Similitude Accidents in the Concrete as Just White c. in which the Subject is as it were the Matter Accident in the Abstract is the Form in which Number also are Works performed by Art Of this Place also are those things in which are distinguished Material and Formal Or in which there is something Analogous to Matter and Form So the Matter of Disciplines are Precepts the Form Method Of Interpretation Voice the Form Signification This whole uses to be call'd Physical because Physicks vindicate to themselves the Consideration of those things which consist of Matter and Form Vulgarly it 's called Essential Ax. 12. An Integral Whole is that which has Part out of Part. 1. § Now Essential Parts are really different for Matter is one thing and Form another But yet one Part is not out of another For Matter permeates Matter and informs all its Parts But Parts Integral because each is endued with his proper Quantity not only differ in themselves but also Site or at least Order So that one is not contained in another For this it is to have Part out of Part. For Example The Parts of the Human Body are Head Breast Belly Limbs of the which one containeth not another So the Parts of Number are divers and one is not contained in another This Whole is termed Mathematical because Quantity is of Mathematical Consideration Vulgarly Integral more properly Integrate Ax. 13. An Integral Whole is either Continued or Discrete Ax. 14. Both are divided into Homogeneal and Heterogenal that is Similar and Dissimilar Ax. 15. Homogeneal is that which has Parts of the same Name and Nature Ax. 16. Heterogeneal of a Diverse 1. § This Distribution of the whole Integral is extant in the First Book of the Hist An. Cap. 1. and Book 2. Of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. and Book 1. Of the Gener. of An. Cap. 1. For Example Inanimate Substances as Water Wine Flesh also Magnitude Motion and Time are Wholes Homogeneal Continual The Bodies of Animate Heterogeneal Continual Numbers as Three Ten are Wholes Homogeneal Discrete An Army Church the World Heterogeneal and of the same Denomination Ax. 17. A Part Heterogeneal is either Principal or less Principal Ax. 18. That 's a Principal by whose Ablation or Taking away the whole is destroyed Ax. 19. The less by whose taking away the Whole is only maimed or mutilated 1. § For Example Hand Brain Heart Liver are Principal Parts of Man because these taken away of Necessity the Man must die Foot Hand Ear c. are less Principal because these being taken away it is not necessary a Man should die Ax. 20. A Whole by Accident is chiefly said Four Ways and first of a Cause of divers Effects secondly an Effect of divers Causes thirdly of a Subject of divers Adjuncts fourthly of an Adjunct of divers Subjects 1. § First a Cause of divers Effects And so a Plant may be said to be a Whole because of Plants some heat others cool c. Secondly an Effect of divers Causes as Mice some of which are said to be generated of the Sun others of Mice c. Thirdly a Subject of divers Adjuncts as Men some of which are said to be bond some free some good some bad c. An Adjunct of divers Subjects as Diseases some of which are said to be of the Mind some the Body these again either of the Brain Eyes Lights c. CHAP. XV. Of Cause and Caused in general Ax. 1. A Cause is that by the Force of which a thing comes to pass COMMENTARY 1. § Principle Element and Cause are Words that are ally'd in Signification Principle is either largely taken or strictly Largely it is defined Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks Cap. 1. to be the First from whence any thing is or exists or is known More strictly Book 4. Of the Physicks Cap. 5. where Principles are defined to be those things which are neither from one another nor others and of and from which are all things In this Sense there are only reckon'd Three viz. Matter Form and Privation The Definition of Element is Extant Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks Cap. 3. and is thus An Element is that our of which any thing at the first is compounded in which it is and which in its own Species is indivisible into any other Species 2. § Cause is here said to be that by which a thing is that is which confers somewhat towards the things Existence and therefore Privation cannot be a Cause because it confers Nothing but only towards its Mutation Ax. 2. A Caused is that which is constituted of its Causes Ax. 3. The Cause is before it s Caused both in Nature and Knowledge 1. § In Nature because the Caused depends upon the Cause Knowledge that is simply and distinct Knowledge which follows the Order of Nature For to us the Cause is more known than it because nearer to the Senses For from the Senses do we derive all our Sensible Knowledge Ax. 4. The Causes are Four viz. Matter Form Efficient and End 1. § This Partition is extant Book 2. Of the Post Cap. 2. Book 2. Of the Physicks Cap. 3. and Book 4. Cap. 2. And is built upon the best Reason For whatever is made is made by another For nothing is made by its self There is therefore an Efficient Cause Nothing finite can produce any thing out of nothing There is therefore Matter out of which things are to be made and Form which is introduc'd upon that Matter when things are made Nothing lastly acts without Design there is therefore an End for whose sake the Cause Efficient acts Ax. 5. The Caused of Matter and Form is call'd the Composed of the Efficient the Effect of the End the Means or Designed and these differ not in Reality but Reason 1 § And since to the Constitution of the Caused Four Causes concur as in all Corporeal things there do it ought not to seem strange that one and the same thing should be called Composed Effect Means c. according as it is compared with divers Causes Ax. 6. In every Genus there is a certain Subordination of Causes Ax. 7. Subordinate are those that depend one upon another 1. § To wit either as to their Existence and so the Son upon the Father the Father upon the Grandfather or Causality and so the Quill upon the Hand in Writing or both and so the Second Causes upon the First or Creatures upon God Ax. 8. Causes likewise are said either to be Essentially or Accidentally subordinated Ax. 9. Essentially are those of which one depends upon another when and in as much as it causes Ax. 10. Accidentally Of which one indeed depends upon another but not when or in as much as it causes 1. § And so a Cause is said to be two Ways subordinated by Accident First when it depends indeed upon a superiour Cause but not when that is when it Causes and this is Effected when it depends upon it
That he should be a Man if he has a Rational Soul is requisite and necessary c. Ax. 23. Place from Efficient has two Canons and the first of them is Such as the Cause is such is the Effect c. 1. § And thus God is very good and therefore his Works are so This Canon is deceitful unless cautiously used For first it sails in Causes that are by Accident For neither does it follow that a Son is good because his Father is so nor yet bad For a Son is not produc'd by his Father as he is good or bad but as he is a Man c. And so it fails in Equivocal Causes For it does not follow that the Sun is animated although it animates the World nor that the Whetstone is sharp although it sharpens Iron Lastly in Causes Voluntary when making use of their utmost Endeavours they do something which does not correspond to their Skill or Art As when a Painter paints less elegantly than becomes his Art c. Ax. 24 Secondly That which is the Cause of the Cause is also the Cause of the Caused c. 1. § As Virtue is partly from Nature partly from Institution partly from Custom Virtue is the Cause of civil Happiness And therefore civil Happiness is partly from Nature partly from Institution partly from Custom c. This Canon has Place only in Causes Subordinate of themselves For in Causes Subordinate by Accident it for the most part fails For it does not follow because God is the Cause of our Will and our Will is the Cause of Sin that therefore God is the Cause of Sin c. Ax. 25. Place from the End has this Canon viz. That the End being put there are also put the Means to that End 1. § And so Ovid concludes that Man was made with an upright Countenance because to contemplate the Heavens deeming that to be the End of an upright Figure The Words of the sweet Poet are these Omnia cùm spectent Animalia caetera Terram Os homini sublime dedit Caelùmque tueri Jussit erectos ad sydera tollere Vultus Which admirable Pare-Royal may be rendred in these two sorry Couplets in this manner And whereas other Animals behold With down-cast Looks this Sublunary Mold To Man he gave a stately upright Frame And bad him view those Heav'ns from whence he came Which tho' they fail as to their Versifcation yet may they serve to shew in some measure the Meaning of that memorable Passage of excellent Ovid. Now the Means are often express'd by a Negation of those things which impede the End As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye is to admit all Colours and therefore to be without Colour The Elect must be saved And therefore must not Sin unto Death c. But now tho' the End being put it is necessary that the Means should be so yet that the End not being put they should not be so is not always necessary For it is not necessary that a Man should be destitute of Books and Masters because he is not Learned c. Ax. 26. Now the Place from Caused has four Canons And the first is the Composed posited the Matter and Form must be so too And when that 's taken away the Material Form also must be taken away 1. § And so Plants are living things And therefore they must have a Body and Soul And Stones are not And therefore they must not have a Soul I said Form Material For that the Composed taken away the Matter should be so too Or the Form Immaterial is not necessary For it does not follow that there is no Iron because no Sword or that the Soul of Man is not because he dies c. Ax. 27. Secondly The Effect being posited it follows that either there is a Cause Efficient or else that there has been one 1. § As there is a Building and therefore there is or was an Architect to build it Here are the Footsteps and therefore this Way in all likelihood there has passed some Man c. Ax. 28. Thirdly Such as is the Effect such is the Cause that produc'd it 1. § As this Picture is fine and therefore so must the Artist be that drew it To this are to be added the same Limitations which were added to the first of the Place from Cause Efficient viz the Cautions against Accidentals and Aequivocals because in these Cases this Rule may fail us Ax. 29. Fourthly The Means taken away the End must also be so too 1. § As Stones are not nourished and therefore they do not live Many Men the Gospel will not be Preached to and therefore many Men by means of the Gospel will not be saved c. Ax. 30. The Place from the Subject has this Canon viz. that the Subject being posited the Propriety must also be so too and that taken away the Propriety must also be so too 1. § As Christ is God and therefore he has the Power to forgive Sins The Writings of the Fathers are not the Word of God and therefore they are not of Divine Authority c. Now these Canons without any Limitation are certain and firm Ax. 31. The Place for Adjuncts is of great Extent and has under it Proprieties Objects Signs and Circumstances Now Ax. 32. The Place from Proprieties has two Canons and first that to which the Propriety is given to that also the Subject And that to which the Propriety is not given to that neither the Subject c. 1. § As Christ is Omniscient and therefore he is God Angels fill up no Place and therefore they have not Bodies c. Ax. 33. The Second is that which is said of the Propriety may be also said of the Subject And that which cannot be said of the Propriety that neither of the Subject c. 1. § As a Talkative Person is to be avoided and therefore a Busie-Body or one that is inquisitive into other Peoples Matters A wise Man is not to repose himself upon things of a Fleeting and Transitory Nature and therefore not upon Riches or other Earthly Commodities or Goods c. Ax 34. The Place from Object in the second Place has this Canon viz. That that to which the Object is given to that also the Subject and that to which the Object is not to that neither the Subject c. 1. § As The Doctrine of fallacious Sophisms directs the Mind towards the Knowledge of things and therefore is a Part of Logick Logick has not things necessary for its Object and therefore is not Science c. The Arguments of this Place are very firm if drawn from proper Objects but otherwise only Probable As if one should say thus He talks of Military Affairs and therefore he is a Soldier Of Laws and therefore he is a Lawyer Her Delight is not in Womens Company and therefore she is not a Woman c. Ax. 35. Place from Sign has this Canon viz. Positing the
Sign viz. Antecedent Consequent or Conjoyned the thing signed is also posited and that taken away the thing signed also is taken away 1. § As it is Day and therefore the Sun will rise The Woman longs and therefore she has conceiv'd The Man flyes and therefore he is guilty of the discovered Conspiracy It is not Full-Moon and therefore there can be no Eclipse c. Now Arguments drawn from this Place also are firm when the Signs are necessary and proper to the thing signed otherwise they are only probable As he was not Sempronius 's Enemy and therefore he kill'd him not The Woman does not love the Boy and therefore she is not his Mother c. And therefore it is that the Philosophers make use of these so much the more sparingly Ax. 36. The Place from Circumstance lastly has this Canon viz. positing the Circumstance of the thing you posit the thing it self and taking that away you also take away the thing it self 1. § As he has stolen something out of a sacred Place and therefore he is Sacrilegious The Spring comes on and therefore Flowers will be found He goes covered with a Cowle or Hood after the manner of the Monks and therefore he is a Monk Christ was to be born in the time of the Jewish Polity and that at Bethlethem which Polity is not now in being as likewise Bethlehem And therefore Christ is not now to be born as believe the unconverted Jews but is so al-already He is not in Mourning and therefore he mourns not c. Arguments also from this Place are Part firm and Part probable and Use will be the only means to distinguish betwixt them And now we come to treat of the Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous Compared and Testimonies CHAP. XVIII Of Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous Compared and Testimonies Ax. 1. THE Place from Opposites in general has these two Canons And first that of which one of the Opposites is affirmed of that the other must be deny'd COMMENTARY 1. § As It is a House and therefore cannot be a Man he is sick and therefore cannot be sound c. And here the Laws are to be observed which we have recited Book 1. Cap. 22. concerning Opposition Ax. 2. The Second is The Predicates of Opposites are also opposed 1. § As. A just Man is he that keeps the Law and therefore an Unjust that transgresses it But here Care is to be taken lest their Difference or Affection Generical be predicated For it does not follow in that a Man has an Animate Body that a Beast has an Inanimate nor that because Whiteness is visible Blackness is invisible because to be animated is the Difference Generical of Man and Visible the Affection of Colour not Whiteness c. But this viz. that because Whiteness scatters therefore Blackness gathers the Sight is a good Consequence and does follow c. Ax. 3. The Place from Contraries has three Canons First that which takes up one Contrary that takes up another and that which takes not up one that neither another 1. § As Love is in the Concupiscent Appetite and therefore Hatred Right belongs not to Beasts and therefore they cannot suffer Injury c. Ax. 4. Secondly The Causes Effects and Adjuncts of Contraries are Contraries 1. § As Virtue is from a good and therefore Vice from an ill Habit. That makes one happy and therefore this miserable That is to be wished and therefore this to be shunned c. But here two things are to be avoided And First lest we take the Causes or Effects by Accident instead of those per se For it does not follow a good Man loves and defends his and therefore a wicked Man hates and deserts his Because Love to one's own is not from Virtue but Nature Secondly whose Effects are dependent on the Disposition of the Matter For by reason of Dissimilitude of Matter it often happens that the same Cause produces contrary Effects or contrary like For Heat hardens Clay and softens Wax and Threatnings not rarely produce that in some which in others Entreaties To wit because the Efficient acts not according to the Measure of its Virtue but that of the subjected Matter Ax. 5. Thirdly Of Contraries Immediate Of Necessity one of them must be in the Capacious Subject and the other not 1. § As Libertus is not a Servant and therefore he is free The Number is not even and therefore it is odd The Canons here observing the aforesaid Limitations are firm enough and especially the Third Ax. 6. Place from Relateds has but this Canon viz. posited one of the Relateds there is also posited the other And that taken away the other also is taken away 1. § As he to whom his Father is Master the same is his Father's Servant The Confederates of Rome are not their Subjects and therefore the Romans are not their Masters c. This Canon is most certain Ax. 7. The Place from Privatives has this Canon viz. Of Privatives The one must of Necessity be in the Capacious Subject the other not 1. § As he is blind and therefore does not see I says our Saviour am the Light of the World and therefore whosoever follows me walketh not in Darkness The Subject is said to be capable when so in respect to Nature and the time set by Nature c. This Canon holds firm Ax. 8. Place from Contradictings has this one Canon and that is one of the Contradictings being placed the other must be removed and so on the contrary 1. § This Canon is the very Foundation upon which lean the Principles of all Sciences and which whosoever denies has no Reason c. Ax. 9. That from the Major has two Rules or Canons and the first is that to which the Major agrees to that also the Minor 1. § As God gave Life to Man and therefore he will give Food Bodies and therefore Raiment c. Ax. 10. The Second That which convenes not to the Major that neither to the Minor 1. § As Angels are not pure before God and therefore much less Man A Man taken by his Enemies cannot make his Will much less a Traytor c. Ax. 11. Place from the Minor has also two Canons and first that to which the less does not agree to that neither the greater 1. § As It is not lawful to be angry with ones Brother rashly or without a Cause much less to kill him Ax. 12. Secondly That which to the Minor that also to the Major 1. § As An unchaste Look upon a Woman is a Sin and therefore Adultery God gives Food and Raiment to the Beasts and therefore how much more to Men c. Ax. 13. Place from Equal has three Canons and first to Equals equal things agree 1. § As It was lawful for David to eat the Shew-Bread to allay his Hunger and therefore for Christ's Disciples to pull the Ears of Corn and eat them on the Sabbath-Day to satisfie
that it be conjoin'd with the Patient and 2dly unlike unto it 1. § The first of these is precepted Book 7. Physicks Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup Cap. 7. An Efficient is said to be two ways joined to the Patient to wit either by Existence vulgarly call'd Suppositum or Virtue For Example When Fire burns Wood it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Existence when heats the Sitters by it is not joyn'd to them by its Existence but Power or Virtue 2. § An Agent likewise is said to be Two Ways unlike the Patient either as to Species or Degree In the first manner Hot to Cold in the last that which is more hot to that which is less hot or that which is more cold to that which is less cold Those which neither the one cannot act upon the other or suffer from it any manner of ways Ax. 9. Thirdly the Efficient is divided into free and necessary Ax. 10. A Free is that which Causes Consultedly or with Design Ax. 11. A Necessary not but by Necessity of Nature 1. § Liberty in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleases and therefore he who is absolutely free is free from all Servitude Law imposed upon him by others Coaction and Necessity of Nature But when the Will is said to be free and a free Cause opposed to a Necessary nothing farther is understood by the Name of Liberty but an Immunity from Coaction Necessity and natural Determination For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law enjoys the Liberty of his own Will when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives But Natural Necessity and Coaction evert Liberty Why therefore is not coacted Cause contained in this Division Because he who is compell'd is so compell'd by another as that he conduces nothing to the Effect himself and therefore cannot be numbered amongst the Efficients 2. § By Natural Necessity we understand not only that by which Inanimate things act as Plants but that also by which Brutes and Infants before the Use of Reason For the Actions of Brutes and Infants proceed almost in the same manner from Natural Instinct and Sense as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it self In this Sense are the Parts of the Division immediately opposed and in this are contained all the Species's of Causes which follow Ax. 12. A free Cause can act and not act what how and when it pleases Ax. 13. A Necessary is determin'd to one certain thing and acts both when and as much as it can 1. § For Example For this Cause is one said freely to dispute or write because Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one disputes or writes and also because one can dispute or not dispute and the Disputation begun can at Will interrupt or do any of those things which are said to be in our own Power For to these only does the Liberty of the Will extend Causes necessary are determin'd to one thing that is they can but cannot but act and that only which they do and nothing else and as much as they can So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter and heats every thing so much as that it cannot heat it any more Ax. 14. Fourthly Cause Efficient is divided into Cause by it self and Cause by Accident Ax. 15. Cause by it self is that which as it is such produces an Effect of its own Council and agreeable to its Natural Disposition Ax. 16. By Accident which not as such or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension 1. § That a Cause Efficient be a Cause of it self two Conditions thus are required First that the Effect answer to its Council or Natural Propension to its Council if a Free Propension if a Necessary The other that it produce it as such If either of these are wanting the Cause is said to be by Accident If the first because some Event or Effect by Accident coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cause Efficient by it self As when one digging up the Earth finds a Treasure For to dig the Earth is the Effect of the Digger by it self with which Effect the finding of the Treasure by Accident that is besides the Council of the Digger and Nature of the Digging is joyn'd So when an Animal begets a Monster it is the Cause of the Monster by Accident Because the Generation of the Monster is joyned with that of Nature by Accident and besides its Scope and Intention If the latter that is if the latter Qualification be wanting the Cause is said by Accident because the Effect is not ascrib'd to the Cause but that which happens to it As when Polyclete or a Musician is said to be the Cause of a Statue For neither does Polyclete make the Statue as he is Polyclete or Musician as he is Musician but a Statuary For it is Accidental to the Statuary that he is either Polyclete or a Musician See Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 2. Ax. 17. To cause by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance 1. § Videlicet To the first Species of it which is said to be by reason of its Effect Fortune in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is defin'd by Aristotle Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 5. thus It is therefore manifest that Fortune is a Cause by Accident in those things which are done for the sake of something and consultedly undertaken By Themistius in his Periphrase upon this Place more fully to be a Cause by Accident of those things which neither necessarily nor often but rarely happen and in those alone which for the sake of something are consultedly undertaken 2. § Now Chance in Creek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a Cause by Accident of those things which rarely happen and that in all those things which are undertaken for the sake of another and not only consultedly For Chance extends farther than Fortune For whereas both are Causes by Accident which act for the sake of some End and are conversant in things rarely happening Fortune only is placed in those things which act consultedly Chance also in those which act by Necessity of Nature as in Infants Brutes Plants and also inanimate things in which there is no Place for Fortune As for Instance when any one digging finds a Treasure we may say that 't was by Chance or Fortune done But when a Tile falling from a House shall wound a Passer by that is we say by Chance not Fortune done All Fortune therefore is Chance but not on the contrary as is said Book the same Cap. 6. Altho ' these Words are often confounded Ax. 18. Fifthly Cause Efficient is divided into Principal and less Principal Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue Ax. 20. A Less which inserves the Principal towards its producing the Effect Ax. 21. The Principal Cause is either equal to or nobler never worse than
because begotten of no other Man as the rest were but immediately created of God So also the Heaven is the first Cause of Motion not absolutely but in the Genus of Natural Causes as is collected from the 1st Book of the Meteors Cap. 1. In the same manner may the Soul be said to be the first Cause of vital Operations and likewise every principal Cause in regard of its Instruments c. Ax. 30. Seventhly Cause Efficient is divided into Universal and Particular Ax. 31. Universal is that which concurrs with other Causes with the same Efficiency to the producing of many Effects Ax. 32. A Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one Effect 1. § Universal Causes are God and the Heavens God concurrs with particular Causes to all Effects The Heavens only to them which are Natural and Material In this Sense Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 2. The Sun and Man I add God are said to beget Man The Sun as an universal For with the same Efficiency it concurrs to the producing of all things Man as a Particular So also may a Driver be said to be a Universal when driving a Team of Horses because in the same manner and with the same Virtue he drives all his Horses as well the Sound as the Lame Ax. 33. Lastly and Eighthly Cause Efficient is divided into next and remote Ax. 34. The Next is that which produces the Effect immediately Ax. 35. The Remote which produces the Effect by means of some more neighbouring Cause 1. § A Cause Efficient is said to be two ways Next to wit either generally or specially In general that Cause is said to be Next which either by its Existence they commonly say Suppositum or Virtue is joyned to the Effect For such Virtue being an Instrument of the principal Cause it is deem'd with the Principal to be one only And therefore when the principal Cause by its Virtue is joyned to the Effect it is its self esteemed to be joyned to the Effect Neither is it any matter whether that Virtue be an Instrument conjoyned or separate For Example The Fire is said to be the next Cause of Ustion Parents of their Children notwithstanding the Fire acts by Mediation of Heat and the Parents of Seed For altho' Heat and Seed are Instruments yet do they not effect by their Intervening but that the principal Cause may be said to be next to the Effect A Cause therefore is said to be remote in this Sense viz. which neither by its Existence nor Virtue is joyned to the Effect As when the Grandfather is said to be the Cause of his Son's Son or Grandson c. 2. A Cause Efficient is said to be next in Species which is so joyned by its Existence to its Effect as that it is joyned to it without any mediating Virtue And a next Cause has no Place in Substances but only Accidents especially proper For a Substance does not effect a Substance without some mediate or instrumental Virtue And this is the Cause which is said to be absolutely next and that is either Internal or External Internal is that which is in the Subject of the Accident of which it is the Cause So the Soul and every Substantial Form is said to be the next Cause of its own Proprieties Hitherto appertaineth the Emanative Cause Likewise the Continent or Synectical of the Physicians External is that which is not in the Subject of that Accident whose Cause it is And so the Interposition of the Earth is said to be the next Cause of an Eclipse But the Use of this Cause in the Definition and Demonstration of proper Accidents is much the more great CHAP. XVIII Of End Ax. 1. ENd is defin'd to be that for the sake of which a thing is 1. § Being that which moves the Efficient to Action by superinducing its Love upon it and begetting an Appetite on and Desire of it self Ax. 2. End is three ways divided and first into that of which and for which Ax. 3. The End of which is that which the Efficient desires Ax. 4. For which for whose sake or for which the Efficient desires such an End 1. § As for Instance The of which of Medicine is Health for which the Sick Ax. 5. Secondly End is divided into Principal and Secondary Ax. 6. The Principal End is that which the Agent first or also principally intends Ax. 7. The Secondary which the Agent so intends as that it may enjoy it with the Principal or else attain it if the first and principal End should fail 1. § For Example The principal End of Clothes is that our Bodies should be defended against the Inclemency of the Heavens the Secondary Conjoyned with that Principal is that they should adorn it So the Principal End for which God was pleas'd to manifest himself in the Creation of the World was that Man should be endued with the Knowledge of God and Piety The Secondary and Succedaneous that he might render them inexcusable who holding the Truth in Unrighteousness go on still in Iniquity Ax. 8. Thirdly and Lastly End is divided into Subordinate and Last Ax. 9. A Subordinate End is that which is referred to some farther End Ax. 10. The Last to which all other Ends are referred that it self to no farther 1. § There is often a long Series of Subordinate Ends in which the Subordinate is a Means in Respect of the Sequent End For Example One digging in the Earth to fetch out Iron Iron is drawn out that of it may be made some Instrument which may be serviceable for our Use As suppose a Penknife or a Lancet the Lancet inserves the Physician for the Cutting of the Vein the Cutting of the Vein to transmit the Superfluous Blood or take away the Vitious The Loss of Blood conduces to the Conservation or Recuperation of Health Our Health indeed of it self is to be desired but referred notwithstanding to this End that our Actions may be free and Expedite Actions again are referred either to Pleasure or Glory or Honesty or something else in which Subordination of Ends there is no going to Infinity as we have taught before For otherwise vain and fruitless would be that Appetition which Nature has planted in all things as the Philosopher argues Book 1. of the Ethicks Cap. 1. There is therefore some chief End in which the Appetite must terminate and acquiesce 2. § An End is said to be two ways last either in its own Genus or absolutely That is said to be so in its own Genus which is the last amongst those Ends which are intended by the same Agent So in that Series which I have brought there are many Ends which are last in their own Genus For to fetch forth Iron is the last End of such who dig in the Mines the Penknife of the Smith Health of the Physician But there is but one absolutely last and that is Felicity 3. § That End which is subordinated in
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is from Number it 's collected that Arithmetick is the Science of Numbers And Physick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Nature it 's collected that Physick is the Natural Science or Science of Nature c. 5. § From Derivation a Definition is collected when from the Definition of one Conjugate the Definition of another is collected as the Definition of Prudence from that of a prudent Man 6. § From the Definition of one Contrary also may be collected that of another For of Contraries the Science is the same And therefore when Aristotle Book 3. Cap. 1. had defin'd an unvoluntary Thing to be that which is either done by Force or Ignorance and affirmed that to be done by Force whose Principle is External and such as that he contributes nothing to it who does or suffers it He thence collects that a voluntary Thing is that whose Principle is in him who acts and is not ignorant of the Circumstances of the Fact c. Hence then proceed we to the Consideration of the next to be considered viz. Division its Laws and Species's which will be the Subject of the next Chapter CHAP. V. Of Division its Laws and Species's Ax. 1. OF Division one is of the Name or Nominal the other of the Thing Ax. 2. Division of the Name is an Enunciation of the Significations of an Homonymous or Doubtful Word or Sentences of an ambiguous or doubtful Speech COMMENTARY 1. § As if any one should recite the Significations of these Latin Words Jus Canis Malum c. or distinguish in this Oration Aio te Aeacide Romanos vincere posse That is I say you Aeacides can conquer the Romans This properly indeed is not so much Division as Enunciâ—â—â—â—â— and is more frequently call'd Distinction than Division Ax. 3. And is to be adhibited in the Beginning of a Disputation 1. § So that the Disputation may seem to be instituted against the Thing not Words For it may happen says Aristotle that the Answerer may not direct his Thoughts the same way with him that interrogates when any thing is ambiguous in a Speech Book 1. Top. Cap. 8. Ax. 4. Now Division of the Thing which is properly said to Be a Division is an Explication of the Whole by its Parts Ax. 5. And is either by its self or by Accident Ax. 6. Division by it self is that by which is divided a Whole into its Parts which are in it of or by themselves Ax. 7. Accident by Accident 1. § For Example when Animal is divided into Man and Beast or into Body and Soul the Division is a Division by it self because Man and Beast are by themselves contained under Animal and Animal is of it self composed of Body and Mind But when Men are divided into Freemen and Slaves good and bad the Division is by Accident because here not Men of themselves are divided but the States and Conditions of Men or other Accidents which happen to them Ax. 8. Division of it self again is Four-fold One of the Universal Whole or Genus into Species's Another of the Formal or defin'd into its Parts defining as Genus and Difference Another of the Essential or Composed into its Composing as Matter and Form Another lastly of the Integrate into its Integrating and this by a peculiar Name is called Partition 1. § For Example When Animal is divided into Man and Beast or Element into Fire Air Water and Earth or Moral Vertue into Justice Fortitude and Temperance c. the Division is of the Universal or Genus into Species's When the Definition of Man is resolved into its Parts or when Animal and Rational are said to be Parts of Man or of the Definition of Human Essence the Division is said to be of the Whole Defined or Formal When Man into a Body and Rational Soul the Division is a Division of the whole Composed or Essential c. And hitherto are to be referred all Distinctions of Things into Material and Formal as when the Material of a Word is said to be Voice Formal Signification Lastly when Man or Human Body is divided into its three Regions and Limbs or the Year into 12 Months a Kingdom into its Provinces greater into less or Logick into Thematical and Organical It is a Definition of the Integrate or Mathematical and is called Partition Ax. 9. Division by Accident is Four-fold to wit either of a Cause by its Effects or an Effect by its Causes to wit Material Efficient or Final or a Subject by its Adjuncts or an Adjunct by its Subjects c. 1. § Of Cause by its Effects as Plants others heat others cool Syllogisms others effect Faith others Opinion others Science Effect by its Causes and 1st Efficient as of Testimonies others Divine others Humane By Cause Material as of Statues others are Marble others Brass Of Living things others are of Seed others Putrid Matter c. Cause Final as of Men others voluptuous others studious of Money others speculative others ready for Action c. Cause Formal that is Division by Cause Formal is a Division by it self Division by it self also is when a proper Accident is divided by its next Cause Efficient or Final So Diseases or Distampers do differ in Species which have a diverse next Cause or Synectical or Containing as a Fever and a Pleurisie c. of Subject and Adjuncts as of Men some are Bond some Free some are Learned some Unlearned Sounds some are Grave some Acute Numbers some are Even some Odd Charity one towards God the other towards ones Neighbour Flowers some Spring others Summer Animals some Land others Water others both But Division of Subject by Adjuncts is often a Division by it self As th' External Sense is Conversant either about Colour Sound or Smell or Taste or the Tactile Qualities Lastly Adjunct by Subjects as Vices some are of the Mind some Body Virtues some of the Understanding some Appetite c. Ax. 10. The Principal Laws of Division in general are seven and first the Parts of it ought to consent or agree in the whole 1. § And therefore Vitious is the Division of Men into living and dead real and painted because dead and painted Men are not Men unless aequivocally So Vicious is the Division of Animals into Mortal and Immortal because no Animal is Immortal c. Ax. 11. Secondly The Parts ought amongst themselves to be opposed 1. § Vicious therefore that Division when either the Parts are not different as when Pleasure is divided into Delectation and Joy or when one Part is contain'd in the other As if Animal should be divided into Mortal and Rational c. and that Division is the best which consists of Parts affirmed but oftentimes by reason of the Imbecillity of our Minds and Want of Words we are forc'd to divide by Privation as when the Body is divided into Animate and Inanimate c. Ax. 12. Thirdly In Division are to be taken the next and
If Science it is call'd Demonstrative or Apodictical as Cap. 2. Soph. Elench And if Opinion or other Assent besides Science it is called Dialectical c. Ax. 3. So that a Dialectical Syllogism is nothing more than a Syllogism Generating Opinion or any other Assent besides Science Or as Aristotle explains himself Book 1. of his Top. Cap. 1. arguing out of Probables And he is thought the best Dialectick who can best defend his own and dilute or wash away the Opinions of his Adversary c. Ax. 4. And in treating of this sort of Syllogism we are to consider of Questions Propositions and Invention of Arguments Ax. 5. And a Question here may be any thing provided it contradict not Piety good Manners or common Sense 1. § For he that shall call in Question whether God be to be worshipped or Parents Honoured or the Magistrates to be obeyed ought rather to be punished than followed with Dialectical Arguments So he that shaâ—â— doubt whether the Snow be white is not otherwise to be convinc'd than by the Testimony of his outward Sense which he who disbelieves what is iâ— that he will believe c. Ax. 6. So that concerning the Subject of the Dialectical Problemes we need not much to be sollicitous anâ— their Attributes are either of the first or second Notions of which those constitute Real these Notional Problemes c. Ax. 7. A Real is when the Attribute of thâ— Question is real as is a Place a Superficies or so A Notional when a Notional as is Superficies the Gonus of Place or so Because Genus is not a true thing but a second Notion or Logical and only feign in the Mind whereas a Superficies is a true thinâ— and not feign'd in the Mind c. Ax. 8. Real again are either absolute or compared Ax. 9. Absolute that in which sought whether tâ—â— Attribute agrees to the Subject or no. Ax. 10. Compared when two or more Subject being proposed it is asked which the Attribute â—â—grees or disagrees most to or two or more Attributes whether of them agrees more or most to 〈◊〉 Subject c. 1. § For Example When saught whether Glery to be numbered amongst our good things it is an Aâ—solute Probleme when whether Virtue or Glory a most to be desired or Alexander more Valiant or Tâ—â—â—rate a Compared Ax. 11. Problemes Dialectical of what kind soeveâ— may be taken out of all Disciplines whatsoever Ax. 12. Propositions Dialectical are to be true 〈◊〉 least probable not Paradoxal that is against the common or receiv'd Opinion For how shall the Respondent grant that which is against the common or râ—ceiv'd Opinion and which it may be he judges to be false But let us take some Notes from the Learned Hereboord and so end this Chapter Notes and Observations from the Learned Hereboord having Relation to this Chapter 1. A Dialectical Syllogism may also thus be defin'd A Dialectical Syllogism is that which begets Opinion Human Faith or Doubt or any other Assent besides Science or Error which distinguishes it likewise from the Sophistical Syllogism 2. A Syllogism Dialectical is also by another Name called Topical from the Greek Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place in Latin Probabilis that is Probable or Contingent because tho' it produces a true yet is it an uncertain and infirm Assent because its Propositions tho' true are yet Contingent as may appear by what is said above 3. When a Paradox is said to be a Probleme true against the common Opinion it is not to be understood only of that of the Unlearned or Vulgar but also of the Multitude of the Lettered who have taken up with Principles Ancient and not so well examined such as that viz. the Earth moves which tho' it be true yet may it be so against the common Opinion and therefore a Paradox 4. A Term of Art signifies no more than this viz. a Term proper to every Art So Metonymy and Synecdoche are Terms of Art viz. Rhetorical Meridian Horizon Zodiac Astronomical Genus and Species Logical c. And this brings us to the next Consideration viz. that CHAP. XVI Of the Invention or finding out of Dialectical Arguments or Topical Places and Rules Ax. 1. NOW to the Invention or finding out of Probable or Dialectical Arguments belong Place and Rule A. 2. A Place is a Seat or certain Common Note by whose Admonition an Argument is found Ax. 3. A Rule a Canon or Proposition containing the Reason of the Consequence of Dialectical Syllogism c. Ax. 4. The Distribution of the Arguments here to be used viz. in Dialectical Disputations is usually into Artificial and Inartificial that is into those of Art to be drawn from the Consideration of the Parts of the Question and Testimonies which are to be found without Now the first Ax. 5. Are to be used for the Confirming or Refelling of all sorts of Problemes alike that is in the same manner being no other than Testimonies But the Artificial not but may be said to be of two sorts viz. those for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional and those for Confirming and Refelling of such as we have call'd real Problemes because concerned about real things Ax. 6. Now those of the first kind viz. for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional Problemes are always taken from the Nature or Propriety of that Affection or 2d Notion concerning which it is query'd in the Probleme 1. § Which or else some Canon belonging to it being placed in the Major an Assumption being made the controverted Affection is prov'd to be in the Subject as because Air is the Subject Matter of Wind we prove it not to be its Genus and because Immortality is the Affection of Life Eternal we prove it not to be its Genus both which Arguments lean upon this Rule viz. That that which is the Subject or Propriety of a thing cannot be its Genus c. given us Cap. 11. of the first Book And so Divines make it appear that good Works are not to be the Cause of our Justification because every cause is before its Effect But good Works are after our Justification and therefore not its Cause And this Argumentation leans upon this Foundation Theoreme 3. Cap. 15. of the first Book viz That every Cause is before it s Caused in Nature and Knowledge c. Such Syllogisms as these Aristotle calls Book 2. Post Cap. 8. Syllogisms Logical that is Notional and the Use of them is very great in all Discipline Ax. 9. Arguments of the other sort viz. for Proving or Refelling of real Problemes are always taken from the Affections belonging to the Nature of the Subject or Predicate as from their Places Ax. 10. Of which those are the best which are taken from the Nature of the Predicate because not sought whether the Subject be but Predicate or whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not c. 1. § Now for Examples of them both suppose any one
