that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms and the Subjects are evidently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These and not according to its Essence or Nature that is the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental And let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner they shall never avoid the Conclusion if they do put the Subject or Body to be truly an Ens and that it may be otherwise than it was and yet not Immediately cease to be that Ens either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense 28. I know it will be repli'd that all Natural Bodies are Compound Entities or made up of many little Particles which put together Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously do enable them to perform those several Operations peculiar to each and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech it is such an Ens. And that therefore all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground since all may be Explicated by the Taking away Adding Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner But this comes not up to the Point nor can serve them to escape our Argument but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction For admit that each Compound Ens as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities or at least a great part of it be made up of those little Particles I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no after the Composition that is whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing or Many Actual Things or Entities If the First then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force for then since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Corruptible it must as was prov'd above have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w ch is to be made out of it which we call Matter and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was and consequently which does not remain in the New One which is what we call the Form And because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant the Former Subject or Body admitted of Alterations first and consequently there was Mutation in it both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms But if they say as I fear they will because they must that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many or if they say that after Composition there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens which is a plain Contradiction for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin there is but One Ens Actually tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Divisibility between them or which is the same One Thing apt to verify different Conceptions and Notions which as was said above partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another we are naturally forced to make of it Now to make the Subject consist of Potential parts Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it for to say it is Potentially Many is the same as to say it is Actually One and to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens neither of which were One Actual Part before is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titlâ— to be One of its own nature For to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express 29. But to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae as Gassendus calls them of Epicurus and from that Original Mass of Matter of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made which the Antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vncompounded And I farther alledge that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quantum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively so neither can Many Entities such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be compound One Ens unless they be United Entitavely Wherefore those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are for were they Actually there they would be Entitatively Many Whence the Ens made up of those Many Actual Entities could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se and which is worst to compleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Contradiction it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se viz. in ratione Entis which is to be perfectly Chimerical 30. Thus they come off and so must every one who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense For the Word Compounded is in reality a kind of Transcendent and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal whence while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches they take the word in an Vnivocal signification they come to apprehend that the compounding many Entities together according to some Extrinsecal respects such as are Situation Motion joynt-Action and such like is the same as to compound them according to that most Intrinsecal respect call'd Substance and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively or One Ens. 31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body which leads them into Innumerable Errours And the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing is far greater than to make One Body compounded of those Particles in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least make One Artificial Compound v. g. a House tho' not a Natural one whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture but must unavoidably when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can remain Two Actual Things and moreover such Two as are toto genere Distinct nor consequently can they either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind be signify'd by One Word or be called A Man as the former Compounds could be called a House or a Clock And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natural thing or
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
