it must be moral and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause and Author of them and is not this an high piece of blasphemie We are so far from asserting that God determines men to the most wicked actions as that we say he determines men to no wicked action no not the least Yea we adde further that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good and in part sinful albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodnesse of the action and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act yet he predetermines not to the vitiositie of the act or the act as sinful So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even such as have sin appendent to them This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie 1 Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants agree 2 The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience Futurition Divine Concurse and Gods permission of sin 3 The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees the Futurition Divine Permission Prescience Providence Predefinition and Predetermination of Sin THE prolixitie we have used in explicating and stating our Question wil render our subsequent work more facile and concise For here that old Proverbe holds true A good beginning is half the work But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it wil be necessary to manifest 1 Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree 2 Wherein our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis differ among themselves 3 Wherein we differ from them The explication of these Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question § 1. Wherein we and our Opponents who maintain the Antithesis do agree Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are others on the contrary make them lesse our first work therefore wil be to shew wherein we agree which I shal endeavor to lay down in the following Propositions 1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to passe Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us albeit they differ from us as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confesse and say that God doth truly decree althings that happen but not althings in one and the same manner but some things effectively other things permissively which is the commun opinion of Theologues according to that famose Axiome of Augustin There is nothing done which the Omnipotent doth not wil either by permitting that it be done or by doing of it Yet the said Strangius in what precedes gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees It is not needful saith he that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God touching his Concurse to be afforded as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature as he hath given them a power to act c. This general Decree foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis is most unworthy of the Divine Being in that it overthrows the Prescience of God imposeth imperfection on the Divine Wil and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianisme 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glorie is absolute and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man This Proposition although it be denied by the Pelagians Socinians and Arminians yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius Le Blanc and others For these albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans sin yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glorie which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election why should they not be also estimed such as to Reprobation Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itself Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee al acts and events of the human wil Must they not then be al decreed absolutely by God See hereafter Chap. 5. § 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin as wel as of al other Events This Proposition is universally granted by al the New Methodists Amyraldus Strangius c. as also by most Arminians although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Partie For al the wit of man yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils wil never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees I must solemnely professe I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument against the certaintie of Gods prescience if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events of which more in what follows Chap. 5. § 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternitie he predetermines in time This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition we willingly grant that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us to the same he doth determine our wil For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined it is necessary that he effect the same or cause that it be done because the Decree of God seeing it is absolute and efficacious must necessarily have its effect which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefinite act otherwise if the wil should not act that which is predefined the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated which is absurd A good concession which wil be of use to us in what follows Chap. 5. § 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good as also to some other commun acts and effects This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians as also by Baronius yet the New Methodists who have chalked out a middle Way generally entertain it Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shewen that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil namely not in actions intrinsecally evil and to which Vitiositie is necessarily annexed albeit in things lawful not only in works of
God to al and singular actions of the wil The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain persuade us namely That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination yet Aquinas is not c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge 1 Was not Thomas Aquinas himself a Dominican of the Order of Dominic And are not al the Dominicans sworne Thomists Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions even such as are sinful and yet Thomas their Master against it 2 Take the character of impartial Writers and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's sentiment See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward Professor of Theologie at Cambridge his Determinations pag. 117 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurse to al actions of the wil out of Thomas But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend we shal appele unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversie namely to Le Blanc and Baronius Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. par 3. thes 10. pag. 430. assures us That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans teach for the explication of Divine Concurse That God doth premove and applie the very second causes to their worke for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require For according to their mind God is therefore said to be the first Mover because he doth antecedently move and applie al other causes to their operations c. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein Thus also Baronius who in his Metaphysics Sect. 8. Disp 3. § 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurse to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas as the principal Founder thereof So § 79. pag. 147. And § 82. pag. 149. he urgeth That from the opinion of Thomas it follows that God is the Author of sin The like § 85. pag. 151. But 3 to let passe the testimonies of others if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses and the reflexions of our own reason thereon it is to me most evident that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries Thus 1. 2. Quaest 79. Art 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act and in both regards it is from God for it 's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being c. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among our selves pretend that this includes immediate concurse but not predeterminative it is most evident that Aquinas owned no concurse but what was predeterminative For what is predetermination of the wil but the application of it to its act as Strangius pag. 244. grants And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concurse of God to al acts of the wil What more commun with him than this grand Effate That God applies al second causes to their act Thus in his sums par 1. Quaest 105. Art 5. he layes down this conclusion That God actes in every Agent finally effectively and formally yet so as they also act And then in the explication hereof he saith 3 That it is to be considered that God doth not only move things to work as by applying the formes and virtues of things to their operations as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the axe but also gives formes to creatures acting and preserves them in being and because the forme is in the thing and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings which among althings is more intime it follows that God workes intimely in althings and for this reason in sacred Scripture the operations of nature are ascribed unto God as working in nature according to that Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me c. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis He saith 1 That God actes in every Agent not only finally and effectively but also formally 2 That God moves things to worke by APPLYING i. e. predetermining the formes and virtues of things to their operations Yea 3 That God applies the second cause to act as the Artificer applies the instrument to worke Whereby he makes al second causes the wil not excepted but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience For the wil albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts yet in regard of the Divine concurse which it receives and in virtue whereof it actes it may safely be termed a vital Instrument 4 That God acting most intimely in althings the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him which notes predetermination in the highest point So also Aquinas Quaest Disp q. 3. de Potentia art 7. speakes fully of this predeterminative application of al second causes by God And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him So that I cannot but wonder that any learned man should urge Aquinas's testimonie against us We descend now to Scotus the Head of a Sect opposite to the Thomists yet who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis I am not ignorant that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus's name to patronise his Antithesis and I shal not denie but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than Thomas yet this I no way dout but to make good that as to our Hypothesis touching Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Scotus is fully of our persuasion This wil appear evident 1 if we consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them as Le Blanc de Praescient thes 33. pag. 443. confesseth And certainly such as hold Gods prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition cannot with any shadow of reason denie Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin 2 Scotus and his sectators generally hold That God efficaciously concurs to al second causes and their acts not by any influence or impression on the second cause which the Thomists assert but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act Which we judge to be the very truth as it hath been demonstrated by us Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination but only as to its origine and principe the Thomists making it to consiste in a physic intrinsec influxe impressed on the creature
2 There is also a libertie strictly so termed which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object also to act or not to act and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state as Strangius p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc p. 435. and others There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means not the end yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Libertie But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie among those who owned the Synod of Dort was Strangius who asserts a two-fold Libertie one considered in its own Nature which is essential to the wil and the other as limited to lapsed man which includes Indifference c. as in places above cited What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined distinction of Libertie unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians I cannot conjecture Certain I am that I never could find it among the ancient Philosophers Primitive Fathers Scholastic Theologues or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any libertie but what is essential to the wil and al human acts Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us that Liberty is essential to al moral acts both in the future as wel as the present state of the Soul Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie Doth not Amyraldus de Libero Arbitrio as wel as we make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be Wil it satisfie the Pelagians Jesuites or Arminians No because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not If it be supposed that Indifference be essential to libertie in this imperfect state wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians that the wil is not according to these new Methodists free in Conversion because not indifferent It were not difficult to demonstrate how invalid this new-coined distinction of Libertie is and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie we have with what studie and diligence we could inquired into and discussed the same Court of the Gentiles P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 29 32. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. § 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions 1 Natural Libertie as it denotes a power has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copiosely demonstrated in the forementioned places Hence 2 Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them 3 The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute but limited and conditionate 4 The necessitie which ariseth from the concurse of God the first cause no way diminisheth but establisheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil or is injuriose to its Libertie so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto the act is in its own power and free for as Aristotle Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing happens to such an one but what he wils 5 Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts is no way essential to natural Libertie but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection 6 The formal native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie both as to state and exercice includes no more than a rational spontaneitie This last proposition which is the principal Strangius owns and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit Thes 19. p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines even of Amyraldus Placeus and other new Methodists That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant see his Determinations Quaest 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie These Propositions about natural Libertie we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie and particularly this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie doth nothing to purpose § 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil we are to consider Moral Libertie or Free-wil as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good This moral and spiritual Libertie our Adversaries the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature they falsely charge us with denying the former therefore to remove this confusion of the termes and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse the following Propositions wil be of use unto us 1. Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts whatever act is voluntary is for that very reason free Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation as also by the determination of the best Philosophers termes synonymous and equipollent as we have demonstrated Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. § 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good that is only accidental to the human Soul it may come and go be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul or violation to natural Libertie It 's true that Moral Libertie consisting in virtuose Habits Inclinations and Exercices is the Perfection of Man yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof 2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good This is granted on both sides and therefore needs not further demonstration 3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good I cal this Impotence total and universal as it overspreads the whole soul and has stript it of al seeds of or inclinations to any
at an end The sum of al is this That the determination or predetermination of Divine concurse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act or a contrary act a simple or most strictly natural impossibilitie as some would persuade us but only infers a necessitie of the consequence the wil having stil in sensu diviso i. e. on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concurse an habitual indifference to act or not to act though in sensu composito as predetermined by Divine concurse it cannot but act Or summarily thus The wil has at that very time when it is predetermined by God to this or that act an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act or to the putting forth a contrary act So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act not the radical power to that act Thus also Davenant Animadv against Hoard p. 240 333 341 360 402. proves strongly and accurately That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events Of which more hereafter § 5. The next terme that fals under consideration is the Wil of God its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures under which our Opponents concele themselves and their misrepresentations of our sentiments The ancient distinction of the Divine wil which they say Hugo de S. Victore first formed was into voluntatem signi voluntatem beneplaciti Gods significative wil and his beneplacite wil. 1 Gods significative wil they make to consiste of Precepts Promisses Prohibitions Permissions Counsels and Admonitions By Permissions here we must understand such as are moral not natural which as to sin properly belong to Gods beneplacite wil as anon This significative Wil of God some Divines terme his Reveled wil from Deut. 29. 29. others terme it his Legislative or Preceptive wil others his Approbative wil whereby he declares what he approves and what he disapproves of which see Davenant Animadv against Hoard pag. 222 356 391 399. Lastly learned Chamier and Daillé out of him terme this significative wil of God his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of complacence or complacential wil whereby he declares what is most agreable to him and what not Our judicious Davenant makes use also of this terme as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of Gods Approbative wil. These several notions of Gods significative wil albeit they may differ in some formalitie yet they agree in substance and import denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie and that which is most agreable to his holy wil and nature 2 As for Gods Beneplacite wil commonly â—…iled his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of good pleasure it is that whereby he decrees effects or permits al events and effects whence it is distributed into effective and permissive Gods effective beneplacite wil is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and supernatural effects Gods permissive beneplacite wil is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin This distribution of the Divine wil is greatly opposed by the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists 1 The Jesuites whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians do what they can to baffle this distinction so Molina the Head of that Faction in Thom. Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 12. tels us That these signs of the Divine wil signifie properly and formally some nolition or volition in God and therefore Gods significative wil cannot be contradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil. The same is urged by the Arminians But the Orthodox both among Papists and Protestants replie that Gods reveled significative wil is only equivocally analogically figuratively and improperly termed his wil as the Edicts of Princes and Laws of States So Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiae Praelect 4 sect 20. tels us That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie constituted with himself what he wil do his significative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law by signifying what he wil have done by us Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God but this later improperly and analogically so called The like Davenant Animadvers pag. 392. It 's true Divines grant that this significative wil of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil answering thereto for the wise God decreed that this or that should be mans dutie but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the same with his decretive wil touching events 2 Our Adversaries pretend that by this distinction of the significative and beneplacite wil we make two opposite wils in God and such as clash each with other This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction as of no use in our present case But Divines answer that these wils are not opposite in God but only disparate and diverse the things decreed and the things reveled and constituted by Gods significative wil may oppose each other but the decretive and reveled wil never oppose each other The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands or approves with an intention that it shal be mans dutie and rewarded if performed but not alwayes with an intention that it shal be effected 3 Our Opponents and particularly the new Methodists confound Gods Beneplacite Decretive Wil with his Wil of Complacence and Approbation and under this confusion endeavor to secure their opposition against Gods willing the Permission of Sin Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. None can be said to wil what he doth not approve Thence others make Love of complacence essential to al acts of the Divine Wil and thence conclude if God wil the permission of Sin he must necessarily take complacence therein But the replie hereto is not difficult we say that God takes complacence in al his own Acts but not in al the objects they refer unto but now love of complacence is not so termed from the act but object about which it is conversant which must be some good either natural or moral Whence it is evident that God may wil the permission of Sin and its existence as a consequent thereto and yet not take complacence in or approve of sin See more of Gods Wil and its various Distributions Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 3. § 6. The last terme that needs our Explication is Divine Concurse its Immediation Efficacitie and Predetermination Strangius l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. distinguisheth Concurse from Influxe thus 1 Influxe is more large than concurse for the causality of every efficient is termed Influxe and therefore the Influxe of God is seen in many things in which his concurse is not as when he acts without the concurrence of a second cause Thence 2 the terme Influxe is absolute not denoting the respect of any other cause but that of concurse is relative I have no mind to
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which notes to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner so as to overcome al resistence made against the force of the Agent So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who efficaciously worketh althings The like v. 11. of which hereafter This efficacious concurse as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concurse and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Lord cooperating or efficaciously concurring So elsewhere that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose efficacious and predeterminative concurse in and with althings is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work readily It 's rendred by the Syriac sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concurse but a particular present certain efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurse exerting it self in al individual acts and effects Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred by the Syriac Rom. 7. 5. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work to act with diligence to be efficacious as Boderianus And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to act to work to perform to effect as Boderianus Lastly it is rendred by the Syriac Ephes 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who hath efficaciously wrought althings Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of Gods concurse as to al second causes and acts Hence 2. This efficacious Concurse as it determines and applies the second cause to act is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative We find both these termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurse Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a terme or limit 1 primarily and properly signifies to termine set bounds or limits to any cause effect or thing So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man Nation and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life So Arrian Epictet lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Virgils Song is remarquable Stat sua cuique dies Every ones day stands fixed or determined which Servius understands of the fixed determined period of human life So that we see that not only sacred Philosophie but the very Pagans by their dim light asserted a fixed period of Divine life as determined by God albeit some that professe themselves Christians denie the same Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the bounds or the position of termes for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of termes or limits to any cause action effect or thing God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set termes and limits to al second causes their actions effects and events there is nothing so contingent in nature but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places as wel as to causes and acts So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines or limits a day Thence in the Glossarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I termine or limit as to place Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gives terme or limit Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine determine or constitute termes to any place or thing Num. 34. 6. Josh 13. 27. 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition which is the terme or boundary of an essence according to Cicero who renders it the circumscription of a thing 2 From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary namely to decree destine to a certain end predestine predetermine In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine and so it is transferred to predestination predetermination or the decree and purpose of the Divine wil even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it was determined or predetermined decreed Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion which was the greatest of sins and intrinsecally evil and yet lo as to the substrate mater or entitative act predetermined and decreed by God The same Acts. 2. 23. Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by that defined determined or predetermined counsel of which more Chap. 3. § 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree deliberate determine is expounded by Theodotion Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predestine or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. 1 of things appertaining to salvation 1 Cor. 2. 7. 2 of persons elect Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. 3 of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin yea that which was intrinsecally evil So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before or predetermined to be done For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine predestine predetermine to set limits bounds termes to persons or things Thence as to this present text and point when it is said here that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act which was predetermined by God as in what follows Chap. 3. § 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal constitute or make firm any thing which is rendred by the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to order dispose constitute institute The Divine Wil and Decree gives order constitution limitation determination yea predetermination to althings al persons and things times and places ends and means receive termes limits destination and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to foreknow 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to propose or purpose Rom.
