inexhaustible abyss of matter as sufficeth to the generation not onely of this world but of an infinite multitude of others fully as large as this so well as we are assured that in this world is contained matter sufficient to the composition of an Elephant as well as of a Flea Sure I am no man ever saw the outside of the world and if so is it not a meer Rhodomontado of phansie or as Pliny calls it a high madness to imagine such an infinite abyss of matter Let us however deal with these as wise Physicians with Hypochondriacks that they may the more easily cure them allow them their absurdities and grant that from eternity there was such an infinity of Atoms confusedly hurried to and fro in an infinite space yet the difficulty will always remain how in so great a laxity and infinite liberty of range so many Atoms could so convene and combine together as to terminate and setle each other by reciprocal coherence and mutual concatenation how so orderly marshal and dispose their several divisions into such elegant Figures how adapt those figures to such genuine and constant operations and all this without the counsell disposition and revinction of any other cause but their own rude and giddy propensity to motion and the casual result of their cessation from discord That Animals have obtained such exquisite forms respective to their several destinations this we can refer to the artifice of their peculiar Seminalities or the cunning of that Formative virtue which lying ambuscadoed in the spumous consistence of their genital emissions and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient Matrix or Receptarie immediately designes this or that parcel of matter for such or such a part another for another and so spins it out into an uniform labyrinth of members at last weaving all those into an ingenious Figure in all points resembling the Protoplast or first genitor of that species who received this Seminal Tincture or faculty prolifical from the immediate bounty of its Creator But that Atoms as they are in their naked and incomplex nature should be allowed to have a Plastick or fabrefactive virtue equal to that conferred upon the seeds of Animals is a sigment as worthy our spleen as that ridiculous branch of the same root the Autocthonous or spontaneous eruption of our first Parents from the confermentation of Water and Earth and the production of mankinde like that of Mushroms which whimsey is also entituled to Epicurus by no meaner a tradition then that of Censorinus de Di. Nat. cap. 2. whose words for the more clear and credible transmission of the Fable I thought it not altogether impertinent here to insert Nec longe secus Epicurus credidit limo calefactos uteros nescio quos radicibus terrae cohaerenteis primum increvisse infantibus ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem natura ministrante praebuisse quos ita educatos adultos genus hominum propagasse To this we may adde for a single testimony is not strong enough to oblige any man to beleive so unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philosopher the concurrent Auctorities of Lactantius lib. 2. cap. 7. Plutarch 5. Placit 19. Diogenes Laertius lib. 2. in vita Archelai Atheniens Diodorus Siculus lib. 1. and Macrobius 3. Saturn 6. Though for my part I conceive this phrensie to have possessed many heads upon whose skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Moss many hundreds of years before Epicurus his was warm in regard many antient Nations in particular the Aegyptians and Phoenicians contending for the honor of seniority have gloried in the title of Autocthonae and thought their Eschutcheons sufficiently noble if charged onely with this impress Terrae silii But I return from this my Excursion If the World indeed were as Ovids Chaos rudis indigestaque moles a deformed and promiscuous miscellanie or masse of Heterogeneities and the several parts of it variously blended together without either discrimination or order then might the pretence of Fortune be more plausible For should we take a man who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in some obscure cavern of the earth and never lookt abroad upon the World nor heard of more then what immediately concerned his aliment and other natural necessities on a suddain educe him from his dungeon and shew him an Animal cut in peices and all its dissimilar parts as skin muscles fat veins arteries nerves tendons ligaments cartilages bones marrow c. laied together in a promiscuous heap doubtless we could not quarrel at his incredulity if he would not be perswaded that any thing but Chance had a hand in that confusion But should we instantly present him another Animal feeding walking and performing all the comely functions of vitality instruct him in the several uses and actions of all those parts which he had formerly surveyed in the disorder of an heap then kill that Animal also and for his farther information anatomzie its carcase and exhibite to him the several parts in all things respondent to the former t is conjectural that we should finde that the rudeness of his education would not so totally have extinguished the Light of Nature in him as not to have left some spark by the glimmering whereof he might discover some more noble Principle then Fortune to have been the Efficient of that more then ingenious machine Now we cannot but observe that in the great engine of the universe nothing is with less order decency beauty uniformity symmetry constancy in a word with less wisdom either deâ—â—gned or finished then in the smaller organ of an Animal in the perfection of its integrality And if so how neer comes it to an absolute contradiction that we should acknowledge some noble and prudent Cause that moulded and compacted all those different parts into one most elegant and accomplisht body and exactly accommodated that body to the easie execution of its predestinate operations and yet not acknowledg the same in the ordination and construction of the more admirable because more difficult fabrick of the Universe I say a Contradiction for if the easier Artifice of an Animal be conceded too hard assuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organ'd World must needs be granted impossible to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of Fortune Quanto enim major operis moles tanto erit ut sapientiae ita potentiae majus argumentum non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpusculorum non commendet artificem sed quod in opere ingenti symmetriam servare industrium materiam regere operosum esse videatur Lastly as the Votaries of Fortune have argued à minori ad Article 6. The Epicureans grand Argument of the possibility of the configuration of the Universe by a casual and spontaneous disposition of Atoms from the frequent actuall production of an Infect by the same means or principles countermined by an inversion or Argument Ã
disposition of Atoms from the frequent actuall production of an Iusect by the same means or principles countermined by an inversion or Argument à majori ad minus p. 65. 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inserence and ours prevented and the invalidity of theirs though their own hypothesis were conceded in terminis declared by an adaequate similitude p. 67. 8. The conclusion of this section or the aequipondium of the praecedent reasons if perpended in the mass and conjunctively to the most perfect demonstration p. 68. SECT IV. ARTIC 1. THat Antique absurd expostulation who◠Instruments Auxiliants materials predisposed God made use of in his act of Fabrication of the Vniverse copiously satisfied and the energie of the Divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either p. 69. 2. A second immodest interrogation wherefore God so long deferred the creation resolved with a detection of the unreasonableness of undecent curiosity p. 73. CHAP. III. Why God Created the World Page 77. SECT I. ARTIC 1. THe improbability of the worlds creation by God insinuated by the Atheists from his defect of any possible Motive scope or final cause p. 71. 2. Their first Argument that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either emolument or delectation from the Vniverse p 78. 3. The satisfactory resutation thereof and Gods glory manifested to have been his prime and principal end p. 79. SECT II. ARTIC 1. THeir second Argument that God had no especial regard to the benefit of Man and the Fortification thereof by 8 reasons p. 82. 2. The total redargution thereof by a commonstrance that the benefit and felicity of man was Gods secondary end and the impossibility of satisfaction to the first end by any creature but man concluded from his 1. Rationality p. 86. 2. Sermocination p. 88. 3. Lucretius his 8. reasons subverted particularly p. 90. CHAP. IV. The General Providence of God Demonstrated page 94. SECT I. ARTIC 1. THe Authors reasons for his praesent adherence to the common discrimination of Providence from Creation p. 94. 2. The Definition and received Division of divine Providence p. 95. 3. A short list of the principal ethnick Physiologists who in order to their propagation of Atheism have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence and a gentle cure of S. Hieroms wound caused by his venial lapse from the same ibid. 4. The Atheists first Argument against universal Providence with the absurd and malicious comment of Lucretius thereupon p. 97. 5. Their second Argument and its convenient dissection into two parts viz. 1. The irregularity of contingencies p. 99. 2. The unequal or unjust distribution of good and evil p. 101. SECT II. ARTIC 1. That the Notion of General Providence is Proleptical inferred from the umversality of its recepeption p. 102. 2. From the misplaced devotion of Idolaters ibid. 3. From the confession of most Philosophers of the highest forme as of 1. Ecphantus p. 103 2. Plato ibid. 3. Aristotle ibid. 4. The Stoicks p. 104. 5. The Academicks and Scepticks ibid. 4. A review of the induction and the Argument found to be Apodictical on one side and on the other only perswasive p. 105. SECT III. ARTIC 1. GOds General Providence demonstrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts p. 107. 2. The same particularly supported by that trinity of Attributes viz. his 1. Infinite Wisdome p. 109. 2. Infinite Power ibid. 3. Infinite Goodness p. 110. 3. The necessity of the worlds gubernation by the indefinent influence of Gods general Providence demonstrated from the consideration of the absolute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First p. 111. 4. The vastity of the world the infinite variety of its parts and the irreconcileable discord of many natures demonstrate as much p. 113. 5. Vnder what restriction we are to understand that tropology of some Hermetical Philosophers Deum esse Animam Mundi p. 114. 6. The Atheists subterfuges of Nature and Fortune praecluded p. 116. SECT IV. ARTIC 1. THe Atheists first Antiprovidential Argument refuted by the Perfection of the Divine Nature and their absurdity in commensurating the excellencies of God by the infinitely inferior Faculties of man detected ibid. 2. Divinity demonstrated superior to the circumscription both of Time and Place p. 118. 3. That the procuration of all the infinitely various actions of second causes in the World cannot be any interturbation of Gods serene felicity proved by an Argument à minori p. 119. 4. The same illustrated by a second comparison p. 120. 5. That the administration of petty occurrences can be no indignity or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God but on the Contrary absolutely essential to him firmly evicted from the universality of his Cognition and Presence p. 121. SECT V. ARTIC 1. THe first division of the Atheists second objection viz. that the apparent irregularity of events doth justisie their non-praedestination or meer Contingency strongly convelled and that to the praeordination of Divinity nothing can be casual clearly commonstrated p. 124. 2. The Authors Antithesis that all Natural Agents are under the strict laws of their distinct species p. 129. 3. A second Counterposition that those laws were instituted and sancited by an infinite wisdome ibid. 4. A third that the legislator hath reserved to himself a praerogative power to alter transcend invert or repeal the laws of Nature ibid. 5. The verity of the first and second Positions amply demonstrated p. 130. 6. The verity of the third Position demonstrated p. 136. 7. A farther confirmation of the same by an Argument from the miraculous operations of God in praeterito p. 137. 8. That there was an universal Deluge p. 138. 9. The Cessation of Satans Oracles after the advent of the Word of Truth proved authentiquely ibid. 10. That there was a prodigious Eclips of the Sun at the passion of our Saviour p. 140. 11. A Demonstration of the impossibility of the Catholique Deluges proceeding from Causes Natural p. 141. 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles upon the incarnation of God was an effect meerly fupernatural comprobated uncontrollably p. 146. 13. That the Eclips of the Sun at the death of Christ was purely Metaphysical irrefutably demonstrated p. 149. 14. The Adaequatien of all to the verification of the Authors third Position p. 152. SECT VI. ARTIC 1. LUcretius his blasphemy that mans ignorance of the energy of Natural Causes is the sole basis of the opinion of an Universal Providence p. 152. 2. The redargution thereof p. 153. 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion p. 154. 4. The opinion of a General Providence consistent with Physiology p. 155. 5. Lucretius his scruples concerning the seemingly temerarious effects of the Thunderbolt singularly resolved ibid. CHAP. V. The especial Providence of God Demonstrated page 157. SECT I. ARTIC 1. THe introduction intimating the neer cognation betwixt this present and the precedent Theme and the necessity of the Authors
