1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
God to al and singular actions of the wil The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain persuade us namely That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination yet Aquinas is not c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge 1 Was not Thomas Aquinas himself a Dominican of the Order of Dominic And are not al the Dominicans sworne Thomists Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions even such as are sinful and yet Thomas their Master against it 2 Take the character of impartial Writers and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's sentiment See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward Professor of Theologie at Cambridge his Determinations pag. 117 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of Thomas But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversie namely to Le Blanc and Baronius Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. par 3. thes 10. pag. 430. assures us That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans teach for the explication of Divine Concurse That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require For according to their mind God is therefore said to be the first Mover because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations c. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein Thus also Baronius who in his Metaphysics Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas as the principal Founder thereof So § 79. pag. 147. And § 82. pag. 149. he urgeth That from the opinion of Thomas it follows that God is the Author of sin The like § 85. pag. 151. But 3 to let passe the testimonies of others if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses and the reflexions of our own reason thereon it is to me most evident that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries Thus 1. 2. Quaest 79. Art 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act and in both regards it is from God for it 's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being c. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend that this includes immediate concurse but not predeterminative it is most evident that Aquinas owned no concurse but what was predeterminative For what is predetermination of the wil but the application of it to its act as Strangius pag. 244. grants And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil What more commun with him than this grand Effate That God applies al second causes to their act Thus in his sums par 1. Quaest 105. Art 5. he layes down this conclusion That God actes in every Agent finally effectively and formally yet so as they also act And then in the explication hereof he saith 3 That it is to be considered that God doth not only move things to work as by applying the formes and virtues of things to their operations as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the axe but also gives formes to creatures acting and preserves them in being and because the forme is in the thing and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings which among althings is more intime it follows that God workes intimely in althings and for this reason in sacred Scripture the operations of nature are ascribed unto God as working in nature according to that Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me c. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis He saith 1 That God actes in every Agent not only finally and effectively but also formally 2 That God moves things to worke by APPLYING i. e. predetermining the formes and virtues of things to their operations Yea 3 That God applies the second cause to act as the Artificer applies the instrument to worke Whereby he makes al second causes the wil not excepted but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience For the wil albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts yet in regard of the Divine concurse which it receives and in virtue whereof it actes it may safely be termed a vital Instrument 4 That God acting most intimely in althings the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him which notes predetermination in the highest point So also Aquinas Quaest Disp q. 3. de Potentia art 7. speakes fully of this predeterminative application of al second causes by God And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him So that I cannot but wonder that any learned man should urge Aquinas's testimonie against us We descend now to Scotus the Head of a Sect opposite to the Thomists yet who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis I am not ignorant that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus's name to patronise his Antithesis and I shal not denie but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than Thomas yet this I no way dout but to make good that as to our Hypothesis touching Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Scotus is fully of our persuasion This wil appear evident 1 if we consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them as Le Blanc de Praescient thes 33. pag. 443. confesseth And certainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 2 Scotus and his sectators generally hold That God efficaciously concurs to al second causes and their acts not by any influence or impression on the second cause which the Thomists assert but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act Which we judge to be the very truth as it hath been demonstrated by us Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination but only as to its origine and principe the Thomists making it to consiste in a physic intrinsec influxe impressed on the creature
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who efficaciously worketh althings The like v. 11. of which hereafter This efficacious concurse as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concurse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Lord cooperating or efficaciously concurring So elsewhere that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose efficacious and predeterminative concurse in and with althings is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work readily It 's rendred by the Syriac sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse but a particular present certain efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurse exerting it self in al individual acts and effects Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by the Syriac Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work to act with diligence to be efficacious as Boderianus And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to act to work to perform to effect as Boderianus Lastly it is rendred by the Syriac Ephes 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who hath efficaciously wrought althings Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of Gods concurse as to al second causes and acts Hence 2. This efficacious Concurse as it determines and applies the second cause to act is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a terme or limit 1 primarily and properly signifies to termine set bounds or limits to any cause effect or thing So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man Nation and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life So Arrian Epictet lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Virgils Song is remarquable Stat sua cuique dies Every ones day stands fixed or determined which Servius understands of the fixed determined period of human life So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie but the very Pagans by their dim light asserted a fixed period of Divine life as determined by God albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the bounds or the position of termes for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause action effect or thing God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes their actions effects and events there is nothing so contingent in nature but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places as wel as to causes and acts So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines or limits a day Thence in the Glossarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I termine or limit as to place Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gives terme or limit Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine determine or constitute termes to any place or thing Num. 34. 6. Josh 13. 27. 