is That we may describe from any Point a Circle at what interval we please we not only grant that a Line may be drawn from a Point equal to another Line which Euclid effects in that Proposition after a very round-about manner But we allow that from any Point may be drawn an infinite number of Lines of what length we please But the Design of most Commentators is not to Illuminate their Authors and to find out Truth 't is to make Ostentation of their Learning and implicitly to defend the Authors which they Comment on even to their Vices 'T is not so much to make themselves or their Authors understood they talk as to make him admir'd and themselves together with him If the Gentleman before-mention'd had not stuff'd his Book with Sentences of Greek with a great many Names of unheard of Authors and such other useless Observations for the understanding Common Notions Verbal Definitions and Geometrical Postulates who would have read his Book who would have admir'd him or who would have conferr'd on its Author the Honorary Title of Learned or of a Man of Sense I presume it can't be doubted after what I have said but the Indiscrete Reading of Books often prepossesses the Mind But as soon as Prepossession enters in that which we call Common Sense is banish'd out of it 'T is incapable of Judging soberly of any thing any way relative to the Subject of its Prepossession It stains and tinctures with it every Thought nay it cannot apply it self to Subjects quite remote from those it is prejudic'd for Thus a Man opinionated with Aristotle can relish nothing but Aristotle He must judge of every thing with relation to Aristotle What does not accord with that Philosopher seems false he has constantly some Saying of Aristotle in his Mouth he is citing him upon all occasions and all sorts of Subjects both to prove things so obscure as no Man can comprehend and to prove things so self-evident as Children cannot doubt of because Aristotle is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others So if a Man be possess'd with the conceit of Euclid and Geometry he will be for reducing every thing you shall say to him to the Lines and Propositions of his darling Author and shall talk nothing but with reference to his Science The whole would not be bigger than its part but because Eulid has said it nor will he be asham'd to quote him for the Proof of it as I have sometimes observ'd But this is still more customary with those who are devoted to other Authors than those of Geometry in whose Books nothing is more frequent than Greek Hebrew Arabick Citations to prove things as evident as the Sun at Mid-day All this is occasion'd by Reason that the Traces imprinted on the Fibres of the Brain by the Objects of their Prepossession are so deep as always to remain gaping and half open And the Animal Spirits continually passing through them preserve them so without permitting them to close again So that the Soul having always of necessity the Thoughts that are connected with these Traces becomes as it were enslav'd to them and she is ever troubled and disquieted even when knowing she is wrong she is willing to be Righted Thus she is in constant danger of falling into a great number of Errors unless she stands always upon her guard with an inviolable Resolution of observing the Rule given in the beginning of this Work that is of Denying an entire Consent except to things entirely evident I pass over the evil Choice that is generally made of the kind of Study Men apply themselves to as properly belonging to Moral Philosophy to treat of though it may likewise be reduc'd here to what has been said of Prepossession For when a Man is fallen beyond retrival into the Reading of the Rabbins and Books of all sorts of most unknown and consequently most useless Languages and spends his whole Life therein he does it doubtless out of Prepossession and the Imaginary hopes of becoming Learned though it is impossible by that Method to acquire any true Sience But because this Application to unprofitable Studies does not so much subject us to Error as waste our Time to possess us with a foolish Vanity I shall not speak here of those who fondly think of becoming Learned in all these sorts of sordid and unprofitable Sciences the number whereof is very great and the Study usually too passionate and earnest CHAP. VIII I. Of the Inventors of new Systems II. The last Error of Men of Learning WE have been manifesting the state of the Imagination of Men of Books and Study who resign up all to the Authority of some certain particular Authors There are others still very opposite to these who have no respect at all for Authors let their Esteem be what it will among the Learned If they esteem'd them formerly they are now of a contrary Mind and set themselves up for Authors They love to be thought Inventors of some new Opinions thereby to procure Reputation in the World and are well satisfy'd that by saying something that was never said before they shall not fail to have their Admirers This sort of People are generally of a strong Imagination the Fibres of their Brain are in such a disposition as to preserve for a long time the Traces of what has been imprinted on them Thus when once they have imagin'd a System that has in it any thing of probability 't is impossible to beat them out of it Whatever any way makes for its confirmation is most heartily embrac'd and retain'd And on the contrary all the Objections that are made to it are over-look'd at least are eluded by some frivolous Distinction They are inwardly pleas'd with the sight of their own Workmanship and of the Esteem they hope will redound to them from it They only apply themselves to consider the Image of Truth deduc'd from their probable Opinions They fix this Image stedfastly before their Eyes but never behold with a steddy View the other sides of their Sentiments which would betray their Falshood There must go great Qualifications to capacitate a Man to be the Inventor of any true System For 't is not enough to have a quickness of Parts there must besides be a certain Capaciousness of Thoughts and Reach of Mind which can at one View take in a clear prospect of a great many things Little and narrow Minds with all their Vivacity and Delicacy are too short-sighted to survey all that is necessary to be seen for the establishing a System They are check'd and even stop'd with some little Difficulties that discourage them or with some glimmering Lights which dazzle and carry them away their Sight is too narrow to survey at once the whole body of a capacious Subject But however Capacious and Penetrating the Mind is unless it be withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice there is no Good to be hoped from it Prejudices
take up one part of their Mind and tinge and infect all the rest The Passions confound all the Idea's a thousand ways and make us generally discover in the Objects all that we have a mind to find in them Even the Passion that we have for Truth sometimes deceives us when it is too vehement But the Ambition to be thought Learned is the great Impediment to our becoming really so Nothing then is more rare and extraordinary than to find such Men as are capable of making new Systems and yet nothing is more common than to find such as have fram'd some System or other to their Humour We see few of those who study much reason upon common Notions there is ever some Irregularity in their Idea's which is an evident sign they have some particular System we are unaquainted with 'T is true all the Books they compose do not savour of it For when their Business is to write for the Publick Men are more cautious of what they say and a bare Attention is often enough to undeceive them Yet we see Books Publish'd from time to time which are a sufficient Proof of what I say And there are Persons who are proud to let the World know at the beginning of their Book that they are the Founders of some new System The number of the Inventors of new Systems is much increas'd by those who have been prepossess'd with any Author For it often falls out that having not met with Truth nor any solid foundation in their Opinions of the Authors they have read they first enter into a great Dislike and an high Contempt of all sorts of Books and thereupon fall to Imagining some probable Opinion which they hug and cherish and wherein they strengthen themselves in the manner I have explain'd But as soon as this Heat of Affection for any Opinion is boyl'd over and abated or the Design of Appearing in Publick has oblig'd them to examine it with a more exact and serious Attention they discover the Falsity of it and throw it up but with this Condition that they will never take up any other but utterly condemn all those who shall pretend to the Discovery of any Truth So that the last and most dangerous Error which Men of Study fall into is their Imagining there can be nothing known They have read many Books both Ancient and Modern and have miss'd of Truth in them They have had many fine Notions of their own which they have found to be false after a more strict and attentive Examination From whence they conclude that all Men are like themselves and that if those who fancy they have discover'd some Truths should seriously consider them they would be undeceiv'd as well as themselves And this is enough for them to condemn them without making any more particular Enquiry because if they did not condemn them it would be a kind of Confession that they were wiser than themselves a thing they cannot think very probable They look therefore upon those as Bigotted to their own Thoughts who give out any thing as certain and infallible Nor will they suffer a Man to talk of Sciences as of Evident Truths which cannot reasonably be doubted of but only as of Opinions of which it is good not to be ignorant Yet these Gentlemen would do well to consider that though they have read a great number of Books yet they have not read all or that they have not read them with all the Attention that was necessary to a perfect Understanding of them And that though they have had many fine Thoughts which they have found false in the Conclusion yet they have not had all that are possible and so 't is no improbable thing that others should have found better than themselves Nor is it necessary absolutely speaking that others should have greater Sense than they if that offends them for 't is enough to have had greater Fortune They need not be affronted to hear it said That others have Evident Knowledge of what they are Ignorant since we say at the same time that many Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths Not for want of excellent Wits but because these excellent Wits have not luckily fall'n upon them Let them not be angry therefore that a Man sees clearly and speaks as he sees but let them apply themselves to what is said to them if their Minds be still capable of Application after all their Excursions and then let them judge if they please But if they will not examine it let them hold their Tongue But I would have them reflect a little whether that Answer so readily made by them to most of the things demanded of them No body Vnderstands it No body knows how 't is done be not an injudicious Answer Since to answer so a Man must of necessity believe he knows all that all Men know or all that is possible to be known by them For had they not this Notion of themselves their Answer would be still more impertinent And why should they be so hard put to it to say they know nothing of them since in some particular junctures they acknowledge they know nothing at all And why must all Men be concluded Ignorant because they are inwardly convinc'd they are Ignorant themselves There are then three sorts of Persons that apply themselves to Study The first are such as are preposterously Bigotted to some Author or some insignificant or false Science The second are such as are prepossess'd and full with their own Fancies The last which usually proceed from the other two are such as Imagine they know all that is possible to be known and who fancying they know nothing with Certainty conclude universally that nothing can be Evidently known and regard all things that they hear as bear Opinions 'T is easie to be seen that all the Faults incident to these three sorts of Men depend on the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the X. and XI Chapters and especially of the First That all this is owing to Prejudice which choaks up their Minds and makes them insensible to all other Objects but those they are prepossess'd with It may be said that their Prejudices do in their Minds what the Ministers of Princes do in respect of their Masters for as these Gentlemen permit as little as possible any others than those of their own Party and Interest or such as are unable to displace them from their Master's Favour to come to the speech of them so the Prejudices of the former suffer not their Minds to take a full View of the pure and unmix'd Idea's of Objects But they disguise them they cloath them with their own Liveries and thus all mask'd and discolour'd present them to the Mind So that 't is next to impossible it should discover and throw off its Errors CHAP. IX I. Of Effeminate Minds II. Of Superficial Minds III. Of Men of Authority IV. Of the Experimental Philosophers I Have if
if he has 't was to very little purpose And so he became a Genteel Pedant or a Pedant of a species entirely new rather than a Rational Judicious and a Worthy Man Montagne's Book contains so evident Proofs of the Vanity and Arrogance of its Author as may make it seem an useless Undertaking to stand to remark them For a Man must needs be very conceited that like him could imagine the World would be at the pains of reading so large a Book meerly to gain some acquaintance with its Author's Humours He must necessarily distinguish himself from the rest of the World and look upon his own Person as the Miracle and Phoenix of Nature All created Beings are under an indispensable obligation of turning off the Minds of such as would adore them towards the only One that deserves their Adoration And Religion teaches us never to suffer the Mind and Heart of Man whom GOD created for himself to be busied about us and to be taken up with loving and admiring us When St. John prostrated himself before the Angel of the LORD the Angel forbad him saying I am thy fellow Servant and of thy Brethren Worship GOD. None but the Devils and such as partake of their Pride are pleas'd with being worshipp'd To require therefore that others should be affected and taken up with our particulars what is it but to desire not only to be worshipp'd with an outward and apparent but also with a real and inward worship 'T is to desire to be worshipp'd even as GOD himself desires it that is in Spirit and in Truth Montagne wrote his Book purely to picture himself and represent his own Humours and Inclinations as he acknowledges himself in the Advertisement to the Reader inserted in all the Editions I give the Picture of my self says he I am my self the Subject of my Book Which is found true enough by those that read him for there are few Chapters wherein he makes not some Digression to talk of himself and there are even some whole Chapters wherein he talks of nothing else But if he wrote his Book meerly to describe Himself he certainly Printed it that his own Character might be read in it He therefore desir'd to be the Subject of the Thoughts and Attention of Men though he says there is no reason a Man should employ his time upon so frivolous and idle a Subject Which words make only for his Commendation For if he thought it unreasonable for Men to spend their time in reading his Book he himself acted against Common Sense in publishing it And so we are oblig'd to believe either that he Thought not what he said or did not what became him But 't is a pleasant Excuse of his Vanity to say he wrote only for his Friends and Relations For if so how chance there were publish'd three Editions Was not one enough for all his Friends and Relations Why did he make Additions to his Book in the last Impressions but no Retractions but that Fortune favour'd his Intentions I add says he but make no Corrections because when once a Man has made his Book of publick right he has in my Opinion no more pretence or title to it Let him say what he can better in another but let him not corrupt the Works already sold. Of such as these 't is folly â—o purchase any thing before they are dead Let them think long before they publish Why are they in such haste My Book is always one and the same He then was willing to publish his Book for and deposite it with the rest of the World as well as to his Friends and Relations But yet his Vanity had never been pardonable if he had only turn'd and fix'd the Mind and Heart of his Friends and Relations on his Picture so long time as is necessary to the reading of his Book If 't is a Fault for a Man to speak often of himself 't is Impudence or rather a kind of Sottishness to praise himself at every turn as Montagne does This being not only to sin against Châ—â—stian Humility but also Right Reason Men are made for a sociable Life and to be form'd into Bodies and Communities But it must be observ'd that every particular that makes a part of a Society would not be thought the meanest part of it And so those who are their own Encomiasts exalting themselves above the rest and looking upon others as the bottom-most parts of their Society and themselves as the Top-most and most Honourable assume an Opinion of themselves that renders them odious instead of indearing them to the Affections and Esteem of the World 'T is then a Vanity and an indiscreet and ridiculous Vanity in Montagne to talk so much to his own Advantage on all occasions But 't is a Vanity still more Extravagant in this Author to transcribe his own Imperfections For if we well observe him we shall find that most of the Faults he discovers of himself are such as are glory'd in by the World by reason of the Corruption of the Age That he freely attributes such to himself as can make him pass for a Bold Wit or give him the Air of a Gentleman and that with intent to be better credited when he speaks in his own Commendation he counterfeits a frank Confession of his Irregularities He has reason to say that The setting too high an Opinion of one's self proceeds often from an equally Arrogant Temper 'T is always an infallible sign that a Man has an Opinion of himself and indeed Montagne seems to me more arrogant and vain in discommending than praising himself it being an insufferable Pride to make his Vices the Motives to his Vanity rather than to his Humiliation I had rather see a Man conceal his Crimes with Shame than publish them with Impudence and in my Mind we ought to have that Vnchristian way of Gallantry in abhorrence wherein Montagne publishes his Defects But let us examine the other Qualities of his Mind If we would believe Montagne on his word he would perswade us that he was a Man of No Retention that his Memory was treacherous and fail'd him in every thing But that in his Judgment there was no defect And yet should we credit the Portraicture he has drawn of his own Mind I mean his Book we should be of a different Opinion I could not says he receive an Order without my Table-book and if I had an Oration to speak that was considerably long-winded I was forc'd to that vile and miserable necessity of learning it word for word by Heart otherwise I had neither Presence nor Assurance for fear my Memory should shew me a slippery trick Does a Man that could learn Memoriter word for word long-winded Discourses to give him some Presence and Assurance fail more in his Memory than his Judgment And can we believe Montagne when he says I am forc'd to call my Domestick Servants by the Names of their Offices or their
understand but rather Superstition and Hypocrisie The Superstitious out of a slavish Fear and a dejection and timerousness of Spirit start and boggle at a lively and penetrating Wit Explain to them for instance the natural Reasons of Thunder and its Effects and you shall be a reputed Atheist But Hypocrites by a diabolical Malignity transform themselves into Angels of Light for they employ the appearances of Truths of universally sacred and rever'd Authority to withstand from out of partial Interests such Truths as are rarely known and of little Reputation Thus they oppugn Truth by her own Image and whilst they ridicule in their Heart what is reverenc'd by the World they establish their Reputation so much more deep and impregnable in the Minds of Men as the Truth they have abus'd is more sacred and inviolable Such Persons are the strongest powerfullest and most formidable Enemies of the Truth They are not indeed very common but there need be but few to do a world of mischief The Shew of Truth and Vertue frequently do more Evil than Truth and Vertue themselves do Good For one subtile Hypocrite is enough to overthrow what cost a great many truly wise and vertuous much labour and pains to build Monsieur Des Cartes for instance has demonstratively prov'd the Existence of a GOD the Immortality of our Souls and a great many other both Metaphysical and Physical Questions and our Age is under infinite Obligations to him for the Truths he has discover'd to us Notwithstanding there starts up an inconsiderable Person and takes upon him being an hot and vehement Declamer and in Esteem with the People for the Zeal he manifested for their Religion to compose Books full of Calumnies against him and accuse him of the vilest Crimes Des Cartes was a Catholick and was Tutor'd in his Studies by the Jesuits whom he frequently mention'd with an honourable respect This was enough with that malicious Spirit to persuade a People opposite to our Religion and easie to be provok'd upon Matters so nice as those of Religion are that he was an Emissary of the Jesuits and had dangerous Designs because the least shadow of Truth in Points of Faith has more influence on Men's Minds than real and effective Truths in Matters of Physicks or Metaphysicks for which they have little or no regard Des Cartes wrote of the Existence of a GOD and this was sufficient for this Slanderer to exercise his false Zeal and to oppress all the Truths that made for his Enemy's Defence He accus'd him of Atheism and of cunningly and clandestinely teaching it like that infamous Atheist Vanino burn'd at Toulouse who to cover his Malice and Impiety wrote for the Existence of a GOD. For one of the Reasons he alledges for his Enemy's being an Atheist was that he wrote against the Atheists as did Vanino for a cloak to his Villany So easie is it for a Man to overwhelm