the Intire Thing consisting of Mattâ—r and the Essential Form has many Acâ—idental Forms or Modifications in it which are also truly Intrinsecal to the Thing tho' not Essential to it Which Forms are Compounded with the Intire Thing as with the Matter or Subject of them For example We say a piece of Wood is Round Hard Long Green and such like and therefore since Wood has in it besides it 's Essential Form these Accidental Forms of Hardness Length c. there is therefore a Real Composition of Wood which is a Complete Ens and their Subject with these supervening Forms because the Thing has really in it what grounds and answers to all these several Conceptions Farther say they there is consequently a Real Divisibility between the Wood and these Additional Forms in regard the Causes in Nature can work upon and Change the Wood according to it's Length Roundness Hardness c. and yet not change the Nature or Essence of Wood. Therefore say the Peripateticks the Wood which is the Subject can be Chang'd according to these Accidental Forms that is there may be Formal Mutation in it according to those Accidental Notions or Natures tho' it remains Substantially and Essentially the same And since the Form of what nature soever it be is conceiv'd to be in the Subject hence say they both these sorts of Formal Mutation are also Intrinsecal or a Change of the Thing according to somewhat that is truly conceiv'd to be in it 8. I expect that all this Discourse will look like Gibberish to the Corpuscularians whose thoughts beat upon nothing but upon Particles thus Figur'd Moved and Situated and all the while they read this they will be conceiting how dextrously all this may be explicated to be perform'd by their Hypothesis and therefore how needless it is to have recourse to such abstruse Speculations as are those about Matter and Essential Forms that are Intrinsecal and especially to such unintelligible points as Formal Composition and Mutation But I must beg their Patience to suspend their thoughts till we come to the Proof of Formal Mutation which we are not yet got to What we are now about is barely to declare and lay open the Scheme of the Aristotelian Doctrin resting confident that in the sequel of this Discourse the main point we have undertaken will be forced upon them with such Evidence that it will be unavoidably necessary to admit it In the mean time the Aristotelians with so less Assurance than they use Confidence do peremptorily challenge their thoughts and bring them as Witnesses against themselves if ever they reflected on the Common Rudiments of True Logick and they set upon them thus 9. It must be granted that we cannot have Science of any thing but by means of Discourse That the most Exact and most Evident Discourses are those we call Syllogisms That Syllogisms are resolved into Propositions and Propositions into Two Terms and a Copula that connects them That all that we can say of those Parts of a Proposition is that they are Notions or Meanings of the Words that express them That therefore all Discourse is built on the right putting together of these Notions and can be built on nothing else nor made on any other fashion That no Discourse can be Solid but what is grounded on the Natures of the Things themselves without which they must necessarily be Aiery and Chimerical and impossible to beget Knowledge That for this reason our Notions which ground all our Discourse and Knowledge are the very Natures of the Things without us existing Spiritually in our Understanding That our Operations of Apprehending Iudging and Discoursing of the Natures of Things being Immanent or Perform'd and Perfected within us the Objects of those Operations or the very Natures of the Things must be likewise within us That 't is Evident by Experience that we do make Diverse Conceptions or Notions of the same Thing that is all the Operations of our Mind are built on those Partial and Inadequate Notions of the Thing about which we are to Discourse That we can frame a great Number of these Abstracted or Partial Notions of the same Thing and many of them Intrinsecal ones That therefore that Thing must have in it what corresponds to all those several Notions which we call Formal Composition That hence there is a Divisibility in the Thing as grounding one of those Notions from the same thing as grounding Another of them by reason that Natural Causes are apt to work upon the Thing according to that in it or that part of it as it were which is thus conceiv'd and yet not work upon it according to what in it is otherwise conceiv'd or to what grounds a different Notion Whence they make account is inferrâ—d this Grand Conclusion that therefore There is FORMAL MUTATION in regard it can be wrought upon according to that in it which corresponds to the Notion of FORM and not to that in it which answers to the Notion of Matter Whence follows unavoidably that there is Formal Composition Divisibility and Mutation in it as is above explained Which Conclusion must necessarily follow if they allow as they must this Method of Discoursing each part of which has been made good in the foregoing Treatise And the Aristotelians presume it is altogether Impossible for them to assign any other that can bear the least show of Sense or Coherence 9. The Peripatetick School has yet another great Exception against the Corpuscularians which is that because their Schemes do not take their rise from our solid Natural Notions made by Impressions of the Things upon our Senses and thence convey'd to the Mind they come by this means to have little regard to the Nature of the Things or to their Metaphysical Verity the only Firm and Deep-laid Ground of all Knowledge Through which neglect having render'd themselves Incapable of laying any First on Self-evident Principles taken from our most Firm and most Radical Conceptions of the Thing and Predicated of it accordingly to which they may finally reduce their Discouâ—ses hence they are forced to coin to themselves Principles from their own Wit and Fancy Out of which they contrive certain Hypotheses which granted they hope they can make some congruous Explication of Nature By which manner of proceeding their Systems of Natural Philosophy being Grounded on such Supposed Principles is meerly Conditional or Hypothetical Whence they not only disable themselves from Concluding any thing or Advancing Science but instead of doing this which is the Duty of a Philosopher they breed an utter Despair of it and introduce meer Scepticism To pursue the Truth of which is not our Task at present nor sutes it with our intended Brevity 10. Yet to show the Justice of this Objection it may suffice to remark at present that neither does Epicurus regard the Intrinsecal Nature of his Plenum or Atomes or go about to show why they must be so Infractil
