said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to play the Geometer i. e. to measure out to althings their just essences virtues perfections and limits for Geometrie according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians from whom Plato borrowed the notion signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil as it gives measures and termes to althings 3 The divine Wil is most perfect effectively 3. Effectively as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie where we hope fully to demonstrate That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of al effects The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively as compared with the human wil. 1 If we consider the divine Wil absolutely so its perfection may be demonstrated from its Simplicitie pure Actualitie Eternitie Immutabilitie Omnipotence c. as before 2 If we consider the divine Wil relatively or comparatively as compared with a create human or Angelic wil so its perfection appears 1 in this that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things whereas every create wil presupposeth goodnesse in things that it wils every create wil dependes on because it 's moved by the goodnesse of its object but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil but what is in it self whereas every create wil has a formal reason cause and motive without it self whereby it is moved and influenced 2 In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means but in the divine Wil both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. 3 In mans wil Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act but in God by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature Nolition and Volition are the same We may not imagine that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act but whatever he wils not that it be that he wils that it be not also whatever he wils not that it be not that he wils that it be 4 Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice he may not wil but what is just but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice he doth not wil things because just but they are therefore just because he wils them Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat illud etiam vult ut non fiat item quicquid non vult ut non fiat id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat 5 Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie he wils what he doth but he cannot do al that he wils termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie But God doth not only wil what he doth but also do what he wils his power is as extensive as his wil he can do what he wil his Wil is omnipotent because the same with his Essence as Psal 115.3 8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free The Divine Wil most free Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free if the divine Wil were not free because this is the first Principe of al Libertie as take away the first Cause you also destroy al second Causes so take away libertie from the divine Wil you take it away also from al create wils Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute precedent and regulant libertie in the human wil is conditionate subsequent and regulated The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind now the divine Libertie is the first in that kind and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting but now God is the most perfect Cause therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting which is to act freely Yea the divine Wil is so infinitely free as that it is moved by nothing without it self it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Bonitie whereby it is moved which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge For every create wil as it has a first Cause whereby it is moved physically so a last end whereby it is moved morally but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both these regards and therefore most supreme and perfect The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra or to those ad extra 1 The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant not antecedent for al the operations of God ad intra i. e. such as terminate on himself namely loving himself c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature not from election and choice God cannot but love himself he necessarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself without the least indifference either of Specification or Exercice And yet even in these Acts ad intra which terminate on the divine Essence and are attended with a natural necessitie the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie This is wel expressed by Jamblichus a Sectator of Plato de Myster Aegypt It is saith he necessary that God be as he is not by an extrinsec violent necessitie but by a natural and most voluntary seing he never would be other than he is Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie 2 If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra such as terminate on the Creature so it is not only concomitant but also antecedent i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature not from any necessitie of Nature but by election and choice For al Creatures as referred to the Divine Bonitie are but means wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them This some cal Libertie of Election because al election properly regards the means Again God in willing his own Bonitie necessarily wils althings so far as they participate of his own Bonitie Now the divine Bonitie being infinite there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Lastly if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
its chiefest good Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bonitie or the chiefest Good convertes althings to it self i. e. althings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection 6 The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil the more free it is and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil than his who actually and resolutely adheres to God Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point as two strait Lines 3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual Dependence on the first Cause total and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings Every Creature having something of Nothing or passive Power either physic or metaphysic and obediential it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie which is the root of Dependence Novitie of Being Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature as Eternitie of Being Immutabilitie and Independence is to the Creator For every Creature being only Being by participation hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it and inseparable from its nature as Suarez Metaph. Disp 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates Yea Disp 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being both in acting and causing formally belongs to its essential reason as such because this dependence is founded not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature extrinsecal to its Essence but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof So that the very Essence of the Creature as such is the root of this dependence and to suppose a Creature and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation implies a contradiction Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only but also moral on its first Cause We find both mentioned by Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of al Beings whose conduct he that follows shal be happy And Epinom pag. 980. he assures us That he who praying to God doth trust in his Benignitie shal act wel So in his Timaeus pag. 27. he tels us That al who have any thing of an awakened mind when they attemt any mater either great or smal are always wont to cal on God Which is an high act of Dependence Thence Theages pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▵ AIMONION For there is a certain DEMON which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do c. What this Demon of Socrates was is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers who have written Books concerning it That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. § 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power either Real or Imagiuary Yea Planto in his Timaeus saith That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Demon dwelling in him Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon in imitation of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indwelling Grace Which alludes to that of Paul 2 Cor. 12.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 12.9 that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me It evidently alludes both name and thing to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitation of God with and in men which denotes the highest Dependence And indeed herein consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause Virtuose persons who are most feeble in themselves are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe Where there is a subordination of Causes either moral or natural it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on and receive from the superior Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first Where there is a limited essence is there not also a limited dependent Activitie Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect Must not every mutable variable defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause That which had not Being from it self may it have Operation independently from it self Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self may it expect the privilege of acting from it self independently as to the first Cause Is not the human Wil a mere passive though vital instrument as to the reception of divine influences albeit it be active as to its own operation Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total Yea is not this Dependence immediate And O! how is the Soul enlarged according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult but with it the most difficult are most facile The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken but if God withdraws his hand it soon sals to the ground and is deshed in pieces he need not take it and throw it against the wal it wil break of it self Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Munudaction also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and cooperation of God Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al manner of energie Cyril 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the aide from above Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the auxiliant or assistent Power Greg. Nyssen in Psalm saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue And Chrysostome in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole of good is from the Grace of God Whence God is termed by Cyril in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Creator and Framer of al good and his efficacious Grace is termed by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficacious Aide as by Chrysostome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence Of which more hereafter The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause but continual effusions and insusions into
c. But that God is without cause without end sempiterne and e4ternal increate immutable inalterable simple incomposite incorporeous invisible intangible incircumscripte infinite incomprehensible good just ommipotent the Opificer of al Creatures comprehensive of althings provident of althings the supreme Soverain and Judge we both acknowledge and confesse Also that God is one namely in Vnitie of Essence which is known in three Persons Father Son and holy SPirit c. § 3. The first Attribute that occurs for explication of the divine Being is Vnitie The Divine Vnitie whereof we find great and lively notices both in sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Moses Deut. 6.4 Deut. 6.4 Hear O Israel the Lord our God is one Lord. Mose here first cals for their solemne attention and then laies down his assertion touching the Unitie of the divine Essence which he seems to bottome on the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjoined as a part of the predicate denoting that he who is the first independent Essence and Essentiator of althings can be but one Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32 Rom. 3.29 30. 1 Tim. 2.5 c. And we find much in Platonic Philosophie of the same import Thus Plato in his Parmenides where he lays down his prime metaphysic Philosophemes pag. 142. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. If there be One can it possibly be but that it should part ake of Essence Where he seems to make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens unum convertible namely that Ens is one and one Ens. So he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For ONE always embraceth ENS and ENS ONE with mutual embraces His plain naked mind is that the first Being and One admit of reciprocation i. e. God the first Being is the prime Unitie Aristotle also and his sectators make Ens and Vnum convertible but in a far different manner from Plato who understood both of God Thus also Pythagoras held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Vnitie is the first principe of althings It 's true Plato as others makes mention of many Gods yet he tels us That it was from the Autoritie of their Ancestors and by reason of the severitie of Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without Demonstration or Oriental Tradition yea he confesseth that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polytheisme was repugnant to right reason And this he learned from his Master Socrates who was so zelose and warme in this particular that he was content to suffer a Pagan Martyrdome for the avouching the Vnitie of God against the Laws and Customes of the Athenians Plutarch on the INscription 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 Thou art engraven on the dores of the Delphic Temple assures us that the ancient name given unto God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 EN THOV ART ONE For there cannot be many Gods but one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One ought to be Being as Being one For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diversitie or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being but One is sincere and without mixture for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure Wherein he strongly proves that God can be but one because a pure necessary absolute Being or Act without mixture and composition Plutarch also in the Life of Numa Pompilius assures us That some learned Romans and that not without cause do attribute the order of the beginning and end of mans life to one self-God and Power divine So Laertius in the Life of Zeno informes us That the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that there was one God called by diverse names according to his Proprieties or Attributes and Operations Thus Seneca There are so many Names of God as there are Offices Hence they stiled their Jupiter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. not that they intended to assert many Deities but one and the same Deitie with regard to his various opertions So Aristotle in his Book de Mundo confesseth There was but one God called by diverse names from his effects Thus also Augustin de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. Al these names they imposed on the one God by reason of his diverse powers and causalities not that from the diversitie of effects they asserted diverse Gods And that almost al the learned Philosopher asserted one God is maintained by Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. pag. 97. As for rational Arguments the Vnitie of God may be thus demonstrated 1 That there is a God who is a necessary independent Being has been already proved hence it is evident that he can be but one For a Being absolutely necessary and from it self has a necessitie of Being so far as it is singular therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one For if a singular is not multiplicable then whatever agrees to any thing as singular admits not of multiplicabilitie That a Being absolutely necessary and independent has its necessitie of Being as singular is evident because singularitie is essential and necessary to a Being absolutely necessary as such for a Being absolutely necessary is such so far as in act and it is in act as singular whence singularitie intrinsecally and essentially belongs thereto as Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament l. 2. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. There is therefore in the World a Being necessarily existing of it self which hath no cause nor equal seing it is the Cause of althings from which their substance and existence is but his existence dependes not on any thing without himself This is the blessed God who is therefore one because an Ens necessarily existing 2 Again if there be two or more Gods then they are al infinite independent and self-Beings or some produced and finite The first implies a coutradiction because there cannot be many infinites the later also because such Beings should be produced by real efficience and yet eternal also essentially diverse from the first Being that produced them and yet equal because God 3 That which is most singularly perfect self-sufficient and infinite can be but one For if there were two things or more singularly perfect and infinite then they would differ really or be the same If the same then they are not two if they really differ then one has somewhat which the other has not if so then neither is most singularly perfect and infinite For infinite comprehendes al perfection Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Divinitie is perfect and indeficient every way If then we assert many Gods they must be different but if there be a difference among them where is their perfection For if one be different either in Bonitie Wisdome Virtue c. he so far comes short of perfection See more of Gods Unitie Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42. § 4. Next to the Unitie of God
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
sweetly received by Chrysostome Hom. 31. in Mat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an opportune vocation Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 12. Nihil Augustino certius est quà m in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem per quam solam operamur quicquid boni operamur nominedulcedinis suavitatis delectationis nempe spiritualis coelestis esse significatam Delectationi Dilectionem Ardorem Inflammationemque subnectit Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant Jansen August Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently for so it followeth in the day of thy power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies 1 force and strength of bodie or mind and thence 2 Metonymically richesse or militarie Forces because in them men place their strength job 21.7 Psal 49.6 We may understand it in both senses 1 of Christs powerful efficacious heart-conquering Grace which is the cause or 2 for his powerful Forces and Armies which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence with human Libertie how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes and yet how sweetly it actes so Omnipotently as if there were no room left for human Libertie and yet so connaturally and so sweetly as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence and Force in it Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace Who would not come under such a silken soft sweet violence as this is Need we then fear that any prejudice can befal human Libertie so long as this Wise Soverain Soul-physician workes upon the Wil Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae or handles of the Soul and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock yea to every ward in the lock of the wil Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ And doth not the Wil upon this Divine heart-logic infused by Christ move as freely as chearfully as connaturally as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go as he did Ephraim Hos 11.3 and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis ac dilectionem erumpere Ex quo fit consequenter ut si illa desit voluntas veluti emortua sit Jans August Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love i. e. with rational arguments and moral persuasions as Hos 11.4 Thus Esa 10.21 The remnant shal returne even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel and yet it is to their mighty God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name given the Messias Esa 9.6 Christ drawes them by a mighty power and yet they returne as freely as if there were no power and efficace put forth So Esa 11.6 10 11. The like Esa 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace he addes what followed thereon v. 5. and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace Yea may we not conclude hence that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil by so much the more connaturally and sweetly it actes For hereby it determineth confirmeth and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie both of State and Act. For what more natural to the Wil than to adhere to its chiefest Good Or when doth it act more freely than when it is most peremtorily most inviolably and most immotably determined to love and enjoy its best friend and choisest Good Thus the Omnipotence and Efficace of Medicinal Grace is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil as that it doth most effectually preserve confirme and promote the same CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in the General Creation proper to God the production of something out of nothing Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil Passive Creation what Gods Providence demonstrated The Explication of it The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence Providential means Fire the create mundane Spirit The Object of Divine Providence Its Adjuncts 1 Efficacitie 2 Immobilitie 3 Connaturalitie 4 Perfection 5 Mysterious Miracles Providential Conservation immediate and mediate Ordinary and Extraordinary § 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated effective principe and Adjuncts or various modes of operation we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause whereby he made althings at first and stil continues to make some things out of nothing What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience 1. It 's most evident that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of althings by God but he from a confined mistaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal because he could not imagine how something could be educed out of nothing But true Philosophie as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us that althings were made by God and nothing besides himself is eternal That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes touching the existence of God C. 2. § 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone l'Atheisme Convaincu C. 1. And Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates That it is intrinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal Yet the Jesuites generally grant That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
Tryphon reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious But Plato strongly demonstrates That the Providence of God extendes to althings even the most minute So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie if he should provide for the greater distempers but neglect the lesser would the cure be successeful No surely So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships nor Imperators of Souldiers nor Masters of Families nor Ministers of State nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater Thence Architects denie that great stones can be wel cemented or joined together in a building without smal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let us not then conceit that God is more vile than mortal Opificers who by how much the more skilful they are by so much the more exquisitely and accurately by the benefit of their own Art they consider both great and smal things in such workes that belong to their Art Thence he concludes pag. 903. It seems to me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings This also the Stoics generally asserted whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus his Collections of Epictetus's Philosophie l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some saith he who assert there is no God others that grant there is a God but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he is slothful and negligent and provident of nothing I suppose he means the Epicureans a third sort who hold that there is a God and that he is provident but only of greater and celestial things not of terrene a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as wel as celestial but only in commun not as to singulars and particulars a fifth sort of which number was Ulysses and Socrates asserted that a man could not so much as move without God Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings Actions Substances Accidents Modes c. may be demonstrated 1 From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God which extendes it self to the most minute singulars 2 From the omnipotent Wil of God which gives Futurition Determination Limits Activitie and Operation to althings 3 From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings Whatever is Ens by participation must procede effectively from God who is Ens by Essence and if it procede from him it must necessarily fal under his Providence 4 From the certain Determination Futurition and Order of al effects Either althings must fal under the Providence of God or somethings must happen merely by chance without any certain cause of their Futurition 5 From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence That Gods Providence extendes to al singulars even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73 75 76. So De Potentia Dei Quaest 20. he proves that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways 1 By giving virtue to act 2 By continued conservation of that virtue 3 By moving the Agent to act and applying the virtue to the action 4 As he is the principal Agent in every Act and al other Agents but Instruments 5 As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed The particular Objects of Providence 1 Al natural Beings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe Yea al natural Generations Corruptions Alterations Motions and Actions are subject to Gods Providence Not only the Generic natures and Species of things both Substances and Accidents are determined by God but also al Individuals and Singulars with al their Circumstances and Modes yea things most minute Thus Bradwardine pag. 7 25 291. proves That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence 2 Althings necessary or contingent There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence as Aquinas accurately demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71 72 73. So Bradwardine pag. 271 274. What more contingent than the Lot and yet this fals under the Providence of God as Prov. 16.33 The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. 3 Althings politic Al Revolutions Alterations Advances Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence 4 Althings human Al mans thoughts inclinations interests designes and undertakements are subordinate to Providence Hence 5 Al sinful acts fal under the same 6 Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence of which hereafter In sum Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things unto which his omnipotent Wil Efficience and Causalitie extendes i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie it reacheth al natural preternatural supernatural and moral actions and events When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence Is any thing so great that it comes not within his power or so smal that it comes not within his care I am not ignorant how much some of late as wel Divines as Physicians have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie wil be more fully evident by what follows § 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence The Adjuncts of Providence as before stated there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof As 1. Providence is not merely permissive 1. It is efficacious but energetic and efficacious For 1 Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end and the ordering or disposing of means but also the assecution and attainment of the end It 's true human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient and yet by the interposition of other second causes come short of its end but Divine Providence always reacheth its end Thus Homer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled 2 Al second causes are subject unto and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes but from Divine disposition Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions Also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a multitude of men which are under the same Law Whence it is added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Virtue of a Citie is the constitution of a right Politie Whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Politician or Statesman is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that understandes the constitution of a Citie or Republic Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle in his Politics 1. 