1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore
Grace but also in others that are commun according to his own pleasure he determines it with the preservation of its own native libertie sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature See more on this argument in what follows c. 3. § 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts without any violence offered to its Libertie why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts without prejudice to its Libertie The force of this consequence is so strong that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination See Chap. 5. § 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts even of such as are not intrinsecally evil This Proposition is granted by Strangius l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works it may peradventure be said that God doth determine their wils yet it seems more incommode to say that God moves and predetermines to al other acts as to acts of hatred of God blasphemie c. So that he yieldeth that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts and indeed it cannot be rationally denied sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the substrate mater of the act as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful When I say that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act as sinful As here must not yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively but only Specificatively as it specifies one and the same Act and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil So that the meaning is no more than this that God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil and if he predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good as our Adversaries grant he must also necessarily predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same When our Adversaries shal have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument I shal confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis Of this Argument see Chap. 5. § 4 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entitie in nature whereof God is not the efficient cause This is generally granted by al those that denie sin to be a positive Being So Strangius l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie and no action as it is an action or has any realitie whereof God is not the cause or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God as the first cause on whose concurse and influxe it dependes So a Reverend Divine Cathol Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain that as motus vel actio is quid naturale it is of God as the first cause of Nature and so when a sinner acteth it is not without the first Universal Cause One would think that this concession if well stated and prosecuted would put an end to our controversie For al that we demand is that the real positive act whereunto sin is annexed be from God as the first cause of Nature But yet what our Opponents grant as limited by them wil not answer our expectations For some hold with Durandus that the action is from God but not immediately others that it is immediately from God yet not by a predeterminative concurse Hence 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense yet by others it is Thus Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person For as God himself so his virtue is every where present and energetic For the proof whereof he cites Isa 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the energie and efficace of God whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself so that whatever they are or do act they essentially depend on him in both respects Whereby he seems to evince that Gods Influxe doth not only render the subject habile to act but also immediately reach the very act even that has sin annexed to it The like he addes l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be said and men are wont so to speak That God is the cause of vitiose actions albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said it may in some manner be understood how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin when yet he is void of al sin specially if these things be observed 1 That it be not understood that God moves or inclines men to sin in general 2 Neither that it be said that God moves to al sin but only to such in which he useth depraved wils as instruments to execute his good works 3 Neither that it be understood that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken or sin as sin but only to the material of sin i. e. not to the sin of the Action but to the Action as substrate to the sin so that he be not the Author of the vitiositie which he only permits but of the substrate Act and of his own direction and ordination which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action c. Yea in Actions intrinsecally sinful he seems to grant that the Act as it is a physic or natural Being is from God So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsecally evil such as the hatred of God perjurie c. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil That God concurs to the physic action but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shewen There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius which if he were candid and uniforme in granting us would put a period to the controversie 1
of Soul and self-Dominion yet he grants that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom 2 By the Heart we must understand according to the Hebraic mode the whole soul and al its movements imaginations ratiocinations contrivements purposes and undertakements 3 In the hand of the Lord i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations it 's usually put in Scripture for the energetic potent and predeterminative Concurse of God So Hab. 3. 4. He i. e. Christ whose brightnesse was as the light had hornes i. e. beams as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes coming out of his hands i. e. most potent wil the spring of al his efficacious operations whence it follows and there was the hiding of his power i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power So Solomon saying That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse whereby he applies the heart to its acts conduceth and guideth it therein and determineth it as he pleaseth So it follows 4 As the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he wil. How easie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men please And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God to turne the hearts of men and al their natural conceptions products and issues which way he listes Al this may be evinced from Strangius's glosse on this Text lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence whereby God doth bend impel and incline human wils which way he please not by proper compulsion but by sweet inspiration and motion For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil yet he doth at times and when he please efficaciously move and impel the wils of men and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart Prov. 21. 1. that very same may on a greater account be affirmed of the heart of every man So Augustin de Grat. Liber Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected it shews that not only the good wils of men but even the bad are so in the power of God that where he wil and when he wil he causeth them to be inclined either to performe benefits or to inflict punishments by a most secret yet just judgement So again August de Corrept Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men more than they themselves without dout having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart even such as have intrinsecal evil as they cal it appendent to them Yea Strangius lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes but also to natural and civil as oft as it seems good to him to performe certain ends which he has preordained So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him And how so Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities Exod. 11. 2 3. 12. 35 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple Ezra 6. 1 c. 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies Jer. 15. 11. Al these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius whence we argue That it is impossible but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions for al these actions being exerted by wicked men had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people yea they were ful of hatred against God To these Scriptures we may adde Act. 17. 28. For in him we live and move and have our being Not only Being in general and Life which implies more than simple being but also al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets for we are also his off-spring As if he had said Do not your own Poets tel you that we are the off-spring of God Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of al our motions Doth not Aristotle Phys 8. also strongly demonstrate That al our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God Must not then the substrate mater of al sinful motions even such as are intrinsecally evil be reduced unto God as the prime Motor I shal conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say If the Lord wil we shal live and do this or that There were a number of Free-willers who proudly conceited that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions whom James rebukes and tels them they ought to say If the Lord wil c. So that he plainly resolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God as the original Cause and Principe But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith Who ever understood these words if God wil i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that Then he addes his own glosse But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition IF GOD WIL than this if God shal permit or wil permit as it is elsewhere explicated Act. 16. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confesse I cannot but wonder that a person of so great reason and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation should satisfie himself with so slender an evasion which not only Reason and Scripture but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict For 1 it is most evident that James here as Luke Act. 16. 7. and Paul 1 Cor. 16. 7. speakes not of a mere permissive wil but of an efficacious influential concurse arising from the wil of God which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse for al actions both natural civil and supernatural
much malice murder and hatred of God and his People annexed Yea God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel but also give him a reward for his service as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon my servant God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his service against Israel The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to shew how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally considered and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin 2. To mention one or two Scriptures which speak of Gods using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans and Caldeans yea of Satan himself to afflict Job and yet he saith v. 21. The Lord taketh away He saw by faith Gods hand moving yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially considered albeit not to the vitiositie So Psal 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people to deal subtilely with his servants Here it 's said expressely that God turned i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel God's turning their hearts doth expressely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurse to the entitative material natural act of hatred albeit not to the vitiositie and malignitie thereof So much also the next clause importes and to deal subtilely with his servants i. e. al their subtile strategems machinations and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel by putting to death their Males oppressing them with hard labors c. al these were as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God who turned their hearts thereto And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin Let us now see what our Opponents replie to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus What is said Psal 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people it must be understood that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians but by doing good to his people whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred 1 We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians that 's the commun odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us But 2 We avouch that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating by his doing good to his people Is not this a strange Comment God turned their heart to hate his people i. e. gave occasion of hatred by doing good unto his people Doth not Gods turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficaâ—… predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act 〈◊〉 it 's said Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he wâ—… is it not meant of an efficacious concurse Do not also the following words Psal 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts predetermining them to their act Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts As for the other Texts Strangius's general answer p. 774 775. is That God is the Cause of the act in those sins but not of the pravitie of the Instruments c. And what do we say or desire more But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his for he addes p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure but what he approves as Good i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin because he doth not approve of it Wherein note 1 How he doth with the Pelagians and Arminians confound Gods Decretive Wil with his Approbative complacential Wil. 2 We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts but the Question is touching objects Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit This we peremptorily denie and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place § 4. Another Head of Arguments contains such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan that for his folie committed with Vriah's wife and murder Behold I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour c. This threat we find fulfilled 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin Here Strangius l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth 1 That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact But 2 then he answers that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned namely by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation Moderation and Direction which he afforded according to the modes already explicated about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel and their actions in this wickedness which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20 c. For this is usual that the effect which ariseth from two causes whereof the one is effective and the other directive be ascribed to both but in a different respect c. This is the commun answer which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures which speake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer 1 Take notice that he allows Gods Gubernation Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed but not the production of the act This is evident by the Conclusion wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause but God the directive only But I replie how can God efficaciously Govern Moderate and Direct the Act unless he be also the effective Cause thereof Take his own instance the sinful wils of Absalom and Achitophel how is it possible that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wils but by influencing their wils and efficaciously predetermining them to act If God did as he grants efficaciously govern moderate and direct their sinful wils in those immanent acts of Lust certainly he must necessarily produce those acts 2 Neither wil this answer at al solve the Difficultie for suppose we grant that God doth only efficaciously govern moderate and direct the sinful act not produce the entitative mater thereof yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin as our effective predeterminative concurse For Gods
