concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâaly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the beginning and the end but also ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
fluent Time to mount up above the differences of Time to the contemplation of Eternitie which is without mutabilitie of succession And then he gives us an ingenuous confession that this was his great error when young and infected wih Pelagian infusions I saith he when I was young and ignorant of the Scriptures and the power of God being blinded with this ignorance or rather borne blind and deceived with a false imagination I conceited that the Divine Knowlege and Wil was changed and otherwise disposed by the vicissitudes of Times as human Knowlege and Wil. As to such as supersicially read the Scriptures it may seem that God is this or that way variously affected as men are And this ignorance I judge to be the cause why some others like to me thinke that God is otherwise and otherwise disposed intrinsecally c. Therefore to cure these ignorances and errors about Eternitie we may consider the following Propositions 1. Eternitie not to be measured by Time Prop. Eternitie cannot be measured by any differences or Laws of Time This Proposition is laid down in expresse termes by Plato Tim. pag. 37. where he largely demonstrates That no differences of Time either future or past can be attributed to Eternitie as before It 's true he tels us That God made time ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a certain mobile Image of immobile Eternitie yet so as that none of its differences can properly be ascribed thereto So Parmen pag. 141. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The one God no way participates of time as before So Philo Judaeus de Mundo ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã lo Eternitie there is nothing past nothing future c. Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 3. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end but God only is ever existent yea rather about ever for he is not under time but above time And whereas it is said That the Eternitie of God is oft in Scripture described by differences of time we answer That these are but metaphoric modes of speech wherein the Spirit of God condescending to our narrow capacities describes the eternal infinite duration of God by the differences of time yet so as that he expressely declares that they do not properly agree to God but are only assumed as symbolic Images of Gods Eternitie which is Plato's own phrase And Bradwardine l. 2. c. 51. gives us the reason of this Translation The cause of this Transumtion is because we have not a word which properly signifies the stable mansion of Eternitie wherefore we are forced to transfer by way of similitude our temporal words according to certain temporal differences to Eternitie and Gods coeternal intrinsec Acts. That neither God nor any intrinsec Act of God can be properly measured by time or any difference thereof is evident because Time and al its differences are a variable mutable and divisible measure but the Eternal God and al his immanent Acts invariable immutable and indivisible In Eternitie there is no divisibilitie no majoritie or minoritie no prioritie or posterioritie no accession recession or succession no successive difference of time but one indivisible simple permanent instant Thus Suarez Metaph Disp 50. Sect. 3. pag. 639. proves That what is eternal cannot as to its own nature admit the differences of past and future albeit by reason of our imperfection we so speak of it sometimes How far time and its differences may be comprehended by Eternitie we shal explicate in what follows 4. Prop. 2. Prop. Eternitie is an interminable Duration Eternitie without beginning or end without beginning or end In Eternitie and al eternal Acts neither first or last can be properly assigned This interminable duration of Eternitie is lively illustrated in sacred Philosophie by al those descriptions of God which make him to be the first and the last as Esa 41 4. 44.6 48.12 Rev. 1.8 11. He being the First Being and so without beginning and the Last as having no end Thus the Stoics held that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã God is incorruptible and ingenerable i. e. without beginning and end as Lacertius in Zeno. 1 That the Eternitie of God is without Beginning is evident by many Philosophemes of Plato As Phaedrus pag. 245. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã A first Principe has no beginning but it gives beginning to althings So in his Parmenides pag. 141. he proves That the one God had no beginning c. as before Thus Thales in Laertius ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã God is the most ancient of Beings because without beginning 2 That the Eternitie of God shal have no end Plato assertes in his Phaedo pag. 106. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But God saith Socrates the very Idea or Essence of life as I judge and if any thing be immortal it is evident to al that he cannot cease to be He makes the Soul to be immortal also but the Immortalitie of God who is the original Idea and Essence of life to be of a more transcendent Nature Thus in his Timaeus he distinguisheth between the Eternitie or Immortalitie of Angels and the human Soul which have no end and the Eternitie of God which is absolute without beginning and end The Eternitie of God he makes to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã primary absolute and independent as to al causalitie and therefore not communicable to the Creature but the Eternitie that belongs to the Creature is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã according to a participation of Being i. e. dependent on the pleasure of God ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã as that of Angels and the human Soul which shal have no end albeit they had beginning The best of Creatures have but an half-Eternitie albeit they have no end yet they had a beginning They may be to everlasting but are not from everlasting as God is Psal 90.2 Besides the Eternitie of Creatures is not intrinsecal from a necessitie of Being but dependent on the pleasure of God 3. Eternitie most simple and uniforme Prop. Eternitie is a measure most simple uniforme absolutely indivisible without the least composition or succession 1 When we cal Eternitie a Measure it must not be understood formally either as to God or the Creature because every measure formally considered speakes relation to the thing measured but if the Creature never had been God had been eternal Neither can a measure formally considered be applied to God because a measure is ever distinguished from the thing measured but Eternitie is not distinguished from God Therefore when we cal Eternitie a Measure it must be understood metaphorically and according to our manner of speech 2 We say Eternitie is a simple uniforme measure i. e. without al parts divisibilitie or succession The Antithesis to this Thesis is maintained by Vorstius and the Socinians contrary to the Dictates both of sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Plato Tim. pag. 37. assures us That the parts of time IT WAS and IT IS agree not to
perfect and noble their life is The animal life is indeed composed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation Hence vigor health strength sense vegetation and al the issues of life procede And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are by so much the more active and perfect is the life So in the rational Life the more spirituose the exercices of Reason and Wil are the more perfect the life is 2 Life in its generic notion importes also Actuositie Life consistes not in a mere spirituose principe but in the agitation of that principe And the more actuose the spirituose principe is the more perfect the life is 3 But the main character that seems most essential to life in the general is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã self-motion This Plato makes commun to al life as wel create as increate Brutes they have an animal self-motion men rational Angels intellectile but God absolute essential and independent Thus much being premissed of Life in its generic notion we now procede to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof 1. The Life of God carries in it the most perfect Spirituositie The Life of God most spirituose as he is the most simple pure Spirit without the least shadow of Mater either physic or metaphysic The lesse any thing has of mater the more spirituose it is Angels and human Souls are called Spirits because they are void of al physic mater but yet they have metaphysic mater or passive obediential power and therefore are not pure simple Spirits metaphysically considered Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine assent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More in his Divine Dialogues Dialog 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94 c. where he makes extension agreable to a Spirit and so not proper and essential to Mater solely according to the Cartesian and ancient Hypothesis For if a Spirit be capable of extension in a strict and physic notion which he seems to defend I cannot imagine how it should be exemt from physic mater and al those laws of physic corporeitie dissolution and corruption which attend Mater yet I can easily persuade my self and grant that learned Author that al Spirits have according to the degree of Spiritalitie an Amplitude of Essence which is not confined to the narrow space of a Needles point as the Scholes of old dreamed As for create Spirits both Angels and human Souls we may justly allow them without injurie offered to their spiritalitie metaphysic accidental extension according to the space they occupie as also metaphysic mater as composed of Act and passive obediential power without the least physic extension or mater But now God being void not only of physic but also of metaphysic Mater or al passive Power whatsoever therefore he is said to be a pure simple Spirit in the most eminent transcendent degree Joh. 4.24 as Joh. 4.24 God is a Spirit i. e. the most simple spirituose Being and therefore the most living Being Hence Christ in regard of his Deitie is stiled a quickening Spirit Joh. 6.63 or Spirit that gives life Joh. 6.63 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It is the Spirit i. e. the Deitie which they were ignorant of that quickeneth or gives life Althings give and have life so far as they are spirituose Christ as God being the most pure Spirit he must therefore necessarily be the most living and life-giving or quickening Spirit 1 Cor. 15.45 So 1 Cor. 15.45 Christ as Mediator is called ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a quickening or life-giving Spirit as he is the Fountain of al spiritual life and gives out al to his Members Again Heb. 9.14 Heb. 9.14 it 's said that Christ ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã by the eternal Spirit i. e. by the infinite efficacitie of his Deitie offered up himself So that the Life of God consistes much in his Spiritualitie or Spirituositie 2. 2. The Life of God most actuose The Life of God carries in it the most pure and perfect Actuositie This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former for by how much the more spirituose things are by so much the more actuose they are and by how much the more actuose they are by so much the more living Nothing can be said to live farther than it is actuose when it ceaseth to act it ceaseth to live Life may be considered either in actu primo the first act or in actu secundo the second act the first Act of life consistes in the spirituose Principe or Spirituositie of the Agent before mentioned the second Act of life consistes in the Actuositie or Operation that flows from the first Act or Principe But in the Life of God which is most perfect the first and second Act are one and the same because he is a pure Act without the least composition of Act and Power or first and second Act. In al created life the Principe or first Act is distinct from the Operation or second Act and both together make an accidental composition of Cause and Effect or Act and Power but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true causalitie or proper motion We must conceive therefore of the Life of God as having the most perfect Actuositie and Actuation yet so as to exclude al real Causalitie Composition and Imperfection which attendes every create life by reason of the distinction between its first and second Act which God admits not because he is pure Act without al Power either essential or accidental active or passive his Esse and Agere are the same his Act is his Essence which can be said of no create Being but of God it must be affirmed because he is the first most pure and perfect Act without al power either objective or receptive The pure Actualitie of God is demonstrated by this that pure Act is more perfect than Act and Power but God is most perfect therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent needing an Act to actuate the same whence it necessarily follows that we must either admit a progresse into infinite or grant some first pure Act which needs no other Act for its actuation as Bradwardine acutely demonstrates l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163 c. Whence we conclude that the Life of God is most actuose and perfect because it is a pure Act without al potentialitie Hence 3. The life of God is of al most ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã self-moving The Life of God self-moving Plato aboundes much in this Character of Life which he makes to be most essential thereto So in his Phaedrus pag. 245. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Every bodie that is moved by an externe pulse is inanimate but that which is moved by it self from an interne Principe is animate Wherein he makes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã self motion from an interne Principe the essential character of life And by how
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
clamors barke at and with cruel Teeth endeavor to rend in pieces this Paper or Book A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE § 1. WHereas I sometimes intended to have cast the whole of Reformed Philosophie into one Systeme I am herein in part disappointed in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philosophia Generalis But what I could not wel digest therein I have now made public in this Part IV. Of Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie So that to speak the truth I have now put my last period to Philosophie without the least Intention of making any farther progresse therein only to give the Reader a Breviarie of the Forme and Method I would assume were I to cast Philosophie into one entire Systeme or Idea as also to give him an Index where to find al the parts of Reformed Philosophie more professedly discussed by me I judge the following Scheme of Philosophie most necessary Philosophie is either General or Particular Particular Philosophie is either Notional or Real Real Philosophie is either Natural Moral or Supernatural This General Distribution of Philosophie taken from its object seems to me of al most genuine and natural and that which reduceth it to one uniforme Syntagme or Systeme as it may appear by the following particulars Philosophie in its General Idea comprehendes the following particulars 1 The General Historie of Philosophie General Philosophie and Philosophers with their several Sects Dogmes Modes of Life Discipline and Characters Of which we have treated copiosely Court of the Gentiles P. 2. and Philos General P. 1 2. l. 1. 2 The Generic Idea of Philosophie Cognition which takes in al the Intellectual Habits As 1 Opinion which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science arising either from Sense or Affection or Considence or Conjectures It s object is things Physic Sensible Singular c. Its Attributes Infirmitie and Incertitude Obscurite Instabilitie and Inquietude Of which see Philos Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. 2 Experience its Diguitie Object Subject Extension Qualities and Effects Of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. s 3. 3 Imitation wherein are considerable its Nature Origine Subject Object Effects namely Images and Signes regular Use and Abuse of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. 4 Faith it s Generic Nature Object both Material and Formal Act Subject Proprieties Differences and Species of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. 5 Sapience its prime Cause Object Act Proprieties Effects Conveniences with and Differences from other Sciences and Corollaries of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. 