubernation But to descend to particulars 1 Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons both Natural and Politic. 1 Natural Seasons Eccles 3.1 as Eccles 3.1 To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose A Season i. e. a certain fixed determinate time 2 Politic Seasons for Human and Politic Actions 2 Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world without the least vicissitude or change in himself Dan. 2.20 21. So Dan. 2.20 For Wisdome and Might are his i. e. for the Gubernation of althings Whence it follows v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings 3 Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors Snow Job 37.6 7. Rain c. So Job 37.6 For he saith to the Snow be thou on the earth likewise to the smal Rain and to the great Rain of his strength Whence it follows v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man that al men may know his worke He sealeth up the hand of every one Elibu's meaning is that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain he thereby seals up or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman that so he may retire out of the fields home and consider his worke Then the Bestes go into Dens as v. 8. 4 God governeth al motions of second Causes even such as are most contingent and voluntary in the most certain manner 5 God governes al Events of things It was a great saying of Julius Caesar which he gained by experience That Fortune whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation has great force in althings but more particularly in the affaires of war wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires § 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man both in his sinful and renovate State Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe but in a more special manner Man and his Affaires So Plato saith Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God truely and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man because he is capable not only of Natural but also of Moral Gubernation God governes every Creature according to its capacitie whether Natural or Moral but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end they may be governed and directed to their last end but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto But Man being invested with a Natural Passive remote capacitie of understanding and Wil can when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation actively conduct and direct himself to his last end Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral 1. Moral by Law or Efficacious 1 Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes and Inclinations which are to them a Law directing them to their end so Rational Creatures have a more expresse formal Law which was at first impressed on their Beings but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation whereby they are directed to their last end For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures who alone can understand the reason of their operations And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is to bring Man into subjection to God and who are subject to God but those who refer al to him as their last end Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make those good to whom his Laws are promulgated And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man but in subjection to God and adhering to him as his last end So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end 2 This also is the main designe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation 2. Efficacious namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men Wicked men if they persevere in their wickednesse are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively by penal executions in order to the vindication of Divine Justice but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit Of both these in their order That wicked men Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are by Divine Gubernation reduced to the last end of al the Glorie of God wil appear evident if we reflect on what was before hinted that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation it immediately fals under another if lawlesse irregular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gracious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life they deservedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice and Eternal Death and
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
from the power of Nature For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. if men were good by Nature then certainly some would be so in their tender years 2 Then he procedes to another Question Therefore seing men are not good by Nature may they not yet be such 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Discipline and Institution This also he denies demonstrating That Virtue is not a Science such as may be taught by Precepts If Virtue saith he may be taught then there must be Masters and Disciples of it On the contrary may we not rightly conjecture that what has neither Masters nor Disciples that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be taught Whence Socrates assumes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely I have oft sought diligently whether there were any Masters to be found who could teach Virtue but I could never as yet find any Thus pag. 93. Now let us consider whether good men can communicate that Virtue they have unto others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or whether virtue be such as that it can be delivered to no one by Institution nor yet be received by any one in such a way He demonstrates the later and exemplifies it by Themistocles who saith he was according to commun estime a good man and a skilful preceptor of Virtue if any ever were And canst thou thinke he would make others good and not his own Son Cleophantus But this addes he he could not do Whence he concludes that Virtue could not be taught Thence he procedes to make inquisition into two sorts of men who professed themselves Masters of Virtue namely Sophists and Politicians and demonstrates that neither of these could indeed teach men to be virtuose Yea p 99. he saith That God oft makes use of the most unapt Instruments for the producing Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Is it not meet Meno to cal those Divine Men who being without understanding excellently performe many of those things they both do and speak Whence he concludes But if in this whole Disputation we have rightly found out the case 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is acquired neither by Natures force neither by any Institutes of Discipline or Doctrine but it comes to those who have it by Divine Afflation or Infusion without the active concurrence providence and industrie of the human soul Lastly he closeth up his Dialogue with this That supposing any should by Institution acquire somewhat of Virtue yet this is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be adorned as it were with a shadow whereas Virtue is a thing real and solid i. e. Al the forces of natural power or artificial Institution give men only a shadow forme or semblance of Virtue whereas the truth and real power thereof comes from God Whence Bias as Laertius informes us advised 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What Good thou shalt performe refer to God as the Author of it We have already demonstrated that the supernatural infusion of Virtue by God was generally asserted by the Greek Fathers albeit too many of them inclined to favor Origen's corrupt infusions about Free-wil Thus Damascene who gives us a sum of the Greek Theologie Orthodox Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we ought to know that Virtue is given to human nature by God and that he is the Principe and Cause of al Good and without his cooperation and aide it is impossible that we should wil or act any good And this he demonstrates from Gods prime Causalitie L. 3. C. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God who gives Being is he that gratiosely vouchsafeth Wel-Being And John Climacus scal Parad. grad 23. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the extremitie of pride consistes in the negation of Divine Aide and the lifting up of our own Virtue is a Demonic Affection for he that thinkes he can of himself without supernatural Grace performe any good denies God to be his helper in althings And Greg. Nyssen saith wel That the Grace of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sum of Virtue That supernatural Good and Virtue comes from God by Divine Infusion is generally asserted and demonstrated by the Sectators of Augustin and Aquinas Thus Gregorius Ariminensis 2. Dist 29. q. 1. where he demonstrates these Conclusions 1 That no just person invested with habitual Grace can avoid any one sin without Divine special assistance because no just person can by Grace received avoid any one tentation or persevere in good 2 That Adam before he fel could not by his own forces with the general insluence of God without special assistance performe any one good act Touching the necessitie of habitual and actual Grace for the performance of any action really morally and spiritually good see Jansenius August Tom. 3. de Grat. L. 2. C. 2. 22 23 c. § 2. Gods care of virtuose men As al Divine Knowlege and Virtue come under Gods supernatural Efficience and Gubernation so in like manner al virtuose men Sacred Philosophie every where inculcates what a paternal and special Providence God vouchsafeth his peculiar people Thus Psal 17.7 Psal 17.7 Shew thy marvellous loving kindnesse O thou that savest by thy right hand them which trust in thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Separate thy Benignities or make thy Benignities marvellous So the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make wonderful i. e. exert thy wonderful Benignitie as thou art wont to do towards those that trust in thee So v. 8. Keep me as the apple of thine eye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the pupil the daughter of the eye There is an elegance in the similitude As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye being like a tender delicate Daughter the darling of the Eye is the main of its care so are the Children of God his darlings Whence he addes Hide me under the shadow of thy wings Which seems to allude to the providence of an Hen which hides her young under her wing thereby to protect foment and nourish them It may also allude to the wings of the Cherubims which spread themselves over the Propitiatorie Exod. 25.20 thereby pointing forth Gods protection of his People Thus Psal 91.1 Psal 91.1 He that dwelleth in the secret place of the most high It seems to allude to the Holy of Holies which in Scriptural phraseologie is termed the secret place of God where he dwelt The meaning is whoever commits himself to the Tuition of God by flying unto his Sanctuarie he shal be safe So it follows shal abide under the shadow of the Almighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shal sojourne or continually loge Of the Almighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai is one of Gods names which signifies Self-sufficient as containing al sufficience in him from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dai sufficient or it may signifie potent to destroy al from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to destroy God is both Alsufficient to provide for his People and Omnipotent to destroy
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature At present it may suffice that we assert that Dependence is so intrinsecally essentially and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite For what doth the notion of a Creature importe but its eduction out of nothing by the Infinite Power of its Creator And he that educed althings out of nothing is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure And where there is an obediential power is there not also subordination and subjection And doth not al this formally speak Dependence Thus Aquinas contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates That God cannot make a thing which shal want any essential principe for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe he should make a thing to be and not to be And in what follows he proves that dependence is an essential principe or mode of a Creature as Suarez and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to operation of which § 10. 2 The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition and if the Dominion of God be Absolute then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction As it is impossible that God should make a Creature whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion so it is as impossible that a Creature should be made which may not depend on him as Suarez Metaphys Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. 3 The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God Is not every Creature Multiforme Mutable and Defectible And must not every Multiforme Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Vniforme Immutable and Indefectible Being as the Original principe of its dependence is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature which renders it fluxible variable and inconstant was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus That althings are in fluxe or motion Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions Again doth not every potential Being need some pure Act to actuate the same And is not every Creature a potential Being which needs God the most simple pure Act to actuate the same Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God who is the first influential Cause of its existence motion and al Yea is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator and what an endlesse Agitation yea Annihilation would it fal into See Aquinas contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. 