figure in saying That God would have that done which he will not do because he knowes sufficient reason to the contrary whether he declare it or not but setting that reason aside would have done Or that he would have that done which he provideth sufficient meanes to bring to passe But that all should signify some and the world the elect because God will not do all he can to save those whom he would have to be saved is a figure in Rhetorick called Mendacium when a man denies the Scripture to be true The same is the difficulty when our Lord Christ who saith to the Father John XVII 9. I ask for them I ask not for the world but for them whom thou hast given me for they are thine prayes upon the Crosse Father forgive them for they know not what they do For though he ask not that for the world which he askes for his disciples yet he would not have prayed for that which he knew not that God would have done His prayer being the reason moving God to grant meanes effectuall to bring to passe that which it desireth But had there been in God a purpose to exclude the Jews from the benefit of Christs death considering them as not having yet refused the grace which Christ prayed for it could not have been said that he would have our Lord Christ dy or pray for them and therefore that he would have them to be saved This is then my argument that the will of man is neither by the originall constitution of God determinable by his immediate operation nor by mans originall sinne subject to a necessity of doing or not doing this or that Because God treats with the posterity of Adam concerning the Covenant of the Law first and since concerning the Covenant of grace no otherwise then originally he treated with Adam about not eating the forbidden fruit For in conscience were it for the credit of Christianity that infidels whom we would perswade to be Christians should say True if you could shew me that God by his immediate act determines me to do as you require me without which you tell me I cannot do it and with which I cannot but do it Or that by the sinne of Adam I am not become subject to the necessity of doing or not doing this or that But supposing either of these if you move me to do what you professe I cannot do you are either a mad man your self or take me for one Do they take their hearers for men and Christians or for beasts who having first taught that man can do nothing but what God determines him to do inferre thereupon that they must indeavour themselves to do what God commands and what their Christianity requires Or that they are obliged by their Christianity to do that which their corruption from Adam necessitates them not to do Is it for the honour of Gods justice that it should be said that he intends to damne the most part of men for that which by their originall corruption they were utterly unable to do without giving them sufficient help to do it no help being sufficient which the determination of the will by the immediate operation of God makes not effectuall as they think Do they not make the Gospel of Christ a mockery that make it to require a condition impossible to be performed by any whom God determines not to perform it having resolved not to determine the greatest part of them that know it to performe it Certainly this is not to make the secret will of God contradict the declared will of God but to make the declared will of God a meer falshood unlesse the declaring will make contradictions true For to will that this be done for an end which God that willeth will not have come to pass makes contradictions the object of that will and that for the same consideration at the same time God from everlasting determining meerly in consideration of his own will that the condition of that which he would have to come to passe conditionally will not come to passe What is it then to declare all this to the posterity of Adam already lapsed without tendring help sufficient to inable them to imbrace what he tendereth For it is manifest that Adam had sufficient grace to doe what God commanded and it is as manifest that God tenders both the Law to the Israelite and the Gospell to the World in the same form as he tendred Adam the prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit Nor can it be denied that this prohibition contained in the force of it all the perswasions all the exhortations all the promises all the threatnings which either the Law or the Gospell to their respective ends and purposes can be inforced with It must therefore be concluded not that they suppose in Adams posterity an ability to do what they require as did the origiginall prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit but that they bring with them sufficient help to perform it not supposing any thing that may barre the efficacy thereof till the will of him to whom it is tendered makes it void And truly speaking of that which the naturall indowment of freedom necessarily imports in the reasonable creature it is utterly impossible that any thing should determine the will of man to do or not to do this or that but his own action formally or in the nature of a formal cause which therefore in the will cannot be the action of God nor be attributed imputed or ascribed to him to whom it were blasphemy to impute that which his creature is honoured with That God should immediately act upon the soul of man or his will is no inconvenience Because that act must end in the will or soul and not attaine that effect which the imperfection of the creature bringeth to passe Ending therefore in the creature and not in that which the action of the creature produceth it leaveth the same of necessity in the state wherein God first made it And I may well suppose here and will suppose that Gods act of creation continues the same for all the time that he maintaines the creature in that perfection of being that is to say in that ability of acting which from the beginning he gave it This discourse I confesse extendeth to the voiding of the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of his creature which my purpose necessarily requires me not to maintaine For concurrence-supposeth the creature to act without help of God that concurreth and therefore cannot be requisite on behalf of the cause being supposed to act of it self but on behalf of the effect wherein it endeth Which having a being is supposed necessarily to require immediate dependance upon the first being which is God A strange subtlety acknowledging the creature able to act and supposing it to act of it self to imagine that this act can end in nothing as that which it effecteth without Gods concurrence Which immediately attaining the
effect in which the action of the creature endeth will enforce that God is as properly said to give light as the sunne to burn as the fire to do that act which is essentially sinne as the man that sinnes And therefore at once not to sinne because we suppose his concourse tied by the originall Law of creation to the determination of his creature And to sinne as producing immediately whatsoever is in that action which is essentially sinne For unlesse the species or nature of the act importing generally no sinne were a thing subsisting by it self as by the understanding it is considered setting aside the sinne which the particular that is acted implyeth as Plato is supposed to have maintained his ideas it is impossible that he who doth the act which is essentially sinne should be said truly not to sinne The Law of concurring to the doing of sinne and producing the act which essentially importeth it necessarily drawing the imputation thereof upon him that freely tied himself by setling it Let it once be said therefore that God made the fire able to burn the sunne able to shine the will of man able to make a free choice as he is a reasonable creature and it will be very impertinent to require any action but that of the fire to the consuming of wood but that of the sunne to the dispelling of darknesse supposing God to maintaine or rather to issue every moment the ability of burning or shining once given his creature from his own spring head of being so long as his creature indureth And therefore if ever God made the will able to chuse the doing or not doing of this before that upon the direction not of right reason which directeth not to sinne but alwayes of reason for all choice supposes reason to direct it it is impertinent to suppose any thing requisite to the exercise of this freedome of choice but the maintenance of reason issuing from the fountaine of Gods Wisdome so long as the man continues a reasonable creature If the immediate concurrence of God to the action of his creature make the actions wherein the perfection of his creature consisteth much more the imperfections and faileurs of it a staine to his excellence much more shall the act of determining the choice of his creature free before it be determined impute to God whatsoever it importeth for the worse the imputation whereof or the better is a staine to his excellency And is it possible that God by making the creature capable of such imputations should depose himself from the Throne of his Godhead and set up his creature in his stead in making it able to act that either naturally without his immediate concurrence or morally also by determining that freedom by the use of his own reason and choice which he in no instance afore determineth Certainly they consider not what they grant themselves when they suppose that God made it able so to do when they make the abilities which he giveth unable to do their work till he determine them so to do so that being so determined before they determine themselves they cannot do otherwise And suppose it a contradiction that the will should choose that which no reason why it should chuse appeareth certainly when reason pronounceth the motive that appeareth to be sufficient the action that insueth cannot be said to proceed from a cause indifferent to act or not though the determination thereof be not peremptory till the act follow Now is there any necessity why God should interpose to determine the indifference of the cause otherwise then as inabling it to determine its own indifference Suppose then a sentence past in the Court of Reason importing not onely This is to be done But This shall be done Do we not see every moment protestations made by the sensuall appetite and acts entered of them by the judge Indeed if the matter of them do not bear a plea the sentence remaines But is it therefore necessary that execution follow Witnesse those that act against conscience Witnesse Aristotels dispute of incontinence placing the nature of it in doing the contrary of that which the judgement is resolved ought to be done as if the one could be absolutely the best the other the best at this time Witnesse Medea in Ovid when she saies Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor I see the better but I do the worse For the mouth of conscience is to be stopped with a pretense of repentance to come and so present satisfaction is clear gaine by the bargaine If at length it come to execution of the sentence I demand what it is that makes the resolution from thenceforth peremptory but the same reason that determined the choice afore unlesse we suppose new matter advanced in plea first and afterwards voided If that which was sufficient afore prove not effectuall till now it is not because any thing was wanting without which the will was not able to proceed but because reason to the contrary appeared considerable before I grant there be those that have so farre determined the indifference of their own inclinations that no reason to the contrary appeares considerable to delay execution of the sentence past long since But this appears by experience to take place as well in those who have degenerated to devils incarnate as those who have improved to saints upon earth And therefore cannot be attributed to the force of true good acting beyond the appearance which it createth in the mind because Gods immediate act directs it But partly to the habituall grace of the holy Ghost with the resolution of Christianity presenting true good as lovely and beautifull as indeed it is Partly to the custome of doing even those acts which without the assistance of God Spirit our nature cannot do Upon which as the habituall indowment of the holy Ghost followes by Gods gracious promise So there followes naturally a facility of doing even supernaturall actions which men habituate themselves to by the meer force of custome excluding the consideration of all that reason to the contrary that hath proved abortive and addle long since Which notwithstanding the choice remaines free by virtue of that originall freedome which determined the indifference of every man to those actions the frequenting whereof hath created an habit And this is the ground of that account which we owe that God showing sufficient reason why we ought to be Christians and the world to the contrary our choice hath followed for the better or for the worse For the efficacy of the said reasons on either side implies beside the sufficiency of them onely a supposition of that which comes to passe which the same reasons determine a man to do that remaine uneffectuall till the execution of sentence But if the will of God interpose to determine the will before it determines there can be no more ground for any account why it acteth or acteth not then the earth is to give why it
from the whole Church For to require me to believe them to be in the torments prepared for the devil and his angels because I cannot say where they are were a reason too unreasonable for a Christian CHAP. XXI The opinion that makâ—s the Predetermination of mans will by God the sourse of his freedom And wherein Jansenius differs from it Of necessity upon supposition absolute The necessity of the Will following the last dictate of the understanding is onely upon supposition As also that which Gods foresight creates The difference between indifferent and undetermined These things thus premised as concerning that estate wherein the Gospell overtaketh the will of man to whom Christ is tendered being under original sin I say that it findes him not void of that freedome of choice in doing or not doing this or that which stands in opposition to necessity But that which stands in opposition to the bondage and servitude of sin This position is intended to contradict an opinion which seemeth to be very ordinary among Divines as well of the Reformation as the Church of Rome though more ingeniously professed and maintained by these Who pretending to derive the efficacy of Gods Predestination and the grace which it provideth from that decree of his Will whereby he determineth the will of his creature to do or not to doe watsoever is indeed don or not don in order of nature before it determine it selfe do consequently professe that notwithstanding this Predetermination of the will is no lesse effectuall then Gods omnipotence whereof it is the immediate and indefeasible consequence and effect yet there is no freedome in the creature no contingence in the effects of it but that which followeth upon this will of God determining understanding Creatures to do that which they do freely as it determining understanding Creatures to do that which they do necessarily This position though I intend not to admit yet I count it a point of ingenuity in them who think they free themselves of great dificulties by supposing it expressely to maintaine the truth of that supposition whereof they make so much advantage For they who not daring to incounter the difficulties wherewith it is chargeable do claime the consequences of it without premising the expresse supposition of it do as good as say nothing where they advise not the reader of those difficulties which the prime principle that they proceed upon is burthened with But he that sees how particular instances depend upon generall principles shall not stick to judge of their positions by the dependance they have upon this supposition so soon as they are informed of the credit which it deserves Now this predetermination Being the immediate effect of Gods omnipotency as for the cause of it as for the nature of it troubles very much those that maintaine it to say wherein it consists as indeed it may very well trouble any man to say of what colour a Chimaera is being in rerum natura just nothing For if they say it is a principle infused by the immediate worke of grace into the Will it is straightwaies evident that the having of it is not to make the Will able which all habituall indowments tend to but to make it actually to worke It must therefore consist in a certain motion or impulse immediately wrought by God in the Will which though it is not in the will to have depending meerely upon the Will of God yet that neither good nor ill can be