6 Intelligence which is said to be an Habit of or Assent to first Principes not Practic but Speculative which give al evidence to but receive no evidence from conclusions as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 1. 7 Science which is a certain assent to necessary conclusions by some certain Medium as Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 2. 8 Art which is an Imitamen of Nature or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 3. 9 Prudence wherein we have considered its Subject the Practic Judgement or Conscience consisting of two parts Synteresis and Syneidesis its Object both End and Means its End and Offices ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Its Species ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Good Counsel ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Sagacitie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Experience ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Sensate and reflexe Cognition ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Providence its Material parts Ethic Oeconomic Politic its Causes both Dispositive and Proxime its Opposites and Differences specially from Carnal Policie or Craft in 20 Particulars its Effects Characters and Corollaries Al which we have copiofely considered Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Also Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. 3 The General part of Philosophie includes also the Examen of its Object Subject Ends Adjuncts Difference from Philosophie and Theologie Excellence Effects Corruption Right use Parts as also the Characters and Offices of Philosophers which we have largely discussed Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 3. § 2. Philosophie considered in its Particular Ideas Notional Philosophie or Logic is either Notional or Real Notional Philosophie termed by the Platonistes Dialectic or Rational because the ancient mode of Reasoning was by Dialogues is now communly stiled Logic which properly treats of Notions either Simple or Complexe Simple Notions are ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Imitamens or Ideas of things impressed on the mind without either Affirmation or Negation as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man Horse or the like Complexe Notions are either Propositions which being composed of simple Notions give some judgement of things or Syllogismes and Discourses which are composed of Propositions or Method which is composed of simple Notions Propositions and Discourses These are the four parts of Logic which are taken from its proper End and answer to the four great Operations of the Mind For what is the End of al Logic The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things Hence Logic is termed by Plato ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Art of Introduction i. e. whereby Men are conducted into the knowlege of things also ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences and al useful knowlege Yea Aristotle as wel as Plato defines Logic ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Method for the right disposing of every Probleme proposed Whence also Aristotle stiles Logic ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Organ or Key of al Sciences whereby we are introduced into the Cognition of althings Aristotle made Logic the Organ of Philosophie yet no part thereof but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. Of what great use Logic is not only for the Acquirement of Sciences but also for the Restauration of the mind to its native Claritie and Acumen in order to a right Apprehension Judgement Discourse and Method in the Cognition or Disquisition of things is most evident to any that understandes the Nature and Use thereof Yea according to the Idea I frame of Logic the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End and that of the Acquisition of Sciences much inferior thereto For of what use are al natural Sciences but to Clarifie and Elevate the Mind for the contemplation of more Sublime and Noble Objects So that to make use of Logic only as an Instrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourselves of the principal use thereof which is to Purifie and Refine the Intellect in order to the more distinct real and perfect knowlege of things specially such as are most Sublime and Divine I no way dout but that a judicious person by the
influential on al the former parts of Logic as also on the operations of the mind about which they are conversant For how can the mind define or divide or distinctly explicate simple Ideas and Notions without Method How imperfect and confused wil its Judgements Ratiocinations and Discourses be unlesse Method assist Hence the Ancients Plato and others reduced the whole of Logic to Method which without al peradventure is the most utile part thereof if not Comprehensive of the whole In the general Method is an Art whereby the Mind is rendred capable rightly to dispose a series of many simple Notions or Apprehensions Judgements and Ratiocinations in order to the Investigation Explication and Demonstration of truth as also the deeper impression thereof on the Memorie In this description we have both the Object Ends and Effects of Method The Object of Method is 1 Simple Notions and Apprehensions Wherein we are to consider their Definition and Distribution In the Definition we are to consider 1 The Name And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from al Obscuritie and Equivocation which is best performed by an Examen of and Inquisition into its Etymologie or Origination Homonymie and Synonymie 2 The Definition of the Thing which must be expressed in termes most known and essential for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifestation of a Thing As for Distribution it is of the whole into its parts which gives a distinct Idea or Notion of a thing 2 Another Object of Method is Propositions and Judgements Wherein we are to avoid al Precipitance Anticipation and Prejudice giving to al Propositions that Measure of Assent as their insite Reason or Autoritie requires admitting nothing as certain or evident but what we know or have reason to believe is certainly or evidently true 3 The last object of Method is Ratiocination and Discourse Wherein we are 1 To leave nothing ambiguous or obscure in the Termes 2 To deduce al Ratiocinations from principes most certain and evident in themselves such as no one invested with commun sense may gainsay For first principes give evidence and force to al conclusions but receive none from them 3 Al Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Investigation of Truth or Remotion of any error must be digested and ranged into the most natural order beginning from things more general simple and easily to be known and thence passing on to things more difficult and composite 4 In seeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there must be a complete enumeration of all singulars and parts with a distribution proportionable thereto that so nothing be omitted that may conduce to the examen of truth More touching Method see Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. B. 4. c. 1. § Thus much for Logic wherein we have been the more large because we have no where treated distinctly and fully of it § 3. Real Philosophie may be according to its different Objects Real Philosophie distributed into Natural Moral and Metaphysic or Supernatural Natural 1. Natural Philosophie regardes things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences or things considered in their notional extension 1 Things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences belong to Physic or Natural Philosophie strictly so termed Physic which considers Things Natural 1 In their General Principes and Affections 2 In their parts which are two the Macrocosme or greater world and the Microcosme or Man Of which see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. 2 Natural things considered in their Notional Extension or Quantitie are discoursed of in Mathematics Mathematic which comprehend Arithmetic Geometrie Astronomie Music Optics Geographie Mechanics c. Of which Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 2. 2. Moral Philosophie is according to its object Moral Philosophie distributed into Ethic 1. Ethic. strictly so termed Oeconomic and Politic. 1 Ethic strictly so termed regards the morals of private persons Wherein we may consider 1 It s Generic Idea Moral Prudence whereof we have copiosely discoursed Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 1. 2 It s prime Object which is the last end and chiefest good which we have largely discussed Philosoph Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. s 1. P. 2. L. c. 1. s 3. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 2 3. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 2. 3 The Principes of Human Acts Practic Judgement Volition or Intention Consultation Election of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 24-27 P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. also Philos Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. § 4. 4 Subjective and Formal Beatitude wherein we are also to consider Vse Fruition and Delectation or Joy Of the first see Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 1. § 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 3. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 23. But of Vse Fruition and Delectation see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. § 4-8 5 The Moralitie of human Acts of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29. P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 c. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. § 1. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 1. 6 Natural Libertie which we have copiosely explicated Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. s 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 28. 7 Moral Good or Virtue its Causes Formal Idea or Nature Parts and Adjuncts Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 29-32 P. 4. B. 1. c. 2 3. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. 8 Moral Libertie of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 3. 9 Sin its Nature and Causes of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. § 33. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. also Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 4. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s 4. § 6. 10 The effects and servitude of Sin Oeconomic of which Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. 2 Oeconomic of which Politic. Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3 Politic of which Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s 6. 3. Metaphysic or prime Philosophie Metaphysic which principally regards the supreme most excellent Being and prime Cause of althings namely God his Existence Essence and Attributes his Acts of Creation and Providence his Concurse and Gubernation both Natural and Supernatural and Creatural Dependence c. Which we have more copiosely discussed Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more cursorily Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c.
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Adonai my Lord 242 339 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Ehjeh I shal be 242 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Light and Fire 452 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Then Eternitie 275 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã El the potent God 242 358 430 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Eloah and ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Elohim 242 358 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã If a formule of swearing 374 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Amen ibid. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Truth Fidelitie 200 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã desperately sick 128 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Prince or Principatie 187 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Belial lawlesse 109 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a son devoted 122 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to create 419 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to adhere 88 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a word or thing 363 428 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Dath Order Law 187 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã mad sinners 136 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Hallelujah 241 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã separate 496 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã glued 135 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã force or power 429 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to see 35 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Aberration 109 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Abilitie force 200 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 ãâã
is not the last end the rule and measure of al order Is not every thing then rightly disposed when it is conveniently brought into a subordination to its last end Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophie And they say that Plato was the first that used the Greek ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã in this philosophic and strict Notion for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to expresse an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection but Plato restrained it so as to signifie thereby a final Cause or that which is last in the series of things desired yet first in intention This Cicero interprets extreme last chiefest What force efficace and influence the last end has in Morals Plato frequently inculcates So in his Theaetetus he assures us That al Science is inutile yea noxious without the notice of the best End This last End he makes to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the principal End of althings which Proclus cals ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the End of Ends. And for the more ful and clear explication of this last End its universal influence and excellence the following Propositions are diligently to be considered 1. Prop. It is necessarie that we constitute some last End as wel posititively as negatively in every Series of Actions This Hypothesis is wel argued by Suarez Metaph. Disput 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means we must necessarily at last stop in some one or more means which are first in execution though last in intention so in Ascent from the means to the end it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end which is first in intention and last in execution Again as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End For in Ends and those things that conduce thereto there cannot be a progresse into infinite but as there is a first means from whence the motion begins so there must be a last end in which it terminates In Ends there is a twofold order 1 of Intention 2 of Execution and in both orders there must be a first and a last That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe which moves the appetite and gives bounds to it and therefore can be no other than the last End that which is first in the order of Execution is the first means conducing to the last End So that a progresse into infinite is on neither part possible if there were not a last end nothing could be desired no action of the appetite could be terminated neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease if there were not a first means from whence the execution should begin no Agent could begin to worke c. 2. Prop. The last End of althings must be as extensive and ample as the first Principe or Cause Thus Plato de Leg. 4 p. 715. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã God as the old Tradition testifies having in himself the Principe and End and Medium of althings In which he plainly indigitates That God is the first Cause and last End of althings That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evident because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents as they who are under God ought not morally neither can they physically move but as dependent on the motion and concurse of God the first Cause so neither ought they to desire any thing under God but what may conduce to God as their last End Such as the Universalitie of the first Cause is in giving Being or Welbeing such is the Universalitie of the last End in requiring and calling for the emprovement of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause farther than his regresse thereto answers his progresse therefrom God as the first Principe gives Being and as the last End terminates and sixeth the Being conferred Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause must tend to him as his last End 3. Prop. The last End of althings can be but one This Hypothesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in And the reason is most apparent because althings desire their utmost perfection which consistes in their tendence to the most perfect Being Now the most perfect Being can be but one For if there should be more than one most perfect then the one would have somewhat which the other hath not and so neither would be most perfect Every good by the addition of some other good is made better and more perfect except the most simple and perfect Good by the participation whereof al other goods are made better Hence 4. Prop. Every man in every human Act virtually if not actually intends some last End This is manifest because in every human Act something is desired for it self which cannot be referred to any other thing and what is this but some last end Again man naturally desireth the complement of al good and albeit there may not be an actual elicite intention in every man as to his last end yet there is a natural propension thereto whence procede al Acts about particular goods 5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely without end or termes Thence Aristotle following Plato herein in his Magn. Moral lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The perfect End is that which being obtained we neither desire nor need any thing beyond it So the Stoics who were akin to the Platonists define the last End ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That for the sake of which al offices are performed but it for nothing else So that the last End gives termes and bounds to althings but admits no termes or measure As to take away the first Cause of our Being supposeth us not to be so to take away the last End supposeth a confused infinitie as to acting Therefore something must be simply desirable for it self and for no other For that which a man desireth in order to a further end the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end but what he desireth for it self towards that his desire is infinite for the better it is the more desirable therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable without termes or bounds The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure for the last End being the terme of the appetite it may not receive termes or limits from any other thing but by how much the more it is loved by so much the better is the love In althings appetible the last End gives measure but receives none because the proper reason of althings we desire is taken from the End Hence 6. Prop. The last End is the terme and measure of althings What
ease and delight but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodnesse it then finds ease and pleasure Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul it can never loge with ease til it loge in the chiefest Good by possessing the same whereby al its wants are supplied The Soul when it sits most uneasie as to inferior goods so far as it dwels in God and God dwels in it so far it finds ease Properly we never enjoy any thing til we find rest in it this the Soul finds so far as it possesseth God Whence springs delectation and pleasure Possession gives the obtainment of desires and desires so far as obtained fil with joy proportionable to the desires 3 The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action 3 Action a cause of Joy Whence Joy is defined by Cicero a sweet motion in sense Yea things in themselves bitter and irkesome how sweet are they oft made by exercice It is generally determined in the Scholes That operation and motion is the proper cause of Delectation and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the sweetest good of al the most noble and perfect Actings of the Soul on the chiefest good O what sweet inspirations of Divine suavities are they attended with Thus Plato Repub. 9. pag. 582. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. How great pleasure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it none but a Philosopher can taste So in his Phaedrus pag. 249. speaking of the Contemplation of the first Being he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã This is the most ravishing ecstasie and composed of the best things That al true pleasure ariseth from virtuose exercices about the sweetest good Aristotle in imitation of his Master Plato has wel demonstrated So Eth. l. 1. c. 9. p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful or most valiant carries away the Crown but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã but they that contend for Victorie So in this human life they that do good are made partakers of good things And then he addes the reason ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Their life is indeed sweet and joyous of it self He is delighted or recreated in just things who by love embraceth justice To those that are studiose of virtue virtuose acts are of themselves pleasant and delicious i. e. they carrie in them their own reward a divine suavitie And he subjoins the reason ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. But their life needs not pleasure as an additament or appendix but has pleasure included in it For besides what has been spoken he is not a good man who is not delighted in good actions Neither doth any cal him just who doth not take pleasure in just deeds or liberal who is not delighted in liberal acts So in other Virtues Whence he concludes If so then ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã virtuose acts are of themselves sweet Whence he collects this general Conclusion ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã formal Beatitude is the best fairest and sweetest thing i. e. Nothing so sweet as by virtuose acts to adhere to and enjoy the sweetest and best good And indeed herein Plato and Aristotle accord and agree with sacred Philosophie For David assures us that nothing was so sweet to him as the Contemplation and Fruition of God by acts of Faith c. So Psal 27.4 Psal 27.4 One thing have I desired to behold the beautie of the Lord Heb. to behold with singular delight For ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã construed with ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã in signifies to see with great pleasure and delectation as v. 13. O! how sweet and delicious was it to David to look on the golden Arke the Symbol of Christs Humanitie and there by Faith to adore the Deitie So Psal 106.5 That I may see the good of thy chosen Psal 106.5 that I may rejoice in the gladnesse of thy nation Heb. to see in good i. e. to enjoy the good seen with pleasure and satisfaction for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã construed with ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã signifies to enjoy with pleasure O! how deliciose is the fiducial contemplation of the sweetest Good What is formal Beatitude but the immediate gloriose perfect Intuition or Vision of the supreme Beautie And what infinite delectation ensues hereon What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deitie in the Arke of Christs Humanitie What infusions of Divine suavities flow hence Doth not the Beautie of the first Cause and fairest Good captivate al hearts that behold it How much spiritual delectation is there in one glance on the sweetest Good How soon is the holy Soul filled with divine suavities when it can in any measure contemplate the Glorie of the prime Beautie Thus Psal 104.34 My meditation of him shal be sweet Psal 104.34 I wil be glad in the Lord. Yea would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God the sweetest Good turne Hel it self into Heaven Such are the divine suavities which attend virtuose acts in the Fruition of the sweetest Good § 7. 2. The Adjuncts of Delectation We now descend to discourse of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts which are various 1 Al Delectation and Joy must be real and sincere 1 It is real and the more real and sincere it is the better it is And doth not this give a great advance to those joys and suavities which attend the fruition of our last end and sweetest good May any delices be compared with these in point of sinceritie and realitie What are al other pleasures in comparison of these but painted shadows yea mere lies This is lively illustrated by Plato Phileb pag. 40. where he stiles al terrene pleasures ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Phantasmes or Imaginations painted in our minds as when a man conceits he has a vast treasure of gold in his possession which he has not yet takes pleasure in such a sick dream Whence he addes There are false pleasures in the minds of men which yet by mens ridiculous figments imitate true pleasures And then he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Neither do I judge that we may consider pleasures in any other regard evil but as they are false Bâ which he invincibly demonstrates that no pleasures are truly ââch but those that are sincere real and substantial which he makes proper to virtuose men who adhere to the sweetest Good This real pleasure is elsewhere stiled by him ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã sincere genuine pleasure which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the best Good This he more openly expresseth Repub. 9. pag. 580. where he assertes That a wise or virtuose man only ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã doth taste of the most genuine and true pleasures So pag. 583. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Neither is there any true pleasure but that of a wise man Whereby he as Solomon understands a virtuose man
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã right Reason the only ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Law is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã is also defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Injustice is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã as the Hebr. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Virtue because ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã uniforme but al Vice ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã multiforme Hence Plato asserted ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã above proper Nature as elsewhere ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators
beautiful although it be fallen into extreme turpitude to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude and so to make it amiable and desirable c. In sum what is Beautie but the splendor and lustre of those perfections which are loged in any subject And thence is not God the first Beautie because most perfect And are not althings so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodnesse For what is al created Beautie but a ray of the Divine Beautie And among created Beauties doth any thing more ressemble the Divine Beautie than true Virtue ' Plato in his Phaedrus pag. 250. saith That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect state have little Light and Beautie but in the future state ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã then we shal contemplate the most perfect Beautie c. And then he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But now Beautie of things divine has gained this dignitie that it is the most illustrious and amiable of althings § 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Libertie as to state we now descend to consider it as to its Exercice Moral Libertie as to Exercice in virtuose Acts. which consistes in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philosophie That the second Act follows the first such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state As in natural and civil Libertie such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state if a man be sui juris a free man he may act as such in that Corporation wherein he is free Thus in moral Libertie such as are free as to state by having their Souls clothed with virtuose habits they wil exert and put sorth virtuose Exercices in that state So that moral Libertie as to Exercice is nothing else but a libertie to act according to that dignitie of state they are invested with Now for the more ful explication and demonstration of moral Libertie as to Exercice we are 1 To explicate what it is and 2 To demonstrate that it is the supreme Libertie of a rational Creature As for the explication of moral Libertie as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propositions 1. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in the spiritual affectionate permanent Contemplation of the first beautie or Truth To contemplate the first Truth The Contemplation of the first Truth as wel according to sacred as Platonic Philosophie is one of the supreme parts of moral Libertie as to Exercice Contemplation according to the Platonist is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible and what more intelligible than the first Truth Thence Plate in his Phaedrus pag. 247. tels us That the mind ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã beholding for some while the first Being and satiating it self in the contemplation of Truth and giving up it self thereto is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasure As sight is of al the most noble sense and most quick in apprehension so contemplation or the sight of the first Beautie and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Libertie that which brings in most tranquillitie satisfaction and pleasure to the mind Of al Contemplations there is none so powerful so sweet so free as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End As God is infinitely better than al Creatures so the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of al the Creatures That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Libertie is most manifest because 1 Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object must needs bring the highest Libertie and Perfection with it Joh. 17.3 2 The mind of man when rectified has a flagrant ardent desire to contemplate the first Beautie and Truth Aristotle assures us ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth 3 The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise emprovement of al other Beings and Objects which occur This spiritualiseth and draws out the Elixir of al objects providences persons and things we converse with 4 The contemplation of the first Beautie is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto If there were a beautiful Picture which persons by looking on should gradually be made like unto who would not gaze thereon And is not the first Beautie such which makes al those as spiritually contemplate thereon beautiful and free Joh. 1.14 Joh. 1.14 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã We have diligently and attentively beheld his glorie as on a Theatre The Human Nature is that gloriose Theatre on which the Deitie descends and offers himself to our contemplation and O! what a gloriose contemplation is this to behold the Deitie in the golden Arke of Humanitie How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same gloriose Image as 2 Cor. 3.18 4 Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind by lively affectionate contemplation thereof 5 Contemplation of the first Beautie is most influential on the divine Life and therefore a main Spring of Moral Libertie Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdome Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men And is not this most true in things moral and divine Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine The greatest Musers are the best Artists and doth not this hold most true here yea doth not the Psalmist assure us Psal 39.3 Psal 39.3 That whiles the heart museth the fire of divine affection burneth Doth not contemplation on the first Beautie fortifie the heart against every tentation tune it for every service and sweeten every crosse Is it not both food and physic to the Soul the life of our life yea universally useful in every state and condition 2. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good What the last End and chiefest Good is with the proper Characters of each we have § 1. of this Chapter fully discussed our present worke is to explicate what moral Libertie the Soul acquires by adhering thereto The last End possesseth the greatest Amplitude Universalitie and Libertie imaginable as to al means it is as an infinite Ocean an immense universal Principe that conteins al Morals in its bosome althings receive bounds and limits from their last end but this receives bounds and limits from nothing Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Libertie it necessarily follows that the more intimately and firmely the Soul adheres to it the more libertie as to exercice it is possessed of Thence Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715.