Truth when supported with the shews of it and when once he has obtain'd an Authority over weaker Minds Truth loves Gentleness and Peace and though she be very strong yet she sometimes yields to the Pride and Arrogance of Falshood and a Lye dress'd up and arm'd in her own Appearances She knows that Errour cannot finally prevail against her and if it be her Fate sometimes to live proscrib'd and in obscurity 't is only to wait more favourable opportunities of manifesting her self for she generally at last breaks out in greater Strength and Brightness even in the very place of her Oppression 'T is no wonder to hear an Enemy of Des Cartes a Man of a different Religion and ambitious to raise himself upon the Ruins of Men above him an injudicious Haranguer in a word a Voetius to talk contemptuously of what he neither does nor will understand But 't is to be admir'd that such as are neither Enemies to Des Cartes nor his Religion should be possess'd with an Aversion and Contempt of him on the account of the Reproaches they have read in Books compos'd by the Enemy both to his Person and his Church That Heretick's Book intitled Desperata Causa Papatus is a sufficient Proof of his Impudence Ignorance Outrage and desire of seeming Zealous thereby to purchase a Reputation amongst his Flock which shews that he 's not a Man to be trusted on his Word For as we are not to believe all the fabulous Stories he has heap'd together in his Book against our Religion so we are not to believe on the strength of his Affirmation those bitter and hainously injurious Accusations he has forg'd against his Enemy 'T is not then the part of a Rational Man to enter into a Persuasion that M. Des Cartes was a dangerous Person because they have perchance read it in some Book or heard it said by others whose Piety is awful and respected for Mens bare words are not to be credited when they accuse others of the highest Crimes nor is the Zeal and Gravity it is spoken in sufficient Inducement to persuade us of the Truth of it For in short 't is possible for Folly and Falshood to be set off in the same manner as better things especially when the Speaker is won over to the Belief of them out of Simplicity and Weakness 'T is easie to be inform'd of the Truth or Falshood of the Indictment drawn up against M. Des Cartes his Writings being easie to come by and not difficult to be understood by an Attentive Person Let a Man therefore read his Books that better Evidence may be had against him than a bare Hear-say and after he has well read them and digested them it may be hop'd the Plea of Atheism will be thrown out and on the contrary all due Respect and Deference paid to a Man who in a most simple and evident manner has demonstrated not only the Existence of a GOD and the Immortality of the Soul but a great number of other Truths that till his time were never thought on CHAP. VII Of the Desire of Science and of the Judgments of the falsly Learned THE Mind of Man is doubtless of a little Reach and Capacity and yet he longs to know every thing All Humane Sciences are unable to satisfie his Desires though he has not room to comprehend any one in particular He is constantly disquieted and impatient for Knowledge either because he hopes to find what he seeks for as we have said in the foregoing Chapters or because he is persuaded that his Soul is agrandiz'd by the vain possession of some extraordinary Knowledge The irregular Desire of Happiness and Greatness puts him upon the Study of all Sciences hoping to find Happiness in moral and looking for that false Greatness in speculative Knowledge Whence comes it that there are Men who spend their Life in Reading the Rabbins and such like Books written in foreign obscure and corrupt Languages by injudicious and sensless Authors but from a Persuasion that the Knowledge of the
Language seem worthy their Study and Application If they read the Holy Scriptures 't is not to learn Piety and Religion but Points of Chronology and Geography and Difficulties of Grammar take them wholly up and they are more earnest to know these things than the salutary Truths of the Gospel they aim at the possession of the Science they have foolishly admir'd in others and for which they are likely to be admir'd by other Fools in their turn 'T is so with them in point of Natural Knowledge not the most Useful but the least Common is their Beloved Anatomy is too mean and low for them but Astronomy is more noble and exalted Ordinary Experiments are unworthy their Application but those rare and wonderful Experiments which can never instruct us are those they most carefully observe Histories that are the most Rare and Ancient they glory to know and whilst they are ignorant of the Genealogy of Princes that at present Reign are diligent in searching for the Pedigree of those who died four thousand Years ago They scorn to learn the most common Histories of their own Times yet endeavour to be critically skill'd in the Fables and Fictions of the Poets They know not so much as their own Relations yet will if you desire it cite several Authorities to prove that a Citizen of Rome was allied to an Emperour and a great many other such things Hardly can they tell the Names of the common Garments in present Use yet busie their Heads to know what were in wear with the old Greeks and Romans Their own Country Animals they are ignorant of while they grudge not to spend several Years in composing huge Volumes on the Creatures of Scripture that they may seem to have a better guess than others at the Signification of unknown Terms Such a Book is the Hearts-delight of its Author and of its learn'd Readers for being patch'd up of Greek Hebrew and Arabick Passages c. of Rabbinical and such like dark and extraordinary Citations it satisfies the Vanity of its Author and the ridiculous Curiosity of those that read it who fancy themselves learneder than others when they can confidently affirm there are six different Words in Holy Writ signifying a Lion or the like They commonly understand not the Map of their own Country or even the Model of their Town whilst they study the Geography of Ancient Greece Italy of the Gauls in Julius Caesar's Time or of the Streets and publick Places of old Rome Labor stultorum says the Wise-man affliget eos qui nesciunt in urbem pergere They know not the way to their City yet are foolishly fatigu'd with fruitless Enquiries They know not the Laws or Customs of the Places where they live yet carefully study the Ancient Right the Laws of the Twelve Tables the Customs of the Lacedemonians or of the Chinese or the Ordinances of the Great Mogul Lastly they would know whatever's Rare Extraordinary and Remote and unknown by others having by an Overthrow of Reason affix'd the Idea of Learning to these things whilst to be esteem'd Learned 't is enough to know what others know not and yet be ignorant of the best and most necessary Truths True the Knowledge of all these things and the like is call'd Science Erudition Doctrine Use will have it so But there is a Science which the Scripture stiles Folly Doctrina stultorum fatuitas I never yet observ'd that the Holy Spirit which bestows so many Elogies on Science in Sacred Writ says any thing in Commendation of that false Science I have been speaking of CHAP. VIII I. Of the Desire of seeming Learned II. Of the Conversation of the Falsly Learned III. Of their Works IF the immoderate Desire of Growing Learned makes Men oftentimes more ignorant the Desire of being thought so not only renders them more ignorant but seems to give a total Subversion to their Reason For the World abounds with such as lose common Sense because they will out-shoot it and speak nothing but silly things because they will speak only in Paradox They deviate so far from the common Thoughts of Mankind whilst they purpose the acquiring the Character of Rare and Extraordinary Wits that they effectively gain their point and are never consider'd without much Admiration or Contempt They are regarded with Admiration when being rais'd to some Preferment or Honour which conceals them we fancy them as much above others in their Parts and Learning as they are by their Quality and Birth But we frequently make a very different Estimate when viewing them near at hand and drawing the Curtain of their surrounding Grandeur we find them contemptible or even Fools and Changelings The Falsly Learn'd shew themselves manifestly in the Books they write as also in their ordinary Conversation It will not perhaps be amiss to give a proof of it As it is Vanity and Desire of Ostentation which engages them in their Studies so when they find themselves in Company the Passion and Desire of Preheminency re-kindles and transports them They are instantly so high upon the Wing that we lose sight of them nor can they often themselves tell where they are They are so fearful of not being above all their Auditors that they are vex'd to think any one can teach them they will stomach the Demand of an Explication and upon the least opposition put on the Look of Scorn and Arrogance In brief The things they say are so novel and extraordinary and so remote from common Sense that the Wise have much ado to hold from laughing while the Ignorant are stunn'd and thunder-struck The first Heat being over if any Man of an Head strong and settl'd enough not to be overturn'd shews that they are out they will however stick obstinately to their Errours the very Look of their confus'd and giddied Hearers turns their own Head round and the sight of so many Approvers which they have convinc'd by the Impression convinces them by rebound at least if it does not convince them it flushes them with Courage to maintain their false Opinions Their Vanity will not suffer them to make any Retraction they constantly invent some Reason for their Defence They never speak with greater Fervency and Zeal than when they have nothing to say They fancy it an Affront and a Design to make them despicable to offer any Reason against them and the stronger and more judicious it is the more it provokes their Pride and Aversion The best way to defend Truth against them is not to dispute it for 't is better both for them and us to leave them to their Errours than provoke their Hatred We must take care not to wound their Heart when we would heal their Mind the Wounds of the former being more dangerous than those of the latter beside that we sometimes fortune to have to do with a Person truly Learned whom 't is possible we may despise for want of rightly taking his Conceptions We must therefore