beginning at the Atheists Objections p. 157. 2. The first objection desumed from the Apathie of the Divine Nature p. 158. 3. The same excogitated by Epicurus and promoted by Lucretius ibid. 4. The second objection extorted from mans being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Natures p. 159. 5. The last objection of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Impious in this life p. 160. 6. The sporadical diffusion thereof upon Ethnicks Hebrews and Christians and the probability of their opinion who hold the book of Job to be a Treatise concerning the same subject insinuated p. 16â— SECT II. ARTIC 1. THat man is the sole object of Gods special Providence argued from hence that he is the principal object of his extrinsecal love and that inferred from hence 1 that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledge of his Divinity then upon any other Creature Angels only excluded 2 that man is only qualified to speculate admire and laud the pulchritude of Nature p. 166. 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods special Providence p. 170. 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion ibid. 4. That Man brings into the world with him an irresistible propension to Religion p. 172. 5. An objection that the Calaici were absolute Atheists refuted p. 173. 6. A second objection that the Massagetae and Scythians were devoyd of all Religion prevented ibid. 7. That it is not in the power of man totally to cradicate this plant of Religion or notion of special Providence Divine out of his mind evinced from hence that the most contumatious Atheists have at some time or other acknowledged it as p. 174. 8. Pharaoh ibid. 9. Herod Agrippa p. 175. 10. Antiochus Epiphanes ibid. 11. Maximinus p. 176. 12. Julian Apostata p. 177. 13. Tullus Hostilius ibid. 14. Bion Borysthenites p. 178. 15. The possibility of the obscuration of the impress of special Providence Divine pro tempore conceded and the impossibility of the total Deletion thereof briefly proved p. 179. 16. The reduction of all to a concise and memorable demonstration that the occurrences of every mans life are the consignations of special Providence p. 180. SECT III. ARTIC 1. THe Atheists first objection confuted and the Divine Nature demonstrated both irascible and placable anthropopathically p. 180. 2. The Atheists scruple of Gods inaudition of the prayers of good men or not concession of their petitions satisfied p. 183. 3. The Atheists second Argument against Speciall Providence divine dissolved and the necessity of Objects hostile and deleterious to the life of man demonstrated p. 184. 4. The same illustrated by a correspondent simile p. 185. 5. The Atheists last and grand objection of the prosperity of the Vitious and adversity of the Virtuous redargued and the nature of the Goods of Fortune profounded p. 186. 6. The Reason wherefore Divine Providence confers Good things on Evil men p. 189. 7. Those apparent Evils which Providence Divine consignes to Virtuous men anatomized and found to be real Goods intrinsecally p. 190 8. The Authors Sanctuary wherein he secured his mind from discontent in all those stormes of Calamities which our late Civil war showred upon him p. 191. 9. Virtue a meer Chimera without the occursion of those things which Sensuality calls Evil. p. 192. 10. The Sense no competent Criterion of the Good or Evil of the mind ibid. 11. The Atheists objection that God ought in justice always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil expunged p. 195. 12. The Summum bonum of this life consistent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will p. 196. 13. An excellent meditation of Marcus Antoninus concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life ibid. CHAP. VI. The Mobility of the Term of mans Life asserted page 199. SECT I. ARTIC 1. THe Assinity of this Theorem to the precedent intimated and the necessary division thereof into a specifical and individual consideration p. 199. 2. The reasons of the Authors concise tractation of the first part p. 200. 3. The moderation of Death by Special Providence Divine argued from the impossibility of the moderation thereof by any other power ibid. 4. The same demonstrated from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning continuation and period on the will of the First Mover p. 202. SECT II. ARTIC 1. A Transient discovery of the almost insuperable Difficulties to be encountred in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem whether the Term of mans life be Moveable or Fatal premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgement and his purpose of taking a middle way between the absolute Fatality of the Soick and the meer Fortune of the Epicurean p. 204. 2. Two praevious considerables necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question p. 207. 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death to three General heads viz. Necessary Fortuitous Supernatural supports the discrimination of the Term of life into Supernatural Natural and Accidentary and the impertinency of the consideration of the Supernatural Term to the present scope p. 207. 4. The proper import of the Natural Term oâ— mans life and also of the Accidental p. 209. 5. The result of our acceptation of the Term of life in the first signification ibid. 6. The consequence of our understanding the Term of life in the second signification p. 210. 7. The Fixation of the Term of life acceptable in a double interest viz. 1 in respect to some Absolute Divine Decree precedent even to Gods Prescience of all Secondary or instrumental Causes 2 to some Hypothetical Divine Decree whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of mans Will And the indifferency of either branch of the distinction to our instant design p. 211. 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction p. 212. 9. The convenient reduction of them to two only ibid. 10. The First opinion declared and the principal Abettors thereof mentioned p. 213 11. The Stoical Fate and the Calvinists Predestination fully defined p. 215. 12. A full and clear discrimination of the Stoical from the Theological Fate ibid. 13. A list of the execrable Absurdities impendent on the opinion of Absolute Fatality so accepted as the Stoick proposeth it p. 217. SECT III. ARTIC 1. THe Authors adhaesion to the Second opinion justified by two important reasons p. 219. 2. The great obscurity and small validity of some Texts of holy writ alledged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion detected p. 220. 3. The Natural Causes proxime of the Longitude and Brevity of mans life and the Authors private conjecture of the cause of Longevity in the first age of the world p. 221. 4. The injustice of our Adversaries title of patronage from the forementioned text of Job further manifested p. 222. 5. Seven testimonies out of holy writ supporting the mobility of the
Fate considered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as a substance p. 303. 3. And what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an Energy or Act together with the etymological reasons of those sundry Appellations the Stoicks have imposed upon it p. 304. SECT II. ARTIC 1. THe second Classis of Philosophers who understood Fate to be a Constitution meerly Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects viz. 1 those who assert the Immutability and Inevitability of Fate 2 those who dâ—fend the possibility of its Alteration and Evasion p. 305. 2. The Leaders of the First Sect Heraclitus Empedocles Leucippus Paâ—menides and chiefly Democritus p. 306. 3. Democritus justly chaâ—ged with the patronage of Inevitable Fate and his doctrine concâ—rning it concisely râ—hearsed ibid. SECT III. ARTIC 1. THe Principal of the Second Sect Aristotle and Epicurus p. 312. 2. The Grounds of the Authors in puting the opinion both of Fates Identity with Nature and the possibility of its Mutation and Declination by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists to Aristotle ibid. 3. Epicurus unanimoâ—s to Aristotle in the point of Physical and Eluctable Necessity p. 314. 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of mans Liberty epitomized ibid. 5. An Exception in the name of Democritus against Epicurus Inference p. 316. 6. The justification thereof by a Respons conforme to the Physiology of Epicurus p. 317. 7. The most weighty Rejoynder of the connexion of those Causes which Avert the Mind from so well as of those which Attract it to an object to the eternal Series of Fate found too light to overbalance Epicurus his defence of mans Liberty p. 319. SECT IV. ARTIC 1. MAthematical Fate briefly described p. 321. 2. The gross Vanity thereof concealed from many Philosophers only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adhaesion to Antique Traditions ibid. 3. The Absurdity of Sydereal Necessity evicted 1 by an Argument desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate 323 4. 2 By the common Experiment of the unaequal Fortunes of Twins p. 324. 5. 3 By the double Impiety inseparable from the belief thereof p. 325. CHAP. X. The Liberty of Mans Will Fortune and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine page 328. SECT I. ARTIC 1. THE intent of the chapter p. 328. 2. Democritus Fate inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of Religion and the Liberty of mans Will and therefore detested ibid. 3. Aristotle and Epicurus their Fate admitted in that it is Identical to Nature but abominated in that it clasheth with the Certitude of Divine Praescience p. 329. 4. The Platonick and Stoick Fate embraced so far as it is conceded to be a Constitution of the Divine Wisdome but abandoned in that it detracts from Divine Omnipotence ibid. 5. In what qualified sense Christianisme may tolerate the use of the term Fate ibid. SECT II. ARTIC 1. FAte and Fortune conciliated in the point of Providence Divine p. 330. 2. Plutarchs ingenious Assimilation of Fate to the Civil Law and his design therein p. 331. SCET. III. ARTIC 1. FAte concentrical to mans Elective Liberty in the point of Praedestination p. 332. 2. The Concord betwixt Theology and Philosophy in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural viz. Necessary and Free the ground of the Affinity both betwixt the Difficulties and Solutions on either part as to the Abolition of the seeming Repugnancy between Fate and mans Free-will p. 333. 3. The First capital Difficulty desumed from Divine Praescience as stated by Divines p. 334. 4. The same as stated by Philosophers ibid. 5. The full solution of the same by vertue of the Divines Discrimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical p. 335. 6. The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the definite Praenotion of future Contingents is no Cause of their definite Contingency but è contrà the definity of their Futurition the cause of their definite Praenotion p. 338. 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion p. 339. 8. The same exemplified ibid. SECT IV. ARTIC 1. THe Second Capital Difficulty erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio as it respecteth both Theology and Philosophy p. 340. 2. Two eminent Opinions of Divines touchant the Solution of this Difficulty recognized and their judicious Modelly in duely acknowledging the mysterie of Praedestination to be Arcanum Divini imperii commended p. 34â— 3. The First opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophisme Ignava Ratio 343. 4. The Second Opinion to a great part extricated from the same Labyrinth p. 345. 5. The Fatists Subtersuge of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion praecluded p. 346. 6. A second subtersuge of the Fatist viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praenotion doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability praevented ibid. 7. A third Conclusion viz. that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods praevision of mans future good actions doth make man the Author of his own Discretion detected and redargued p. 347. 8. Two Extracts from the praemises 1 that the Cooperation of mans Will to sufficient Grace may be conceived a Cause of his Election 2 that to render a reason why God did not constitute All men such as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace and so be Elect is an impossibility to mans understanding other then this that such was his eternal will p. 347. 9. The former Sophisme ignava Ratio in part dissolved by Plutarchs Distinction that though All effects are comprehended in yet all are not caused by Fate p. 348. 10. The insufficiency of that Distinction to the total solution of the Difficulty duely acknowledged p. 349. 11. The most promising Responses of some Philosophers concisely praesented viz. of 1. Of Plato ibid. 2. Seneca p. 350. 3. Chrysippus p. 351. 4. Aquinas p. 352. 12. These acute Responses aequitably audited and their import sound to be no more then this that man hath a Freedome of Assent but not of Dissent to the Will of God p. 352. 13. The Dehortation from immoderate Curiosity in Divine Mysteries and concise Adhortation to conform unto and calmly acquiesce in the Revealed Will of God 353. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED CHAP. I. SECT I. ARistotle though an Ethnick poysoned Section 1. Article 1. Aristotle the most knowing and curious Ethnick did yet by his silence in the cardinal point of Theology proclaim the impossibility of mans full understanding the simple and perfect Essence of God with the Macedonian and Grecian Idolatry nay so given over to that sottish impiety Polytheisme that he could be content to make a Goddesse of his Wench and offer solemn sacrifices to her as a Deity whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of Humanity to devote his orisons to her for good whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to evill as Gassendus Exercitat 3. out of Diogenes Laert. hath accused him had
I should have given unto my self also all those perfections whereof I have the Idea in my mind and so I my self should have been God Nor am I bound to conceive that those excellencies wanting to the accomplishment of my nature can be more difficult to acquire then those graduall abilities of which I am already master for on the contrary t is manifest that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being i. e. for a Cogitant something to be deduced from nothing then for me being once constituted in a Capacity to attain to the cognition of many things whereof I am now actually ignorant which can be esteemed no more but the Accidents of that substance And assuredly had I borrowed the greater my substantiality from my own stock of power I should not have denied unto my self the less those Accumulations or accidentall additions nor any other of those divine accomplishments which I understand to be included in the Idea of God why because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto t is more then probable I should understand that difficulty if I had those Faculties of which my nature stands possessed from my own donation in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of these reasons if I adventure on this supposition that I have been ever heretofore as I now am as if the induction of this hypothesis would be that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher then my self or seek out no other cause of my Existence for in respect that all time may be divided into innumerable parts each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest either precedent or subsequent from hence that I have formerly been is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be unlesse some other cause be admitted which dothfreshly create me in each of those particles or atoms of time and particularly in this instant moment i. e. doth constantly conserve me in being For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of Duration that to the Conservation of any thing through all those several minutes in which its existence endureth is required no less then the same power and act which is necessary to the Creation of the same thing anew if it were not already existent and consequently that the act of Conservation doth not at all but in the cloudy reason of man differ from the act of Creation These things thus stated I am concerned to propose to my self this interrogation Whether there be any power inherent in my nature whereby I may be enabled to conserve my self the same in the future that I am now in the present for since I am nothing but a meer res cogitans for here I precisely regard only that part of my self which is properly and distinctly a Cogitant substance if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence doubtless I should be conscious of it but I am convicted there is none such and therefore from this one evidence that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being for the shortest moment imaginable I judge that I am subordinate unto and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from my self But to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusion put the case that this Entitie to whose sufficiency I owe my Conservation pardon ò thou incomprehensible Essence thou great and sole Preserver of men pardon this supposition that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy Supremacy is not God and that I deduce my production from my Parents or some other cause less perfect then God For determination t is an Axiome to which every Sceptick will readily condescend Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa quantum est in effectu there must be so much at least in the cause as is found in the effect and therefore since I am res cogitans a substance thinking and having a certain Idea of God in me what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being that cause also must be Ens cogitans and must possess the Idea of all those perfections which I ascribe unto God Now of that cause it may be again enquired whether it were derived from it self or from some other Cause for if from it selfe then may it bee naturally collected from what hath preceded in this disquisition that such a Cause is God For as it hath the power or act of self-existence or self-conservation so also undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self i. e. all such accomplishments as I conceive to be concentred in God But if from some other cause then I repeat my question again Article 11. Oâ— from some other cause leâ—s perfect then God concerning this other cause whether that had its being from it self or from another untill I arrive successively at the first Cause or highest linke in the chain which also will be God For no melancholy can be so absurd as to dream of a progress in infinitum in the series of Causes especially since I doe not here intend that Cause only which did in time past produce me but principally that which doth conserve me in the present Nor can it be imagined that a plurality of Causes met concurred and conspired to the making up of my nature and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God from a second the Idea of another from a third the Idea of another c. so that all those perfections may indeed be found severally in the distinct and scattered peices of the Universe but no where conjoyned and amassed together in one single Essence which might be God For on the contrary the Vnity Simplicity Inseparability or Identity of all those excellencies in God is one of the chiefest of those perfections which I understand to be in him nor assuredly could the Idea of the Vnity of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also nor could he have effected that I should understand them conjoyned and married together by an indissoluble union unless he had also effected that I should know what they are in their distinction To expunge the last scruple and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God fair and immaculate have not my Article 12 Or from our Paâ—ents Progenitors devolved a being to my Parents and they devolved the like to me and may not this Idea of those perfections which I attribute to God be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation without the necessary insertion of it by