The Minor must not be denyed in the first Figure Or which returns to the same Account viz. From the Remotion of the Antecedent can't be inferr'd that of the Consequent as we observ'd Chapter the 12th in that Part relating to Hypothetical Syllogism The Fourth is That One of the Premisses must be denyed in the Second Figure Or which is the same thing the Position of the Antecedent ought not to be concluded from that of the Consequent as we have observ'd again in the same Chapter And therefore these sorts of Syllogisms will be Paralogisms viz. Every Man is an Animal A Horse is not a Man And therefore not an Animal Or thus If a Horse be a Man he is an Animal But a Horse is not a Man And therefore not an Animal c. Likewise Every Flatterer is Complaisant Such an One is Complaisant And therefore such an One is a Flatterer Or thus If Crispus be a Flatterer he is Complaisant But he is Complaisant And therefore a Flatterer c. If any one be deceiv'd by these sorts of Argumentations either from himself or others as it often happens he is then deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Consequent 2. But because the Fault of a false Consequence is easily discernible in these sorts of Syllogisms Sophisters usually conceal it either by suppressing one of the Premisses As Crispus is Complaisant And therefore a Flatterer Walks by Night And therefore a Thief Or else by Circumlocution As he that says you are an Animal says true He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal And therefore he that says you are an Ass says true For this Argumentation is just as if one should lay down this Position viz. You are an Animal An Ass is an Animal And therefore you are an Ass Which is an Argumentation contrary to Rule Of two Affirmatives in the second Figure Ax. 11. Which is solv'd by shewing that the Medium is not diverse from the Question or at least more known than it Ax. 10. The Sophism of Begging the Question is then when any thing is proved either by it self or something that is equally unknown with it self 1. § This is call'd a Begging of the Principle because it is a Begging of that which in the Beginning was sought for These Sort of Catches may be two ways laid And First when the same thing is prov'd by it self Secondly when one unknown thing is proved by another that is equally unknown with it self The same thing is said to be prov'd by it self when the Subject or Predicate of the Question the Name being chang'd is brought in for a Medium to prove the Question As if any one should prove the Soul of Man to be ex Traduce English of the Seed of the Parent because begotten by the Seed of the Parent I say the Subject or Predicate changing the Name For if the Name were not changed the Argumentation would be mere Child's Play And yet for all this every Argumentation in which the Medium is the same with the Subject or Predicate of the Question is not to be rejected as a Sophism but only that whose Medium is not only in it self and of its own Nature the same with the Question but also as to us as in that which we proposed above But if the Medium be of its own Nature the same as the Question but not also as to us or our Manner of Concetpion the Argumentation is not to be rejected Unless you can suppose all the Arguments which are fetch'd from Essential Places As Genus Species Definition Whole and Part to make Captious Argumentations c. 2. Secondly The second Way is when the Medium's as much unknown as the Question it self As if one should prove Vision to be made by Emission because not by Reception Now this Sophism tends to this Partly that the Sophister may seem to abound with Arguments partly that changing the Forms of the Words he may conciliate a Shew of Probability to his Declarations Ax. 11. Sophism of not Cause for the Cause is then when that which is not the Cause or by Accident is obtruded for the true Cause and that by it self Ax. 12. And this Sophism is solv'd by the Designation of the true Cause upon which the Effect by it self depends 1. § The Caption of not Cause for the Cause either lies in a Syllogism that leads to Inconvenience or direct In a Syllogism that leads to Inconvenience when the Falsity of the Conclusion brought is imputed to one of the Premisses which is not the Cause of it As if one designing to prove the Humane Soul Mortal should thus argue Every Immortal is Eternal The Soul of Man is Immortal And therefore the Soul of Man is Eternal But this Conclusion is false and the Occasion of it was in the Minor which was that the Soul of Man was Immortal And therefore Mortal For this Argumentation is a Sophism of the not Cause for the Cause For he says that this Proposition The Soul is Immortal is the Cause of a false Conclusion when it was that viz. That every Immortal is Eternal In a Syllogism direct when that which is attributed to the Cause by Accident happens not but to the Causes by themselves As Religion excites Civil Wars From the Reading of the Sacred Scriptures spring Hresies Wine is heady and intoxicates c. And therefore Religion Reading of the Sacred Scriptures and Wine are not to be tolerated in any Common-Wealth c. Ax. 13. The Sophism of many Interrogations is then when two or more Questions are so proposed as that they shew only but as One. Ax. 14. And these sorts of Sophisms are brought about two manner of Ways And first when two Subjects or two Predicates or perhaps more are propounded under so many distinct sort of Names as is the World Eternal and Perfect c. This is a Captious Interrogation For if you answer Affirmatively the Sophister will set upon you as if you had grantted that the World was Eternal and if otherwise he excepts against you as if you deny'd that the World was perfect And secondly you may make a Fallacy of many Interrogations in one Word As Desistine c. Have you left off to commit Adultery Have you lost your Horns c. But enough of this is said in the Place of Homonymy And thus much may suffice for Syllogism The Last of the Four Instruments is that which now demands our Attendance And that is Method Of which we shall entreat in the following Chapter CHAP. XXVIII Of Method Ax. 1. THere remains yet Order or Method to be entreated of And that is an apt Disposition of Things belonging to the same Head so as that they may be the best and most easily understood and the most firmly imprinted upon the Memory Ax. 2. For which End we are ever to set those things before which conduce to the Knowledge of the Following At least are better understood than they Ax. 3. Now
World shall thankful be And gratefully extol thy Charity Which like the Sun extends it useful Light And dissipates the Shadows of our Night Whilst Wisdom here in England does remain Like Benefits impart and Fame obtain L. C. Books Printed for and sold by Richard Cumberland at the Angel in St. Paul's Church-Yard A Scriptural Catechism Or the Whole Duty of Man laid down in express Words of Scripture chiefly intended for the Benefit of the Younger sort Divided into two Parts The First containing the chief Principles of our Christian Belief The Second instructing us in our Duty to God and Man according to the Method observed in the Excellent Book Intituled The Whole Duty of Man To which is added some private Devotions in express Words of Scripture With devout Collects for several Occasions Recommended by the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Gloucester Price 6 s. Reform'd Devotions in Meditations Hymns and Petitions for every Day in the Week and every Holiday in the Year Divided into two Parts The fourth Edition Review'd Price 2 s. 6 d. An Antidote against the principal Errors of the Predestinarian a Work design'd for the Information of the common People Price 4 d. Reflections upon the Devotions of the Roman Church With the Prayers Hymns and Lessons themselves taken out of their Authentick Books The third Edition With an Appendix concerning the Miracles and Reliques of the Church of Rome By John Patrick D. D. Late Preacher of the Charter-House London 8 vo Price 2 s. An Essay concerning Friendly Reproof Explaining clearly the Nature Excellency and Usefulness of it Proving both from Reason and Revelation that it is an indispensable Duty And laying down very plain Rules concerning the properest Methods both of giving and receiving it c. Price 6 s. Serious Reflections on Time and Eternity With some other Subjects Moral and Divine To which is annex'd an Appendix concerning the first Day of the Year how observ'd by the Jews and may be best employ'd by a serious Christian With an Exhortation to Youth to prepare for Judgment By John Shower The Third Edition corrected and very much Enlarged Price 1 s. 6 d. Horological Disquisitions concerning the Nature of Time and the Reasons why all Days from Noon to Noon are not alike twenty four Hours long In which appears the Impossibility of a Clock's being always kept exactly true to the Sun With Tables of Equation and newer and better Rules than any yet extant how thereby precisely to adjust Royal Pendulums and keep them afterwards as near as possible to the apparent Time With a Table of Pendulums shewing the Beats that any Length makes in an Hour A Work very necessary for all that would understand the true Way of rightly managing Clocks and Watches By John Smith C. M. To which is added the best Rules for the Ordering and Use both of the Quick-Silver and Spirit Weather-Glasses And Mr. Watson's Rules for adjusting a Clock by the Fixed Stars Price 1 s. Just published a Compendium of Devotion containing a Treatise of Prayer and Thanksgiving With Morning and Evening Psayers for every Day in the Week c Also a Sermon of drawing nigh to God By the late Reverend B. Whitcott D. D. Pr. 2 s. A Letter from Dr. W. P. to the Right Reverend the Bp. of R in Vindication of his Sermon on Trinity-Súnday Quarto Pr. 1 s. 6 d. The English Atlas Volume the 2 d. containing the Description of Part of the Empire of Germany viz. the Upper and Lower Saxony the Dukedom of Mecklenburg Bramen the Marquisates of Brandenburgh and Mismia with the Territories adjoinng the Palatinate of the Rhine and the Kingdom of Bohemia By W. Nicholson M. A. Fellow of Queens-College Oxon With Maps always sold for 40 s. But now may be had for 15 s. The English Atlas Volume the 3d containing the Description of Part of Germany viz. Schwaben the Palatinate of Bavaria Arch-Dukedom of Austria Kingdom of Hungary Principality of Transylvania the Cyrcle of Westphalia with the Neighbouring Provinces By W. Nicholson M. A. Arch-Dcacon of Carlisle and Fellow of Queens-College in Oxon. Printed for Moses Pitt With Maps always sold for 40 s. But now without at 5 s. Advertisement ALL Gentlemen and others may be furnished with all sorts of Acts of Parliament and Pamphlets either new or old A compleat Sett of all the Philosophical Transactions to this Day at very reasonable Rates may be had at the abovesaid Place A Table of the Chapters and Titles contain'd in these two following Books of LOGICK BOOK I. CHAP. I. OF the Nature and Division of Logick CHAP. II. Of Themes Simple and Composed Vniversal and Singular CHAP. III. Of the Categories in general CHAP. IV. Of Substance CHAP. V. Of Quality CHAP. VI. Of Quantity CHAP. VII Of Things related to each other CHAP. VIII Of Action and Passion CHAP. IX Of the four last Categories CHAP. X. Of the Praedicates in general CHAP. XI Of Genus and Species CHAP. XII Of Difference CHAP. XIII Of Property and Accident CHAP. XIV Of Whole and Part. CHAP. XV. Of Cause and Caused in general CHAP. XVI Of Matter and Form CHAP. XVII Of Efficient Cause CHAP. XVIII Of End CHAP. XIX Of Subject and Adjunct CHAP. XX. Of Conveniency of Things CHAP. XXI Of Diversity or Distinction of Things CHAP. XXII Of Opposition of Things CHAP. XXIII Of Order and of that which is said to be First Last and Together with CHAP. XXIV Of Interpretation in general and of Noun and Verb. CHAP. XXV Of Etymology and Conjugates CHAP. XXVI Of Synonyms Homonyms and various Acceptations of Words CHAP. XXVII Of Vtterance or Enunciation in general and that which is simple and compos'd in special CHAP. XXVIII Of Enunciation Pure and Modal CHAP. XXIX Of Enunciations Vniversal Particular Indefinite and Singular CHAP. XXX Of Enunciation Affirming Denying Finite and Infinite CHAP. XXXI Of Enunciation True and False Necessary and Contingent and their Degrees CHAP. XXXII Of Conversion Aequipollence and Subalternation of Enunciations CHAP. XXXIII Of Opposition of Enunciations BOOK II. CHAP I. OF Definition in general and Definition Nominal CHAP. II. Of Perfect Definition CHAP. III. Of Imperfect Definition CHAP. IV. Of the manner of Investigation or Quest of Definition CHAP. V. Of Division its Laws and Species's CHAP. VI. Of Definition of Syllogism and all its Parts CHAP. VII Of the three Figures of Syllogism and their Modes CHAP. VIII Of the Laws Rules and Proprieties of Syllogisms CHAP. IX Of the Declaration of the second and third Figure by Reduction to the First and Exposition so far as is necessary for our Purpose CHAP. X. Of finding out a Medium with Propriety to each Figure and Mode CHAP. XI Of Induction Enthymeme and Example CHAP. XII Of Syllogism Hypothetical Disjunctive and Relative CHAP. XIII Of Dilemma Prosyllogism and Sorites CHAP. XIV Of Syllogism Modal and Indirect CHAP. XV. Of Syllogism Dialectical or Probable CHAP. XVI Of the Invention or sinding out of
Note or Affection of Quality arises either from Contrariety or Disposition of the Matter Habit and patible Qualities receive more and less from Contrariety For they are remitted when intermixed with their Contrary and intended when they are free from it Light excepted which altho' a a Patible Quality yet is intended or remitted upon the Account of the unequal Disposition of the Subject because is has not a Contrary After the same Manner are the natural Powers intended and remitted To which nothing is contrary with which they can be mixed Ax. 13. Things by Quality are said to be like or unlike 1. § For Likeness and Unlikeness are Relations agreeable to things by Reason of their Qualities CHAP. VII Of Things related to each other Ax. 1. THose things are said to be related which in Respect of what they are are said to be others that is of others or in any other Manner or Respect are referred to 〈◊〉 1. § This Definition of things related is Extant in the Beginning of the First Chapter of the Categories Ax. 2. Relateds are usually divided into Relateds in Respect of their Names and those in Respect of their Essence Ax. 3. Relateds according to their Names are absolute things which include or connote a Relatition and therefore not in Essence but in Name only are referred to something else Ax. 4. Relateds according to their Essence are those things in whom to be and to have respect to something else is the same thing or whose Essence is wholly placed in the Respect they bear to some other thing 1. § Relateds in Respect of their Names and Relateds in Respect of their Essence differ not in the Nature of their Relation but their Names For the Names which agree to Relateds according to their Names signifie of themselves first an Absolute thing and secondly connote a Relation which is included in that Absolute thing But to Relateds according to their Essence are such Names given which of themselves signifie a Relation and connote an Absolute thing which that Relation presupposes as it were its Subject For Example Knowledge and a thing Knowable are said to be Relateds according to their Names because Science is the Name of a Quality which includes a Respect to the Object knowable or which may be known And therefore the whole Essence of Science is not placed in Respect to the Object which may be known Nay the Essence of Knowledge or Science is an Absolute Quality which is yet said to be referred to another because it connotes a Relation But Father and Son are Relateds according to their Essence because these Words of themselves first signifie a Relation or Mutual Respect and therefore the whole Essence of the Father as he is Father is placed in Respect to the Son and that of the Son in Respect to his Father For what is it else to be a Father but to have a Son and to be a Son but to have a Father 2. § From Relateds according to their Names little or nothing differ Relateds transcendent so called because they surpass or transcend all the Bounds of Categories For there is nothing to which such Relateds do not agree So Accident to the Subject Action to the Object Part to the whole and Cause to the Caused c. Ax. 5. Relateds are also divided into Relateds Real and Relateds Rational Ax. 6. Relateds Real are those which of their own Nature and without the Help of the Mind are referr'd to some other thing Ax. 7. Relateds of Reason are such as only by the Operation of the Mind are referred or related to somewhat else 1. § For Example Father Son Husband and Wife and other