effect and if you ask me what his action is I answer it doth materia or substantiare the effect as the efficient did efficere the effect It is also passive in regard of the form but both together co-work to make the effect though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter Now this is the next thing to be inquired after we see who made it then whereof it was made both which we see in every thing and see them as they are done Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia As Kickerman saith it is proxima or remota but he may say so of every argument as well as of materia he saith man is made of the first matter then of the elements which are more remote but ex semine that is nearer alas we do not here consider priority or posteriority neither do these any more press the effect here is no Logick still but materia est causa ex qua ergo this will not fall in Logick and if you mark it presently when he comes to materia prima and to the elements he is in natural Philosophy ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick but of the particular thing that belongs to a particular Art Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam Solis domus auro pyropo ebore argento componitur Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis Clara micante auro flammasque imitante pyropo c. Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid which is a common School book and here a fained cause argues a fained effect ens and non ens are the subject of Logick but non ens gratia entis for so Logick looks at them first and gives entity to ens fictum and therefore Grammar and Rhetorick must follow it for they are attendants on it The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts and they are argued by their matter it had his pillars of gold for their matter and pyropus another matter of the columnes the covering or seeling of Ivory the leaves of the doors made of silver Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all ergo he doth not teach them here for whether they be made of one matter or of more matters all is one ergo there is no Logick in that ergo it doth not belong to Logick Caesar 1. belli civilis Imperat militibus Caesar ut c. Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships then he distributes the ship into his parts keels ribs Carinae primum and statumina ex leui materia the rest was viminibus contextum lined within with leather so that here is distributio integri in membra and every part is argued by the material cause CHAP. VII Causae primum genus est inefficiente materia secundum sequitur VVE have heard of the efficient and of the matter and this is the conclusion of it now we come to the second which is in forma fine so that whilest he saith Causae primum genus ejusmodi est c. he tels me it was a distribution before where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis materiae for so genus is totum partibus essentiale and is never but in speciebus so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts Secundum sequitur in forma fine he doth not say Secundus est forma fine now as the efficient and matter were combined together as moving together a while without the form and end so the form and end though the form be before yet the end comes presently after and is as it were the pedissequa to the form and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing we put the end as being next to it and best expressing it So bene disserere the end of Logick is put for the form of Logick now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in greater matters so is it also in less for there is a co-operation of the efficient and end together first then of the form and end together also though not without the efficient and matter In forma fine for the form is before the final cause for before the form be induced or ingenerated in the matter it cannot be good for his end and the end is causa in respect of the effect not of the efficient So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end for it may be a coat and yet not fit to serve me now then as the efficient began the motion and the motion redounded out of the matter so it runs per formam finem Forma est causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latine there is but a transposition of the letters and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio because when it is made it hath the face of a thing so a thing when it hath its form it hath a face it will seem something so that the efficients esse is not facies rei nor the matters esse for they might be otherwhere ergo the efficient and matter are common causes this is a particular one which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before being more general so that when once he hath the face of a man then is he a man this word forma both in Latine and Greek is taken abusive for the outward figure of a thing it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct for figuration is not forma as we may see in water put in a round glass or in a square glass the same water having the same form will have a round figure or square figure according to the glass wherein it is now because the figure is adjoyned to the form ergo they say it is forma and in Schooles they call it forma accidentalis now the figure follows the form but it is not so essential but it may be changed and yet the water is the same because the water is variable into divers figures as we heard before in water The Schooles say that no artificial thing hath any other form ergo ask them in what predicament any artificial thing is and they will answer in quality but thus they will make Geometry to give the formes of things Figura is a quality ergo to make quality a form is very absurd again as before one and the same thing had divers figures and onely one form that makes the thing one again is the figure of a table the form of it then the table belongs to Geometry not to the Joyners Art again whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia ergo the form too or else it is in divers predicaments again figura is an accident but forma is a cause and gives essence to the thing