4 The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations and is it not a violence to it to be cut off from this dependence Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun which gave it existence O then how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator the prime Cause of its existence and operation What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence Hence § 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature Dependence the same with the Essence That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident because every Creature being Ens by participation it must necessarily follow that dependence on the first cause from whom it participates of Being is most essential to it As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence and so Independent so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation and so Dependent So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably essentially and formally include Dependence on God as that which is not really distinct therefrom This is incomparably wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence it must be said that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such because if we by the force of our Intellect remove whatever is superadded to such an essence we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing and therefore according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being Wherefore albeit we may by the precision of Reason and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing yet this later really superaddes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being Wherein note wel that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators who assert the Creatures dependence on God as to Essence and Conservation but yet denie it as to causation and operation specially as to the substrate mater of sin It may not be denied but that Suarez in his first Tome of Metaphys Disput 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature but a mode distinct therefrom Yet these thing he grants 1 That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally existing in the Creature For al confesse that passive Creation is in the Creature But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation if we speak of the first Creation from God 2 That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature albeit it constitute not the same 3 He
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
Human Wil as chap. 5. § 3. 3 Again if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence 4 The Understanding cannot produce its act without Gods illumination therefore neither can the Wil its without Gods concurse See this more fully in Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. § 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes in this Part 4. C. 7. 9. § 12. Lastly Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural Creatural Dependence as to its parts is either Natural or Moral and Supernatural Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence conservation and operation Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals We find both these dependences conjoined in Man for he having a double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude to God 1 as a Creature and 2 as a Rational Creature he hath also a double dependence on God Supernatural Dependence on Christ 1 Natural of which in what precedes 2 Moral and Supernatural And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting can do nothing without much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors so also in Morals and Supernaturals Supernatural Elevation is the total next and formal Reason of acting supernaturally and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God its supernatural influencing cause by so much the more it partakes of his influence as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression God doth most potently and yet most sweetly influence the Affect Act and Effect of the virtuose Soul Phil. 2.13 Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God Yea the natural Wil by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence is elevated to act above Nature This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ as Mediator and Spring of al Grace is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 87.7 As wel the singers Psal 87.7 as players on instruments shal be there Al my springs are in thee Glassius renders the words thus And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances Al my springs are in thee The Psalmist having given us in the foregoing Verses a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion or in Evangelic Churches and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there he concludes with this as the burden of their Song Al my springs are in thee i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee O great Mediator Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace is Vniversal Total Absolute and Immediate and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace For Habitual Grace 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace So John 1.16 And of his fulnesse have we al received Joh. 1.16 and Grace for Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies either the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon and then the sense is Grace upon Grace i. e. abundant Grace and that freely or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ and Nature received from Adam and then the meaning is this Grace for Grace i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust for there was no lust in his heart but what was communicated to his Posteritie so the Children of Christ the second Adam receive from him Grace for Grace i. e. al manner of habitual Graces answerable to those in his Human Nature This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples Luk. 17.5 Luk. 17.5 And the Apostles said unto the Lord Encrease our Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adde Faith to us i. e. some additional degrees of Faith The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie and therefore now having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience they depend wholly on him for supplies their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven and by Juices derived from a Principe above it self As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto and did not depend on his Creator so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it so long as it dependes on Christ 2. The New Creature has an Universal For Actual Grace Psal 141.8 Absolute Total and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Thus Psal 141.8 But mine eyes are unto thee O God the Lord in thee is my trust leave not my soul destitute Hebr. make not my soul naked or emty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to evacuate or make naked So the Targum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It notes his total dependence on god We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described Cant. 8.5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse leaning upon her Beloved Who is this i. e. this Woman or Church that cometh up out of the Wildernesse This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength Leaning or Cleaving to The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament The LXX render it by a word that signifies confirming her self which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ and not on habitual Grace received from him Members and Branches live on life but the life of their Head and Root So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ as Paul Gal. 2.20 When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received than in dependence on Christ they soon fal into sin This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated Phil. 2.12 13. Phil. 2.12 Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling This fear and trembling doth not implie douting as the Papists would needs persuade us but a modest humble self-abasing sense of our own insufficience with an absolute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace Thence it follows v. 13. For it 's God that worketh in you to wil and to do of his good pleasure This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine