Selected quad for the lemma: book_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
book_n	good_a	read_v	write_v	2,874	5	5.1956	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91783	The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick. By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.	Richardson, Alexander, of Queen's College, Cambridge.; Thomson, Samuel, fl. 1657-1666.	1657 (1657)	Wing R1378; Thomason E1603_2; ESTC R203419	285,683	519

Now true it is that this as also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed from the thing in nature yet Logick is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use for it is in it self in speech in quantity c. so that look where any art is there Logick is but it doth not follow that where Logick is there Arithmetick Geometry c. should be Again it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures ergo in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures to the imployment of the use of the principal Lord therefore he must first see them therefore must be prepared with such a faculty that he may see all things by it Now this is omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That there is such an Art I shew it thus If there be reason then there is an art of it because reason is ens a primo and it is for an end therefore there must be that art that is of reasons act For the proposition I proved it before for reason was for an end for the Assumption none will deny but that there is reason if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men Our Author cals this art Dialectica which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying secerno separo seligo as for example if there were many things together I would sever them and this name fitteth reasons act very well for Logick is like a fire among the Chimists for as fire will congregare homogenia and segregare heterogenia so Logick is the fire of all Arts severing in the same act that fire doth Logick from Grammar and Rhetorick from both c. and then it congregates to Logick that which is congreans to it to Grammar that which is homogenie to it c. so that when it invents it picks out homogenies it disposeth them and layes them in several places therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art that works this wonderful effect Wonderful I may call it for the Chimists can do great effects but the Logicians can do greater for they can see Gods Logick in the things and had not man faln he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures Now if Logick doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is congregare homogenia and segregare heterogenia by the same effect it may fitly be so called now this art is so called saith Diog enes Laertius first by Plato if he were the Author he was more ancient than Aristotle and antiquity should have honour with good reason if we have any reason nay Geometry is so called from its subject rather not metiri from antiquity but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith that Socrates was Platoes School-master and he never writ any thing but Plato alwayes so that Socrates might read it and Zenophon hear it for he was his Schollar for Zenophon Plato fuere aequales and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato as he had noted it from Socrates and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wisest man in his time and he was more wise than Aristotle for Plato that was Socrates Schollar was his Master so that for this name we see how fitly it agrees to this art and also the confirmation of it from antiquity Now Aristotle cals it Logick I do not deny but the name is good but it is later as Laertius witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first but it is from the subject ●eason as the names of most arts are Arithmetick of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 numerus Geometry of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 terra c. but it doth not so lively name this art as Dialectica doth which names the life and delivers the quintessence of Logick so that Logica as it is conjugate of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 names it well but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth So thus we see the reason of the name Est Ars. What art is we have heard before this it is every thing hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is accomplished by many petty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto so that Logicks main end is bene disserere bene invenire and bene judicare are the petty acts of it Now if Logica and Dialectica shew the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and frame of mans reason and direct it to the chief end its happiness where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esteth then it is ars at ergo Est ars bene disserendi First disserendi for the explanation of the word dissero comes of dis and sero sero signifies first to sow and dis a sunder or dissero that makes disserui to sow asunder whether it be so used I find not I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification and that which I told you of concerning dialectica is true 〈◊〉 his that as there was things to be sown and a sati● secernendorum and a sowing them asunder so there are first semina which are arguments in invention Secondly a satio of them that is a disposing of them Axiomatically and syllogistically and lastly a disserio that is a disposing of them according to true method and order so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through as we had in Dialectica So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logick for as in mans body there is a soul or a form per quam res est id quod est a caeteris rebus distinguitur so there is of this art or rather of the subject of it reason and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly that we cannot see their forms but onely the next acts to the formes so here our Author desireth to give to us the form of reason which because he cannot do therefore he delivers it by the final cause the next act to the form so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth bene disserere therefore I conclude thus if this be the happiness the act and soul of reason then it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi at ergo Bene. Here it is an adverb for Grammar here doth declare some controversie and an adverb is a part of speech joyned to the verb to shew his signification therefore bene is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere ergo bene disserere is not two things but one thing and this is a commendation in defining arts to break the forms of them as little as we can because the form is but one argument and if we put two or more words into the form we break it into so many peices Now for the reason of bene in a Art this it is Art is the rule of