5. makes a Citie to be a kind of animate or animal nature For look as an Animal rightly disposed according to nature is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually ordinate and communicating each to other as also to the whole their exercices and operations so in like manner a Citie when duely disposed and instituted is constituted of such proportionate parts for the mutual aide and assistance each of other And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sanitie such is that of a Citie or Republic and its parts as to tranquillitie And what is sanitie according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Disposition or right Order of al parts in the Animal whereby they are capacitated perfectly to exert al exercitations and operations convenient to their nature according to which Analogie or proportion the Tranquillitie of a Citie or Republic is nothing else but its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order or right Disposition of al its parts counected together by some commun Law as Marsilius Patavinus that great Politician in his Defensor pacis cap. 2. pag. 6. has wel determined Cicero defines a Republic Rem populi the Affaire of the People and he desines the People a Societie of the multitude Populus coetus multitudinis juris consensu utilitatis communione sociatas Cic. consociated by the consent of Right and communion of Vtilitie i. e. according to our English Phraseologie The people are a Societis consociated by commun consent and according to some Law for public Good This Strabo also lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitution of al ancient politic Societies as we shal shew § 5. on that head of Legislation A People is defined by Augustin de Civ Dei l. 19. c. 24. a Societie of the rational multitude consociated for concordant communion in those things they consent unto Which is by so much the better by how much the more they concord in what is best and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse And as the processe of Nature and Art is always from things lesse perfect to that which is more perfect so it hath been with al Societies which begin at first only with two Man and Woman Gen. 2.18 c. which Plato termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence this imperfect Societie extended it self to more perfect families and then domestic Societie extended it self to Pagus i. e. to the Societie of Villages for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village who dranke of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Dor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Societie of Villages at last extended it self to that of a Citie as this to that of a Republic as Aristot Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A Citie was at first instituted for the securitie preservation and wel-being of the whole Hence a Citie is defined by Augustin de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some commun bond of Societie So also de Civit. Dei l. 1. c. 15. he saith A Citie is nothing else but a concord multitude of men Thence Grotius de Jure belli pag. 6. defines a Citie a companie of men consâ—ciated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie Wherein note 1 The generic Idea of a Citie which is a Companie or Communitie i. e. perfect for it is essential to a Citie both as to Mater and Forme that it be perfect It is perfect as to Mater in that it is composed of al manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the subsistence and welfare of a Communitie It is also perfect as to Forme as it has a perfect Order and Regiment for the conservation and gubernation thereof 2 Whence follows the formal constitution of a Citie which consistes in its regular consociation of which before 3 Thence also its End is for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie of which also in what precedes Touching a Citie its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer not only of Religion but also of Philosophie Savonarola Epit. Ethicae l. 10. § 5. Legislation its Origine Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Politie and politic Bodie we now passe on to the Empire thereof which consistes in Legislation and Administration or Jurisdiction That al politic Bodies are bounded and governed by Laws has been already proved § 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo Geogr. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one commun Law appointing them what to do for otherwise that a multitude should without harmonie among themselves concur in the doing of one thing it is impossible Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and al politic Bodies is wel laid down by Plato Protag pag. 326. where speaking of the Education of Youth he saith That after they depart from under their Preceptors the Republic compels them to learne the Laws and to live according thereunto a certain Formule being framed that so none act rashly according to their own wils but as Writing-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters and strokes of the pen thereby to forme their hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. So the Republic having framed a Formule of Laws invented by good and ancient Legislators according to their prescript compels both those that governe and those that are governed to act but if any transgresse their bounds him they punish which kind of punishment they cal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Correction 1. The necessitie of Laws Touching the Necessitie of Laws we have an excellent Disscourse in Plato Leg. 9 p. 874 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that Laws be framed for men that so they may live according to Laws for if they should live without these they would in nothing differ from the savage bestes The cause whereof is this because no mans ingenie is so framed by nature as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the commun utilitie of human life or if he should know what is best yet he is not always able or willing to act the same This grand reason of State inducing a necessitie of Laws he explicates in the
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
impartible and boniforme in things partible variate as to operation and distributing whatever is constitutive of proper Nature it remains simple i. e. albeit it acts variously according to the indigence of its subject yet it remains invariable and simple Hence 10 we must with Plato denie that God the most simple Being may be stiled a whole because he can in no regard be said to have parts The absolute Simplicitie of God may be demonstrated 1 From the Perfection of God The Simplicitie of God demonstrated Al parts as parts are finite incomplete and imperfect Again every whole is dependent both on its cause and on the parts whereof it is composed but there is nothing incomplete or dependent in God because he is most perfect Moreover al parts are in order of nature before the whole and therefore need some bond of union to knit them together but God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause prioritie or posterioritie Lastly in every kind things are by so much the more noble and perfect by how much the more simple they are wherefore God being the most perfect Being must needs be most simple 2 From the Vnitie of God This Argument Plato useth as before So Parmenid pag. 144. We did not therefore speak truely even now when we said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that Essence i. e. God was divided into many parts for he cannot be divided into more than one for unto him al as it is most consentaneous are equal Neither is Being wanting to Vnitie neither Vnitie to Being i. e. God but these two are altogether equal Wherein he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Vnitie and it may be thus improved Unitie is generally described negatively by indivision in regard of it self and division from other things Now the divine Essence is most indivisible as to it self but most divided and distant from althings else therefore it is most one and if most one then also most simple Thus Aristot Metaph. l. 4. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Those things whose essential notion is indivise and inseparable such are most one and simple And is not the first Being such May we conceive the least divisibilitie in his Essence This Argument is wel urged by Simplicius in Epict. cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One Bonitie produceth many Bonities and one Simplicitie and Vnitie which excels al others many Vnities and one Principe many Principes For One Principe Good and God are the same Where he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Unitie Thus also the Author of the Book de Fundamentis l. 2. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The name ONE is truely said of that which is indivise in it self and divise as to althings else And by how much the more proper it is to any thing tobe distinguished from other things by so much the more it may be said to be one Thence he concludes That nothing in the world can be said to be so one as to be truely distinct from althings else but God who is therefore most simple So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie or Divine Unitie is multiplied in things partible impartibly drawing and converting things partible to his own Simplicitie i. e. The Deitie being in it self the most simple Unitie is multiplied as to operations in althings according to their indigence yet without the least multiplicitie in it self but it convertes althings multiplied to its own simple Unitie 3 From the nature of Composition What is Composition but the union of things distinct And doth not imperfection always attend distinction Take the most subtile and refined composition which they make to be of Ens and Essence or of Essence and Existence and doth there not some imperfection attend the same Doth not al Composition import some efficience and thence dependence Can that which is compounded be eternal Doth it not implie a beginning and that something was before it Is it not a flat contradiction to say something was compounded from Eternitie Lastly where Composition is there division may be and so by consequence dissolution which to affirme of God is blasphemous This Argument is wel improved by Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Deitie is simple and incomposite but that which doth coalesce out of many differences is composite If therefore we shal say that increate independent incorporeous immortal eternal good Creator and the like are substantial differences and different substances in God being composed of so many things he wil not be simple but composite which truely to affirme is extreme impietie It 's meet therefore to conceive that each of these as affirmed of God do signifie not what he is in Essence but either what he is not or a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habitude which he hath to those things that are distinguisht from him or that participate nature and operation from him Wherein he gives us the genuine reason why the divine Essence which is in it self most simple is expressed under various Names and Attributes namely thereby to remove al imperfection from him or to illustrate some perfection that is in him by the habitude which he has to things made by him 4 From Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience That God is the frist Cause of althings is clearly evident from what has been before laid down of his Existence Hence it necessarily follows that he is most simple For whatever is composite is such by some preexistent cause which framed its composition This Argument is wel managed by Simplicius in Epict. c. 1 p. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For God is the first Being and Cause of althings But now what is first is necessarily most simple For whatever is composite as it is composite and multiplied it is posterior to one 5 From Gods Actualitie That there is one pure Act which is actuated by nothing else but actuates althings else is most evident to any that dare not grant a progresse into infinitie as to Acts. Now what partakes of pure Act but the first Being who was never in possibilitie to be but always a pure Act as to his Essence God the first Being is actually and eternally whatever he may be neither can he ever be what actually he is not Every Creature had a possibilitie not to be before it was and it stil retains the same possibilitie but God is such a pure Act as that not the least possibilitie or potentialitie can be affirmed of him He is such a pure subsistent Act as excludes al state existing in power or potentialitie either passive or objective which speakes the highest simplicitie 6 From the Immutabilitie of God Whatever is composite is mutable for where there is composition there may be division which implies mutabilitie But God is most immutable as we shal in what immediately follows demonstrate This Argument is wel managed by Plato in his
God and those things that belong to God are best and most perfect therefore he cannot admit any mutation for what is best is never changed The force of the Argument lies thus God by the necessitie of his Being has a plenitude of Essence and Perfection and therefore admits not of any augmentation or diminution for what by necessitie of Nature has a plenitude of Being and Perfection that cannot extend it self any further but must be infinite and what is infinite cannot be greater or lesser neither can any thing be taken from or added to it Hence God being by a necessitie of Nature most perfect cannot be more or lesse perfect therefore he cannot fal under any mutation either perfective or corruptive augmentative or diminutive § 2. Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection Hence follows Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection For a Being necessarily simply and immutably such must of necessitie be infinitely perfect A Creature simply and absolutely finite may be in some limited sense said to be infinite as the Soul of man is in regard of its capacitie said to be infinite because capable of an infinite object but nothing is absolutely simply and essentially infinite and perfect but God Infinitie really excludes al negation of Entitie from God and also includes that God is in pure Act whatever Ens in its most extensive universal latitude and notion doth include For an infinite Essence necessarily contains either formally or eminently whatever is or may be of perfection in al Beings either actually existent or possible But to treat more philosophically and distinctly of this Attribute we are to consider that infinite is a negative notion which includes a negation of al termes or bounds now a thing may be said to be terminated bounded or finite in reward 1 of its Essence and Perfection 2 of its Duration 3 of its Presence 4 of its Comprehensibilitie In al these regards God is said to be infinite He is infinite 1 in Essence as most perfect and independent 2 in Duration as eternal 3 in Presence as omnipresent or immense 4 as to our Comprehension in being incomprehensible We shal here treat only of Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection and of the other as distinct Attributes resulting from this Infinitude of Essence Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection may be various ways explicated and demonstrated Gods Infinitude from his Independence Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 2. c. 19. describes God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate independent immortal infinite eternal immaterial chiefest Good the immutable impassible incircumscript immense indefinible incorporeous invisible without indigence absolute most free omnipotent and infinitely potent By each of these divine Attributes the Infinitude of the Divine Essence may be demonstrated As 1. By his Independence The Infinitude of the Divine Essence consistes in a negation of al limitation and termes The termes that limit any Essence are its causes therefore that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any cause must needs be without termes and so infinite And is not the Divine Essence thus independent without al causal termes and limitation Must not God then be infinite in his Essence This Independence of the Divine Essence as to al causes and causal limitation is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie by Gods being the first and the last as Esa 41.4 I the Lord Esa 41.4 the first and with the last I am he So Chap. 44.6 I am the first and I am the last and besides me there is no God Thuse also Chap. 48.12 I am he I am the first I also am the last God is said to be the first as having no causal principe or efficient that might give limits to his Essence and the last as having no final cause or end that might give moral limits or bounds to his Wil. This Infinitude and Independence of the Divine ssence as the first Cause and last End is wel illustrated Rev. 1.8 11. 21.6 22.13 Rev. 1.8 11. 21.6 22.13 I am 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end the first and the last i.e. as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the first letter and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last of the Greek Alphabet so God is the first causal Principe or Efficient and last End or final Cause that gives termes and limits to al created Essences but receives limits and termes from none and therefore is infinite in Essence and Perfection Hence God is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-Being or Being of himself not by any positive influxe for that is impossible that any thing should give Being to it self but negatively by reason of his independence on any other Cause For God as the first has no efficient and as the last has no final Cause thence by consequence no causal termes or limitation This Independence and Infinitude of God as the first Efficient and last End is wel explicated and demonstrated by Plato in his Parmenides p. 137. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore if he the one God hath no part neither truely shal he have any beginning or end or middle for such are the parts of a thing Where he proves that God has no beginning nor end i. e. he is the first and the last from his simplicitie or not having parts And in what follows he gives us the reason of his consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the end and the principe is the terme of every thing i. e. every thing is terminated and bounded by its causal Principle or Efficient and last End therefore to speak in the language of sacred Philosophie He who is the first and the last without a first causal principe or last end to terminate his Essence must needs be infinite Thus Plato concludes in what immediately follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The one God therefore is infinite if he hath neither principe nor end This Argument which agrees with that of sacred Philosophie is most cogent for that which has no causal termes either of beginning or end but is the first causal principe and last end of althings must needs be infinite 2. Gods Infinitude from his Vnitie and Simplicitie The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection procedes from and may be demonstrated by Gods Vnitie Simplicitie and pure Actualitie Thus Plato in his Philebus pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One namely God is as many and infinite and many are as one only Plato here describes the first infinite Being under the commun Pythagorean notion of one and many as being one in regard of the simplicitie of his Essence and yet many in regard of his infinite Perfections and Ideas or Decrees So pag. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the one God is many and infinite The force of this Argument lies thus God being one simple pure Act must needs be infinite
of our Understanding is mutable because dependent on externe objects and Mediums but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable and therefore the measure of al Truth as Aquinas wel notes This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God saith he by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings and al particles of time as they are most truely in himself for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant according to the manner of our human infirmitie but he understandes althings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Wil which represences althings uniformely and invariably As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens which should see by extramission and actively as God seeth it would then always see uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round and the same part now in the East and anon in the South and then in the West Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time with their distinct vicissitudes and successions without the least variation or succession because he sees althings not passively by species and impressions received from the things themselves but actively in his own Essence and Wil the active Principe of al. We poor mortals by reason of our infirmitie cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time always fluent and succeding each other and therefore we take the present instant which of al time is most actual and best known to us and make it the measure of past present and future time whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable but God who knows althings in his own Eternitie is not liable to such succession and mutation his Science being a pure necessary Act must needs be immutable and invariable albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods knowlege the primary object is the divine Essence which is immutable and therefore the divine Science such also Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known then it would be mutable as they are but not otherwise God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential wherefore 1 he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of 2 He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows 3 He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows 4 He cannot begin to know what he before knew not or not to know what before he knew because nothing begins to be future This immutabilitie of the divine Science as to things future arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil and not from any thing in the object is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates That the Causes Origines and Reasons of althings future though in themselves never so instable are most stable immutable necessary yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil whence also the Divine Science is most certain necessary and immutable This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future as before That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary so Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 39. pag. 130 140. Hence 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible 4. Divine Science most certain Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive and be deceived or to be ignorant of supreme Beings much lesse God The Science of God being necessary ad immutable it cannot but be most certain and infallible To know things certainly is to know them in their causes now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings he thence knows them perfectly Gods Science is as certain as the future events for where there is a determinate effect there must be a determinate cause and where the cause is determinate there the science also may be determinate The knowlege of things future in God is as certain as the knowlege of things present for every future compared to God the first Cause and his Science is necessary and necessarily future albeit as compared to the second causes some effects may be contingent or contingently future The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect namely the divine Essence it cannot but be most certain and infallible if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science how much more in divine Science which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light and most simple intuition contemplating every Being and Truth as it is in it self in the glasse of the divine Essence The divine Intellect sees althings as existent in themselves by the infinite light of the divine Essence and therefore most certainly and infallibly as Esa 40.13 14. Hence 5. The Dâ—â—â—â—e Science is absolute and independent not conditionate and dependent on any create Object Thus Plato 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent in his Parmenides pag. 134 c. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-subsistent and independent as to al externe objects and condition For otherwise saith he God should not have a certain knowlege of and soverain dominion over human affaires It 's impossible that any effect should be or be understood as future in any case but dependently on its efficient cause Now what is the first and universal Essicient of al effects but the Decree of the divine Wil on which every effect dependes more than on its proxime cause Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects placed in such circumstances For al futures whether absolute or conditionate are known by God not from the determination of second causes but from the determinatin of the divine Wil which is the first Cause For whence springs the futurition of things but from the determination of the divine Wil And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the second CAuse And if so may we not then hence conclude that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the existence of or any conditions that belong to future objects If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent must not the divine Science which is identified therewith be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object can it be any other than conjectural Where any science dependes on its
dependes This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis on which the whole Fabric dependes but it dependes not on the Fabric so althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God but it on nothing Thus Plato Epist p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 About the King of althings althings are and althings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of althings beautiful Wherein note 1 thâ—â—e stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soveraign King or Lord of al i. e. according to the origination of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai Lord. 2 He saith althings are for God i. e. to be disposed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure And 3 he addes the Reason because he is the cause of althings i. e. God by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience has an universal Dominion over al things to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie The light of Nature teacheth that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work Hence what ever God wils is just because he wils it This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed Psal 135.5 Psal 135.5 6. For I know that Jehova is Great and that our Lord is superior to al Gods Jehovah i. e. the first Supreme Being who gives being to althings but receives nothing from any Creature Is Great i. e. Infinite in being and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure Whence it follows and superior to al Gods i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men though never so potent who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in Heaven and in Earth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever the Lord willeth which notes the Soveraintie Independence and Omnipotence of his Wil. Jonah 1.14 So Jonah 1.14 For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to thy soverain independent Wil. The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil. But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil God independent physically and morally we are to consider that as causes so dependence on those causes is twofold physic or moral Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence And there is this commun to both as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors so in Morals But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause 1 He has no physic dependence on any superior cause because he is the first in the order of physic Causes Again he is superior to al Gods as Psal 135.5 and therefore cannot be influenced by any So Plato Repub. assurâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God nor yet to force him The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil God wils not things because we wil them but we wil things because God wils them 2 Neither is God morally dependent on any other Moral dependence is founded in natural where there is natural independence in an absolute degree there cannot be moral dependence in any degree The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God as a Creature and as rational hence he has a twofold dependence on God one natural the other moral but God being independent as to his Essence must necessarily also be independent as to Morals Moral dependence is either Legal or Final Legal dependence is when an inferior dependes on the Laws Remunerations or Distributions of any Superior Final Dependence is when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent 1 It is not legally dependent because not subject to the law of any The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures but receives Laws from none yea it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature God willeth nothing without himself because it is just but it is therefore just because he wils it The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative 2 The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end because it s own Bonitie is its only end The End is the Cause Reason or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End but now nothing can move the Wil of God but his own Bonitie which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil because nothing is said to be the cause of it self When Theologues affirme That God wils one thing for another they mean not that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed As God willed the Sun Moon and Stars should be for the production of fruits and these for the use of man c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed but no causal influence on the Divine Wil Deus vult hoc propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc Ephes 1.4 5. God wils this for that yet for this he doth not wil that i. e. God wils effects and causes and that the effects are for the causes yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text Eph. 1.4 According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and without blame before him in love How are the Elect chosen in Christ 1 Negatively they are not chosen in Christ as the meritorious Cause of Election nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ as the motive of Divine Election according to the Pelagian Hypothesis But 2 They are said to be chosen in Christ as their commun Head that by him they might be made new Creatures and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil but the Divine Wil decrees that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation Thence it follows v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here