by God but the pure Natural man who wants the illumination of sacred Writ can follow no other conduct but what by the light of nature appears most consonant to truth My Digression is now ended and I returne to the discharge of my Assumption the redargution of that blasphemous opinion which ascribes the honour of the Worlds composure to Fortune SECT II. ANd first I oppose to the Patron of this error the more noble Article 1. The conceit of the Worlds fortuitous production disparaged by a prepollency even of Pagan Auctority that profoundly asserted the contrary viz. of Auctority of many antient and eminent Philosophers who though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paganism had yet their intellectuals so irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature which their Vigilancy and assiduous Contemplation always kept like the Vestal tapours shining and uneclipsed by the Cimmerian foggs of Tradition and Prejudice that they discovered more then a glimps of Divinity in the original of the World For Thales Milesius being introduced by Diogenes Laertius in vita ejusdem as rendring a reason Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus Article 2. Thales Milesius of the extreme glory comeliness and decency of the World and exact symmetry observed in all and every part thereof most wisely sets up his rest and silences all further dispute in this full solution 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 t is the Artifice of God That Anaxagoras had found out the same truth by his retrograde tracing of nature up to her first head or fountain can be Article 3. Anaxagoras obscure to none that shall doe his meditations so much right as to interpret his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mens or supreme Intelligence to be the same with that which we call God for even our School-men doe as much frequently using those appellatives Summa Intelligentia and Deus indifferently and as Synonomas Of Pythagoras and Plato we need no other record then the single testimony of Timaeus Locrus who being a famous Pythagorean Article 4. Pythagoras and Plato and therefore prudently deputed by Plato to deliver his own sense in that golden Dialogue concerning Nature which in the Commentary of Marsilius Ficinus signifies no more then Divinitatis instrumentum in many passages of the debate or investigation takes occasion to declare Deum esse Parentem ac opisicem mundi Nor can it cost the study of many houres to collect from Plato's other inquest into Divinity called Parmenides who also was a disciple of Pythagoras or De uno omnium principio and the now mentioned description of Nature Timaeus conferred together that both Pythagoras and Plato shook hands in that opinion that the world had its beginning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not in Time in regard as they conceived it never had beginning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but in Cogitation i. e. though it be Non-principiate yet may our thoughts have the licence to assume that there was some praeexistent matter out of which it was formed For they both apprehended so absolute a dependence of the world upon God that God being existent in the World must of necessity be reputed the Efficient thereof insomuch as the World could have no other Cause of its Matter Distinction Disposition Beauty and ornament And is not this the same that our Doctors now admit while they defend that the World might have been created by God had his Wisdome thought fit from all Eternity and if so yet notwithstanding he must still have been the Cause of it in regard of that necessary dependence of the World upon him for if there were no God there could be no World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same reason as though we grant the Sun together with its light or a Seal together with its signature to have been from all Eternity yet must we grant the Sun to be the Cause of his light and the Seal to be the Cause of its impression For they condescend to this that an Effect may be coaevous to its Cause and that though the Cause be not prior Tempore it sufficeth that it be onely prior Natura or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is the very expression of Timaeus Locrus However this may be disputed yet sure I am that as well these two Patriarchs of Learning as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point That God was Author of the Universe What the Stoicks thoughts were concerning this grand particular Article 5. The Stoicks is publick and cannot escape the cognizance of any who have look't into the lives of the Scholiarchs or Heads of that numerous Sect amply registred by the even pen of Diogen Laert. or read Cicero's second Book De natura Deorum where he elegantly personates Balbus smartly and profoundly disputing against Velleius and Epicurus whither I remit the unsatisfied Reader in avoidance of Prolixity For the grand signieur of the Schools Aristotle truth is I Article 6. Aristotle cannot conceal that when he maintains in 8. Physic prioribus de Coelo the Universe to be ingenitum without origination and contemns that forementioned distinction of Priority 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as excogitated by Pythagoras and continued by Plato rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the convenience of Doctrine then the interest of Truth he is positive that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all and therefore Simplicius in 8. Physic digress 3. chiding Philoponus for daring to assert that the World had its origin and production from God according to the testimony of Moses Chronicle cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his oracle Arist and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned Productor since it tacitly rendred him subject to that imperfection Mutability which is incompatible with the constant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplisht for so mighty an action and implies that he was not the same from all Eternity and but lately became Parens Conditórque mundi But yet have I ground enough to stand upon that Arist grew wiser as he grew elder and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim for in the last exercise of his pen his book De mundo which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies cap. 5. 6. he sings a palinodia and makes open profession that the universal harmony consonance and pulchritude of this great machine were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab universorum Conditore Confirming the verity of that pious A dage confest and pronounced by all men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All from God That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto fathered upon Zoroaster that King and Magus of the antient Baâ—trians and contemporany to Ninus and Semiramis as Eusebius lib. 10. de praep Evangel cap. 3. accounts Factor qui per se operans fabrifecit mundum doth not want its share of probability
lines pages sheets should attain to that admirable Form which they now hold by a meer fortuitous assembly and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some supremely-intelligent Cause These reasons though not woven into that strict method which Article 8. The conclusion of this section or the aequipondium of the precedeÌ„t reasons if perpended in the mass and conjunctively to the most perfect demonstration is required to fulfill the web of perfect demonstrations doe yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to conclude the Creation of the Vniverse out of no praeexistence by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence and if judiciously twisted together into one Syndrome or complex Argument must oblige as firmly since they clearly evince the first Article of the Christians Creed as an uncontrollable verity which none but such degenerate miscreants in whom the Light of Nature is wholly extinct or such as are desperatly resolved to shut the eye of their minde against the splendor of that infallible Criterion can longer doubt of And therefore having determined neither to scandal the intellectuals of my Reader either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of those proofs already urged or multiplying others in order to the illustration of that truth to which he hath formerly submitted his plenary assent nor unfruitfully to spend that time and paper which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other necessary points on a work of supererogation I shall onely fringe this exercise with that pertinent and emphatical passage of Lactantius De Opif. Dei cap. 6. Tanta ergo qui videat talia potest existimare nulla effecta esse consilio nulla providentia nulla ratione divina sed ex Atomis subtilibus exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula nonne prodigio simile est aut natum esse hominem qui haec diceret ut Leucippum aut extitisse qui crederet ut Democritum qui auditor ejus fuit vel Epicurum in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi sonte prostuxit and so proceed to the satisfaction of two collateral Scruples SECT IV. Scruple 1. THe Curiosity of some whether more insolent or vain is Article 1. That Antique absurd expostulation what Instruments Auxiliants materials predisposd God made use of in his act of Fabrication of the Universe copâ—ously satisfied and the energie of the divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either hard to determine hath been so audacious as to adventure upon this Quere If God made the world pray what instruments tools mechanick engines what assistants did he make use of in the work The Satisfaction This is no green impiety unless it hath lately budded forth again amongst those Human-devils the Ranters the report of whose prodigious blasphemies hath sometimes transported me to a hatred at least a contempt of my self for being in the same rank of reatures and made me wish for a second deluge but almost half as old as Time and may be traced as high as the Epoche of the Grecian learning witness those many secret convulsions of it by Plato both in his Parmenides and Tâ—mâ—us while he frequently affirmes the divine Nature to be Inorganical and the immediate operations of the universal cause to be above the necessity of Corporeal means witness also Cicero most of whose streams came out of the Grecian fountain who in 1. De Nat. Deor. introducing the Atheist Vellejus disputing against Plato and the Stoicks who held the divine essence to be the Author of the Universe proposeth the scruple at large in these Words Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabrâ—cam illam tanti operis qua construi à Deo at que aedificari muâ—dum facit quae molitio quae ferramenta qui vectes quae machinae qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt c. That boldness is the daughter of ignorance is herein plainly verified for had these unhappy Pagans understood any thing of the majestick essence of divinity or but apprehended the vast disparity between the efficiency of the Highest and that of all other Subordinate causes t is more then probable they had not been so sawcy with his imperial Attribute Omnipotence nor run into that common mistake of flesh and bloud of measuring the ways of God by the ways of man True t is that man hath need of instruments to the performance of any peice of Art nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule or describe a circle without the help of his compass the Carpenter work without his Axe Saw and other tools the Smith without his fire hammer anvill c. all which the wit of man sharpned by necessity hath invented to compensate the insufficiency of his naked hands made by nature either too soft too weak or too obtuse for those difficult uses But yet what can impede our assurance of the eternal existence of a more Noble Essicient whose Will is infinite Power and that Power infinite Activity whose single Let it be done is both Cause and Means and whose simple act of Volition not onely the Efficient but also the Instrument Do not we observe that I may extract an Argument from the evidence of sense how in the twinckling of a lovers eye that comely Arch of colours the Rain-bow is painted on the clouds and yet without either hand compass or pencill doe we not behold whole mountains of ponderous Clouds piled one upon another and yet neither vessels to lave up nor engines to sustain that sea of water And cannot these familiar observations instruct us with more knowledge then to doubt the fabrication of the world without corporeal organs Why is our reason so immodest as to inquire into the ability of the First cause when alas it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakest Secondary if the meanest and most ordinary effect of Nature imports so much stupendious industry as transcends the narrow capacity of man what audacious ignorance is it in him to question the eâ—ergie of that Principle that made Nature her self and prescribed her rules to act by from which she cannot vary without a miraculous dispensation We are willing forsooth to profess that we cannot understand by what artifice the delicate body of a Pismire is configurated animated and impowered for the noble actions of sense and voluntary motion nay for ought we know to the contrary for that more noble and elaborate office of discourse also and yet when we come to contemplate the more magnificent form of the Vniverse shall we degenerate into such impertinent Ideots as to debate the Mathematick energie of its Creator and demand how he could operate without Engines to transport adfer and winde up the materials with scaffolds to advance the roof or servants to assist in several offices requisite Assuredly as the frame of that slender Animal doth confess a certain Faculty by which it was modelled delineated and compacted though the reason