Relateds of that sort are real Relateds because the Father's being the Son's Father and the Husband 's the Wive's Husband does not depend upon the Cogitation of our Mind But Right and Left are Relations of Reason because that to one standing betwixt two Columns this should be Right that Left rather than the Contrary is from the Ordination of the Mind In this Sense to the Heaven also we assign Right and Left Before and After and other Differences of Positions But that One Hand shou'd be called Right and the other Left seems not to be attributed to Reason but Nature To Relateds of Reason also Identity or Sameness is to be referred For when any thing is so compared with it self as that it is said to be the same with it self that one thing is so used by the Understanding as if it were two Hitherto also refer Beings of Reason which are mutually referred to each other as Genus and Species Subject and Predicate c. Ax. 8. In every Relation are required Subject and Term. Ax. 9. That is called the Subject to which the Relation is attributed or that which is referred to some other thing Ax. 10. That the Term to which the Subject is referred Ax. 11. The Subject is said to be the Relate and the Term the Correlate when affected with a Relation and considered together with it Ax. 12. Related and Correlated are mutually referred each to the other and that not in one but a two-fold Relation Ax. 13. In which Reciprocation or mutual Relation that which is the Subject of one Relation is the Term of the other and so on the contrary Ax. 14. As also that which is in one Relation the Relate is in the other the Correlate and so on the contrary 1. § These things that you may understand suppose we between the Father and the Son Two Relations to intercede of which the One in which the Father is referred to the Son is commonly called Paternity the Other in which the Son is referred to the Father Filiation or Son-ship But Paternity and Filiation are not one but two Relations diverse from each other Because the Father is otherwise related towards the Son than the Son is towards the Father These Two Relations require two Subjects and two Terms which are two Men as suppose Philip and Alexander Philip is the Subject of Paternity Alexander the Term. On the other side Alexander is the Subject of Filiation Philip the Term Father is the Relate in Paternity Son the Correlate On the other side Son is the Relate in Filiation Father the Correlate 2. § Father the Subject of Relation is wont vulgarly to be distinguished into Subject of Inhaesion and Subject of Denomination But these things have more in them of Subtilty than Truth Ax. 15. Some Relations are supposed supposing the Subject and Term Others besides these do require a Foundation Ax. 16. And a Foundation is that by whose Means the Relation accrews to the Subject 1. For Example When an Egg is said to be like an Egg the Similitude between these two Eggs arises in each as soon as they begin to exist nor is there any thing required towards their Relation besides the Existence of two Eggs. But the Relation of Servant does not presently arise in the Subject so soon as
for Existence and not Causality After this manner depends the Father upon his Ancestors in the begetting of his Son and every near Cause upon the more remote Secondly when it also depends upon a Superiour Cause when it causes or for its Causality but not for as much as it causes or not in the same manner after which it causes In this manner the Statuary is subordinate to the Heavens in the making of the Statue For because the Statuary stands in need of the Virtue of the Heavens towards his Work he may be said to depend upon the Heavens in Respect of his Causality but because not as he makes the Statue but as he lives He is said to depend upon the Heavens by Accident and to be Accidentally subordinated to them in the making of the Statue In the same manner the Horse spurr'd on by his Rider hurting his Leg halts The hurt Leg is the Cause of his Halting subordinated to the Rader by Accident For the Leg or Horse is impell'd on by the Rider to Motion but not to a vitious Motion c. Ax. 11. In such a Subordination there is ever one next Cause the rest are remote Ax. 12. The next Cause is that which immediately constitutes the Caused Ax. 13. Remote that which concurs to the Constitution of the Caused by the Mediation of some other Cause of its own Genus 1. § A Cause is said to be next two Ways either in its own Genus or absolutely That is said to be absolutely next which not only immediately but by its own Existence constitutes the Caused And so that it being supposed it is necessary the Caused be so too The next Cause in its Genus we have already defined and have said it immediately concurs towards the Constitution of the Caused no other of its own Order coming between One thing may have many Causes in their own Genus next but one only that is absolutely next which in Substances is Form Accidents Efficient and End So whereas to Man the Proximate Matter is Humane Body Efficient Father End Well-being Form Rational Soul the Rational Soul yet only is the next absolute Cause Ax. 14. Lastly In every Genus there are some Causes Total some Partial Ax. 15. That Cause is total which in its Species wholly causes the Whole Caused Ax. 16. That Partial which joyned with the other Causes of its own Species causes the Caused only in Part. 1. § In every Genus of Causes there are many Species's of Cause and those either Subordinate as Cause First and Second Next and Remote Principal and Instrumental or Coordinate of which one depends not upon another A Total Cause is said wholly to constitute the Caused because not assisted by other Causes of its own Species For Example The Writing depends upon the Quill and the Hand but upon both as total Causes For the Quill is only or wholly the Instrumental and the Hand the Principal Cause So likewise when God the Sun and Man are said to Generate Man every one of these Causes is Total God is the First the Sun or Heaven is the total Universal Man the total Second and Particular But when two Horses draw in a Cart they are said to be partial Causes because they are both of the same Species which brings us to the next Axiom viz. Ax. 17. Of One thing there cannot be many total Causes of the same Species but there may be many different in Species and Subordinate 1. § If many Causes not Subordinate do concur to the same Caused of necessity they must be Partial For the total Cause causes the whole thing Wherefore if there are many total Causes either the rest cause Nothing and so are not Causes or else cause again what was caus'd before But if Causes different in Species are Subordinate it may so be that the same Caused may depend upon many Causes total So the whole Writing depends on the Hand and the Quill and the whole Man upon God and the Sun and his Parents CHAP. XVI Of Matter and Form Ax. 1. OF the Four Causes Two are Internal Matter and Form and as many External Efficient and End Ax. 2. Those Causes are said to be Internal which enter the Essence of the Caused as Parts COMMENTARY 1. § Altho' Form be far more noble than Matter and confer more to the Constituting the Caused yet it is not to be doubted but that Matter also is part of the Essence and not only a Vehicle or Receiver Ax. 3. Matter in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is defined to be that out of which inexisting something is made 1. § This Definition is extant Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 3. and Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. But it may more Fully and Explicatiously be defined in this Manner Matter is an Internal Cause of which any thing is made or consists Why I add Consists will be sufficiently understood out of the 9th Theoreme Matter is also defined Book 2. Post Cap. 11. but more obscurely to be That which any thing being supposed of Necessity must be so too 2. § Generally Matter is divided into that out of which in which and about which That out of which is that which is properly so called and we have but now defined In which the Subject about which the Object Of which in their Places Ax. 4. The Offices of Matter are two to take up Forms and sustain them and with the Form to constitute the Composed Ax. 5. Matter is either First or Second Ax. 6. The first Matter is informed Ax. 7. The Second formed 1. § Altho' no Matter may exist without Form yet Because Matter is not altogether nothing nor the same with Form why may it not by it self be understood not understanding Form And this is the first Matter which Aristotle Book 1. of the Physicks Cap. 9. defines in this Manner That is Matter says he which is the first Subject out of which any thing is made So that it is not in it by Accident and if it should be spoiled it would be into that resolved at last Nor is it yet to be thought that the First and Second Matter are two several Matters Nay one and the same Matter is said to be first and second as it is this way or that way considered Ax. 8. Farther Matter is either of Natural or Artificial Bodies 1. § For Example Elements are the Matter of Mix'd Bodies Seed of Living Gold or Silver of the Cup Wood of the Shelf c. Ax. 9. And both of these either of Composition or Generation Ax. 10. The Matter of Composition is that of which a thing consists Ax. 11. Of Generation out of which it is made 1. § For Example The Body is the Matter of Composition in an Animal Seed of Generation In things of Art the Matter of Generation and Composition is almost the same as also in Meteors For a Shelf is made and consists of Wood Clouds of Vapours Ice of Water c.
the Effect the less Principal as far as it causes is always worse than or inferiour to the Effect 1. § When we compare the Effect with the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such that is according to that Virtue by which it causes when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains in it whatever is in the Effect it is said to be a principal Cause The Effect is said to be contained in the Cause either formally or eminently When formally or the Effect is of the same Nature with the Cause the Cause is said to be univocal and is equal to its Effect as when Heat begets Heat or a Mouse a Mouse When Eminently or the Cause by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect it is said to be Aequivocal and is better than its Effect as when Light produces Heat or the Architect an House when neither formally nor eminently it is said to be less Principal and that not so much effects as subserves the Principal in producing the Effect Ax. 22. The less Principal is subdivided into procatarctical Proëgumenal and Instrumental Ax. 23. Procatarctical is that which Extrinsically excites the principal Cause to Action Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal which inwardly disposes or also excites the principal Cause to Action 1. The Cause in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Procatarctical in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans that is beginning or inchoating And is either Object Occasion Author or Merit So far it may be said to be the Object as it moves or excites the principal Cause to Action Occasion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in which it self also has some Force of moving to Action in as much as it removes Impediments to Action Author here is said to be him who proposing Reasons persuades the principal Cause either to or from Action He is also call'd the Moral Cause Merit or Meritorious Cause is that which moves the Agent to a Requital and that either in good or evil things And even all these are without the principal Cause In which they are distinguished from the Proegumenal which consists in the principal Cause it self For Example If any one walking about in the Night should see many precious things in the open House of his Enemy from whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury to be negligently kept and at the Instigation of another should take them away The objective Cause of of this would be the Precious Things themselves exciting the Covetousness of the Thief the Occasion the Darkness of the Night and open House which in no little Measure further him in his Purpose the Author or Moral Cause he who instigated him the Meritorious the Injury received for which the Thief comes to be more prone to steal The Proëgumenal Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief Farthermore Author or Cause Moral has Place only in voluntary Causes Object Occasion Meritorious and Proëgumental also in others Occasion is sometimes taken for Cause Meritorious As when an Injury committed or done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight or War or Slaughter and in this Sense if feigned is call'd by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latins Pretext The Proëgumenal either disposes only the principal Cause as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners or also moves it and spurs it on As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge or Avarice of Theft 2. § The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Causes are of great Use in Physick For Physicians reduce almost all Diseases to three Causes Procatarctical Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing The Procatarctical with them is the External and Evident Cause The other Two the Internal and hidden Causes The Proëgumenal the Antecedent The Containing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or that which is connate with and also exists together with the Disease and coheres immediately with it and this with us is the next Cause For Example The Procatarctical Cause of the Fever is either Cold or the Astringent Bathes the Proëgumenal the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred the Containing the Humour Putrescent and accended Ax. 25. The Instrumental Cause is that which subserves the principal Cause in its Effecting 1. § All Instruments subserve not the Principal in the like Manner For there are some Instruments joyn'd to the principal Cause in acting and there are some in acting separate from them Those are Instruments conjoyn'd of which the principal Cause makes use in the Effection of the thing And these are either Active as the Heat in the Fire or Passive as a Knife a Sword c. Separate Instruments are those which act in the place and stead of the principal Cause So the Ambassadour is the Instrument of the Prince and the Seed seems to many the Instrument of Generation but mistakenly For separate Instruments have no Place in Naturals but Morals And this brings us to the next Maxim viz. Ax. 26. The Essence of Instruments consists in their Fitness for Use 1. § Instruments says Aristotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uses are distinguish'd or convene amongst themselves For every Instrument is that which it is because and so far as it is fit for some certain Use So an Ax is so far an Ax as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form it is fit to cut And the Eye so far an Eye as it is fit to see with For the Eye the Hand and other Organical Parts of Man or Beast when dead are not Eye or Hand unless Homonymously or ambiguously that is doubtfully as Aristotle says Book 4. of the Meteors Cap. 17. Ax. 27. Sixthly Cause Efficient is divided into First and Second Ax. 28. The First is that which depends upon none Ax. 29. The Second which depends upon the First 1. § A Cause is Two Ways said to be First to wit absolutely or in its own Genus That is said to be absolutely on which all things depend both when they are Made Exist and Operate or as they say in Fieri Esse and Operation The Cause absolutely First is only One to wit God For all things depend on God both as to their Making Being and Operating according to that of the Apostle St. Paul Acts 17. In him we live and move and have our Being Furthermore all things are said to depend upon God as they are made or in Fieri as they say by reason of Creation and that either proximately or remotely as they are or in being by reason of Conservation as they operate of his Providence either ordinarily or extraordinarily c. 2. § That Cause is said to be First in its own Genus on which the rest of the Causes of the same Genus depend Such a First Cause is not only given in every Genus of Causes but also in every Subordination So Adam is the first Cause of Men in his Species
its own Genus is referr'd to a farther End by it self But that which is last by Accident For Example The Smith softens Iron in the Fire puts it upon the Anvil strikes it hammers it polishes it whets it till of it he makes a Lancet All these by themselves and in respect of the same Agent viz. the Smith are subordinated For the Lancet is the whole Endeavour of the Smith But that it should be serviceable to the Physician in letting of Blood is no Care of the Smith's and therefore all those things which the Smith does in Order to the making the Lancet are subordinated to this End of the Pysician's by Accident Ax. 11. When the End is good by how much the farther off it is by so much the better it must needs be the last End therefore must be the best and the chief Good it self 1. § This Theorem is extant Book 1. of the Eth. Cap. 5. That the End is good is abovesaid Otherwise it would not move the Efficient Nor is it yet sufficient that it be good but it ought also to be good of it self since the Means are no otherwise good than as they are serviceable to the obtaining of the End from whence follows that the End is better than the Means But the subordinate is a Means in respect of the Sequent that is the subordinate End The last End therefore is something which is best because in no respect a means by which it should become worse Nor is it material whether this End be real or imaginary as is said Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. Since the End no otherways moves the Efficient than as it seems to be good and so we come to the next Axiom which is Ax. 12. By how much an End is the last in the Execution by so much the earlier is it in the Intension And so on the contrary 1. § End also is divided into Internal and External but this Division has not Place in all things but only Faculties and Arts Conjectural in which that is said to be Internal which the Artificer attains to as often as he pleases External which he does not always attain to So the Internal of Oratory is to speak Ornately and Accommodately to persuade the External to persuade 2. § The Division of End into End by it self and End by Accident as vulgarly understood is not without its Fault For an End by Accident is not a Final Cause For a Final Cause is not a Cause any farther than it is intended But an End by Accident is not intended but evenes besides the Intention Wherefore when an End is said to be by Accident the Event or Effect by Accident is to be understood For if any one digging in the Field that he may make it more Fertile should by Accident find a Treasure the finding that Treasure will not be the End but Effect or Event of it by Accident CHAP. XIX Of Subject and Adjunct Ax. 1. A Subject is that to which something is adjoyn'd besides its Essence Ax. 2. And an Adjunct that which is adjoyn'd to something besides its Essence COMMENTARY 1. § We commonly use to distinguish betwixt a Subject of Inhesion and a Subject of Praedication or Denomination A Subject of Inhesion is nothing else but a Substance in Respect of its Accidents Inherent So Snow is the Subject of Whiteness which inheres in it A Subject of Predication or Denomination is either largely or strictly taken Largely for any thing whether Substance or Accident of which any thing may be said in any Predication whether Essential Accidental Internal External Absolute or Limited 2. § In this Place not only the Subject of Inhesion but also every Subject of Predication or Denomination of which any thing may be said in an Accidental Predication whether External Internal Absolute or Limited is to be understood And all these things which may be said in this Manner of any Subject are to be understood under the Name of Adjuncts Ax. 3. Adjuncts may be 3 ways divided and first into Proper and Common 1. § Common are nothing else but Accidents that are absolutely so call'd and oppos'd to Proper Ax. 4. Secondly into Absolute and Limited Ax. 5. An Absolute is that which simply and absolutely agrees with the Subject Ax. 6. A Limited which in some respect only 1. § That is according to some Part or Nature or Time or Place or Respect For Example Mortality is the absolute Adjunct of Man whilst Immortality is the Limited because Man is not absolutely Immortal but only as to the Soul So Whiteness is the Limited of an Aethiop because he is not absolutely which is as much as to say totally but only as to his Teeth White Ax. 7. Thirdly Adjuncts are divided into Internal and External Ax. 8. Adjuncts Internal are those which inhere in the Subject Ax. 9. External which are ordered and disposed Externally about it 1. § A Subject receives Adjuncts Internal into its self As Snow Whiteness the Soul Science or Knowledge External to it self as the Sight Colour Soldier Arms c. Internal give to the Subject Internal Denomination External External For when Snow is denominated from its Whiteness it is an Interternal Denomination But when a Soldier is said to be Armed or the Eye to see any thing it is an External Denomination Vulgarly these Denominations are called Intrinsical and Extrinsical 2. § Internal Adjuncts are Accidents as suppose Quantity Quality c. and their Subject always a Substance Adjuncts Externl are either Substances or Accidents For either a Substance to a Substance or an Accident to an Accident or an Accident to Substance or a Substance to an Accident may be joyned as from what follows will appear Ax. 10. An External Adjunct is either Object Sign or Circumstance Ax. 11. An Object is that about which any thing is employ'd in its Operation 1. § Object and Subject in Disciplines are us'd almost without Discrimination 2. § In Disciplines Theoretical one only Object is required in Practical a Two-fold viz. one of Doctrine another of Use The Doctrinal is that which is explained by Definitions and Divisions throughout the whole Discipline The Object of Use or Practice is that about which the Exercitation it self of the Discipline is Conversant So in Ethicks or Morals the Objects of Doctrine are Virtues and Vices Practice the Soul For this do Ethicks endue with Virtues In Disciplines Directing the Object of Practice is even almost Two-fold one which from the Discipline it self is directed and the other in which is operated that which is directed So the Object of Logick we have said to be two-fold In Arts Mechanical the Object of Doctrine does not appear because acquired by Exercitation only and not Precepts or Institution Ax. 12. Of Objects some are by themselves others by Accident Ax. 13. An Object by it self is that which is both objected to the thing as such and about which the thing as such is employed Ax.
of that mutual Habitude or Relation which things may have each to the other whether simple or Analogical And these are large in their Extent as Trope Ax. 9. Reason of unequal Attribution viz. that those signifie that common Nature which is unequally communicated to its subjected Species's Ax. 10. By Reason of us the Homonymy is when for the sake of the Memory of any Person near and dear to us or some Illustrious Person in Hopes of Similitude or the like we impose such and such Names upon our Children and Friends Ax. 11. Of these the farthest distant from Synonyms that is such as we have in the Beginning of this Chapter defined are Homonyms by Chance and those whose Reason or Homonymy is in us More nearly the Tropicks and first the Analogous Nearest of all those that are Ambiguous by reason of Unequal Attribution c. 1. § Now the general Cause of Homonymy or Ambiguity is the Infinite Multitude of things and Paucity of Words For by reason of that much greater Paucity of Words than Things of Necessity one Word must be applied to signifie many things But the Cause why this Word or that Word is Homonymous is either none as in Homonymy by Chance Or if there be any which may move a wise Man to make use of the same Word to signifie many things it is either the Change of the Word from its proper Signification as in the Tropicks or unequal Attribution as in them which convene not equally to Inferiours or Conservation of some ones Memory or the Hope of Similitude or Example For Instance the Word Jus in Latin signifies both Broth and that which is oppos'd to Injustice the Homony my is by Chance For there is no Reason why this Name should be impos'd upon things having no Affinity at all amongst themselves 2 § What and how many sold Trope is is to be known from the Rhetoricians But Trope causes Homonomy because a Sentence pronounc'd in Tropical Words may be ambiguous and sallacious as when the Word fox is put for a Guilâ—ful Person Pastor for a Minister of the Church Soul for Man Author for the Work c. For it 's uncertain whether a Man may use these in their Proper or their translated Signification Homonyms by unequal Attribution are For Example such as these viz. Enâ— or Being in Respect of Subfrance and Accident Syllogism in respect of Syllogism strictly so call'd and other Syllogisms which 〈◊〉 are wont to be called Syllogisms and so the Term Sanum in Latin is given to Animal Medicine and Urine c. 3 § And even all these have their Causes of Ambiguity in Things Others also there are which we have said have their Causes of Ambiguity in us and our Will as when we give the Name of the Parent to the Child for the Conservation of his Memory or some Pious and Learned Person hoping that ours may be excited by his Example to become like unto him These Ammonius in his Commentary on the Book of the Categ calls Memoriae and the others Spei gratia 4. § But that the Homonomy of Words may be so much the better understood which is in the first Place to be regarded in Disputations we may take Notice of some Canons or Criterions which Aristotle delivers Book 1. Top. Cap. 15. Of which we shall here repeat the Chief All those Words in the first Place fall under the Title of Homonymous to which many are Contraries as that of the Latin Word Grave to which Leve and Acutum Secondly Those which have sometimes a Contrary sometimes not as the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to love unto which sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or hate and sometimes nothing as when signifying to wont Thirdly Those which have sometimes a Medium sometimes not So the Words Candid and Fâ—â—â—â—d that is in English White and dark Brown For when Discourse is of Colour the Pale and other Middles are interjected between them But when of Voice said to be Candid or Fuscid that is Clear or Hoarse then nothing Fourthly Those are said to be Homonymous to which something is opposed that is Ambiguous So Acute is an Homonym because Obtuse For both an Ax is said to be Obtuse and the Voice and the Wit So also the Word Flock and therefore likewise Pasior And so in other Genus's of Oppositions excepting Disparates Fifthly those whose Conjugates jugates are Homonyms and so because the Latin Word Sanus is an Homonym so also must the Word Sanitas be Sixthly Those which signifie Things of divers Kinds and so Good because to be found in all Categories So also the Greek Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it signifies as well an Ass as a Milstone Seventhly Those which are attributed to such things as are not such as that they may be compared and the one be said to be more such or as much such as the other and therefore Candid because attributed both to the Voice and a Garment When a Voice can be said to be neither more nor less so than a Garment Eighthly Those Words which signifie the Differences of Genus's that are not Subaltern As Acute that is the Difference both of Voice and Magnitude Ninthly Those which have diverse Differences as the Word Jus in Latin For others are the Differences of that from which the Lawyers are called Jurisconsulti and Others that which may be drank Tenthly and Lastly Those which signifie sometimes a Species and sometimes a Difference as the Word Candor which signifies a Species of Colour and a Difference of Voice c. Ax. 12. The diverse Acceptions of Words which the Schoolmen call Suppositions Effect no Homonymy Ax. 13. Words are either taken Materially or Formally Ax. 14. They are said to be taken Materially when for themselves Ax. 15. Formally when for the Things by them signified 1. § For Example When I say Animal is a Word of Three Syllables of the Neuter Gender and the Third Declension the Word Homo is a Word of Two Syllables of the Common Gender The Words Homo and Animal are Materially taken that is by and for themselves not otherwise than as if they signify'd nothing at all But when I say Man is an Animal the Words Man and Animal are formally taken that is for those things which they signifie according to Institution Ax. 16. Formal Acception when of singular Words is but of One Mode but when of Universal it is either Simple or Concrete and Ax. 17. Simple then when a Universal is taken for the Common Nature Abstractedly from Inferiours Ax. 18. Concrete when in Inferiours 1. § For Example When I say Animal is the Genus of Man the Word Animal is taken simply for the Nature of Animal Abstractedly considered as in the Notion of the Mind or Understanding it is prescinded from Inferiours But when I say Man is an Animal the Word Animal is taken in the Concrete viz. as it exists in Humane Species This Concrete Acception is by the