thou wilt thou canst make me clean as elsewhere whereby not only the Deitie of Christ is acknowleged but also the Identitie of his power with his wil that his power is as extensive as his wil or that his wil is omnipotent This Hypothesis touching the Identitie of Gods executive Power with his Wil has been avouched and defended by the most acute Scholastic Theologues Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves That Gods Wil is of it self operative neither may we place in God any other executive power And his reasons are cogent For 1 if there were any thing more required to the production of an effect than the Divine Wil it would thence follow that the Divine Wil is not of it self sufficient to act contrary to the forecited Textes 2 It 's evident that the Wil of God is in some manner operative of it self even as our wils are in moving our own bodies And if the Divine Wil be in one degree operative why not in every degree Doth it need any executive virtue for the supplie of its deficience Is it not omnipotent 3 If any such executive power be placed in God it must naturally mediate between the Divine Wil and effect but this cannot be because the effect necessarily follows upon the Divine Volition The same Hypothesis is defended by Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. conclus 1. We may not place in God besides his Intellect and Wil any third executive power eminently or formally distinct for the production of things But of this more in Gods Efficience Sect. 4. § 3. Prop. 2. § 5. Prop. 4. The object of Gods Power is every thing possible The object of Gods Power every thing possible For every power must have some object adequate thereto and by how much the higher and more universal the power is by so much the more universal is the object and is not the active power of God the first Cause most supreme and universal Must it not then comprehend under its object al possible Entitie And the more fully to understand this we are to understand that a thing may be said to be possible two ways 1 Positively and so that is possible which may be produced by a power Things possible are not said in this sense to be the object of Gods power for then the same thing would be explicated by it self for to say the power of God is extended to althings positively possible is the same as if we should say it is extended to al such things as are by it denominated possible Wherefore 2 a thing may be said to be possible negatively in a way of non-repugnance as it implies not any repugnance of existing and so althings are possible which implie not a contradiction And in this sense things possible are said to be the object of Gods infinite Power What things are impossible which extendes it self to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing For in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens Ens and non Ens being contradictories it thence follows that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehension of Ens possible possible Being but must be simply and of it self impossible God cannot verifie contradictions because they have not a passive power or possibilitie of being verified for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other they cannot be both true because they should not be contradictions if the truth of the one did not necessarily make the other false That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of Gods power is not from any defect of power in God but because the thing has not in it self any possibilitie of existing or of being reduced into act for no power can be denominated such in relation to a terme or effect which implies an impossibilitie of existing as what is contradictorie doth Al power extendes it self to that which can be actuated thereby as al sensitive power is conversant about sensible objects so far as they may be actuated thereby so the power of God is conversant about al possible things so far as they are capable of being actuated thereby Whence it appears that the impossibilitie of contradictions ariseth from the incapacitie of the mater not from any defect in the power of God Now the impossibles which implie a repugnance of being done by God are either such as regard God himself or the Creature or both 1. The Impossibles that regard God himself are either absolutely such or only in some limited sense 1 The Impossibles which regard God himself absolutely are al such as are simply repugnant to the Divine Essence As God cannot deceive or be deceived he cannot sin or be the moral cause of sin he cannot condemne or punish though he may afflict yea torment the innocent or justifie the wicked without a satisfaction 2 The Impossibles that regard God in a limited sense are such as implie a certain mode of acting or a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence 1 Such as implie a certain mode of acting as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal bodie he cannot eat drinke speak c. in that mode we do c. 2 The Impossibles under a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence are such as these not to do what he has decreed or promised 2. The Impossibles which regard the Creature or the externe object of Gods power are such as destroy the essence of the object Thus God cannot make a Creature independent or not to depend on himself both as to Being and Operation For dependence is essential to a Creature and therefore to suppose a Creature not to depend on God as wel in Operation as Being is to suppose a Creature not to be a Creature as Suarez strongly demonstrates against the Hypothesis of Durandus who denies Gods concurse to the material act of sin Again to suppose that God in the Eucharist should Transubstantiate or commute the Bread into the Bodie of Christ and yet the Quantitie and visible Accidents of the Bread stil remain implies a contradiction because Quantitie or Extension is essential to a bodie Besides this Popish Hypothesis of Transubstantiation implies other contradictions in that it supposeth two bodies to be in the same place or space and the same bodie of Christ to be in two places at once c. In like manner we say God cannot according to the Lutheran Consubstantiation make the bodie of Christ to be at the same time in the Heavens and circumscribed thereby and yet in and with and under the Bread 3. Things impossible both in regand of God and the Creature are such as are repugnant to the Essence of both Thus God cannot by his infinite Power produce an effect equal to himself infinite in Essence For by making an effect infinite he should make his own Essence finite it
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
and Absolute may be proved by these invincible Reasons 1 From the Independence of the Divine Wil the first cause of althings The first cause according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause and dependence Thus Plato Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God under the notion of the chiefest good and the first cause of althings he gives him this character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is not mere essence but somewhat more august than essence transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme effective cause of althings and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumental causes Yea he wil have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being it self and Eternitie it self and thence no way dependent on second causes And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential and so most independent And alas how absurd and monstrose is it that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings the same with the Divine Essence May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. 2 From the pure actualitie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power therefore no dependence 3 From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God solely being without Principe or independent he is the Framer of althings c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence For where there is dependence there is inferioritie and subordination And may we presume that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause What! can it be first and yet subordinate What is this but to be first and yet not first but second For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause as independence of the first 4 As the concurse of the first Cause is independent so also absolute yea therefore absolute because independent for that which dependes on nothing without it self must needs be absolute That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject or object it workes upon specially as to gratiose effects is most evident from sacred Philosophie Eph. 2.8 9 10. So Ephes 2.8 9 10. He saith v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith and that not of your selves it is the gift of God It 's true it workes through faith but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul the whole is the Gift of God and why v. 9. Not of workes lest any one should boast As if he had said Alas if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us then there were indeed room for boasting which Christ wil not allow of Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free independent and absolute communication of the spring Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in or by Christ Jesus unto good workes i. e. look as God created and formed the first rude confused Chaos not for any foreseen goodnesse in it but out of a pure nothing so Christ frames the New Creature not for any foreseen conditions it can performe but unto al conditions or good workes as Esa 19.25 We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace in Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace which enables us to act if we wil there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil such as Adam had and Angels now have and thus Christ hath died in vain for the proper Grace of Christ which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities Gratia medicinalis non est talis quae dominatrici samulando voluntati vel influit vel non influit prout imperanti sese determinare vel haerere placet sed prorsus talis quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia repugnantémque domat voluntatem tollit omnem ejus resistentiam rapit eam secum ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit Jansen August Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil expecting when our Wils wil move but it enables us to wil for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil. That the influxe and concurse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurditie yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God How absurd is it to conceit that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil Yea how impossible is such a conditionate influxe For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurse then he concurs to the working of that condition or not if not then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse If God doth concur to that condition then absolutely or on some other condition if absolutely then his former concurse is not conditionate for he that requires any condition of his act and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition why not also to the former act If God concur to the second condition conditionately then also to the third c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite which Nature but much more the God of Nature abhors Hence 3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent Gods concurse previous and antecedent For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause for therefore the second cause cooperates because the First cause operates The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects Thus Isidorus Pelusiota lib. 2. Epist 72. Edit Commelin 1605. pag. 121. An evil tree saith he cannot bring forth good fruit Mat. 7.18