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition which is the terme or boundary of an essence according to Cicero who renders it the circumscription of a thing 2 From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary namely to decree destine to a certain end predestine predetermine In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine and so it is transferred to predestination predetermination or the decree and purpose of the Divine wil even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it was determined or predetermined decreed Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil and yet lo as to the substrate mater or entitative act predetermined and decreed by God The same Acts. 2. 23. Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by that defined determined or predetermined counsel of which more Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree deliberate determine is expounded by Theodotion Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. 1 of things appertaining to salvation 1 Cor. 2. 7. 2 of persons elect Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. 3 of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin yea that which was intrinsecally evil So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before or predetermined to be done For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine predestine predetermine to set limits bounds termes to persons or things Thence as to this present text and point when it is said here that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act which was predetermined by God as in what follows Chap. 3. § 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal constitute or make firm any thing which is rendred by the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to order dispose constitute institute The Divine Wil and Decree gives order constitution limitation determination yea predetermination to althings al persons and things times and places ends and means receive termes limits destination and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to foreknow 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to propose or purpose Rom.
it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of
Grace but also in others that are commun according to his own pleasure he determines it with the preservation of its own native libertie sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature See more on this argument in what follows c. 3. § 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts without any violence offered to its Libertie why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts without prejudice to its Libertie The force of this consequence is so strong that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination See Chap. 5. § 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts even of such as are not intrinsecally evil This Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works it may peradventure be said that God doth determine their wils yet it seems more incommode to say that God moves and predetermines to al other acts as to acts of hatred of God blasphemie c. So that he yieldeth that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts and indeed it cannot be rationally denied sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful When I say that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful As here must not yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively but only Specificatively as it specifies one and the same Act and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil So that the meaning is no more than this that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good as our Adversaries grant he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis Of this Argument see Chap. 5. § 4 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature whereof God is not the efficient cause This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being So Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie and no action as it is an action or has any realitie whereof God is not the cause or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God as the first cause on whose concurse and influxe it dependes So a Reverend Divine Cathol Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain that as motus vel actio is quid naturale it is of God as the first cause of Nature and so when a sinner acteth it is not without the first Universal Cause One would think that this concession if well stated and prosecuted would put an end to our controversie For al that we demand is that the real positive act whereunto sin is annexed be from God as the first cause of Nature But yet what our Opponents grant as limited by them wil not answer our expectations For some hold with Durandus that the action is from God but not immediately others that it is immediately from God yet not by a predeterminative concurse Hence 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense yet by others it is Thus Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person For as God himself so his virtue is every where present and energetic For the proof whereof he cites Isa 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and efficace of God whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself so that whatever they are or do act they essentially depend on him in both respects Whereby he seems to evince that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act but also immediately reach the very act even that has sin annexed to it The like he addes l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be said and men are wont so to speak That God is the cause of vitiose actions albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said it may in some manner be understood how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin when yet he is void of al sin specially if these things be observed 1 That it be not understood that God moves or inclines men to sin in general 2 Neither that it be said that God moves to al sin but only to such in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works 3 Neither that it be understood that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken or sin as sin but only to the material of sin i. e. not to the sin of the Action but to the Action as substrate to the sin so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie which he only permits but of the substrate Act and of his own direction and ordination which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action c. Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful he seems to grant that the Act as it is a physic or natural Being is from God So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil such as the hatred of God perjurie c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil That God concurs to the physic action but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius which if he were candid and uniforme in granting us would put a period to the controversie 1
point about Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans it 's certain that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth and particularly Alvarez who is principally struck at by the adverse partie deserves great honor and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations Strangius and a Reverend Divine of Name among our selves have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defense of our Hypothesis but the Jesuites themselves who are his most puissant Impugnators give him a more candid and favorable treatment For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminensis and Estius whom they judged more severe they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate to whom they required the Jansenists to conforme in those points controverted in order to an accommodement and the reasons they allege are of moment For say they Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis there is a grand apparence that he and those others who writ at the same time and since took up this mode of speech to salve Libertie according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had albeit they made no Decree on this mater of which see Refutat de Pere Ferrier Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme p. 82. wherein remarque 1 That the Jesuites Alvarez's sworne enemies give him a more favorable character as one who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis for the composing the differences in those points in controversie between the Dominicans and Jesuites about Predetermination Yea 2 That the Popes themselves Clement 8 th and Paul 5 th had the same sentiments with Alvarez Is it not strange then that the Jesuites who are professed enemies to Predetermination and the Popes themselves who have been generally favorers of Pelagianisme should have a greater kindnesse for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination than Protestant Divines whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuites can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination For mine own part I cannot but confesse