efficient as essential for actio is before passio so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi As we are saved by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ovids the 4. remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity But first Logick being a general Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turks may receive these being more generally known to the world than are the Scriptures and again Divinity is the most special Art of all And so Ramns findeth fault but justly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selves As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B. c. Now Logick is a general Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetorick a general Art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conserving causes of love then tropical causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus â—e reasons otia are the causes of love for take them away and love is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of love so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo put idleness and you must put love aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we have a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is general to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they have all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in every cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the special causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away love so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum so in judgement it is also true as give otium to Egistus and you may give him love which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed us an example out of an Author he wils us to look for the use of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logick is a general Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the use of all Art is Now the aliquid before is love which we should have heard of against which Ovid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sons Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here she takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcanae tigres are preserving causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Object But doth he well to bring fallaces Answ Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsook her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis c. He makes examples of his own and there is genesis teaching us that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Again our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantial effect to be from substantial causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordinarily in artificial things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before we can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CHAP. IV. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis VVE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it rhe most general modi was procreans and conservans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more general than per se and per accidens in use but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing see which modus is brought with it as in the example before the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans and with the modus of conservans as you would take away love take away idleness for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love Now as God is the procreant and conserving cause of all things so he is causa sola first ergo that is before causa â—um aliis afterward he is causa cum aliis working together with the creatures and we finding this in the first efficient we may also find it in the first in the second and in every one because all things are simulacra of the first Now these belong to Logick for there is reason in them and any thing deserveth more or less praise or dispraise as he doth good or evil sola aut cum aliis Earumque omnium saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra That is earum omnium quae cum aliis efficiunt saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra for so saepe here is part of the axiom and thus often it fals out that one among the rest in doing of things is principal and as we say ring-leader to the rest though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows So that as the Lord did at the first work all things alone and then with others so likewise do the creatures in nature and here again as the Lord is principal when he worketh with others so also when creatures work together one for the most part is principal Alia adjuvans ministra That is as it were a minister and an instrument Here we are to understand there
you shall see a composed form so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus ensula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven told us the form of it CHAP. VIII De fine Finis est causa cujus gratia res est VVE have gone through the esse of a thing we have but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes up the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that serveth to make up the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keep the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logick Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cujus gratia Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cujus gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio◠for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent than any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it evermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slave the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or form would move ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment and so of a good form yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happiness and so is not perfect Again this shews the difference between the formal cause and the end for the form may be as we see and not the end Again we know there are many things that have not their perfection but by growth and yet have all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the matter reason the form yet here is not his end namely fitness to serve God And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est homini Deus Of natural things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach unto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference between the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it never be dwelt in so for a garment to be worn is one thing and to be fit to wear another So if I go forth to speak with one and he be gone yet I obtain my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out and she would give him one of her Nymphs which she presseth upon him by final causes first that she may spend all her years with him and secondly that she may make him the father of a fair off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side mark the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy mind here was the propositum What meantst thou to have done even to have killed Caesar So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing but even substantial and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the form so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soul as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answ But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will do any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus we have heard the doctrine
