till he hath evinced a specialty in our case which will be somewhat an uneasie task though we should grant him his own option that God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto i.e. to the actions and sinfulness of them too for upon that supposition there is less necessity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans corrupt nature because he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propension to of it self and so Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back which puts him on a little faster in the way he was going before 3. We are at a great loss as to Mr. H's meaning whether it be that it is a detraction from Gods perfection to affirm God was not able to make a Creature that could not act universally without determination or particularly as to forbidden actions the generality of the terms calls for the former sense the conclusion he was to prove for the latter 1. If the former sense be that he will own I seem to my self fairly allowed to infer that then man in his primitive state had not nor have the good Angels at present any Divine determination to good actions because to both unnecessary and unnecessary it must be presumed because it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of such a nature as that they should not need it and because they had no disinclination to be overcome by an efficaciously determinative influence which is the reason Mr. H. gives of the necessity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapsed state Post p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unnecessary to a state of Integrity And if this inference be natural I wonder not that Man fell but that he fell not as soon as he was set upon his legs nor that some of the good Angels turned Rebels so soon to their Soveraign Lord but how the rest persevere in their Loyalty I have hitherto swom with the stream of Protestant Divines not because it was easie but in my apprehension safe who have conceived the good Angels security an effect of a greater degree of determinative influence to borrow Mr. H's Phrase or corroborating grace that is in the terms of the Question now agitated Predetermination than was afforded to the now bad Angels or to speak more strictly of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one which was suspended as to the other which conception of Divines to note that in passage may be easily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon Gods Holiness Justice or Truth upon the first because God by the suspension of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels sin than the Sun of the darkness that overspreads the air when it hath withdrawn its rays upon the second for it is a ruled case in the Schools Non datur justitia proprie dicta inter Deum Creaturas i. e. God cannot be properly said to be a debtor to his Creatures no not when he hath passed a promise to them for even then if we will speak strictly he is a debtor to himself namely to his own truth and fidelity not to them and if he should to suppose an impossibility for illustration-sake break his word he would be but Mendax non injurius a Lyar not unjust Not upon his Truth for he was not under the bond of a promise as he is to the part of repaired Mankind whom we denominate Saints to preserve the Angels from Apostacy As for those who take this Doctrine for a blemish upon Gods goodness I turn them over to God himself for a reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory Propositions contained in his Word and within the verge of our own experience that God is good and yet that he hath permitted a passage for sin which he could have impeded If the latter sense be avowed as a genuine interpretation of Mr. H's mind I know not how it will be able to save its credit if I should charge it with being guilty of this gross absurdity viz. a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful actions in concreto i. e. the natural actions and sin that adheres to them 'T is true God made Man mutable and how could he do otherwise unless he should have made him a God which very terms involve an insufferable contradiction and so in a remote capacity of sinning But Mr. H's words import a next or immediate capacity of acting which the Creature is capable of as soon as it starts out of nothing into something without the intervenient aid of Predetermination I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning and I would offer him a friendly hand if he would accept of it to help him out of the pit he is fallen into by minding him of our distinction between the materiale and formale of sin the natural action that is the subject and the sin that is the inseparable adjunct in our temporary estate which distinction supposed in conjâ—nction with Mr. H's Hypothesis Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the encumbrance now inferred upon it and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man suffices to the natural actions since sin adhered to them as well as before without the help of Predetermination But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the issue for though it may clear him of one yet it will entangle him in many absurdities or at least self-contradictions For then 1. How shall he quit himself from the blame of being a Favourer of Durandus Hypothesis for the sense is the same and the words not much different And yet why should he once attempt it seeing that Hypothesis serves his professed design of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin with much officiousness and that he may accept this suggestion the more kindly a most Learned hand shall tender it to him Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence but mediate only in respect of voluntary agents And according to this opinion it is easie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes in producing their defective effects If the will of the Creature saith Scotus C. 2. Dist 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cause of her action and that God had no immediate efficiency but mediate only in respect thereof as some think It were easie according to that opinion to shew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes for the producing of their effects for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin the will only should be the total cause of it and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately in that he caused and produced such a will
