but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
be thy duty we use to say It is Gods will that we should obey him And so when we do not obey him we are said to Violate his will But this is but metonymically For that which is Gods will indeed is but that we shall be bound to obey whether we do or not And the event whether we shall or not de facto is not at all determined by the Law 351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing and command the contrary it would not prove two contrary wills in God nor is there any great shew of a contradiction in it For to say I forbid Judas to hang himself and I decree that he shall hang himself are no contradictions It is but to say It shall be his Duty to preserve his life and Eventually he shall not preserve it All that is a mans Duty doth not come to pass And to determine of Duty is not to say It shall come to pass Otherwise Gods word were false whenever man sinned Nay in reality Augustine truly judged that by Gods Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted and yet then he was a chosen Vessel and God Decreed to save him He thought that Perseverance was the Duty of some that after fell away and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away though not presently to be possessed and yet that God decreed that ipso permittente eventually they should fall away and perish 352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another and yet knoweth that a certain Traytor that hath broken Prison is like to fall into the hands of some Thieves or Enemies that will kill him If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them it is no contradiction The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill But it saith not that they shall not de eventu by way of Prognostication 353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act â—nd yet Decree that the same Act immediately commanded shall not be â—one or that the act directly forbidden shall be done Because sin is a thing â—hat God cannot decree or will of which anon 354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is sometimes said â—o be commanded or forbidden And this may be contrarily decreed of God And men that think not truly of the matter think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden and so they err by such confused thoughts E. G. Gods command is that I shall relieve a poor man and not let him faâ—ish and that I shall heal the sick c. and yet God may decree that this â—oor man shall be famished and this sick man dye And yet no contradiction For indeed Relieving in effect is but the End of the Act which is commanded me and not the act it self I am bound to offer him â—elief But if one cannot take it and another will not yet I have done my duty And so in the other instance So God commanded Abraham â—o sacrifice his Son and yet decreed that he should not be sacrificed And â—his without any contradiction For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham and made his duty was not actual eventual sacriâ—icing For then it had been a duty to resist the Angel and do a thing â—mpossible But to consent and endeavour on his part to sacrifice his Son which he did So the preservation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God and yet at the same time mens death decreed Because the thing indeed commanded is not Preservation as it signifieth the effect and success but only Preservation as it signifieth our true endeavour So the Jews were forbidden to kill Christ and yet God decreed that Christ should be killed For the thing forbidden them was their own Consent and wicked act But the thing that God willed and decreed was only the effect without any Will of their Act that caused it unless in genere actus but only a permission of it Men of gross brains that cannot distinguish and judge accurately may blaspheme God in their ignorance in a case that to a discerning judgement is very plain 355. * * * Of which see Amyraldus against Spanhem de Grat. Universali The next distinction of Gods Will is into Absolute and Conditional which some Divines use and others condemn and say that God hath no Conditional Will The common answer which most Schoolmen and other Papists agree with the Protestants in is that there are Conditions rei volitae of the event of the thing Willed but no Conditions of the act of Volition in God As Aquinas saith of Causes †††De Vol. Conditionali authoritatibus rationibus pro eadem Vide Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 20. But his assertion that Una creatura est Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale secundario ut Deus velit aliam producere is a fiction though he lay his stress on it about the ordo decretorum For movere is causare and nothing doth cause or move God to act There are Rationes effectuum eorum ordinis but none of the efficient Acts of God in him If you say It is absurd to say that God had no Reason to will the creation of this world rather than another I answer That is an Act of efficient Wisdom above all Reason But to fetch Reasons from the object and thereby to be moved to Act is the part of the imperfect creature Reasoning properly is below God much more to be moved by extrinsick objective reasons Yet on this Ruiz disp 24. layeth a great fabrick and so men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reasonings as they variously fancy Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc non autem propter hoc vult hoc 1. There are both Causes and Conditions of the event willed of God 2. Denominatione extrinseca ex connotatione objecti his Will is hence called Conditional meaning but a Volition of Conditionals 356. That God willeth Conditions and Conditional Propositions and Grants is past all controversies For he willeth his own word which is his work But his word hath conditional promises and threats And as his word also may be called his will he hath a Conditional will because a Conditional word 357. Gods eternal Omniscience proveth that at no instant he had a will properly Conditional quoad actum Because he that at the same instant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not must needs have his will to be thereby absolute But yet if it had pleased God to suspend the Act of his own Volition upon a humane Condition it would not have exposed him at all to the charge either of mutability or dependence which is very clear For 1. It is presupposed his Will as Voluntas Essentia is unalterable and is not that of which we speak 2. But only his Volition as terminated on this or that object and so as haec volitio
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
to make a difference 3. The means much differ which several men have And God usually operateth according to the means upon the soul § 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit it is no question For that were but to ask Whether all men have equal faith love and other graces which common experience denyeth § 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul in nature antecedent to Act and Habit I would have them remember that either there is such a thing or not If there be I rightly mention it If not we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would For then the question must be only about that which is past question viz. 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himself which is his simple Essence 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith Love c. in Man which all the World knoweth is not equal For all men have not faith For as for pre-disposition the question will be revolved to the same point It is certain that all are not equally disposed and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Essence SECT X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral § 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words though â— make too much stir Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before I will not repeat it here 1. If the question be de operatione ut est actus agentis before the effect it were but to ask Whether Gods Essence be Physical or Moral which is unworthy an answer § 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes as the Preacher c. if truly Acts they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agentâ— But the Acts of Laws and other objects meerly as objects on man are called Moral Acts because they are but nominal but indeed are no Acts and therefore neither Physical nor Moral For they are but signa and significare is not agere but is only an objective aptitude by which an Intellectual agent can â—difie it self All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action by being signa objectively to my active Intellect § 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul it is quid reale and therefore physicum And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits They are physical and moral accidents And they cannot be moral unless they be physical § 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale formally differ as Actus qua talis and ordo qua ordo do differ ab ordine seâ— Relatione ad Legem ad finem morum and Moralitas est actus Physici vel privationis Relatio viz. ad Regulam finem morum § 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act but the Morality of the Cause viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally I answer plainly that There is no true Cause which is not Physical A moral Cause not physical is but Causa reputata vel â—â—minalis Objects are usually said to Cause morally But if they be meerly objects they cause not efficiently at all but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie But some things vulgarly called objects as Light Heat c. are Active and so effect And he that doth proponere objectum doth indeed effect by speaking or doing But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind as it is a meer object But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation And many mercies afflictions and other means forementioned have their several wayes of active operation But it is readily confessed that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul but only Active Spirits like it self Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do largely as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical And I plainly say de nomine that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent and Physical as they are Physical effects on man and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects And that they are called Moral in two usual senses 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them 2. And in that objects being much of the Means the operation or efficiency of objects as objects is properly none at all They do but materially as it were constitute the Act and terminate it and occasion it as sine quibus non which many call a Moral Reputative Metaphorical Causation And yet diversification is much by objects § 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion I desire them to consider well 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced but a pre existent substance and faculty to be actuated 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere that is to be caused by Grace but the due ordering of acts as to right objects c. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit not indifferent between Action and cessation but as naturally prone to Act as the earth to rest and as a stone in the air to descend and as the Sun to move and shine so that it is never one minute out of Action even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath day or night Though in different manner 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature affording it that Concurse or Influx necessary thereto which in Nature he made due to it As he doth to the Sun in its action and to the souls of Brutes So that Activity as such distinct from the due order of it is given by God in Nature 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe as a wheel in a Watch where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses or superiour agents 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls do work as Voluntary Agents in Political Order though not without the regulation of Gods Law or Will 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause though whether he do so or what we know not 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts though properly they do nothing so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam occasions sine quibus non yet the reasons
permissor sed effector â—jus mali Prorsus invalida consequentia Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis N. B. Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non sit alicui conducibile Neque necessâ— est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi magis quam ut sit author peccati Nam certissimum est extra omnem controversiae alâ—am positum peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi etiam in genere conducibilis potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie An â—â—li existentia bonum sit viz. the bonum honestum utile jucundum I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion and to be so much more accurate than he as to remember that this distinction is but de Bono Creaturae whose pleasure profit and honesty are distinguishable But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good and that things are first Good as related to him the Prime and Ultimate Good And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the â—creature is none of those three but the conformity of things to the Will of God the absolute Rule of Goodness And therefore when we ask An bonum sit ut sit malum we mean not an sit bonum hominis secundum quid but an sit bonum simpliciter viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae And if they can prove that Deus velit â—â—â—â— fieri we will confess it to be Good But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile seeing it doth the sinner no good For Bonum jucundum in genere is not sin God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth and not less But it is hoc minus jucundum sensibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum spirituale which is sin Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure So that sin is neither utile nor jucundum And the Doctor is quite out in calling â—ccasio a medium conducibile and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as occasio Whereas occasio as such is no medium at all no more than possibilitas est ens unless you take Medium very largely Their chief argument is that the moral specification of an Action is an Entity and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it is to deifie that creature making it a first cause Answ 1. The comparative Order of Actions as the terminating them on this object rather than that and at this time rather than that c. is but the modus modi entis and so is no proper entity 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cause without his predetermining Causality 3. This power is the excellency of the creature and the honour of its Creator § 5. As for their argument that there is no effect without a cause nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect I answer 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself And he is the Free cause of all things necessary in the World 2. The soul is Gods Image 3. The Will when undetermined hath a self-determining power Therefore this is but petere principium 4. But there are many sub causes that are a reason of the determination As objects opportunity knowledge the removing of competitors c. § 6. Therefore Gibieufs Guil. Camerarius c. way of predetermination by the Causa finalis is nothing to our question that being no efficient but a Material objective or Moral Causation § 7. When they say that else God dependeth on the creature and is determined by it as to his Concurse I answer 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent be his dependence on it when it expresly speaketh its dependence on him without whom it cannot be nor act 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts nor his transient as to the meer Impress and first effect and so not Gods Act at all unless Terminating be Determining It is only its own Act which the creature determineth which is a secondary effect of Gods act as proceeding from the second cause Gods Influx maketh all that Impress on the soul which God intendeth absolutely But whether by that Impress the sinner will consent the will determineth and is the chief determiner in Evil. § 8. Saith Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digres 9. The second cause non agit in primam c. Hoc faceret vel volendo vel aliâ—d agendo c. Answ It 's granted God is not passive nor doth any second cause act on him as passive Who is his Adversary in this § 9. He addeth Neither on the Influx of God do we act for an Act is not the subject of an act Answ 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the soul it is a false supposition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Essence But if the said effect be meant I have shewed you that both Indisposition in the Recipient and a contrary Act may resist it § 10. Against our Passive determination of the effect he saith that God is denyed to act by physical action on mans will which if he did he would rather determine it than be determined by it because it cannot resist him c. Ans 1. The will doth not resist by reaction on and against God but by Indisposition and by its own not acting when it can c. 2. Who dare deny all Physical Action of God on mans will when it is quaedam natura 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will nor reject his Impress but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum posse the will would never disobey or fail of the due effect § 11. He saith ib. Doth God move only to the Act in genere or also to this species of action The first cannot be said For Suarez Hurtado say that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act And the creature hath as much need of help to the species of motion which is perfecter than the genus as to the genus And Gods Influx is singular and not determined to Generical nature c. Answ Gods universal motion as the Suns doth necessarily make its Impress on the creature and giveth him sufficient help ex parte sui to Act yea necessarily continueth the soul in some Action And that Action is singular and not a non existent universal But it is only the General Nature of a singular Act which Gods Natural Influx necessarily causeth And the Moral species what need soever we
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum agendum unum vel alterum which Rivet resteth in and fitteth the doctrine of necessitation but I think expresseth not Liberty strictly taken It may be ad utrumlibet if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen. Bellarmine's is lib. arb est libera potestas ex his quae ad finem aliquem conducunt unum prae alio eligendi aut unum idem respuendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio nostro ad magnam Dei gloridm concessa which Paraeus dissenteth not from But all defining is vain â—ill the ambiguous word Freedom be distinguished and the sense accordingly variously stated yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some 168. But if this were so then ☞ 1. The suspension of the will might be nevertheless by force or restraint which is a non velle And so when they say Voluntatem ab ipso Deo non cogi posse because when it acteth it acteth willingly that is when it willeth it willeth the consequence holdeth not because it may be forced from all action unless they mean that it cannot nolle non agere at once 2. And if this were so then either they mean that God cannot naturally necessitate the will to act or that such a natural necessitation consisteth with its Liberty If the first they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination For what is that but Gods Physical irresistible efficacious premotion determining the will to act And what is natural necessitation if this be not If the latter then they contradict their own definition of Liberty which they oft give us that it is Liberty from natural necessity which Twiss calleth Libertas naturae distinct from Libertas conditionis vel civilis And what more natural necessity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action without which no agent natural or free can act and which none can resist 169. Their opinion of Liberty also leaveth no difference between bruitish appetite or spontaneity and free-will save only that this doth follow reason which indeed is a difference of Guides but not of Liberty 170. And according to this opinion if God gave Satan power to move any mans will to sin by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen it were no constraint nor loss of natural Liberty because it is moved to be Willing 171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination then if Satan could infuse unresistibly into the Will an Inclination to hate God or to any sin and then physically determine it according to that inclination it were no force or loss of natural liberty 172. But I think he that by irresistible efficiency makes a mans will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts doth incomparably more against him and his liberty than he that could force his tongue or hand against his will or he that only tempted and perswaded him 173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion are elsewhere given I now name but these three 1. Because whatever vain talk is used to blind men it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world or can be 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lyes and other sins in the world then his Veracity which is the formal object of faith is gone And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false nor when God moveth them to the one or the other For to Call their motion by the name of Inspiration will satisfie no man that Gods Inspiration can do any more at least to interest himself in the act than his necessary physical premoving determination 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for not-conquering God who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act that is for not being Gods or greater than God And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which he thus pre-moved us to irresistibly and it was as impossible to forbear as to touch the Moon 174. In the issue of all these Controversies the sharpest contenders seem agreed whether they will or no Arminius granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary necessitate consequentiae * * * Bonavent in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Resol Praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem non imponit cum â—o modo res cognoscat quo futurae sunt Duplex est necessitas Absoluta quae opponitur Contingentiae dicitur necessitas consequentis Respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae haec non opponitur contingentiaeut si ambulat movetur In praescito non est necessitas absoluta sed solum consequentiae Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub 1. Duplex est necessitas Consequentiae consequentis Bene sequitur necessitate consequentiae Deus novit me cras sessurum ergo sedebo consequens tamen est contingens ut homo currit ergo movetur Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in â—o quod agit liberum esse ab omni necessitate ut proprie non possit necessario agere quoad exercitium sui actus quamvis respectu Divinae ordinationis certo infallibiliter agat Ames Bellarm Enervat To. 4. l. 4. c. 1. He meaneth it of a caused physical necessity no doubt which is as is said but a Logical necessity in ordine probandi that is It is a good consequence This God fore-knoweth ergo it will come to pass And it is only the necessitas consequentis which he denyeth which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth necessitas causata and I had rather call necessitas effecti which is in ordine productionis And Dr. Twiss doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert any more than necessitas consequentiae And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this which also fore-knowledge it self will inferr It 's worth the reciting Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digres 5. Quid quod ab eruditis eadem statuitur necessitas ab utraque profluens tam à praescientia Dei quam ab ipsius Voluntate Nam licet Arminius voluerit necessitatem à Dei voluntate profectam esse necessitatem Consequentis à praescientia verò promanantem duntaxat Consequentiae aliter tamen visum est magnis Theologis Sic enim Durandus Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de necessitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam quia omnia respectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere ideo absolute loquendo possunt non evenire Expressius Bonaventura Dei voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri conditionalem verò minime sed advertendum quod est necessitas consequentiae sicut praedictum est
de praescientia Ipsa enim non habet necessitatem consequentis sed consequentiae Quia necessario infertur sequitur Deus praescivit hoc Ergo hoc erit Sed tamen non necessario praescit quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens Sic intelligendum est quod Voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae sed non consequentis quia non mutat eventum rei unde sicut praescientia quia necessario infert effectum non potest falli sic voluntas absoluta quia necessario infert that is in arguing non potest impediri Annatuâ— de scient Med. cont Twiss de Libertate cap. 6. seemeth not to understand him as to this Necessity consequentiae which is not at all Causal of the event but of the Conclusion in arguing Leaving it out from whence the event is Ita Trigosius in sum Theol. Bonav Effectus contingentes liberi si comparentur ad scientiam providentiam Voluntatem Dei dicuntur necessarii secundum quid sive ex suppositione quae necessitas vocatur conditionalis consequentiae non tamen absoluta consequentis Quoniam istae consequentiae sunt optimae Deus praescivit hoc futurum Ergo erit Deus vult aliquid fieri Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit quando voluerit Quia non stat dari antecedens verum consequens falsum Istis ad amussim congruentia sunt Aquinatis illa Quamvis Voluntas Dei sit immutabilis invincibilis non tamen sequitur quod etiam effectus sit necessarius necessitate absoluta sed solum conditionata sicut de praescientia dictum est But the word effectus here is more than the rest say And more fully ibid. sect 18. pag. Vol. min. 230. Quid quod Scholastici nominatim vero Aquinas Durandus nec quenquam novi aliter sentientem N. B. non aliam agnoscunt necessitatem rerum ratione Voluntatis Dei quam quae dici potest necessitas consequentiae And yet plainer ibid. sect 18. pag. 332. c. 2. At ea necessitas quam juxta nostram sententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit quod monuit Perkinsius vere quam ex suppositione decreti divini in Argumentatione scilicet quoties scilicet posito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura legitime infertur necesse esse ut suo tempore futura sit At hujusmodi necessitas nihilo minus evincitur ex suppositione actus liberi cujuscunque quam ex suppositione decreti Divini etenim posito quod existat actus liber necesse est ut existat 175. We are all agreed then what Necessity it is that fore-knowledge decree and providence inferr as to the acts of sin viz. of Logical consequence Let them now but make it good that their Physical efficient predetermining premotion causeth no other and I will contradict it no more 176. But whereas they constantly say that God predetermineth mans will to the mode as well as to the act that it be done freely as well as that it be done if Willingness and freedom were all one I would grant it on their grounds But if an Immediate-Physical-predetermining efficient premotion and an invincible causation of Habit and Act by the first Cause bring no other necessity but of Logical sequel and be no real cause of the thing it self I confess I understand not what they mean nor know what Liberty is if the will have not a Power to act without such a Predetermination 177. The same I say of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot propug li. 1. c. 23. p. 46 47 c. Scot. 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib 1. q. 16. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19. sect 6. Vasquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14. a chain of necessitating Causes viz. that God by the object necessitateth the act of the Intellect in specie 2. And that the Intellect necessitateth the will For all cometh to one if all sinful Volitions be necessitated Nor will it satisfie any man well that Camero doth resolve all mans sin into the Devils temptation as a necessitating cause till he know into what to resolve the Devils sin And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to necessitate innocent man to sin and bring all sin and misery on the world much more he that saith that God did all this himself 178. As there is Libera Voluntas and Liberum arbitrium or Libertas Voluntatis Libertas hominis so there is a coaction or constraint of the Co-action in sensu composito is a contradiction and impossible but not in sensu diviso to be forcibly or by unresistible power made willing of unwilling Yet in a large sense I confess that Voluntarium quà tale est liberum Will and of the Man I should take my Will to be constrained if by an unresistible power it were suddenly made impious in act and habit or either But the man is not said to be constrained so long as he hath his Will 179. The unhappy descriptions of free-will which I mentioned Jansenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat cap. 5. 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large As Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas seu Volitio non sit libera sicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem id est Volitionem esse posse quae non sit libera Apud Augustinum esse liberam esse aliquam hominis Angeli Voluntatem seu Volitionem pro iisdem prorsus usurpantur Voluntas seu Volitio libera Voluntas idem est sicut Velle libere Velle Impossibile est ut Velle non sit liberum Lege etiam Annatum Petavium Cont. Vincent Lerinens Pennoti propugnacul haec plenius tractans 180. The Liberty of the will consisteth not in such an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar Scot. Disp. Philos Moral qu. 4. for Gibieâ—fs sence of Liberty as not involving defectibility leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that As Macedo against Tho. White confesseth with others For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that destroyed Liberty But in an Indetermination with a Power of self-determining which power is called Indifferent because it is a Power to this or that and not because it is equally inclined no nor equally a Power to either For there may be inequality 181. When Dr. †††Twiss de Scient Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat de Scient Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135. Twisse with Bradwardine * * * Vid. Bradward l. 3. c. 10 11. passim about the definition of free-will which
subject de quo of which it is truly said They are without the Gospel 520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation called the Object is Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them 521. 3. Gods not Pardoning Justifying Adopting and Sanctifying men is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation and object of the Laws contrary sentence is Impenitent Unbelievers or the non-performers of the condition of Justification c. in the Covenant 522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men is no Act nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid is none of Gods act But the sentence of condemnation is Gods Act and no doubt some other Positive Execution And the object of these is All finally Impenitent Unbelievers and unholy ones that is who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under 523. And it being past all denyal that these are the objects of the Executive Acts we must say that these also are the objects of the Decrees accordingly where a Decree is proved and when we speak of them only juxta ordinem executionis and not Intentionis which I laid by before 524. And lest you recurr to it once more I will recite more of Davenants words de ordine Intentionis De Praed Reprob cap. 1. p. 107. 