not consent to his own Adnihilation though he might evade his torments by the bargain with advantage preferring the miserable condition of something to the horrid opacity of nothing Third that God made such abundant provision conductive to the utility of men that both from the Amplitude and Variety of 3. his work they might collect matter sufficient to incite them to the constant contemplation of his Wisdome and gratefull acknowledgement of his Munificence as also that having observed what of the Creatures were less commodious they might be directed in their election of the more commodious and beneficial as well for their Conservation as Delight Fourth that the labours of Agriculture are superfluous and voluntarily undergon by man more for the maintainance of his 4. delicacy and inordinate luxury then the provision of Necessaries to his livelyhood Since the same liberal earth which is Mother Nurse and Purveyer to all other Animals cannot be thought inhospitable to man only nor so cruelly penurious as to exclude her best guest from participating the inexhaustible bouÌ„ty of her table And though we grant some moderate labour necessary in order to the comfortable sustentation of our prodigal bodies always upon the expence yet have we good cause to esteem that more a blessing then a curse since the sweat of industry is sweet Not only because the active genius of man is constellated for business and therefore never more opprest then with the burthen of idleness but also because the sprightly hopes of a wealthy harvest sweeten and compensate the labour of semination Nor is the contentment which growes from ingenious Husbandry much below any other solace of the mind in this life if we may credit the experience of many Princes who having surfetted on the distractions of royalty have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleasures of the Court magnified only by such ambitious Novices who never discovered the gall that lyes at the bottom of those guilded sweets and with inestimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges have found it a greater delight to â—ultivate the obedient and gratefull earth then rule that giddy beast the multitude a happier entertainment of the mind and more wholsome exercise of the body to hold the easie plough then sway an unweildy Scepter and revell in the infatuating pomp of greatness Fifth that those preposterous seasons Blights Mildews Combustions c. putrefactive accidents that make the preguant earth 5. suffer abortion and so nip the forward hopes of the laborious swain doe neither intervene so frequently nor invade so generally as to introduce an universal famine or so cut off all provision as not to leave a sufficient stock of Aliment for the sustentation of mankind Sixth that the divine Intellect was the universal exemplar 6. to it self framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man within it self and accordingly configurating them This may be evinced by an argument à minori since even our selves have a power to design and modell some artificial engine whose pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing existent without the circle of our selves but coyned in the solitary recesses of our mind Seventh concerning mans being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies as the voracity of wild beasts the venome of 7. Serpents the conflagration of Lightning the contagion of the Pestilence the corruption of swarms of other diseases both epidemick and sporadick c. that all these are the regular effects of Gods Generall Providence and have their causes times and finalities preordained and inscribed in the diary of Fate to whose prescience nothing is contingent But of this more satisfactorily in our subsequent consideration of universal Providence whither in strictness of method it refers it self Eight that this complaint against the unkindness of Nature 8. for producing man tender naked unarmed c. is grosly unjust For the imbecillity of our Infancy is necessary to the perfection and maturity of those noble organs contrived for the administration of the mandates of that Empress the Cogitant Soul and is amply compensated either by the vigor and acuteness of the senses or by diuturnity of life It being observed by Naturalists that those Animals which live long have a long gestation in the womb a long infancy and attain but slowly to their maturity and standard of growth the four general motions of life Inception Augmentation State and Declination carrying set and proportional intervals each to other as that truly noble Philosopher Scaliger hath hinted in his correction of that fabulous tradition of the extreme loâ—gaevity of Deer in these words De ejus vitae longitudine fabulantur neque enim aut gestatio aut incrementum hinnulorum ejusmodi sunt ut praestent argumentum longaevi Animalis As for his being born naked t is no disfavour nor neglect in her for that cumbersom wardrobe of raggs which man hath gotten upon his back is become necessary only by the delicacy of his education and custome not so intended by nature in the primitive simplicity and eucrasie of his constitution when there needed nothing but the skin either to warme or adorn the body Lastly those Armes which Nature hath denied him either he wants not at all or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleasure CHAP. IV. The General Providence of God DEMONSTRATED Sâ—CT I. THe Synopsis of my method exhibited in the hem of the first Section of the first Chapter was designed Article 1. The Authors reasons for his present adherence to the common discrimination of Providence from Creation as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my Reader along the series of those Attributes of the supreme Ens which as being of most general concernment and such as may be clearly demonstrated by the Light of Nature even to those who either never heard of or except against the testimony of Holy Writ I have promised to illustrate by the conviction of Arguments deduced from that catholique Criterion Reason to whose Judicature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther explanation of the connexion and dependence of this Theme upon the precedent but only in avoydance of misconception to advertise that when I say the Creation of the World ex nihilo and the constant Conservation of the same in its primitive order and harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate are the general operations of the Wisdome and Power of the First cause I doe not intend that those are Acts really distinct each from other for in the demonstration of the Existence of God t is plainly though succinctly evinced that the Conservation of the Vniverse is nothing but the Act of Creation prolonged or continued but only conform my theory to the customary notions and terms of the Schools and yeeld to the necessity of a division in the gross capacity of mans understanding in order to the more
assertors of Providence is manifest from that saying of Cotta reproving Balbus an eminent Stoick apud Cicer. de natur Deor. 3. At enim minora dii neque agellos singulorum nec viticulas prosequuntur nec si uredo aut grando quidpiam nocuit id Iovi animadvertendum fuit nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant sic enim dicitis c. And lastly that the Academicks and Scepticks were of the 5. The Academicks and Scepticks same perswasion however being carried against the stream of all Affirmative learning by the contrary tide of their own Negative humor and obliged to fall foul upon all truths in defence of their own affected Nescience they have been observed to have had some light skirmishes with the Champians of Providence Nor need we acquiesce in the bare affirmation hereof while to any man that shall with equanimity and attention compare their tender arguments against the opinion of general Providence with those more sinewy and vehement reasons of their profest neutrality in many other notions there will offer it self a fair ground for more then conjecture that they purposely contrived them soft gentle and dissoluble that so they might seem neither to quit their habit of contradiction nor yet to dare the subversion of that catholick position to which all men those few of the black guard of Hell whom we lately nominated excepted had subscribed and which the dictates of their own domestick oracle Reason had confirmed as sacred and uncontrollable To which we may annex the testimony of Gassendus who in Animadvers in lib. 10. Diogen Laert. de Physiologia Epicuri pag. 731. speaking conjunctively of both those sects saies thus ut argument atisunt adversus Providentiam sic opinioni de providentia suam probabilitatem fecerunt neque saltem ea fronte fuerunt ut esse providentiam absolutè inficiarentur Now to take the just dimensions of this Argument let us allow it like Janus to have two faces and then survey the aspect Article 4. A review of the induction and the Argument found to be Apodictical on one side and on the other only perswasive of each a part On one hand it looks Absolute and Apodictical on the other only Perswasive Apodictical since the universality of any beleif such especially as hath ever been attested even by those who have made the profoundest search into its fundamentals and streyned every nerve in the whole body of reason to demolish it is no obscure proof that it must be one of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Implantate Notions which the same hand that made our nature hath engraven on the table of our minds and lest it not in the power of our depraved Wills totally to obliterate That there are some Implantate Notions no man who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature will dispute Nor is it less certain that all Philosophers have decreed Anticipation which Aristotle in 1. Poster 1. calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praeexistentem cognitionem and Cicero hath interpreted 1 de Nat. Deor. notionem menti insitam anteceptam quandam in animo informationem to be the Touch-stone of verity nay Empiricus himself forgot his custome of Scepticisme when he came to this point and grew positive advers Gramm advers Ethic. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that no man could so much as enquire or doubt of any thing without Praenotion And that the Notion of the worlds regiment by universal Providence is one of those propositions Quae sunt in nobis adeo antiquae ut iis ex quo esse sentire coepimus evaserimus informati which like letters carved on the bark of a young plant are impressed upon our very Intellect and grow up together with us is already proved collaterally and upon induction in our Demonstration of the Existence of God for therein it is cleared that the excellent Idea which we have of the Supreme Beeing contains all Perfections whatever and among the rest that noble Attribute Creator which to him that shall attentively consider the nature of Duration must sound one and the same thing with Conservator or Governour Only perswasive since humane Auctority considered perse is but an inartificial Argument and binds not but when consorted with others more rational into one syndrome or multiplex demonstration not is the concentration of all mens minds in one and the same assertion an infallible Criterion of its verity For the judgement of man in generall lyes open to the encroachments of Error and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only discoverable in the gross and visible delusions of vulgar heads whose business is to beleive not examine but hath frequently broken out upon the soundest brains and confest it self Epidemical in the absurd mistakes of the greatest Criticks of Truth especially in the promotion and transmission of opinions haereditary and traditional SECT III. LEt us not therefore entrust the supportation of so weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of Auctority but give our selves Article 1. Gods General Providence demonstrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts liberty to imagine that no man ever beleived or asserted an universal Providence and having thus devested our minds of all Praesumption or Anticipation expose them as tables newly derased to receive the pure impressions or sincere documents of the Light of Nature converting our contemplations First upon the Nature of God and thence upon the most exact order and confederacy of all secondary causes in the world First I say let us set our reason a work upon the nature of the First Cause or Eternal Being and order our cogitations thus The same demonstration whereby the mind of man is convicted of the Existence of God doth also at the same time violently but naturally conclude his nature to be so accomplisht in all Perfections as to be above all Access or Addition For manifest it is that by the terme God every man doth understand something to which no perfection is wanting and should it be granted possible that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more then what is comprehended in the idea which it holds of the nature of God yet still would that thing to which it could ascribe that perfection be God Since t is impossible to cogitate any perfection which is not the essential propriety of some Nature and to think any Nature more perfect then the Divine plainly absurd because we conceive that to be most perfect or else we do not conceive it to be God God and Absolute Perfection being one and the same thing and ordinarily conceived as one notion Now to be so insinitely Wise Potent and Good as to order all things in the world to the best to regulate and predetermine the operations of all second Causes to keep Nature her self sober and in tune and so prevent those discords which otherwise would in a moment succeed to the reduction of all to a greater confusion
direct line conducted our single reason to the demonstration of his General Providence which indeed is the clearest mirror of his superexcellent Nature and to the opticks of mortality doth afford a lively reflexion of his infinite Wisedome Power and Goodness It succeeds that we endevour to look at Providence through the Telescope or Perspective of the World Since God made the World as hath been already proved it cannot but be absurd to imagine that he instantly deserted it or Article 3. The necessity of the worlds gubernation by the indesinent influence of Gods general Providence demonstrated from the consideration of the absolute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First having once imprest a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vast machin immediately withdrew his hand from action leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or swinge and all the lesser and subordinate wheels of particular natures to conforme to the impulsion of those greater For though he made all things Perfect i. e. omitted nothing requirable to the integral accomplishment of each Creature in suo genere yet since himself is the Vniversal Soul that both Materiald and Informed each particle of this great body in striâ—tness of consequence nothing can have existence longer then he shall please in every minute of its duration freshly to create it or to speak the interest of Providence to conserve it in being by a continual communication of it self all the Actions of Divinity being real Divinity at second hand or nothing but Dissusions or Emanations of its own essence Again who ever reared a magnificent structure a purpose to ruine it and since there is no Artificer so unnatural or stupid as not to desire rather that his Artifice should prosper and continue long by carefull looking to then be exposed to ruine by neglect or violence t is infinitely more improbable that the great Exemplar of all Mechanicks for no age ever produced a peice of Art whose pattern was not first in Nature should so far grow out of love with his own operation and despise those perfections which were but the extracts of himself as to disclaim it commit it to the imminent disorder and demolition of Fortune and not make provision of all things conducible to its preservation especially when no Intellect but his own could be large enough to comprehend the Idea of the work no Prudence but his own absolute enough to project the convenient modell of its due gubernation no Power but his own almighty enough to furnish him with requisites thereto Nor can it with safety or honour to our judgements be imagined that God might had he so pleased have constituted the World in such absolute perfection as that from the minute of its complete existence it might have continued independent and to all eternity have subsisted by it self and all its appointed motions have constantly without intermission or variation succeeded by the direction of their bequeathed impressions without the assiduous moderation of his care or the minutely supply of his providence since the Universe according to the Grammar of sound Philosophy