don without it being necessary as they think to the effectuall determining of the will upon two accounts First as the will is a secondary cause that cannot worke unlesse moved by the first cause Secondly as the Will not being determined of it selfe cannot be determined to any act but by the same first cause But these two accompts seem to me both one For nothing can determine the will to act speaking of that which determines it formally or in the nature of a formall cause but the act of it For supposing the will to act and excluding whatsoever else might be considered the will remaines determined Not suposing that it may further be questioned what determines it The question then being onely what it is that determines the will in the nature of the effective cause the difficulty that causeth the question is but one because it is presumed that the second cause can not act if not acted that is determined to act by the first The nature then of this motion received lodged in the Will is imagined neverthelesse to be successive such as is the being of colours in the aire when they goe to the eye or that impulse which a handicraft-man moves his tooll with And the necessity of it standeth upon a generall account not of originall sine but of Gods creature such as the will in all estates is requisite to the acts of the will because nothing can be don by the creature but that which God shall determine it to do But there is of late an other opinion started in the Church of Rome by Jansenius in his Augustinus which maintaines that the Will in all actions that are goâ—d according to Christianity is determined by grace effectually inclining the will by the love of true good preventing not expecting the motion thereof and producing that influence of the will whereby formally it acteth The nature of it then consists in that very act of life whereby the reasonable creature exerciseth its choice no waies requisite to the actions of nature which man is able to do under originall sin but meerely upon that account as the cure of it restoring the due command over that concupiscence wherein originall sin consisteth and not extending to the state of innocence Which notwithstanding the will is no lesse naturally determined by it then by that principle which the other opinion advanceth For they say both that the will is not determined by the object howsoever proposed but morally as he that outwardly adviseth or perswadeth determines him that resolves upon that consideration which he advanceth to that which he proposeth And therefore this determination both agree satisfies not that efficacy of grace which the scriptures proposed in the premises require Therefore as the former opinion determineth the will naturally by a principle really lodged in the nature of the wil so this by the very vitall act of vvilling really subsistng in the nature of the Will though produced by God a cause above nature which when the delight in good which it importeth is so great as to swallow up all contradiction it determineth to the same preventing the determination of it selfe when otherwise acknowledging that though of the same nature with that which overcometh it is never the lesse defeasible From this ground there flowes an other difference between these two opinions we goe further from the fountaine head still more visible For the former admitting free will to be a faculty able to act or not to act supposing all
this then that which the supposition of free will necessarily requires Certainly Aristotles resolution that they are sure in the alternative but that neither part of it can be certaine That is to say that Peter being tempted shall either deny his master or not but that being contingent it can neither be certaine that he shall nor that he shall not is utterly inconsistent with that particular providence of God over all things which Châ—â—stianty supposeth renders that great mastâ—r as a man too cunning not to see â—he conâ—equence of his own position very sususpicious in a point so neerely concerning the belief of Gods providence Now future contingencies in the notion of contingencies that are not yet come to passe being in themselves nothing that is to say being onely understood to be posible cannot reduce themselves to the nature and state or future contingencies in the notion of contingencies that shall come to passe such as we believe all contingencies that have or shall come to passe to the worlds end were to God from everlasting It is therefore a meere contradiction to imagin that contingencies either by the possibilty of their nature or by the capacity of the cause that is of it selfe utterly undetermined to do rather then not to do to do this rather then that can be an object capable of being known by that knowledg upon which they may be said to be certaine future as things that shal be not as things that may be not as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distinguish with Aristotle There are indeed those who undertake that when it is said Peter shall deny his Lord Peter shall not deny his Lord the one of which sayings must needs come to passe seeing this necessity must needs be in the object before it be in the saying because the saying is true or fals by reason that the matter of it is so or otherwise before therefore that part which appeares true in time was true from everlasting But that they suppose cannot be by virtue of any or all causes least the effects should no more be contingencies Therefore by virtue of the things themselves because of a contradiction the one part must needs be true the other false And this being of future contingencies they imagin it is which the knowledg of God attaining is therefore called sight because it reacheth that which is in being and therefore present to it But this imagination is a meere contradiction to common reason which is able to tell any man that possibilities differ onely in this from nothing that there are such things as can bring them to passe And therefore have no being at all but in the ability of their causes Whereas suppose them in being before their causes bring them to passe what remaines for their causes to doe which would have nothing to doe if that which they bring to passe were in being before they bring it so to passe And what contingency could then remaine seeing whatsoever is must needs be while it is For this position prevents any supposition that may be made concerning the being of that which is said to be before you can suppose or understand it to be And where is the difference between the being of God and that of future contingencies both being of themselves Surely supposing the necessity of this their being because God could not see them otherwise they would be not only objects denominating that knowledge of God to be sight which reacheth the present being of them but causes on which the sight of God must depend as our sight depends on the object that causeth it The future being therefore of contingencies necessarily supposeth the determination of their causes The contingence of them that thâ—s determination is from their causes themselves freely determining themselves The certainty of them from the infinite reach of Gods understanding comprehending the resolution of the Creature by the present inclination thereof meeting the considerations which it is presented with Wherefore as it is impossible that the will should act unlesse the understanding go before and the resolution of the will to do or not to do this or that necessarily depends upon some act of the understanding shewing by sufficient reason an end sufficient to move the wil to proceed and resolve So doth not the will effectually proceed untill the understanding shews that reason which effectually moves it to proceed Now these reasons proceeding from those appearances which the objects that every man meets with cause in his mind either at the present or by comparing that which outwardly appears at the present with that which is laid up in the storehouse of the mind And God having provided what objects every man in every moment shall meet with to resolve him what to do in every case that may come in debate It cannot be imagined that he provideth this and knoweth not by the means which he proviâ—eth what will be the issue supposing that he knoweth it not by his own resolution to determine a man by his own immediate act to do whatsoever he does And indeed God comprehending what considerations a man every moment is moved with and what be his own inclinations that is moved with the same it cannot seem strange that by this means seeing it appears impossible that by any other means he should comprehend what will so come to pass though knowing that he that acteth had or might have had sufficient reasons to have done otherwise Wherefore if any man ask me whether God know what will come to pass if any case should be put which he knoweth shall never be put which is now called in the Schools Gods middle knowledge because it hath on the one side that knowledge whereby he comprehendeth the natures of all things and the possibilities of all events on the other side the view which he hath from everlasting of all things that have been are or shall be for that tract of time which they endure because I seem to say that this is it which directs Gods providence in resolving what course to hold by which resolution it appears to him what shall come to pass I shall not answer nevertheless without distinguishing That God comprehends not the issues of those future possibilities which men can imagine to themselves and yet comprehends the issues of these future possibilities whereof we suppose him to determine all the circumstances For let a man infinitely endeavour to limit by his understanding all that he can consider in the case of any man left to his freedome he shall never be able to express that consideration which shall be effectuall certainly to determine him that is presented with it Because it is manifest that infinite considerations more may present themselves to move him to do nothing or otherwise But when the word of God speaks of these means which being provided by God determine effectually the resolution of him that is moved by them to wit by
that the Grace whereby we are justified is a quality habitually informing the soule of man as supernaturally infused by God into it But onely that Faith Hope and Charity are infused into them that are justified and inherent in them as shed into theire hearts by the Holy Ghost Which they say may all be understood supposing that a man is justified by the acts of Faith Hope and Love infused or shedde into the hart by the Holy Ghost as well as by habites supernaturally created to reside in the soule For you may see by Morinus in his Late worke de Administrationâ— Pâ—nitentiâ— VIII 2. 3. 7. that for MCC yeares after Christ a good while after the Schoole Doctors were come in there was no question at all made whether we are justified by an infused habit of grace or not and that it was about the yeare MCCL that this opinion intirely prevailed in the Schooles Whereby it appeareth that as this opinion containes nothing destructive to the faith if it be understood in that sense which the Church of Rome allowes that it is not the naturall worth of it which justifies but Gods accepting of it to that effect So if it did yet could not the Church of Rome be said to teach any thing destructive to the faith But onely to allow since â—uch things to be taught For the Council of Vienna under Clement V. determines it not as matter of faith but as the more probable opinion as you may see Clement de summa Trin. Fide Cathol Tit. I. Cap. VII And therefore Albertus Pâ—ghius de libero Arbitrio lib. V notwithstanding this decree stickes not to count this doctrine forged without any authority of Scripture And those that speake of it with more respect then he thinke not themselves tied to that which the Council holdâ— the more probable It is indeed manifest by the experience of all Christians that the custome and practice even of supernaturall actions to which the inclination of corrupt nature is utterly averse breedes in a man an habituated disposition of doing those things with â—ase and pleasure which at the beginning of his Christianity he could not doe without offering himselfe much violence But that habit which custome and practice leaves behind it though supernaturall for the cause or effect of it because the acts upon which it accrues as also those which it produces cannot accrue from meere nature without the helpe of Christs grace is notwithstanding for that wherein it consists a disposition really qualifying the nature and substance of the soule and inclining it to act otherwise then without it Besides the Gospell promising the Holy Ghost for a Gift to abide with and dwell in those that are baptized nothing hinders the Gift thereof to be held and termed an habituall grace In these regards I find it neither prejudiciall nor inconsequent to the Christian faith to acknowledge habituall grace though neither scripture nor tradition of the Church owne any habit of grace created by God and infused into the soule in a moment as the Schoole imagineth But they seeme to have committed another mistake in that the Church having decreed against Pelagius that the Grace of Christ is necessary to all truly good actions and therefore that man cannot merit the first grace this infused habit of grace they have made to be that First grace which God giveth before man will indeavor any thing towards it For so the Master of the Sentences determineth that grace which preventeth mans indevors to be faith with Love libro II. distinct XXVI D. which though it be capable of a very good sense That the motion to beleeve the truth of Christianity out of the love of God is that which Gods grace prevents all mans compliance with yet in what sense they swallowed it will appeare by the difficulties and dispuâ—es they were intangled with about that sorrow which the heart conceives for sinne out of meerâ— love to God not feare of punishment which the love of our selves breedeth For this sorow being necessarily a disposition preparing him for justification that cometh to God in regard the first grace which God preventeth all manâ— indeavors with is to them this infused habit of Faith and love which formally justifieth how he should come prepared for justification by that contrition which without Gods grace man cannot have who is justified by that infused habit of grace which he was first prevented by God with hath been among them the subject of endlesse jangles Whereas it is manifest the maintenance of the Faith against Pelagius requireth no more then that the resolution of persevering in Christianity to the â—nd be thought necessarily to depend upon the motion to imbrace it which God first preventeth man with without respect to any act of man obliging God to grant it And therefore it is manifest that the Church decreed no more against Pelagius but that the first motion to become a good Christian that every man is prevented with must be ascribed to Gods free grace through Christ not ingaged by any act of mans goeing afore Now requiring onely the actuall assistance of Gods preventing grace it is easy enough to say not how attrition that is sorrow for sinne in regard of punishment accompanied with slavish feare is changed into contrition that is sorrow for sinne out of the love of God whome it offendeth For it is not possible that he who loveth God should be sory for sinne for the same reason which he was sorry for while he loved the world But how the man that was attrite becomes contrite For when first the Gospell reveales unto a man his desperate estate in and by the first Adam it is not possible that he should remaine uâ—touched either with sorrow for the present or apprehension for the future And yet no lesse unpossible is it according to Gods ordinary way of working even by his Grace that he should in an instant resolve to imbrace the onely way to give him peace in that exigence But while he neither casts off the motion of grace nor resigneâ— his interest in himselfe and the world to it but considers upon what reason it behoves him to resolve this consideration by the worke of Gods Spirit disâ—overing to him how much God and the next world is to be preferred before himselfe and this as the love of God and the world to come prevailes in him above the love of himselfe and this accordingly of necessity must the greife of having offended God afore prevaile in him above all that he can conceive for the misery he hath incurred And all this by virtue of those helpes which God grants though allwayes in consideration of our Lord Christ yet not by virtue of that Covenant which is not contracted till â— man be baptized but of his owne free goodnesse dispensing the effects of Christs coming according to the reason of his secret wisdome which the Covenant of grace discovers not I neede say no more to show how a
when wee see persons authorized in behalf of their particular Churches do an act which shall oblige those respective Churches For by the same reason persons authorized on behalf of all Churches shall be able to do an act that shall oblige all Churches Which is all that I claim when I maintain that by Gods Law all Churches are to make one Church When Matthias was Ordained an Apostle in stead of Judas I demand why that Assembly of Apostles and Disciples at which this was done should not be counted a General Council having showed that this Church of Jerusalem was then the whole Church and the creating of an Apostle whom all were to acknowledge in that quality for the future being an act concerning the Whole I will not say that the act of creating the seven Acts VI. concerned the whole Church being content that it remaine in question whether the intent of it were such or not But in as much as those that do not allow that they intended to create an Order of Deacons which all Churches were to make use of afterwards do not question that if they did intend it the whole Church must needs stand obliged by it I am not afraid to reckon this Assembly also in the rank of General Councils As for that of Acts XV. it appeareth sufficiently that those who founded the Church of Antiochia had their first commission from the Apostles not onely by the first preaching of the Gospel there and the sending of Barnabas Acts XI 19-26 but chiefly in that those which taught the necessity of observing Moses Law are disowned as having no commission so to teach Acts XV. 24. For as for S. Paul who challengeth an immediate commission from our Lord Gal. I. 1. it is easily granted because hee was made an Apostle Yet in that hee allegeth the verifying of it to S. Peter and S. James and the Churches of Judaea who having never seen his face glorified God for him Gal. I. 18-24 in that hee is brought by Barnabas who acted by commission from the Apostles to Antiochia and upon this beginning was sent by the Holy Ghost that is by Prophesie to do the office of an Apostle with Barnabas Acts XII 1 2 3. in that hee is owned by the Apostles afterwards Acts XV. 12. Gal. II. 1 7-10 which makes it more than probable that both these Texts speak of one and the same time of S. Pauls coming to Jerusalem in these regards I say it appeares sufficiently that the Church was to own him for an Apostle upon the owning his immediate calling from heaven by the rest of the Apostles Wherefore when wee see those that were trusted on behalf of the Church of Antiochia and those Churches which had been founded by those that were sent by the Holy Ghost from thence resort to the Apostles and Church at Jerusalem for an end of the difference in debate well may I with those that have gone afore mee reckon this meeting among the General Councils the cause of it concerning the whole no part concerned that it obliged not I will not say so much of the meeting of S. Paul with S. James Acts XXI 18. though the Elders there mentioned are thought to be those that had the chief authority in the neighbouring Churches as well as in that of Jerusalem And though S. Paul by this time was become rhe Head of many more Churches of his own foundation than afore Because of the dispersion of the rest of the Apostles and the founding of other Churches by this time which could not be tied by the result of this meeting further than the mater of it was inforced by the decree formerly made of which among the Apostles there ought no doubt to be made Let no man expect that I inferre upon these premises that the Church is bound by a positive Law of God to call Councils and to decide all emergencies by the vote of them much lesse that it is not able to do this otherwise I that pretend the Church to be a Corporation founded by God upon a privilege of holding visible Assemblies for the common service of God notwithstanding any secular force prohibiting the same must needes maintain by consequence that the Church hath power in it self to hold all such Assemblies as shall be requisite to maintain the common service of God and the unity in it and the order of all Assemblies that exercise it but especially that profession which it supposeth But I intend not therefore to tye the Church to inflame persecution by holding such Assemblies as may give occasion of sinister suspicions to secular Powers that protect not Christianity when the effect of such Assemblies is to be obtained without assembling For whosoever they be that ought to be authorized in behalf of particular Churches to constitute a Council they can have no other authority than their respective Churches do challenge It cannot be imagined that being present in one place together and seeing one anothers faces can purchase them that authority which they cannot have at home to conclude the whole by the consent of the Council The presence of Representatives affords infinite opportunities of better information one from another by debate one with another which distance of place allowes not otherwise But yet in maters concerning the state of the Whole or any great part of it means of information for the maintenance of that confederacy wherein I maintain the Society of the Church to stand is to be had by daily intercourse intelligence and correspondence between Churches without those Assemblies of Representatives which wee call Councils A thing so visibly practised by the Catholick Church from the beginning that thereupon I conceive it may be called a standing Council in regard of the continual settling of troubles arising in some part and tending to question the peace of the whole by the consent of other Churches concerned had and obtained by means of this mutual intelligence and correspondence The holding of Councils is a way of farre greater dispatch but the expresse consent of Churches obtained upon the place is a more certain foundation of peace in regard of the many questions that may arise as well in the discharge of that trust which Representatives are charged with as in the respect allowed their votes by the Council As it may easily appear by the difficulties that have risen about executing the decrees of Councils And therefore the power of them is meerly derivâ—tive from their respective Churches tending to supply those difficulties of bringing the whole to agreement which distance of place createth That therefore which I allege here is this That the succession of Pastors alleged by Irenaeus and Tertullian to convince the Hereticks of their time by S. Augustine and Optatus to convince the Donatists to be Schismaticks proceed wholey upon supposition of daily intercourse and correspondence between Churches as of force to conclude particular Churches by consent of the whole Which is the true reason of
it may be said that a thing comes to passe necessarily and that sense in which it may be said that it must necessarily come to passe For I suppose that the property of our English will help me here to distinguish these two senses to all that consider their mother tongue and may discerne a severall meanâ—ng when a man saies the fire burnes necessarily Peter must necessarily deny our Lord supposing that our Lord had fore told it For when the necessity is understood to be in the cause which the nature thereof though by Gods will determines it is proper to say thaâ— it comes to passe necessarily But when the necessity is understood to stand upâ—n a supposition of the effect either being or knowne to be which knowledg presupposeth it to be being supposâ—d to be true or the like it is proper to say this must needs come to passe or it must of necessity come to passe but not that it comes to passe necessarily because then the necessity must noâ— fall upon the coming of it upon passe but upon the manner by which it comes to pâ—sse I say then if any can inferr upon my saying that the necessity which it infers is antecedent to the being of it I grant I am faln into the inconvenience which I would a void and will disclaime the position upon which it followes But if it be onely consequent upon supposition either that it is or that it is taken to be it is no more then that necessity which is found in all coâ—tiâ—gencies according to all opinions that must allow all things necessarily to be â—hough not to be necessarily supposing that they are Now when I say that God determines the evenâ—s of future contingencies I say not that he doth it by determining their causes to do them speaking of free causes for the contingâ—â—cies which come to passe by the concurrence of naturall causes I grant â—o be meere necessities in regard it is necessary that when every cause actâ— to the uâ—most of his strength that must not onely needs come to passe but come to passe necessarily which the concurrence of severall forces produceth and must needâ— appear in the causes to any that comprehends the force of them all buâ— that this act of his ends in determining the motives which present themâ—elves to such causes Which act is consistent with an other act whereby he mâ—intaines the cause in an ability of doing or not doing that which it is movâ—d to do But that comprehending the inclinations thereof and the force oâ— the motives which it is presented with he comprehends thereby that it will proceed to act though comprehending that it might doe otherwiâ—e shâ—uld it regard those appearances which either habitually it hath or actuâ—lly â—t â—â—ght to have Now I confesse againe it is hard for me to show how it ought actually to have those appearances which habitually it hath But seeing thaâ— supposing this I show evidently how the providence of God iâ— unceâ—easibâ—â— the will remaining free and the effects thereof contingent I will rathâ—r conâ—esse that I cannot shew where their freedome might or ought to move when it does not then destroy the ground of all Christianity Thus much is evident supposing my saying that the certainty of the event includes the supposition of the will acting freely therefore infers no necessity antecedent to it the knowledge upon which providence decrees foreseeing that it will freely proceed being so moved CHAP. XXV The grounds of the difference between sufficient and effectuall How naturall occasions conduce to supernaturall actions The insufficience of Jansenius his doctrine Of sufficient grace under the Law of Moses and Nature ANd now I shall not use many words to declare what it is that makes those helps of grace which of themselves are sufficient effectuall For if all particulars are contayned in their generalls that which is said of all the works of providence must hold in those helps of supernaturall grace whereby it conducteth to the happinesse of the world to come And therefore the efficacy of Gods grace taking efficacy to imply the effect consists in the order which providence useth that the motives of Christianity whether to imbrace or performe the profession of it be presented in such circumstances as may render them accepted of the will to whose judgement for the preâ—ent they so appeare So that the same for nature and kind prove effectall to one which to an other prove void and frustrate For it is manifest that those helps are the grace of Christ even as they are sufficient and supposing them not to take effect And it ought to be manifest that the circumstances in which they are present to every particular person are brought to passe by the conduct of Gods spirit which filleth the world and attaineth from the beginning to the end of all things which come to passe And this spirit and the coming thereof being purchased by our Lord Christ and granted in consideration of his obedience it is easy to bee seen how it is the grace of Christ not onely as sufficient but also as effectuall This resolution then presupposeth two things as proved Chap. XVIII The first That the preaching of the Gospell is the grace of Christ That is to say A Grace granted by God in consideration of Christs merits and sufferings The second That the grace of Christ attaineth and reacheth the very effect of conversion and new obedience and resteth not in having inabled man to doe it of himselfe without the influence of it To make this part of faith better to be understood among believers better to be maintained against unbelievers that which this resolution advanceth is this That the Grace of the H. Ghost purchased by the humiliation of Christ and by his exaltation obtained as it is the meanes which God hath provided for the publishing of his Gospell to the conviction of all who understand it that they ought to submit to the faith and live according to it so it is the meanes to make it effectuall to the conversion of the Nations to Christianity that conversion effectuall in their lives and conversations by presenting the reasons and grounds thereof being of themselves sufficient for the worke to every mans consideration in those circumstances procured by the providence of God which it executeth in which his wisdome â—oresaw that they would takâ— effect and become to the purpose And truly when our Lord saith Iohn XVI 8 9 10. And when he cometh he will convict the world of sin of righteousnesse of judgement Of sin because they believe not in mee Of judgement because the prince of this world is condemned we must understand that the H. Ghost convinced the world of sin because those miracles which the Apostles did by the holy Ghost convincing the world that they spoke the word of God shewed the world that they were under sin and liable to Gods wrath if they became not Christians And that he convinced
the world of Judgement because the Prince of theis world is condemned by the conversion of those who forefook him to become Christians Therefore S Steven upbraideth the Jews saying Ye stisnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and eares ye do alwaies resist the Holy Ghost even you also as did your fathers Acts VII 51. Because being convicted by the Holy Ghost which spoke in him that he spoke from God neverthelesse they submit not to his message Therefore our Lord Mark III. 28. 29 30 All sins shall be forgiven the sons of men and blasphemies which they shall blaspheme But whoso shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath no remission for ever but is liable to everlasting damnation Because they said he hath an unclean spirit which you have againe Math. XII 31 32. Luke XII 10. Because being convicted that our Lord spoke did his miracles by the Holy Ghost they blasphemed saying that he spoke and did them by an uncleane spirit For these words and these workes are the meanes by which our Lord accomplished â—his promise Iohn XIV 23. If any man love me he will keep my word and my Father will love him and we will come to him and abide with him For before the condition If any man love me be fulfilled the case is that which our Lord expresseth Apoc. III. 20. Behold I stand at the dore and knock And if any man heare my voice and open the dore I will come in to him and sup with him â—e with me But being fulfilled the words of our Lord take place Iohn XVI 15 16 17. If yee love me ye will keep my commandements And I will aske the Father and he will give you an other Advocate to abide with you for ever even the spirit of truth which the world cannot receive because they â—ee it not nor know it but you know it because it abideth with you and is in you For seeing it is manifest by the premises that the undertaking of Christianity is the condition upon which the Holy Ghost is granted as a gift to abide with Christians the preaching of Christianity that is the proposing of those reasons which God by his word hath shewed us why wee should be Christians is the knocking of our Lord Christ by the spirit at the dore of the heart that he may enter and dwell in us by the same spirit according to the words of S. Paul 2. Cor. II. 16. For ye are the Temple of the living God as God hath said To wit I will dwell and converse among them and will be their God and they shall be my people That which some Philosophers say of the naturall generation of man That the soule frames its owne dwelling being fulfilled in the worke of generation by grace when the Holy Ghost by his actuall assistance frameth the man to be fit for the habituall gift of the Holy Ghost by becoming a true Christian If then we believe that the Holy Ghost was given by God and obtained by Christ as well to make the Gospell effectuall as to move the Apostles to preach it there can no doubt remaine that the preaching of the Gospell that is to say the meanes which the Holy Ghost provideth to make it either sufficient or effectual to convince the world of it is the instrument whereby he frameth himself that invisible house of true believers in which he dwelleth And therefore the meanes whereby Gods grace becomes effectuall to those who imbrace it is the same that renders it sufficient for those who refuse it the difference lying as well in the disposition which it meets with for which the man is accountable as in the spirit of God that presenteth it which renders God the praise when it takes effect and leaves men accountable when it does not If this reason had been in consideration with Socinus and perhaps with Pelagius he would have found it necessary acknowledging as all that read the Scriptures must needs acknowledge that which they find so frequent and so cleare in the Scriptures that the habituall gift of the Holy Ghost is granted to inable those who undertake Christianity to performe it to acknowledge also that the actuall help of it is necessary to make the motives of Christianity effectuall to subdâ—e men to it And by consequence that the coming of the second Adam was necessary to restore the breach which the first had made seeing it was not to be repaired without the same Nor is it to be marveled at that naturall meanes conducted by the grace of Christ should produce supernaturall effects such as I have shewed the obediencâ— of Christianity to be which supposing the Covenant of grace and freedome of mans will cannot be otherwise The reasons which appeare to the understanding and move the will to act contrary to the inclination of originall concupâ—scence in professing Christianity and living according to the same being sufficient to convict it to give sentence that so the man ought to doe And the circumstances in which the spirit of Christ conducteth these motives to the heart which it knocketh at by their means being able to represent them valuable to take effect with him who is moved to the contrary by his originall concupiscence And though meanes naturall because they move a man to proceed according to right reason which nature requires him to doe yet as they are brought to passe and conducted by a supernaturall cause nothing hinders the effect to be supernaturall in such a nature as is by them made capable of acting above nature I do much approve the discourse of some that have indeavoured to shew how this comes to passe thus supposing the covenant of the Law to be the renewing of that which was made with Adam in Paradise for the maintaining of him in the happnesse of his naturall life Which we may suppose though we suppose not that God covenanted not with him at all for the life to come For the dispensation of those blessings of this life which the covenant of nature limited by Moses Law to the happinesse of the land of promise tendreth may well be the advantage which God taketh to make the covenant of Grace acceptable especially to those who by Gods blessing failing of the blessings of the first covenant by that meanes becoming out of love with this present worlâ— meeâ— with the Covenant of Grace in such a disposition as may render it acceptable For so long as things goe well with men in this world it seemes haâ—sh to require them to takeup the Crosse of Christ that they may obtain the world to come But when the comforts of this world faile it is no marvell if any condition that tenders hope in the world to come be welcome If it be said that this renders the grace of Christ effectuall onely to the poore and men oâ— meane condition in the world who have cause to be weary of their estâ—te in it It is answered that it is no marvell if the
meanes that makes the grace of Christ effectuall addresse it selfe especially to that estate o men in which our Lord Christ to whom they so become conformable appeared in the world And for that very reason to figure that estâ—te of mind which the Gospell requires the people of â—sraell were by Gods Law left unâ—uâ—nished of many helps of policy and force by which other nations maintain themselves free from servâ—tude that they might remaine obliged to depend upon Gâ—dâ— immediate assistance providence But it is to be said further That the greatest estates of the world being subject to the greatest crosses through want of successe and those great changes to which they are liable this way of preparation to the kingdome of heaven can no way seeme wanting to any estate when a begger is seen no lesse to doâ—e upon this world then an uncleane person is seen to doâ—e upon that whore by whom he is abused It is moreover to be said That the remembrance of death which must and the inconstancy of this world which may deprive us of all the benefits thereof being by Gods judgement the punishment of sin soures all the content of them that drench themselves deepest in the pleasures of this life and gives them just cause to forsake them all in case they stand not with the hope of the world to come And the very injoying of them being injoyed with that conscience which all Châ—â—stians have of Gods providence and the sense of his hand from whence they come is reasonably an advantage to those who injoy the best successe that can be expressâ—d in the course of this world both to become thankfull to God for it and also to prefer â—â—ernity before it Whereby it may appeare that the course of this world disposed by God upon the terms of the covenant of nature containes â—â— it those opportunities and advantages which the act of Gods providence by the grace of Christ knowes easily how to makâ— effectuall to the supernaturall purposes of it This is the place for the rest of that which I am to say of the opinion of Jansenius setling the efficacy of saving grace upon other grounds then those which I use The ground of it seems to stand upon the observation of S. Augustin de corrept gratia Chap. XI XII Distinguishing between the help of grace without which the worke of grace is not don that by which it is don auxilium sine quo non and auxilium quo and comparing the grace of Christ which cometh to effect notwithstanding originall concupiscence with the grace given Adam which might have come to effect had he pleased but came not notwithstanding his innocenâ—e as more powerfull in our weakenesse then that in his strength For hereupon he will have the grace of Christ to be onely that which takes effect confining that help without which the worke of grace cannot be don to the state of innocence as ouâ— of date now under oâ—iginall sin So that the freedome of the will is so far from being râ—quisite to â—he effects â—hereof that it hath no being but bâ— the meanes of it consisting in that free love of that which God commandeth because he commandeth it which it inspireth As on the other side the counâ—erfeit of it in them that sin without reluctation bâ—cause free from righteousnesse is nothing but the free lâ—ve of sin for the saâ—isfaction of concupiscence It is therefore in his opinion impertinent how necessarily the grace of Christ determineth the wil to imbrace the true good seeing it is the love of it the delight in it which grace worketh in the wâ—ll that determines it willingly and freely to imbrace it To tâ—ke the more distinct view of this plea let us put the case in him who running full speed in a course of sin is caâ—led by the preaching of the Gospell to become a Christian Or to the same purpose in him who being a Christian and runnâ—ng the same race is summoned by his profession and the grounds thereof to reâ—urne to it In this case can any man imagine that the reasons which move us all to be Christians shâ—uld raise no love of true good no dislike to sin no feare of vengeance no desire of everlasting hapâ—iâ—esse in him that considers them as they deserve Especially being managed by the spirit of God which knocketh at the dore of the heart by that meanes Or can any man question as it is â—he feare of vengeance that beginneth so it is the love of good for Gods sâ—ke that conâ—ummateth the resolution of becoming a true Christiâ—â— But the quâ—stâ—â—n being put about changing the chief end of a mans whole life and doings can it be supposed that any man is prevented with such a delight in true gooâ—nesse as iâ—stâ—ntly to abandon the lust which his bâ—sâ—nesse hath been hitherto to satisfie without demurre or regret I doubt not that God can immediatly crâ—aâ—e in any man that appearance of true good that shall without debate or looking back transport him to the prosecution of it That notwithstanding the Covenant of grace he may doe it Which though a rule to his ordâ—nâ—ry proceeding is no Law to his Soveraigne perogative But him that is thus sâ—ved though sâ—ved by grace yet we cannot count to be saved by the Covenant of grace Which proposeth a reward to them who are led by motives thereof notwithstanding the difficulties to the contrary though implying the worke of grace in him that overcometh And this no man more câ—earâ—ly acknowledgeth then Jansenius de gratia Christi VIII 2. where â—â— conâ—esseth that the predetermination of the will by the grace of Christ is not indefeasible but onely when it overcomâ—s as Gods predetermination according to the Dominicans is For by this difference whâ—ch in statiâ—g of this opinion I have not neglected afore the efficacy thereof cannot be attribuâ—ed to â—e â—aâ—ure of that help which overcometh aâ— of an other kind then that which pâ—oveth frustrate And therefore notwithstanding that large and elaborat work of his he hath left us to inquire further whence the efficacy of it proceedeth As having in effect onely resolved us wherein the efficacy of Grâ—ce consisteth in the nature of the formall cause Not from whence it proceedâ—th in the nature of the effective cause which the question indeed demandâ—th And truly the very consideration premised That as freedome from sin coâ—sists in the determination of the will to righteousnesse which the Grace of Chrâ—st effecteth so freedome from righteousnesse in the determination of it to sin which it acteth Inâ—orceth an other kind of freedome common to both estates not importing praise or dispraise but a capacity of either by doing that which no necessity determineth a man to doe And therefore that though the grace of Christs Crosse be the medecine yet till it be freely taken it worketh not the cure This is that freedome from necessity by the present condition of our nature the use whereof
not that those Imperial Laws took place which made this profession a lawful cause of dissolving mariage in being per bonam gratiam as the Romane Law called it whether the party so deserted were allowed to mary elsewhere or not And indeed we find S. Basil qq fusius explicat XII and S. Chrysostome in Mat. hom LXIX ad pop Ant. in 1 Tim. hom XIV together with Cassiane in the example of Theonas Collat. XXI 9. 10. in their zeal to monasticall life advising maried persons not to stay for the consent of their parties in making such a profession as this At such time as the West where monasticall life was not yet so originally spread S. Hierome Epist XIV and S. Augustine Epist XLV CXCIX de adult conjugiis maintain the contrary opinion Which to me I confesse seems faâ— more probable For granting single life duely ordered to be the ordinary way and means of attaining perfection in Christianity according to the promises this state of eminence necessarily supposeth that which is necessary to the being of Christianity Therefore the way to perfection must be grounded upon justice Now in justice the contract of mariage among Christians gives each party that interesse in the others body which mariage exerciseth Which interesse noting but consent seems to dissolve And therefore seeing there is no Tradition of the whole Church to inforce this right not onely particular Churches not allowing it shall not seem to me to depart from the Unity of the whole in so doing But also Soveraign Powers through their severall dominions in regard of the interesse which all States have in the mariage or single life of their subjects shall lawfully use their Power to limit the force of it But as for mariage consummate and used I cannot see how the party deserting upon such pretense is excused from the guilt of adultery which the deserted may commit either single or maried again As for the question that may be made whither the mariage of one that hath professed single life be void or valid supposing the profession of single life to be agreeable to Christianity as I conceive I have showed sufficient reason to believe there is no consideration sufficient to make mariage after it valid but the abuse of the profession it selfe amounting to such a height as may serve to satisfie a Christian that in consideration thereof it is it selfe in the first place become void Another impediment yet remains questionable whether it be of force to dissolve those mariages which are called clandestine whither for want of consent in the Parents or the solemnities of the Church Some think that want of consent of Parents not onely makes the act unlawfull which all agree in but the mariage void As if the reverence due to Parents by Gods law did make a mans contract with a thirdperson void who is no waies bound to inquire whither his free consent be lawfully exercised or not In the Scriptures we see Gods people proceed by consent of Parents and daughters especially S. Paul supposes to referre themselves to their Fathers 1 Cor. VII 36. But neither was Esaus mariage taken to be void because it was made without such consent Geâ— XXVII 45. Nor was there any particular consent of Iacobs Parents to his mariages Gen. XXIX nor were the Fathers of Iudah or of Tobias made acquainted with their mariages And as for the Romane Laws which void mariages for want of this consent in some cases it is no more an argument of the Law of nature then the power of the Father by the same Laws which neverthelesse allow the Mother none when as Gods Law alwayes as well as the Law of Moses gives them equall interesse It is therefore manifest that there is ground in Gods Law to make this impediment of force to dissolve mariage contracted without it And that either for the Church as the reverence of Parents is a part of Gods law now in being which the power of the Church pretendeth to preserve Or for the secular Power as the interesse of Parents in the mariages of their children is of consequence to the publick peace and wealth The same may be said of those mariages that are made without witness or without solemnities of the Church saving that those solemnities which contain the approbation of the Church arising upon the account of the Church it is evidently more proper for the Church to make this impediment of force to dissolve mariage For the secular power to inâ—ct the Law of the Church by force of arms and temporall penalties There remains one cause more to hinder mariage so as to dissolve it when consummate being made notwithstanding it the condition of slavery in either of the parties at such time when as the rights of bondage subsisted This cause stands now by the Canon Law and is inâ—orced and limited by the Casuists But it was not the Canon Law that first voided the mariage of a slave taken for free but the Laws of the Empire as Ivo himselfe a Collector of the Canons witnesseth Epist CCXLIII where having produced the Law of Iustiniane he thus proceedeth In tali ergo contractu quod lex damnat non homo sed iâ—stitia separat quia quod contra leges praesumitur per leges solui meretur In such a contract then that which the law oondemns it is not man but justice thâ—â— separates Because what is presumed against Law by law deserves to be dissolved Which reâ—son takes place also in legall kindred according to the Imperiall Lawes whereby an adopted Brother is disabled to mary his sister by adoption In imitation whereof an opinion of the publick honesty of Christianity so prevâ—iled in that Church afterwards that being once Gossips came to be an hindrance of mariage which opinion howsoever grounded notwithstanding introduced the same kind of burthen and no other then that of legall kindred by adoptions These reasons though not admitted by all professions in Religion that shall meet with this yet seeing they proceed upon one and the same common ground the effect and consequence whereof cannot be admitted in some and refused by the rest And seeing that some of them are admitted on all sides there being no other reason sufficient why they should be admitted may serve to evidence the interesse of the Church in Matrimoniall causes And that evidence may serve to inferre that though the secular Power hath also an interess in the same yet in regard of the trouble which concurrence may cause in civill Government Christian Princes and States have done wisely as well as in regard to the interess of the Church they have done Christianly in referring the conduct of Matrimonial causes almost wholly to the Church Especially supposing that they take good heed that the laws thereof neither trench upon the Interess of their Crown not the wealth of their subjects But whither secular Power can make laws by virtue whereof that which a man voluntarily acts afterwards