management of Life that 's too trite and vulgar it not being their purpose to be useful to others or themselves but only to be reputed Learned They either alledge no Reasons of things which they advance or if they do they are so mysterious and incomprehensible as neither themselves nor any body else can evidently conceive Clear Reasons they have none but if they had they would not use them because they surprize not the Mind are thought too simple and common and suited to the Abilities of all Mankind They rather bring Authorities to prove or with pretence to prove their Notions for the Authorities employ'd seldom prove any thing by the Sense they contain but only by being Greek and Arabick But perhaps it will be pertinent to speak something of their Quotations which will acquaint us in part with the disposition of their Mind It is methinks manifest that nothing but a falsly-term'd Learning and a Spirit of Polimathy could bring these Citations into fashion as they have formerly been and are still at this day with some of the Learned For 't is usual with some Authors to be perpetually quoting long Sentences without any Reason for it whether because the things they advance are too clear to be doubted of or that they are too intricate and obscure to be made out by the Authority of their Authors since they could know nothing of them or lastly because the Citations inserted are inserviceable to adorn and beautifie their Discourse 'T is repugnant to common Sense to bring a Greek Passage to prove the Air transparent because 't is evident to all the World to employ the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that Intelligences move the Heavens because we are certain Aristotle could not know it and lastly to mingle strange Languages Arabian and Persian Proverbs with French English or Latin Books written for every body forasmuch as these Citations cannot be ornamental at least are such fantastical Ornaments as disgust most Persons and can satisfie but very few Nevertheless the greatest part of those who would fain be thought Learned are so extreamly pleas'd with this kind of Giâ—â—rish that they blush not to quote in strange Tongues which they do not understand and tug might and main to draw into their Books an Arabick Passage which they cannot so much as read Thus they puzzle themselves strangely to effect a thing repugnant to good Sense but that sacrifices to their Vanity and makes them esteem'd by Soâ—s One very considerable Fault is still behind which is that they are but in little care to seem to have read with Choice and Judgment all they desire being to be reckon'd great Readers especially of obscure Books that they may seem more Learned of Books that are scarce and dear that they may be thought to have every thing of wicked and impious Books which honest Men are afraid to read with much the same Spirit as some boast to have acted Crimes which others dare not Hence they rather cite very Dear very Rare very Ancient and Obscure Books than other more Common and Intelligible Astrological Cabalistical and Magical Books than such as are good and wholesome as if they did not see that Reading being a kind of Conversing they should rather desire to seem industriously to have sought the Acquaintance of Good and Intelligible than Wicked and Obscure Authors For as no Man in his Senses would chuse out for ordinary Converse People that want an Interpreter when the same things that are to be learn'd of them might be known another way so 't is ridiculous to read Books not to be understood without a Dictionary when the same things may be had in those that are more intelligible And as it is a sign of a deprav'd Nature to affect the Company and Conversation of the Impious so 't is the Criterion of a corrupt Heart to delight in reading Wicked Books But 't is an extravagant Pride for a Man to pretend to have read those which he has not which yet is a thing of very common occurrence For we find Men of Thirty Years standing quote more ill Books in their Works than they could have read in many Ages whilst they would have others believe they have very exactly read them But most of the Books of some of these Learned Gentlemen owe their Birth to the kind Dictionary and all their Reading may be reduc'd to the Indexes of the Books they quote and some Common Places heap'd together from out of different Authors I venture not to enter into the Particulars of these things nor to give Instances to prove them for fear of provoking Persons so fierce and cholerick as these Learned Pretenders as not caring to be revil'd in Greek and Arabick Besides that 't is needless more sensibly to evince what I have said by particular Allegations the Mind of Man being ready enough to tax the Management of others and make particular Application of this Discourse In the mean time let them hug themselves and feed upon this vain Fantom of Greatness and give one another the Applauses which we deny them For we have been perhaps already too troublesome by molesting them in their so seemingly sweet and grateful Enjoyments CHAP. IX How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Errour HOnours and Riches no less than Vertue and Science which we have already spoke of are principal Acquirements to give us the Ascendant over other Men. For there seems to accrue to our Being a Growth and Enlargement and kind of Independency from the Possession of these Advantages So that the Love we have for our selves naturally streaming out to Honours and Riches every body may be said to have some sort of Inclination for them We will explain in brief how these Inclinations obviate the Discovery of Truth and engage us in Falshood and Errour It has been shewn in several places that much Time and Labour Assiduity and Contention of Mind must go to the clearing up Compound Truths surrounded with Difficulties and depending on many Principles Whence it is easie to conclude that Men of publick Characters of great Employments who have large Estates to look after and great Affairs to manage and whose Hearts are fix'd upon Riches and Honours are not the fittest Enquirers after Truth and that they commonly err in point of all things difficultly known whenever they pretend to judge of them And that because First They have little time to lay out in the Search of Truth Secondly They take but little Pleasure in this Search Thirdly They are very incapable of Attention because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Ideas of the things they wish for which take up their Thoughts whether they will or no. In the fourth place They fancy they know every thing and can hardly be induc'd to believe their Inferiours have more Reason than themselves some Matters of Fact they may vouchsafe to learn of them but are above being taught by them solid and
Simple or Compound But I have not oblig'd my self to account for all the different Motions whereof the Mind is capable I am willing to have it known that my principal Design in all the foregoing Treatise concerning the Search after Truth was to make Men sensible how weak and ignorant they are and how subject to Errour and Sin I have said it and I say it again perhaps it will be remembred I had never design'd a Thorough particular Explication of the Nature of the Mind but I have been oblig'd to say something of it to lay open its Errours in their Principle to unfold them methodically in a Word to make my self intelligible If I have transgress'd the Bounds I had prescrib'd my self â—t was because I had methought new things to say which seem'd of moment and which I believ'd might be read with Pleasure Perhaps I was mistaken but that Presumption was necessary â—o encourage me to write them For who would say any thing if he did not hope to be attended to I have said it 's true several things which seem to have less Analogy with the present Subject than would be the particular Treatment of the Motions of the Soul and I acknowledge it But 't is not my Intention to put my self under any Constraint when I propose to my self a Method I lay down a Rule to go by but I presume it may be permitted me to turn aside as I walk when any thing falls in my way to be consider'd I presume too I have the Liberty of diverting to a Resting Place provided I lose not Sight of the Road I am to pursue Such as will not ease themselves with me may go on if they please 't is but turning to a new Page But if they take it amiss I would let them know that there are many who find that the Resting Places I have made choice of make their Journey easier and more pleasant The End of the First Volume PREFACE to the Second Volume Which may serve as an Answer to the ANIMADVERSIONS on the First SOme time since was publish'd a Book entituled Animadversions upon the Search after Truth wherein at the same time are examin'd part of M. des Cartes 's Principles being a Letter by an Academick in Paris c. 'T is said this Book attacks me and truly not without Reason for the Title shews it and the Author manifests it was his Design which gives me a Right and imposes on me a sort of Obligation of speaking my Thoughts of it For besides that I ought to disabuse some people who delight in these petty Quarrels and immediately determine on the side of the Criticks that gratifie their Passion I think my self bound to give some Answer to the Aggressor that I may not be thought to be â—ilent out of Insolence or Impotence The Animadverter may pardon me if he pleases if I sometimes seem to give him Provocation I should be very sorry so much as to design it But I cannot defend my self without wounding him nor repell the Blows he makes at me without making him feel and others know his Weakness and Imbecillity Self-defence is a natural Obligation but the Defence of Truth is absolutely indispensible See here in short his Design He supposes the Book he animadverts on is a Method for laying the Foundations of the Sciences He reduces this Method to fourteen Heads and shews that they are either Suppositions without Proof or Assertioâ—s without Foundation and consequently that the Substance of the Book is intirely useless to the Enquiry after Truth though there are here and there some Observations in it that place it in the rank of Works which have gain'd the Estimation of our Age. I answer in General that the Author of the Animadversions has not understood or has dissembled the Understanding the Design of the Book he impungs it being plain that the principal Design of it is to discover the Errours we are subject to 'T is true it treats of the Nature of the Senses Imagination and Intellect but 't is manifest and I precaution in several places that this is only to discover these Errours in their Causes This being the Method I always endeavour to observe as believing it most advantageous to the enlightning the Mind The Title of the first Page of the Book he opposes wherein are to be seen in Capitals CONCERNING THE ERROURS OF THâ— SENSES the very Table of the same Book or rather the Place where I make the Division of the whole Work might have taught him my Design if he had desir'd to know it where he might have read these words which methinks are clear enough And so all the Errours of Men and the Causes of them may be reduc'd to five Heads and we shall treat of them according to that order First We shall speak of the Errours of the SENSES Secondly Of the Errours of IMAGINATION Thirdly Of the Errours of the PURE INTELLECT Fourthly Of the Errours of our INCLINATIONS And fifthly Of the Errours of the PASSIONS And thus having made an Essâ—y to rid the Soul of the Errours which she is subject to WE SHALL Lastly LAY DOWN A GENERAL METHOD TO CONDUCT HER IN THE SEARCH OF TRUTH 'T is plain enough from this Division that the first Volume which is the subject of our Aâ—thor's Animadversions treats only of the Senses Imagination and Intellect and that the Method which he supposes I have given ought to be the Subject of the Second Volume Nevertheless as he is pleased to make me undertake a Design I do not execute that he may have the more to Charge upon my Conduct so he goes to prove it was my Design to lay down a Method in that Book I do him no Injury says he in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundations of the Sciences For besides that the Title expresses so much he declares himself upon the Point in the following manner Let us examaine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice I do a Man no Injury when I say he designs to draw an Hercules but if I shew that instead of an Hercules he takes a Polyphemus or Thersites I make him ridiculous Should I say with many others that the Animadverter is a Cartesian or that he designed by his Animadversions on my Book to defend the Doctrine of Des Cartes I should not wrong him but if at the same time I should shew that he opposes me without understanding me I should possibly offend him 'T is then injuring a Man to charge upon him Designs which he never had to render him ridiculous But a Man must be wretchedly in the wrong who imposes them on such as have like me in several places explain'd themselves clearly upon