to me and my Church as Tarnovius § 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is we are now to demonstrate Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest that this is the supreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of 1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are the more morally free they are It s Order for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our last End and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 504. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law whence men are made regular and orderly which belongs to Justice and Temperance i. e. al Acts are so far regular as they partake of Justice and Temperance which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices Justice and Temperance according to Plato are universal cardinal Virtues which regulate and dispose al human Acts according to the best order wherein their freedome chiefly consistes Whence Plato makes mention of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Chorus of Virtues wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner Yea he affirmes That the whole life of man should consiste of Harmonie Order and Vniformitie And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã is most musical and harmonious i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã of Symphonie or Concent and musical Ryme so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule Words to Thoughts and Actions to Words and herein consistes the ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã good Order and Libertie of human Exercices So again in his Laches pag. 188. he assures us Non est hujus animus in recto cujus acta discordant Omnia facta dictáque tua inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi una forma percussa sint Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi Sen. Epist. That is the best Music when words and life concord or agree among themselves as also to the Rule Virtuose Exercices consiste in all equal tenor of life agreable to it self and to the Law which is always attended with a good order and libertie It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian mentioned in his Life pag. 133. That his life was singularly composed of active and contemplative he always yielding to God what he could to his Prince what he ought and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law but that of charitie Again pag. 175. That which made him most admired was the coupling together of Virtues and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject as Knowlege and Humilitie Prudence with Meeknesse Retirednesse and Officiousnesse Seriousnesse and Pleasantnesse Argutenesse without offence Brevitie and Perspicuitie Sweetnesse and Soliditie So great was the concent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts and the more of order the more of libertie Now virtuose Acts are of al most regular and orderly because they are measured by the exactest Rule and directly tend to the last End which is the first Principe in Morals Thus in sacred Philosophie Gal. 6.16 Gal. 6.16 And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground also the white Line in the Grecian Race And ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã here signifies so to walke as to keep an exact order not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race And what is the privilege of those who thus walke Peace be to them i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie 2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie Connaturalitie Facilitie and Suavitie Virtuose Exercies most spontaneous and sweet For al Libertie consistes in an ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a self-motion and by how much the more spontaneous connatural facile and sweet the self-motion is by so much the more free it is judged to be And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous spiritually connatural and sweet than such as are virtuose Plato in his Lysis assures us that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Good is most proper to our nature and what is better than virtuose acts are they not then most proper or connatural Thence Definit Platon pag. 411. Temperance is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a self-motion according to nature i.e. connatural or agreable to rectified human Nature And Plato in his Timaeus tels us That the best motion of the Soul is in it self because this is most akin to rational Nature And when doth the Soul move more in it self than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end Is not the last end the best part of our selves Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it doth it not move most in it self It 's a great Notion among the Platonists That Virtue is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã most proper and congenial to man but sin is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã most aliene and repugnant And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates That to adhere to God as our first Cause and last End is the most natural act of a rectified Soul and is it not then most free Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper O! then how free are virtuose Acts The Platonist instructes us That to a good man God is a Law but to the wicked Lust is a Law Now if God be a Law to a good man then al his motions toward God are most free There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law Repugnanti non volenti necessitas est In volente necessitas non est Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it for al obey what they love as Plato assures us Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie so that he obeys it not out of force but choice for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã force cannot touch love There is a service of Love which is most free by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is by virtuose acts subjected to God by so much the more free it is for the very act of love as terminated on the Creator is formal moral Libertie as Jansenius acutely demonstrates August Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul but also most facile sweet and delicious Plato Timae pag. 81. tels us Whatever is repugnant to Nature is most irkesome ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet Now that virtuose acts are most agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated What can furnish us
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Customes are defined by Galen ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã do act wel ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Again ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Sin is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã is of the same import with ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã injustice Definit Platon is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã without a yoke which the LXX translate ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that which truly is not yet not simply
because beyond the sphere of his confined corrupt Reason Whence he stiles those first Philosophers who traded in such oriental Traditions ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Lovers of Fables or Traditions For saith he a Fable is composed of things wonderful 3 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã things most difficult to be known namely Immaterials 4 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã things divine It was a general Principe among the Ancients ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Sapience is a Science of things divine Hence they made Sapience to be the same with Theologie 5 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that which essentially is also ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that which always existes again ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Being it self and lastly ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Being simply or the first Being namely God For Plato generally by ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Ens or Being understandes the first independent Being God in comparison of whom althings else are said not to be or to be mere nothings as hereafter cap. 3. § 1. Thence Plato makes Sapience to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the knowlege of Being i. e. God Whence also among the Egyptians in the Temple dedicated to Minerva the Goddesse of Wisdome there was this Inscription I am that which was which is which shal be Which is conteined in the Mosaic description of God Exod. 3.14 Exod. 3.14 and denotes thus much that God who is the first yea only independent essential Being is the prime Cause and supreme Object of al Sapience of which hereafter more fully As for the proper act properties and effects of Sapience in the general we have fully handled them in Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. § 2. Metaphysic a natural Sapience We define Metaphysic a natural Sapience whereby it is distinguished from supernatural divine Theologie It 's true Plato seems to make al Sapience divine and supernatural Thus in his Epino pag. 989. he makes al true knowlege of God to be from God So Repub. 6. pag. 483. he proves That the mind of man needs divine illumination for the understanding things divine as much as the eye needs the light of the Sun to see things visible Hence also Plotinus En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. makes God to be the essential Sapience from whom al the rayes of created Sapience stream as beams from the Sun But in as much as these Gentile Philosophers came altogether short of al supernatural knowlege of God which since the Fal of man is by God appropriated to the second Covenant it necessarily follows that if we wil make Metaphysic a Science distinct from supernatural Christian Theologie it can be no other than a natural Sapience of objects supernatural such as the wiser of the Philosophers Pythagoras Socrates and Plato attained unto partly by the advantage they had from oriental Traditions and partly from the working of their own inquisitive minds thereon So that by Metaphysic here we understand only that natural Sapience which Plato and other Philosophers gained by their own inquisitive thoughts dwelling on oriental Traditions and may be further improved by natural contemplation on objects supernatural For we see by daily experience what great contemplations of God and things divine the natural mind of man may arrive unto by means of supernatural Revelations and the workings of his own thoughts thereon together with some more commun illuminations of the Spirit without any supernatural divine knowlege We find this fully exemplified in multitudes of Platonic mystic Divines who have given us many raised sublime spiritual notions of some of the highest Mysteries in Theologie without any supernatural knowlege or sense thereof The same may be said of many Schole-men their contemplations of God and things divine Again we cal Metaphysic a natural Sapience as it has for its fundament or proper ground rational Arguments whereby it is distinguished from supernatural Theologie which has for its proper ground and foundation divine Testimonie and Autoritie In Metaphysic as it is a part of Philosophie Reason is the highest Autoritie but in Theologie the Autoritie of God is the highest Reason Yet in as much as Metaphysic ought to be subordinate to Theologie we also may yea ought sometimes to explicate and demonstrate several parts thereof by divine Testimonies For as Metaphysic at first borrowed its object from Theologie so some of its best Arguments Demonstrations and Explications are to be fetcht thence § 3. The proper Act of Metaphysic is Contemplation The proper act of metaphysic Contemplation whereby it is distinguished from moral Prudence which chiefly regards Action Thence in the Platonic Definitions Sapience is defined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a contemplative Science Not that Socrates or Plato excluded Action from Sapience and Metaphysic or Contemplation from moral Prudence and Ethics for no active Science can be wel managed without contemplation neither is any contemplative Science right if it end not in Action So that contemplative and active Sciences according to Socrates and Plato are not to be opposed but composed and made subordinate each to other at least the former to the later Contemplation ought to assist Action in Morals and Action ought to crown Contemplation in Metaphysics When therefore we make Contemplation the proper Act of Metaphysic in distinction from Action which is the proper effect of moral Prudence it must be understood not in Aristotle's sense who makes contemplative or speculative and active or practic Sciences opposite species and so inconsistent each with other but in Plato's who Repub. 2. distributes Disciplines into ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Music or Contemplative and Gymnastic or Active the former he makes to respect things divine and the later things human Whence the object of Metaphysic being things divine its proper Act must necessarily be Contemplation For the highest and most noble act of the Soul about things supernatural and divine is contemplation whence al Affections and Actions proportionable thereto follow in their course Hence the formal Beatitude of the rational Soul is generally placed in vision or contemplation as the principal part thereof This Contemplation Contemplation of God the most excellent wherein the Platonists place the formal Act of Sapience or Metaphysic is wel described by Alcinous in his Systeme of Platonic Philosophie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Contemplation is a vigorous operation of the Intellect understanding things intelligible The proper object of this Contemplation they make to be Truth specially the first Truth whereby the life of the Understanding is nourished and maintained Thence Plato Repub. 6. pag. 485. tels us That nothing is more akin to Wisdome or Metaphysic than Truth And in his Timaeus pag. 90. he makes Contemplation of Truth principally divine to be the proper motion of the Soul And more expressely Repub. 5. pag. 475. he saith Those only are true Philosophers who are much conversant ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã in the contemplation of that which essentially is namely God also ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã such as are most greedy
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
impartible and boniforme in things partible variate as to operation and distributing whatever is constitutive of proper Nature it remains simple i. e. albeit it acts variously according to the indigence of its subject yet it remains invariable and simple Hence 10 we must with Plato denie that God the most simple Being may be stiled a whole because he can in no regard be said to have parts The absolute Simplicitie of God may be demonstrated 1 From the Perfection of God The Simplicitie of God demonstrated Al parts as parts are finite incomplete and imperfect Again every whole is dependent both on its cause and on the parts whereof it is composed but there is nothing incomplete or dependent in God because he is most perfect Moreover al parts are in order of nature before the whole and therefore need some bond of union to knit them together but God is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã without al cause prioritie or posterioritie Lastly in every kind things are by so much the more noble and perfect by how much the more simple they are wherefore God being the most perfect Being must needs be most simple 2 From the Vnitie of God This Argument Plato useth as before So Parmenid pag. 144. We did not therefore speak truely even now when we said ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that Essence i. e. God was divided into many parts for he cannot be divided into more than one for unto him al as it is most consentaneous are equal Neither is Being wanting to Vnitie neither Vnitie to Being i. e. God but these two are altogether equal Wherein he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Vnitie and it may be thus improved Unitie is generally described negatively by indivision in regard of it self and division from other things Now the divine Essence is most indivisible as to it self but most divided and distant from althings else therefore it is most one and if most one then also most simple Thus Aristot Metaph. l. 4. c. 6. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Those things whose essential notion is indivise and inseparable such are most one and simple And is not the first Being such May we conceive the least divisibilitie in his Essence This Argument is wel urged by Simplicius in Epict. cap. 1. pag. 9. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã One Bonitie produceth many Bonities and one Simplicitie and Vnitie which excels al others many Vnities and one Principe many Principes For One Principe Good and God are the same Where he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Unitie Thus also the Author of the Book de Fundamentis l. 2. c. 10. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. The name ONE is truely said of that which is indivise in it self and divise as to althings else And by how much the more proper it is to any thing tobe distinguished from other things by so much the more it may be said to be one Thence he concludes That nothing in the world can be said to be so one as to be truely distinct from althings else but God who is therefore most simple So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Deitie or Divine Unitie is multiplied in things partible impartibly drawing and converting things partible to his own Simplicitie i. e. The Deitie being in it self the most simple Unitie is multiplied as to operations in althings according to their indigence yet without the least multiplicitie in it self but it convertes althings multiplied to its own simple Unitie 3 From the nature of Composition What is Composition but the union of things distinct And doth not imperfection always attend distinction Take the most subtile and refined composition which they make to be of Ens and Essence or of Essence and Existence and doth there not some imperfection attend the same Doth not al Composition import some efficience and thence dependence Can that which is compounded be eternal Doth it not implie a beginning and that something was before it Is it not a flat contradiction to say something was compounded from Eternitie Lastly where Composition is there division may be and so by consequence dissolution which to affirme of God is blasphemous This Argument is wel improved by Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. The Deitie is simple and incomposite but that which doth coalesce out of many differences is composite If therefore we shal say that increate independent incorporeous immortal eternal good Creator and the like are substantial differences and different substances in God being composed of so many things he wil not be simple but composite which truely to affirme is extreme impietie It 's meet therefore to conceive that each of these as affirmed of God do signifie not what he is in Essence but either what he is not or a certain ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã habitude which he hath to those things that are distinguisht from him or that participate nature and operation from him Wherein he gives us the genuine reason why the divine Essence which is in it self most simple is expressed under various Names and Attributes namely thereby to remove al imperfection from him or to illustrate some perfection that is in him by the habitude which he has to things made by him 4 From Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience That God is the frist Cause of althings is clearly evident from what has been before laid down of his Existence Hence it necessarily follows that he is most simple For whatever is composite is such by some preexistent cause which framed its composition This Argument is wel managed by Simplicius in Epict. c. 1 p. 9. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For God is the first Being and Cause of althings But now what is first is necessarily most simple For whatever is composite as it is composite and multiplied it is posterior to one 5 From Gods Actualitie That there is one pure Act which is actuated by nothing else but actuates althings else is most evident to any that dare not grant a progresse into infinitie as to Acts. Now what partakes of pure Act but the first Being who was never in possibilitie to be but always a pure Act as to his Essence God the first Being is actually and eternally whatever he may be neither can he ever be what actually he is not Every Creature had a possibilitie not to be before it was and it stil retains the same possibilitie but God is such a pure Act as that not the least possibilitie or potentialitie can be affirmed of him He is such a pure subsistent Act as excludes al state existing in power or potentialitie either passive or objective which speakes the highest simplicitie 6 From the Immutabilitie of God Whatever is composite is mutable for where there is composition there may be division which implies mutabilitie But God is most immutable as we shal in what immediately follows demonstrate This Argument is wel managed by Plato in his
