Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	absolute_a	according_a	act_v	26	3	7.1032	4	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A42442	Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.; Selections. English. 1699	Gassendi, Pierre, 1592-1655.; Bernier, François, 1620-1688.	1699 (1699)	Wing G297; ESTC R8129	274,288	497

but be driven from what he is driven So that there remains nothing else for him to desire but that the Shapes of Things might come to him such as they ought to make them appear as really they are and that the Evil might not impose upon him under the disguise of Good nor the Good under that of Evil. He fancies further that certain Things seem truly to be in our Power seeing that we try that we advise and consult and that we freely chuse without constraint one thing before another But nevertheless that is nothing in reality because the occasion of the Consultation or the representation of several Things which make us almost equal and keep the Ballance steddy holding our Spirit in suspence cannot but be made to us because of the sequel of Things which proceeds from a higher Principle the Mind remaining in an uncertainty until the usefulness of the one appears to exceed that of the other and then the first usefulness draws and fixes it As if election were no other thing but a pursuance of what is best or of that which seems best and which is done without Constraint or without Aversion because we naturally love Good of our own accord and willingly seek after it So that in his Opinion Liberty is nothing else but Libentia Moreover he holds as all others do who are Defenders of this Doctrin of Fatality and namely Manilius viz. That to treat now of Fate or Destiny and to examine its Laws and Nature as we here at present do that this is according to the Laws and Course of Destiny Hoc quoque fatorum est legem perdiscere fati Hoc quoque fatale est sic ipsum expendere fatum Because if you suppose any kind of human Action he will have its nearest cause to have been so moved by some other going before and this by another and that other by one preceeding that and so on to Infinity that such a Series of Causes hath been appointed and that such and such Actions could not but follow Such as is saith Cicero the Desire of Ennius Would to God that never any Ax had out down those unhappy Trees of Pelion He might have taken his Rise a little higher in this manner Would to God that never any Trees had grown upon Mount Pelion nay further yet Would to God that Mount Pelion had never been and so by ascending still higher to wish That the Ship had never been made and that Medea had never departed from her own House Among those who have truly allowed of a natural Necessity but nevertheless not absolute and unavoidable the chief are Aristotle and Epicurus In respect of Aristotle he will have Destiny or fatal Necessity to be nothing else but Nature it self or if you please every Cause as it acts according to Nature or according to its natural Course As for Epicurus he was of the same Opinion as Aristotle and accordingly he took away the absolute and unavoidable necessity of Things but he hath this Conceit particularly to himself that he hath invented for that purpose another Hypothesis and hath fancied this long series of Causes or this mixture of Atoms mentioned before that there might be something to break off the necessity of Destiny and might preserve the liberty of the Will which he saith is free and not subject to the Fates Et fatis avolsa voluntas That is to say out of that sequel or series of Movements which according to Democritus follow one another by an absolute everlasting and unavoidable Necessity as if Experience and Reason had drawn this Truth from the Mouth of Epicurus contrary to his own Principles Besides did all Things move in a direct Line Did still one Motion to another joyn In certain order and no Seeds decline And make a Motion fit to dissipate The well-wrought Chain of Causes and strong Fate Whence comes that perfect freedom of the Mind Whence comes the Will so free so unconfin'd Above the power of Fate by which we go When ere we please and what we will we do But Democritus as Cicero hath afterwards done would but make a Jest of that Hypothesis or Supposition not only because 't is a meer Imagination but also because 't is of no use to Epicurus nor to his design for saith he This declining Motion of Atoms being as natural as the perpendicular all Things will be done always in the same manner as by Destiny seeing that which will happen will happen always by the same necessity according to the difference and diversity of the Causes of these Motions which follow one another as in a kind of Chain by a certain continued Series because he supposing the Spirit of Man to be corporeal or composed of Atoms as other Things are he draws it not out of that everlasting Chain of Motions which are of themselves natural and necessary as he makes all the Atoms generally to be It can never be saith Democritus to Epicurus That the Mind of Man can shew or exercise this Liberty by which he desires as suppose for instance an Apple He ought first to have the Idea or visible Shape of the Apple in his Imagination which Idea passing through his Eyes moves his Understanding to know the Apple And that the Apple may be able to transmit that Idea to the Eye it ought to be put into such a place by one who hath gathered it from the Tree or that he hath had elsewhere Now the Tree besides the Sun-beams the Moisture and the Earth which have made it grow ought to have had a Grain of Seed from whence it had its beginning This Grain must have proceeded from another Apple that Apple from another Tree which Tree was set in that place and in that time and not in another and thus going back to the very beginning of the World in which time the Earth and all Earthly Seeds were generated as he says from a general Meeting or Concourse of these Atoms which that they might be able to meet or gather together in such a place and in that manner ought to come from thence and not from any other place from that World and not from another and so of all the foregoing Eternity Besides if as he pretends the Spirit is made up of Atoms these Atoms ought to have been continued in the Seed of the Parents they ought to gather there together from certain Food from a certain Air from a certain Sun Such and such Food ought to have been taken and no other their Causes and all other Causes ought to have been so and to proceed from such Causes and from no other and so from all Eternity So that these Causes have from all Eternity been so bound to the other Causes that when these last have met together the Mind could not but desire and wish for this Apple This is what Cicero seems to have in his Fancy when he laughs at this Declension of Atoms as a thing altogether whymsical and