of further grace 4 Whereas he saith That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto is not sin but ruine the consequent of their sin the word stumbling and falling signifying their destruction it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie according to our precedent explication of them primarily their sin and then their ruine or destruction as the consequent of their sin This also is evident from that parallel Text Jude 4. For there are certain men crept in unawares who were of old ordained to this condemnation ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse and denying the only Lord God These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination to be given up to this condemnation of turning the grace of God into lasciviousnesse c. So that it is evident that God foreordained and decreed not only their destruction but to leave them to those sins which should cause the same But to sum up the whole of this Head we grant 1 That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of mens sins or damnation It 's true elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation 2 That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated Yet we denie 1 That it is injust for God by an absolute efficacious Decree to reprobate some for the glorifying of his own Justice For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any 2 We denie also that there is any motive cause or condition of Reprobation as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence also 3 we denie that the act of Reprobation is merely negative but affirme that it is positive and absolute of which see Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprobat p. 113. Hence 4 It necessarily follows that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation he predestines and preordains in like manner by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil to leave men to their own sinful courses and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins See more Chap. 5. § 3. CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin 1 Fathers Augustin Prosper Fulgentius 2 Such as succeeded in the Roman Church Hugo de Sancto Victore Aquinas Scotus Ariminensis Holcot Altissiodorensis Bradwardine his Conversion Parts both natural and acquired zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin How God wils Sin How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin The Dominicans and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis The concurrent perswasions of Jansenius and his Sectators also of the Tridentine Catechisme 3 The Sentiments of Reformed Divines Wiclef Calvin Zuinglius Beza Chamier Lud. Crocius the Synod of Dort and Church of England Davenant Sam. Ward c. 4 Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin more ancient Durandus his proper Hypothesis and who may be accounted his Sectators Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and designe Arminius and his Adherents the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes The New Methodistes Camero Amyraldus Placeus Le Blanc Baronius Strangius How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments and who may be estimed such § 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis touching the efficacious predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in al Ages of the Church and withal to shew who have in al Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries First among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurse I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries as Strangius by name are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimonie in defense of their Antithesis but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works Thus de Grat. Lib. Arbitr cap. 20. If the Scripture saith he be diligently inspected it wil appear that not only the good wils of men but also the bad are so in Gods power that he can incline them where and when he wil to performe his benefices or to inflict his punishments by his most secret yet most just judgement Again in the same book he saith That God workes in the hearts of men to incline them which way he please either to Good out of his Mercie or to evil according to their deserts by his Judgement sometimes open sometimes secret but always just So De Praedestinat Sanct. c. 16. It is saith he in the power of wicked men to sin but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that is not in their power but of God dividing the darkness and ordering it that so hence what they do against the wil of God might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God Again De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto c. 5. Some things saith he God makes and orders other things he only orders righteous men he makes and orders but sinners as sinners he makes not but only orders i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good and of the action but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin but only of the act ordering it for his glorie Again De Civitate Dei l. 13. c. 22. he saith That Sin as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law that is the Divine Wil or Decree Moreover Augustin frequently asserts that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another So Contra Julian l. 5. c. 3. de Civitate Dei l. 15. c. 6. libro de Natura Gratia from cap. 20. to the end To these Testimonies we may adde several Hypotheses of Augustin which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin As 1 He asserted that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Wil and so in it self positive and absolute 2 He held That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation of which see Jansenius August de Gâ—…t Christ l. 10. c. 3 4. 3 He maintained That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary because punishments as Jansen de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly that Augustin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians who
other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed must hold That there is some real positive entitie in sin whereof God is not the cause whence by consequence such must assert That there are two first Causes one of Good and the other of Evil which was the error of Marcion and Manes who held there were two first Principes the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme good who was the cause of al good the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme evil God who was the cause of al evil And certainly they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin wil necessarily fal into the sentiments of Marcion and Manes Again Hieronymus Epist ad Ctesiphontem makes this Antithesis of Durandus to be the Doctrine of Pelagius who saith he held That God having once conferred free-wil it is not necessary that he further operate with us and he speaks of natural operations as of the motion of the hand c. which was Durandus's opinion Though I cannot but confesse Jansenius August Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us the Pelagians granted That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurse to al operations in termes but denied it in effect and consequences as our Adversaries now-a-days Compton Carleton in his Philosoph Vnivers Disput 28. Sect. 1. § 3. assures us that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him by Nicolaus Bonetus lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others But yet it cannot be denied but that the principal Author of this Antithesis was Durandus whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme which they cal a rash erroneous dangerous error little better than Arianisme Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. lib. Arb. saith it is repugnant to the Scriptures Testimonies of the Fathers and manifest Reason Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith It is erroneous in Faith de Concursu l. 1. he assertes That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended but also rejected by al approved Theologues as an error in Faith Is it not strange then that Reformed Divines yea some of great vogue for Pietie and Learning should espouse an error so grosse and so much decried by Papists themselves But to give a convictive demonstration that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of Durandisme we are first to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurse is and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators Durandus proposeth his opinion in sentent l. 2. Dist 1. Q. 5. in these words Vtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature which he denies and the principal reasons of his negation are these 1 Because then God should be the author of Sin 2 Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie in that it determines the wil and so puts an end to its Indifference of which see Strangius p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments which were used by Durandus against immediate Concurse are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus yet I must freely declare my mind I cannot conceive how they can without apparent contradiction defend their own but by espousing that of Durandus which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth And that the most of our Adversaries even among the New Methodists who in profession disown it fal under the imputation of Durandisme we shal anon make evident when we come to treat of their particular sentiments at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme 1 Al such as assert a Divine Concurse to the principe or subject only and not immediate unto the Act fal under the imputation of Durandisme This is wel observed by Strangius l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause moving it to act without a continued concurse to the action fal into the error of Durandus Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus a professed abettor of Durandisme Thus also Amyraldus and a Divine of name among our selves 2 Al those who hold only a general immediate concurse to the act such as is determinable by the mater it workes on as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme Thus Baronius together with the Remonstrants and Molinists 3 Al such as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience justly fal under the marque of Durandisme Thus Camero and our Adversaries generally who denie that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsecally evil 4 Al those who affirme That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shal act without immediate concurse must necessarily symbolise with Durandus This is acknowledged by Baronius Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurse sithat this involves no contradiction To which he answers wel in the Negative that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as wel as in essence involves a flat contradiction because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with as hereafter in our account of Strangius But we descend to the particular Sects who oppose our Thesis with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypothesis of Durandus And we shal begin with the Jesuites who now generally passe under the name of Molinists from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr cum Gratiae donis c. Quaest 14. Disp 26. assertes 1 That Gods immediate concurse terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act but only on the act it self and effect Whence 2 That this Concurse is not antecedent or previous as to the act but only simultaneous i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the same act and conserves the same Thence 3 That this immediate concurse of God is not predeterminative at least as to human acts but only indifferent and determinable like that of the