of the causes CHAP. IX De effectis Effectum est quod e causis existit siveigitur gignatur sive c. NOw we come to see a thing made up it is worth the consideration to see how we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are four esses distinct which we must look at distinctly and orderly if we â—ill see things aâ—ight First the efficients then the matters c. now then let us see effectum Effectum for the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes oâ— efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to understand that it hath reference to all the causes even materiatum formatum finitum Object Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects as there are of causes Answ Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their own ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectum efficientis effectum materiae effectum formae or effectum finis ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath all the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with every other cause matter form and end should have the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He means argumentum absolute consentancum now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it self to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and form substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logick is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Again he puts efficiens generally a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he used quod so often is because he would tell us that Logick is general to every thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend every thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complemental est is a causa qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand upon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them Ecausis Here e is as much as a ex per and gratia ecausis that is ab efficiente ex materi per formam gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels do existere they must have all the causes so the soules of men after they be out of the body they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes for if any one cause be wanting they will be incomplete Sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy but Ramus teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur c whether it be made or corrupted sive modo quodam moveatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantial motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then again whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa distruens is a motus and a cause as well as opus destructum is an effect and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits yet they are effects in respect of their causes ergo they are causes both alike they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him ergo whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done it would be his effect at least the corruption of nothing Now the effect is double motus and res motu facta every thing is made motu God onely is sine motu and doth not move when he works for else he should not be primus movens but motus but if we resolve all things it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable for so Aristotle found out most things by motus now again there are those that sever motus and res motu facta as the Aristotelians which makes Ramus to commorari they say somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta but that is not so for there is nothing that God hath made which doth movere but there is a res motu facta of that motus they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum as when one playes on the Virginals they say there is nothing left behind Answ What care I for that Logick looks not to that but as there is playing so there is something playd which is res motu facta and as there is writing so there is something written These namely motus and res motu facta are never distinct asunder one without another but onely in that the one is not the other Hujus loci sunt laudes vituperationes As if Ramus should say if you would commend
a thing indeed let it be from the effect we may commend one from his fair building but that is beggerly as Tully saith or a woman for her beauty but this is childish for the true commendation is from the effect so man is here to be dispraysed from his sin so the Lord is to be praised from his effects Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri prophani Why in Scripture because Divinity stands in action not in Theorie and therefore we have them so often commended that have done well contra Aenei 6. facta variorum populorum c. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera c. The Romans are commended from their effects first regere imperio populos again parcere subjectis c. these are compared with the acts of other people and they are made minora to the effects of the Romans Excudent alii spirantia c. As the Corinthians will carve you any thing Orabant causas melius as the Orators among the Athenians Coelique meatus c. as the Caldeans and Egyptians will do Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt That is dicta and scripta in respect of Authors but if we look at the things written or spoken so they are testimonies So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well Demosthenes and Tully for both Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia deliberationes c. Counsels and deliberations are effects of them that consult and deliberate etiam si omnio ad exitum perductae non fuerint And this appears evidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death being suspected of conspiracie against Alexander So also were Lentulus and Cethegus and other companions of Cataline Sunt etiam effecta virtutum vitiorum Quid non ebrietas designat operta recludit c. Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an effect but that which is substantial but accidental causes as I may call them may have accidental effects As drunkenness first operta recludit secondly in praelia trudit inermem it makes a man go to warre leaving his weapons behind him it will make a man think himself as good as my Lord Maior Faecundae calices here are cups for drink and drink for drunkenness quem non fecere desertum that is a dizard he meanes a Logician contracta quem non c. it makes a man in poverty a brave minded fellow CHAP. X. De subjecto Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subjectum adjunctum c. VVE have heard of the essential parts of a thing and so have seen the thing in his essence and we see how Logick doth direct the eye of our reason to see the most inmost thing in it Now we come to see the complemental things that belong to a thing not belonging or concurring to the existere of it so that the causes were as it were the simular parts these are as it were the blood in the sinews c. to make them full and complemental Modo quodam consentaneum as if he should say the causes were required ad esse rei these are but required ad bene esse rei so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing and now we come to look at the outside of it Argumentum modo quodam c. This is an imperfect transition containing onely the proposition of that which follows modo quodam as if he should say if they be there it is well notwithstanding if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the thing for they are but circumstances whereas argumenta absolute consentanea are penetralia again argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing for accidens inseparabilis as homini risus aequo hinnitus are but acts of the soul working in the bodies of their subjects Succedit Why because they are after those that agree absolutely we have heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes and cannot existere without them ergo it must be a thing of necessity before it be subject or adjunct or before it can have a subject or adjunct for that which hath adjuncts is a subject contra Vt subjectum adjunctum A subject is by nature before an adjunct and a thing is first a subject before it be an adjunct and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing can be adjoyned to a subject again the subject is more general than the adjunct not that there are more subjects to one adjunct for it is quite contrary for there may be twenty adjuncts to one subject but I mean it is more in use and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth As when I say the King is there ergo the Guard is there is stronger than to say the Guard is there therefore the King and here we see as before priority and posteriority Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God for whatsoever we see it was first in God and when he hath made a thing then it is a subject and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them ergo subjectum is before adjunctum in the practise of God and also of man Now subjectum as it is first so must it be taught first The name subjectum tels me it is a thing laid undermost in regard of the adjunct and it doth support it and yet it is not of the essence of it but onely laid under it and adjunctum is to ride on it as a pack-horse now as the efficient was most inmost then the other three or the effect so is subjectum here ergo it is by nature before adjunctum Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur He omits the genus and the reason why he doth not teach the genus namely argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because it is a definition it self as absolute consentaneum was for there is no definition of a definition but if he had defined it he had brought a definition to a definition he wanted a word to name the thing and therefore gives me a description instead thereof cui aliquid this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art so that this aliquid is any thing not simply but quatenus it hath an affection to be joyned A thing being an effect is fit to receive outward things and subjectum is defined by his relate adjunctum for it is cui aliquid adjungitur and whatsoever is subjected to another thing is his adjunct as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white Adjungitur Adjungitur so that subjectum is the argument and adjunctum the aliquid adjungitur so that here he tels us that the adjunct is adjoyned to the subject th at which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tyed ergo subjectum is before adjunctum he saith it is but adjunctio not entring into the essence of it but that it may be taken away so that
parts distributed Objection But in a distribution we should have but two species Answer Why is it not requisite that there should always be a decotomie for indeed if we could find it out every thing is decotomised but the Lord hath not revealed it unto men but hath kept it secret to himself Objection Singulars have no differences but are distinct onely by a conflux of common accidents Answer Then singulars should not differ in essence ergo I should be the same with you and you with me the first matter indeed was imperfect but every thing else is an effect ergo hath all the causes ergo the form If they ask me what it is I answer them that my soul is my form as they hold or else thus as my members are not another mans members so my form arising from the parts of my body is not another mans form but is really distinct from it Objection But say they the reasonable soul is generall to all men Answer There indeed may be some scruple but when we consider that the forms of the body and the soul make up the form of a man we shall see every man to have a distinct form by which we shal know them each from other Sic animal genus hominis bestiae dicimus He means that genus is a generall totum and comprehendeth the species under it for as a Hen covereth her chickens with her wings so genus covereth the species with his essence then again make an axiome as homo est animal and you shall see the species to be the subject more often than the genus ergo he saith subjecta Genus est generalissimum aut subalternum Here he distributes genus unto us shewing us that there are two kinds thereof the one is generalissimum for so indeed every genus is general and hath his subsistencie onely in singularibus and because all genera do subsist in singularibus ergo all but singularia are genera hence it is that they say in Schooles ens and unum confunduntur Species sub alterna aut specialissima Genus generalissimum cujus nullum est genus Generalissimum is so called because it is most genus because that can be nothing but genus Subalternum genus is genus but not onely genus nor alwayes genus Cujus nullum est genus There must needs be an end for as there is a lowest whereat we must begin so there must be an highest above which we cannot go for there cannot be an infinitus motus in creatures so the Lord hath in great wisdom ranged things in their order So the common Logicians have made ten predicaments or genera generalissima but the first four have Logicks use in them the rest are arguments but if we would know the genera generalissima every Art will tell us them best now we may ascend to ens too so that ens is the definitum indeed God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so in Logick argumentum is genus generalissimum vox in Grammar c. and all these are species of ens Nullum genus Here he denies any genus to stay our reason that so we may not go too far for since genus ariseth from the matter we shall at last come to that which is no genus but a matter onely ergo we must distribute this into his matter and form Subalternum genus ut subalternaitem species quod species hujus illius autem genus est Subalternum genus may also be subalterna species so that these being one and the same onely differing in respect therefore one definition may serve for them both Species specialissima quae est individua in species alias ut materia forma singulares Species as before signifies firstly a singular thing and other species are called species at the second hand but individua are properly cald species quae speciuntur Now he saith specialissima