the terms when they labour under any ambiguity or however fall not under the apprehension of those who are to be instructed for want of skill in that art or science to which they belong or language from which they are borrowed In neither of these respects will it be needless in the Controversie now to be agitated not as to the first because Mr. Howe gives us his sense in various terms and such as seem repugnant to each other one while that which he denies is a Predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the Creatures Let. p. 32. and Postsc p. 3. and Predeterminative concourse Post p. 19. another while 't is Predetermining Influence Post p. 19. and a Determinative influence Let. p. 36. and Efficacious influence Post p. 52. As for the two former phrases which are of the same import they are in effect contradictio in adjecto in their conjunction I appeal to Strangius Mr. H.'s friend but my Adversary in the main Question under consideration Hujusmodi Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum praevium appellant c. i.e. Some confound this kind of Predetermination with the general concourse of God But they speak very improperly who call Predetermination a previous or Predeterminative concourse or say that God does by concourse determine second causes and he quotes Twisse with approbation saying Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo c. i.e. To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect is not to determine that agent For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect and yet it does not determine God therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act Strang. de Vol. Dei Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction I confess but the reason out of Twisse gave him as just ground as it does me so to call them As for the latter phrase influence which he makes equipollent with the former concourse in these words I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms as some do Post p. 29. I had rather he should hear Strangius again than me blaming his not affecting that curiosity of distinction Caeterum nobis operaepretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo vocabula concursum influxum c. i.e. But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between those two words Concourse and Influence which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded For first Influence is of a larger extent than Concourse For the causality of every Cause especially the Efficient is called Influence And therefore in many instances there may be observed an Influence of God when yet there is no concourse as when he acts not making use of any second cause Again although in the concourse of two Causes each of them are considered as having their Influence yet the word Influence is absolute and noting a respect to another cause but the word Concourse is relative to another cause Strang. de Vol. Deil. 1. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term Efficacious it suits us well enough if Mr. H. intends by it an Infallibility of the event or the certain production of those actions which God hath an Influence upon The ambiguity of Mr. H. phrases removed and the sense of them brought to a certainty I assert the contradictory to his Proposition That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions even those that are most wicked Post p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms we would thus lay down That God does determine or predetermine or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions Strangius fairly enough cites our Thesis lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Question then to be discussed is Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions So Strang. fairly l. 2 c. 4. p. 155. Unless it may seem meet to add that reduplicative particle as such because of Mr. Howe 's addition even those that are most wicked Post p. 52. As to which it is to be noted that we who assert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures do limit it to the actions considered abstractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them as for instance we hold Gods Predetermination of the natural act whereby David begat a child in Adultery as well as of those whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony and of the use of his tongue in telling a lie to Abimelech the Priest as well as in praising God Whereas Mr. Howe limits Gods Predetermination only to morally or spiritually good actions as such Posts p. 39. n. 6. Which Predeter nation special we grant but withal assert a general which extends to evil actions In which we consider 1. The subject and as to this we say that sin is in that which is good the nature of man and his faculties and actions and these God excites and guides efficaciously And this subject is called the materiale or substrate matter of sin 2. The end and thus though not the nature yet the existence of sin is good or it is good that sin should be because God draws good out of it and hence God predetermines to the natural actions though he knows sin will adhere to them The grand term then to be explained is Predetermination or as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it Praecurse and Praemotion of which terms the former which signifies a fore appointment is either from eternity or in time The latter two only in time The former viz. Predetermination is either from eternity and so is an immanent act of Gods that is of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures or in time which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood and this act of Gods is called Predetermination because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that and 't is called a Precourse or Premotion i.e. a running before or fore motion as I may so speak because in order of nature it is before the action of the creature Again Predetermination or Precourse or Premotion is distinguished into Physical or Moral The latter I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such but not with respect to evil actions unless the proposing objects and occasions of sin may as some learned men judg be reduced to the actions of a moral cause But whether the moral acts of God in commanding threatning promising c. may be justly denominated Predetermination will remain dubitable till another doubt be resolved viz. Whether the will do always follow the last practical dictate of the understanding Against the affirmative of which Question to note that obiter the most acute and learned Wallis seems to oppose an