nor in what their more than Adamantin Hardness consists nor how the Potential parts of these Atomes do come to have such an insuperably-Firm Coherence Nor yet does Cartesius explicate to us of what Nature his First Mass of Matter is what Degree of Consistency or Density it has and if any as it must have some or oâ—her why it was to be of that Density or in what that Density consists Which shows that neither of them regarded or minded the Intrinsecal Nature of their First Matter tho' this must needs have had great Influence on the Oeconomy of the World and have afforded us much Light to know the Constitution and Temper of Natural Bodies and consequently of their Proper Causes and Effects as also of many Intrinsecal Modifications of them highly conducing to give account of and explicate the Operations of Natural Agents The only thing they seem to have regarded was the Extension of their First Matter and the Motion Figure and Situation of it's parts which are Extrinsical or Common Considerations but to give any account of what Intrinsecal or Essential Nature that Matter was they are perfectly silent They suppose it to be but they do not so much as Suppose it to be of such or such an Intrinsical Nature which yet they must be bound to do since all Extrinsical respects came by Motion which was not yet begun Or if Epicurus does by making his Atomes Infractil 't is both said gratis and besides he gives us no Account in what that Quality of Indissoluble Hardness consists or how it is to be Explicated 11. Hence the Peripateticks alledge that however the Authors of those Sects are men of Great Wits and strong Brains for 't is not a Task for Ordinary Capacities to undertake a Design that fathoms and comprehends all Nature yet they can never begin with Evident Categorical Propositions and First Principles or carry on their Discourses so as to bear the Test of True Logick but either their Principles must be far from Self-evident and must need Proof which is against the nature of First Principles or else their Consequences must be Loose and Slack And the only way to refute this Objection is for some of their School to put it to the Trial by laying their Principles and proceeding forwards to draw all along Evident Conclusions without intermingling their own Suppositions But the Peripateticks are very Confident they neither can do this nor will ever Attempt it I mean so as to carry it along with Connexion and Evidence in which Spinoza tho' perhaps the best Writer of the Cartesian School falls very short and pieces out his Discourse with many unprov'd Suppositions as is hinted above in my Preface 12. And hence it is that the Corpuscularians being forced by their Cause to decline such a severe Method strive to avail themselves and uphold their Cause by Witty Discourses Smooth Language Clear Expressions Apt Similitudes Ingenious Experiments that bear a Semblance of Agreeing with their Doctrin and such like Stratagems to make a Plausible Show of Science But their Chief Reliance is on the Facil and Familiar Appearances to Fancy with which they court that Delusive and easily Deluded Faculty And to this end they gratifie it with such Proposals as are apt to sink into it most pleasingly such as are Particles of Matter whose Variety of Imaginary Figures and the Diverse Positions of them they without Study quickly apprehend And conceiting that all is done when they have thus Fancy'd or Apprehended them they argue thus If these Pores and Parts will do the business what need is there of those Abstruse and Metaphysical Speculations of Formal Composition and Mutation and those many Intrinsical Changes of which Fancy can frame no Idea's or Shapes And indeed such high Points seem to that Superficial Faculty Mysterious Whimsies they disgust it with the Laboriousness of comprehending them and persuade men of Fancy 't is Impossible to explicate Nature by such Principles because they are rais'd beyond it's reach And indeed if Nature could be solidly explicated by a kind of Contessellation of Particles Fancy would have as it never has Some Reason But if upon Examination we come to find that such Schemes go no deeper than the Surface of the Essences of Things that they can never reach to the Bottom-Principles of Nature nor give Solid Satisfaction of the true Intrinsical Natures of any thing to the Judgment attending to Maxims of Evident Reason and to true Logick then we must be forc'd to follow the Aristotelian Doctrin and have Recourse to Intrinsical and Formal Mutation especially if the Necessiâ—y of Allowing it shall happen to be Demonstated 13. To do which being our present Work we will begin with Epicurus a Scholar of the First Class in the School of Democritus This Philosopher if we may call him so puts Innumerable Atomes or rather contrary to a Clear Demonstration an Actually Infinit Number of them and of an Infinit Number of Figures descending in an Infinit Imaginary Space or Vacuity some of them downwards some of them overthwart according as his Hypothesis had occasion that so they might overtake their fellow-Atomes With which clinging together by virtue of their meer Figures they compound several Worlds and every particular Body in each of those Worlds That Natural Bodies become Rare or Dense according as they have in them more or fewer of those Atomes or as they call it Plenum in proportion to the Vacuum Thus much in common of his Hypothesis which were the circumstance proper it were easie to show besides it being Vnprov'd be a Hotch-potch of the most Refined Nonsense in every particular Sentence and almost in every word notwithstanding the Explications and Patronage which Gassendus Lucretius and our Dr. Charleton have lent him While I am speaking of his Tenet I note here by the way that by the Indivisibility of his Atomes he means Insuperable Hardness or Absolute Infractilness and not that they consist in a Point or want Extension as he is understood by Mr. Le Grand in his Entire Body of Phylosophy Part 4. c. 4. § 6. For to think that since he makes them of several Figures there should want room or space to admit Division could not be meant by such men as Epicurus or Gassendus But to return to our business what concerns us at present is this that let him contrive his Scheme as he pleases for in such Fantastick Philosophy all is as pleases Fancy the Painter yet he must be forced to grant Intrinsecal and FORMAL MUTATION even while he most industriously strives to avoid it At least tho' perhaps his Followers will not own the Conclusion yet they must allow the Grounds of it or the Principles that ought to inferr it 14. To show which we ask Are all his Atomes of the same Matter He must grant it for he allows no difference between them but that of Figure Again each of those Atomes must be granted to be