declare not the Essence of a thing and therefore are imperfect unless the same thing happen to be more known to us and more known in it self But neither must a perfect Definition consist only of those that are more known but also Indemonstrable For Definition is the Principle of Demonstration as is said Book 1. of the Soul Cap. 1. and Book 1. Post Cap. 1. It is taught that the Principles of Demonstration are immediate which certainly could not be if their Parts were to be demonstrated by former Causes Ax. 11. A perfect Definition consists of the next Genus and Specifick Difference 1. § This Canon is precepted Book 6. Top. Cap. 1. But yet if the next Genus want a Name there is added in its Place a Remote with a Difference to limit it and make it a next Genus So when an Animal is desin'd to be a Living Feeling Corporeal Substance Living Corporeal Substance is put in place or lieu of a next Genus and the specifick Difference is Feeling Ax. 12. The Difference of Substances if not without is always taken from their Form but if without or that Form be unknown Propriety is added in the stead of Form 1. § So when Man is defined to be a Rational Animal the Difference is taken from his Form which is a Rational Soul But because incorporeal Substances have none and the Specificks of Corporeal even lye hid because of themselves they incurr not our Senses in the Place of Form some Property must be taken as An Angel is an Incorporeal Substance a Dog a Barking-Beast c. Ax. 13. The Differences of Accidents are not taken from their Form or Essence but their respect to their Subject Object Cause Efficient or Final or somewhat else not contain'd in the Essence 1. § Which is the Cause or Reason why Aristotle Book 6. of the Metaph. Cap. 5. says that Substances are simply and primarily defin'd Accidents secondarily only or according to something and that the Definitions of Accidents are Orations through Additions because those things that are added to their Genus in their Definitions are without their Essence and almost of another Category Ax. 14. Proprieties are defin'd by Genus Subject and next Cause and that either Efficient Final or both 1. § And first Efficient as an Eclipse of the Moon is a Defect of Light in it by Reason of the Earth's being Diametrically interposed between the Sun and it Thunder is the Noise of a broken Cloud by reason of the Fire 's being oppress'd and so 2dly Final as Sense is a Natural Faculty in an Animal for the End of Judging betwixt Singulars The Appetite for the gaining of what is good to its self and avoiding what is Evil or both as the Act of Respiration is a Reciprocal Attraction and Expulsion of the Air by the Lungs for the Refreshment of the Heart c. The Subject now 's sometimes in a Definition of Proprieties unmentioned because it is contained either in the Genus or next Cause As the Memory is an internal Sense conserving of the Images of things known Here the Subject of Memory is not express'd to wit Animal because contain'd in the Word Sense and express'd in the Definition of that So also Risibility is a nanural Faculty of Laughing arising from a Rational Animal I say not of Man because sufficiently understood when I say arising from a Rational Animal c. Ax. 15. Accidents improper besides the Genus take to themselves in Definition in the Place of Difference either Subject or Object Cause Efficient or Final or something that is made out of these But 1. § The manner of defining of these is scarcely to be contained within any certain Rules For some are defined by Genus and Subject as Simity is the Crookedness of the Nose Some Genus and Object as Physick is the Science of Natural Body And after this manner Theoretical Sciences and some again by Genus and End as Grammar is the Art of speaking well Also Genus End and Object as Logick is an Art of making of Instruments and therewith directing the Understanding in the Knowledge of Things or Liberality is a Virtue observing a Mediocrity in giving and receiving of Moneys c. After this manner Arts and Habits Moral Some lastly by Genus and Cause Efficient as Whiteness is a Colour arising from a Predomination of Clear Sound a Patible Quality arising from a Stroke of the Air between two Bodies collided or hit one against another And after this manner all Patible Qualities if not proper of other Genus's of Accidents there can scarce be given any certain Rules but each how they are to be desin'd Use and Examples of approved Authors must teach which for this End the Studious of Logick ought to collect together Ax. 16. The Parts of Definition are always so to be plac'd as that the Genus may precede the Difference and every Word following may limit its foregoing 1. § So teaches Aristotle Book 2. Post Cap. 13. For Example An Animal is not to be defined a Feeling Animate but an Animate Feeling Body c and so we come to Imperfect Definition CHAP. III. Of Imperfect Definition Ax. 1. IMperfect Definition is properly a Description and that is either Necessary or Arbitrary Ax. 2. Necessary viz. when the Defined is either not capable of a perfect Definition or else through the Imbecillity of our Minds we cannot attain to a perfect Definition of it or lastly when there are wanting fit Words required for an Accurate Definition Ax. 3. Of the first Sort are first Infinite Things and Secondly those which have not a true Essence Thirdly a Perfect one and Fourthly one by it self Fifthly and lastly those which are not placed immediately under some Genus COMMENTARY 1. § And 1st Infinite things as God having not a true Essence as Beings of Reason Things feigned Images of Things Privations Not a Perfect as Parts Principles of Things Things in doing or Imperfect Not one by themselves as Concretes Aggregates Complex Not under one Genus as Transcendents Supreme Genus's At least not immediately as Individuals For these are contained immediately under Species and by Mediation of that under Genus Ax. 4. By reason of the Imbecillity of our Minds or Understanding Substances Incorporereal and most of the most special Species's of Corporeal Substances 1. § For Genus's and Species's Subaltern may be defin'd any way as an Animal is a living feeling Body c. In the Definition of Corporeal Substances of the lowest Species in the Place of Essential Difference there uses to be added Propriety as we observ'd a little before The Proprieties of Incorporeal are likewise unknown to us Yet Man although he is the lowest Species is rightly enough defin'd a Rational Animal Ax. 5. When a fit or proper Word is wanting there are to be two or more joyned together by a Grammatical Conjunction But 1. § Such Definitions as these sin against the 5th Law of Defining propos'd in the
9th Theoreme of the former Chapter to which I refer you Ax. 6. Imperfect Definition Arbitrary is when declining or rejecting a Perfect Definition we draw the thing in gross either for Delectations sake or that we may attemper our Definition to the Capacities of others Ax. 7. Of Imperfect there are several Species's of which those approach nearest to the Perfect Desinition which agree most with the Laws of Definition which we have but now before proposed Ax. 8. The principal Species's of them are these First when a proper Accident is defin'd only by an External Cause 1. § As an Eclipse is an Interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon Death is an Extinction of the Vital Heat This is called a Definition Causal or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as in the Greek Book 2. Post Cap. 10. Ax. 9. Secondly by Genus and Subject not mentioning the Cause 1. § As an Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon Death is the Exit of the Living and by this the Causal Definition is effected a Perfect Definition of a proper Accident as an Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon by reason of the Earth's Interposition Diametrically betwixt the Sun and the Moon Death is the Interritus of the Living by reason of the Extinction of the Vital Heat c. Ax. 10. The third Species of Imperfect Definition is that which consists of Genus and of one or more Proprieties 1. § As a Dog is a barking Beast Man is a Risible Animal a Loadstone that which draws Iron And in this manner are defined Substances whose Essential Differences are concealed from us as is beforesaid Ax. 11. The fourth is that which consisteth in an Enumeration of Parts or Species's 1. § As Logick is an Art of Defining Dividing Arguing and Ordering well The Roman Civil Law is that which consists of Laws Acts of Senate Judgments Authorities of Lawyers Usages Lastly and Equality as Cicero says in his Topicks Ax. 12. The Fifth is that which consists of a Removement of its Opposite as that of Horace viz. Virtus est Vitium fugere Et Sapientia prima est Stultitiâ caruisse i. e. Virtue is to fly Vice and the first Degree of Wisdom is to be void of Folly Ax. 13. The Sixth when the Relate is defined by the Correlate without Mention of the Genus and Foundation 1. § As he is a Master that has a Servant a Father that has Children Teacher or Master that has Disciples Ax. 14. The Seventh which consists of a Coacervation or heaping up of Circumstances and common Adjuncts 1. § And this properly is a Description altho' Use has now obtain'd that every Imperfect Definition be call'd a Description For Example Man is a two-footed Animal uncover'd with Hair or Feathers of an erect Countenance and endued with Hands Which Formula of Definition is used by Historians and Poets in the Description of Persons Facts Places and the like singular things 2. § Boethius adds other Species's of this Imperfect Definition as is First Definition by way of Metaphor As when Youth is defined to be the Flower of Age Age the Winter of Life Sleep to be the Image of Death c. Secondly by way of Praise or Dispraise to which belong Elogies which are attributed to things either by way of Praise or Dispraise as when History is by Cicero Book 2. of his Orat. describ'd to be the Witness of Time the Light of Truth the life of Memory the Mistress of Life and the Messenger of Antiquity Or when Philosophy is describ'd by Plato to be a Similitude with God as much as in Man lies Pleasure the Food of Evils Anger a short Madness or voluntary Distraction Thirdly by way of Periphrasis as Homer is the Writer of the Trojan War Fourthly Difference as Hatred is that which is more lasting than Anger Fifthly Example or Instance as an Animal is a Man a Horse c. Sixthly what it wants of its Genus as a Deunx is a Roman Pound wanting an Ounce c. But yet all these are such as hardly if at all merit the Name of Definition CHAP. IV. Of the Manner of Investigation or Quaest of Definition Ax. 1. DEfinitions are collected from Division or Induction or Demonstration or Etymology or Derivation or Lastly from the Definition of the Contrary COMMENTARY 1. § And by way of Division thus when Division being made of the chief Genus and Subordinate Species's under which the Defined is contained as far as the Defined it self all the Essential Attributes are collected out of which its Definition is to be framed After this manner let us search for the Definition of Man Man is a Substance but because an Angel is also a Substance That it may appear how Man differs from an Angel Substance ought to be divided into Corporeal and Incorporeal A Man is a Body an Angel without a Body But a Stone also is a Body That therefore a Man may be distinguished from a Stone divide Bodily or Corporeal Substance into Animate and Inanimate that is with or without a Soul Man is a Corporeal Substance Animate Stone Inanimate But Plants are also Animate Let us divide therefore again Corporal Substance Animate into Feeling and void of Feeling Man feels a Plant not But a Horse also feels and likewise other Beasts Divide we therefore Animate Corporal Feeling Substance into Rational and Irrational Here therefore are we to stand since it appears that every and only Man is Rational From hence therefore may be collected this Definition viz. That Man is a Corporeal Substance Living Feeling Rational or lest in Definition of the Species be put the Definition of the Genus a Rational Animal This Method Aristotle delivers Book 2. Post Cap. 13. and there advises in this Series of Division no Essential Difference be pass'd by I add also that no Accidental must be adhibited 2. § By Induction thus viz. when the Essential Attributes of them contain'd under the Defined being compared together rejecting those that appear proper to the Singulars the Definition is confected of the rest which are common to all Seek we thus the Definition of Animal Under Animal are contain'd Man Horse Lion c. The Essential Attributes of these are Corporeal Substance Living Feeling These are common to all The Property of Man is to be Rational Irrational is common to the Horse and Lion The Property of a Horse is to whinny Lion to roar That therefore you may find the Definition of Animal Rational Irrational Whinnying Roaring are to be rejected as being too streight From the rest such a Definition as this will arise viz. That an Animal is a Living Feeling Corporeal Substance c. This Method Aristotle delivers in the Place now last cited 3. § Demonstration is hereafter to be treated of 4. § As for Etymology it often supplies the Place of the Difference of Things which with the Genus may Constitute a Definition So because Arithmetick is so said 〈◊〉
Ax. 1. NOW Canons Compared are either of certain or else uncertain Place Ax. 2. And the first of these are either General or Special Of which these contain a Comparison in every those only in one certain Genus COMMENTARY 1. § For Example This Canon that whose Effect is more such that it self is more such is of certain Place because it expresses the Place of the Effect from whence this Argument is taken and General because Adaptible to all things which admit of any kind of Comparison But now that that which agrees to the better subject that it self is better is indeed of certain Place because indicating the Argument was fetch'd from the Place of the Subject But not General because only to be adapted to those things which are compared in Goodness But this that which is more lasting is best is of uncertain Place and Special because it neither expresses Where the Place of the Argument is Neither can it be Adapted to all things which are compared amongst themselves c. 1. § Now compared Canons from the Conjugates are these and first that to which one of the Conjugates more agrees to that also the other As Caesar consulted the Republick more than Bibulus and therefore in this respect was more a Consul than he Secondly If one of the Conjugates be better than one then the other of the Conjugates will be better than the other as if Piety be before Learning then a Pious Man will be before a Learned Man c. Thirdly From the Definition these and first that to which the Definition most agrees to that also the Defined as if the Definition of Whiteness be a Colour dispersing the Sight it will follow that that which is whitest disperses the Sight most c. Secondly That which agrees to the Definition that also to the Defined as if a Habit recalling the Affectious of the Mind and Actions to Mediocrity confers more to Felicity than Riches then Virtue confers more to Felicity than Riches c. So from Genus and Species Fourthly we have these as first that which agrees most to the Genus that also to the Species's and that which most to the Species's that also to the Individuals as if a Substance Immaterial be more perspicacious than a Corporeal then the Soul of Man separate will be more perspicacious than it is now when it is in the Body c. Secondly that which is contain'd under the better Genus or Species that also its self is better and so because a living thing is better than a not a Fly will be better than the Heavent c. Fifthly From the Whole and Part we have these as first if the whole Homogenous or whole consisting of Parts of the same Name and Nature be more so than such a Whole then its Part will be more so than such a Part and conrariwise as If Gold be heavier than Brass then it will follow that every Part of Gold observing the same Proportion of Magnitude will be heavier than the like Quantity of Brass c. Secondly that which is absolutely such or effects any thing as such its Whole will be more such and Effect that any thing else be more such than its Part and so if Rhubarb have a Power of Purging Choler then a Drachm will have a greater Power than has a Scruple because it is but the third Part of a Drachm c. Under which general Maxim are contain'd several special as first many Goods are to be preferr'd before fewer and so Virtue with Nobility is to be preferr'd before Virtue alone Secondly that which is Honest Pleasant and Profitable will be beyond that which is only Honest Pleasant or Profitable Thirdly that which encreases or diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access is better than that which neither encreases nor diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access Fourthly by how much more it encreases or diminishes Good by its Absence or Access by so much is it better than any other thing than the which it is better in this Respect c. Fifthly from Matter and Form in the next Place we have these and first that whose Matter is more so that also it self is more so So because Gold is better and more durable