that might at her pleasure do what she would Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working which first he gave them Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field of the Church B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Durandus opinion in these words But they that are of sounder judgment resolve that as the light enlightneth the air and with the air all other inferiour things so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes and preserveth them in the same but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them c. Ibid. p. 122. 3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the material and formal part of sin approved of above by Dr. Field Most of his way viz. Mr. Gales mince the business and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful not as sinful so Mr. Howe 's Postsc p. 33. Answ Except it were affirmed that it implied a contradiction for God to make such a creature there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it Let. p. 37. and subjoins soon after I must confess a greater disposition to wonder that ever such a thing should be disputed than dispute so plain a case p. 38. Reply That it is affirmed Mr. Howe cannot surely be ignorant nay he frees himself from that blame I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himself This Argument ab absurdo from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himself is urged against those that deny immediate concurrence and so by just consequence conservation and Predetermination 1. As to mediate concurrence 't is urged for it by Durandus That there is no repugnuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that should be able to act without his help otherwise that is than by conserving its being and powers To this is Answered Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae sit potens c. That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator as well in respect of the created cause it self which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it for seeing they are Beings by participation they essentially depend upon the first Being Wherefore as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe 's nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto no though Mr. Howe should acknowledg immediate concurrence as in his Postsc he does of which in his whole Letter there is altum silentium and deny only Predetermination for this Answer is a shoo that will fit either foot as will appear in its place 2. As to conservation the no necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures as when once made may continue their Being though the operation of the Agent cease by which they were produced To this Argument Suarez also fits a rational reply Ad amplitudinem divinae potentiae spectat c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power that nothing is nor can be a moment after its production without its influence and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures and an intrinsick power of annihilating them by the suspension or withholding of his influence Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2 17. 3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe 's explication of his mind that he does really believe Gods immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures both immediatione virtutis suppositi yet not determinative to wicked actions Postsc p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination i. e. applying it to action and to one rather than another action and 't is this that such a creature would be but ens secundarium a second being not causa secunda a second cause or which is all one God should be but ens primum not causa prima the first Being not the first Cause which I prove thus Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concourse and not by Predetermination or previous motion then God cannot be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them But the consequent is absurd and Mr. Howe I presume will not own it Therefore so is the Antecedent The Consequence is proved thus God is not by concourse the cause of the actions of the creatures as those actions proceed from them because then concourse must be before the action of the creature for every Physical cause is before the effect but the very name concourse imports a joyning together in the same action as the Master and Scholar whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter And all consent in concourse neither does God act before the creature nor the creature before God but both together and at once Arg. 2. To make good the English Proverb He is twice killed that is killed with his own weapon I shall retort Mr. Howe 's two concessions upon him 1. If there be an immediate concourse then there is a Predetermination or putting the creature upon action before it acts or else the creature is the first mover of it self to action The consequence is plausible enough as depending on this ground that by concourse alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual action rather than another As for instance in the state of innocency when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden all good and fit for food whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another The concourse of God with Adam's will in the election of one suppose that in the midst of the Garden before the prohibition passed upon it could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest as is plain in external actions Two men lanching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect but the one does not determine the other by lending common assistance to that act There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature though not of time to that act of Adam's will supposed of eating that tree instanced in to which God