operations invenire and judicare therefore the Art being the Idea of this frame that hath two parts must have two parts for Logick behold reason not as it is a faculty belonging to natural Philosophy but as it acts Now thus I argue If reasons frame run into two heads or actions that it may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then the Art must do so now that reason is framed to run into these two heads thus I shewed it All things were made for man therefore he must have an eye to see them now all things that God hath made are considered in themselves or with others for the world is one consisting of many parts and they are considered alone or with others therefore mans reason must run accordingly God onely is entire in himself having no respect to any other thing he is simple and hath no parts therefore he is not liable to Logick all other things are composed that it might appear that he is simple so that every thing else is composed or disposed with others yet first it must be in it self in use for if I say a brick-wall there must needs first be bricks and what use have we of words alone in Grammar but in Syntax and first we must see the Etimologie of them nay in every Art except Rhetorick there is no use of the first part without the second neither is invention ever without judgement therefore when every thing hath his double consideration there must be two parts of reason for as things are so must reasons act be for every thing must be so administred as that it be liable to reason and be considered alone before it be disposed therefore invention is first so that any man that hath reason will acknowledge the necessity of this distribution now these two parts are called Invention and Disposition First for the reason of the name Invention man was to see all Gods creatures and so to see his order in them now how should man see them were they written in his understanding no more than Pauls steeple is in my eye for man came furnished into the world onely with Logick Grammar Rhetorick and Divinity neither with the knowledge of these Arts but with the faculties of them and therefore the Arts must needs be there for we read the Arts in the things so that for Arithmetick Geometry and nature man was to learn them by the creatures as he was also to learn the knowledge of Logick Grammar Rhetorick and Divinity The reason is this the Genesis of every thing is Gods and man must see the rules of Art therefore man must see them from singulars by analysis now then if man must learn these and know them by his senses observation induction and experience then he must seek and find out these for they are not written in him again whereas every thing is in disposition it is requisite that man find them out and see them severally therefore in this respect is this Art of reason called Invention namely as he is sent by God to find out these things in his creatures now if man must find them out with this act of his eye of reason then is it fitly called invention at ergo And this teacheth man thus much that he is to seek out and find this wisdom of God in the world and not to be idle for the world and the creatures therein are like a book wherein Gods wisdom is written and there must we seek it out Why is not this first Art called Disposition because that is more familiar and easie to us for all things are disposed but we are by this Art to sever them and to look at them simply so that this name teacheth man what he is to do in this act of his reason namely invenire argumenta as in mists to look at the elements c. Now Kickerman cannot away with this distribution and yet sayes nothing to this purpose against it for I suppose Invention to be an ambiguous name and have equivocation with it as I do not deny but it is taken sometimes for judgement but that is tropically yet while my Author tels me what it is that is sufficient to know his meaning how here it is taken Object But Invention is never without judgement saith he no inventions use is ever without judgements use so he may say Etimologie is never without Syntax I but saith he you cannot invent without judgement therefore they are no parts of Logick as for example a chest is made of wood by this rule materia est causae ex qua res est therefore here is syllogistical judgement which is concluded a definitione and this is Aristotles demonstration as if you should make a syllogisme thus That whereof the thing is that is materia But wood is that ex quo the Chest is ergo But here is onely Logicks practise and not any rule of Art taught us The question betwixt Ramus and him is whether any rule of invention belongs to judgement This it is the rules of invention give precepts of nothing at all concerning judgement aut contra therefore these are the true parts of Logick and whilst he argues from the precept to the rule it is fallacia accidentis as if he should reason Socrates est animal animal est genus ergo Socrates est genus whereas we know the thing animal is not that Logical notion neither Socrates for they belong to natural Philosophy but genus is no adjunct attributed unto them so this invention is onely of simple arguments and of the simple consideration of them and therefore our Art runs along according to Gods order and though we cannot practice any rule of invention but by judgement yet it doth not therefore follow that they are the same for it is as if he should say this homo quae pars orationis Nomen here is the practise of Syntax ergo Etimology and Syntax are all one Inventio est prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis We have heard of the reason of the name Invention why it is given to the first part and that with great reason for we must find by much seeking before we can see things Again Logick being the first help to see Gods wisdom in his creatures and this use of invention being to be found in the thing it is hard to find therefore it is fitly called invention from the act of it So again in dispute a man is fain to seek a third argument to prove his question Judgement the second part is properly the act of our understanding when it looks at arguments disposed therefore here it is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject when it is put for dispositio and again it is properly the disposing of arguments together which is of Axiomes and Syllogismes Method doth not look at the disposing of arguments but at the placing of axioms so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus Dalecticae partes duae sunt inventio dispositio