is no Noune Substantive and enjoyes reality only by a distinction i. e. is something by dependence upon him who was eternally contrary to nothing and being at that instant when Omniety informed Nullity into existence educed out of nothing by the single Fiat of God and thence forward continued to be something by the continued Power of the Creator must unavoidably revert to nothing again if the perseverance of that identical power be substracted from which it once obtained to be something And as Light cannot subsist if separated from a lucid body but instantly vanishes into opacity so cannot the World which is but a reflexive deradiation from that Light which is invisible continue if the perpetual sourse of that miraculous Virtue which upholds its existence be withdrawn but must immediately vanish into nothing For the Analogy holds in all points and the dependence of the Creature upon the Creator is as highly absolute as that of Light upon the Sun or other lucid body And though there are some things which being once assisted into determinate essences by their causes doe afterwards subsist without them and keep possession of those Forms by their own native force yet are they such as were still something before their specification to this or that nature by their causes since all that natural Causes can doe is to mould an old matter into a new figure and so dispose the faculties existent therein that a new something may start out of the ruines of an old something But the World which was nothing before the fruitfull voyce of Elohim called it into something hath nothing from it self to subsist upon but must therefore in the twinckling of an eye become nothing again unless its existence be supported and maintained by the constant recruit of the same miraculous Power which first created it I say the same miraculous Power for the Creation doubtless was the greatest miracle that ever was wrought it being more difficult to turn Nothing into all things by the bare nutus or vote of the First Cause then to produce an extraordinary effect by inverting the usual method of Secondary Causes a harder wonder to make Nature herself then to praeposter or transcend her customary rules of acting to the causation of an effect either against or above her self Though to speak rationally and as men that understand something of Theosophy nothing can be a miracle to him to whom all things are not only of equal possibility but of equal facility also When therefore we say that God is the Cause of the world we are to understand him to be so in the same relation that the Sun is the Cause of Light and by consequence as the Light disappears in the Aer when the Sun discontinues its Actinobolisme or deradiation in our hemisphear by visiting the lower so also must the World disappear and be lost in adnihilation when God shall please to discontinue his influx of minutely Creation or to speak more conform to our praesent scope though it signifie the same thing in height of truth to intermit his Providence Moreover so immense are the bounds of this vast Empire the Article 4. The vastity of the world the infinite variety of its parts and the irreconcileable discord of many natures domonstrate as much World so numerous and various its subdivisions and those again dichotomized into so many myriads of Cantons or Provinces and each of those peopled with so many millions of different and discordant natures that no reason can admit it so much as probable that a constant correspondence could be maintained and a general amity observed though all without the conserving influence of a Rector General or Supervisor whose Will receives laws from his Wisdome and gives them to all besides himself And therefore their thoughts missed not much of the white of truth who conceived God to
man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator Ad quid enim tantus decor universi nisi esset homo qui consideraret ipsâ—que perspecto hymnum Authori caneret T is an Axiome of constant Verity that Nature makes nothing in vain and this rule doubtless she learned from that Wisdome which determineth all its actions to certain adequate and proper Ends now we must grant either that God adorned the Universe with such exquisite pulchritude and admirable imbellishment of Art to no purpose at all and so was more vain and improvident then his instrument Nature or else that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it to this end that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained exercised and delighted in the speculation and admiration thereof and through that maze of pleasant wonder be conducted to the true Elyzium the contemplation of the Fountain of Pulchritude and entelechia of Excellencies God For there is no medium between these two Contraries nor any hope of evading the rigour of this Dilemma upon pretence of neutrality since God had no other end wherefore he beautified the World but his own Glory in chief and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man as subservient thereunto nor doth the World contain any other Nature but Man that is qualified with Faculties requisite to the satisfaction of that end Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam quae aedificium hoc tantum conspiciens in Architecti sapientissimi admirationem perinde rapiatur We well know that Relatives secundum esse positively necessitate the existence each of other and therefore to allow what cannot be disallowed but by incurring a more dangerous absurdity that God made and exhibited the Beauty of the World tanquam admirandum spectaculum as a spectacle that cannot but excite Admiration in the speculator and yet to deny that he provided a fit and respective spectator such whose Sense should transmit the idea of that Pulchritude to the judicature of a higher Faculty and that again be thereby impregnated with Admiration which is nothing but our Reasons being at a stand at the novelty or excellence of an object occurring to our sense for what is either frequent or manifest to our cognition we never admire and that 's the cause why this Affection of the mind as it is the first of Passions so it is the only one that wants a Contrary as the unimitable Des Cartes hath discovered to us in lib. de passion part 1. articl 54. is not only an impious derogation to the wisdome of God but also a manifest Contradiction to our own reason which from the existence of the Relatum a spectacle immediately concludes the necessary existence of the Correlatnm a spectator And that this Spectator can be no other Animal but man is too bright a truth to need any other illustration but what is reflected from it self To which Argument of the Creators adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favorite the Logick of every man may superadd many others of equivalent importance drawn from the consideration of those Praeeminences and Praerogatives wherewith his Munificence hath bin pleased to ennoble his nature and exalt him to a neerer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Essence then any other Creature in the Universe as the excellent contexture and majestique Figure of his Body the semi-divine Faculties of his Soul his Monarchy domination or royalty over all other sublunary natures Omnia enim sibi submittit dum omnia quae in mundo sunt vel ad usus vitae necessarios refert vel ad varia genera voluptatum and lastly that inestimable propriety the Immortality of his Soul Now to direct all this to the mark since God hath thus proclaimed Man to be next to his own Glory which is the last of Ends as his Will is the first of Causes the grand and principal scope of his mighty work of Creation and that he made all things in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life and allurement nay manuduction or conduct to immarcescible beatitude after Death and since his Act of Providence or the constant Conservation of all things in the primitive perfection distinction and order of their Natures is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged or spun out through all the independent Atoms or successive particles of time as hath bin more then once intimated beyond all dispute the Product must be the same with our Thesis viz. That Man is the object of Gods special Providence and by consequence that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined ordered and brought to pass by the same As every man brings into the World with him a certain Prolepticall or Anticipated Cognition of a Deity or First Cause Article 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods special Providence of all things deeply and indelebly stamp'd upon his mind as hath bin formerly demonstrated so also holds he as an Adjunct or rather a part thereof a coessentiall Prenotion that this First Cause or Supreme Nature is the Fountain from whence those two different streams of Happiness and Misery or Good and Evil the former by Condonation the other by Permission are constantly derived and upon consequence that all Occurrences of his life are the just and prudent Designations of its special Providence That every man in whom the Light of Nature is not damp't by Fatuity either native and temperamental or casually supervenient hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or impress of an especial Providence decreeing and disposing all events that have do or shall befall him is manifest from hence that no man though educated in the wildest ignorance or highest barbarisme imaginable but was naturally and by the advisoes of his intestine Dictator inclined either to conceive or imbrace some kind of Religion as an homage or fealty due from him to that Supreme Power in whose hands he apprehended the rains of Good and Evil to be held and whose favour and benigne aspect he thought procurable and anger attoneable by the seasonable addresses of Invocation and Sacrifice And in truth to him whose meditations shall sink deep enough it will soon appear that this Anticipation is the very root of Article 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion Religion for though man stood fully perswaded of the Existence of God yet would not that alone be argument sufficient to convince him into the necessity of a devout Adoration of him unless his mind were also possessed with a firme beleif of this proper Attribute of his Nature which so neerly concerns his felicity or infelicity viz. his special Providence which regulates all the affaires and appoints all the Contingencies of every individual mans life For t is the sense of our own Defects Imperfections and Dependency that first leads us to the knowledg of his All sufficiency Perfections and Self-subsistence the apprehension of our
and limited by the Special Providence of God Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the mounments of the most Ethnical Philosophers nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability if we conjecture that our Patriarch Galen in most other things but weakly armed against their censure who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithite ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Atheist of the highest Classis had his mind touched with the same Magnet at that time when he wheeled about from his old position of a meer Naturalist and pointed directly at the pole of Divine Providence in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. de usu part God hath done all things that he had formerly decreed to doe SECT II. For the second MOre then sufficient reason had I to call it a Tedious and Article 1. A transient discovery of the almost insuperable Difficulties to be encountred in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem whether the Term of mans life be Moveable or Fatal premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgemeÌ„t and his purpose of taking a midle way between the absolute Fatality of the Stoick and the meer Fortune of the â—picuream Aenigmatical Controversie For first the obscurity of the Subject being such whose clear imperceptibility hath worthily listed it among the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or secrets of Gods Councel proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential Wonder then exercise our sawcy Curiosity hath unhinged the brains of most who have essayd to explain it and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions discrepant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as far as heaven and earth each from other and left future enquiry instructed rather what to avoyd then what to sollow insomuch that the learned and profound Job Beverovicius whose slame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits on this side the line into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular when he had received perused and indifferently perpended their severall Epistolical responses found himself still perplex't with his former tremor of Scepticisme and therefore confessed super hac re nuper plures consului qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio mihi certè penitùs satisfacere non potuerunt in tanta it aque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixerim cum Xenophonte apud Varronem Hominis est hec opinari Dei scire And again whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympick exercise by deciding the quaestion on the side of Truth must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between absolute Fate and mans Freewill must clearly distinguish between the certain Prescience and immutable Predestination or Predetermination of the Divine Intellect and Will a task not to be undertaken after dinner nor performed upon one legg as must soon appear to him who sufficiently excogitates how hardly the blunt edge of mans understanding can divide betwixt the Praevidence of God and his positive Decrees setled from all eternity since Cognition Election Volition and Decretion make but one simple and entire act in his Intellect nor can reason make out how God can Foresce meer Contingents while they are yet in the nothing of Futurity unless because he hath pre-ordained the means place time and other circumstantial requisites to their respective Contingencies must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolemen whether any of Gods Decrees are Hypothetical or Conditionate and so subject to mutation upon mans observation or non-observation of the Condition or proviso on his part to be performed and lastly must solve that Scruple An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam or An condition at a Dei volunt as ullum faciat decretum de futurorum eventu Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God if any such there be doth import an absolute and immutable Decree concerning the event of things to come Problems about which not only the gravest Philosophers have stretched the membranes of their brains and with great anxiety hack't and slash't for many ages together but even the Church her self hath disputed so hotly that she hath rent her seamless coate of Faith into such numerous and wide Schismes that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the Jews then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Phrensy of Vanity as not to know how immense a disproportion lyeth between the utmost extent of my short judgement and the center of the necrest of these Abstrusities but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my Presumption as Capacity I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me to have collected so much light from the beams of Mersennus Episcopius and others as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a midle way betwixt the Absolute Fatality of the Stoicks on one extreme and the absolute Fortune of the Epicureans on the other The First whereof strains the cord of Predestination up to the height of inevitable Necessity and so leaves nothing in the power either of Mans Free-will or the conspiracies of Second Causes nay chain 's up the hands of the First Cause in fetters of Adamant according to that of the Poet. Fatis agimur cedite fatis Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi Quicquid patimur mortale genus Quicquid agimus venit ex alto Non illa Deo vertisse licet Quae nexa suis currunt Causis By Fate we are impell'd submit To what the Destinies think fit That thread by ' th Fatal Damsels spun By our Cares can nere b' undone What we act what undergoe From their fixt Decrees doth slow Jove himself cannot controll What doe's from linked Causes rowl As also that of Sencca de providentia where he had the reason to speak it Quicquid est quod nos sic vivere jussit sic mori eadem necessitate Deos alligat irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit ille ipse omnium Condiror ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata sed sequitur semper paret semel jussit The Others cut it quite asunder and so relaxing the ligaments of Providence Divine leave all Events to the loose and undetermined results or hits of meer Chance but both concurring in the most bloody Error of Irreligion But the concernement of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular express and ample enquiry how that long Civil war betwixt these three different Notions of Fate Fortune and Free-will I may be conciliated and brought to a full Combination and Consistence with Divine Providence In the meane time that we may both with more decent Method and perspicuity attain to some verisimilous at least Article 2. Two praevious considerable necessary to the â—ight understanding and consâ—quent discussion of the question solution of our present Problem viz. Whether the Term of mans life in individuo