and the same simply in the some forme In which excellent explication and demonstration of the Immutabilitie of God we have these observables 1 He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number by reason of the severitie of their Laws and Customes but intends thereby one only God as before in the Unitie of God 2 He demonstrates this one God to be immutable because he cannot be changed either by any other or by himself That he cannot be changed by any other he proves because al change is for the better but God cannot be changed for the better because he is best The same argument he useth to prove that God cannot change himself For such a mutation would be either perfective or amissive God is not capable of any perfective mutation because he is the best and most perfect Being neither is it possible that he should affect any amissive mutation because none willingly change for the worse Proclus addes that God is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã invariable because al mutation is a signe ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã of infirmitie as it is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã which is inconsistent with the omnipotent Essence In sum this Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence is that Attribute whereby God is said to preserve his own Being without the least power of not Being or conversion into any other Essence or increment and decrement or alteration and motion 1. God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in al his immanent Acts and Decrees There is a twofold mutation physic and moral physic mutation is by Addition or Ablation and Substraction of some real Entitie Moral mutation is either of Science and Knowlege as when a man judgeth that false which he before thought to be true or else of Wil and Purpose when a man wils that which before he nilled c. God is absolutely immutable in al these respects he is neither capable of physic nor yet of moral mutation either as to Knowlege or Wil. For al mutation either of Knowlege or Wil implies inconstance and imperfection if not imprudence and infidelitie which are al inconsistent with the Divine Being 1. Knowlege 1 God cannot be said to change in regard of his Knowlege because his Knowlege is not distinct from his Being he knows himself and althings else in and by himself he cannot know any thing that he did not know before neither can he know any thing otherwise than he did before He knows things successive without succession by intuition also things complexe by one simple intuitive act His Knowlege is as necessary and eternal as his Essence and therefore most perfect and immutable both extensively and intensively Objects known by God are variable but his knowlege of them and of their variations invariable Althings are the same to Gods knowlege as they are in their own Beings things past present future are present to God in al their circumstances and differences If Gods Science should be changed it would be about things future when they are present and so passe into preterite or what is past but this cannot be because those circumstances of future present past are al determined by the Divine Wil and so present to his Science of Vision Moreover no objects are the cause of the Divine Knowlege but on the contrary the Divine Knowlege and Wil the cause of al objects future present and past In sum God knows al particular objects and circumstances intrinsecally in the glasse of his own Essence and therefore invariably and uniformely Things both complexe and simple may varie but God knows them al invariably in the infinite claritie of his own Divine Essence and Ideas Every thing future if we compare it with the prescience of God it is necessary and necessarily known by him This Immutabilitie of the Divine knowlege Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas by means whereof he makes God to have the most accurate absolute infinite eternal and immutable knowlege of althings So in his Timaeus pag. 28. as in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. § 4. and in what follows Chap. 4. 2 God is immutable in al the Acts and Decrees of his Wil. 2. Wil. For these also have one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence Again if Gods Wil were mutable his Knowlege must also be so for God cannot know things future but by the determination of his own Wil whence they receive their futurition It 's true God wils al mutations of things yet his Wil admits no mutation It 's one thing to change a Wil Deus non mutat voluntatem sed vult mutationem rerum Aquin. and another to wil a change For God by the same immutable Wil decrees that in such a period of time such a thing shal be and in another the contrary without any beginning to wil what he willed not before or ceasing to wil what he before willed God begins to wil or nil nothing al his Wils and Nils are eternal He hates nothing that he before loved nor loves any thing that he before hated neither doth his Wil admit any degrees of some or lesse No immanent Act or intrinsec denomination can happen de novâ unto God albeit many yea infinite externe relative denominations may be attributed to him Thus the externe relative denomination of Creator is given to God in time not intrinsecally but extrinsecally the change of Creation was not in God but in the Creature the very act of Creation taken passively and extrinsecally is in the Creature and not really distinguished from it if we consider it actively as in God so it is the same with the Wil and Essence of God in which regard God may be said to be Creator from al Eternitie as his Wil is the productive cause of athings Thus al other externe relations and denominations attributed to God in time as Lord Father c. are not because of any new thing in God but in regard of something new in the Creature from God There is no new Act in God which was not from eternitie albeit the effects of those Acts were not from eternitie but in time Al mutations are proper to Creatures only because Creatures and the mutabilitie of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Therefore God is altogether immutable and inalterable for he hath determined althings by his Prescience every thing according to its proper and convenient season and place Wherein note 1 That by Gods Prescience must be understood the Divine Decree whence his Prescience resultes and therefore oft put for it 2 That by this Divine Prescience and Decree althings though most mutable and variable as to their proper times and places are immutably determined 3. God is also immutable in regard of his Word Gods Immutabilitie in regard of his Word God being the first Intellect and Truth he cannot
is not manifest in his sight because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie as they fancied Argus ful of eyes or al eye would it not discerne althings round about it without the least turne or mutation of its posture So God being ful of eyes or al eye and present with al Beings is it possible that any thing should be hid from him Hence Plato held ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã althings are ful of God and therefore nothing could he hid from him 3 Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas or Decrees Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being by reason of his Divine Ideas which were the original Exemplar of althings This Plato much insistes on both in his Timaeus and Parmenides as hereafter 4 Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings So Act. 15.18 Act. 15.18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world 5 Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings Plato Leg. 10. pag. 901 c. proves That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things whereof he has an accurate knowlege being ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the most wise Opificer and Framer of althings For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful knowlege of his own worke in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al. But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science The Object of Gods Omniscience we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe or incomplexe Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses Incomplexe 1. Complexe Intelligibles real things 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles or propositions and discourses both divine and human mental oral and scriptural Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God or subsequent 1 Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God are such as belong to the Divine Essence as that there is a God That God is eternal immutable c. These God knows by his Essence alone and not by his Wil because antecedent thereto Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Wil are al such whose truth is caused by and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Essence simply considered nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings so al propositions that belong to them depend on and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying The Reasons of good and evil are eternal if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil it is most false For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby see Bradwardine de Caus l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible or future 1 Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence 2 Things future in his Wil which gives futurition to althings Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent but things contingent as to us are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil and therefore necessarily known by God That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil and so certainly known by him is most evident because they are al present to God For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us but because it is future When it is present it is certainly known what it is wherefore althings being present to God by reason of his Divine Wil which gives suturition to althings therefore they must be al even things most contingent as to us certainly known by him Even among men those that understand the causes of things and their certain coherence with the effects may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse and shal not the omniscient God who gives Being to al Causes and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects Thus Homer Iliad ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Who knows things present to come and past There is nothing so vile so inconsiderable but it fals under the omniscient eye of God Prov. 15.3 as Prov. 15.3 The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil the productive Cause thereof and whatever is evil by its opposite good as also by the positive Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated which also fals under the determination of the Divine Wil so far as it is a real positive Being For he that perfectly knows a thing must needs know al the accidents modes and appendents thereof now al Evil being but a privation of what is good it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation Again Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation which being known to God thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man if this be known by God Gods Omniscience as to the human Soul then surely nothing can be hid Now that the human Soul and al its Principes Habits Cogitations Inclinations Ends Designes and Acts are al known to God is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for sacred Philosophie it is in nothing more positive and expresse To begin with that great series of Demonstrations Psal 139.1 c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me Psal 139.1 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã thou hast searched me narrowly sifted me to the bran thou so knowest me and al that is in me as he who knoweth a thing exactly after the most diligent and accurate inquisition So much ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã importes v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off The sense is there is no part of my life hid from thee whether I sit or rise thou knowest it al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee as 2 Kings 19.27 al my thoughts are present to thee long before they are existent Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee before they were mine Thence it follows v. 3. Thou compassest my path v. 3. and my lying down and
object it cannot be more certain than the object is whatever contingence belongs to the object wil also influence the Science and make it contingent whence if the divine Science be certain as without al dispute it is then it cannot depend on its mutable contingent object but must be absolute and independent Is it lesse than blasphemie to conceive that the infinite Science of God should depend on any finite object or finite mutable conditions appendent thereto Yea is not such a conditionate Science altogether impossible as to God For must not the object as such be before the act And may we suppose any created object or condition appertaining thereto in any regard to be before the divine Wil and Science Is not the futurition of althingâ both objects and conditions the effect of the divine Decree ââârefore in order of Nature subsequent to the divine Wil And if so then are not al objects and the conditions appendent thereto foreseen by God in his divine Decrees without the least dependence on the things themselves or their contingent conditions Indeed a conditionate Science to speak properly is that which as yet never existed but wil follow on the position of the condition whence truely such a Science cannot existe even in men before the condition be performed and therefore where the condition is never performed it can never existe How impossible then is it that such a Science should be found in God who no way dependes on externe objects for his Science We must therefore conclude that God in the absolute and efficacious Decree of his own Wil hath predetermined al futures both contingent free and necessary in particular and thence certainly and infallibly knows them to be future both as to their substance and circumstances As for sins future God certainly and infallibly knows them both as future and present in the determination and permission of his own Wil whereby the create Wil is determined to the entitie of the sinful act as a real act and permitted as to the moral pravitie of the act as before in the object of Divine Prescience Hence 6. The Divine Science is eternal Thus Plato 6. Divine Science eternal both in his Timaeus and Parmenides makes his Divine Ideas to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã eternal and sempiterne And the reason is most evident because the Divine Science is the same with the Divine Essence If God should begin to know any thing that he knew not before his Intellection should depend on the object known which is impossible Again if God should begin to know what he knew not before then he should be composite or compounded of Act and Power and so not a pure Act then also he should not be most perfect and most blessed for every Act addes to the perfection of the habit or power Al the successions and vicissitudes of time or things in time are foreseen by God in his Eternitie by one simple intuitive Act. Thus Maximus Tyrius Dissertat 1. pag. 10. The Divine Intellect is not perfect unlesse it be added to it ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã always to understand Thus also Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 14. Art 13. God knows al contingents not only as they are in their own causes but as they are each of them actually in themselves And albeit contingents are brought into act and existence successively yet God doth not know them successively as they are in their own Being as we do but al at once because his knowlege is measured by Eternitie as also his Being but now Eternitie being existent al at once doth compasse about al time whence althings that are in time are present to God from al Eternitie not only as the reasons of althings are present with him but because his intuition is from Eternitie cast on althings as they are in their presentialitie This presentialitie must be limited to the Divine Wil which gives futurition to althings and so makes them present to the Divine Understanding Hence 7. The Divine Science is infinitely perfect 7. Divine Science infinitely perfect Thus Plato ascribes to God Parmenid 134. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the most exquisite perfect Science otherwise he could not be Rector of the Universe So Maximus Tyrius Dissert 1. pag. 10. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That he be most perfect who understandes both at al times and althings and at once Psal 147.5 God knows althings always and at once therefore most perfectly Thus Psal 147.5 Great is our Lord and of great power his understanding is infinite or of his understanding there is no number i. e. his Understanding is every may perfect he knows althings and that in the most perfect manner And it is observable that the Psalmist grounds the Infinitude of Gods knowlege on the Magnitude or Infinitude of hsi Essence and Power whereby we are informed that Gods knowlege dependes not on the objects known but ariseth from his own omnipotent Wil and Essence The perfection of the Divine Science may be considered essentially intensively extensively 1 Essentially as Gods knows himself perfectly in himself and by himself and althings else in himself God knows althings distinctly in the claritie of his own Essence those things that are diverse and multiplied in the Creatures are most simply and unitely in God Man according to the diversitie of objects has diverse notices or apprehensions of things As he understandes first principes so his knowlege is stiled Intelligence as Conclusions flowing from first Principes so his knowlege is called Science as the highest Cause so Sapience as things practic and moral so Prudence But al these God comprehendes by one simple Act of Intuition in his own Essence 2 Gods knowlege is most perfect intensively For every Intelligent is so far perfect as to degrees of knowlege as he partakes of Immaterialitie Brutes have some degree of apprehension as they have spirituose Souls but these their animal Spirits being but the purer parts of mater therefore their apprehension is most imperfect and not reckoned among the species of true knowlege Mans apprehension depending very far upon his senses and material objects it 's therefore more imperfect than that of Angels yea the Angelic Intelligence being made up of act and power which is a kind of metaphysic mater hence there is much of imperfection mixed therewith if compared with Gods Intelligence which being pure Act and exemt from al mater as wel metaphysic as physic hence it is most perfect intensively as to al degrees of knowlege 3 Gods Science is most perfect extensively not as to kinds or parts of Science for it is most indivisible and simple without al extension of parts but as to objects because it extendeth unto al objects God by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes al particular things with al the particles of time in and by himself God being in the highest degree immaterial it necessarily follows that his Science is most ample and extensive as to its object for