and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concurse we are to consider that there is a twofold Concurse of God one moral the other efficacious which some terme physic Concurse because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect but a moral Cause as dictinguished from physic is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect yet he doth so far morally concur as that the effect is imputed to him as it 's wel determined by Suarez Metaph. Disput 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent but only objectively and remotely by Commands Arguments Incentives Motives and such like moral influences which is only a metaphoric indirect remote improper and inefficacious kind of efficience But now a physic Cause is that which alone deserves and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause because it doth by a proper real direct and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good He commandes propones arguments invites persuades what is good as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them This being premissed we procede to demonstrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurse 1 From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working specially in supernatural gratiose effects The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion Conservation Promotion and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne or supernatural vocation and motion they terme it sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the operant and cooperant Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Energie Aide and Assistence of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ineffable Virtue of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the assistent Power It 's termed also by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne and Divine impulse or inclination also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of protection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Spring of Energie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self perfect and sufficiently operative Chrysostome termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insuperable Assistence But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it than Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. de Adorat Tom. 1. where he assertes That men are turned from sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only by words injected into the Soul i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion by moral suasion only but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an energetic efficacious Aide whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand Clemens Alexandr l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Inspiration of God also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words And Athanas contr Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power communicated from God Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of God hath overcome Whence the Greek Theologues termed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence And Chrysostome saith expressely that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God 2 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil. We have before § 3. demonstrated that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God but only the act of the Divine Wil which being omnipotent it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious Whence it is worthy our notice that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word as Gen. 1.3 c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil Hence in sacred Philosophie the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie both Word and Thing denoting to us that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done is done and whatever is done is but the effect of his Word or Wil every Word and Wil of God which regardes the event and issues of things is omnipotent and operative 3 From the Determination of the second cause by the first Gods Concurse is not only moral by propounding objects and persuading thereto but really operative and productive of things Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate the first and second cause cannot be coordinate but the later must be subordinate to the former and if subordinate to then it must be determined by the first Cause It 's certain that either the second cause determines the first or the first the second and is it not more likely that the first cause should determine the second than that the second should determine the first to act Can we imagine that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God and the condition of a Creature to determine that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes See Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez de Auxil l. 3. Disp 18-21 l. 4. Disput 32. Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. Gods Concurse connatural Lastly Gods concurse albeit it be most potent and efficacious yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial there is not more of force than Divine suavitie mixed therewith So Psal 110.3 Psal 110.3 Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power Willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies 1 Free ready chearful spontaneous 2 Metonymically a free gift or oblation 3 Princes who ought to be free-spirited generose liberal as Luke 22.25 4 The word is here used in the abstract which carries a great emphase for abstractes speak essences 5 It is here also in the Genitive case plural of thy willingnesses which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree So that the meaning is thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free ready willing as Noble and Free-borne Princes to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering gift or oblation unto thee Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the interne philtrum or charme by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace which is
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence 3 Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates That God permits nothing but what he wils It 's true man oft permits things that he neither wils nor doth because he cannot hinder them but there is no mere permission with God without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie Efficacitie and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282 c. spends a whole Chapter to prove That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God not only permitting but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative As 1 Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner 2 The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence c. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates That where-ever there is any permission of God there also is his actual Volition Hence 2. 2. Immobile and fixed Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile immutable fixed and certain order things most contingent and free as to second causes are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence Hence the Stoics as also Plato expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence That providence puts into things a fixed immutable order is evident because 1 nothing fals out but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. 2 Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause and therefore subject to his Order Yea this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain because it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil Efficience and Gubernation as more fully anon 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon The Necessitie and Immobilitie 3. Connatural and agreable that attendes the Providence of God doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes but confirme the same Therefore men act freely because the Providence of God determines them so to act So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence because it determines althings to act according to their Natures it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil but sweetly though necessarily moves it to the end appointed Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them For 1 Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power Virtue and Efficacitie to worke 2 Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted 3 Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence 4 Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly yet powerfully order the manner of working as also perfect the same Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions Hence 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect 4. Beautiful and perfect al its executions are in Number Weight and Measure Doth not the Wise Man assure us Eccles 3.11 That every thing is beautiful in its season Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God What are al the travels and births of time but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light Have not al issues and events not only natural and necessary but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence which renders them most beautiful and perfect Are not those very products which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed most beautiful in their time and place as they relate to Divine Providence Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees Is not that which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed in regard of Gods Providence and Execution most beautiful as Christs Crucifixion What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches Persons and Things Doth it reach the Providence of God Is it not only in regard of second causes and our mistakes as to the first cause Cannot yea wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos It 's true Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World but whence springs the evil of these later days Is it not from the Lusts of Men not the Providence of God Are not the worst of days Naturally good yea Morally also to those who are good and do good Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil If Men were better would not the Times soon prove better Yea are not those very Disorders and Confusions that arise from the Lusts of Men ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole As in Nature varietie addes Beautie so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful It was a great saying of a Stoic He that wil take upon him to mend things let him first take upon to mend God Certainly nothing is done by God but that which to leave undone were not so good Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts are not so if we consider the whole Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved that God provides and governes althings according to his most wise Wil he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature or Essentially As therefore he is good he provides for he that provides not for such as are under his care is not good but as he is wise he takes care to provide the best things Therefore it becomes us attending to these things to admire al to praise al to receive without curiose inquisition al the workes of Providence albeit they may seem to many injust because incognite and incomprehensible as in what follows That the Providence of God is most perfect see Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible 5. Mysterious The Providences of God are much like his Being very ful of mysteries So Psal 36.6 The Judgements of God are said to
Rector of althings Thus we may applie Eccles 8.4 Where the word of a King is there is power or Domination and who can say to him what doest thou i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is by so much the greater is his Domination God being King of Kings and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination This is oft inculcated by Plato and carries with it its own Evidence For 1 althings receiving their Being Perfection Virtue and Operation from God it cannot be but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them 2 Althings tend to God as their last end therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end it 's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end Thus Aquinas 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good it 's necessary that the Gubernation of the world be best But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one c. 3 God is infinitely wise to order althings and potent to bring them to their ends therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who is most wise both can and wil take care of his own Creatures c. 4 The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made Whatever flows from God as the first Cause must returne to him as the last end 5 This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation to see that althings reach the end for which they were made For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made to the end for which it was made And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings Hence 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things The last end of Divine Gubernation What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end And what is the last end of althings but the Glorie of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us persuade this young man that he who by his providence takes the care of the whole that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue doth wisely dispose and order althings to this end the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Vniverse according to their nature Whereby he explicates to us how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie This he more fully lays open in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But thou knowest not that al generation of singulars is for this that the life of the whole may be blessed his Essence is not for thy sake but thou wert made for his sake For every Physician and every skilful Artificer makes al for the sake of the whole aspiring after the commun utilitie Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part but the part for the sake of the whole But thou art ful of indignation because thou canst not see how that which is best may accord with the commun good and thy proper interest Here are several things remarquable for explication and demonstration that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation 1 He saith Al singulars are for this that the life of the whole may be blessed Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole understand God That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion specially in his Timaeus pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contemplations of the whole c. I could easily persuade my self 2 But grant that we must understand this of the Vniverse strictly taken yet it must at last be resolved into God for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake not God for the sake of the Universe 3 Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer who workes al for the sake of the whole and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Vniversitie or whole into which al lower ends must be melted 4 Plato blames his young Atheist and in him the most of men for preferring their private good before the good of the whole which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation for the Glorie of God is manifest 1 From the prime motion and causalitie of God For God being the prime Motor of althings and moved by nothing it thence necessarily follows that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself as the last end The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings 2 From Gods Dominion over althings Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie 3 From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glorie of God By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie by so much the more perfect it is and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself which al desire as their last end and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end Hence 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth althings to their last end is most fixed The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed Esa 40.26 immobile and perfect This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed Esa 40.26 Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things that bringeth out their host by number he calleth them al by name by the greatnesse of his might for that he is strong in power not one faileth Observe here 1 he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God 2 He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation 3 He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things specially the Celestial bodies by bringing out their host by number O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by