Sun Whence 4 That as to the substrate mater of Sin immediate Concurse doth no way determine the wil or applie it to its act but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner so as the wil stil retains its innate indifference and libertie of acting or not acting Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuites wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists Thus Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul c. 14. p. 58. where he proves That this simultaneous Concurse confers no forces or aide to second Agents but only accommodates it self to the forces of the create power c. which sufficiently demonstrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandisme albeit the avouchers of it oppose Durandus with great vehemence But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola a Capucine Friar yet learned and acute who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties the Dominicans and Jesuites His book he termes A Quadripartite Disputation touching the mode how the Concurse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants as also against the Assertors of Middle Science His first part is general stating the controversie between the Jesuites who assert a Middle Science and the Dominicans the Assertors of Predetermination and withal explicating the origine of the Controversie from the presupposed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurse His Second Part is against the Jesuites to demonstrate That a next immediate and identific concurse of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans proving That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked by a physic Predetermination and moreover by an identific and simultaneous concurse In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth with al the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation wil admit the Hypothesis of Durandus That the general Concurse of God to acts of a natural order specially such as are wicked is not proxime immediate and identific but remote mediate and really distinct from the act of the creature This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurse with human Libertie the vindication of Gods Sacred Majestie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concurse And I cannot but conceive my self under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point that it is impossible for our Adversaries the New Methodists or any others to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with it self or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us unless they betake themselves to this stratageme and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola and therefore I do no way wonder that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus it being the only refuge to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation Among the Reformed Churches the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants communly stiled Arminians from Arminius their first Founder Professor of Theologie at Leyden who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat publica Thes 7. § 8 9 10. p. 193. but more fully Thes 9. de justitia efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning progresse and consummation of Sin 1 As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into 1 Impedition both sufficient and efficacious whereby God puts an impediment to sin and 2 Permission which is contrary to Impedition the suspension of al impediments which might hinder the execution of Sin The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil 2 Gods Efficience about the progresse of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination 1 Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth passing on from one extreme to the other mightily and yet disposing althings sweetly according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome c. 8. v. 1. 2 Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence whereby God puts measures to his Permission and termes to sin that it run not into infinite according to the pleasure of the creature 3 Gods Efficience about the consummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition and Remission As for Gods Concurse to the Act of Sin as naturally good he doth craftily according to his wonted mode in such cases wave that difficult point Yet in his Articles De Peccati Causa Vniverse p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists to prove That we make God the Author of Sin But to sum up Arminius's Sentiments in this point Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments which is no way influential on the Act yet in that he allows also a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hypothesis that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin of which hereafter Chap. 5. Arminius's Sectators usually stiled Remonstrants from their Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort Grevincovius Vorstius Episcopius Corvinus c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland gave themselves the confidence but those poor Churches the peste of divulging their Pelagian Poison which by the interposure of King James who was a professed enemie to that faction occasioned the Synod of Dort An. 1618. where Divines out of England France and Germanie resorted to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod writ their Acta Scripta Synodalia Dordracena wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation and Gods Providence in sinful Acts falsely charging on our Divines 1 That they held the Reprobate were destined to Incredulitie Impietie and Sins as the Means and Causes of Damnation 2 That they made God the Author of Sin and the like of which see Acta Synodalia Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica p. 40 41. I shal here only adde what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc Conciliat Arbit Humani Thes 32. p. 434. That
is such a supreme Rule of Justice as that whatever he wils is for that very reason because he wils it to be accounted just So Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez de Auxil Disput 109. 3 a Conclus The positive act whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome was not conditionate but absolute antecedent in a moment of Reason to the il use of Free-wil And it is proved 1 Because there can be no cause of Reprobation 2 Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie before the Prescience of the good or il use of free-wil elect some to life eternal and by a positive act wil not to admit others And our Divines generally grant That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation than the absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God But none is more categoric and positive in this than judicious Davenant who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists in his incomparable Animadversions on Gods love to mankind Wherein he doth puissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis 1 That Gods secret wil of good pleasure is very different from his reveled preceptive complacential wil as pag. 221 349 376. 2 That Gods reveled complacential approbative wil is the measure of our dutie but not of Gods decrees or operations pag. 222 356 391 399. 3 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is only properly his wil pag. 392. 4 That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself pag. 375 376. 5 That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promisses of life and threats of death pag. 241 332 375 387 398. 6 That God may be said according to his wil of complacence and approbation to intend the salvation of sinners yea Reprobates by providing the means of grace conducing thereto pag. 271 376 394. 7 That the externe means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means not the unknowen wil of God pag. 353. 8 That God by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands pag. 329 393 394 401. 9 That al under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibilitie of salvation pag. 256 257. 10 That Gods evangelic providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by mans sin although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated p. 377 381 387 388 395. 11 That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events though not with contrary events pag. 240 333 341 360 402 253. 12 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God with its difference from that of men pag. 232 321 336 339 342. 13 That absolute Decrees oppose not Gods Holinesse pag. 240-272 14 That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercie of God pag. 277-310 15 That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods soverain Being and Independence pag. 226. 16 That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth pag. 349-362 17 That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of Gods gifts pag. 374-404 18 That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessitie or compulsion to sin pag. 253. 19 Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibilitie and libertie to the Agents pag. 333 340 341 351 360. 20 That the Arminians grant an absolute immutable fixed Decree of Reprobation which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists p. 302 332 333 340 351 354 400 418 419. 21 Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessitie on the wil and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation pag. 418 419 442 462. 22 Lastly he shews us What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees pag. 454-526 These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents of which hereafter Chap. 6. § 4. Our next Argument shal be taken from Divine Concurse its Principe Nature and Efficace the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonstration of our Hypothesis which we shal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars 1. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful may be demonstrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurse What is the active principe of al Divine Concurse but the Divine wil Doth not sacred Pagine expressely speak so much So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counsel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it 's said Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord did acte but what Gods hand or wil and counsel predetermined to be done of which before And Strangius himself grants us lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurse as to its prime act is in God and the same with God Now such is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil that althings must necessarily be done which he wils to be done and in that manner as he wils them as Aquinas wel determines How then is it possible but that if God wil that the substrate mater of sin existe it must necessarily existe and in that manner as he wils it Can any person or thing resiste the Divine efficacious wil And what is al active concurse but the determination of the same efficacious wil See more of Gods wil being the spring and principe of Divine concurse Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 3. 2. That God predetermines the wil to the substrate mater of sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concurse as to its Totalitie Vniversalitie as to effects Particularitie as to manner of working Immediation Antecedence and soverain absolute Independence 1 The Totalitie of Divine concurse sufficiently demonstrates its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin That Gods concurse to al second causes acts and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Thus much is also granted by Strangius lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. where he assertes That the whole action dependes on God as also on the creature otherwise God should not concur immediately Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us as also of the same partie with Strangius denies Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin to be total yet because he is singular therein and different from his own partie I shal take it for granted that Gods concurse is
God should immediately produce this act of the wil without applying the wil to the act Do not the very Jesuites Suarez Carleton with others grant That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human wil And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowlege further That Gods Concurse to this sinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil not only simultaneous as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56 Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more That Gods immediate concurse reacheth not only the act and effect but also the wil itself as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries touching immediate concurse that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of sin Can we imagine that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human wil and yet God not applie the wil to its act which is al that is meant by predetermination Yea doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the same act but also influence the wil in the production of that act as Strangius and others grant and yet not applie it to act How is it possible that God should influence the wil in the production of any act without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act doth he not applie it to the act and so predetermine the same Again doth God by an immediate concurse not only influence the wil and its act but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causalitie before the wil concurs to its own act as Strangius also grants and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration that God predetermines the wil to that act Can there be any previous concurse immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act but what is predeterminative Doth not the wil necessarily depend on the previous concurse of the first cause and if so must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby But more of this previous concurse in our next Argument Lastly if we allow with the Jesuites unto God only an immediate concurse to the act of the wil al those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination may with the same facilitie be reflected on them for if they make God by an immediate concurse to concur to the act of sin do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as wel as we More of immediate Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. 