and Love and for the same Ends. 'T is Nature hath established what is right just and equitable to its Law 'T is a greater Evil to be the cause of Wrong than to suffer it Nature commands that our Hands should be always ready to afford assistance Let this be always in our Heart and at our Lips Homo sum humani nihil à me alienum puto I am a Man and think my self obliged to all the Duties of Humanity THE Third BOOK OF Liberty Fortune Destiny and Divination CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is AFter we have examined the moral Virtues we must speak something of Destiny Fortune and of Free-will which some esteem to be Causes others to be Modes or manner how certain Causes act and others to be nothing but empty Names vain and imaginary Notions we must I say speak something and the rather because according as they are received or rejected Virtues and Vices will be allowed or not allowed and consequently our Actions may deserve praise or blame rewards or punishments for 't is most certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy but what is done freely and with deliberation and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Necessity is neither to be commended nor condemned This being unquestionable the first thing that we have to do is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will consists what is Fortune and Destiny that so we may the better understand how Fortune and Liberty either contradict or may agree with Destiny To begin therefore with Liberty And here 't is to be understood that we mean not precisely such a Liberty as is taken in opposition to Slavery that which relates properly to the Body and is described a power of living as we please but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id quod in nobis seu penes nos nostrove in arbitrio potestateque situm est that which is in us within our Power or Free-will namely something which is in the Soul and is not under Bondage to any external Master or if I may make use of the words of Epictetus That which cannot by any means be hindered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if we should say A full and entire Power or Liberty to do any thing The Latins and chiefly the Divines call it commonly liberum aribitrium Free-will and sometimes liberale arbitrium Upon which we must observe First That this is given to Reason or which is the same thing to the Understanding because Reason is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties or as a Judge to examin to consult and deliberate and at last to decide as the Judgment is sway'd upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Case Secondly That as soon as the Consultation and Deliberation are concluded Reason hath indeed elected and chosen one thing preferrable before another which she hath conceived or believed to be the best the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite will immediatly follow Thirdly That by this word Appetite I understand the reasonable Appetite and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone as Reason is because we shall hereafter indifferently make use of these Terms Will and Appetite meaning the reasonable Appetite Fourthly That because the Action of the moving Faculty which is properly the pursuit of that which is good follows the Appetite or as we commonly speak the Will the Faculty being taken for the Action that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reason termed Voluntary as if one should say willingly undertaken that is with Deliberation and Consultation Fifthly That Reason or Free-will is supposed in Man to be so free that of the several things which come under his Deliberation there is nothing he chuseth but he hath at the same time an equal liberty of refusing it and making choice of something else Truly we usually ascribe this Liberty to the Will or to the reasonable Appetite which signifies the same thing for we all agree that the Original of Liberty is in Reason which we commonly call Understanding that is to say in the intellective Power for we usually hold that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it self blind which cannot incline to any thing till the Understanding goes before and holds forth if I may so say a Light before it So that 't is the Property of the Understanding to precede and enlighten and of the Will to follow So that it cannot easily be turned out of the Path it hath taken until the Understanding first turns the Light which directs it that way Liberty therefore seems by consequence to be first and primarily in the Understanding and secundarily or dependantly in the Will To open the Matter a little more clearly The Nature of Liberty seems first to consist in an indifferency by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing and this is called Liberty of Contradiction or incline in such a manner to any thing as it may equally incline it self to the contrary and this is called Liberty of Contrariety And in truth as we cannot imagin any Liberty without a Faculty free to chuse 't is certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency because where there is but one thing proposed or where the Faculty is resolved and determinated to act or to pursue any certain thing there can be no Choice nor Election which supposeth at least two things whereof the one is to be preferr'd before the other I know some are of Opinion that the Will is then principally and altogether free when it is so fixed and resolved on any certain thing suppose for Example the sovereign or chief Good and Happiness that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing that is to say to Evil because say they the actual love the pursuance the enjoyment of this Good or Happiness is altogether Voluntary and by consequence altogether Free But I know not whether they take notice enough that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action for a willing or spontaneous Action is nothing else but a certain propensity or impulse of Nature which impulse may be effected without any Reasoning whereas the free Action supposeth and depends upon some Reasoning Examination Judgment or Choice preceding And to prove that a spontaneous Action is a certain impulse or propensity of Nature they instance in Children and Brutes unto whom they never attribute the use of Reason or Liberty yet they perform many things sponte and this is said also of things inanimate as of a Stone that it falls down sponte of its own accord or of Fire that it ascends sponte so that fiery sponte and fieri natura seem to be the same thing Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good 't is no wonder that we should say that 't is carried sponte of