every facultie is by so much the more extensive by how the more immaterial it is hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become althings how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect which is in the highest degree spiritual The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in it self yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power which is infinite Again by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars of any one species or al but infinitely excedes each of them yea a whole multitude of al if they could be congregated together That the Science of God is most perfect essentially intensively and extensively see Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121. Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science we now procede to its distinctions Gods simple Ditelligence with relation to its objects For albeit the Divine Science be in it self one simple Act identified with the Divine Essence yet this hinders not but that we may by some inadequate conception of reason distinguish this Science by reason of its object into different kinds The commun distribution of Gods Science is into simple Intellience and Science of Vision 1. Gods Science of simple Intelligence is of althings possible which he contemplates in the Alsufficience of his Essence For God being in the highest degree Intelligent he must necessarily understand althings that are intelligible but now whatever may be may also be known where-ever there is a possibilitie of existence there is some intelligibilitie Again God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future but also whatever is possible Not that the existence of things possible is known by God but only their Essence which he contemplates in his own EssEnce Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive because it abstractes from the actual existence of its object 2. Gods Science of Vision Gods Science of Vision as to things future is that whereby he knows things as future in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we must premit that when we say Gods Science of Vision terminates on things as future the conjunctive Particle As must be taken not formally as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing but only materially and so it denotes only thus much that Gods knows things future to be future and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220 c. largely demonstrates these Propositions 1 That God doth not know things future merely by his Essence without the determination of his Wil because nothing is in its own nature future but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. 2 That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only because the Divine Intellect considered in it self is not practic but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. 3 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science because the Infinitie of the Divine Science being supposed it doth not thence necessarily follow that this or that thing be future 4 That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their second Causes For such a knowlege implies discourse from the cause to the effect again such a knowlege would be contingent when the second causes are such 5 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immensitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie 6 That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil because then Gods knowlege should not be certain Hence he positively concludes God knows things future by his Wil. 7 That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition namely by his Divine Wil. For as Aristotle 1. Post 2. instructes us To know a thing is to know it by its cause and is not the Wil of God the first Cause that gives futurition to althings Again how can God certainly know future contingents such as al human acts are but in and by some necessary certain cause And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future but in the cause of their futurition the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil whereby things become future did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience but in one and the same moment of Nature God decrees what shal be future and foresees it future Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future not simply from his Essence or sufficience nor yet from their presentialitie to God as the Dominicans persuade us but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is most efficacious omnipotent immutable and most known to himself and therefore it is necessary that whatever he wils should be future be so and known to him to be so for he wils not only the things themselves but also al their modes and conditions of contingence necessitie libertie c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelligibilitie as future wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former it cannot also but give the later Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã God may be deduced from ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to see ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã for nothing can be hid from God yea he is the Inspector of althings And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For he beholdeth althings before they are produced eternally understanding every thing according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. But here we must know that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Predestination causally and not extrinsecally in its own proper nature is the cause or object of the Divine Science or Prescience For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his knowlege but he hath althings future with himself intrinsecally cognitivè causativè intuitivè seu scientificè cognitively causatively intuitively or scientificly from himself only and so he knows althings c. So
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on
condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him 3 It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners in that it resolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it self 4 It subvertes the Covenant of Grace in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes 5 It destroyes the Grace of Perseverance in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil § 3. As for the Wil of God The Wil of God although it be not really different from his Vnderstanding and Essence yet we may in regard of its effects conceive of it as in some manner distinct The Wil of God is taken either properly for the Divine Volition Intention or Decree whereby althings receive their Futurition and Existence or else improperly for the legislative declarative significative Wil of God which is the measure of our dutie The former is that which we are first to discourse of whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophie and something also in Plato Phileb p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Wil as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future he makes this Preface ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For althings that ever were invented being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art by means hereof are declared His meaning seems to be this that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer according to which they are framed so althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil according to which they are accurately formed Thence he addes And truly the Ancients who were better than we and lived nearer to God delivered to us this report or Tradition ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That althings consist of ONE and MANY which are said ever to be 1 That by these Ancients whence this Oriental Tradition came we must understand primarily the Hebrews has been sufficiently demonstrated P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere 2 That by this ancient tradition of One and Many we must understand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil seems also manifest Whence he subjoins ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That we ought things being thus constituted alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular and accurately to observe the same c. That by this ONE IDEA which we are to inquire after must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Wil I think wil be evident to any that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas delivered in his Timaus and Parmenides of which before P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. § 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert Parmenid p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil. We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Propositions 1. Prop. God primarily Wils himself and althings else in subordination to himself The Object of the Divine Wil. 1. That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident 1. because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Wil besides himself he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing which is impossible for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie 2 The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for it self therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. 3 The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its primary object and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil but the Divine Essence Hence 2 God by willing himself wils althings else in subordination to himself For he that wils an end wils althings else in order thereto God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie The Wil of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie and participate thereof God wils himself Necessarily but althings else so far as they relate to himself Hence 1 God wils al singular Goods so far as they partake of goodness For God willing himself as his last end wils althings so far as they conduce to himself but every thing so far as it is good participates of and tends to the Divine goodness therefore as such it is willed by God Hence 2. Prop. The Wil of God considered in it self is but one simple indivisible pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act. Thus Plato Phileb 16. saith we ought always to inquire after ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã one idea of althings Whereby he notes that the Divine Wil as the origine of all things is but one The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil for God by one simple act wils himself and althings else Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exemplar of al Bonitie and the Divine Wil by one and the same act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie It is otherwise with the Humane Wil which by one act wils the end and by another the means conducing to the end whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means but in the Divine Wil there is no such causalitie of end and means to be found in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means and al grant that the same thing cannot be the cause of it self Thence Suaxez Metaple Disput 30. § 16. p. 127 c. proves That Gods Wil is not a real power but the last pure Act for there is no receptive power in God althings that are in God are as actual as his effence and as pure from all Potentialitie Hence 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is most Soverain and Independent The Divine Wil Independent Thus the Platonistes generally assert that the Divine Wil is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã without cause and Independent and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Self-subsistent and Independent because althings else depend on them but they on nothing else This Independence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Wil is set forth in Sacred Philosophie under the notion of a Foundation 2 Tim. 2.19 2 Tim. 2.19 The foundation of the Lord standeth sure the Lord knoweth who are his ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation which dependes not on any part of the Structure but the whole Structure dependes on it so God being to build a Celestial House layes the eternal purpose of his own Wil as a self-subsistent independent foundation on which the whole
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã he hath infringed dissipated made void from ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã he hath broken from ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
here cannot signifie disposed or prepared as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would perswade us for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã differs much from ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author as I can learne used to signifie an interne Qualitie or Disposition but it generally signifies to Ordain primarily in military affaires and thence in any other maters So Act. 22.10 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã And that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã cannot be here taken nominally but must signifie Ordained is most evident from the sense For it 's said they were ordained to eternal life as the terme not unto faith only as the means wherefore if ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã should signifie disposed the sense must be they were disposed to eternal life as many as were disposed for what is faith but a disposition to eternal life It 's most evident therefore that ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã must signifie not nominally but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme and unto faith as the means by the absolute and antecedent wil of God That Gods Wil properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated 1 From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã eternal and sempiterne Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal then not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature which is in time 2 From the Simplicitie Independence and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God supposeth his Divine Wil to hang in suspense and dependent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man and is it possible that the prime cause should depend on or be influenced by the inferior second cause What must the Supreme Soverain Wil attend yea subserve the nods and becks of human created wil The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as something consequent thereto because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed the wil of God must be changed 3 From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God as stated by the Jesuites and their Followers supposeth an Antecedent imperfect wil consisting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination which is unworthy of the most perfect wil. 4 From the Omnipotence of God If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature which shal never be then the wil of God is not Omnipotent but in the power of the Creature either to fulfil or frustrate the same And Oh! how incongruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon then it may be wholly frustrated as to al its counsels and decrees touching the rational world 5 This distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God For every one is so far blessed as he has his wil fulfilled To have our wils crossed or frustrated is accounted by al no smal portion of miserie may we then imagine that the Divine Wil properly so termed is ever frustrated 6 This distinction of Gods wil into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bountie and goodnesse Sacred Philosophie compareth God to a liberal Prince who deviseth liberal things Esa 32.8 and thereby establisheth his Throne Esa 32.8 But the liberal deviseth liberal things and by liberal things he shal stand It 's spoken of Christ as Mediator or the great King of Sion as appears vers 1. who deviseth al manner of liberal things and thereby stands or is established on his Throne as the word denotes in the Hebrew Did not Christ keep open house and distribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely his Throne would not be established he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome But now the distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder al the nerves and ligaments of Christs Liberalitie in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al but a Consequent Wil towards none but those who can by their good merits purchase his favor This distinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 1. Distinct 46 47. where he concludes thus Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bountie and Grace and this speakes that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil because no cause antecedes in us but al our good things flow from his Bonitie 7. The Divine Wil most perfect Prop. The Divine Wil is most perfect This Adjunct of the Divine Wil is but the result of the former and that which makes way to what follows The perfection of the Divine Wil may be considered intensively extensively or effectively 1. Intensively 1 The perfection of the Divine Wil considered intensively consistes in its not admitting any intension and remission or latitude of degrees but being alwaies intense in the highest degree For the Divine Wil having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence it is one simple pure Act without the least gradual remission or intension Hence it is stiled by Plato ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the perfect Idea of good which admits no latitude of degrees no velleitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete without the least velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonstrated 1 from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God For al composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. 2 From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Essence which admits not the least latitude of degrees 3 From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progression to a more perfect and so mutation 4 From the Wisdome of God For al Velleitie implies ignorance and supposeth that God understandes not fully what the issues and events of the human wil may be 5 From the Omnipotence of God Al Velleitie notes impotence to accomplish what we wil. We may not therefore imagine that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie or conditionate incomplete volition either formally or eminently but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees because it is the same with the Divine Essence 2 The Divine Wil is most perfect extensively 2. Extensively as to Objects in that it extendes it self to al objects So in sacred Philosophie Act. 17.26 Acts 17.26 And hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation It is said that God hath determined ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã i. e. by his soverain perfect Wil given termes bounds measures and limits to althings the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited it receives limits and termes from nothing but gives bounds and termes to althings Hence God is