1. Sciendum tenendum est si Dei naturam perfectionem in se consideremus illum non prius unum videre deinde aliud neque prius hoc decernere aut velle deinde illud sed unico simplicissimo actu c. 2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit signa quaedam prioritatis posterioritatis distingui possunt Hic tamen observandum est inter ipsos Scholasticos non admodum certam constantem esse hanc doctrinam de hisce signis seu instantibus prioritatis Scotus qui primarius est ad haec signa fabricanda artifex videtur non-nullis non solum eadem posuisse priora posteriora secundum nostrum intelligendi modum sed etiam statuisse unum esse in ipso Deo prius naturâ alio But from this he vindicateth him Ex adversa parte Occamus noster haec signa quocunque modo considerata negavit in 1. d. 9. q. 3. Et Biel ejus sententiam amplexus haec signa oppugnavit in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub 3. Prioritates in Divinis non sunt ponendae sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum Unus est enim Actus in Divinis re ratione indistinctus qui est ipsa essentia Divina ne secundum nostram quidem considerationem talem ordinem Prioritatis posterioritatis concipi posse in decretis Divinis ut talis consideratio non sit falsa speculatio If this hold our Controversie of the order is at an end 525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomist Domin Bannes quamvis non omnino explodat haec signa cum Biele perpendens tamen discordiam Theologorum in his assignandis Animadvertendum est inquit quam pro libito in negotio praedestinationis reprobationis multiplicentur instantiae à Theologis quam parum illa conferant ad assignandam rationem differentiae inter praedestinatos reprobos Liceat itaque hic paucis monere non esse nimis confidendum aut certo dogmati adhaerendum ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum sive à Protestantibus sive à Pontificiis assignato cum difficile sit duos reperire sive inter nostros sive inter adversarios qui ad amussim per omnia consentiant in hac serie decretorum divinorum describenda Caveat it aque unâ—squisque ne talem considerationem praedestinationis reprob inducat quae vel Divinae justitiae vel gratiae gratuitae adversetur tâ—m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis c. SECT XVII Of Gods Causing and Decreeing Sin 526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods Causing and Willing sin Of too many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine de Utilit Credâ—ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde sit malum nihil reperiâ—nt nisi malum Obj. Omnis determinatio diâ—ina est immutabilis Omnia siuâ—t Deo determinante Ergo omnia siunt immutâ—hiliter Respondet Mâ—lanâ—th Ad maj Est immutâ—bilâ—s necessitate conseqâ—entiae Ad minor Dissimilâ—s est determinatio in bonis malis actionibus Mala siunt 1. Deo praesciente non impediâ—nte non autem adjuvante vel impellente Item Deo sustentante naturam suum opus Item Deo eventus certos decernente Strigel in Melancth pag. 296. Carbo Compend Thom. 1. q. 19. a. 9. Malum ut malum nullo appâ—titu potest appeti nisi per aâ—â—idâ—ns Deus â—ullo modo vult malum Culpae Deus neque vult siâ—ri malum â—â—que non vult sed permitti Ruiz de praedesin Tr. 2. disp 13. §. 3 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just ex destitutione circumstantiis And d. 16. §. 3. he tellâ—th us of many wayes by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin in form or nearest matter which is a great reason of these Controversies I shall say somewhat more particularly of that About which there are various Opinions 1. Some think as Hobbs that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated as the motions in an Engine though unobserved by our selves who see not the Concatenation of Causes 527. 2. Some Dominicans and our Dr. Twisse and Rutherford held that no act natural or free can be done by any creature without the Predetermination of Gods Physical efficient immediate Premotion as the first total Cause of that act But yet that this standeth with Liberty because God causeth contingentia contingenter fieri And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances and the totum materiale peccati and all that the sinner causeth But yet that he is not the Author of sin nor causeth the form Because 1. They say that sin hath no efficient cause but a deficient which God is not being not obliged to act And sin is nothing but a privation 2. Because God is under no Law and therefore though he do the same things that man doth it is sin in man but not in him And saith Holkot he is the cause of sin but not the Author because he commandeth it not by his Law 3. At other times they say that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced but not the relation which resulteth from it 4. And God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory or as a punishment of former sin
Creatures and their various species of being is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives viz. INTELLECTUAL SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter upon AIR WATER and EARTH § 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause and Inferiours from the Superiour second Causes But they are Naturally Active in that dependence and supposing that Influx § 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures are MOTION causing Motion GUBERNATION causing ORDER and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination satisfying their Appetites and giving them their Ends. * * * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus movemur vivimus In Patre sumus in Filio vivimus in Spiritu Sancto movemur Pater est sons omnis essentiae Filius est Vita Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah quod significat endelechiam continuam perennem agitationem Vid. Strigel in Melanct. Loc. com pag. 294. § 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image in Vital-Active-Power Intellect and Free-will a Threefold Virtue in One as the formal Essence of his soul is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under § 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers 2. Governours of the Inferiour so also are they 3. Their Immediate or nearest End having a Goodness in them fitted to attract terminate and satisfie the Appetites of the Inferiour God is not the only end of Appetites § 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent are 1. Action or Motion 2. Special Government 3. Love From whence God is Related to Man the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed †††I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata Et c. 3. cor 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente Et c. 4. cor 3. â—adem de Deo Motore â—aking immediation for proximity and facere movere for the action as such and not for the meer moral specification and comparability 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR 2. As RECTOR 3. As AMICUS vel FINIS Lover Benefactor and End 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection is in him in the third § 17. Creation inferreth Propriety and making us Good and inter bâ—na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us from what is past he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly § 18. Gods Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation propriety and Motion His Wisdom in Governing and Order and his Good will in our Benefits efficiently and our Perfection finally in mutual Love § 19. MOTION is caused by Moving â—â—â—ce impressed ORDER moral by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END § 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called From the second Moral RECTITUDE In the third is FELICITY as to single persons § 21. From the first viz. God as Actor upon Many or the Universe ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concurse All things work together as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second Divine ORDERING ariseth HARMONY and from the third UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation and to man perfect Love § 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion or passive impedition and its effect as such not free but Necessary Government by Law is resistible and obedience free Final Goodness or Love do perfect and felicitate necessarily and freely not effecting for so they are not now considered but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed § 23. The Creation being past and Beings existent except what Generation and Composition make unfearchably and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled we shall confound and be confounded if we distin-guish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them and their foresaid differences in themselves SECT II. The Order of Divine Operations § 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions caused * * * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae forma maxime essentialis principalis cujuscunque formati and so acteth all things And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature we mean that he is More and not Less And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth Necessarium the most proper name of God But when he saith c. 17. that Gods Essence Omnipotence Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge and cause it and so putteth Causes and Effects in God he is too bold by him as to the Proximity of God to the effect For he is every where present in Essence and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self We must not conceive of Gods using means as we do of mans where the Pen the Saw the Knife c. is between the hand and the effect God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth as if he used no second cause § 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione Suppositi seu Essentiae Virtutis speak true but not aptly because it ill insinuateth as if Gods Virtus were not his Essence when as in God they are all one only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute but not otherwise And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus § 3. Since the Creation in the Motions of Providence God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts as truly as a Clock or Man is one hath setled a course of second Causes that one thing may act upon and move another and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course and some of them Voluntary and Free and operate more mutably and contingently § 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God upon us that are here on earth § 5.
of all true profit to us no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one than in my choosing the commanded one To hate God and love sin hath no more natural entity than to love God and hate sin To speak an Oath or Lye than to speak Truth and Holily To will a forbidden Act than to Nill it and to will a good one So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause of that which hath no natural entity that is of an Act not as an Act but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised And Dr. Twisse hence saith That moral specification of Acts is no true specification of them And it 's true that it is not a Physical specification 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety Even to will or not will do or not do And in this case to do or will when forbidden is more than not to do or will I answer 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power and it is as natural to it to be in act as to a stone to lie still And the Cartesians will tell you that Action needeth no more cause than Rest But I rather say that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul but only this or that Action upon this or that Object at an undue time So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such whether Vital Intellectual or Volitive The Action which God commandeth he willeth The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object Adam had this liberty of contradiction to will or not to will this particular Act of eating the forbidden fruit but not to will or not will simply Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit instead both of nilling it and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it had no more natural entity in it than if he had not willed it but willed somewhat else at the same time 3. An Action it self is not properly Res but modus Rei and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature that supposing God the cause of its Power continued shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power he saith that which no mortal man can prove The Glory of Gods Works is their likeness to Himself And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness we know not just how far God can go in such Communications I see no contradiction in it to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force with necessary though not determining concurse can determine it self without any more causation And if it be not a Contradiction God can do it 4. But this is all prevented by considering that mans Soul is never out of Act. It s active force is never idle though it act not always the same way nor with the same extension or intension so that to reduce it into act is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum but from a power acting one way or slowly to act another way or more intensly 5. Yea this is all answered by considering that as I said while God continueth the Soul in its nature it continueth a naturally active force or power inclined essentially to activity So that though I say that Action needeth more cause than non-action that is here done in God still causeth the active disposition But supposing that upheld I say that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action than to cause it to act Whatever the world talketh against Durandus they are never well able to answer à Dola though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed as a threed supposing God to continue the nature of it and all things else there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling than to make it fall when the threed is cut It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action which is but modus rei that is in question but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action so that it is but modus modi rei 7. And lastly The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion Now whether any man should deny all our Religion and certain necessary Truths for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this that God is not able to make a Creature that can cause a modus modi in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that without Divine predetermination let sobriety be judge C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts without Gods determination as well as of the evil B. Jansenius is in the right in this we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse But we cannot do good especially spiritual saving good unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace To the specifying of good actions there must ever concur Gods natural help Gods gracious help and mans free-will or self-determination It is not two or three determinations of the Will which are made by these several Causes but one determination So that under God man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good or else he were not a Believer nor rewardable or punishable And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will for with that such a determination was consistent but from its Pravity or Corruption But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. Vol. minoris hath a full digression 4 to prove that God willeth that sin shall come to pass he permitting it and saith Nostri Theologi affirmanâ— Arminiani â—ontificii negant * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book His Friend Alvarez de Aux li. 11. disp 110. p. 442 c. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis and concludeth that Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam et permittere peccatum eorum non est conditionata sed absoluta nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nuâ—la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum
thank himself too for all the good he does that Being as much of him as the other c. Answ It follows not For 1. Of all the good that man doth God is still the moral Cause egging on to it by all c. 