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A28600 Some considerations on the principal objections and arguments which have been publish'd against Mr. Lock's Essay of humane understanding by Samuel Bold ... Bold, S. (Samuel), 1649-1737. 1699 (1699) Wing B3494; ESTC R19250 32,612 64

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE Principal Objections AND ARGUMENTS Which have been Publish'd against Mr. Lock 's Essay OF HUMANE UNDERSTANDING By SAMVEL BOLD Rector of Steeple Dorset Re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus Cic. de Fin. l. 3. LONDON Printed for A. and I. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row 1699. SOME CONSIDERATIONS On the Principal Objections and Arguments Which have been Publish'd against Mr. Lock 's Essay of Humane Vnderstanding § I. IT is no Disparagement I conceive to any Book nor an Attributing more to Mr. Lock 's Essay of Humane Understanding than it most justly deserves to say That Essay is a Book the best Adapted of any I know to serve the Interest of Truth Natural Moral and Divine And that it is the most Worthy most Noble and best Book I ever read excepting those which were writ by Persons Divinely inspir'd This excellent Treatise having been published several Years and received through all the Learned World with very great Approbation by those who understood English a mighty Out cry was at last all on the sudden raised against it here at Home There was no doubt some reason or other why so many hands should be employed just at the same time to Attack and Batter this Essay tho' what was the weighty consideration which put them all in motion may perhaps continue a long time a Secret Several Persons have discovered their Inclination to find fault with this Treatise by nibbling at several passages in it which it appears they did not understand and concerning which they have been at a loss how to express themselves Intelligibly Some have spoken handsomly of the Author others have treated that Incomparable Gentleman with a rudeness peculiar to some who make a Profession of the Christian Religion and seem to pride themselves in being of the Clergy of the Church of England But whatever Reputation may accrue to them on either of those accounts their Conduct doth not contribute any thing to the Honour either of the one or of the other § II. The principal Passages in this excellent Treatise which have been insisted on as faulty are these two First Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition This saith Mr. Lock we usually call Knowing or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition Essay of Humane Understanding B. 4. c. 6. § 3. Secondly We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any meer natural Being thinks or no it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respect of our Notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases super-add to our Idea of Matter a faculty of thinking than that he should super-add to it another substance with a faculty of thinking since we know not wherein thinking consists nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which cannot be in any created Being but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator Essay c. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. To which I will add the better to shew Mr. Lock ' s sense the following words which he immediately subjoyns on this occasion which those who have thought fit to excep● against what he says here have thought fit always to omit how fairly I will not say Mr. Lock ' s following words are For I see no contradiction in it that the first Eternal thinking Being or Omnipotent Spirit should if he pleased give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter put together as he thinks fit some degrees of sense perception and thought tho' as I think I have proved lib. 4. c. 10. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose Matter which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought should be that Eternal first thinking Being § III. Against the first passage viz. Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition There are two Charges exhibited First That the Proposi●ion is not true In consequence of which the way of Ideas is condemned as no way at all to Certainty or Knowledge and in opposition to the way of Ideas we are told That to argue or make Inferences from Maxims is the way to Knowledge or Certainty Secondly That the Proposition is inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith § IV. First It is said that the Proposition is not true Now in o●der to make a right determination whether the Proposition be true or no it may be ●it to consider in what the Truth of a Proposition doth consist For I suppose it will be allowed that our being certain of or knowing the Truth of a Proposition doth consist in our perceiving that wherein the truth of the P●oposition do●h consist otherwise we may know or be certain that a Proposition is true tho' it be not t●ue which carries such a sound with it I conceive few will be ambitious to grant it whatever way they take to attain to Certainty The truth of a Proposition consists in words being so put together in the Proposition as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for as really it is This Mr. Lock calls Certainty of Truth just before those words in his Book which are pretended to be fa●lty This passage I take for granted will be permitted to pass for true not only because no obj●ction hath been started against it after so strict a scrutiny to find out something from whence a colour might be taken to give the Book an ill Name but because otherwise it must be owned that a Proposition may be true tho' it is not true or tho' the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the terms which make up the Proposition is not such as the Proposi●ion doth express And if the truth of a Proposition doth consist in what hath been related it is most evident that our being certain of or knowing the truth of a Proposition must consist in our perceiving that the Ideas for which the words which make up the Proposition or of which the Proposition doth consist do stand do so agree or disag●ee as the Proposition doth express For there is no way by which we can attain to be certain or to know that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Proposition doth declare they do but by perceiving that they do so agree or disagree unless certainty or knowledge of the truth of Propositions may be had without perception or without perceiving the truth of what is expressed And if it may be had without perceving