that is indeed and properly as generalissimum had no genus above it so species specialissima hath no species under it individua is here an adjunct to species specialissima now he saith individua because he speaks of division ergo here he tels us that we can go no further to find any inferiour species we may onely divide it into members if we will Genus vero species notae sunt causarum effectorum He doth commorari here because the Schools have not commonly received that genus contains the matter and common form of the species but we know a perfect definition layes out the quiddity of a thing that is the matter and the form now the form is there but where is the matter why the genus contains the quiddity the essence the causes ergo it is an argument unswerable that the genus contains the matter Hinc universale est insigne ac praestabile quia causam declarat The common Logicians never lookt after any distribution but of the integrum into the members and of the genus into the species now integrum is commonly a singular ergo in opposition to it they called genus an universal then again the integrum is made of the matter and form of the members now they are singulars ergo there can arise nothing from them but that which is singular Now the genus is common to the species therefore by reason thereof it comes to be universal and we must apprehend it in our minds Object It is a great question whether universalia be realia or onely intentionalia Answ True it is that every universal is subsistent in singularibus so that there is truly animal but we must look for him in individuis for genus is totum partibus essentiale but if we make an abstraction of it from the singulars then it is not real but here is a fallace for the universal still remains a thing though I thus consider it in my mind for I would dispute with them thus If it be but a phantasme then can it give no essence Again when we define do we not lay out the thing ergo if genus were onely mental it could not give essence so causa effectum and all other arguments are things real in nature howsoever my Logick takes hold of them Insigne True it is that every whole is general because it is totum but genus is universale insigne ac praestabile and so it appears for because it gives esse not onely in a distribution but also in a definition ergo it is of great use even set in the fore-front of the Aristotelians quia causam declarat and our knowledge is e causis Distributio generis in species valde quidem excellit sed difficilis est rara inventu Valde excellit that is in use sed difficilis est rara inventu the reason is this the genus is totum universale and gives matter and form to the species now the form is hard to be found so that in common Authors we find this definition seldom but in Arts it
this Art of Rhetorick namely that 't is to sweeten speech with otherwise being inartificial it is of little force in the hearers eares For whereas every thing coming to mind doth first come to the outward senses then to the inward senses and hence to the understanding so to the affections and last of all to the Will Rhetorick comes to the understanding yet presently before it can examine it the affections lay hold of it and so tickle the Will that it may approve it and hence it came to be abused 1. with sophistry to the understanding 2. for tickling of the Will We have heard also that it hath two parts namely for that Speech is so either writing or uttering of it hence is the double consideration of speech the first whereof is called elocutio which may be in writing alone without pronunciation but pronunciation cannot be without elocution hence it followeth that these are several parts And secondly Elocutio is before Pronunciatio now elocutio is either in one word alone adorning etymology or in more words together adorning Syntax that which is in one word alone is called tropus and the reason of the sweetnesse of a Trope is because it doth not only give a splendour but besides that it carrieth us to another Argument from whence it was drawn for every Trope signifieth two things to the hearer First A kind of sweetnesse with the thing it delivereth and secondly the argument whence it was drawn Therefore though at the first necessity found it out yet afterwards variety did so delight that it would not cast them off Now these Tropes are not of any words as we will but of consentanies with consentanies dissent with dissent c. and therefore the distribution of the doctrine of Tropes must run along according as the arguments are distributed yet we have not fit words to distribute them withal for if we should have said that a Trope is either simple or comparate then we should have left out those Tropes which do arise from orta argumenta as synecdoche integri membri generis speciei Again not every simple argument is put for every simple one neither every comp for every comp so that in this distribution there would have been a double errour therefore he contents himself with the special words Metonym and Ironia commending unto us a totum which we are to imagine by these specials as they have a community one with another which is in regard of the arguments from whence they arise 1. For a metonymy of the cause that is either of the efficient or of the matter The reason of these two Tropes is because these two causes in constituting the effect are precedent a good while before either forme or end Now here first the efficient is put for the effect for that often times giveth names to the effect and this metonymy hath two modi the first when the Inventour is put for the thing invented the second when the Authour is put for the thing effected so we call Ramus his Logick Ramus and the reason hereof is this because at the first we had not readily a name for it for the thing being new we could not hastily give it a name but gave the Author's name till we had a better for it So for the matter we call Money silver because at the first we had not readily a better name Now there are no Tropes of the formal and final causes and the reason is because they were so confused with the effect that at the first we cannot readily sever them both because forma simul ingenita cum effecto and secondly because these two causes do work so near to the effect a good while after either efficient or matter 2. A metonymy of the effect is when the efficient is signified by his effects here he seemeth to make the effect only to answer to the efficient but it doth answer also to the matter at least though not in Latin yet in Hebrew and English Luz was called Bethel before it was Bethel Now this metonymy of the effect hath two modi The first when the effect is given to the efficient adjectively the second when given to the efficient not adjectively but abstractively as he said Death was in the Pot because Colliquintida was in it Now as the cause is put for the effect contrà so the subj for the adj contrà 3. In the metonymy of the subject the modi are either contin pro re contenta as locus pro incolis ad res locatas or possessor pro re possessâ or Dux pro exercitu or Advocatus pro Cliente 4. Now followeth the metonymy of the Adjunct Cùm ex adj res subj signifie That is when the name of an adjunct is given to the subj whereof 't is an adjunct So we use to say Saving your Honour If it please your Worship Honour and Worship being put for the subjects thereof for because the term of the cause effect subject and adj did not at the first come readily to our hand therefore we were fain to put cause for effect subj for adj aut contrà So the names of Vertues and Vices are put for vertuous and vitious men as Lecher for a lecherous man Covetousness for a covetous man c. and this is the first modus of this metonymy The second modus is when the signe is put for the thing signed as pubes for inventus for pubes is properly the budding of the beard when he beginneth to be adolescens The third modus is when the adjunct of time is put for the subject as time for the unmannerly Citizens in that time so aspera saecula for the People that were then asperi so is togae for Peace and here cedant arma togae conced c. are two Hyperboly's CHAP. VII Ironia est Tropus à contrar ad contr SO that this Trope is only from those Arguments of contraries and not of disparates because they are too many This definition is too general for Relates are not so put one for another because they are of more use in their agreeing affection than in their disagreeing but only is special to adversa contradicentia and privantia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cavillator a wrangler simulator making that to be which is not dissimulator making thâ—t not be which is illusor a mocker irrisor a derider this is the proper name of this Trope and the use of it chiefly is ad jocandum Now here because there is so little reason that one contrary should be put for another therefore 't is hardly perceived yet is to be distinguished either by word or gesture or by both Heus bone vir So Meaning malè adversa Curasti probè That is Non curasti contradicentia So integritas tua i. e. your uprightnesse your shame-fac't-nesse your good done deeds and so for the adversa The modi here are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
first the other followeth yet both move together and as two hands laid together do move together and yet one before the other so is it with the formal cause and effect the formal cause moves and the effect also but the effect follows it in every step and the final cause follows the form as the shadow follows the body and the effect comes last again this is a property ergo an adjunct ergo is after the subject for the form is an effect before it be a subject so that the efficient doth as it were make the form and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial things so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated so farre forth the effect is accomplished Anima rationalis est forma hominis c. Here our Author doth commorari and stay upon the doctrine of forma for it is so deep and subtil as that it can hardly be perceived This example is not true because anima rationalis may subsist from the body now as there can be no matter without a form so there can be no form without a matter therefore this example will not serve his turn yet he brings that he could get many in Schools have stumbled at this and have gone about to mend it but indeed they have marred it Some say ratio belongs to Angels ergo it is not the proper form of homo and therefore they have added mortale and say homo is animal rationale mortale Now if they joyn mortale to ratio it is not mortalis Again animal ratione mortale doth detract from man unless we speak of his body Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis That is not so for the Angels though they be animae and so have not animam rationalem yet they have rationem again doth not the body of man distinguish him from other thing so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A mans soul in a bird will not make it a man Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis quadrangulis sua forma est He brings such examples as he could find and those whereof greatest question might be made it hath been a question among Logicians that this forma is peculiar to substances not accidents and hence have made a distinction of forma to be substantialis or accidentalis but they are deceived for Logick is a general Art and every thing that is made hath causes ergo may be defined ergo hath matter and form for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar Rhetorick and Arithmetick or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects ergo accidents behold a form as well as an efficient ergo he saith in Geometry take a triangle it consists of three lines with three angles which by their unition in their angles make up one form as well as one matter Phisicarum rerum coeli terrae arborum piscium sua forma est He doth commorari here long for two causes first in respect the form is deep and needs illustration Secondly to confute other Logicians that say accidents have no forms unde praecipua rerum ut natura est c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est then it is praecipua rerum natura Nature proper is res nata that is that springeth principiis that is matter and form so that the whole nature consisteth of them and this is the proper signification of it afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselves hence is materia and forma called natuâ—ae so that in natural Philosophy when you read of nature they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma then again by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject it signifieth the qualities natural in things all this shews forma to be praecipua rei natura Praecipua first because it makes the thing to be id quod est so doth not the matter again forma why it is principium actus from whence the qualities principally arise for as the Philosophers teach though not truly in every point materia is principium passionis forma actionis and actio is better than passio ergo the form more excellent than the matter but both matter and form do agere for they are causa yet the forms begin and the matter is but the sustentation of it and the forms act is the stronger by the matter not onely as it acts internally but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect so it is praecipua rei natura so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio si possit inveniri Si possist inveniri He saith it neither can be found out nor that it cannot be found out Si possit inveniri sure it is findable I prove it thus it is lyable to Logick if it be objected to the eye then the eye may see it it may but hardly be found because it doth not descry it self to the outward senses by qualities as bodies do again the form in nature is so subtil that we can hardly find it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo divers have thought the forms of things to be divine Some have gone so farre as to think them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to find out then either the efficient or matter ergo we commonly call that the matter which contains the form too because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause than as it hath a formal Vt in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom as we may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing again the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificial things are the works of men and one man may trace another though every man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificial things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form but we use to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beams all along two foot asunder put into the earth the distances between them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told us now why saith he I am a French-man and I will tell you the form of a French wall where if you do but look at the forms of every part and of them
here comes in their predicament of qualitas and qualitas is no genus of any thing ergo that distinction of qualitas to be naturalis or moralis is not at all but a special use of a thing that is taught in a general Art for qualitas is but a logical term and as adiunctum is genus to them so is qualitas Every example is infima species in Logick so that calor is an adjunct to fire and when I have said so I have considered the logical respect and no more Praeter causas We have heard that there can be nothing but must have causes and so the existere of a thing is from the esses that the causes give and then the adjuncts come over and above the thing Now qualities are of two sorts proper and common these are but special modi of these qualities they may be proper because they argue at proper common because they argue at common or at random as we say Now whatsoever hath affection to argue that belongs to Logick ergo these because they have affection to argue rather as modi that as adiuncts as modi efficientis before So therefore they are distingushed thus So risus doth argue homo not so much in regard of his adiunctity as of its property Now qualitates propriae have these properties with them conveniunt they come together with the subiect and are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the whole and afterward with the parts ergo he saâ—th well conveniunt Omni. This is somewhat hard for omni non dicitur de uno aut de duobus but tria simul omnia that is three will make an omne and our Author teacheth in iudgement that a special axiom is quando consequens non omni and there it may be of one or two but here it must be taken more general for one or two c. but because the Schools thought properties convenire omni speciei onely and thought that individua had no properties as they also thought that forma was onely speciebus and individua were distinguished accidentibus But our Logick teacheth that every thing hath a form and therefore hath properties for commonly properties arise from the form ergo he saith conveniunt omni whether it be omni speciei omni individuo Soli. Soli shuts out all others else it is not a property Semper So that if they agree omni and non soli or soli and non omni or omni and soli sed non semper semper sed non omni soli they are no properties ergo a property doth argue with this vertue that it argues omni soli and semper and so it is meet because they will come into Art and will make a rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for this it is every Art ought to deliver the causes qualities and act of a thing for so there is in nature first the thing then the qualities or faculties then the act which points out the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that if one would make an Art of homo that part of natural Philosophy he must speak of risus because he doth some thing in nature by vertue of that quality so heat and cold first agree to elementum calidum and frigidum and afterwards to the species not by the immediate acts of their forms upon their matter but by the common acts of fire and agree to produce heat and water and earth to produce cold Vt homini risus aequo hinnitus cani latratus c. He meanes the faculty not the act so neighing to a Horse every beast hath his peculiar voyce though we cannot discern it so well Common adiuncts are such as agree to that which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but is first in the parts and then in the general as learning first agrees to Socrates Plato c. and then to man and this is the difference between proper and common adiuncts the proper adiuncts agree first to the generals and then to the singulars The common agree first to the singulars and then to the generals Hoc genere argumenti Faunium Chaeriam Cicero pro Roscio Comaedo cavillatur Nonne ipsum caput supercilia illa penitus abrasa c. He had not an hair for he shaved them off ergo he reasons from thence that he was a knave and it may be true because they are hot headed that are bald this is a new modus and he reasons from signes which are common qualities they do not agree omni soli and semper and yet a knave doth omni soli and semper commonly Sic Martialis 2. lib. Zoilum ludit Crine ruber niger ore brevis pede lumine luscus c. The cause of these not making a good man is this the cause of a red head is colour ergo there is much heat and where there is much heat there will be much fancy and where there is much fancy there will be much iuggling Niger ore that comes from melancholy that lies in the muscles about the mouth brevis pede that may have some reason with it for such a one will go apace lumine luseus for when a man thinks he looks on him then he looks asquint and when one would think he looks asquint then he looks on him Siv vestitus comitatus res adiunctae sunt quo circumstantiae genere Dido c. Oecanâ—m intera surgens aurorarelinquit c. So that not onely accidents but substances may be adiuncts a man may be an adiunct as he is a servant So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time aâ—rora then the attendance of young men then their hunting instruments c. Est vero adiâ—nctorum ad subiecta quibus occupantur usus item magnus There is another kind of adiunct which are occupantia as we heard before of subicta occupata So Plato proves that those Cities are mâ—serable which want Physitians and Judges quia multa quoque intâ—mperantiam iniustitiam in ea civitate versari necesse est Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est unde quidvis alteri consentaneâ—m vel idâ—m vel unâ—m diâ—i possit We have now seen both what goes to the esse and bene esse of a thing now he cals it categoria the arguing categeria signifies to plead against and they that gave it that name first to argue did discern truth by the contrary which is borrowed from the Lawyers and we know when we would see a thing that if we take the contrary it will make it mag is illucescere afterward it came to signifie not that gain-saying one of another but one mans pleading alone for his client then it came to signifie the arguments that he used in his speech for his client and lastly it came to signifie any argument and thence comes argumentum the predicaments are called so namely categoria and so Ramus would have us consider every argument to be a predicament Idâ—m vel unum Moreover he doth commorari a
gerendmu And as the other was extrinsecè agens so this is intrinsecè agens And this also we may see in Adam who was indued with strength of body and comly aspect The heathen Philosophers have stumbled at these things in making felicity to consist in riches honour and the like yet Aristotle thought they did only conduce unto happiness thouhg he was deceived with the same fallacy he was before Partis is Corporis aut Animi Because bonum is externum aut internum Bonum corporis est quod est innatum or connatum corpori For it is not acquisitum as bona animi are Object But these bona corporis are natural ergo how are they required ad bene te gerendum Answ We have them to some end and therefore to mannage the carraige of our selves ergo the Poet saith Gratior est virtus veniens a corpore pulchro This stands in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This stands in aspectu grato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est quâ validè te geras And validity lyeth in the body and he that will performe any vertue as justice wisdome or the like must have this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that if a man be sick lame or deformed or have no constitution of body that action whatsoever it be looseth his grace and is ridiculous in respect of him that performeth it I remember Socrates found fault with the games of Olympia because there the body was only exercised and the vertues thereof and not the vertues of the mind and so he said an Ox or Lyon might be practised But he was deceived for the case is not equal for the bona corporis in man are ad bene se gerendum whereas there is no such thing meant in the strength of an Ox or Lyon Aspectus gratus est quo decenter te geras et 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that this addeth decus to the action and we se by continual experience that where men are not much known therefore the comely aspect of one man is much preferred before another and ergo though a man had all the bona that went before and wanted this he would but be a mocking stock So that as a pretious jewel should be placed in a pretious matter and not in dust so should vertue in a comely man Euexia is more general than sanitas and tells us that all the members of a mans body do concur to thâ—s good action Pulchritudo is properly that good colour that is of a good crasis and belongeth to a woman and ergo is more special than aspectus gratus Bonum animi est bonum quod facultatem animi perfecit eodemque sensu virtus diciter I say quod facultatem animi perfecit perfectio and bonum are all one for then we say a thing is bonum when it is perfectum God hath indued mans soul with faculties which when they can act readily then they are called bona and habits perfecit because these faculties of understanding and will are not perfected till they can work readily and then they have their perfection so that look what faculties of the soul have such readiness of act they have their perfection and they are called bona animi Aemulatio est quâ alterius exemplo excitamer ad bonum Virtus animi hath her stirrer up to that which is good and in her course her spur and limits and carriers For a man that is expert in the eupraxie of any quality is stirred up by some of these so that this aemulatio is not a vertue of it self but is a provoker of bunus Ethicus unto vertue Quâ excitamur or excitaris Because every man at the beginning was made for an eupraxie for God and in the fall though he were no way able to perform it yet there remain such relicks as to leave him without excuse and so stir him up to good by others example and amongst the rest this is one provoker and indeed the first of them Alterius exemplo this is the cause that provoketh us to bonum not envying the good examples of others but grieving that we cannot excel them Ergo this ariseth from a kind of ambition but it is good not desiring the evil or the staying of him but his going on Calcar est quo currens excitatur ad bonum persequendum Now as we have heard that there is an impetus or first setting on to begin so there is a spur in cursu to set him on to go lustily forward Calcar est mediocre aut ingens Mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat It is from the notation and if calcar in genere be quod incitat then calcar mediocre est quod mediocritèr incitat Mediocre est Laus Mediocre est Fama Laus est mediocre calcar à paucioribus propter mediocrem viriutem additum subditum First We do not give laus to any one till we see he do something of the act and so it differeth from aemulation I say mediocre calcar because this spur doth not gag so deep as ingens calcar doth Propter mediocrem virtutem For laus is of that vertue which is not yet come to perfection but is a degree unto it Apaucioribus because it not yet being perfect is not known so well as that of fama is Fama est calcar mediocre quod plurium ore versatur Now when vertue is but mean and so not known to many we give laus unto it if it be known of many then it hath fama given unto it And this is the difference betwixt laus and Fama Calcar ingens est quando virtus venerit ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Calcar ingens est Honor. Calcar ingens est Gloria Honor est quo virtus perfecta honoratur I say quo virtus perfecta honoratur because here the act is come to its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or perfection So we see in Arts and Trades that we do not give honor to any Art till the man be his Trades or Arts-master Now gloria is the highest spur and differeth from honour in that it is more general than honour even as fama is more general than laus Cancelli aut carceres sunt quibus virtue intra suos limites coercetur aut continetur Cancelli sunt Pudor Cancelli sunt Paenitentia So that whilest these two are in man they are as bridles to keep us from evil and to do good Pudor est quo à transiliendis limitibus coercetur Now I say so because pudor is a shame-fac't-ness to commit evil and to omit good and that alwayes before the act whereas verecundia is that blushing after act and that is natural and is but in some men not in all and therefore it belongeth not to moral Philosophy So that a man should be shameful lest he do evil and ergo Aristotle faith in his Politicks That he is not a man that will not be shameful and yet in his Ethicks he saith that pudor