sapientia est ipsi Lex c. i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a superiour Legislatour yet his own wisdom is a Law to him and as Zuinglius himself teaches us That what a Law is to us that is Gods own nature to him God is therefore no less bound not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God Wherefore if God should impel Mr. Howe 's phrase men to these things which are contrary to the Eternal Law and to his own nature and wisdom as to Adultery his will were evil because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom and God should deny himself which cannot be as the Apostle says Thus far Bellarmine ubi supra Answ Mr. Howe concludes What relief is there in that dream of the supposed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself For what can be supposed more repugnant or what more impertinent If innocent how were it punishable A Law already made in the case how can it be innocent Let. p. 42. Reply Mr. Howe leaves us wholly at a loss who it is that with this dream hath attempted to relieve a pious and sober mind closely urged with the horrour of so black a conception of God that he does first irresistibly determine mens will to and then punish them for the hatred of his blessed self as he tragically but falsely represents our opinion p. 40. I say falsely for God does not punish that natural passion we call hatred which himself as first Cause applies the second to the production of nor does God determine the will to that natural passion its elicite act irresistibly in his sense forcibly But as Austin long ago of Gods influence upon good actions so say we of bad God acts Omnipotenter pro te suaviter pro me Omnipotently according to his own nature but sweetly according to ours as shall be fully cleared in its place If any particular person of our judgment in the main shall propose an argument liable to exception I see not that we are obliged to defend it But as Mr. Howe introduces it it seems to be represented as a common extravagancy of the Predeterminants which I am sure it is not nor does Mr. Howe labour under a surguedry of candour in a bare presentation of this supposition without its application to the Question Both which because Mr. Howe hath neglected I think not my self obliged to give the Reader an account of but shall dismiss it without any adoe Arg. 2. The second pressing and importunate Argument of ours which Mr. H. repeats That God does predetermine sinful actions as actions otherwise it were impossible for God to foreknow the sinful actions of men many whereof he hath foretold if their futurition were a meer contingency and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent not determined by the supream agent God Let. p. 35 36. Ans To which Argument this is the sum of his Answer That this supposed indetermination of the Will in reference to wickâ—d actions is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them which is a small inconvenience and manifest absurdity not to acâ—nowledg the like in many cases seeing God does many things whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor understand Let. p. 47 48. Rep. 1. To which I reply That the way how God foreknows future contingencies is in his own Decree at least as to such which he hath decreed For I cannot divine what can be opposed to this Proposition That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree though it should be granted that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner which we can neither explicate nor understand Taking that then for granted till it be denied I think Mr. H. hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingencies For either he must exclude the good actions which he grants God predetermines men to Postsc p. 39. yea and all actions of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords immediate concourse p. 28. from being Contingencies which himself as well as we suppose in the whole controversie now agitated Or deny that they fall under Gods Decree which is too absurd because there 's nothing more evident than that what God does in time he decreed to do from Eternity Or if he grants both then it roundly follows that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to or concur with and such are all the actions of men disjunctively Rep. 2. We shall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree and consequently the sinful actions of men 1. By Scripture Isa 46.9 10 I am God and there is none like me declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying my counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin so I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews sometime Bishop of Winchester's admonition that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour thus glosses Neque solum ejus praescientiam hic commendat c. i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience but he affirms that he had testified by the Prophets what he had decreed For there were no certainty nor firmness in the Predictions or Prophesies unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass had the event of things in his own hand As to which words we may further observe 1. The form of the expression two Attributes are here applied by God to himself Wisdom and Soveraignty or liberty of Will and a common adjunct of both Immutability or we may call it a common effect the certainty of the event that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself shall certainly come to pass 2. The extent of it that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow viz. all that should certainly come to pass For as Judicious Calvin observes upon vers 11. Posteaquam Propheta c. After that the Prophet had spoken of the Prescience of God he accommodates the general expression he had used to his present purpose to comfort the Jews in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus c. 3. The argument which is couched in them to evince the certainty of Gods foreknowledg of what he did predict viz. because the events predicted were the result of his Wisdom and Pleasure or of his own wise Decrees And now to draw down this General to the particular in question Whether God foreknows sinful actions in his own Decree And for the proof of the