without Examination They consult their Memory and therein immediately find the Law or Prejudice by which they pronounce without much reflexion As they think their Parts better than other Men's they afford little Attention to what they read Hence it comes that Women and Children easily discover the Falsity of some Prejudices which they see attack'd because they dare not judge without examining and that they bring all the Attention they are capable of to what they read whilst Scholars on the contrary stick resolutely to their Opinions because they will not be at the Trouble of examining those of others when quite contrary to their preconceiv'd Notions As to the Attendants on the Great Men of the World they have so many external Adherencies that they cannot easily retire into themselves nor bring a competent attention to distinguish Truth from Probability Nevertheless they are not extremely addicted to any kinds of Prejudices For strongly to prosecute a Wordly interest neither Truth nor Probability must be rely'd on As a seeming Humility or Civility and external shew of Temper are Qualities which all Men admire and are absolutely necessary to keep up Society amongst Proud and ambitious Spirits Men of Worldly Designs make their Vertue and Desert to consist in asserting nothing and believing nothing as certain and indisputable It has ever been and will ever be the Fashion to look upon all things as Problematical and with a Gentleman-like Freedom to Treat the most holy Truths lest they should seem bigotted to any thing For whereas the Gentlemen I mention are neither applicative nor attentive to any thing but their Fortune there can be no Disposition more Advantageous or that seems more reasonable to them than that which the Fashion justifies Thus the Invaders of Prejudices whilst they flatter on one hand the Pride and Remisness of these Worldly Men are well accepted by them but if they pretend to assert any thing as Undeniable and to manifest the Truth of Religion and Christian Morality they are look'd upon as Opinionated and as Men who avoid one Precipice to run upon another What I have said is methinks sufficient to conclude what should be answer'd to the different Judgments divers Persons have pronouc'd against The Treatise concerning the Search after Truth and I shall make no Application which every Man may do himself to good purpose without any trouble I know indeed that every Man do will not do it but perhaps I might seem to be the Judge in my own Case if I should defend my self as far as I was able I therefore resign up my Right to the Attentive Readers who are the natural Judges of Books and I conjure them to call to Mind the request I made in the Preface of the foregoing Treatise and elsewhere Not to judge of my Opinions but by the clear and distinct Answers they shall receive from the only Teacher of all Mâ—n after having consulted him by a serious attention For if they consult their Prejudices as the decisive Laws to judge of the Book Concerning the search after Truth I acknowledge it to be a very ill Book since purposely wriâ—ten to detect the Falsity and Injustice of these Laws ADVERTISEMENT WHereas the following Illustrations were compos'd to satisfie some particular Persons who desir'd a more special Explication of some important Truths I think fit to premise that cleary to apprehend what I shall say it will be requisite to have some Knowledge of the Principles I have offer'd in the Treatise concerning the Search after Truth Therefore it will be the best way not to meddle with these Observations till after having carefully read the whole Work for which they were made and only to examine them at a second reading as they shall be found referr'd to by the Margin This Caution however is not absolutely necessary to be observ'd by understanding Persons because I have endeavoured so to write these Elucidations as that they might be read without referring to the Book they were compos'd for I know that Truth is of all things in the World that which gives least trouble to acquire it Men use not willingly to collate those Passages in a Book which have Reference to one another but commonly read things as they fall in their way and understand of them as much as they can wherefore to accommodate my self to this Temper of Men I have tried to make these Remarks intelligible even to those who have forgotten the Places of the foregoing Treatise whereunto they refer Nevertheless I desire those who will not be at the trouble of carefully examining these Illustrations not to condemn them of false and extravagant Consequences which may be deduc'd from want of understanding them I have some Reason to make this Request not only because I have right to demand of the Readers who are my Judges not to condemn without understanding me but on several other Accounts which it is not necessary for me to declare in this Place ILLUSTRATIONS UPON THE TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH THE FIRST ILLUSTRATION UPON THE First CHAPTER of the First BOOK God works whatever is real in the Motions of the Mind and in the Determinations of them notwithstanding which he is not the Author of Sin He works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence and yet is not the Author of it SOME Persons pretend that I relinquish the Comparison of the Mind and Matter too soon and fansie the one has no more Power than the other to determine the Impression which God gives it and therefore wish me to explain if I can what it is that God works in us and what we do our selves when we sin since in their Opinion I shall be oblig'd by my Explication either to grant that Man is capable of giving himself some new Modification or to acknowledge that God is actually the Author of Sin I answer That Faith Reason and my own inward Consciousness oblige me to quit the Comparison where I do being every way convinc'd that I have in my self a Principle of my own Determinations and having Reasons to persuade that Matter has no such Principle which shall be prov'd hereafter Mean while here is what God operates in us and what we do our selves when we sin First God continually drives us by an invincible Impression towards Good in general Secondly He represents to us the Idea of a particular Good or gives us the Sensation of it Lastly He inclines us to this particular Good First God drives us continually towards Good in general For God has made us and still preserves us for Himself He wills that we shall love all Good and is the first or rather only Mover In brief this is evident from innumerable things that I have said elsewhere and those I speak to will not dispute it Secondly God represents to us the Idea of a particular Good or gives us the Sensation of it For 't is he alone that enlightens us and the surrounding Bodies cannot
bounds them See here what an infinite number of invisible figures present themselves in an instant which are far more numerous than those our Eyes acquaint us withal which yet induce the Mind that trusts too much to their reach and capacity and stands not to examine things to the bottom to believe these Figures don't exist As for Bodies proportion'd to our Sight the number whereof is very inconsiderable in comparison of the other we discover their figure tolerably well but never know it exactly by our Senses Nay we cannot so much as be assur'd from our Sight if a Circle or a Square which are two of the most simple figures that are be not an Ellipsis and a Parallelogramme though these figures be both in our Hands and very near our Eyes I add farther that we cannot exactly discern whether a Line be Right or not especially if it be somewhat long We must then have a Rule for it But to what purpose we know not whether the Rule it self be such as we suppose it ought to be nor can we be fully satisfy'd concerning it And yet without the knowledge of this Line we can never know any figure as is evident to all the World This is what may be said in general of Figures which we have before our Eyes and in our Hands But if we suppose them at a distance from us how many changes do we find in the projection they make in the fund of our Eyes I will not stand to describe them here they may easily be learn'd in any Book of Opticks or by examining the Figures which we see in Pictures For since the Painter is oblig'd to change them almost all to the end they may appear in their Natural site and to paint for instance Circles like Ellipses 'T is an infallible sign of the Errors of our Sight in Objects that are not Painted But these Errors are corrected by fresh Sensations which possibly may be lookt upon as a sort of Natural Judgments and may be term'd the Judgments of the Senses In beholding a Cube for Example it is certain that all the sides we see of it never cause a Projection or an Image of an equal dimension in the fund of our Eyes since the Image of all these sides when painted in the Retina or the Optick Nerve nearly resembles a Cube pictur'd in Perspective and consequently the Sensation we have of it ought to represent the faces of a Cube unequal because they are so in Perspective This notwithstanding we see them all equal nor are we in an Error Now it might be said That this is occasion'd by a kind of Judgment which we are naturally inclin'd to make namely That the Faces of the Cube which are farthest from us ought not to cast on the fund of our Eyes so large Images as the Faces which are nearer but whereas Sensation is only peculiar to the Senses and Judgment in propriety of Speech cannot be ascrib'd to them it is certain this Judgment is only a Compound-sensation which consequently may be sometimes false However since that which is only Sensation in us may in Relation to the Author of Nature who excites it be consider'd as a kind of Judgment I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments because this form of Speaking is expedient in giving an account of things as may be seen towards the End of the Ninth Chapter and in several other places Though the Judgments I speak of are serviceable in correcting our Senses a thousand different Ways and without them we should hardly ever be in the Right nevertheless they fail not to be sometimes the occasion of our Error If it happens for instance that we see the Spire of a Steeple behind a great Wall or beyond a Mountain it will appear to us to be both little and at no great distance But if we should see it at the same distance