that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination I read Alvarez with al possible diligence and exactitude of spirit and found therein so penetrant an acumen so profound soliditie and such masculine Demonstrations as that I never met with his equal excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis This Justice I conceive my self under an essential obligation to do him to wipe off those undeserved clamors and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us have loaded him with His own Sentiments in the defense of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations de Auxil l. 3. Disput 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate That God doth by a previous motion truely and efficiently or according to the mode of a physical cause premove free-wil to the act of sin as it is an Act or Being His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible namely from the Participation Limitation and Dependence of every Second cause c. Of which hereafter c. 5. Lastly that the Scholemen generally besides such as are Pelagian assert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin see Twisse Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress 2. I now passe on to Jansenius and his Sectators who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuites as to the point of Predetermination The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers For 1 It 's evident that Jansenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans not the thing it self as asserted by Augustin Thus in his August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77 c. he proves That there is no manner of speech among the Scholemen so efficacious and pregnant to expresse Predetermination by but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concurse And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie and thence the true opinion of Augustin Again cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressely that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with physic Predetermination that the office of physically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract but also in the concrete Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very terme of physic Predetermination to expresse efficacious Concurse by albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Scholemen So that it 's evident he was not averse from the thing albeit he but seldome used the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues as also to confine himself to the termes used by Augustin 2 That reverend Divine among us who makes use of Jansenius's name against physic Predetermination doth yet grant that Jansenius held the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment Wherein he opposeth Jansenius and also Augustin who held that sin as a punishment was willed and caused by God as before 3 Jansenius August de Statu Nat. Laps l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us That men in their lapsed state before Faith be introduced are under the captivitie of lust and can do nothing but sin which captivitie is the same with that foresaid necessitie and coaction whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 1 He proves cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is also positive 2 He demonstrates cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation according to its comparative consideration is the absolute wil of God This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. part 3. Sect. 7. § 22. pag. 93. in these words Jansenius's Doctrine is that the Reprobation of men was by Gods positive absolute wil of men in original sin and the effect of it excecation and obduration This being his proper opinion it necessarily follows that he asserted Gods predeterminative
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged and that with as great color of Reason by the Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination to gracious acts I must confesse I could never neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin be admitted as valid 2 The like may be said of that other objection or reason why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin namely That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible c. Is not this very objection and the reason urged to enforce it as much urged by Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side What reason do the new Methodists give that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible but that it takes away the Wils Indifference and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference and its power to act or not to act 3 Our Adversaries urge That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises Invitations and al evangelic offers of Grace and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners in making offers of Grace and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers Is not this very objection with its reason urged and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewil without a predeterminative Concurse are not al gracious Promises Invitations and offers of Grace to Sinners who fal not under this Predetermination vain and uselesse Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally some few excepted denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace as by the predeterminative Concurse of God 4 Our Adversaries object That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin supposeth God to compel and force men to sin and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good and that with as much color of reason For say they If God predetermine the wil to what is good then he compels and forceth the wil to be good so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act which destroyeth al moral good c. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it as we shal demonstrate c. 6. § 5. To conclude this argument I am very confident our Opponents the new Methodists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin which is naturally good for al or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later may and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former and that with equal force And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes though lesse friendly to divine Concurse to denie al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. n. 66. c. p. 136. § 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin its substrate mater and formal reason 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin we have demonstrated Ch. 1. § 2. 1 That al human acts considered in their natural entitie abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil 2 That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law 3 That no human Act considered physically or according to its natural entitative substance is intrinsecally evil but only morally in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object Hence 4 That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes we hence argue That God must necessarily concur to yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil morally are according to their substrate mater physically good doth it not necessarily follow that God the first cause must concur thereto yea predetermine the same Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first necessarily demonstrate not only its dependence on but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited defined and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being which is such by Essence May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries who grant that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act So Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse saith he that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act for then every act would be sin also that it doth not follow as the act procedes from God for then every act that procedes from God would have sin Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius that Breme Professor who was a member of the Synod of Dort and there began the New Method Duodecas Dissert de Volunt Dei Dissert 8. Thes 99. p. 426. As to the Act saith he of the Divine Wil about sin the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves whiles that some expressely affirm That God nils and hates sins and those that commit them Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say That God wils creates effectes them Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree if the distinction be rightly observed 1 Between the Act and the Vitiositie of the Act. 2 Between the Act as it is from God and as it
God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quà m vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quà m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ◠Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.
That in Actions intrinsecally evil there is a physic or natural entitie separable from the ethic or moral vitiositie 2 That the physic or natural entitie of al sinful Actions even such as are intrinsecally sinful is immediately from God as the first cause of Nature But I must confesse I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in these his concessions but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted For 1 He sometimes asserts that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsecally evil as that the vitiositie cannot be separated from it Again 2 albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby he doth too much verge unto if not wholly espouse Durandus's mediate concurse as to acts intrinsecally evil Thus also Amyraldus as it is wel noted by Le Blanc Thes Conciliat Arbitrii c. Thes 48. p. 436. 9. Prop. That Gods Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie This most of the new Methodists grant albeit some seem to denie it at least in part Our Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God if man doth that which God permits sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth God must foreknow and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. ` Furthermore it must be observed which we have oft mentioned that God albeit he doth not wil sin as sin yet he doth advisedly permit direct and ordain it in the best manner to execute his righteous judgements and illustrate his glorie The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to sin formally taken or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily annexed yet we acknowledge that God doth so rule and order the sinful wils of Men and Devils that by permitting tentations offering objects subministrating occasions denying Grace which he owes to none letting loose the reins to Satan removing impediments or by operating in any other secret manner the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows and specially that that work be performed for the effecting of which God useth their ministerie How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversie were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it Doth he not say here as much as we abating only the terme Predetermination and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted 10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin This Proposition we chearfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto although it be the grand designe and unwearied endeavors of our Adversaries both Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and new Methodists to fasten the Antithesis on us namely That we make God to be the Author of sin Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurse as we shal shew in what follows Chap. 4. § 2. Having laid down the general Propositions wherein our Opponents generally though not without some variation concord with us it follows that we shew briefly wherein they differ among themselves Indeed so great is the difference of our Adversaries specially the New Methodists Amyraldus Baronius Strangius Le Blanc and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they al agree And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution suspension and hesitation of mind as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true Placeus Tractat. de Liber Arbit p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question with this modest concelement of his mind Truely we according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majestie of God dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first is It sufficeth us that too much dependence cannot be asserted provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins Which we readily close with renouncing al such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin So Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomists previous predeterminative concurse namely that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God and efficaciously i. e. irresistibly moved first to act and then to act this rather than that before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us In the mean while we professe these two things 1 That we do much against our wil recede from this opinion and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men which are Patrones thereof 2 That we are ready if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith to reject it Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. Thes 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversie yet Thes 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But Thes 57. he confesseth That provided God be not made the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted c. And Thes 58. he concludes That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about sinful acts is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse but that God doth many ways procure promove direct and moderate sinful events So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries Yea how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concurse immediately influencing al natural acts and yet elsewhere denie the same to acts intrinsecally evil And so in other points controverted by us But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars 1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as to Gods Prescience of sinful acts Al the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of al sinful acts but yet they are at a great difference yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it 1 Strangius lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated that seems the most probable which is taken from
Actions and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts 1 We may consider the object althings i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie althings must be here taken distributively into al singulars there is no Being that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God 2 Here is to be considered the Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who worketh energetically or efficaciously for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to work with an invincible efficace and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie as before c. 1. § 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse working in and with althings according to their natural propensions Thence 3 follows the original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the counsel of his own wil. Which notes that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings there is no executive power in God distinct from his Wil his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition as we have largely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. § 3. Whence also it follows that Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil has one and the same Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects even such as have sin appendent to them Strangius p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus From this place nothing more can be collected than that God has decreed those things that he worketh as it is certain that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute not that God worketh sins c. 1 This Text speaks more than what Strangius allows it to speake namely that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh but also that he works by his Decree or omnipotent Volition for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil as Scotus Bradwardine and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate 2 Who saith that God worketh Sins surely none but Marcion or Manes or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being 3 But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture that God worketh that entitative natural Act whereunto sin is appendent for otherwise how can he be said to worke althings Is this good sense or Logic to say God workes althings not only according to their generic or specific distribution but also according to their distribution into each singular for so the Syncategoreme Al is here taken but yet he worketh not al singular entities namely the substrate mater of Sin Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction He workes althings but yet doth not worke althings What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions 2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to al human actions and effects even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man Thus Psal 33. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike he considereth al their works 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who fashioneth formeth frameth as the Potter doth his clay it notes not only yea not so much the first Creation of the human Soul as its actual figments frames imaginations and thoughts this is evident from the scope and contexture of the words for what is the Psalmists intent and undertakement but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience and its perfect comprehension of al the figments frames thoughts intentions and affections of the heart as vers 13 14 And how doth he prove this Why because he fashioneth their hearts alike i. e. puts al the first thoughts inclinations intentions and movements of the heart into what forme frame or fashion he pleaseth There is also a great Emphase and significance in that terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render alike but may be as properly rendred together as it is by the Latine simul neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth but to the object Hearts and so it notes an universalitie distributive into al singulars without the least exception of any And then the sense wil be who fashioneth formeth or frameth the hearts of al mankind in al their very first motions conceptions imaginations resolutions end interests contrivements ebullitions affections prosecutions and fruitions or other actions whatsoever Whence he addes He considereth al their works what works doth he mean Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands but also the workings movements and figments of their hearts and how can God consider them if he did not forme frame and fashion them Yea there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts namely that Gods forming framing and fashioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cause of his considering their works For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of mens hearts unlesse he be the former framer and fashioner of them al as to their real entitative acts al the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us So that Gods Science of Vision or Prescience as to the figments of mans heart ariseth from this that God is the framer former and fashioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements which also implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its first motions inclinations and affections So then to forme and sum up our Argument from this Text Doth God indeed fashion forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions imaginations and affections And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins though never so intrinsecally evil What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts if he be not the former and fashioner of them al as to their natural entitie I must confesse the validitie of this argument from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great as that should it be baffled I see no way left but to turne Socinian and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the contingent imaginations of mans heart which implies much Atheisme Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse as to al human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water he turneth it whithersoever he wil. 1 He mentions the Kings heart as the measure of al other mens because Kings generally have a greater Soveraintie and Dominion over their own hearts than other men if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse surely Kings may specially such as Solomon was who obtained from God such an amplitude
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
Concurse to the entitative act of sin is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it which he wiped off with this answer That the same action which is sinful in regard of man is not so in regard of God because he is not under the same Law with man Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 87. pag. 152. The third mode saith he is peculiar to Zuinglius who teacheth that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin because God hath no Law set to him but man hath To which Baronius answers That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature not to deal injustly or cruelly with men This replie although borrowed from Bellarmine is now become commun with our Adversaries yet without the least shadow of reason for they do but beg the question in saying That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei cap. 6. tom 1. of his Workes pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man he always sins when he actes against the Law albeit he neither be nor live nor operate but in God and from God and by God But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin but not in like manner to God for man is under a law but God is free Therefore one and the same wickednesse suppose adulterie or homicide as from God the Author Motor and Impulsor it is a work not a crime but as it is from man so it is a crime and wickednesse for God is not bound up by law but man is condemned by law Thus he procedes to illustrate by many exemples of David c. Thence pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh c. wherein note 1 That he cals God the Author Motor and Impulsor of the act which must be understood not morally but physically as he excites and applies the wil to its act 2 That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin because he actes not against any law a distinction which was valid in his time albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines yea Calvinists Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade but in use long before Zuinglius by Scotus Ariminensis and other scholastic Theologues who followed Augustin herein Thus Scotus in Sent. 2. Dist 37. Quaest 2. saith The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil but not as to Gods concurse quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere Deus autem non debet because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law to give rectitude to the action but God is not as before How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313 c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God he saith 1 That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God Thence he procedes 2 to demonstrate That albeit God wil and know and decree althings in the world yet that he is not the Author of sin So pag. 315. 