said by Plato always ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
Nature and not from free election there could nothing be contingent as Suarez and others prove But here occurs a knotty objection What indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God which is thus urged How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election when as they are the same with the Divine Essence and so attended with the same natural necessitie This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus That between the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination not of time but of nature But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates in what sense it may be said that God could before nil what he now wils It is manifest saith he that God could not either in regard of Time or Eternitie before nil privatively or positively what he now wils but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe not that it is really a power in God So Gregor Ariminensis Sent. l. 1. Dist 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis and at last concludes That the Wil of God as the first Cause of things may be said to be both necessary and contingent necessary as the same with the divine Essence and yet contingent as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. Disp 7. pag. 114. saith That we may conceive signum rationis a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future And Disput 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative Negative Indifference he makes to be that which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that or to act than not to act and in this regard addes he the divine Wil was before it determined to create the world in that signo rationis moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God Al these solutions are much of the same import and may be resolved into this That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence and so they are necessary or as they terminate on the Creatures and are the cause both of their futurition and existence and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason nature or causalitie in which they might not have been And this we stile Antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil but only a prioritie of Causalitie which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie 9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible Gods Wil irresistible This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philosophie So Esa 46.10 My counsel shal stand Esa 46.10 and I wil do al my pleasure The like we find in Homer Iliad ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled Thus also Rom. 9.19 Who hath resisted his Wil By which the Apostle excludes al manner of resistence not only actual but also possible That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated 1 from Gods prime universal Causalitie God according to Plato is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the most soverain Cause and ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Cause of al second Causes which are but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ministerial instrumental Causes of God ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã who gives essence to althings Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing Now how is God the first universal cause of althings Is it not by his Divine Wil We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil he effectes and operates immediately by his wil without any distinct executive power as we shal prove anon 2 From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us Psal 115.3 Psal 115.3 and 135.5 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth So Psal 135.5 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human men wil what they can do but God can do what he wil because his wil is omnipotent If Gods wil were not Omnipotent he could not do whatever is possible for he workes althings by his wil neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed Omnipotent or Almighty but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect because its volition is its operation it s fiat is its factum esse its word its deed Thence that of Augustin Gods wil is most certain because most potent Of which see more fully Ariminensis Sent. 1. Dist 46 47. and Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. I wil not saith he have him for my God who is not Omnipotent in Acting who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do what he wils who hath not a wil universally efficacious infrustrable indefectible and necessary in causing yea whose wil is not to me necessitie 3 From the Beatitude of God Aristotle as reason assures us that al men do what they wil if they can because herein their Beatitude seems to consist So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. And if he could and would he hath also done it for al when they can and wil act for there is no impediment Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition therefore what men desire they do if they can as Aristotle subnectes Hence the Divine wil if it could not do what it would it should not be blessed because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition So Bradwardine l. 2. c. 27. Yea I constantly and freely avouch I wil not have him for my God whose most blessed wil poor miserable sinful I can when I please pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie and subjugate c. 4 From the Infinitude of
God An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would nor forced to do what he would not a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent unless it has at least equal power How then is it possible that a poor infirme impotent Creature should resist the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way For who knows not that it altogether follows if God can do any thing and wil do it he doth it c. But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God C 7. § 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil as has been demonstrated we may distribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions 1. into Decernent or Decretive and Legislative or Preceptive Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti and his Legislative Preceptive Wil Voluntas Signi This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected as the salvation of Reprobates or the like which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil but may very wel of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distinction we are to consider 1 That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally or analogically and figuratively such Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil 1 Metaphorically as Princes signifie their interne wil by their externe commands which are thence termed their Wil. 2 Metonymically as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God as Sanderson De Obligat Conscient p. 132. Davenant against Hoard p. 392. and Ruiz prove Hence 2 Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are disparate or diverse but not opposite The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other but the wil decreeing and the wil commanding do not oppose each other because they are not ad idem the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law or the measure of his operation and permission but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law or the Rule of our operation and offices The Decree of God determines what he wil do or not do the Precept what we ought to do or not to do Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule Reason and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him 3 The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute efficacious and particular but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute sometimes conditionate sometimes universal sometimes particular sometimes efficacious and sometimes not 4 Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent called in Scripture his ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã good pleasure which is the measure of his own Affects and Effects But Gods preceptive wil is externe and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects but only of our Dutie 2. Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29 Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled which is much the same with the precedent mentioned Deut. 29.29 The secret things belong unto the Lord our God but things which are reveled unto us i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation but his reveled wil of ours So Prov. 25.2 It 's the Glorie of God to concele a thing Gods wil is stiled secret 1 as the things he wils are unknown to us 2 as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us 3 as it is as it were the Law Rule or measure of his Divine operations Gods reveled wil is so termed because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word or Workes every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil as wel as his Word 1 Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices towards us Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God 2 Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive There is a conformitie which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God To the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due to the promissive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission Resignation and Dependence due Lastly this reveled wil of God is never opposite to albeit it be oft diverse from his secret wil and the reason is because they are not about the same object Gods secret wil regards the events of things his reveled wil the duty of man either active or passive 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential Gods Wil Complacential Providential and Beneplacite Providential and Beneplacite 1 Gods Complacential Wil is his simple complacence in al the good Actions Habits and Events of men yea it extendes not only to moral but to natural goods as Gen. 1.31 There is a perpetual necessary volition in God which taketh pleasure in al good whether create or increate Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence of which see Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 6. § 2. p. 38. and Disp 19. p. 214. 2 Gods Providential Wil is that whereby he is said to wil and intend an end when he in his providence either graciose or commun affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it As where God sends his Gospel he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent albeit they are not al saved because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same were they but really embraced and improved In this regard Davenant and others affirme that Christs death is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã an universal remedie applicable to al and that God by his Voluntas Providentiae as Aquinas stiles it intended it as such This intention or wil of God
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the principal supreme Cause but also ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Idea making ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã giving essence to althings for ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the chiefest Good It 's true there are other ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
sweetly received by Chrysostome Hom. 31. in Mat. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã an opportune vocation Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 12. Nihil Augustino certius est quà m in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem per quam solam operamur quicquid boni operamur nominedulcedinis suavitatis delectationis nempe spiritualis coelestis esse significatam Delectationi Dilectionem Ardorem Inflammationemque subnectit Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant Jansen August Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently for so it followeth in the day of thy power ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã signifies 1 force and strength of bodie or mind and thence 2 Metonymically richesse or militarie Forces because in them men place their strength job 21.7 Psal 49.6 We may understand it in both senses 1 of Christs powerful efficacious heart-conquering Grace which is the cause or 2 for his powerful Forces and Armies which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence with human Libertie how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes and yet how sweetly it actes so Omnipotently as if there were no room left for human Libertie and yet so connaturally and so sweetly as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence and Force in it Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace Who would not come under such a silken soft sweet violence as this is Need we then fear that any prejudice can befal human Libertie so long as this Wise Soverain Soul-physician workes upon the Wil Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae or handles of the Soul and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock yea to every ward in the lock of the wil Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ And doth not the Wil upon this Divine heart-logic infused by Christ move as freely as chearfully as connaturally as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go as he did Ephraim Hos 11.3 and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis ac dilectionem erumpere Ex quo fit consequenter ut si illa desit voluntas veluti emortua sit Jans August Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love i. e. with rational arguments and moral persuasions as Hos 11.4 Thus Esa 10.21 The remnant shal returne even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel and yet it is to their mighty God ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the name given the Messias Esa 9.6 Christ drawes them by a mighty power and yet they returne as freely as if there were no power and efficace put forth So Esa 11.6 10 11. The like Esa 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace he addes what followed thereon v. 5. and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace Yea may we not conclude hence that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil by so much the more connaturally and sweetly it actes For hereby it determineth confirmeth and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie both of State and Act. For what more natural to the Wil than to adhere to its chiefest Good Or when doth it act more freely than when it is most peremtorily most inviolably and most immotably determined to love and enjoy its best friend and choisest Good Thus the Omnipotence and Efficace of Medicinal Grace is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil as that it doth most effectually preserve confirme and promote the same CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in the General Creation proper to God the production of something out of nothing Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil Passive Creation what Gods Providence demonstrated The Explication of it The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence Providential means Fire the create mundane Spirit The Object of Divine Providence Its Adjuncts 1 Efficacitie 2 Immobilitie 3 Connaturalitie 4 Perfection 5 Mysterious Miracles Providential Conservation immediate and mediate Ordinary and Extraordinary § 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated effective principe and Adjuncts or various modes of operation we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause whereby he made althings at first and stil continues to make some things out of nothing What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience 1. It 's most evident that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of althings by God but he from a confined mistaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal because he could not imagine how something could be educed out of nothing But true Philosophie as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us that althings were made by God and nothing besides himself is eternal That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes touching the existence of God C. 2. § 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone l'Atheisme Convaincu C. 1. And Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates That it is intrinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal Yet the Jesuites generally grant That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
Tryphon reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious But Plato strongly demonstrates That the Providence of God extendes to althings even the most minute So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie if he should provide for the greater distempers but neglect the lesser would the cure be successeful No surely So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships nor Imperators of Souldiers nor Masters of Families nor Ministers of State nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater Thence Architects denie that great stones can be wel cemented or joined together in a building without smal ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Let us not then conceit that God is more vile than mortal Opificers who by how much the more skilful they are by so much the more exquisitely and accurately by the benefit of their own Art they consider both great and smal things in such workes that belong to their Art Thence he concludes pag. 903. It seems to me ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings This also the Stoics generally asserted whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus his Collections of Epictetus's Philosophie l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some saith he who assert there is no God others that grant there is a God but ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that he is slothful and negligent and provident of nothing I suppose he means the Epicureans a third sort who hold that there is a God and that he is provident but only of greater and celestial things not of terrene a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as wel as celestial but only in commun not as to singulars and particulars a fifth sort of which number was Ulysses and Socrates asserted that a man could not so much as move without God Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings Actions Substances Accidents Modes c. may be demonstrated 1 From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God which extendes it self to the most minute singulars 2 From the omnipotent Wil of God which gives Futurition Determination Limits Activitie and Operation to althings 3 From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings Whatever is Ens by participation must procede effectively from God who is Ens by Essence and if it procede from him it must necessarily fal under his Providence 4 From the certain Determination Futurition and Order of al effects Either althings must fal under the Providence of God or somethings must happen merely by chance without any certain cause of their Futurition 5 From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence That Gods Providence extendes to al singulars even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73 75 76. So De Potentia Dei Quaest 20. he proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways 1 By giving virtue to act 2 By continued conservation of that virtue 3 By moving the Agent to act and applying the virtue to the action 4 As he is the principal Agent in every Act and al other Agents but Instruments 5 As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed The particular Objects of Providence 1 Al natural Beings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe Yea al natural Generations Corruptions Alterations Motions and Actions are subject to Gods Providence Not only the Generic natures and Species of things both Substances and Accidents are determined by God but also al Individuals and Singulars with al their Circumstances and Modes yea things most minute Thus Bradwardine pag. 7 25 291. proves That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence 2 Althings necessary or contingent There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence as Aquinas accurately demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73. So Bradwardine pag. 271 274. What more contingent than the Lot and yet this fals under the Providence of God as Prov. 16.33 The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. 3 Althings politic Al Revolutions Alterations Advances Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence 4 Althings human Al mans thoughts inclinations interests designes and undertakements are subordinate to Providence Hence 5 Al sinful acts fal under the same 6 Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence of which hereafter In sum Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things unto which his omnipotent Wil Efficience and Causalitie extendes i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie it reacheth al natural preternatural supernatural and moral actions and events When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence Is any thing so great that it comes not within his power or so smal that it comes not within his care I am not ignorant how much some of late as wel Divines as Physicians have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie wil be more fully evident by what follows § 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence The Adjuncts of Providence as before stated there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof As 1. Providence is not merely permissive 1. It is efficacious but energetic and efficacious For 1 Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end and the ordering or disposing of means but also the assecution and attainment of the end It 's true human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient and yet by the interposition of other second causes come short of its end but Divine Providence always reacheth its end Thus Homer ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled 2 Al second causes are subject unto and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes but from Divine disposition Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence
which being cast out of the neast by their Parents and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air making loud cries Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41 Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones To this sense Vossius Mcy and others incline The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin as also by Bochart de Animal Tom. 2. p. 203 c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions Job 39.39 Psal 34.10 and 104.21 both of which by reason of their vehement appetite and unskilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production as they refer both to God differ only mentally Conservation continued Creation Creation gives Being and Existence unto things Conservation Continuation in Being Something 's are conserved immediately by God becuase subject only to him as Spirits That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means Now that the conservation of such things also as to Gods immediate conservative influxe differs not really but only mentally from thier first production is manifest because conservation as to God whether it be by means or without means is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation which is no other than his most simple volition but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold That Conservation is a continued Creation Which must not be understood of proper continuation but according to our manner of understanding or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act without any successive duration or real continuation as to God but only a most simple indivisible permanence as Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates Hence we may easily understand how Creation or the first production of things and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception and expression Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced Creation includes a Novitie of Essence which conservation excludes and conservation includes precedent Existence which Creation excludes Nehem. 9.6 Thus Conservation is continued Creation as Nehem. 9.6 where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17 So John 5.17 My Father hitherto worketh and I worke i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God for the production and conservation of things 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various The Object of Divine Conservation Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act not different from the first production of things save by some connotation only yet it admits various Objects and Effects 1 God conserves Individuals some to al Eternitie without the least corruption or alteration as Angels and Human Souls Other Individuals shal be conserved for ever yet not without some alteration and resinement as the celestial Bodies c. 2 Pet. 3.10 12. 2 Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species and in the whole for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã of the whole Vniverse unto which there is more regard to be had than to any part albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species when they decay as to their individual Natures 3 God conserves also the vigor virtue and efficacitie of al second causes together with their Operations so long as they are existent CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin God the Supreme Gubernator The end of Divine Gubernation It s Order most perfect and immobile It hath the force of a Law Its use of means It s extent to althings Gods Gubernation as to Men particularly as to Sinners and Sin The Origine of Sin and its causes God not the Author of Sin How God is the cause of the material act of Sin How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive not merely Negative but Ordinative Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin § 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God Divine Gubernation we now descend to his Gubernation whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great as it may appear in the particulars thereof I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it Thus Plato Phileb p. 28. What O Protarchus may we determine that althings and this which is called the Vniverse are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason as Fortune wil Or rather on the contrary should we not affirme with our Ancestors ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã that the eternal Mind and a certain admirable Wisdome ordering al in the most accurate manner doth governe He saith that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner and with the best order Thus also Iamblichus saith That the Egyptians when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move governe and direct the Ship so doth God the world We find the same similitude used by Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 as before Hence this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence whereby he directes governes and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends in the most orderly manner This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator God the Supreme Gubernator Eccles 8.4 Soverain Gubernator and absolute
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã any Cause or Idea of Evils because ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Evil is an irregular passion or ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã no cause thereof because ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the gift of God to men The like Epinom ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Royal Law as elsewhere of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature At present it may suffice that we assert that Dependence is so intrinsecally essentially and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite For what doth the notion of a Creature importe but its eduction out of nothing by the Infinite Power of its Creator And he that educed althings out of nothing is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure And where there is an obediential power is there not also subordination and subjection And doth not al this formally speak Dependence Thus Aquinas contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates That God cannot make a thing which shal want any essential principe for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe he should make a thing to be and not to be And in what follows he proves that dependence is an essential principe or mode of a Creature as Suarez and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to operation of which § 10. 2 The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition and if the Dominion of God be Absolute then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction As it is impossible that God should make a Creature whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion so it is as impossible that a Creature should be made which may not depend on him as Suarez Metaphys Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. 3 The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God Is not every Creature Multiforme Mutable and Defectible And must not every Multiforme Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Vniforme Immutable and Indefectible Being as the Original principe of its dependence is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature which renders it fluxible variable and inconstant was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus That althings are in fluxe or motion Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions Again doth not every potential Being need some pure Act to actuate the same And is not every Creature a potential Being which needs God the most simple pure Act to actuate the same Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God who is the first influential Cause of its existence motion and al Yea is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator and what an endlesse Agitation yea Annihilation would it fal into See Aquinas contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. 4 The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations and is it not a violence to it to be cut off from this dependence Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun which gave it existence O then how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator the prime Cause of its existence and operation What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence Hence § 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature Dependence the same with the Essence That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident because every Creature being Ens by participation it must necessarily follow that dependence on the first cause from whom it participates of Being is most essential to it As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence and so Independent so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation and so Dependent So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably essentially and formally include Dependence on God as that which is not really distinct therefrom This is incomparably wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence it must be said that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such because if we by the force of our Intellect remove whatever is superadded to such an essence we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing and therefore according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being Wherefore albeit we may by the precision of Reason and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing yet this later really superaddes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being Wherein note wel that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators who assert the Creatures dependence on God as to Essence and Conservation but yet denie it as to causation and operation specially as to the substrate mater of sin It may not be denied but that Suarez in his first Tome of Metaphys Disput 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature but a mode distinct therefrom Yet these thing he grants 1 That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally existing in the Creature For al confesse that passive Creation is in the Creature But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation if we speak of the first Creation from God 2 That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature albeit it constitute not the same 3 He
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
Human Wil as chap. 5. § 3. 3 Again if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence 4 The Understanding cannot produce its act without Gods illumination therefore neither can the Wil its without Gods concurse See this more fully in Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. § 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes in this Part 4. C. 7. 9. § 12. Lastly Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural Creatural Dependence as to its parts is either Natural or Moral and Supernatural Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence conservation and operation Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals We find both these dependences conjoined in Man for he having a double ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or habitude to God 1 as a Creature and 2 as a Rational Creature he hath also a double dependence on God Supernatural Dependence on Christ 1 Natural of which in what precedes 2 Moral and Supernatural And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting can do nothing without much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors so also in Morals and Supernaturals Supernatural Elevation is the total next and formal Reason of acting supernaturally and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God its supernatural influencing cause by so much the more it partakes of his influence as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression God doth most potently and yet most sweetly influence the Affect Act and Effect of the virtuose Soul Phil. 2.13 Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God Yea the natural Wil by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence is elevated to act above Nature This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ as Mediator and Spring of al Grace is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 87.7 As wel the singers Psal 87.7 as players on instruments shal be there Al my springs are in thee Glassius renders the words thus And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances Al my springs are in thee The Psalmist having given us in the foregoing Verses a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion or in Evangelic Churches and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there he concludes with this as the burden of their Song Al my springs are in thee i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee O great Mediator Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace is Vniversal Total Absolute and Immediate and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace For Habitual Grace 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace So John 1.16 And of his fulnesse have we al received Joh. 1.16 and Grace for Grace ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã here signifies either the same with ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã upon and then the sense is Grace upon Grace i. e. abundant Grace and that freely or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ and Nature received from Adam and then the meaning is this Grace for Grace i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust for there was no lust in his heart but what was communicated to his Posteritie so the Children of Christ the second Adam receive from him Grace for Grace i. e. al manner of habitual Graces answerable to those in his Human Nature This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples Luk. 17.5 Luk. 17.5 And the Apostles said unto the Lord Encrease our Faith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Adde Faith to us i. e. some additional degrees of Faith The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie and therefore now having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience they depend wholly on him for supplies their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven and by Juices derived from a Principe above it self As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto and did not depend on his Creator so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it so long as it dependes on Christ 2. The New Creature has an Universal For Actual Grace Psal 141.8 Absolute Total and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Thus Psal 141.8 But mine eyes are unto thee O God the Lord in thee is my trust leave not my soul destitute Hebr. make not my soul naked or emty ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã signifies to evacuate or make naked So the Targum ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã It notes his total dependence on god We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described Cant. 8.5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse leaning upon her Beloved Who is this i. e. this Woman or Church that cometh up out of the Wildernesse This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength Leaning or Cleaving to The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament The LXX render it by a word that signifies confirming her self which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ and not on habitual Grace received from him Members and Branches live on life but the life of their Head and Root So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ as Paul Gal. 2.20 When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received than in dependence on Christ they soon fal into sin This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated Phil. 2.12 13. Phil. 2.12 Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling This fear and trembling doth not implie douting as the Papists would needs persuade us but a modest humble self-abasing sense of our own insufficience with an absolute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace Thence it follows v. 13. For it 's God that worketh in you to wil and to do of his good pleasure This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã prae videndo ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Evils find no place with God Again ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Must we not determine then that God is indeed good ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But no good is noxious ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã as elsewhere of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã But the progenie of this Mind is a certain ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã ãâã Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to