but with many Fields and Houses lying betwixt us and it it would undoubtedly appear both much bigger and more remote although in both cases the projection of the Rays of the Steeple or the â—mage of the Steeple which is pictur'd in the fund of our Eye is altogether the same Now it may be said that the reason why we see it greater is the judgment we naturally make viz. That because so many Fields lie betwixt us and the Steeple it must needs be more remote and consequently greater But if on the other hand we saw no interjacent Lands betwixt our Eyes and the Steeple tho' at the same time we knew there were many and that it was a great way off which is very observable it would notwithstanding seem to us to be very little and very near as I have said before which we may farther suppose to happen from a kind of judgment natural to our Soul whereby she sees the Steeple in this manner because she judges it to be at five or six hundred paces distance For generally our Imagination represents no greater space betwixt the objects and our selves unless assisted by a sensible view of other intervening objects and beyond which it has still liberty to imagine something more 'T is for this reason that the Moon at the Rising or Setting is seen much bigger than when elevated a good height above the Horizon For this elevation removes our view from off the objects lying betwixt us and her the dimensions whereof we know so that we cannot judge of that of the Moon by forming the comparison between them But when she is just risen or about to set we see a great many Fields betwixt her and us of whose extension we have a tolerable knowledge and thus it is that we judge her more remote and upon that reason see her so large as we do And it must be observ'd That when she is elevated above our heads though our Reason most infallibly assures us she is vastly distant yet we cannot avoid seeing her very near and very little because indeed these Natural Judgments of the Sight are founded only on the Perceptions of the same Sight and Reason is unable to correct them So that they frequently lead us into Error by making us form voluntary judgments that go hand in hand along with them For when we judge according to our Sensations we are always deceiv'd though we never err in judging according to our Conceptions because the Body is no farther instructive than is conducing to the Body and 't is only GOD who always teaches us the Truth as shall be shewn hereafter These false Judgments not only deceive us in the Distance and Magnitude of Bodies which are not the Subject of this Chapter but in representing their Figure otherwise than it is We see for Instance the Sun and Moon and other very remote Spherical Bodies as if they were flat and only circular Because at that great distance we are unable to discern whether the part opposite to us is nearer us than the others and on
the Fire which causes it that Light is in the Air and Colours are upon colour'd Objects They have no Thought of any Motions of Imperceptible Bodies which are the Cause of these Sensations It is true they do not judge that Pain is in the Needle which pricks them in like manner as they judge that Heat is in the Fire But the reason of it is That the Needle and its Action are visible but the little parts of the Wood that proceed from the Fire and their Motion against our Hands are altogether invisible Thus seeing nothing that strikes upon our Hands when we warm our selves and yet feeling Heat in them we Naturally judge this Heat to be in the Fire for want of discovering any thing in it besides So that it is generally true that we attribute our Sensations to the Objects themselves when we are Ignorant of the Causes of these Sensations And because Pain and Titillation are produc'd by Sensible Bodies as by a Needle or a Feather which we both see and touch we for this Reason do not conclude that there is any thing in these Objects like the Sensations which they cause in us And yet I confess that we do not fail to judge Combustion is not in the Fire but only in the Hand though it proceed from the same cause i. e. the Action of the little parts of the Wood as well as Heat which yet we attribute to the Fire But the Reason of this is That Combustion is a Species of Pain For having often judg'd that Pain is not in the external Body which produces it we are induc'd to form the same Judgement of Combustion That which is another Reason of our Judging in this manner is that Pain or Combustion most strenuously applys our Soul to the consideration of the parts of her Body and this Intension of the Soul turns off her thoughts from any other thing Thus the Mind attributes the Sensation of Combustion to the Object that is most present and nigh her self And because we find presently after that the Combustion has left some visible marks in the part in which we felt the Pain this is a Confirmation of the Judgement we have made that Combustion is in the Hand But this is no Impediment why we should not embrace this general Rule That we are accustom'd to attribute our Sensations to Objects when-ever they act upon us by the Motion of some Invisible Parts And upon this ground it is that we usually believe Colours Light Smells Tasts Sounds and some other Sensations to be in the Air or in the External Objects which produce them for as much as all these Sensations are produc'd in us by the Motions of some Imperceptible Bodies CHAP. XII I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we have no Perception of these Motions or that we confound them with our Sensations III. An Experiment that proves it IV. Three kinds of Sensations V. The Errors that accompanie them THE second thing that occurs in every Sensation is the Vibration of the Fibres of our Nerves which is communicated to the Brain And we err in confounding always this Vibration with the Sensation of the Soul and in judging there is no such Vibration at all when we have no Perception of it through the Senses We confound for instance the Vibration excited by the Fire in the Fibres of our Hand with the Sensation of Heat And we say the Heat is in the Hand But because we are insensible of any Vibration caus'd by Visible Objects in the Optick Nerve which is in the Fund of the Eye we think this Nerve is not vibrated at all nor cover'd with the Colours that we see On the contrary we judge these Colours are spread only on the surface of the External Objects Yet it is manifest by the following Experiment that the Colours are as strongly and lively express'd on the Fund of the Optick Nerve as in visible Objects For take but the Eye of an Ox just kill'd and strip off the Coats that are opposite to the Pupill and situate near the Optick Nerve putting a piece of very transparent Paper in their room This done place the Eye in the hole of a Window so as the Pupill may be towards the Air and the hind-part of the Eye in the Chamber which should be close shut up and darken'd all over And upon this the Colours of Objects that are out of the Chamber will appear to be spread upon the Fund of the Eye but painted topsy-turvy If it fortunes that the Colours are not lively enough on the account of the too little distance of the Objects represented in the Fund of the Eye the Eye must be lengthened by constringing the sides of it or shortned if the Objects are too remote We see by this Experiment that we ought to judge or perceive that Colours are in the Fund of the Eye in like manner as we judge that Heat is in our Hands if our Senses were given us for the Discovery of Truth and if Reason conducted us in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses But in accounting for this inconsistent Variety of our Judgements about Sensible Qualities it it must be consider'd That the Soul is so intimately united to her Body and moreover has contracted so much Carnality since the Fall that she attributes a great many things to the Body which are only peculiar to her Self and can hardly any longer distinguish her self from it Insomuch that she does not only attribute to it all the Sensations we are at present speaking of but also the Force of Imagination and even sometimes the Power of Reasoning For there have been a multitude of Philosophers stupid and senseless enough to believe the Soul was nothing else but the more refin'd and subtle part of the Body A Man that shall read Tertullian considerately will be but too sensibly convinc'd of what I say since he subscribes to this Opinion after a great number of Authors whose Authority he alledges This is so true that he endeavours to prove in his Book Concerning the Soul that we are oblig'd by Faith Scripture and particular Revelations to believe the Soul a Corporeal Being I design not a Refutation of his Notions because I have suppos'd a Man to have read some of St. Austin's or Mr. Des-Cartes's Works which will sufficiently discover the Extravagance of these Thoughts and confirm and corroborate the Mind in the Distinction of Extension and Thought of the Soul and Body The Soul then is so blind as not to know her self nor discern that her own Sensations do belong to her But to explain this it is necessary to distinguish in the Soul three kinds of Sensations some Vigorous and Lively others Faint and Languishing and lastly a Middle sort between these two The Vigorous and Lively Sensations are such as surprize and quicken the Mind with a sort of Violence as being
obtain'd a Facility for Meditation who would only take up with the clear and distinct Notions of Intellect and industriously reject all the confus'd Idea's of Sense and who had both Time and Inclination for Study would doubtless very rarely fall into Error But such a Man as this is not the subject of our Discourse 't is Men of the vulgar stamp who usually have nothing of this in them I say then that the Solidity and Consistence accruing with Age to the Fibres of Men's Brains gives the Solidity and Consistence to their Errors if I may so speak 'T is the Seal that seals up their Prejudices and all their false Opinions and locks them from the Attempts and Force of Reason In fine by how much this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is advantagious to well Educated Persons by so much it is prejudicial to the greatest part of Mankind because it confirms each of them in the Notions they have taken up But Men are not only confirmed and strengthened in their Errors when they have attained to the Age of Forty or Fifty Years They are still more liable to fall into new ones every day for believing themselves competent Judges of every thing as indeed they ought to be they peremptorily determine yet only consult their Prejudices to give a decision For Men reason only upon things with relation to the Idea's they are most familiar with and accustomed to When a Chymist would reason about any Physical Body immediately his three Principles are present to his Mind A Peripatetick has recourse forthwith in his Thoughts to his four Elements and the four Primitive Qualities And another Philosopher drives every thing up to other Principles And so there can nothing enter into the Mind of a Man but is instantly tinged with the Error he is subject to and augments their number This Consistence of the Brain has besides a very mischievous Effect especially on more Aged sort of People which is to incapacitate them for Thought and Meditation They