than Stone it follows that a Golden Statue is better and more durable than a Stone one c. Secondly that which has a Nobler Form that it self is also Nobler So because the Form of Man is better than that of Beasts because this is Immaterial and Immortal and that Material and Mortal it follows that Man is better than Beasts c. Sixthly From the Cause Efficient these and first that which by it self simply and by its Nature is such is more so than that which by Accident is such or in some respect or by Participation And so Meat as Meat is wholesomer than Physick because that of it self is so and this only by Accident and Light is more Profitable than Darkness because that is useful to all this only to Thieves and such as will abscond Lastly the Sun is more splendid than the Moon because that shines of its own Nature this only by Participation c. Secondly that which of it self and by its own Nature is more such that effects more and so on the Contrary So Fire heats more than Water when it is warm'd because hotter So you know Iron to be heavier than Wood because it more swiftly descends c. This Canon can be used only in Causes of them selves For in Causes by Accident it fails often For Iron red-hot altho' not hotter than Flame burns yet more vehemently the Density of its Matter assisting it and impressing the Heat more strongly upon the Patient and so in other Instances of the like Nature Thirdly that to which the Cause agrees most to that also the Effect and so on the Contrary So you may prove Old Men to be more Prudent than Young because they have more Experience in Things Fourthly that by which any thing is such that it self also must be more such And so because Water grows Warm by Fire it may be collected that the Fire is more Hot than it But this Canon in some Cases will fail us And first in Causes by Accident and Aequivocal For it does not follow that because some one is drunk by Wine that therefore Wine should be more drunk or because the Knife is sharpen'd by the Stone that therefore the Stone should be sharper than the Knife Secondly in Effects which receive not more or less As if you should prove the Father to be more a Man than his Son because the Son is so by his Means Thirdly those which depend not upon one Cause For although the Scholar derive his Learning from his Master yet it does not follow that the Master must be always Learneder than the Scholar For it may be that the Scholar may have more Ingeny and Industry than his Master c. Fifthly those whose Operation Work or Effect
the Argumentation is infirm and begetteth not Science When Subject frivolous and inept For in vain should we prove for Instance that the Pigmies are Cholâ—rick because of their short Stature unless it appears that there are Pigmies c. Of Premisses or Principles also that they are true For otherwise we lay a Foundation of Things that are not known It remains therefore that of the Affection it should be demonstrated that it is and of the whole Conclusion consisting of Subject and Affection that it be true or that the Affection is in the Subject c. Ax. 6. Of which Precognitions those that are self-evident that is so that no body can be ignorant of them are only made in the mind those not so but that they may be unknown are always express'd in the first Entrances of Sciences Ax. 7. And if so soon as produc'd they are believ'd by the Disciple they may be properly term'd Suppositions but if not and the Disciple be doubtful of them or even encline to a contrary Opinion Postulata or things to be required or demanded 1. § There are some things says Aristotle in Sciences of which no one can be ignorant and these they call Suppositions as we said before or Axioms that is such as carry such a Native Clarity with 'em as they are worthy of every body to be credited some of which one may But yet so soon as proposed by a Master are believed without Proof And such as these are termed Definitions And some not so immediately but delivered Precariously and by way as it were of Agreement because the Probation of them if any belongs to the Metaphysicks And such as these they call Postulata or things required or to be demanded c. And so we come to the Conditions which in every Demonstration Why are to be observed and First to those of the Question to be demonstrated and Medium which is to be used in Demonstration CHAP. XXII Of the Question to be demonstrated and Medium which is to be used in Demonstration Ax. 1. THE Conditions which are to be observ'd in Demonstration Why are partly belonging to the Question partly to the Cause or Medium of Demonstration and partly to the Premisses or Principles of which in the Chapter following Ax. 2. Every Question does not admit of a Demonstration Why but only that which is true and has a certain and immutable Cause of its Truth Ax. 3. And therefore neither Propositions immediate nor fortuitous can be demonstrated but only proper Accidents 1. § Now Propositions immediate cannot because they have no Medium or Cause of their Truth 1. § Chance likewise cannot because they have not any Dependance upon any certain Cause or Rule Accidents therefore and those proper only can be demonstrated For Substances have no Cause why they 're in the Subject because they are predicated always as Genus's or Differences And Accidents improper have no certain and definite Cause Now whether these Accidents proper flow from the Essence of the Subject or some External Cause or whether they be perpetual or only frequent it matters not But this that they cohere with their Causes so as that they being put these also be put and that being taken away these also may be taken away is necessary and required For Instance Altho' the Moon be not always deficient yet that she is so when so may be demonstrated because she is always so when the Earth is Diametrically interpos'd between the Sun and the Moon and never so when otherwise c. And so much of the Question to be demonstrated Ax. 4. Now the Medium of Demonstration must be the next Cause of the Predicate and that either Efficient or Final and if Efficient either Internal or External 1. § Now whereas Cause is said to be two Ways next that is either absolutely or in its own Genus In this Place is to be understood the Absolutely next that is such as that being put the Effect also must be put and that taken away the Effect also must be taken away And farther it is required that it be also the Cause of the Predicate For that it be also of the Subject is not so necessary because it is not enquir'd whether the Subject be for that is pre-supposed but whether the Predicate or in plainer Terms whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not c. 2. § This next Cause must be either Efficient or Final because the Predicate being an Accident has not Matter or Form properly so call'd The Cause Final is adhibited in those things which are done for the sake of another As Means Natural Instruments c. Also Actions and Habits if such are to be demonstrated and in other Cases the Efficient It happens sometimes indeed that the Cause Proximate viz. the Efficient is also the Form or Matter of the Subject and when it is so the better But however they differ not in Specie from the rest But these things will appear more by Examples as here 1. Every Rational Creature is capable of Science Every Man is a Rational Creaturâ— Every Man therefore is capable of Science c. In this is the Medium Rational the Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and Form of the Subject Here 2. Every Earthly thing is overwhelm'd wiâ—n thrown into the Water An Ebony-Tree is an Earthly thing And therefore every Ebony-Tree is overwhelm'd when thrown into the Water The Cause Efficient Internal and Matter of the Subject Here 3. Whatever consists of Matter and Form has a Three-fold Dimension Every body consists of Matter and Form And therefore every body has a Three-fold Dimension c. Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and both Form and Matter of the Subject Here 4. That which is endued with a Three-fold Dimension admits not of another Body's being with it in the same Place But every body is endued with a Three-fold Dimension c. The Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and the Propriety of the Subject c. Here viz. 5. That which the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated by the Rays of the Sun that suffers an Ecclipse of the Light receiv'd from the Sun But the Moon the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated with the Rays of the Sun c. The Cause Efficient External of the Predicate Here 6. He who was made for the Contemplation of Celestial Things ought to be of an upright Countenance Man was made for the Contemplation of Celesti-Things And therefore Man ought to be of an upright Countenance The Cause Final and also that of the Predicate c. 3. § Now sometimes it happens that the same Question may be demonstrated by the Cause Efficient together with the Final and so you may demonstrate that an Animal sleeps viz. either because the common Sense is sopited or drown'd by Vapours and the Passage of the External Senses obstructed And this is from the Efficient or else that the Spirits may be refresh'd and Strength
§ As If any one should collect Poeta a Poet to be of the Feminine Gender because Nota is so or Glycerium Neuter because Delirium Or that Urere to burn Verberare to beat Movere to move are Actions And therefore Ardere Vapulare must be so Or that Ingratitnde signifies a Quality And therefore so must Longitude c. 2. Hitherto belong the Sophisms in which the Words are ill joyned with the Nouns Pronouns or Adverbs of Relation What an one How great Who What When Where How many How often c. As What is bought in the Shambles that is set before you for Supper Raw Meat is bought in the Shambles And therefore raw Meat is set before you for Supper Here the Fallacy lies in that in the Minor The Quality is taken with the Substance Whereas the Word What does only relate to the Substance of the Thing and not the Quality See how many many Fingers again an Infant has so many has an Old Man An Infant has ten little or small Fingers And therefore an Gld Man has ten little or small Fingers This Fallacy consists in that in the Minor the Continued Quantity's taken with the Discrete Whereas the Word How many is referred only to the Discrete Here also What I am you are not I am a Man And therefore you are not Here the Fallacy is in assuming the Species in the Minor whereas What in the Major denotes no more than an Individual c. And so we come to the second sort of Sophisms which we said were in Things CHAP. XXVII Of Sophisms or Fallacies in Things Ax. 1. OF the Sophisms in Things there are seven Places viz. Accident a Word simply spoken and according to something Ignorance of the Elench Consequent Begging of the Question Not Cause for the Cause and manifold Interrogation Ax. 2. Accident is then when we collect that to agree to the Subject which was said of the Predicate Ax. 3. And this is solv'd by shewing that that which is gathered of the Subject is only said of the Predicate by Accident or that the Predicate it self is Accidentally said of the Subject 1. § And thus a Catch of the Accident is laid for us two manner of Ways And first when any thing 's said of the Attribute by Accident as this Man is a Species Socrates is a Man And therefore he 's a Species This Fallacy consists in this viz. in that to be a Species is said of Man by Accident But To be a Man of Socrates by himself The other is when the Attribute it self is said of the Subject by Accident As here The Mouse gnaws Cheese Mouse is a Syllable And therefore a Syllable gnaws Cheese This Fallacy is because to gnaw Cheese is said of the Mouse by it self to be a Syllable by Accident and Cause of its Name Both Ways the Fallacy arises out of the Acceptation of the Word chang'd or Genus of Supposition as the Schoolmen call it For Man in the Major is taken in a Simple Minor a Concrete Acceptation and Mouse in the Major is taken Formally or for the thing signify'd and in the Minor Materially or for the Word only Ax. 4. That from the Thing simply said is then when from something that is simply true we collect another that is true only in some respect or according to something On the Contrary That in some Respect is then when from that which is partially true or according to some respect we collect that any thing is simply so Ax. 5. This is solv'd by shewing the Difference between that which is spoken simply and that in some Respect 1. § A simply said is that whose Predicate agrees with the Subject in every Respect Part Time and Place without any Limitation That according to something in some Respect Part Time Place only c. Examples of the first kind are these viz. The Right-Hand is not to be cut off And therefore not then when it is invaded by a Gangrene The Man is Mortal And therefore so as to his Soul The Pledge ought to be restored to its Owner when he requires it And therefore a Sword altho' he be Mad when he requires it c. From that according to some Relation these viz. Man's Soul is Immortal And therefore the Man Wine hurts a Man in a Fever And therefore in general Mycillus is a good Shoemaker And therefore he is good c. Ax. 6. Sophism from the Ignorance of the Elench is that when the Conclusion seems to contratradict the Proof of the Respondent and yet does not contradict it by reason of some Condition's being Wanting Ax. 7. And this is solved by shewing what Condition is omitted 1. § We have Cap. 25. affirmed an Elench to be a Syllogism with a Contradiction and Cap. 22. of the First Book we entreated of the Conditions of Contradiction But altho' every Sophism offends by Ignorance of the Elench for every Sophism seems to be an Elench and yet is not so yet here that especially is so called in which the Conclusion is opposed to another's Assertion and yet some Condition or other is wanting that belongs to a legitimate Contradiction For Example If one going about to prove that Christ was not David 's Lord should conclude that he was his Son he mistakes by an Ignorance of the Elench that is an Ignorance of the Case and the true Sense wherein the Respondent were to be taken and Laws of Opposition For Lord and Son are Opposites if they are attribted to any One in the same Respect But these are not attributed to Christ in the same Respect but in a Diverse For he was David's Lord as to his Divine and Son as to his Humane Nature c. Ax. 8. Sophism of Consequent is then when One Enunciation is inferr'd from another from the which it does not follow Ax. 9. And this is solv'd by citing of the Rule against which such Inference does offend 1. § There are Four Rules which are to be observed in the Inferring of a Consequent from an Antecedent of which if we break but One the Consequent will be Null and if such an Inference be admitted there will be then a Caption or Fallacy of the Consequent And the first of these is The Universal Affirming must never be simply converted And therefore if any Man should conclude thus viz. Because every Flatterer is Complaisant Therefore every Complaisant is a Flatterer he would be deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Consequent And the second Rule is that from a Universal Affirming a Universal Denying can't be concluded otherwise than by Contraposition And therefore if any one should conclude thus viz. Whatsoever is begotten has a Beginning And therefore whatsoever is not has not as the Humane Soul the World c. One should commit a Fallacy of the Consequent For thus one should have inferr'd viz. That that which has not a Beginning is not begotten and so it is a Conversion by Contraposition The Third is