Understanding yet I say it is certain that in this Supposition we may still save our Liberty in that when we are ready to act and prepared 't is always in our Power to stop and desist from acting and to consider seriously of things so that if we distinguish the real advantages from those that are counterfeit we should cause the false Reasonings in the Understanding to be rectified and by that means cause this Propensity that is in the Will to be inlightned and so consequently not to seek after an apparent good instead of what is real Vice instead of Virtue CHAP. II. Of Fortune and Destiny THO' according to the Opinion of Cicero Folly Mistake Error Blindness and Ignorance of Things seem to have introduced and brought in fashion the Names of Nature and Fortune and that therefore Fortune cannot be without Ignorance Nevertheless 't is not generally agreed upon that this is only a foolish vain and imaginary Name seeing there are many that hold that 't is not only a Cause but a Divine Cause which occasioned these Verses of Juvenal Fortune was never Worship'd by the Wise But set aloft by Fools usurp'd the Skies That it is not really so Plutarch according to Plato holds That it is a Cause by accident which unexpectedly follows things acted according to Counsel And agreeable with this is Aristotle's Opinion That it is a Cause by accident in things done for a certain End and that this Cause is uncertain and changable For this example is alledged as a common Instance he who digging in the Ground with an intent to Plant a Tree found a Treasure which he never thought of now the Discovery of the Treasure is an Effect by accident that is to say that it happen'd beyond the Expectation and Intention of him that acted So that he who digged being the cause of the Pit made in the Earth is also the cause by accident of the Discovery of the Treasure 'T is in this manner that the Notion of Fortune is commonly explained Nevertheless it may seem by this Name that something else I know not what is understood and that they call not proprerly Fortune either him who digs or his action Therefore often we call a casual thing by the name of Fortune or that which happens unexpectedly And it seems by this Name of Fortune we are to understand The concurrence of several Causes that happen without any mutual dependence or advice so that from them proceeds an event or an effect called Casual which all the Causes or some of them or at least he to whom it happens had never in his Mind and Intention So as by the casual Discovery of the Treasure 't is not only requisite that some should dig in the Earth but that some other body should first hide the Mony 'T is manifest that Fortune or the cause of the Discovery is the concurrence of the hiding of the Mony and of the diging in the Earth in that place I say without any mutual dependence or advice and beyond or besides the Intention of all or some of the Causes Because tho' one or many of the Causes may have designed it and intended it 't is no less Fortune in respect of that Cause that never was thought upon As if one hides a Treasure with a design that he whom he foresees will dig in the Earth should find it In this Case the Event is not truly Casual in regard of him who hid the Treasure but it will be nevertheless in regard of him who was ignorant that any thing had been there concealed Thus that which happened at the opening of the Sepulcher of Nitocris was not absolutely a Hazard or Casual in respect to Nitocris for he imagined that some King would come to open it being induced by this Inscription If any of the Kings of Babylon that shall come after me be in want of Mony let him open this Sepulcher and let him take as much as he please but let him not open it unless he hath need for in such a Case it will avail him nothing But the Event was a Hazard or Casual in relation to Darius because instead of Mony he found this written within If thou wert not unsatiable of Mony thou would'st not have opened the Sepulchers of the Dead We must nevertheless acknowledge that we call that properly Fortune that of all the Causes which concur together not one of them foresees what will happen from thence An eminent Example of this is instanced in delaying the death of Socrates after Sentence had been pronounced For the cause of this delay hapned thus The day before the Sentence was given it hapned according to the yearly Custom a Ship was Crowned in order to be sent to Delos and in the mean while till its return it was not lawful to execute any Person But here neither the Priest in Crowning of the Ship nor the Judge in Pronouncing the Sentence ever thought by this accident to delay the death of Socrates Now 't is not without cause that Epicurus persuades us so much that we should not acknowledge Fortune as a Goddess for the weakness of Men is such that they don't only admire that which they understand not but they fancy it also as some divine Thing and above Nature So that when they had perceived that sometimes Fortune was favourable and sometimes adverse and contrary they adored it under several Shapes and erected Temples to it under these several Titles Fortunae Bonae Malae Blandae Averruncae Calvae Equestri c. This hath given occasion to the Complaints of Pliny That all over the World and at all times Men address themselves to Fortune so that she alone is called upon she alone accused and condemned she alone is praised and blamed that she alone is worshiped with Scoffs Many fancy her uncertain unconstant blind favouring those who deserve it not c. From hence is that common Expression The May-game or Sport of Fortune And this hath caused the life of Man to be likened to playing at Dice or Cards which is equally hazardous to the Gamester whether he understand the Game or not 'T is true that as the Play and the Life of Man are managed by Industry a skilful Gamester and a a wise Man commonly succeed best but this happens not always for often the ignorant Gamester is more fortunate than the skilful and the weak Man more successful than the wise and very frequently Fortune hath as much or more a hand in things than Wisdom This caused Plutarch to say That Fortune and Wisdom tho' very much differing often bring forth very unlike Effects And as there are but few Men who make Profession of Wisdom that know well how to manage and govern the Proceedings of Fortune Theophrastus hath been so bold as to say That 't is Fortune and not Wisdom that governs our Life Vitam regit Fortuna non Sapienta And Lucretius speaking according to the Vulgar saith That Fortune often