are unable to fasten their Attention upon any thing they have a Mind to know and so are incapable of reaching to Truths that are any thing obscure or intricate They are utterly insensible to the most reasonable Opinions when founded upon Principles that to them seem Novel though as to those other concerns that Age has given them Experience in they are very understanding Men. But all that I here affirm is only to be understood of those who have spent their younger days without the due Use and Improvement of their Mind and applying it as they should do To illustrate these things 't is necessary to know that not any thing whatever can be learned without Advertency and Attention and that 't is impossible we should be attentive to any thing unless we Imagine it and frame a lively Representation of it in our Brain But to the end we may Imagine any Objects 't is necessary we should inflect some part of our Brain or impress some other kind of Motion in it that we may frame the Traces whereunto are consociated the Ideas that represent these Objects to us So that if the Fibres of our Brain were any whit hardned they would be capable of no other Inflection or Motions than those they were formerly us'd to And thus the Soul could form no Imagination of nor consequently be attentive to what she pleases but only to such things as are customary and familiar to her Hence we ought to conclude that 't is of very great Advantage to use a Man's self to Meditate upon all sorts of Subjects in order to acquire an Habitual Facility of Thinking on what he will For as we acquire a great Readiness at moving our Fingers all manner of ways and with a prodigious Nimbleness by the frequent Use we make of them in playing on a Musical Instrument so the parts of our Brain the Motion whereof is necessary to the Imagining what we please attain by Use a certain Facility of Plying and Inflecting themselves which makes us imagine the things we have a Mind to with a great deal of Ease Readiness and Distinction Now the best means of procuring this Disposition which causeth the Principal Difference between a Man of Parts and another is to accustom a Man's self from his Youth to the Disquisition of the Truth of things very abstract and difficult Because in that Age the Fibres of the Brain are pliable and flexible all manner of ways I suppose not however that this Facility can be acquir'd by those we call Men of Books and Learning who only apply themselves to Reading without Meditation and without searching out the Resolution of Questions themselves before they Read them in Authors 'T is palpable enough that hereby they only acquire a Facility of Remembring what they have read 'T is daily observ'd that Men of much Reading are unable to bring Advertency of Attention to things that are new to them and unheard of and that the Vanity of their Learning inclining them to form a Judgment of them before they conceive them makes them fall into gross Errors to which other Men are not obnoxious But though the want of Advertency is the main Cause of their Errors there is one still that is peculiar to them which is that finding ever in their Memory abundance of confus'd Notions they presently select some one of them and consider it as the subject of the Question And because the things a Man speaks are not conformable to it they ridiculously conclude he is in an Error Should you endeavour to represent to them that they are deceiv'd themselves and that they understand not so much as the state of the Question they fall into a Passion and not being able to conceive what is said to them they persist to embrace that false Notion their Memory has suggested But should the falsity of it be made too manifestly apparent they substitute a second and a third in its room which they defend sometimes against all appearances of Truth and even against their own Conscience as having but little Respect or Love for Truth but a great deal of Shame and Confusion in acknowledging there are things another knows better than themselves All that has been said concerning Men of forty or fifty Years old ought with greater allowance to be understood of Aged Men because the Fibres of their Brain being still more inflexible and wanting Animal Spirits to imprint new Traces in it their Imagination is altogether faint and languid And whereas generally the Fibres of their Brain are loaded with abundance of superfluous Humours they lose by degrees the Memory of things past and return to the weaknesses usually incident to Childhood Thus in this Decrepid Age they have the Defects which depend on the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain which are found both in Children and in grown Men. Though it may be said they have more Prudence than either of them because they are less subject
speak at random and without foundation I am oblig'd to transcribe a Passage here of La Cerda somewhat long and tedious wherein that Author has amass'd together the different Authorities upon that Subject as upon a Question of greatest Importance These are his words upon the Second Chapter of Tertullian De Resurrectione carnis Quaestio haec in scholis utrinque validis suspicionibus agitatur num animam immortalem mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseveraverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos Hi sunt è Graecis Latinis interpretibus Ammonius uterque Olympiodorus Philoponus Simplicius Avicenna uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. De examine vanitatis Cap. 9. Theodorus Metochytes Themistius S. Thomas 2 Contrà gentes Cap 79. Phys. Lect. 12. praetereà 12. Metaph. Lect. 3. Quodlib 10. Qu. 5. Art 1. Albertus Tract 2. De Anima Cap. 20. Tract 3. Cap. 13. Aegidius Lib. 3. De Anima ad Cap. 4. Durandus in 2 Dist. 18. Qu 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes latè Eugubinus L. 9. De perenni Philosophia Cap. 18. quod pluris est discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus magistri mentem ore calamo novisse penitus qui poterat In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres nec infirmi Philosophi Justinus in sua paraenesi Origines in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ut fertur Nazianzenus in Disp. contrà Eunom Nyssenus Lib. 2. de Anima Cap. 4. Theodoretus de Curandis Graecorum Affectibus Lib. 3. Galenus in Historia Philosophica Pomponatius L. de Immortalitate Animae Simon Portius L. de Mente Humana Cajetanus 3. de Anima Cap. 2. In eum sensum ut caducum Animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis de Auditore qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem quamvis Eugubinus Cap. 21. 22 eum excuset Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander mortalitatem nempe ex 12. Metapâ— inde S. Thomas Theodorus Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt Porrò Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque Nam cum hic adscribat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae tamen L. de Anima C. 6. pro contraria opinione immortalitatis citat Eadem mente fuit Plutarchus pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in L. 5. de placitis Philosoph Nam Cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit Cap. 25. immortalitatem Ex Scholasticis etiam qui in neutram partem Aristotelem constantem judicant sed dubium ancipitem sunt Scotus in 4. Dist. 43. Qu. 2. Art 2. Harveus quodlib 1. Q. 11. 1. Sent. Dist. 1. Q. 1. Niphus in opusculo de Immortalitate Animae Cap. 1. recentes alii Interpretes quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem sed Scholii lex vetat ut authoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam I deliver all these Quotations as true upon the integrity of the Commentator as thinking it would be loss of time to stand to verifie them Nor have I all those curious Books by me from which they were taken I add no new ones of my own as not envying him the Glory of having made a good Collection And it would still be a greater loss of time to do it though a Man should only turn over the Indices of Aristotle's Commentators We see then in this Passage of La Creda that Men of Books and Study that have pass'd for the Ingenious of their Times have taken abundant Pains to know whether Aristotle believed the Immortality of the Soul and there have been some of them who are able to write Books peculiarly on the Subject as Pomponatius For that Author 's chief Design in his Book is to shew that Aristotle believ'd the Soul was Mortal And possibly there are others who not only are solicitous to know what were Aristotle's thoughts upon this Subject but who moreover look upon it as a very important Question to know for instance whether Tertullian Plutarch or others believ'd or not whether it was Aristotle's Opinion that the Soul was Mortal As there is great Reason to suppose from La Cerda himself if we reflect only on the latter part of the Passage we have quoted Porrò Tertullianum c. Though it be an useless thing to know what Aristotle believ'd concerning the Immortality of the Soul and what were Tertullian's and Plutarch's thoughts concerning Aristotle's belief yet the foundation of the Question The Immortality of the Soul is at least a Truth very necessary to be known But there are infinite things the Knowledge whereof is very impertinent and useless and consequently more useless still to know what were the Ancient thoughts about them and yet there are Men very anxious and inquisitive in conjecturing the Opinions of Philosophers on such sort of Subjects There are found whole Books full of these ridiculous Inquiries and 't is these noisâ—e trifles that have been the occasion of so many Wars among the Learned These vain and impertinent Questions these ridiculous Genealogies of fruitless Opinions are the important Subjects for the Criticisms of the Learned They think they have the Right and Privilege of dispising those who dispise these Fooleries and of treating as ignorant Persons such as glory in being ignorant of them They imagine they are perfect Masters of the History and Genealogy of Substantial Forms and the Age is ungrateful unless it acknowledge their Merit These things manifestly discover the weakness and vanity of the Mind of Man and that when Reason does not govern his Study his Studies are so far from perfecting his Reason that they darken corrupt and totally pervert it 'T is worth while here to observe that in Questions of Faith 't is no fault to search into the Belief of St. Austin for instance or any other Father of the Church nor even to make Inquiry whether St. Austin's Belief was the same as his Predecessors Because matters of Faith are only learn'd by Tradition and Reason is unable to discover them The most Ancient Faith being the most true we must endeavour to know what was the Faith of the Ancients which cannot be done but by Examining the Opinion of several Persons who have succeeded one another in several times But things which depend on Reason are quite of another Nature and we ought not to be solicitous about the Opinion of the Ancients to know what we ought to hold concerning them Yet I know not by what strange subversion of Reason some Men are angered if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle has done and yet take it very patiently to hear a Man talk in Divinity contrary to the Gospel the Fathers and Councils I am of Opinion that those who make the greatest out-cry against the Novelties of Philosophy which ought to be had in Esteem are the most obstinate and