3 He proves That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative This he demonstrates pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph the robbing of Job the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto Shimei's cursing of David the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam c. 4 He procedes pag. 319. to the fal of Adam which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God c. The same Controversie he manageth against Castellio de aeterna Dei praedestinatione p. 360. where he proves That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God The like pag. 401. where he proves That God doth not compel men to sin or infuse sin into them but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators but also by that of Arminius who objectes the very same things against them as are objected against us namely That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose by which opinion saith he God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin of which see Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes in this as in other points which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession and signed by their Ministers and Professors for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus and others in the French Churches That not only the German and Helvetian but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis is most evident by the most elaborate acute and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier the greatest light that ever France Reformed had Calvin only excepted who in his Panstrat Cathol tom 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose distinct and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists He titles this Book Of the Author of sin and proves cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin Martyr and Beza therewith Thence cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines namely That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David Absoloms incest c. Whence cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin which they make to be only by speculative idle permission as some new Methodists Cap. 4. he procedes to prove That God wils the existence of sin Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists namely that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God Thence cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration Whence cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument from Gods energie in sinful acts which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally And thence cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree
predetermining the free causes to those acts as Learned Strangius yet denie that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypothesis which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurition as Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 11. His reason is because nothing can be certainly known but what is certainly true but nothing is certainly true but what is necessary either absolutely or conditionally Whence he collects that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science which is infallible and most certain unlesse there be included the condition whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred But if this reason prevails God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future but what he before decreed as absolutely future which yet Strangius admits not who confesseth that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God Thus Le Blanc of Strangius's self-contradicting Hypothesis And indeed to speak the truth nakedly there seems so much force in Strangius's reason whereby he proves That al Gods Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurition namely from the certainty of divine Prescience that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same albeit to the subversion of his own Phaenomena And I am very bold yea confident in asserting and demonstrating these following Propositions 1 Prop. That God can have no certain Prescience of things future but from his own decree the only certain determinate cause of their futurition And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent denie also Gods Prescience to be certain as Le Blanc De Concord P. 3. Thes 1. p. 438. and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree Hence 2 Prop. There is an hypothetic or consequential necessitie that ariseth from Gods certain Prescience This is wel urged though in the defense of an hell-bred Hypothesis by the Socinians and cited by Le Blanc as a knot not easily untied de Concord Par. 3. Thes 22. pag. 441. There is saith he much of difficultie here which in times past has exercised the ingenies of Doctors For seeing it is impossible that the Prescience of God may be deceived it cannot be but that those things must happen which God foresees wil happen and therefore that althings happen necessarily and it is impossible but that the very wil of man must produce those acts which God from eternity foreknew it would produce This Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Adversaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis See more of this Chap. 6. § 5. Hence 3 Prop. The same arguments that are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Wil to the substrate mater of sin may be as they are by the Socinians urged with as great force against Gods certain Prescience of Sin For our Adversaries Strangius Le Blanc c. granting the certain futurition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God fal under al those Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us who assert the predefinition futurition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree This Proposition is incomparably wel demonstrated by judicious Davenant in his Animadversions on Gods Love to Mankind p. 418 419 442 462. where he proves That Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the Wil as absolute Predestination and Reprobation Of which more in our next Argument also c. 6. § 5. Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adversaries take Sanctuarie in to secure themselves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Prescience And here at what a miserable losse and confusion are they among themselves How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving this argument Some flie for refuge to the Molinists Middle Science telling us That God foresaw that men being placed under such hypotheses and circumstances would sin against him c. Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 12. Disp 2. n. 55 56. p. 326. where he professedly defendes Fonseca's conditionate Science making God to have a conditionate Science of the first sin if Eve seduced by the Serpent should temt Adam c. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among us But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more fober of this new Method particularly by Strangius who l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervoâ—… That there can be no such thing as a Middle or conditionate Science in God because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible or Knowable and this he proves because an object cannot be certainly knowen unlesse it be certainly true which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not Thus also Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 1. p. 452 c. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion have recourse to the Dominicans real presence of things future in Eternitie whereby they make God by his Science of Vision to behold the sins of men Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded saith he to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision c. But more fully l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of althings in Eternitie because the Eternitie of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible The same he inculcates p. 595 596 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie is greatly opposed by some of his own party the New Methodists who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof So Le Blanc De Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 37. p. 443. First saith he as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternitie to eternitie it self it appears to be a mere figment for that one thing coexiste to another it is necessary that both existe c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves who has espoused Strangius's Hypothesis fals soul on the Thomists for asserting Althings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali c. Lastly others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Prescience Thus Le Blanc De Concord Par. 1. Thes 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable c. Yet he grants Thes 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth yet it doth not satisfie the Question nor remove the main difficultie namely How things passe from a state of
of the new Methodists Baronius Strangius and others about Concurse fal in with those of the Jesuites for a simultaneous Concurse only albeit some of them in termes disown it 6 Lastly the soverain and absolute Independence of Gods Concurse gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods Concurse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 412 c. And indeed what more absurd yea impossible than such a conditionate Concurse whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose Gods concurrence to depend on mans Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progresse into infinite For if God concur on condition that man concur doth God concur to that condition or not If not is there not then some act of the creature produced without Gods concurse If God concur to the working of that condition then absolutely or conditionally if absolutely then his former Concurse is not conditional if conditionally then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence We take it then for granted that Gods Concurse is not conditional but absolute and independent And hence we thus argue If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin then he doth predetermine the wil thereto the consequence is rational and clear For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect the one must necessarily depend on the other and that which depends on another must be determined by that other for every cause that is dependent on another is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby It 's true natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun without being determined thereby because the Sun is a limited cause and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is workes on but is rather determined thereby and so in that respect dependent thereon But as for God the first cause whose wil the principe of his concurse is omnipotent and most efficacious it 's impossible that he should have any dependence on or be any way determinable in his concurse by the mater he workes on he being the most universal cause infinitely perfect and void of al potentialitie or passive power must necessarily predetermine al second causes to their acts but be determined by none But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurse 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurse we now procede to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurse whereby he concurs to the mater of sin to be predeterminative yet he grants it is efficacious calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force and efficace of God whereby he subordinates second causes to himself so that whatever they are or act they essentially depend on him in both respects And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concurse is al that we require to build our present Demonstration on which we shal distribute into two branches 1 Gods efficacious concurse unto al natural acts and effects 2 Gods efficacious concurse to al supernatural acts and effects 1. We shal demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacitie of Divine concurse as to al natural acts and effects which evidently appears in the following particulars 1 Gods concurse to al physic or natural causes motions and effects is most efficacious This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme as Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. § 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us as before c. 2. § 1. 2 The efficace of Divine concurse dependes on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurse considered actively but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act so or so To presume that active concurse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to crosse the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 3 Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al second causes to al their natural actions and effects Is it not impossible but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of mans wil the said action or effect must necessarily follow Is not the wil of God sufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil so great that not only those things are done which God wils shal be done but in that manner as he wils them Doth not Strangius confesse so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266. Whence if God in his own wil purpose and determine that the human wil should produce such or such an action suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed is not the human wil necessarily in regard of the Divine wil and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord expressed Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by the decreed fixed determined wil of God The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 4 The efficacious concurse of God modifies and according to its mode determines al actions of second causes not only necessarily but freely Doth the Divine wil determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect and may it not yea must it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al such faculties acts and effects as are subject to its Empire and has not the Divine wil which is infinitely more efficacious power to determine al inferior powers acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion And doth it not hence follow that the soverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurse predetermine al the free acts of the human wil which necessarily fal under its Empire and modification See this wel demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward Determinat de Concursu Dei pag. 118 c. Whence 5 The efficacious predeterminative concurse of God equally extendes itself to al natural good even to the substrate mater of sinful acts Strangius and others of our Opponents grant That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurse extendes it self not only to al supernatural good but also to al natural good that has not sin intrinsecally annexed to it whence we may by a paritie of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of al actions though never so intrinsecally evil for