his leg the instrument of motion The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears in that the very same influence draws forth a fragrant savour from a bed of Roses That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapourâ— but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter The upper-wheel of a Clock though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel that is irregular in its motion yet it is not the cause of that irregularity When a dexterous Pen-man writes upon sinking paper he makes pothooks as we say of children that begin to learn the art of writing blots rather than letters which yet is not his fault but the Papers Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26. Reply 4. There must needs be a separation and therefore 't is possible to be between actions and the evil of them upon Mr. Howe 's own Hypothesis viz. That God does predetermine to all good actions which in the present state are but imperfectly good Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man as to the same action and ascribe the action and grace of it to God and the evil that adheres to that action to man unless he will ascribe all to God Absit blasphemia verbo If Mr. Howe can extricate himself and not us with the same Answer or rather if he can excogitate any other Answer than by this exsibilated distinction erit mihi magnus Apollo and without an Irony sapientum octavus Reply 2. To the connexion I Answer That it infolds a twofold contradiction 1. For it supposes some actions to be intrinsecally evil and yet by our Hypothesis to be determined i. e. compell'd if Mr. Howe may be admitted our Interpreter whereas that is not sin which is not spontaneous neither is that spontaneous which is necessary i. e. violent or compell'd For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient in which sort of actions vertue or vice hath no place for the will is the principle of moral actions So the learned Camero de Scand p. 98. where note that I presume Camero denies not original sin imputed to be suo modo i. e. in its kind voluntary and so truly sin according to St. Austins sentiments nos omnes eramus ille unus homo i.e. we were all that one man Adam and so sinned in him This to prevent any misapprehension 2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause whereas 't is a known Rule in Divinity Peccatum qua tale essentialiter est effectus moralis non habet causam Physicam i. e. Sin as such and essentially is a moral effect and hath no Physical cause Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. Howe 's Antecedent and Connexion we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis by proving that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves or that no moral evil is positive but only privative which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines in enquiring into the nature of moral evil And I shall borrow one Argument which will be instead of all from the most learned Dr. Barlow the now Renowned Bishop of Lincoln Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being But moral evil formally taken is not from God the author and first cause of all Being Ergo moral evil formally taken is not a real and positive Being The Minor is evident and acknowledged by the very Heathens in the appellation of Optimus the Best which they apply to their Jupiter together with Maximus the Greatest And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe who eo nomine for that very reason rejects Predestination of evil actions because in his apprehension it makes God the author of moral evil The Major let us hear the learned Bishop prove and the rather because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such Proof Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being which does not depend and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being viz. God for it must needs be if there be any Being not caused by God that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause and consequently God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being whence follow many absurdities c. whereof I shall only take the sum as himself hath given it us with an application to moral evil If moral evil i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law be a real Being then 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being for of so deformed a birth divine goodness cannot be the Parent 2. This granted it will follow 1. That there is a secondary Being and a Being by participation such as every finite Being is supposed to be which does not partake of or receive its being from the first Being 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God both as to production and conservation All which things we know and believe are contrary not only to Philosophy but Divinity Thus far the most acute Philosopher and Divine Exercit. metaph 2 a. de natura mali ad calcem Scheib met p. 32 33. Let us take notice of the instances of those sins which are supposed to be evil in themselves or positive Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil ex genere objecto whereof two are specially insisted on Adams eating of the forbidden fruit and by Mr. Howe the hatred of God are in themselves evil Answ 1. In general If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul body or both and this motion abstractively considered be the material part of every actual sin and hath God for the prime cause in whom we live and move and have our being then no sin can be assigned wherein this material part may not be found So the Learned Davevant sometime Bishop of Sarisbury Animadv on Hoard p. 174 175. Answ 2. As to the instances The first in eating the forbidden fruit the material part of the sin in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof in regard of the body the mastication chewing and manducation eating and other bodily acts Separate these from the formal part which is modus appetendi the manner of desiring and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command and God was the prime author thereof The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God this is reducible as being a defect only to the defective will of man Davenant ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance hatred of God That the act terminated upon that object in complexo is evil and cannot be otherwise we deny not but then that is true of acts and undue