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind renewing the Will healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it and in a word making it every way more it self God must be more an Owner than man And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will because it flowed from Divine Goodness That which is good in man by way of Off-spring being so in God by way of Well-spring Ibid. p. 10. the same degree of impress or influx or force which causeth one man to believe or act is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed Nay it is most probable that they are not Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference than their countenances have of particles making the wonderful diversity which we see Nor is the same man long equally disposed 5. Men equally disposed if such there were may have unequal impediments without and in their bodies and temptations which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a Power causeth not the Act also For that is a contradiction to cause the Act and not to cause it 7. But a less degree of impulse or help may cause the act in one when a greater degree causeth it not in another 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in â—ll other diversities in the World by the diverse receptive dispositions of the Patient Which made Johan Sarisberiensis in Nugis Curial and many School-men to liken God with some acknowledged difference in his Operations to the Sun which by one invaried efflux of motive illuminative and calefactive power causeth innumerable varieties of effects as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions 9. But all good disposition or preparation is of God But by such ways of operation as we are searching after But all ill disposition is from our selves 10. To conclude God giveth men sometimes as much power to Will or Act when they do not as they have when they do But usually not an equal predisposition some having more indisposed themselves which is to be changed by contrary acts But whether de facto men equally enabled predisposed helped and hindered do yet without any cause but their own free-will it self act or will variously is a question that these Controversies need not come to That such were there such in the World could do it I take for granted what-ever they do The Controversie is well known which Hobbes hath raised in the World who saith That to be free and to be willing is all one and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion as the motions of any Engine are And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark not that there is any such thing indeed but when we know not the train of Causes we use those names which signifie but our ignorance And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each Volition as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow And the Dominicans predetermination and Camero's necessitation by a train of second Causes is the same I think But I think God hath made a very good use by his over-ruling ordination of the Doctrine of Hobbes learnedly and timerously or cautelously seconded by Gassendus and improved by Benedictus Spinosa an Apostate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus For the goodness and learning of such worthy men as were Alvarez Twisse Camero in all other points moderate and admirably judicious hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine which Hobbes and Spinosa having plainly and nakedly propounded is now detested by almost all good men For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion and consequently of all true Religion I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion nor yet am And that indeed all pretended middle ways between Hobbes his Necessitation Physical and true Free-will are but fancies as far as I can perceive And if I leave true Free-will I must turn to their necessitation I confess their arguing is very plausible that there is no Effect without a Cause and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing and refuseth another there is some antecedent Cause in the power disposition or external things and that the same Cause in the same state and mode having no difference in it self doth always produce the same effect Otherwise the diversity should have no cause And that the Will being in the same disposition and having all the same objects helps impediments and other circumstances will have the same acts All this is plausible But 1. If I receive it I must let go almost all Religion as well as Christianity of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties 2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted For he that is the first Cause eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate unicus plurima immo omnia causat Therefore their Principle is false 3. And finding man made after the Image of God not only as holy but as man Gen. 6. I have great reason to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image and that as God is a causa unica plurimorum so may Free-will be And that as a God is causa prima entium so Free-will may be a kind of causa prima not actionis qua talis but of the comparative moral species of its own acts as choosing this thing rather than that which is no addition to real entity but a wonderful mode of it which man cannot tell whether he should call something or nothing 4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause Free-will may be the cause of various Effects without a various predisposition C. Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act B. That it acteth not always according to Habits which are more than dispositions is certain by experience For objects oft prevail against habits and habits do not necessitate C. That is because the Will is otherwise disposed by some contrary stronger habits As either
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
imputed to us for righteousness If it be only the object and not faith why is it so often called faith believing being perswaded c. Will you say that It is not faith as an act of ours only Whoever dreamt it was For à quatenus ad omne If as an act then every act even plowing and walking and sinning would justifie us Will you say that It is not Faith as a Moral Virtue or Good act only Who saith it is For then every moral good act would justifie men Do you say that It is not by faith as faith in genere It is granted you For else à quatenus ad omne any act of faith would justifie even believing that there is a Hell Will you say that it is not any other species of faith besides our baptismal faith We grant it you But if you will also say that It is not this species even the Christian faith neither that is meant but only the object of it then 1. Why say you that it is Faith as connoting the object contradicting your self for if be not faith at all it is not faith as connoting that which is not doth not connote 2. And why say you that it is not faith it self essentially Is not the object essential as an object to the act in specie Is it not essential to our Christian faith to be a Believing in Christ 3. But what sober unprejudiced Christian that readeth the Text throughout and hath not been instructed to pervert it can choose but see that it is Faith it self that the Apostle speaketh of and that it is our personal Relation of Righteousness that it is said to be imputed for And who can believe that this is the sense Abrahams faith was imputed to him for Christs Righteousness or this either His faith that is Christs Righteousness and not his faith was imputed to him for Christs Righteousness Undoubtedly by faith is meant faith and by Righteousness is meant our own Relation But it is most easie to discern that the plain sense is Christ being presupposed the Meriter of our Justification and Salvation which he hath given the world conditionally by a Law of Grace or Covenant Donation by which now he ruleth and judgeth us all that this Covenant Gift or Law requireth on our part to make us Righteous and entitle us to the Spirit and everlasting life is that as Pâ—nitent Believers we accept Christ and life according to the nature ends and uses of the gift and this also by his grace Reader hold close to this plain Doctrine which most of the lower sort of Christians know who have not faln into perverters hands and youâ— will have more solid and practical and peaceable truth about this point than either Dr. Thomas Tullie or Maccovius or Mr. Crandâ—â— or Dr. Crispe or the Marrow of Modern Divinity * Written by an honest Barber Mr. Fisher as is said and applauded by divers Independent Divines or Paul Hobson or Mr. Saltmarsh or any such Writers do teach you in their learned Net-work Treatises by which being Wise or Orthodox overmuch being themselves entangled and confounded by incongruous notions of mans invention they are liker to entangle and confound you than to shew you the best method and grounds for the peace of an understanding dying man Christs Righteousness is Imputed or Reckoned to be as it is the total sole Meritorious Cause of all that Grace and Glory given us in and by the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace and of our Grace for performance of the Conditions and it needeth nothing at all of ours to make it perfect to this use nor hath our faith any such supplemental Office But this condition of our part in Christ and of our Right to his Covenant-gifts must be performed and the sentence of Absolution or Condemnation life or death must be passed on us accordingly it being not Christ but we by