5 The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse doth invictly demonstrate its predetermining the wil as to the substrate mater of sinful acts We shal here reassume a Principe already established and granted by Jesuites and New Methodists namely That the action of the first cause concurring with the second is not as to passive attingence distinct from the action of the second cause This is generally granted by the Molinists as Le Blanc Concil Arbitr par 3. thes 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius August tom 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It 's true the Concurse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second as to active attingence or principe because Gods concurse actively considered is the same with his wil yet as to passive attingence the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause This being premissed we procede to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurse and that in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causalitie concur before the second This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward Determinat de Concurs Dei pag. 116 c. And the arguments for it are invict for 1 where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie which is proper to every second cause there posterioritie is essentially appendent Again 2 al second causes in regard of God are but instruments as Aquinas proves yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient And doth not that which is subservient in order of causalitie move after that which is the principal Agent But here we are to remember that when we assert Gods Concurse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence we denie not but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause as Alvarez lib. 3. de Auxil Disput 19. num 4. Twisse Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat part 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is That Gods Concurse is solely concomitant and simultaneous and that 3 because this simultaneous concurse makes God only a partial cause and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect Yea some of the Jesuites grant That if we consider the concurse of God absolutely without respect to this or that second cause so it is in order of nature before the influxe of the second cause So Fonseca Metaphys lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest 5. sect 13. The like Strangius lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60 61. Thus also Burgersdicius Metaphys lib. 2. cap. 11. grants Gods concurse in supernaturals to be previous albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous which is most absurd for the active concurse of God being nothing else but the immanent act of his wil must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 4. p. 416. Hence 2 Prop. This previous Concurse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and applie every second cause to its act and effect For how is it possible that the second cause should act unlesse the first move and applie it to its act Can a second cause move it self to an act unlesse it be first moved thereto by the first cause Whence 3 Prop. This previous Concurse of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Wil and God concurs in order of nature before the wil yea premove and applie it to the act must he not necessarily predetermine the same Al the wit and subtilitie of our Adversaries wil never extricate themselves or satisfie any awakened mind in this point How God doth by a previous concurse move and actuate the Wil and yet not predetermine it to the act Indeed to speak the truth the Sentiments not only of the Arminians but also
God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quà m vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quà m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ◠Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.
ours 2 How doth God judicially punish one sin by another but to use his own words by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error And if so then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God Of this hereafter § 6. But 2 I passe on to his second answer whereon he seems to lay the most weight though indeed most feeble But saith he because those words Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which points out the reason of that which next follows namely that those ten Kings having changed their opinion should destroy the Whore and Antichrist it seems to me more commodious if in that vers 17. there be a reason given of this famose change that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him namely because God hath put this into their heart And the first words of vers 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition But what is subjoined That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste until the word of God should be consummate I should think ought to be expounded negatively c. Thus Strangius A strange comment indeed let us a little inquire into it 1 How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make what follows the fulfilling of Gods wil to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse and more particularly to the last clause until the Word of God shal be fulfilled and so it notes that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil 1 In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste and 2 When the words of God were fulfilled i. e. Antichrists reign expired then to hate the Whore c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to and enemies against Antichrist 2 As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste certainly if such glosses should be admitted we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities Why may not the most profane debauched wretch when he is pressed with those Commands Thou shalt not commit adulterie Thou shalt not kill c. replie that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively Thou shalt commit adulterie c But Strangius saw ful wel that the affirmative sense of those words That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words and therefore he saw no way left but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words But 3 being after al his glosses sensible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this response he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge telling us That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient but that beyond it there must be also signified that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste I have no mind to contend about this mater sithat the sense is sufficiently sane which ever way the words be understood In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil but of the substrate act and punishment or Judgement which is annected to the sin but in good works not only of the substrate act but also of the moral Bonitie c. Who of us denies this would our Adversaries but stick here how soon would our Controversie be ended But here lies the sting even in this plausible concession Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie § 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious Permission of sin The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin but this sin in its formal nature Our Adversaries the Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists al grant Gods permission of Sin but only such as is otiose speculative negative and naked without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act or direction of it to its proper ends But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive efficacious directive and ordinative permission of sin arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it So it 's said of Eli's Sons 1 Sam. 2. 25. They hearkened not to the voice of their father because the Lord would slay them The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God The Soverain Lord had by an absolute peremtorie decree predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine and thence it 's said they hearkened not because the Lord would slay them the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be I am not ignorant that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft as they phrase it Version and among these some make it conclusive and so render it ideo idcirco quapropter others render it quamvis as Turnovius others otherwise But certainly our English Version which renders it causally because seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions So the LXX who render the words thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them In willing willed i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome peremtorily efficaciously immutablely and absolutely willed Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions with some later Munster Pagnine Arias Montanus Junius and Tremelius Osiander Piscator Malvenda with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions yea Castalio not excepted render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally because according to our sense and interpretament Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809 c. He answers 1 That the sons of Eli were for their flagitiose impieties destined and devoted by God to ruine 2 That the punishment of death here mentioned seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal not eternal 3 That however it be as it is manifest that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting
and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in
this Because the Apostle and Augustin and other holy men placed Predestination Prescience and the like on Gods part the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins and retort the cause and blame on God who so predestinated or foreknew therefore these holy men would say that God by his Predestination Prescience or such like doth not compel them against their wil to sin but that they sin freely and by their own wil and that God by predestinating foreknowing or willing sins doth not sin nor do unjustly neither is he the first imputable or culpable cause of sins but the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper wil of the Sinner This indeed is the proper state of our controversie at this day Then he addes pag. 303. But if it yet be said that it always hears il with many to say That God doth any wise wil sin it is certainly true and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited not because that which is said is not wel said but because that which is wel said is not wel understood I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdome and savor and understand the truth which is savory to a sane tast and that they would know that there is no evil in the world which is not for some great good why therefore should we substract from the World and from God the Author of the World this way of doing good or of benefaction which is so admirable and great Yea it seems more miraculose and great to worke good out of evils than out of goods or to worke good only And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many if it be said that God wils and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter of the Son with the Mother of Parricide Sedition Blasphemie and other like sins and yet not only the Saints but also the Philosophers speak thus For who in such an incest prepares the seed and moves creates and infuseth the soul into the foetus but God and however it may sound thus the Saints of God speak yea the Spirit of God who speaks in them What could be said more acutely demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversie would men but receive it 5 Again Bradwardine l. 2. c. 20. p. 542 c. proves out of Altissiodorensis super 2. sent That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altissiodorensis's arguments are these 1 From the Passion of Christ which was good and proceded from a good cause namely the Wil of God 2 From the act of Fornication whereby an holy Prophet is begotten which act is the cause of good and therefore good and yet it is also evil and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God Thence he addes the Testimonie of Thomas in Quaest de malo q. 19. where he demands Whether the act of sin be from God and he answers thus It must be said that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater some said more anciently that the action of Sin was not from God attending to the very Deformity of Sin which is not from God but some said that the action of Sin is from God attending to the very Essence of the Act which must be granted to be from God and that on a double reason 1 Commun because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence and his very Essence his Being it must thence necessarily follow that whatever doth participate of Being must be derived from him who is Being by Essence 2 Special for it is necessary that al motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover who is God as p. 554. 6 Bradwardine l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher and proves strongly That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God of himself properly actually and specially applying it to act and moving of it Which he demonstrates many wayes as 1 Because no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith 2 Because al natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause 3 Because the create wil cannot subsist of it self therefore neither can it act of it self as c. 24. p. 563. 4 Because God by reason of his infinite Actualitie permits nothing but what he wils 8 Bradwardine l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher and demonstrates That God albeit he impel no man violently against his wil yet he impels al mens wils spontaneously and draws them to al their free acts even such as have sin annexed to them But further addes he it may be probably said that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin as to the substance of the act yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin or to the deformitie of sin as it is sin or the deformitie of sin for the omnipotent God may as it appears separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformitie of sin and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good without such a defect and privative malice Specially sithat Sin Deformitie Vitiositie or defect is not essentially the very act nor of the essence of the act nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act Therefore the good God acting rightly pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act according to its substance and nature good the vitiositie or sin doth not thence necessarily follow whence therefore doth it follow but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient and from the wil of the Sinner What could be said more acutely more judiciously more demonstratively and more piously to put a period to this controversie had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth I have been the more prolixe in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries but what I find rationally solidly and convictively solved by him above three hundred years since As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then and ours now we shal produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis Ch. 6. § 1 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we might now descend to the later Scholemen specially the Thomists but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries as the orthodoxe Calvinist and it deserves a particular remarque that look as the Pelagian Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calvinists so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point under the Bears skin of being Dominicans and indeed no wonder sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this