repentance prayers and piety corâ—ect those depravities and repaire those violent decays of that our temperamental Constitution occasioned by intemperance diseases extraneous Accidents or other means whatever and so hinder the otherwise impendent immature Collabascence and precipitous Dissolution thereof In a word Whether though God hath predetermined that no man shall exceed that Term of life to which the Durability of his individual Temperament or the strength of his particular Constitution may in probability be extended his Special Providence doth not yet suffer that by reason of putrefactive and destructive Preter-natural Causes occurrent the temperament may be vitiated impaired and ruined and so not hold out to that point of time to which otherwise in respect of its primigenious and native condition it might have lasted But if we understand the Term of life in the second signification Article 6. The consequence of our understanding the Term of life in the second signification then the Question must be Whether the immature or preternatural Period of every individual mans life by what means soever either disease famine war wounds nausrage decollation suspension suffocation luxury drunkeness sollicitude grief c. occasioned be so precisely fixt by Destiny that no prudence or caution on his part can transpose nor danger of fortuitous Accidents invading accelerate or prevert it In short Whether the Catastrophe of every mans life be prescribed in the book of Fate In what sense we are to understand the Term of Mans Life to be Fixt or Moveable As for the Second Preconsiderable the Term of life may be Article 7. The Fixation of the Term of life acceptable in a double interest viz. 1 in respect to some Absolute Divine Decree precedent even to Gods Prescience of al Secondary or instrumental Causes 2 to some Hypothetical Divine Decree whose mutâ—bility is suspended on the liberty of mans Will And the indifferency of either branch of the distinction to our instant designe sayd to be Fixt in a twofold sense 1 in respect to some positive Divine Decree antegredient or precedent not only to all conspiracies but also the Prescience of all Secondary or Instrumental Causes whereby God hath so precisely fixt and limited a certain space or time of life to every single man together with all relative Circumstances as place manner or kind and cause of Death that it is absolutely impossible to man what means soever he shall use to the contrary in order to his preservation or what dangers soever he shall have formerly exposed himself unto notwithstanding either to prolong his life beyond or to fall before that Fatal Term. 2 In respect not to some Absolute but Hypothetical or Conditionate Decree of God i. e. such whose mutation or accomplishment is suspended on the liberty or Free Election of mans Will according as that either being conducted by the manuduction of Light Supernatural or Divine Grace shall pursue the real and true Good or being seduced by the delusion of its own sensual judgements shall wander in the devious tracts of Error and so hunt after only apparent and false Good Now whether we understand this Conditionate Decree to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible prenotion of all concomitant things circumstances manners causes and finally of mans election of and adherence unto Good or Evil objects and his consequent Virtuous or vicious course of life or whether we understand it to be made without any such certain Prenotion or Volition of Prenotion at all but yet with a deliberate and positive Sentence certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fulness of time or opportunity when the right use or abuse of this Prerogative or Freedome of the Will shall be in actual determination i. e. shall ripen the Suppositionality of the decree into Absoluteness and reduce the Possibility thereof into actual Necessity the distinction is not Material For it can be of no considerable advantage to our present attempt whether of these two Notions we prefer and that the reason is why we here omit to enquire whether holds the neerest Cognation to truth From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three Article 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction different opinions The First of those who hold it as point of faith that the Term of every mans life together with all means or Causes immediate mediate remote circumstantial and corollary or in any relation whatever pertinent thereto is absolutely immoveable and Fatal being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistible law of the Divine Will The Second of those who averre the absolute Fatality or Fixation of every individual mans Term of life à Posteriori but decline it à Priori i. e. they concede that in truth the term of every mans life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate in this respect that it can never be extended or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain but not in this respect that it admits no possibility of Contraction or Abbreviation The Third of those who allow the Term of life to be Fatal indeed yet upon no higher a Necessity then that of Gods meer Prenotion or hypothetical determination respective to mans right use or abuse of the Liberty of his Will and therefore not so fixt but that it may be not only abbreviated but also prolonged non praesupposita ista aut praenotione aut hypothesi citra praenotionem And this is the most passant Division of mens dissenting opinions Article 9. The convenient reduction of them to 〈◊〉 only concerning this intricate Subject but if we come with naked minds to examine the state of the difference between the last and the second we shall find them concentral in the point of Mutability or Mobility and therefore both perspicuity and brevity perswade that we gratefully adhere to that more convenient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem to two only offered by Joh. Beverovicius Epist ad Simon Episcopium in words of this importance Some maintain the Term of mans life to be fixt by the eternal and immutable law of Destiny and on the contrary others contend that it is not so fixt but that it remains moveable as well forwards as backwards not only obnoxious to Decurtation or Anticipation by depravities and exorbitances of the Six Non-naturals by Epidemical Diseases or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant Fortune but also capable of Production or Postposition by a temperate anticachectical and cautious course of life Now as for the First of these Opinions 't is generally known Article 10. The First opinion declared and the principal Abettors thereof mentioned to have bin Canonical among the Stoicks who bound up the efficiency of all things in the Universe in the iron chaines of Fate beleiving all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity that their prevention suspension or
more both of Imprudence and Inconstancy it must import to play the uncircumspect Sophister with those who as our Adversaries themselves affirme stood possessed with a full perswasion that the Term of every mans life was absolutely and without any respect to his future piety or Impiety predetermined I profess sincerely I am yet to be perswaded that any Credulity can be so pedantique and slavish as to entertain a beleif that even Man I forbear to say God can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men and by this loose and childish jugling forfeit that reputation which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties and the just performance of all Articles to which he had subscribed 'T is one thing to admit that the Holy Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man when he is pleased to hint unto us those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ineffable Mysteries which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity such are those glances whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the New Jerusalem and allegorical description of the joyes and glories of the Eternal Life an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible Essence and three distinct Subsistences in one indivisible Existence c. and a far different nay contrary to say that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities when he promiseth those things which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension but are familiar to our knowledg nay such as the neerest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know And such is the quality of those Blessings which the Bounty of Providence hath by promise assured unto the Virtuous in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life and particularly that of longevous subsistence upon earth To conclude the Spirit or Form of a Promise doth consist in this that they to whom the promise is made do understand the good therein specified to be really bona fide in specie intended to be performed by him who made the promise Now if there arise any doubt whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared then doth the force and sanction together with the Dignity thereof totally vanish and become voyd Our Adversaries have rejoyned that God doth therefore promise Longevity to obsequious Children because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective Durability But alas this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty nor prevents the Doubt For if his Decree concerning their Longevity be Absolute devoyd of all Suppositionality and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience no reason can discover what Force or Energy the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the Condition required Again how can that Promise 〈◊〉 way of invitation or allurement affect those who are already confirmed that what the promise imports is formerly by the positive and non-conditionate Will of God made inevitable and hath the Possibility of its Futurition determined to precise Necessity In fine the Postulation of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal Identity of God that promises nor effectually move those to whom he makes the promise to endeavour the Consequution of that ample reward of filial obedience for his Decree concerning the Term of their life doth and shall forever stand firm and immote whether the Condition be performed or not The last Testimony they have essayed to extort from us is the Article 8. The sixth Testimony cleared from 4. Exceptions Instance of Ezekiah and this by a Fourfold Cavillation 1 By this Excuse Singulare aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam that one single denormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law or one swallow makes no summer This Exception I confess might have had some colour or slender pretext of Validity had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was equally extended to all and every individual person from Adam down to us For most certain it is that God never limited his free Omnipotence by any fixt law or bound up his own hands with the same setled Constitutions whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures it being the Prerogative of his Nature to know no Impossibility but to be able to act either above or against the statutes of his Deputy whensoever and upon what subject and to what end soever he pleases But I have no warrant to beleive that among the Propugnators of Fate any one hath deviated inro so remote an Alogie as to opinion that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons are not so definitive precise and immoveable as those of all others in generall 2 By this Response that under the seeming Absoluteness of the Prophets Sentence Morieris Thou shalt dye there lay concealed a tacite Hypothesis which was this Nisi seria poenitudine te ad Deum convertas unless by serious and profound repentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin and apply thy self wholly to the Mercies of God Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be that it wants the principal inducement to beleif and so can afford no satisfaction at all For besides this that it quadrates neither to their First Exception nor their Thesis concerning the Immobility of Destiny what Logick can tolerate the induction of an Hypothetical upon a Categorical Proposition or more expresly how can any Condition be comprehended under that message which by a definitive and peremptory decree and such as carried no respect to the performance or non-performance of any condition whatever tels the K. in down right terms that the date of his life was now expired and that the severe Publican Death stood ready at the door of his chamber within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature Subordinata non pugnant is an Axiome I well know and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity that dares question the universality of its truth but that a condiiional Decree can be subordinate to an Absolute I am bold to deny nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof the very Antithesis of those notions Absolute and Conditional sufficiently declaring as much To take the just dimensions of this Cloud every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will insomuch that the Event thereof cannot be known
which otherwise would not have come to pass doth or some other Cause interposeth which besides its proper destination and the unpraemeditated concurse of certain other things effecteth that some even◠which otherwise would doth not come to pass or that some event which otherwise would not doth come to pass hence is it manifest that this Posterior kind of Contingency is in the general that w ch men call Chance and if it be especially in Man besides or beyond whose intention any Effect eveneth then is it what they call Fortune unless that somtimes they confound both these and then 't is indifferent whether the event be referred either to Fortune or Chance However we perceive reflecting upon the former Example since the Double Effect viz. the digging of the earth and the invention of the treasure had but one single Cause viz. the man that digged that for this reason the Digger may justly enough be sayd to be Causa per se in respect of the one and per accidens in respect of the other To which we may add this that since in Effects meerly Natural one and the same thing may be both Fortune and Nature or a Natural Cause therefore Gassendus had very good reason to justifie Epicurus in this particular that he made Fortune and Nature no more then synonoma's signifying one and the same thing in Reality Now though common Enquirie may goe away satisfied with Article 3. Their Anatomy of her Nature desicient a more perfect one praesented this pausible Adumbration of Fortune yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein for the Example introduced to explain it comes largely short of a requisite Adaequation insomuch as no rational man can appositely enough accept either him that digged or his Action of digging for all that 's comprehended under that obscure notion of Fortune Wherefore omitting the consideration of Res Fortuita or the Event which is most frequently apprehended for Fortune it self or the cause of that insperate event let us understand Fortune to be such a concurse of various Causes made without all mutual consultation or praecogitate conspiracy betwixt them as that from thence doth follow an Event or fortuitous Effect which neither all the Causes concurrent nor some of them nor especialy he to whom the Event happens ever in the least measure intended or could expect Now according to the tenor of this Defifinition in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treasure is required not only the Person who digg's and finds it but also he who first digg'd and hid it it is no obscure nor controvertible truth that Fortune or the Cause by Accident of the invention of the treasure is the Concurse both of the Occultation and Effossion thereof in that particular place We sayd without mutual Consultation and besides the intention of any or all the Causes concurrent thereby intimating that though one or more of the Causes may have haply intended that event yet nevertheless t is properly and absolutely Fortune in relation to that Cause which intended it not Thus if any man who foreknowes or at least conjectures that such a Person will come and digg in such a place doth there hide treasure to the end that the other may find it in this case in respect to him that hid it the Invention of the treasure is not a Fortuitous Effect but in respect to him who unexpectedly finds it it is Thus was it not altogether Fortuitous in respect of Nitocris what hapned at the Violation of his Tomb in regard he praesumed that in process of time there would be some King or other who invited by this promising Inscription If any of my Successors the Kings of Babylon shall want mony let him break open this Sepulchre and thence take what may supply his wants but on no condition unless his wants be real let him attempt it for it shall redound to his no swale detriment would open it but yet in respect to Darius that instead of mony he therein found this deriding Engravement Had'st not thou bin insatiable with riches and covetous of sordid lucre thou wouldst not have thus prophaned the Ashes of thy Praedecessors and ransack't the sacred Dormitory of the Dead this was meerly Fortuitous And thus also though Democritus hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old Aeschylus why because his bald pate being mistaken by a volant Eagle for a white stone in the field was the cause why the Eagle drop't a Tortois perpendicular thereupon yet had we bin of the Jury we should have found her guilty of the Murder 1 in respect of the Poet since that sad event was besides his intention he at the same time having withdrawn himself from the Town for fear of being destroyed according to the tenor of the Astrologers praediction by the fall of an house nor could he possibly foresee that prodigious mischance impendent 2 in respect of the Eagle who drop't not the Tortois with purpose to brain the Poet but to break its shell that so he might come at his prey the flesh thereof However we are willing because in truth we ought to acknowledge that if we regard the height or punctilio of her Propriety Fortune is chiefly when among all those several Causes which concurr no one either principally or collaterally intends or aimes at that Event which unexpectedly succeeds upon that their concurse of which we have a most illustrious and competent Example in the Dilatation of the death of Socrates a day beyond the time praefixt by his Judges for the Execution of their Sentence upon him as Plutarch de Fato hath praecisely observed We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature Article 4. Fortune nothing but a meer Negation of all Praenotion in a Concurse of natural Causes respective to a fortuitous Event D r Harvey that he never dissected any Animal but he always discoverd somthing or other more then he expected nay then ever he thought on before so useful infinite in variety is the Magna Charta of Nature and perhaps some of our Readers may here have occasion to say as much of this our Dissection of Fortune for while we have exercised our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature we have unexpectedly found that if considered per se reverà she hath no nature at all i. e. that in Reality she is nothing For when we have abstracted all those Causes in the Concurse which act per se or by natural virtue there remains no more but a meer Privation or Negation of all Praenotion in the concurrent Causes of that particular Concurse and also of the intention and expectation of the subsequent Event nor can that unpraemeditate Concurse of Causes be rightly accounted the Cause of the Fortuitous Event by any neerer relation then that which Philosophers have termed Conditio sine qua non Since as the Admotion of any
to a thread now in twisting in the hand of the Spinster 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect to the Future or Lot yet remaining behind to every man which holds an analogie to Flax not yet spun off the distaff Which is the Summarie of Possidonius de mundo and Apuleius 10. de repub their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the Three Fatal Sisters Article 1. The second Classis of Philosophers who understood Fate to be a Constitution meerly Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects viz. 1 those who assert the Immutability Inevitability of Fate 2 those who defend the possibility of its Alteration Evasion SICT. II. IN the other Classis of Philosophers who have apprehended Fate to be Res purè Naturalis a Constitution meerly Natural devoyd of all Divinity nor dependent upon any eternal Decree we find a subdivision of two different Sects For 1 Some have proposed to themselves a Series of Natural Causes so harmoniously adapted and linked together by mutual revinction that the posterior being continually suspended on and moved by the praecedent performe their operations compulsively i. e. they cannot but do what they do so that thereby is inferred a Necessity so absolute that it admits of neither Evasion nor opposition such a necessity as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks Lex Adamantina or Adrastaea formerly mentioned if this only difference be allowed that according to that Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by God but according to this a subalternate series of Causes whose Constitution reciprocal concatenation and eternal duration are made by and dependent upon it self and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable then the other And 2 Others have indeed likewise allowed a Series of natural Causes mutually complicated but yet have they reputed that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon nor commoved by the Superior but that they may be impeded from doing those things which by the impulse of their inhaerent Essiciency and without the intervention of any impediment otherwise they would have done Impeded we say by things purely Contingent or Counter Agents endowed with and using the Arbitrary Liberty of their Will The Coryphaei or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers were Heraclitus Empedocles Leucippus Parmenides and who Article 2. The Leaders of the First Sâ—ct Heraclitus Empedocles Leucippus Parmenides and chiefly Demoâ—â—itus took the right hand of all the others Democritus as we have found upon the list of Cicero de Fato For albeit the Foundation of his Physiologie was the same with that of Epicurus Fortuito factum esse mundum that the Universe was made by Chance which Hypothesis we have formerly explained examined and exploded yet did He strenuously endevour to impose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure Fato omnia fieri that all things are effected by Fate confounding two most contrary Notions meer Contingency and incluctable Necessity If any demand how we can justify this our Accusation of Democritus we answer that it may be genuinely collected Article 3. Democritus justly charged with the patronâ—ge of Inevitable Fate and his doctrine concerning it concisely rehearsed from hence that it was his opinion that Fortune is nothing else in reality but Nature and that Nature is bound by her own adamantine laws to do what she doth in all particulars For the First of these positions that Nature and Fortune are Identical we cannot much dispute since all the Attributes of Fortune are bur surreptitious and usurped from Nature nor doth Fortune in a meer philosophical Sense import more then Mans Ignorance in the Di hoti of many Effects which Nature produceth or are at least produced by natural means For the Second that Nature is its own Fate or more expresly that Nature being only a constitution of Causalities resulting from Chance or from a fortuitous disposition and setlement of the Universal Matter in that Figure the adspectable World now beareth doth necessitate her self to the causation of all things this He hath conceived inferrible from this process of reason Atoms saith He apud Magnenum being the Catholique Principle of which all things consist have an ingenite or connatural Motive Faculty essentially inhaerent by the uncessant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved and all things by coalescence composed of Atoms cannot but conforme to the same motions by which their principles are commoved And sithence some Atoms tending one way are by the occurse and justling of others diverted to another course both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency cannot but observe continue and pursue those necessary motions By the same reason some bodies composed of concreted Atoms as they are praecipitated one way by the impulse of their own coessential Faculty may by the occursation and arietation of others steering a different course be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial to some other transverse oblique rectilinear c. so that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but observe continue and pursue those compulsive motions And this in General is that Fate or Necessity whereby Democritus would have all things effected and by which the World was at first composed in the same Figure we speculate at this day for as the Universal Principle Atoms concurring crowding rebounding reciprocally in an infinite space by the agitation of their own inexistent Faculty could not but convene coalesce and cohaere into any other Forme but what they did so now having acquired that forme by Chance can they not either change it or not observe and execute those motions begun and by the mediation or intercession whereof all Events are brought to pass For in Plutarch 1. placit 26. He sayth plainly Necessitatem nihil esse aliud 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quam lationem percussionem repercussionem Materiae that Necessity is nothing else but the Lation Percussion Repercussion of the material Principle of all things i. e. of Atoms From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that passage in Simplicius 2. physic comment 59. that some of the Ancients held an opinion that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Material Necessity was the sole Causatrix of all Effects in respect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive as most have dreamt but uncessantly operative and that not by impression but Inhaerency as being to it self the Principium à quo of all its motions And this we here touch upon opportunely to discriminate this Doctrin from that of others who constituted a meer Formal or Agent Necessity distinct from the material principle of the world whether that Agent be simply Natural according to the Physiology of Aristotle or Primus Opifex the First Operator according to the hypothesis of Plato and the Stoicks who also sometimes radicated that Necessity whereby Evils are continually existent in the world in the Matter thereof as Seneca de Provid 5. excusing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator
sayth positively Non potest Artifex mutare materiam it was not in his power to Abstract it because not to alter the Matter But not to leave our Explanation of Democritus Fatum Materiale imperfect we may from what hath praeceded perceive at what mark these words of his were directed Necessitatem quâ omnia fiunt esse Fatum Iustitiam Providentiam opisicem mundi apud Plutarch 1. placit 45. that the Necessity whereby all things are effected is both Fate Justice Providence and Maker of the World viz. this that the Series of things in which the reason or essence of Fate doth consist could not have bin otherwise constituted that upon this Series it depends why one thing is accounted Just and another Unjust why the world is governed thus and all things proceed according to the praesent method and no other and why the adspectable form of the Universe was made in all points responsible to what it now holds c. For He referred the Causation of all things to those newly explicated congenial motions of Atoms and so conceived that even the Soul or Mind of man which He also fancied to be a certain Contexture of sphaerical or orbicular Atoms is variously agitated not only by those internal motions of its own insensible particles which vary according to its individval Complexion i. e. the Atoms composing the Soul of a Melancholy man are of one sort at least of one contexture those of a Cholerick of another those of a Phlegmatick of a third c. but also by those Extradvenient motions caused by Objects by whose Species or Images incurrent which Atoms also constitute the Mind cannot but be Attracted if they be consentaneous and allective or gratefull nor not be Averted if they be dissentaneous and repulsive or ingratefull That if the Mind be not alwaies allected by Attractive Species the reason is because at the same instant there occur unto it the more potent sollicitations of their Contrary Averting Species and if it be not alwaies Averted by Repellent the reason is equal viz. because at the same instant it is more strongly sollicited by their Contrary Attractive Species That therefore the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good or that which is gratefull and allective so long as it discovers no Evil admixt thereto nor not be averted from Evil or what is ingratefull and aversant so long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith That therefore the Mind cannot when two Goods are objected but pursue the greater Good as that which attracteth more potently nor when two Evils are objected but avoyd the greater as that whereby it is averted more potently That when two objects the one Good the other Evil at the same time praesent their Species it cannot but neglect the Good so long as the Evil averts more potently then the Good attracts nor not be carried towards the Good while the Evil averts more weakly and the Good attracts more strongly Finally that since by reason of the Ignorance or Dimness of the Mind it doth frequently not perceive the Evil consequent upon its prosecution of some Good therefore is it subject to Deception in some cases and is often carried on to that from which it ought to have bin averted nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecution of some Evil and is therefore as often averted from that object to which it ought to have bin converted But notwithstanding insomuch as all objects by this and no other way occur unto and affect the Mind still it cannot but Necessarily be carried whither it is carried nor but be averted from that from which it is averted and consequently that there remains to it only a Desire of Truth i. e. that no Counterfeit Species may occur but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil nor Evil gilded o're with the splendid semblance of Good For this is the summe of what Empiricus 2. advers Physic makes Democritus to have desiderated when He sayd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci Now by this complex Argumentation Democritus may be understood to have