this very Law that are to be Judged Justified or Condemned And this is the Condemnation that light is come into the World and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil But to as many as Received him he gave Right to become the Sons of God even to them that believe in his name And there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus who walk not after the Flesh but after the Spirit For being perfected he is become the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him And it is not they that cry Lord Lord that shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven but he that doth the will of our heavenly Father For Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is and of that to come CHAP. X. Whether Gods justifying those to day that were yesterday unjustified signifie any change in God P. IX OF this also I have said so much in my Apologie to Dr. Kendall and in the two first parts of this Book before that I shall now put you off with this short notice 1. There is nothing changed or new in God That which on his part is in God the Cause of our Justification is his eternal simple essence 2. But Gods Essence Understanding or Will considered simply in it self is not to be called Mans Justification But the effect produced by it And partly the extrinsick object as terminating Gods act and so by extrinsick denomination or connotation Gods Essential Intellect and Will is said de novo to justifie But it is only man that is really changed 3. The New effect in man from which God is said de novo to justifie him is 1. A new Right or Relation to Christ pardon and life and to the Father and the Holy Ghost 2. A new objective termination of Gods estimation acceptance and complacency And 3. A new heart hereupon at the same instant given us I think none of this is from eternity And that as God did de novo make the world and judge it existent and love and order it as existent without any change in him as also millions of creatures proceed from his simple Unity so is it here And this needeth no more words with knowing or teachable men And to others there is no end CHAP. XI Whether a Justified man should be afraid of becoming unjustified Lâ—b THis fear of losing our justification which you teach men is most injurious to Gods free grace and immutability and a rack for Conscience to destroy mens peace P. I have said so much of this before about Perseverance and Assurance as forbiddeth me tedious repetitions Here needeth no more but this explication of the matter which you confound 1. Fear is either Causeful or Causeless 2. Fear is either such as hindereth comfort or such as helpeth it 3. Fear is either a Duty or an unavoidable natural passion or a sin of unavoidable infirmity or a more deadly or heinous sin 4. It 's one thing to cause and cherish Fear and another thing to teach men that cannot avoid
move another to do it will not stand with proper permission 585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting Answ 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin and not to Will-nill-it 2. If you mean more I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and phâ—sical premoving predetermination of the first cause 3. But if all this were so it 's nothing to the present case and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin but only that man is a Cause also caused by the first Cause and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely 586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness than to Will it and to predetermine the will of man to it besides commanding it which is a moral act and we speak only of proper efficiency He doth but will that Holiness be and cause all that hath any entity in it And so they say he doth about sin 587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self and so he doth not sin Answ The first is denyed by themselves if you speak of Gods end For they confess that God only is his own end for which he loveth all things 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both if he equally will the existence of both Object But he hath a Complacence in Good only Answ 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will he hath a complacency in it The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is as it is the fulfilling of his own Will And to break his Law they make to be such ergo pleasing 2. But if it were not so that 's nothing to our Case of the efficient Will 588. 4. To avoid tediousness in sum This opinion seemeth to me to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei which is Veracitas Divina and leaveth no certainty of any word of God For if he do will and predetermine by premotion ut fiat omne mendacium quod fit then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles 2. It maketh the Scripture false which saith so much of Gods hatred and unwillingness of sin 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness which is made the great reason of our holiness 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness but a common or indifferent thing 5. It maketh sin so little odious as being a Divine off-spring as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sorrow repenting confession and all practice of means against any sin 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world and did and suffered so much to save men from sin and to destroy it 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell and that God will damn men for ever for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination unavoidably 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God and more For Satan can but tempt us to sin but they make God absolutely to will that it be and physically to predetermine us to it And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil the father of lies malice and murder should come to destroy the work of God 11. It taketh away the reason of Church discipline and purity and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness 12. It would tempt Magistrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue good and bad in the Common-wealth 589. Now to their arguments 1. Rev. 17. 17. God put it into their hearts to do his will and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast Answ 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome with the effects will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed and not the sin 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts whether pride covetousness cruelty c. but only to do his pleasure and agree or make one decree to give up c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts which with their own sins would have that effect which he willed If a thief have a will to rob God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way 590. But for brevity besides what is said I shall farther direct the â—mpartial Reader how to answer all such objections And withall let the â—onfounding cavillers against distinguishing see what blasphemy and subversion of Religion may enter for want of one or two distinctions which â—onfused heads regard not 1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin from the nature 2. And â—emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary by privation or position of Volitions 3. Distinguish between the Act as it â—s Agentis and as it is in Passo 4. And between the Act and the effect 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes making a compound effect 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the â—ontrary and one forbidden object compared with another 591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin or the Act as Acted and as Received Adultery Murder Theft usually signifie the Acts of the Adulterer Murderer Thief as done and as received â—n Passo and as effecting 2. That the former only is the sin viz. first the Volition Nolition or Non-Volition and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will And no more The reception of this act in Passo is not sin as such nor the most immediate effect of this act It is but the effect of sin 3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes a Good and bad And so God may be a cause of that effect which mans sin also concurreth to cause And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin 4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden though both make the act sinful and yet