Concurse to the entitative act of sin is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it which he wiped off with this answer That the same action which is sinful in regard of man is not so in regard of God because he is not under the same Law with man Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 87. pag. 152. The third mode saith he is peculiar to Zuinglius who teacheth that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin because God hath no Law set to him but man hath To which Baronius answers That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature not to deal injustly or cruelly with men This replie although borrowed from Bellarmine is now become commun with our Adversaries yet without the least shadow of reason for they do but beg the question in saying That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei cap. 6. tom 1. of his Workes pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man he always sins when he actes against the Law albeit he neither be nor live nor operate but in God and from God and by God But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin but not in like manner to God for man is under a law but God is free Therefore one and the same wickednesse suppose adulterie or homicide as from God the Author Motor and Impulsor it is a work not a crime but as it is from man so it is a crime and wickednesse for God is not bound up by law but man is condemned by law Thus he procedes to illustrate by many exemples of David c. Thence pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh c. wherein note 1 That he cals God the Author Motor and Impulsor of the act which must be understood not morally but physically as he excites and applies the wil to its act 2 That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin because he actes not against any law a distinction which was valid in his time albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines yea Calvinists Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade but in use long before Zuinglius by Scotus Ariminensis and other scholastic Theologues who followed Augustin herein Thus Scotus in Sent. 2. Dist 37. Quaest 2. saith The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil but not as to Gods concurse quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere Deus autem non debet because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law to give rectitude to the action but God is not as before How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313 c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God he saith 1 That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God Thence he procedes 2 to demonstrate That albeit God wil and know and decree althings in the world yet that he is not the Author of sin So pag. 315. 3 He proves That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative This he demonstrates pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph the robbing of Job the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto Shimei's cursing of David the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam c. 4 He procedes pag. 319. to the fal of Adam which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God c. The same Controversie he manageth against Castellio de aeterna Dei praedestinatione p. 360. where he proves That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God The like pag. 401. where he proves That God doth not compel men to sin or infuse sin into them but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators but also by that of Arminius who objectes the very same things against them as are objected against us namely That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose by which opinion saith he God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin of which see Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes in this as in other points which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession and signed by their Ministers and Professors for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus and others in the French Churches That not only the German and Helvetian but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis is most evident by the most elaborate acute and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier the greatest light that ever France Reformed had Calvin only excepted who in his Panstrat Cathol tom 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose distinct and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists He titles this Book Of the Author of sin and proves cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin Martyr and Beza therewith Thence cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines namely That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David Absoloms incest c. Whence cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin which they make to be only by speculative idle permission as some new Methodists Cap. 4. he procedes to prove That God wils the existence of sin Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists namely that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God Thence cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration Whence cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument from Gods energie in sinful acts which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally And thence cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins
That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ◠de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the
with that of Durandus c. So Thes 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts one externe and the other interne as for the externe act he placeth it in two things 1 in proposing objects 2 in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace The interne act of God consistes according to him in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil obscure or remove the one or cause some other object to be offered which is most taking In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurse asserted Yea in his Speciminis special p. 468. he saith in down-right termes That the wil of God dependes on us not we on the wil of God which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points see Pet. Molinaei de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro Judicium praesat Placeus another Salmurian Professor albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method yea in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin he seems pendulous and in suspense Thus De libero Hom. Arbitr p. 174. edit 1656. What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is the Papists sharply dispute It is truly confessed by al that God doth concur with every cause so as to operate conveniently with its faculties but this concurse some make immediate proxime and altogether the same with the very action of second causes but others denie it But we according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majestie of God dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is it sufficeth us that provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God too much cannot be ascribed unto God c. Le Blanc also Professor of Theologie at Sedan though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie Concil Arbitr thes 55. yet thes 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius and others That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil without being the Author of sin But yet thes 57. he recals himself and saith That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted And thes 58. he addes this as most certain That the aide and efficace of Divine providence even about sinful acts may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse c. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of Scotland Baronius and Strangius who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin As for Baronius he is accused of rank Arminianisme and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts Thus in his Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78. pag. 146 c. he endeavors to prove That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians Jesuites and Arminians namely that this previous motion and predetermination 1 destroyeth human libertie pag. 147. 2 That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts pag. 148. 3 That it maketh God the Author of sin pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways 1 Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie pag. 150. 2 Because the action then as of such a species must be from God 3 Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel as pag. 151. 4 That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments urged by Pelagians and Arminians to which we shal answer more fully hereafter chap. 6. § 1 c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to answer our principal argument That the second cause doth not act but as moved by the first and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse It 's true § 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants which is wel observed by Le Blanc Concil Arbitr Hum. thes 35. pag. 434. This at least without al dout is the opinion of Robert Baronius in his Metaphysic where touching the Concurse of God and so of its concord with human libertie he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action neither is it needful that God premove second causes but it is sufficient that together with them he influence their actions and effects And indeed Baronius's own illustration Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters in itself indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians Lastly pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege Whence it is to me apparent that it would not be an act of injustice should we reckon him among the Arminians whose sentiments and cause he has espoused yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius Professor at Glascow who as they say having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford writ a great Volume in four Books Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans Twisse and Rutherford who in his influences of the life of Grace both Preface and Book oft animadvertes thereon as if these al by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts made God the Author of sin I must confesse he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences yea contradictions that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions But this I impute not to any defect in naturals but in his cause which admits not any solid reason for its defense And that which yet seems more strange to me is this that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus Molina
Wil to the entitative act of sin 1 From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree the objections against this argument solved 2 From the certitude of Divine Prescience with the solution of objections 3 From the Decree of Reprobation Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees 4 From Divine Concurse 1 It s Principe and Origine 2 Its Nature Totalitie Vniversalitie Particularitie Immediation Prioritie and Independence 3 Its Efficace as to al natural and supernatural Acts and Effects Al the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin strike as much against Predetermination to what is good 5 From the nature of sin its substrate mater and formal reason 6 From Gods permission of sin which is natural negative and positive 7 From Divine providence about sin both conservative restrictive gubernative 8 From the absolute immediate essential dependence of al creatures on God as the first cause § 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration as also the unanimous testimonie of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concurse in al Ages of the Church for the confirmation of our Hypothesis we now procede to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence which we shal reduce to the following Heads 1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree which we thus forme That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence But the substrate mater of al sin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition therefore it necessarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its existence The major is granted by our Adversaries particularly by Strangius who oft assertes That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event And what more rational than this assertion Yea what is predetermination of the event but predefinition in the Decree The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree and predetermination as to actual concurse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation as active Creation gives futurition to things and passive actual existence so predefinition and predetermination and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine So that our major seems so clear as to carrie with it its own evidence Wherefore we passe on to demonstrate the minor which our Adversaries principally strike at and therefore needs our strongest forces This we shal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature without some cause of its futurition How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie contingence and indifference but by some cause Do not possible and future differ and must there not be some cause of this difference 2 Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal This is most evident because whatever is future was so from Eternitie for God foreknew it to be so otherwise how could his knowlege be certain Hence 3 Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God For is there any thing but God eternal 4 Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things for things are not future because God foreknows them but he therefore foreknows them because future Hence it follows that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. § 9. whence also it necessarily follows 5 That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege but the wil of God which gives futurition to althings And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections 1 They replie to our minor That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God but from the wil of man that gives existence to it Thus Strangius lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove That it is not repugnant that something should be future which God hath not absolutely predefined but left to the wil of man to effect So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes That God hath not decreed al futures namely the Fal of Adam or the sin against the Holy Ghost c. So pag. 631. he saith Nothing hinders but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc Concord Libert Hum. p. 1. thes 55 57. where he endeavors to prove That what is the cause why things existe in time the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie but mans wil only is the cause why sin existes in time ergo c. A poor Response indeed or rather begging of the Question For is it possible that the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie yea in Nature that the cause is ever at least in order of nature before the effect and is the second cause confined by time before the eternal futurition of its effect 2 But Le Blanc answers hereto thes 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason and an extrinsec denomination of the thing which is said to be future not something really distinct from the thing future c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident for hereby it follows that the thing is not future before it is existent can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence How many absurdities would follow hereon But our Adversaries have one grand Objection which they lay much weight on against our minor and that is this If the wil of God gives futurition to sin then sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the wil of God and so the futurition of sin must be God This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius Le Blanc and a Divine of name among us So Strangius lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631 632. having pag. 626 c. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin he replies thus Herein saith he lies the whole force of the argument that there can be no other cause of a
possibilitie to a state of futurition c. Whence he concludes Thes 43. Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions and absurdities to professe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience Yea some of them procede so far in this pretended modestie as to professe That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture Thus Strangius l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of dout but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressely delivered in Scripture The like others But is it so indeed Doth not the Scripture declare expressely the mode of Prescience Why then 1 are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages How comes it to passe that they contend with so much heat and passion for that which they confesse is not expressely delivered in Scripture Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession But 2 We easily grant them that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out as indeed al Divine Perfections are but yet must we thence necessarily conclude that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressely delivered in Scripture 1 Doth not the Scripture evidently declare That the mode of Gods Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Mans science as much as Heaven is above the Earth yea infinitely more 2 Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience al manner of Imperfections much more Contradictions And is not the mode of Gods Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man But see more hereof Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 2. § 3. We passe on to our third Argument which shal be taken from the Divine Wil and Decrees and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation And here we shal lay down this Principe which is granted by Strangius and others of the New Method That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant saith he that the predefinition of God from eternitie and the predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us he must also determine our Wil to the same This he inculcates c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on for we no way dout but to demonstrate That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin Which we shal endeavour to make good in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive proper condition or cause This Proposition is generally denyed by the New Methodists who grant That God decrees al good absolutely but as for Sin say they God decrees that only respectively and conditionally So Strangius l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548 But we no way dout but before we have finisht this Demonstration to make it evident that Gods Decree of Reprobation whereby he determines to leave men to sin is absolute as wel as the Decree of Election Yea it is to me a thing altogether impossible to defend an absolute Decree of Election and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected Doth not the Election of the one necessarily implie the Reprobation of the other It 's true our Divines that follow the Sublapsarian mode as Davenant c. speak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole masse of corrupt nature yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive which should incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another for nothing can move the divine Wil but what is some way antecedent to it Now the consideration of al sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. 2 Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative but positive and efficacious It 's granted that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation which they terme Non-election or Preterition yet hereby they intend not a suspense act of the Divine wil but include also a positive efficacious act Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin That Gods negative Reprobation is positive So Davenant Dissert de Elect. Reprob p. 113. But we must take heed saith he lest with Scotus we think that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates which he electes not but passeth by is merely negative for in this very act which we expresse by a Negation is contained an expresse and affirmate Wil of God So in his Determinations Quaest 25. p. 117. he tels us That it 's most certain there can be no Decree permitting sin to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree And p. 118. he instructs us That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious not in a way of efficience but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil 3 Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord not as a Righteous Judge The Pelagians Molinists Arminians and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge not as a supreme absolute Lord whence they conclude that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins not considering that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment but of denying Benefits wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended according to that of the Apostle Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay c What is soverain Dominion but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law more than what is in his own nature and wil Hence it follows 4 That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man Thus Jansenius August de Grat. Christi l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation And Augustin complains That it is a great injurie to God when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil for his Wil
the contrary as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do of which hereafter § 8. 2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection From the Promisses and Invitations of God which are made uselesse and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin we answer 1 That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations which are but branches of the Covenant of Grace are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation to whom they are many ways useful notwithstanding Divine Predetermination For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature by its own free-wil to accept of these offers or performe the Condition on which the offers depend but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul for the inabling of it to performe the Condition So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect for whom they are primarily designed operative of Grace albeit as to others they are only exactive of dutie whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace 2 Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invitations uselesse as to Reprobates for 1 They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein namely Life and Salvation And to make this more clear we are to remember that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only their necessary connexion that in al conditional Propositions on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent is evident from that of our Lord John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth c. Whence it is apparent that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible The God of al grace has by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation so that this Proposition is infallibly true If thou believest thou shalt be saved and the holy God has given his Ministers Commission to preach it to al Mankind neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on Gods part albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief for the sinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer which consistes in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination as Davenant wel observes Animadvers on Gods Love p. 377. where he shews That the Decree of God permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature So p. 387 388. he demonstrates That Divine eternal Decrees whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered do not crosse the end for which such Grace is administred to persons not elected And he gives this reason for it p. 352. God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the infallible event or successe of the Means Gods meaning when he offers any Grace unto men is that they should performe such actions whereunto such grace conduceth and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man if he believe and persevere is truely to performe it if he so do But it is not always Gods absolute wil to cause men to use his Grace to their own good If the Remonstrants wil have nothing termed Gods meaning but his absolute Wil in their opinion as wel as in ours it wil follow that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glorie Lastly p. 392 393 394. he proves That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to albeit he decree the contrary event Hence 2 These general Promisses and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates that it leaves them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief for if God doth by such Promisses and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe and withal an expectation that they accept his offers yea his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life with a provision of al means necessary thereto what excuse can men have for unbelief Wil they say that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention Take the Replie of Davenant Animadv p. 271. We answer that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events than by providing orderly means for the producing such events Non-election provideth no means of making men sin and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin though it include a prevision of sinful Events and a Decree to permit them c. 3 The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination to what is good and Divine Prescience of sinful acts doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promisses and Invitations as ours For 1 In that they assert none can performe the condition required and so embrace the evangelic offer made without efficacious predeterminative grace do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impossibilitie of Believing as we do Are not al offers for want of this predeterminative Grace altogether uselesse to them for whom it never was intended 2 So also as to Gods certain Prescience of their Sins did not God according to their Concessions certainly foreknow that they would never yea never could accept of the offers made to them without predeterminative Grace which he decreed never to give them Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibilitie as our predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of Sin This is wel argued by Davenant Animadv p. 242. His Hoard's nibbling at the Synod of Dort and charging them with mantaining a fatal Decree is to little purpose If he cal that fatal which is certain and immutable we are not afraid to affirm that al Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of mens final impenitence is as absolute and immutable and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend Thus also p. 332. The Remonstrants we adde also the New Methodists dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated according to their decree founded upon the prevision of