inferred that though some Actions seem situate within the praecincts of our own jurisdiction or that it is absolutely in our power to Elect or Reject this or that object insomuch as every mans experience doth demonstrate to him that he doth and can consult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects and actually electing the one refuseth the other and that not by Compulsion but Freely yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power because not only the occasion of our Consultation but also the Consultation it self is imposed upon us by inevitable Necessity First that the Occasion of Consultation or the Exhibition of many objects which almost equally affecting the Mind and by reason of the aequipondium of their Verisimility or moments of Good holding it suspended in aequilibrio of necessity ingage it to a Deliberation cannot but be imposed upon us we conceive it not obscure to him who shall deduce the conducing Series of things ftom a due Epoche or height and analytically undoe the chain of Causes and Secondly that also the act of Consultation is a Necessary Effect is manifest from hence that when two objects occur to the mind so equally Attractive that their Apparencies of Vtility or Praesentations of Good are aequilibrated and reciprocally counterpoise each other the mind must of necessity be agitated by a kind of Fluctuation and detained in the suspence of Indifferency or Indetermination or Consultation untill it acquiesce in its Election of that Object whose praesentation of Vtility seems to praeponderate the others Which aequitably audited amounts to no more then this that Election is nothing but the prosecution of an Object which either really is or at lest seems more Good and that a spontaneous one without all coaction or renitency in respect that man doth both spontaneously affect and willingly prosecute Good And that you may not admire this bold assertion viz. that both the Occasion and Consultation and free or rather libent Election of Objects are all links in the Chain of Fate and so comprehended under this Natural Necessity propugned by Democritus the Stoicks intercept your wonder by obtruding another as strange viz. that it depends on the same Concatenation of things that you now read this our discourse of Fate as Manilius lib. 2. Hoc quoque fatale est sic ipsum expendere Fatum And this because whatever Action of any man you shall suppose it can be no difficulty according to this Hypothesis to find out the proxime Cause exciting him thereunto and to refer that Cause to the permotion of another remote one and that third to the permotion of a fourth that fourth to the induction of a fifth c. unravelling the series of Causes so that it must at length be inferred
that that supposed action could not but follow upon those other actions subalternately praecedent and consequently that it must be as Democritus would have it Fatal or Necessary Which opinion Aristotle ardently impugneth in lib. de Interpre cap. 8. when discussing the verity and necessity of Propositions He contends to evince that though of two opposite singular propositions which concern a thing either Praeterite or Praesent one must be true the other false yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary singular propositions which concern a thing Future the Verity of the one not necessitating the Falsity of the other For as He there argues if every Affirmation or Negation concerning a thing to come were true or false ex Necessitate then would the Futurity of any thing include a Necessity of its Futurition i. e. whatever is Future would be Necessary and on the contrary whatever is not Future would be Not-necessary and upon just inference nothing could remain either Fortuitous or Arbitrary which to admit is an Incongruity so manifest that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it an Incommodity so intolerable that it not only disparageth but confuteth it self And this if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory is the Summary of their Theory who have apprehended and asserted Fate to be a meer Natural Constitution of Causes subalternately connected as not dependent on any thing Divine nor any Eternal Decree so not capable of any mutation or interruption by the intervention of any Impediment purely Fortuitous or Counter-activity of any Arbitrary Agent SECT III. Article 1. The Principal of the Second Sect Aristotle and Epicurus IN the other Division of Philosophers who also conceded Fate to be a meer Natural Constitution of Causes subalternately dependent c. but yet denied the inevitable or necessary insequution of all Effects upon that concatenation allowing the possibility of its mutation or interruption by either Chance or mans Free will the Principal are Aristotle and Article 2. The Grounds of the Authors imputing the opinion both of Fates Identity with Nature and the possibility of its Mutation Declination by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists to Aristotle Epicurus First as for Aristotle that He held Fate or fatal Necessity to be nothing but very Nature or if you like it better every particular Cause acting secundum suam naturam naturalémve ductum according to its proper or natural Virtue is manifest from his own words in sundry places of his Writings To particular 1 He sayth in 2. phys cap. 6. Eas generationes acoretiones alterationes quae violentae sunt ut dum ex arte ob delicias cogimus plantas aliquas praematurè pubescere adolesceréque esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non Fatales hoc est non Naturales making Fatal Effects to be meeâ—ly Natural And 2 He sayth 1 Meteorol cap. ultim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes imbriúmque excessus quibus creentur diluvia contingere eo modo quo contingit hyems statis anni temporibus which rightly paraphrased imports thus much that as Winter the Sun receding from our climate at some certain period of the yeer according to the Ecliptick progress consigned unto it by Nature is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance even so are hard Winters and immoderate rains the regular effects of some periodal Conjunctions of the Planets proceeding in their motions according to the setled Constitutions of Nature From whence we have an advantage to observe that though Stobaeus Ecl. Phys tells us Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam quà m modum Causae advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis that Arist conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause as the manner of a Cause advenient to things determined by Necessity yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant as that we understand Fate not to be any new kind of Cause but Nature her self which in respect to her Agency is called a Cause and in respect to the certain proper and necessary manner or way of her acting is called Fate And that He impugned the former Error viz. that all Agents included in this Universal Subalternation act ex inevitabili necessitate or cannot but doe what they doe is not obscurely intimated in this that He defined Fate to be pure Nature Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable necessity as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation which is commonly impeded by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter and other resisting Accidents but also in Generous and virtuous Minds which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations or propensities to Avarice Luxury Audacity Incontinency c. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament Upon which reason we may conjecture that Arist reflected when He sayd of Socrates praeter naturam ac fatum suum continens evasit He acquired an Habit of Continency even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual Nature and particular Fate Secondly as for Epicurus that his thoughts made an Unison Article 3. Epicurus unanimous to Arist in the point of Physical and Eluctable Necessity with those of Aristotle in the key of a Non-ineluctable Fate is sufficiently constant from hence that having admitted a certain Necessity Natural in this sentence Naturam à rebus ipsarúmve serie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doceri cogique sive necessitate agi in Epist ad Herodotum He yet denied the Inevitability or Absoluteness thereof in another Fragment of his revived by Stobaetis in Ecl. Phys where He delivers as a general Canon Omnia sieri trium modorum aliquo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Necessitate Consilio Fortuna For in that he makes Fortune and Consultation or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with Necessity Natural He manifestly excludes it from being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sole Despot or Monarch and reserves to the two others an equal dominion Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also that Cicero de Fato introducing Epicurus disputing about the verity of Future Events makes him deny with Aristotle that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come the one must be true and the other false subnecting this reason Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas And certainly as He stood equal with Aristotle in the denial so hath He outdone him by many degrees in his endevours Article 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of mans Liberty epitomized for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms illustrated
in the incomparable Commentary of Gassendus as a motion which once conceded doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man This Plutarch taught us in two perspicuous texts 1 when He sayth de Anim. Solert that the motion of the Declination of Atoms in the Human Soul was subtilly invented by Epicurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that Fortune might be brought on the theatre of the world there to act her part and the Arbitrary power of man might not be abrogated 2 when He declares de Stoic repub that the same Epicurus sese in omnem partem versare ingeniúmque contendere in id incumbendo ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium ac pravitatem esse inculpabilem non patiatur rack't all the nerves of his wit to find out a way for the protection of mans Free will and so that evil might not praetend to inculpability Now though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader out of the direct tract of our praesent Theme into a wide Digression concerning Epicurus his whole Romance of the Declination of Atoms in the Soul especially having lately remitted him to Gassendus his accomplisht Comment thereupon yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method here to arrest him while we informe him briefly How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of mans Liberty from the inexorable Coaction of Fate We conceive that Epicurus having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals but principally in Man viz. Natural Violent and Voluntary took it for granted that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from Atoms the Principium à quo of all motion and hereupon concluded that the spring of all Natural motion was the primary motion congenial or inhaerent to Atoms viz. that whiâ—h physiology calls the motion of Gravity whereby an Atom is praecipitated ad lineam rectam to a perpendicular that the spring of all Violent motion was the motion of Reflexion or that which ariseth from occursation arietation or repercussion of one Atom by another whereby the Atom reflected is carried ad lineam obliquam and lastly that the spring of all Voluntary motion was the motion of Declination to which no region is determined nor time praefixt But might not Democritus and other Defendants of Absolute Necessity natural have excepted against this as insufficient to Article 5. An Exception in the name of Democritus against Epicurus Inference the protection of mans Evasory Freedome by returning that because this motion of Declination is no less Natural for it is derived from no other principle but Atoms themselves then that of Gravity therefore doth it still remain that All things are effected by Fate as well when Epicurus his Hypothesis is conceded as before Insomuch as all things which were to come to pass by reason of those various motions of Arietation Repuls Declination c. by an eternal series and kind of subalternate Concatenation are consequent one upon the heels of another and particularly that event of Cognition and Appetition to which mans Liberty appertains and so are brought to pass by an equal Necessity For that the Mind of man may display or execute that Liberty Elective whereby it affects and prosecutes any object conceive it to be an Apple necessary it is that the Image or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight invade percell and commove the Mind to know or apprehend it Necessary to the Apple before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye that it be put in some place convenient for adspect by him who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere Necessary that the Tree which bore that apple be first generated by a seed and nourished by the moisture of the earth concocted by the heat of the Sun Necessary that that Seed be derived from a former apple and that from a former tree planted in this or that determinate place at this or that determinate time and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world when both the Earth and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Concursions and Complexions of Atoms which could not being agitated by the impulse of their own inhaerent Faculty Motive but convene and coalesce and acquiesce in those Figures those situations at that time Again if the Soul or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms those Atoms must have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents must have consluxed thither from certain meats and drinks as also from the Aer and beams of the Sun those me at s must have bin such and no other and so subalternately successive from eternity the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity whatever of the Causes lateral or concurrent which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms you shall please to begin at Because from Eternity Causes have so cohaered to Causes that the last causes could not but concurr which being deduced into act the Mind could not but know and knowing affect or desire that particular object viz. the Apple And what is here said of Causes the same in all points is to be understood also of Atoms which constitute those causes and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their Motions by which they attain to be Causes To this Exception that we may compose some Response such Article 6. The justification thereof by a Respons conforme to the Physiology of Epicurus as may seem Consentaneous to the Doctrine of Epicurus and to contain somewhat of Probability at least we must usurp the liberty to assume that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul or Mind its Declinant Atoms can break that Rigidity arising from other Atoms and so make its nature Flexile to any part in which Flexility the root of Liberty doth consist And therefore the mind being allected by the Species of any object is indeed carried towards that object but so that if another object shall instantly occurr whose Attraction is aequivalent it may again be invited by and carried towards that object also so that deflecting from the first it may become aequilibrated or indifferent to either part which doubtless is to be Free or Arbitrary And that the Mind being thus constituted Flexile and Indifferent doth at length determine it self rather to one then the other part this ariseth from hence that the impression of one Species is more violent then of the other and consequently that the Election succeeds upon the Apprehension of that object whose species appears either positively good or comparatively more good Finally that the Mind when it electeth or willeth any object is as it were the principal Machine or main Spring by whose motions all the Faculties and the members destinate to execution are excited and carried thither whither the Mind tendeth and