extraordinary Impressions which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them 6. Prop. Gods Gubernation by second Causes The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments yet so as it actes immediately in and with them yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation saith That albeit God takes the care of the whole Vniverse himself yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And over al these parts of the Universe are set Rulers and Moderators who constantly governe althings even the most minute parts that so by these they may governe al even to the last part unto their end By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation I presume he understandes al second Causes made use of thereby Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes but these include subordination to Divine operations Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors Corporals by Spirituals and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes Touching the Executions of Divine Providence see § 3. Prop. 4. 7. Gods Gubernation reacheth althings Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 903. proves That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable but it fals under Divine Gubernation But to descend to particulars 1 Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons both Natural and Politic. 1 Natural Seasons Eccles 3.1 as Eccles 3.1 To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose A Season i. e. a certain fixed determinate time 2 Politic Seasons for Human and Politic Actions 2 Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world without the least vicissitude or change in himself Dan. 2.20 21. So Dan. 2.20 For Wisdome and Might are his i. e. for the Gubernation of althings Whence it follows v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings 3 Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors Snow Job 37.6 7. Rain c. So Job 37.6 For he saith to the Snow be thou on the earth likewise to the smal Rain and to the great Rain of his strength Whence it follows v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man that al men may know his worke He sealeth up the hand of every one Elibu's meaning is that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain he thereby seals up or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman that so he may retire out of the fields home and consider his worke Then the Bestes go into Dens as v. 8. 4 God governeth al motions of second Causes even such as are most contingent and voluntary in the most certain manner 5 God governes al Events of things It was a great saying of Julius Caesar which he gained by experience That Fortune whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation has great force in althings but more particularly in the affaires of war wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires § 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man both in his sinful and renovate State Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe but in a more special manner Man and his Affaires So Plato saith Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God truely and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man because he is capable not only of Natural but also of Moral Gubernation God governes every Creature according to its capacitie whether Natural or Moral but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end they may be governed and directed to their last end but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto But Man being invested with a Natural Passive remote capacitie of understanding and Wil can when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation actively conduct and direct himself to his last end Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral 1. Moral by Law or Efficacious 1 Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes and Inclinations which are to them a Law directing them to their end so Rational Creatures have a more expresse formal Law which was at first impressed on their Beings but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation whereby they are directed to their last end For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures who alone can understand the reason of their operations And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is to bring Man into subjection to God and who are subject to God but those who refer al to him as their last end Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make those good to whom his Laws are promulgated And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man but in subjection to God and adhering to him as his last end So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end 2 This also is the main designe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation 2. Efficacious namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men Wicked men if they persevere in their wickednesse are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively by penal executions in order to the vindication of Divine Justice but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit Of both these in their order That wicked men Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are by Divine Gubernation reduced to the last end of al the Glorie of God wil appear evident if we reflect on what was before hinted that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation it immediately fals under another if lawlesse irregular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gracious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life they deservedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice and Eternal Death and
from the power of Nature For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. if men were good by Nature then certainly some would be so in their tender years 2 Then he procedes to another Question Therefore seing men are not good by Nature may they not yet be such 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Discipline and Institution This also he denies demonstrating That Virtue is not a Science such as may be taught by Precepts If Virtue saith he may be taught then there must be Masters and Disciples of it On the contrary may we not rightly conjecture that what has neither Masters nor Disciples that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be taught Whence Socrates assumes thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely I have oft sought diligently whether there were any Masters to be found who could teach Virtue but I could never as yet find any Thus pag. 93. Now let us consider whether good men can communicate that Virtue they have unto others 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or whether virtue be such as that it can be delivered to no one by Institution nor yet be received by any one in such a way He demonstrates the later and exemplifies it by Themistocles who saith he was according to commun estime a good man and a skilful preceptor of Virtue if any ever were And canst thou thinke he would make others good and not his own Son Cleophantus But this addes he he could not do Whence he concludes that Virtue could not be taught Thence he procedes to make inquisition into two sorts of men who professed themselves Masters of Virtue namely Sophists and Politicians and demonstrates that neither of these could indeed teach men to be virtuose Yea p 99. he saith That God oft makes use of the most unapt Instruments for the producing Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Is it not meet Meno to cal those Divine Men who being without understanding excellently performe many of those things they both do and speak Whence he concludes But if in this whole Disputation we have rightly found out the case 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is acquired neither by Natures force neither by any Institutes of Discipline or Doctrine but it comes to those who have it by Divine Afflation or Infusion without the active concurrence providence and industrie of the human soul Lastly he closeth up his Dialogue with this That supposing any should by Institution acquire somewhat of Virtue yet this is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be adorned as it were with a shadow whereas Virtue is a thing real and solid i. e. Al the forces of natural power or artificial Institution give men only a shadow forme or semblance of Virtue whereas the truth and real power thereof comes from God Whence Bias as Laertius informes us advised 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What Good thou shalt performe refer to God as the Author of it We have already demonstrated that the supernatural infusion of Virtue by God was generally asserted by the Greek Fathers albeit too many of them inclined to favor Origen's corrupt infusions about Free-wil Thus Damascene who gives us a sum of the Greek Theologie Orthodox Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we ought to know that Virtue is given to human nature by God and that he is the Principe and Cause of al Good and without his cooperation and aide it is impossible that we should wil or act any good And this he demonstrates from Gods prime Causalitie L. 3. C. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God who gives Being is he that gratiosely vouchsafeth Wel-Being And John Climacus scal Parad. grad 23. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the extremitie of pride consistes in the negation of Divine Aide and the lifting up of our own Virtue is a Demonic Affection for he that thinkes he can of himself without supernatural Grace performe any good denies God to be his helper in althings And Greg. Nyssen saith wel That the Grace of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sum of Virtue That supernatural Good and Virtue comes from God by Divine Infusion is generally asserted and demonstrated by the Sectators of Augustin and Aquinas Thus Gregorius Ariminensis 2. Dist 29. q. 1. where he demonstrates these Conclusions 1 That no just person invested with habitual Grace can avoid any one sin without Divine special assistance because no just person can by Grace received avoid any one tentation or persevere in good 2 That Adam before he fel could not by his own forces with the general insluence of God without special assistance performe any one good act Touching the necessitie of habitual and actual Grace for the performance of any action really morally and spiritually good see Jansenius August Tom. 3. de Grat. L. 2. C. 2. 22 23 c. § 2. Gods care of virtuose men As al Divine Knowlege and Virtue come under Gods supernatural Efficience and Gubernation so in like manner al virtuose men Sacred Philosophie every where inculcates what a paternal and special Providence God vouchsafeth his peculiar people Thus Psal 17.7 Psal 17.7 Shew thy marvellous loving kindnesse O thou that savest by thy right hand them which trust in thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Separate thy Benignities or make thy Benignities marvellous So the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make wonderful i. e. exert thy wonderful Benignitie as thou art wont to do towards those that trust in thee So v. 8. Keep me as the apple of thine eye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the pupil the daughter of the eye There is an elegance in the similitude As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye being like a tender delicate Daughter the darling of the Eye is the main of its care so are the Children of God his darlings Whence he addes Hide me under the shadow of thy wings Which seems to allude to the providence of an Hen which hides her young under her wing thereby to protect foment and nourish them It may also allude to the wings of the Cherubims which spread themselves over the Propitiatorie Exod. 25.20 thereby pointing forth Gods protection of his People Thus Psal 91.1 Psal 91.1 He that dwelleth in the secret place of the most high It seems to allude to the Holy of Holies which in Scriptural phraseologie is termed the secret place of God where he dwelt The meaning is whoever commits himself to the Tuition of God by flying unto his Sanctuarie he shal be safe So it follows shal abide under the shadow of the Almighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shal sojourne or continually loge Of the Almighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai is one of Gods names which signifies Self-sufficient as containing al sufficience in him from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dai sufficient or it may signifie potent to destroy al from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to destroy God is both Alsufficient to provide for his People and Omnipotent to destroy
ful and convictive demonstration and explication of the Necessitie and Nature of creatural Dependence we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Every Being dependent or independent Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent That this distribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate is generally confessed by such as discourse of Metaphysics And for the demonstration and explication hereof we are to consider That a dependent Being and that on which it dependes do really differ in number And the reasons are demonstrative 1 Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself 2 The dependent is in order of Nature at least posterior and inferior to that on which it dependes 3 Dependence importes subordination to that on which the dependence is Hence Divines say that the Son of God albeit he be as to Origine from the Father yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father he cannot be said to be dependent on him For he being in the forme or Essence of God thought it not robberie to be equal with God Phil. 2.6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 2.6 here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie and we may take it properly and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper sense when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him that which belonges to another Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie against God by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an independence either in Essence or Operation it may justly fal under the imputation of Robberie against God because it thereby equaliseth itself to God But our Lord Christ accounted it not robberie to be equal with God i. e. independent as God is For one person in the Trinitie is not essentially divided from the other but the Son is so generated by the Father as that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another essence or thing albeit he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another person The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father and the Spirit So that although one person be really distinct from the other yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence it implies a contradiction to say one person dependes on the other which was the great error of Origene imbibed from Platonic Philosophie as before Ch. 6. § 4. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 8 9. § 2. One prime independent Being An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself as the cause of its Being and Operation This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus 1 There is one prime independent Being This is evident from the series of causes in which we find that althings obey the superior Power from which they derived their origine whence it necessarily follows that to prevent a progresse into infinite we stop in one prime supreme infinite Power which received no this Being from any other but is truely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being and Self-sufficient or Independent Again that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest because where-ever there is Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence there must needs be Dependence But now al Beings except the first Cause admit Participation Limitation Potentialitie and Contingence as to their Essence and therefore none but the first Being can be independent Hence it follows 2 That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being as the cause of its Being For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause supposeth also Participation Posterioritie and Inferioritie which the prime independent Being excludeth Whence also it follows 3 That the prime independent Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-being or from himself When we say the prime independent Being is from himself it must not be understood positively as if he did effectively produce himself for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impossible but negatively that he receives not his Being from any other Hence we conclude 4 That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause as Dependence is to second Beings and Causes As it is essential to the Creature to be defective indigent limited receptive and dependent so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite alsufficient and without al deficience indigence and dependence either actual or possible Hence § 3. Dependent Being by participation c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation finite potential contingent and defectible 1 Every dependent is Ens by participation For whatever is not Being by Essence and independently must necessarily be such by participation where there is not self-Being there must be a reception of Being from some other which connotes participation 2 Whatever is dependent is also finite and limited both in Being Virtue and Operation 1 Whatever is dependent is finite in Being because its Being is by participation and according to communication of the superior Cause 2 Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be limited in its virtue and efficace Hence 3 every dependent is also finite in its Operation For the sphere of Activitie cannot be larger than the sphere of Essence if the principe be limited the operation cannot but be limited 3 Whatever is dependent is also potential To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a dependent Being we must consider 1 that nothing is pure Act but the first most simple independent Being no Creature is pure Actualitie where there is dependence there is somewhat of Potentialitie or passive Power either physic or metaphysic Al mater hath a physic passive power or natural possibilitie of being corrupted Spirits have not a physic passive power or natural principe of corruption yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated or cast back into their primitive nothing 2 Besides the natural power which a dependent Being has there is an obediential power appendent to its nature For the explication of which we are to know that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first increate and independent Being so far as to obey it in receiving al impressions and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction Hence the Scholes distribute the power of the second cause or dependent Beings into natural and obediential their natural power of receiving influences from the superior cause or acting is that which is appendent to their natures and whereby they naturally receive or act and produce effects proportionate to their natures But the obediential power of dependent Being is that whereby they are according to the
between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature At present it may suffice that we assert that Dependence is so intrinsecally essentially and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite For what doth the notion of a Creature importe but its eduction out of nothing by the Infinite Power of its Creator And he that educed althings out of nothing is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure And where there is an obediential power is there not also subordination and subjection And doth not al this formally speak Dependence Thus Aquinas contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates That God cannot make a thing which shal want any essential principe for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe he should make a thing to be and not to be And in what follows he proves that dependence is an essential principe or mode of a Creature as Suarez and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to operation of which § 10. 2 The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition and if the Dominion of God be Absolute then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction As it is impossible that God should make a Creature whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion so it is as impossible that a Creature should be made which may not depend on him as Suarez Metaphys Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. 3 The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God Is not every Creature Multiforme Mutable and Defectible And must not every Multiforme Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Vniforme Immutable and Indefectible Being as the Original principe of its dependence is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature which renders it fluxible variable and inconstant was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus That althings are in fluxe or motion Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions Again doth not every potential Being need some pure Act to actuate the same And is not every Creature a potential Being which needs God the most simple pure Act to actuate the same Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God who is the first influential Cause of its existence motion and al Yea is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator and what an endlesse Agitation yea Annihilation would it fal into See Aquinas contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. 4 The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations and is it not a violence to it to be cut off from this dependence Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun which gave it existence O then how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator the prime Cause of its existence and operation What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence Hence § 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature Dependence the same with the Essence That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident because every Creature being Ens by participation it must necessarily follow that dependence on the first cause from whom it participates of Being is most essential to it As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence and so Independent so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation and so Dependent So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably essentially and formally include Dependence on God as that which is not really distinct therefrom This is incomparably wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence it must be said that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such because if we by the force of our Intellect remove whatever is superadded to such an essence we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing and therefore according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being Wherefore albeit we may by the precision of Reason and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing yet this later really superaddes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being Wherein note wel that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators who assert the Creatures dependence on God as to Essence and Conservation but yet denie it as to causation and operation specially as to the substrate mater of sin It may not be denied but that Suarez in his first Tome of Metaphys Disput 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature but a mode distinct therefrom Yet these thing he grants 1 That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally existing in the Creature For al confesse that passive Creation is in the Creature But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation if we speak of the first Creation from God 2 That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature albeit it constitute not the same 3 He
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
Human Wil as chap. 5. § 3. 3 Again if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence 4 The Understanding cannot produce its act without Gods illumination therefore neither can the Wil its without Gods concurse See this more fully in Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. § 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes in this Part 4. C. 7. 9. § 12. Lastly Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural Creatural Dependence as to its parts is either Natural or Moral and Supernatural Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence conservation and operation Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals We find both these dependences conjoined in Man for he having a double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude to God 1 as a Creature and 2 as a Rational Creature he hath also a double dependence on God Supernatural Dependence on Christ 1 Natural of which in what precedes 2 Moral and Supernatural And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting can do nothing without much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors so also in Morals and Supernaturals Supernatural Elevation is the total next and formal Reason of acting supernaturally and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God its supernatural influencing cause by so much the more it partakes of his influence as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression God doth most potently and yet most sweetly influence the Affect Act and Effect of the virtuose Soul Phil. 2.13 Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God Yea the natural Wil by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence is elevated to act above Nature This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ as Mediator and Spring of al Grace is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 87.7 As wel the singers Psal 87.7 as players on instruments shal be there Al my springs are in thee Glassius renders the words thus And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances Al my springs are in thee The Psalmist having given us in the foregoing Verses a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion or in Evangelic Churches and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there he concludes with this as the burden of their Song Al my springs are in thee i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee O great Mediator Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace is Vniversal Total Absolute and Immediate and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace For Habitual Grace 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace So John 1.16 And of his fulnesse have we al received Joh. 1.16 and Grace for Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies either the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon and then the sense is Grace upon Grace i. e. abundant Grace and that freely or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ and Nature received from Adam and then the meaning is this Grace for Grace i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust for there was no lust in his heart but what was communicated to his Posteritie so the Children of Christ the second Adam receive from him Grace for Grace i. e. al manner of habitual Graces answerable to those in his Human Nature This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples Luk. 17.5 Luk. 17.5 And the Apostles said unto the Lord Encrease our Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adde Faith to us i. e. some additional degrees of Faith The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie and therefore now having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience they depend wholly on him for supplies their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven and by Juices derived from a Principe above it self As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto and did not depend on his Creator so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it so long as it dependes on Christ 2. The New Creature has an Universal For Actual Grace Psal 141.8 Absolute Total and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Thus Psal 141.8 But mine eyes are unto thee O God the Lord in thee is my trust leave not my soul destitute Hebr. make not my soul naked or emty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to evacuate or make naked So the Targum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It notes his total dependence on god We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described Cant. 8.5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse leaning upon her Beloved Who is this i. e. this Woman or Church that cometh up out of the Wildernesse This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength Leaning or Cleaving to The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament The LXX render it by a word that signifies confirming her self which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ and not on habitual Grace received from him Members and Branches live on life but the life of their Head and Root So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ as Paul Gal. 2.20 When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received than in dependence on Christ they soon fal into sin This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated Phil. 2.12 13. Phil. 2.12 Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling This fear and trembling doth not implie douting as the Papists would needs persuade us but a modest humble self-abasing sense of our own insufficience with an absolute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace Thence it follows v. 13. For it 's God that worketh in you to wil and to do of his good pleasure This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine