have refused it took the fig telling Diogenes he had lost both his figg and his conceit Then throwing it up into the aire and catching it as boyes use to do O worthy Diogeâ—es said he and restored it He said to Learning three things are requisite Nature Institution Exercise Being told that one had reviled him When I am absent said he let him beat me too He said Beauty was a better recommendation then any Letter Others ascribe this to Diogenes adding that Arâ—stotle called beauty the gift of a specious â—orm He called Socrates a short-liv'd Tyranny Plato Natures Prerogative Theophrastus silent â—raud Theocriâ—us specious hurt Carneades a guardlesse Kingdome Being demanded what difference there is betwixt the learned and unlearned he answered as much as between the living and the dead He said Learning in prosperity is an ornament in adversity a refuge He said they who educated children well are more to be honoured then they who beget them for these only gave them life others well-living To one boasting of the greatnesse of his Country That saith he is â—ot to be considered but whether a man deserve to be of a great Country He said Friends are one soul in two bodies He said some men lived so sparingly as if they were to live alwaies others so prodigally as if they were to die to morrow To one that asked why we love the company of those that are fair That saith he is a question for a blind man to ask Being asked what he had gotten by Philosophy hee answer'd to do those things voluntarâ—ly which others do for fear of the Law Being demanded how Disciples should profit most he answer'd if they follow those that are before them and stay not for those behind them To a foolish talker who after a long Discourse said to him I am afraid I have been tedious to you not at all answer'd he for I did not mind you Being asked how we should behave our selves towards our Friends he answer'd as we would have them do towards us He said Iustice is the vertue of giving to every one according to his desert He said Learning was the best provision against old age He used as Phavorinus relateâ— in the second of his Commentaries to say frequently he who hath many friends hath none which is â—â—â—â—wise extant in the seventh book of his Ethicks 〈◊〉 said when things happen not as we would we must will as they happen Seeing a youth very self-conceited and withall ignorant young man saith he I wish I were what you think your self and my enemies what you are Seeing a young man proud of a fine Cloak why boast you saith he of a Sheeps Fleece He said they who demonstrate plain things light a candle to see the Sun Being reviled by an impudent person Thou saith he who art vers'd to bear all things speakest them with delight I who am not used to speak them take no delight in hearing them Being demanded why he who taught others to speak himselfe held his tongue a whetstone saith he cannot cut yet it sets an edge upon swords Being asked who can keep a secret He saith he that can hold a glowing coal in his mouth Seeing a young man very neatly dress'd are you not asham'd saith he when Nature made you a man to make your self a woman A handsome young man much courted said to him If I were hated of the Citizens as you are I would hang my self And I reply'd he would hang my self if I were lov'd by them as you are Being demanded how a man should come to be rich he answer'd by being poor in desire It repented him of three things that he had ever committed a secret to a Woman that he had rid when he might have gone a foot that he had lived one day not having his Will made CHAP. XI His will and Death FRom that speech of Aristotle last mentioned may be gathered how carefull he was to make his Will but more from the exact form thereof which was thus BE all well but if it happen otherwise thus Aristotle maketh his Will Be Antipater my sole Executor during the Minority of Nicanor Let Aristomenes Timarchus Hipparchus Dioteles and if he please and have leisure Theophrastus be Guardians of the children of Herpylis and all that I leave I will that my Daughter assoon as she shall be marriageable be given Nicanor for Wife If any thing happen otherwise which God forbid before she be married or after she be married before she hath any Children let Nicanor have the ordering of my Sonne and the disposall of all other things for his reputation and mine Let therefore Nicanor take care of the Maid Pythais and my Son Nicomachus and order their Estates according to their condition as a Father and a Brother If in the mean time any thing shall happen to Nicanor which God forbid either before my Daughter be married or if married before she hath any Children if he make any Will as he appointeth so let it be Otherwise if Theophrastus approve of it let him marry the Maid and have the same power that Nicanor should have had Otherwise let the Estates as well of the Maid as the Boy be disposed with the joint consent of the Guardians and Antipater as they shall think fit Let likewise the Executors of Nicanor take care to remember us and Herpylis since that she hath been faithfull to me and if she will take a husband that such a one be given unto her as may be no disparagement unto us Let them give her out of my Estate besides what is already mentioned a Talent of Silver three Maid-servants if shee so please and the handmaid which she hath and the boy Pyrrhaeus And moreover if she will dwell at Chalcis let her have that habitation which joyneth to the Garden if at Stagira our Patrimoniall seat which howsoever Herpylis shall choose let the Executors furnish it as they shall think convenient and proper for Herpylis Let likewise Nicanor take charge of the Boy Mirmax that he may be restored honourably as becommeth us unto his own with all his goods which we delivered to our Trust. Let likewise Ambracis be a free woman and have bestowed upon her at her marriage fifty Drachmes and the Girle which she hath I will likewise that to Thales be given besides the Handmaid he hath bought a thousand Drachmes and another Handmaid Likewise to Simo besides that money which he hath already received to buy a Servant let another Servant be bought or the like Sum be given again wherewith he may purchase one As soon as my Daughter shall be married let Tycho Philo Olympias and his Son be free men Of those boyes which served me let none be sold but let my Heirs make use of their service and when they come to age as they deserve let them be manumitted Let the Executors take care to those Statues of
key-hole I shewed them how desperately ill I was and bespoke them to come on the morrow to the funerall of Pherecydes There was another of this name of the same Island an Astrologer there are more mentioned by Suidas FINIS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Second Part. Containing the Ionick Philosophers LONDON Printed for Humphrey Moseley and are to be sold at his Shop at the Princes Armes in St. Pauls Church-yard and by Thomas Dring at the George in Fleetstreet neere Cliffords Inne 1655. ANAXIMANDER CHAP. I. Of his life PHilosophy had a twofold beginning one from Anaximander another from Pythagoras Anaximander was Disciple to Thales whence that Philosophy was called Ionick Thales being an Jonian for he was of Miletus Pythagoras was Disciple to Pherecydes that king of Philosophy called from the place where he taught Italick Thales was succeeded by Anaximander Anaximander by Anaximenes Anaximenes by Anaxagoras Anaxagoras by Arceolans in whom as Plutarch Laertius and others affirm it ended Socrates the scholer of Archelans introducing Morality Anaximander a Milesian â—ountryman companion and Kinsman of Thales was his Disciple also and successor in the propagation of his Doctrine son of Praxiades corruptly called by some Praxidamus born the third year of the 42 Olympiad He flourished most in the time of Polycrates Tyrant of Samos He demonstrated the compendium of Geometry being next Homer the first Master of that science hee first set forth a Geographick table of which Laertius is to be understood who affirms he designed the circumference of the Sea and land In the 50. Olympiad he found out the obliquity of the Zodiack that is saith Pliny he opened the gates of things He invented the Gnomon set up the first in an open place at Lacedaemon He found out the Aequinoctiall Solstices and Horologies He framed Horoscopes to denote the Tropicks and Aequinoxes whence Salmasius conceives the use of his diall was onely to delineate the Tropick and Aequinoctiall points that they did not serve to distinguish the hours or twelve parts of the day he proveth because the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that sence or the division of the day into twelve equall parts was not known a long time after He advised the Lacedaemonians to quit their City and houses and to lie armed in the open field foretelling an Earthquake which threw down the whole City and tore away piece of the Mountain Taygetus As he sung the boyes used to deride him whereupon hee said we must learn to sing better for the boyes Of his Auditors are remembred Anaximenes and Parmenides Of his writings these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of Nature This treatise perhaps Laertius meanes who saith he digested his opinions into Commentaries which Book fell into the hands of Apollodorus the Athenian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Sphear with other things He was according to Apollodorus 64 years old the second yeare of the 58. Olympiad and died soon after CHAP. 2. Of his Opinions Sect. 1. That Infinity is the principle of all things THales saith Cicero who held that all things consist of water could not perswade his Countryman and Companion Anaximander thereto for he asserted That infinity is that whereof all things were made or according to Plutarch Laertius and Iustine Martyr that it is the principle and element of things for these two he confounded as was observ'd of his Master Thales but not declared what this infinity is whether Air Water Earth or any other body for which condemned by Plutarch That it is one infinite in magnitude not number whence Aristotle reprehends him for imagining contrarieties can proceed from the same principle That it is for that reason infinite that it may not fail That the parts thereof are changed the whole is immutable Symplicius saith moveable That out of it all things proceed and resolve into it That there are infinite worlds generated which corrupt into that whereof they were generated Sect. 2. Of the Heavens HIs opinion according to Cicero was that the Gods are native having a beginning rising and setting by long intervalls and that there are innumerable worlds This Plutarch and Stobaeus apply to the Heavens and Stars But how can we addes Cicero understand a God that is not eternall That Heaven consists of cold and heat mixed That the starrs are globous instances consisting of air full of fire respiring flames at some certain part moved by the circles and sphears wherein they inhere which assertion Aristotle borrowed from hence That the Sun is seated highest the moon next then the sixed starres and Planets That the circle of the Sun is 28. times Theodoret saith 27. greater then the earth having a hollow circle about it like a Chariot wheel full of fire in one part whereof there is a mouth at which the fire is seen as out of the hole of a â—lute which is the Sun equall in bignesse with the Earth That the cause of the Sunn's Eclipse is the stopping that hole in the midst out of which the fire issues That the circle of the Moon is 29. times greater then the Earth like a Chariot wheel having a hollow or be in the midst full of fire like the Sun and oblique breathing fire out at one part as out of a tunnel That the Eclipse of the Moon happens according to her conversions when the mouth out of which the â—ire issueth is stopped That the Mooon hath a light of her own but very thin that she shineth in the light she borroweth from the Sun which two assertions are so far from being inconsistent that it is the common opinion â— both are true Sect. 3. Of Meteors THat wind is a fluxion of the air when the most subtle and liquid parts thereof are either stirr'd or resolved by the Sun That Thunders lightnings presters and whirlewinds are caused by the wind enclosed in a thick cloud which by reason of its lightnesse breaketh forth violently the rupture of the cloud maketh a crack and the divulsion by reason of the blacknesse causeth a slashing light Seneca more expressely He ascribed all to wind Thunder saith he is the sound of a breaking cloud why unequall because the breakings are unequall Why doth it thunder in a clear day Because even then the wind breaks through the thick and dry air Why sometimes doth it thunder and not lighten Because the thinner and weaker spirit is able to make a flame but not a sound What is lightning The agitation of the air severing it self and rushing down disclosing a faint fire What is Thunder The motion of a piercing thick spirit All things are so ordered that some influence descend from the Aether upon inferiour things so fire sounds forced upon cold clouds When it breaks them
servant being upon a journey weary with carrying of mony throw away saith he what is too much and carry as much as you can He bad his slaves away his mony throw Because ore-charg'd with weight they went too slow Being at Sea and understanding the owners of the Vessell were Pirats he took his Mony and counted it then let it fall into the Sea as unwillingly and sighed some affirm that he said It is better these perish for Aristippus then Aristippus for them He reproved men for looking upon goods exposed to sale and taking no care to furnish their minds Others ascribe this to Diogenes Living in Asia he was seized by Antaphernes the King's Lievtenant whereupon one saying to him And where is now your confidence When said he you fool should I be confident if not now when I shall meet with Antaphernes Those who forsook Philosophy to apply themselves to Mechanicall Sciences he compared to the Suitors of Penelope they could get the good wills of Melantho Polydora and others of the servants but could not obtain the Mistress in Marriage Not unlike is that of Aristo who said that Ulysses when he went to Hell saw all the dead and spoke to them but could not come so much as to the sight of the Queen Being demanded what Boyes ought to learn That saith he which they ought to practice when they are men To one who accused him for going from Socrates to Dionysius To Socrates saith he I went for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 education to Dionysius for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 recreation To a Curtezan who told him she was with child by him You know that no more said he then if passing through a bush you should say this thorn pricked you To one who blamed him that he took Mony of Dionysius Plato a Book he answered I want Mony Plato Books Having lost a great Farm he said to one who seemed excessively to compassionate his losse You have but one field I have three left why should not I rather grieve for you It is madnesse addes Plutarch to lament for what is lost and not rejoyce for what is left When one told him the land is lost for your sake Better saith he is it that the land be lost for me then I for the land Seeing one angry vent his passion in words Let us not saith he suit words to our anger but appease our anger with words Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair This saith he is a little evill but a great beauty They who invert these words and read a little fair one but great evill mistake the meaning of Aristippus who plaies upon that ordinary saying applying the inversion to his own luxurious humour To one who demanded his advice whether he should marry or no he said no If you take a fair a wife saith he she will be common if foul a fury He used to advise young men to carry such provision as in a shipwrack they might swim away withall As a shoo that is too big is unsit for use so is a great estate the bignesse of the shoe troubles the wearer wealth may be used upon occasion either wholly or in part CHAP. VIII His writings SOme affirme of whom is Soâ—icrates that he wrot nothing at all others that he wrot The Lybian History three Books dedicated to Dionysius Dialogues twenty five or rather twenty three for the number seemes corrupt in one Book some in the Attick dialect others in the Dorick their Titles these 1. Artabazus 2. To the shirwrackt 3. To Exiles 4. To a poor man 5. To Lais. 6. To Porus. 7. To Lais concerning a Looking-glass 8. Hermias 9. The Dream 10. To the Cup-bearer 11. Philomelus 12. To servants 13. To those who reproved him for using old wine and common women 14. To those who reproved him for feasting 15. An Epistle to Arete 16. To the Olympick exerciser 17. An Interrogation 18. Another Interrogation 19. A Chria to Dionysius 20. Another on an image 21. Another on Dionysius his Daughter 22. To one who conceived himselfe dishonoured 23. To one who endeavoured to give advice Exercitations â—ix Bookes Of pleasure mention'd by Laertius in the life of Epicure Of Physiology ont of which Laertius cites that Pythagoras was so named because he spake no less truth then Pythius Of the luxury of the Antients four Books containing examples of those who indulged to love and pleasure as the love of Empedocles to Pausanias in the first Book of Cratea to her son Periander of Aristotle to the Concubine of Hermias in the fourth of Socrates to Alcibiades Xenophon to Clinias plato to Aster Xenocrates to Polemo But these latter instances show that these Books were not write by this Aristippus Epistles four are extant under his name in the Socratick col lection put forth by Leo Allatius Socion and Panaetius reckon his treatises thus Of discipline Of vertue an Exhortation Artabazus The shipwrackt The banish'd Exercitations six Chria three To Lais. To Porus. To Socrates Of Fortune CHAP. VIII His death HAving lived long with Dionysius at last his daughter Arete sent to him to desire him that he would come to Cyrene to her to order her affairs for that she was in danger of oppression by the Magistrates Aristippus hereupon took leave of Dionysius and being on his voyage fell sick by the way and was forced to put in at Lipara an Aeolian Island where he dyed as may be gathered from this Epistle which he then sent to his Daughter Aristippus to Arete I Received your Letter by Teleus Wherein you desire me to make all possible hast to Cyrenc because your businesse with the Praefects goeth not to your minde and your Husband is unsit to manage your domestick affairs by reason of his bashsulness and being accustomed to a retirâ—â— life remote from the publick Wherefore assoon as I got leave of Dionysius I sailed towards you and being upon my journey fell sick by the way at Lipara where the friends of Sonicus provide carefully for me with such humanity as is needfull for one neer death As for your demand what respect you should give those whom I manumised who prosess they will never desert Aristippus whilst they have strength but ever serve him and you trust them in all things they have learned from me not to be salfe For your selfe I advise you to apply your selfe to the Magistrates which counsell will proâ—it you if you affect not rather to have much You will live most at ease if you contemn excess for they cannot be so unjust as to leave you in want You have two Orchards left sufficient to maintain you plentifully and that possession in Bernicia if alone left you were sufficiâ—nt to supply you fully I do not counsell you to neglect small things â— but not to be troubled for small things since vexation is not good even for great If when I am dead
Ephippus in Naufrago objects to Plato and some friends of his that corrupted with money they detracted from many persons that they went proudly habited and they took more care of their outward beauty then the most luxurious See Athenaeus lib. 11. CHAP. XV. His Writings THE writings of Plato are by way of Dialogue of the Invention of Dialogue we have already spoken now of the Nature thereof A Dialogue is composed of puestions and answers Philosophical or Politicall aptly expressing the Characters of those persons that are the speakers in an elegant stile Dialectick is the art of discourse whereby we confirm or confute any thing by questions and answers of the disputants Of Platonick discourse there are two kinds Hyphegetick and Exegetick subscribed thus Hyphegetick Theoretick Logick Physick Practick Ethick Politick Exegetick Gymnastick Majeutick Physick Agonistick Endeitick Anatreptick we know where there are other divisions of Dialogues as into dramatick Narrative mixt but that division is more proper to Tragedy then to Philosophy Of Plato's Dialogues are Physick Timaeus Logick The Politick Cratylus Parmenides The Sophist Ethick Apology of Socrates Crito Phaedo Phaedrus Symposium Menexemus Clitophon Epistles Philebus Hipparchus The Rivalls Politick The Common-wealth The Lawes Minos Epinomis The Atlantick Maieutick Alcibiades Theages Lysis Laches Pirastick Euthyphron Menon Ion. Charmides Theaetetus Endeictick Protagoras Anatreptick Euthydemus Hippias 1. Hippias 2. Gorgias 1. Gorgias 2. It being much controverted continueth Laertius whether Plato doth dogmatize some affirming others denying it it will be necessary to say somthing thereupon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to dogmatise is to impose a Doctrine as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to impose a Law A Doctrine is taken two waies either â—or that which is Decreed or the Decree it self That which is Decreed is a proposition the Decree it self an imposition Plato expounds those things which he conceiveth true Confutes those which are false suspends his opinion in those which are doubtfull He asserts what he conceiveth true under one of these four persons Socrates Timaeus an Athenian Guest an Aelian Guest The Guests are not as some conceive Plato and Parmenides but imagined namelesse persons as what Socrates Timaeus speak are the Decrees of Plato Those whom he argueth of falsehood are Thrasymachâ—s Callicles Polus Gorgias Protagoras Hippias Euthydemus and the like In Argument he often used induction of both Sorts Induction is a discourse which from certain truths Collects and inferreth a truth like to those Of Induction there are two kinds one from Contraries another from Consequents From Contraries as when he who is questioned answereth in all things contrary to himself as thus My Father is either the same with yours or not the same if therefore thy Father be not the same with mine he is not my Father and again if a man be not a living creature he is stone wood or the like but he is neither stone nor wood for he hath a soul and moveth himselfe therefore he is a living creature if a living creature a dog and an Ox. This kind of induction by contraries serves not for assertion but confutation Induction by consequents is two-fold one when a singular being sought is concluded from a singular the first proper to Oratours the second to Logicians as in the first the question is Whether such an one were a murtherer it is proved from his being bloody at the same time This induction is Rhetoricall for Rhetorick is conversant in Singulars not in universalls it inquireth not after justice but after the severall parts thereof the other is Dialectick whereby Universalls are concluded from Singulars as in this question Whether the Soule be immortall and whether the living are of the dead which is demonstrated in his Book of the Soul by a generall Maxime that contraries proceed from contraries this being generall is proved by singulars as waking succeeds sleeping the greater the lesser and so on the contrary Thus he useth to confirm what he asserts Thrasylus saith he published his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogie His genuine Dialogues are fiftie six his Common-wealth divided into ten they make nine Tetralogies reckoning his Commonwealth one Book his Lawes another The first Tetralogie hath a common subject declaring what is the proper life of a Philosopher every Book hath a two-fold title one from the principall person the other from the subject The first Euthyphron or of Piety Pirastick Socrates his Apologie Ethick Crito or of that which is to be done Ethick Phaedo or of the soul Ethick The second Cratylus or of right naming Logick Theaetetus or of Science Pirastick The Sophist or of Ens Logick The Politick or of a Kingdome Logick The third Parmenides or of Idaea's Logick Philebus or of Pleasure Ethick The Symposium or of Goodâ—Ethick Phaedrus or of Love Ethick The fourth Alcibiades 1. or of human Nature Majeutick Alcibiades 2. or of Prayer Majeutick Hipparchus or the Covetous Ethick The Rivalls or of Philosophy Ethick The fift Theages or of Philosophy Majeutick Charmides or of Temperance Pirastick Laches or of Fortitude Majeutick Lysis or of Friendship Majeutick The sixt Euthydemus or the Litigious Anatreptick Protagoras or the Sophist Endeictick Gorgias or of Rhetorick Aâ—atreptick Menon or of Vertue Pirastick The seventh Hippias first or of Honest Anatreptick Hippias second or of Falâ—â— Anatreptick Io or of Ilias Pirastick Menexenus or the funerall Oration Ethick The eight Clitophon or the Exhortation Morall The Commonwealth or of Just Politick Timaeus or of Nature Physick Critias or the Atlantick Ethick The ninth Minos or of Law Politick Lawes or of Legislation Politick Epinomis or the Nocturnall convention or the Philosophers Politick Epistles thirteen Ethick in the inscriptions whereof he useth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cleon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Aristodemus one to Architas two to Dionysius foure to Hermias Erastus and Coriscus one to Leodamas one to Dion one to Dions friends two Thus Thrasilaus Others of whom is Aristophanes the Grammarian reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies placing in The first The Common-wealth Timaeus Critias The second The Sophister The Politick Cratylus The third Lawes Minos Epinomis The fourth Theaetetus Euthyphron Apology The fift Crito Phaedo Epistles The rest single without order Some as we said begin with Alcibiades major others from Theages others from Euthyphron others from Clitiphon others from Timaeus others from Phaedrus which they say was the first Dialogue he wrot as the subject it selfe seemeth to confirme which savours of youth and therefore Dicearchus condemnes it as too light to which censure Cicero agreeth as conceiving he ascribeth too great a power to Love others begin with Theaetetus many with his Apologie He mentions not himselfe in all his writings except once in his Phaedo and another time in his Apologie for Socrates At the recitall of his Phaedo all but Aristotle rose and went away The efficacy of that Dialogue which treats of the immortality of the Soule is evident from Cleombrotus of Ambracia
weak man both are dishonest but to do wrong is worse by how much it is more dishonest It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished as that a sick man should be cured by a Physician for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passions it is necessary that we define passion Passion is an irrationall motion of the Soul arising out of some good or ill it is called an irrationall motion because neither judgments nor opinions are passions but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul For in the irrationall part of the Soul there are motions which though they are done by us are yet nothing the more in our power They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will for somtimes it falleth out that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing expetible nor avoidable yet we are drawn by them which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise In the definition is added arising from some good or some ill because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these no passion is ever excited in us All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill If we see good present we rejoice if future we desire On the conrrary if ill be present we grieve if imminent we fear The simple affections and as it were elements of the rest are two Pleasure and Grief the rest consist of these Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions for he who feareth is not wholly deprived of pleasure nor can a man live the least moment who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow and therefore he who feareth sorroweth But he who desireth like all those who desire or expect somthing is delighted insomuch as he is not absolutely confident and hath not a firm hope he is grieved And if desire and fear are not principall passions it will doubtlesse follow that none of the other affections are simple as anger love emulation and the like for in these Pleasure and Grief are manifest as consisting of them Moreover of Passions some are rough others mild the mild are those which are naturally in men and if kept within their bounds are necessary and proper to man if they exceed vitious Such are Pleasure Grief Anger Pitty Modesty for it is proper to man to delight in those things which are according to Nature and to be grieved at their contraries Anger is necessary to repell and punish an injury Mercy agreeth with Humanity Modesty teacheth us to decline sordid things Other passions are rough and praeternaturall arising from some depraved or perverse custom Such are excessive laughter joy in the misfortunes of others hatred of Mankind These whether intense or remisse after what manner soever they are are alwaies erroneous and admit not any laudable mediocrity As concerning Pleasure and Grief Plato writeth thus These passions are excited in us by Nature Grief and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief not moved by either in which state we live longest He asserteth severall kinds of Pleasure whereof some relate to the Body others to the Soul Again of Pleasures some are mix'd with grief some are pure Again some proceed from the remembrance of things past others from hope of things to come Again some are dishonest as being intemperate and unjust others moderate and joyned with good as joy for good things and the Pleasure that followeth Vertue Now because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a good that being to be accounted poor and of no value which is raised out of another and hath not a principall primary essence For Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief and is joyned with it which could not be if one were simply good the other simply ill CHAP. XXXIII Of the formes of Common-wealths OF the formes of Common-wealth some are supposed only and conceived by abstract from the rest These he delivers in his book of a Commonwealth wherein he describeth the first concordant the second discordant enquiring which of these is the most excellent and how they may be constituted He also divideth a Commonwealth like the Soul into three parts Keepers Defenders and Artisicers The office of the first is to Counsel to advise to command of the second to defend the Commonwealth upon occasion by armes which answereth to the irascible power To the last belong Arts and other services He will have Princes to be Philosophers and to contemplate the first good affirming that so only they shall govern rightly For Mankind can never be freed from ill unlesse either Philosophers govern or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a divine manner A Commonwealth is then governed best and according to Justice when each part of the City performeth its proper Office So that the Princes give Laws to the People the Defenders obey them and sight for them the rest willingly submit to their Superiours Of a Commonwealth he asserteth five kinds the first Aristocracy when the best rule the second Timocracy when the ambitious the third Democracy when the people the fourth Oligarchy when a few the last Tyranny which is the worst of all He describeth likewise other supposed formes of Common-wealth as that in his Book of Laws and that which reformeth others in his Epistles which he useth for those Cities that in his Books of Laws he saith are sick These have a distinct place and select men out of every age as according to the diversity of their nature and place they require different institution education and armes The Maritime people are to study Navigation and Sea-sight the Iland fighting on foot those in mountanous Countries to use light armour those on the shore heavy Some of these to exercise fighting on horseback In this City he alloweth not a Community of women Thus is Politick a Verue conversant both in Action and Contemplation the end wherof is to constitute a City good happy and convenient to it self It considers a great many things amongst the rest whether War be to be waged or not CHAP. XXXIV Of a Sophist HItherto we have spoken of a Philosopher from whom a Sophist differeth In Manners because he teacheth young men for gain and desireth rather to seem then to be good In matter for a Philosopher is conversant in those things which alwaies are and continually remain in the same manner but a Sophist in that which is not for which reason he seeketh darknesse that he may not be known to be what
Theologie though there be not any invention of his extant yet he perfectly went through all the parts thereof For he was not only acquainted as some falsely imagine with terrestriall things and those which belong to this World but even with those things which are above this World as may appear from the eight book of his Physick where he saith that the first cause is not subject to motion neither in it selâ—e nor by accident in which words he declareth that God is not a body nor any way passible And in his 12th book of Wisdome or Metaphysicks he discourseth accurately of God and Intelligences in a rationall clear way not inâ—olv'd in Fables or Pythagoricall Symbols but founding his assertion upon reason and demonstration as much as the subject and human reason alloweth Patricius labours much to prove that whatsoever he had in this kind excellent he borrow'd from Hermes Trismegistus But as we have already said Mr. Casaubon hath fully evinâ—'d that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later writer What is added by the antient Latine Interpreter concerning Aristotle's sentence of that visuall Hexagonall Pyramid which a learned person hath observed to be chosen as a midle way betwixt the sentence of those who made the optick penicill a pyramid of a quadratick base and those who made it of a Conick figure is very obsâ—ure and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author CHAP. VIII His correspondence with Alexander WHilst Aristotle taught Philosophy at Athens his Disciple Alexander was employed in an Expedition to Asia against Darius King of Persia incited thereunto by the principles of Honour which were infused into him by Aristotle particularly from the Presidents of Achilles Ajax and other Heroes celebrated by Homer whose Iliads Aristotle had so câ—refully recommâ—nded unto him He began this expedition in the third year of the 11th Olympiad at which time Ctesicles was Archon at Athens immediately after the departure of Aristotle who it is probable came only for this reason from him as preferring a quiet and studious life before the troubles of War The first thing that Alexander did was to visit the Tombe of Achilles in the Sigaeum at the sight whereof he broke forth into these words O fortunate young man that hadst a Homer to celebrate thy praise â— for had it not been for his Iliads addes Cicero in the same Tombe where Achilles's his body lay his name also would have been buried He took with him the Iliads of Homer corrected by Aristotle and made it his constant companion insomuch that hee put it every night with his dagger under his pillow And in a Victory over Darius having taken a Casket of Unguents of extraordinary value amongst the spoiles of Darius beset with Pearles and precious stones as Pliny describes it his friends telling him how many uses it might be put to because Unguents did not become a Souldier Yes saith he it shall serve to keep the Books of Homer that the most precious work may be kept in the richest case hence was this correct copy called as Plutarch saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whilst he was in Asia engaged in the Warrs against Darius in the midst of his continuall Victories and businesse hearing that Aristotle had published his Acroatick books of naturall Philosophy he sent this Letter to him Alexander to Aristotle Health YOu have not done well in publishing your Acroatick discourses for wherein shall we excell others if this Learning wheriâ— we have been instituted be made common to all As for me I had rather excell others in knowledge then in power Farewell To which Aristotle returned this answer Aristotle to Alexander health YOu wrote to me concerning my Acroatick Discourses that they ought not to have been communicated but kept secret Know that they are made publick and not publick for none but they who have heard us can understand them Farewel Thus notwithstanding Alexander were busied in the Warres yet he forgot not his Master Aristotle but kept a friendly correspondence with him So constant was he in his love to Learning and particularly so much enflam'd as Pliny saith with a curious desire of understanding the natures of living Creatures that he sent thousands of men throughout all Asia and Greece to procure all kinds of living Creatures birds beasts and fishes at an excessive charge Athenaeus saith 800. Talents which according to Budaeus's account is 840000 crowns these men he sent with what they took to Aristotle that he might not be ignorant of any thing that any Nation afforded by which information he composed as Pliny affirmeth 50. excellent Volumes of Liâ—ing Creatures of which ten are only left unlesse we put into the same number those Books of his which have some near relation to this subject as Of the going of living Creatures 1. Of the parts of living Creatures and their causes 4. Of the Generation of living Creatures 5. If this were done by Alexander as Pliny and Athenaeus attest though Aelian ascribe it to Philip it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his Asiatick expedition For Aristotle as hath been already proved staid but a very short time with him after the death of his Father Aristotle made the same use of this correspondence with Alexander as he had done of the Interest he before had with Philip the advantage not only of particular person but of whole Cities This City of Stagira the place of his Birth did acknowledge which at the suit of Aristotle Alexander caused to be reedified and repeopled and restored to its former state having before by Philip been laid levell with the ground For though Plutarch relate this as done in the time of Philip Laertius Ammonius Dion Chrysostome Aelian and others hold that it was done by Alexander to which Valerius Maximus addes that it was not long before Aristotles death In memory of which Benefit the people of Stagira used to celebrate a yearly Festivall which they called the Aristotelean Feast naming the month in which it fell Stagirites Erestus likewise the Country of Theopâ—rastus which Alexander determined to punish very severely by the mediation of Aristotle was pardoned That he benefited many particular persons is evident saith Ammonius from his Epistles to the King yet extant wherein he recommends severall persons to him Hence it is manifest that the Author of his life is mistaken when he affirmes that in Alexanders Asiatick expedition Aristotle accompanyed him to the Brachmanes where he writ that noble piece of the Lawes and institutions of 255 Cities That likewise he travelled over all Persia with Alexander where during the War Alexander died and Aristotle returned into his own Country This relation agrees not with the other circumstances of Aristotles life Alexander died in the fourth year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad two years before Aristotle's departure from Athens But as it is apparent that this mistake
in a storme All Fortune apt to desert us is the true scope which they propose to themselves who war on do unjustly or comply dishonestly only the clearnesse of Vertuous persons is not unacquainted with the instability of Fortune but by reason sustaining all accidents and being as Plato saith above them they are never disordered Take heed therefore of the rapid motion of things look upon them as a Circle which reverts into it self cast up the accounts of life for chance imposeth many things upon life and maketh our inclinations follow it Pardon those that offend ignorantly be ready to acquite those that do good This if you perform not once but continually your Court will be secure from all danger This considering the greatnesse of the things I have said is but little but considering the person to whom I write All. To Alexander 4. I Am in doubt how to begin for upon whatsoever I reflect all seems great and wonderfull nor fit to be forgotten but proper for remembrance and exhortation not to be defaced by Time Good precepts and exhortations of Masters have Eternity for their Spectator Endeavour to make use of your power not to oppresse but to oblige others then which nothing can bee greater in Man's life Mortall Nature which often yieldeth and is overcome by Fate obtaineth eternall memory by the greatnesse of such works Consider this well you are not unreasonable as some are who think good advice ridiculous Your descent is honourable your Kingdome hereditary your Learning sound your glory admirable and as much as you exceed others in the Goods of Fortune so ought you to be excellent amongst the good in Vertue In fine do that which is profitable and finish what you designe To Theophrastus 5. A Sudden Injury is better then a slow benefit for the remembrance and harme of that lasts but a little while but this groweth old as if it hated to build a work to perpetuity and many times deferring what we intend to bestow upon another he meets with a calm else-where which allaies the tempest of his mind Wherefore I say mutuall society ought not onely to do no wrong but if any be received to be ready to forgive it for perhaps to do no wrong is above the power of Man As for him who hath erred to make use of reproof is the property of a good well-seated Judgement THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE THE First PART CHAP. I. Of Philosophy in generall and particularly of DIALECTICK THE Philosophy of Aristotle is well known many abstracts thereof have been published many are read daly in Universities by publick Professours yet will it be requisite to our designe to give a short account thereof that it may appear wherein the doctrine and method of the Peripateticks is different from that of the Academicks and Stoicks Philosophy according to Aristotle is two-fold Practick and Theorelick To the Practick belongs Ethick and Politick this concerning the well ordering of a City that of a House To the Theoretick belongs Physick and Logick but Logick is not properly a part thereof but a most expedient Iâ—strument Of Logick he asserted two ends probable and true for each he makes use of two faculties Dialectick and Rhetorick for the probable Analytick and Philosophy for the true omitting nothing towards Invention Iudgment and Use. For Invention his Topicks and Methodicks afford a plentifull supply out of which may be taken problems for probable arguments For Iudgment his first and second Analyticks in the first propositions are examined in the second he treats exactly of their composition and the â—orm of Syllogisme To Use belongs his Agonisticks and his Books concerning Interrogation and his Eristicks and his Sophistick Elenchs and of Syllogismes and the like Hitherto Laertius Of his Logick we have only these books remaining Of Categories of Interrogation Analyticks Topicks and Soâ—histick Elenchs The first considers simple terms The second Propositions The rest Syllogismes Demonstrative Dialectick and Sophistick The Categories are placed first by the generall consent of all Interpreters neither is it to be doubted but that the rest are disposed according to the genuine method of Aristotle For in the beginning of his Analyticks he saith We must speak of Syllogism before we come to speak of Demonstration because Syllogisme is the more generall And in his Elenchs Of Didascalick and demonstrative Syllogismes we have spoken already in the Analyticks of the Dialectick and Pirastick in the book immediately preceding these We come not to speak of the Agonistick and Eristick CHAP. II. Of Termes TErmes are of three kindes Homonymous Synonymous and Paronymous Homonymous whose name only is common their essence divers Synonymous whose name and definition are common to either Paronymous have denomination from the same thing but differ in case or termination Synonymous or Univocall termes are reduced to ten generall heads called Categories 1. Substance of two kinds First which is most properly substance is neither praedicated of nor inherent in a subject Second substances are species and genus's which subsist in the first The properties of first-substances are 1. Neither to be in nor praedicated of a subject 2. To be all substances equally 3. To signifie this particular thing 4. To have no contrary 5. To admit no degrees of more or lesse 6. To be susceptible of contraries 2. Quantity of two kinds Discrete as Number Continuous as a Line Their properties 1. To have no contraries 2. To admit no degrees of more or lesse 3. To denominate things equall or unequall 3. Relatives whose whole being is in some manner affected towards one another their properties 1. To have contraries as Father and Son 2. To admit degrees of more and lesse as in kindred 3. To follow one another mutually 4. To be naturally together 4. Quality from which things are denominated qualited it hath foure kinds 1. Habit and disposition 2. Naturall power and impotence 3. Passible qualities and passions 4. Form and figure The properties 1. To have contraries as black and white 2. To admit intension or remission 3. To denominate things like or unlike 5. Action 6. Passion Their properties are to admit contraries to admit degrees of intension and remission 7. When. 8. Where 9. Position 10. Habit. These admit not contraries nor degrees of intension or remission Of those which cannot be reduced to any certain Category are 1. Opposites 2. Precedents 3. Coaequals 4. Motion 5. Possession Of Opposites there are foure kinds Relatives Contraries extreams in the same kinde as black and white Privatives as privation and habit light and darknesse Contradictories which affirm and deny as learned not learned CHAP. III. Of Proposition VOice is a signe of the notions of the minde as in the minde are two kinds of Intellection one simple expert of truth and falsitie the other either true or false So in voice some is simple some complexe A noun is a voice signifying according to institution whereof
wherefore they are as Zeno saith inseparable connexed to one another as Chrysippus Apollodorus and Hecaton affirm He who hath one hath all saith Chrysippus and he who doth according to one doth according to all He who hath vertue is not only contemplative but also practick of those things which are to be done Things which are to be done are either expetible tolerable distributible or retainable so that whosoever doth one thing wisely doth another justly another constantly another temperately and so is both wise magnanimous just and temperate Notwithstanding these vertues differ from one another by their heads For the heads of prudence are to contemplate and do well that which is to be done in the first place and in the second to contemplate what things are to be avoided as obstructive to that which is to be done The proper head of temperance is to compose our own appetites in the first place and to consider them in the second those under the subordinate vertues as being obstructive and divertive of appetites The heads of Fortitude 〈◊〉 the first place to consider all that we are to undergo in the second other subordinate vertues The heads of justice are in the first place to consider what every one deserves in the second the rest For all vertues consider the things that belong to all and the subordinate to one another Whence Panaetius saith it is in vertue as in many Archers who shoot at one mark distinguished by divers colours every one aims at the mark but one proposes to himselfe the white line another the black and so of the rest For as these place their ultimat end in hitting the mark but every one proposes to himselfe a severall manner of hitting so all vertues have Beatitude which is placed conformably to nature for their end but severall persons pursue it severall waies As vertues are inseparable so are they the same substantially with the supream part of the soul in which respect all vertue is said to be a body for the Intellect and Soul are a body for the soul is a warm spirit innate in us Therefore our soul is a living creature for it hath life and sence especially the supream part thereof called the Intellect Wherefore all vertue is a living creature because it is essentially the Intellect And therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for that expression is consequent to this assertion Between vertue and vice there is no medium contrary to the Peripateticks who assert a mean progression betwixt vertue and vice for all men have a naturall appetite to good and as a stick is either straight or crooked so man must be either just or unjust but cannot be either more or lesse just or unjust That vertue may be learned is asserted by Chrysippus in his first book of the End and by Cleanthes and Possidonius in his Exhortations and Hecaton because men of bad are made good That it may be lost is likewise affirmed by Câ—rysippus deny'd by Cleanthes The first â—aith it may be lost by drunkennesse or madnesse the other that it cannot be lost by reason of the firm comprehensions of the soul. Vertue is in it selfe vertue and not for hope or fear of any externall thing It is expetible in it selfe for which reason when we do any thing amisse we are ashamed as knowing that only to be good which is honest In vertue consisteth Felicity for the end of vertue is to live convenient to nature Every vertue is able to make a man live convenient to nature for man hath naturall inclinations for the finding out of Offices for the composure of Appetites for tolerance and distribution Vertue therefore is selfe-sufficient to Beatitude as Zeno Chrysippus and Hecaton assert For if â—aith he magnanimity as conceiving all things to be below it selfe is selfe-sufficient and that be a part of vertue vertue it selfe which despiseth all things that obstruct her must also be selfe-sufficient to Beatitude But Panaetius and Possidonius deny that vertue is selfe-sufficient affirming that it requireth the assistance of health strength and necessaries yet they hold that vertue is alwaies used as Cleanthes affirms for it cannot be lost and is alwaies practised by a perfect minde which is good Justice is not by nature but by prescription as law and right reason Thus Chrysippus in his book of honest Vertue hath many attributes it is called 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good because it leadeth us to right life 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is approved without any controversy as being most excellent 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is worthy of much study 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it may justly be praised 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it inviteth those who desire it 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it conduceth to goodnesse of life 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is usefull 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is rightly expetible 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because being present it profiteth being absent it it doth not 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it hath an use that exceeds the labour 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it takes away all want 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it is common in use and extendeth to all the uses of life CHAP. X. Of the End THe end is that for whose sake all offices are done but it self is not done for the sake of any or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred it selfe is referred to nothing The end is taken three waies First for the finall good which consisteth in rationall conversation Secondly for the scope which is convenient life in relation thereto Lastly for the ultimate of expetibles unto which all the rest are referred Scope and end differ for scope is the proposed body which they who pursue Beatitude aim at Felicity is proposed as the scope but the end is the attainment of that felicity If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing he must do all things that he may take his aim aright and yet so as to do all things whereby he may hit So when we say it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature we imply in like manner he must do all things necessary to taking aim and all things likewise to the hitting of the mark but this is the last the chiefe good in life that as to be selected notdesired Reason being given to rationall creatures for the most perfect direction to live according to reason is in them to live according to nature that being the Artificer of Appetite Hence Zeno first in his discourse of human nature affirmes that the end is to live conformably that is to live according to one reason concordantly as on the contrary savage Beasts
possesses'd But in Cleanthes there alone unbless'd He was so famous for Dialectick that it was a common speech If the Gods themselves would use Dialectick they would make use only of the Chrysippean But he was more plentifull in matter then free in expression He was infinitely studious and industrious as appeareth from the multitude of his Books An old woman that waited on him said that he wrote every day 500. Paragraphs When any question'd him in private he answer'd meekly and freely but assoon as any company came he grew eager and litigious saying Brother there hangs a cloud before your eyes Cast quite away this madnesse and be wise When he drunk at Feasts he lay very still only shaked his legs whereupon his woman said Chrysippus's legs only are drunk He had so good an opinion of himselfe that to one who asked him to whom he should commend his son he answered To me for if I knew any better I would hear Philosophy of him my selfe Whence it was said of him He is inspir'd by Jove The rest like shadowes move As also that Had not Chrysippus been No Stoa we had seen Arcesilaus and Lacydes as Sotion saith coming into the Academy he studyed Philosophy with them whence he disputed against Custome and for Custome and of Magnitude and Multitude using the arguments of the Academicks He was a great despiser of honours for of all his writings he dedicates none to any King He was content with little for he lived without any other attendants then one old woman and when Ptolomy wrote to Cleanthes desiring he would come to him or send some one of his Disciples Sphoerus went but Chrysippus refused Having sent for Aristocreon and Philocrates his sisters sons he first taught in the Lyceum in the open air as Demetrius writes CHAP. II. His Apophthegmes TO one that blamed him for not hearing Aristo as many did If I should follow many saith he I should not study Philosophy To a Dialectick assaulting Cleanthes with sophismes Leave saith he diverting an aged person from serious things propound those to us that are young He said meditation is the fountain of discourse He said drunkennesse is a lesser madnesse He said a wise man grieveth but is not troubled for his minde yields not to it To one that said to him your friend revileth you behinde your back Blame him not saith he for he might do it before my face To a wicked man that cast many aspersions upon him You have done well saith he not to omit any thing that is in your selfe Being told that some spoke ill of him It is no matter saith he I will live so that they shall not be believed He said there is a difference between swearing true and swearing truly and betwixt swearing false and forswearing That which is sworn at the time that it is sworn must necessarily be either true or false seeing that the form of swearing is an Axiom But he that sweareth at the same time that he sweareth is not necessarily perjur'd or sweareth true because the time is not yet arived that must determine his oath For as a man is said to have covenanted truely or falsely not when the covenant is made but when the time whereby it is limited is come so a man is said to swear truly or falsely when the time comes wherein he promised to make good his oath Being demanded why he did not undertake the government of the Commonwealth Because saith he If I govern ill I shall displease the Gods if well the people He said he who hath arrived at perfection dischargeth all offices omitting none yet his life is not happy for Beatitude is a post-accession thereto when as the mean actions acquire a constancy habit and peculiar confirmation CHAP. III. His Writings BEcause saith Laertius his writings were very celebrious we shall give an account of them digested according to their subjects They were these Of the Logicall place Theses Logick Philosophick Commentaries Dialectick definitions to Metrodorus 6. Of Dialectick names to Zeno 1. Dialectick art to Aristagoras 1. Of connex Probables to Dioscorides 4. The first order of the Logicall place of things Of Axioms 1. Of not-simple Axioms 1. Of Connex to Athenades 2. Of Negatives to Aristagoras 3. Of Catagoreuticks to Athenodorus 1. Of things spoken by privation to Thearus 1. Of best Axioms to Dion 3. Of Indefinites 4. Of things spoken according to Time 2. Of perfect Axioms 2. The second order Of true disjunct to Gorgippides 1. Of true connex to Gorgippides 4. Division to Gorgippides 1. Of Consequents I. Of that which is for three to Gorgippides 1. Of Possibles to Clitus 4. Of Significations against Philo 1. What are false 1. The third order Of Precepts 2. Of Interrogations 2. Of Percontation 4. Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation â— Epitome of Answers 1. Of Question 2. Of Answer 4. The fourth order Of Categorems to Metrodorus 10. Of right and supine to Philarchusâ— Of Conjunctions to Apollonides 1. To Pasylus of Categorems 4. The fifth order Of the five cases 1. Of expressions defined according to the subject 1. Of Assimilation to Stesagoras 2. Of Appellatives 2. Of the Logicall place concerning words and their reasons the first order Of singular and plurall expressions 6. Of Words to Sosigenes and Alexander 5. Of the anomaly of Words to Dion 4. Of Sorites pertaining to voice 3. Of Soloecismes to Dionysius 1. Of unusuall speech 1. Words to Dionysius 1. The second order Of the elements of speech 5. Of the syntax of things said 4. Of the syntax and elements of speech to Philip 3. Of the elements of speech to Nicias 1. Of relative speech 1. The third order Of not-dividents 2. Of Amphibolies to Apollas 4. Of Tropicall Amphibolies 1. Of connex Tropicall Amphibolies 2. Upon Panthoedus of Amphibolies 2. Introduction to Amphiboly 5. Epitome of Amphibolies to Epicrates 1. Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2. Of Logicall place concerning Reasons and Moods the first order The Art of Reasons and Moods to Dioscorides 5. Of Reasons 3. Of the composition of Moods to Stesagoras 2. Comparison of tropicall Axioms 1. Of reciprocall Reasons and connex 1. To Agatho or of sequent problems 1. Of Inferences to Aristagoras 1. Of placing the same reason in diverse Moods 1. Against those who oppose that the same reason may be plated in syllogistick and not syllogistick Moods 2. Against those who oppose the reduction of Syllogismes 3. Against Philo's book of Moods to Timostratus 1. Logicall conjuncts to Timocrates and Philomathes Upon Reasons and Moods 1. The second order Of conclusive Reasons to Zeno 1. Of first indemonstrable Syllogismes to Zeno 1. Of Reduction of Syllogismes 1. Of redundant Syllogismes to Pasylus 2. Theorems of Soloecismes 1. Syllogistick Introductions to Zeno 1. Introductions to Moods to Zeno 3. Of Syllogismes false in figure 5. Syllogistick reasons by reduction in indemonstrables 1. Tropicall Questions
to Zeno and Philomathes suspected to be spurious 1. The third order Of coincident reasons to Athenades 1. spurious Coincident reasons as to the medium 3. spurious Of Aminius's disjunctions 1. The fourth Order Of Hypotheses to Meleager 3. Hypothetick reasons in Law to Meleager 1. Hypothetick Reasons for introduction 2. Hypothetick reasons of Theorems 2. Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2. Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. Spurious Of expositions to Leodamas 1. The fift order Of introduction to the lying reason to Aristocreon 1. Lying reasons to the Introduction 1. Of the lying reason to Aristocreon 6. The sixt order Against those who think true and false are one 1. Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by distinction 2 Demonstration that infinites are not to be divided 1. Upon that which hath been said against the division of infinites to Pasylus 3. Solutions according to the Antients to Dioscorides 1. Of the solution of the lying reason to Aristocreon 3. Solution of Hedyllus ' s Hypotheticks to Aristocreon and Apollas The seventh Order Against those who say the lying reason hath false sumptions 1. Of the negative to Aristocreon 2. Negative Reasons to Gymnasias 1. Of the diminutive reason to Stesagoras 2. Of opinionative and quiescent reasons to Onetor 2. Of the veiled reason to Aristobulus 2. Of the occult reason to Athenades 1. The eighth Order Of the Nullity to Menecrates 8. Of reasons consisting of indefinite and definite to Pasylus 2. Of the Nullity to Epicrates 1. The ninth Order Of Sophismes to Heraclides and Pollis 2. Of insoluble dialectick reasons to Dioscorides 5. Against Arcesilaus's method to Sphaerus 1. The tenth order Against Custom to Metrodorus 6. Of the Logicall place besides these four differences there are dispersed not containing in the body of Logical Questions 39. Of the Ethick Place for direction of morall notions the First Order Description of speech to Theoporus 1. Morall Theses 1. Probable sumptions for Doctrines to Philomathes 3. Definitions of civill person to Metrodorus 2. Definitions of wicked persons to Metrodorus 2. Definitions of mean persons to Metrodorus 2. Generall Definitions to Metrodorus 7. Definitions of other arts to Metrodorus 2. The second Order Of things like to Aristocles 3. Of Definitions to Metrodorus 7. The third Order Of things not rightly objected against Definitions to Laodamas 7. Probables for Definitions to Dioscorides Of Species and Genus to Gorgippides 2. Of Divisions 1. Of Contraries to Dionysius 2. Probables for Divisions genus's and species Of Contraries 1. The fourth Order Of Etymologicks to Diocles 6 Etymologicks to Diocles 4. The fift Order Of Proverbs to Zenodotus 2. Of Poems to Philomathes 1. How Poems must be heard 2. Against Criticks to Diodorus 1. Of the morall place of common speeches according to Arts and Vertue The first Order Against Rescriptions to Timonax 1. How we think and speak singulars 1. Of notions to Laodamas 2. Of Suspition to Pythonax 2. Demonstrations that a wise man doth not opinionate 1. Of Comprehension and Science and ignorance 4. Of Speech 2. Of the use of Speech to Leptines The second Order That the Antients approved Dialectick with Demonstration to Zeno 2. Of Dialectick to Aristocreon 4. Upon the objections against Dialectick 3. Of Rhetorick to Dioscorides 4. The third Order Of habitude to Cleon 3. Of art and sloth to Aristocreon 4. Of the difference of Vertues to Diodorus What vertues are 1. Of vertues to Pollis Of the morall place concerning Good and Ill the first Order Of Honesty and pleasure to Aristocreon 10. Demonstration that Pleasure is not the chief end 4. Demonstration that pleasure is not good 4 Of those which are said******** Thus concludes the seventh Book of Laertius and who seeth not that the last of these titles is defective and moreover that the rest of the Orders concerning this place of Good and Ill whereof this is but the first are wanting Doubtlesse the end of this book is imperfect and wanteth if not the lives of any Stoicall Philosophers who succeeded Chrysippus whereof he mentions Zeno and others else where yet at least a considerable part of his Catalogue containing the rest of his Ethick writings and all his Physick many of which are elsewhere cited even by Laertius himself which as the learned Casauâ—on had observed he would not have ascribed to Laertius's neglect that Chrysippus's book of Lawes is not mentioned Of his Ethick writings besides those here named were these Of Laws Introduction to the consideration of things good or ill Of Honest. Of Consent Of things expetible in themselves Of things not expetible in themselves Of Politick Of ends Of Passions Of Ethick questions Of lives whereof Plutarch cites the 4th book That Zeno used names properly Of Iustice the first book cited by Laâ—rtius Of Life and Transaction Of Offices Demonstration of Iustice. Protrepticks Of the End Of a Common-wealth Of the office of a Iudge Of Good Of Habits To Physick belong these Physicks Of the Soul the 12th book cited by Laertius Of Providence the first book cited Of the Gods Of Fate Of Divination Of the Philosophy of the Antients In calumniation of the Senses Of Jupiter Of Nature Physicall Theses Of Substance Of Motion Physicall questions the third book cited Of Vacuity Epistles The number of all his writings according to Laertius was 705. He wrote so much that he had often occasion to treat upon the same subject and setting down whatsoever came into his minde he often corrected and enlarged it by the testimonies of others whence having in one book inserted all Euripides's Medea one having the book in his hand answer'd another that asked him what book it was It is Chrysippus's Medea And Apollodorus the Athenian in his collection of Doctrines asserting that Epicurus had written many books upon his own strength without using the testimonies of others and that he therein far exceeded Chrysippus addes these words For if a man should take out of Chrysippus's writings all that belongs to other men he would leave the paper blank Seneca gives this censure of him He is most subtle and acute penetrating into the depth of truth He speaks to the thing that is to be done and useth no more words then are necessary to the understanding thereof but addes that his acutenesse being too fine is many times blunted and retorted upon it selfe even when he seemes to have done something he only pricks not pierceth Some there are who inveigh against him as one that wrote many obscene things not sit to be spoken as in his Commentary of the antient Physiologists what he writes concerning Iupiter and Iuno is obscenely feigned delivering that in 600 Paragraphs which the most impudent person would not have committed to writing for say they he hath related the story most unhandsomly