Sensibility of Men the Corruption of the Senses and the Passions dispose them to the desire of being struck with it and provokes them to strike others with it also I am then of Opinion that there is no Author more fit than Seneca to exemplifie that contagious Communication of a great many Men who go by the Name of the Fine and Bold Wits and to shew how these strong and vigorous Imaginations domineer over the Weak and Unenlightened Minds not by the force and evidence of their Reasons which are the Productions of the Mind but by the Turn and lively way of Expression which depend on the Strength of Imagination I know well enough that this Author's Reputation is considerable in the World and ' will be look'd upon as a rash attempt to have treated him as a very Imaginative and Injudicious Author But 't was chiefly upon the Account of his Esteem I have said so much of him here not out of any Envy or ill Humour but because the Estimation he is in will more sensibly touch the Mind of the Reader and more closely apply it to the Consideration of the Errors I have attack'd For we should as far as possible bring the most Eminent Instances when the things we say are important it being sometimes an Honouring a Book to Critizice upon it But yet I am not the only Man that finds fault with the Writings of Seneca for not to mention some Famous Men of our own Age 't is near six hundred Years ago that a most Judicious Author observ'd there was little Exactness in his Philosophy little Judgment and Justice in his Elocution and his Reputation was rather the result of the Heat and indiscreet Inclination of Youth than the Consent of Learned and Judicious Men. Publickly to engage the grossest and most palpable Errors is labour lost there being no contagion in them 'T would be ridiculous to advertise Men that Hypocondriack People are deceiv'd 't is visible to all the World But if those very Men they have the greatest Opinion of should chance to be mistaken 't is a piece of service to admonish them lest they should imitate them in their Errors Now 't is plain that the Spirit of Seneca is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity And whereas Pride according to the Scripture is the Origine of Sin Initium Peccati Superbia The Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel nor his Morals be allied to the Morals of our SAVIOVR the only true and solid Morals True 't is that all the Notions of Seneca are not false nor dangerous And he may be read with profit by such as have an exactness of Thought and are acquainted with the Foundation of Christian Morality Good use has been made of him by Great Men and I have no intent of blaming those who to accommodate themselves to the Weakness of others that had an excessive Esteem for him have drawn Arguments from his Works whereby to defend the Morality of our LORD and oppugn the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons The Alcoran has many good things in it and some true Prophecies are to be found in the Centuries of Nostradamus The Alcoran is made use of to oppose the Religion of Mahomet and Nostradamus's Prophecies may be of use to convince some Fantastick and Visionary People But what is good in the Alcoran can't make it a good Book nor can some true Explications in Nostradamus's Centuries make him ever pass for a Prophet neither can it be said that all who make use of these Authors approve them or have for them any real Esteem A Man ought not to go about to overthrow what I have said about Seneca by alledging abundance of Quotations out of him which contain in them nothing but solid Truths and consonant to the Gospel For I grant many such are met with in that Author and so there are in the Alcoran and other mischievous Books Nor would he be less to blame who should overwhelm me with the Authority of those great Numbers who have made use of Seneca since use may be made of what we think an impertinent Book provided those we speak to judge otherwise of it than our selves But to ruine intirely the Wisdom of the Stoicks we need only know one thing which is sufficiently prov'd by Experience and by what we have already said which is that we are link'd and fasten'd to our Body our Relations our Friends our Prince and our Country by such ties as we neither can break nor could for shame endeavour it Our Soul is united to our Body and by our Body to all things Visible by so potent an Hand that 't is impossible by our own force to loosen the Connection 'T is impossible our Body should be prick'd but we must be prick'd and hurt our selves because the state of Life we are in most necessarily requires this Correspondence between us and the Body which we have In like manner 't is impossible to hear our selves reproach'd and despis'd but we must feel some discontent thereupon because GOD having made us for sociable converse with other Men has given us an Inclination for every thing capable to bind and cement us together which Inclination we have not strength enough of our selves to overcome 'T is Extravagance to say that Pain does not hurt us and that words of Contumely and Contempt are not at all offensive to us as being above such things as these There is no getting above Nature without being assisted by Grace nor was there ever any Stoick who despis'd Glory and the Esteem of Men through the meer Strength of his Mind Men may indeed get the mastery of their Passions by contrary Passions They may vanquish their Fear or their Pain by Vain Glory I mean only that they may abstain from Flying or Complaining when seeing themselves in the midst of a multitude the desire of Glory supports them and stops those motions in their Bodies which put them upon Flight In this manner they may conquer them but this is no Conquest or Deliverance from their slavery 't is possibly to change their Master for some time or rather to put on a longer and an heavier chain 'T is to grow wise happy and free only in appearance but in reality to suffer an hard and cruel bondage The natural union a Man has still with his Body may be resisted by that union he has with Men because Nature may be resisted by the strength of Nature GOD may be resisted by the forces He himself supplies us with but GOD cannot be resisted by the strength of a Man 's own mind Nature can't be perfectly vanquish'd but by Grace because GOD cannot if I may be allow'd so to speak be overcome but by the special auxiliaries of GOD himself And thus that so much celebrated and vaunted Division of all things in such as depend not on us and such as we ought not to depend on is a Division that seems agreeable to Reason
but is not consistent with this disorder'd state Sin has reduc'd us to We are united to all the Creatures by the Order of GOD but we absolutely depend on them by the Disorders of Sin So that being incapable of Happiness when in Pain or Disturbance we ought not to hope for Happiness in this Life by imagining we have no Dependence upon those things to which we are naturally slaves There is no possibility of being happy except by a lively Faith and a solid Hope which gives us a fore-tast of the Enjoyment of future Goods nor of living up to the Rules of Vertue and overcoming Nature unless supported by the Grace merited for us by Our LORD and SAVIOVR JESVS CHRIST CHAP. V. Of Montagne's Book MONTAGNE's Essays may serve as another instance to prove the Influence some Imaginations have over others For that Author has such a sort of a Fine and Debonaire way and gives such a Lively and Natural Turn to his Thought as 't is almost impossible to read him without being prejudic'd in his behalf that his affected Negligence admirably becomes him and indears him to most Men without making him contemptible and his Arrogancy is that of a Gentleman if we may say so that makes him respected and not disliked That Air of Gentility and Gallantry sustain'd by some stock of Learning works so prodigiously on the Mind that a Man often admires him and still yields to his Decisions without daring to enquire into them and sometimes without understanding them 'T is not by the strength of his Reasons he perswades for Reasons are seldom alledg'd for what he advances at least such as have any force and solidity in them And indeed he neither has any Principles whereon to bottom his Reasonings nor any Method to make Deductions from his Principles A Touch of History is no Argument nor a little Story a Demonstration A couple of Verses of Horace or an Apophthegm of Cleomenes or Caesar are not fit to perswade Reasonable Men And yet these Essays are nothing but a Contexture of scraps of History little Relations good Words Distichs and Apophthegms Montagne should not be look'd upon in his Essays as a Man that argues but as one that writes for his Diversion whose drift is the Pleasure and not the Instruction of his Reader And if those that read him were only diverted by him it must be own'd that Montagne could not do them so much harm But 't is next to impossible to forbear loving that which pleases and not to desire those Dishes that are agreeable to the Palate Nor can the Mind long be pleas'd with the reading of an Author but it will take in its Sentiments or at least receive some Tincture from them which mingling with its Idea's makes them confus'd and obscure But 't is not only dangerous to read Montagne for Diversion by reason that the Pleasure a Man takes in him insensibly engages him in his Opinions but also because his Pleasure is more criminal than is imagin'd For 't is certain that this Pleasure arises chiefly from Concupiscence and that it only feeds and strengthens the Passions this Author's way of Writing being only so taking because 't is sensible and moving and that it rouses our Passions in an imperceptible manner It would not be time mispent to prove this in particular and in general that we are pleas'd with all the divers Styles of Men meerly on the account of the secret Corruption of our Morals but this is not the proper place for it and besides it would carry us too far from our purpose However if we but reflect on the Connection of our Idea's and Passions I formerly spoke of as also upon what passes within our selves at the time of our Reading some well wrote piece we may in some measure discover that if we love the Sublime Style the noble and free Air of some Authors 't is because of our Vanity and our Passion for Greatness and Independency And that the relish we find in that delicacy of Effeminate Discourses is deriv'd from no other Fountain than a secret Inclination for Softness and Pleasure In a word 't is Sensibility and not Reason a certain Skill and Faculty for what affects the Senses and not for Truth that makes some Authors charm and ravish us even whether we will or no. But to return to Montagne The Reasons why his greatest Admirers so much cry him up to me seems to be that they thought him a Judicious Author and far from the imputation of Pedantry as also one who was throughly acquainted with the nature and weaknesses of the Mind If I should shew then that Montagne with all his Gallantry was as much a Pedant as many others and that he had a very imperfect Knowledge of the Mind I shall make it appear that those who most admire him were not perswaded by the Evidence of his Reasons but were only brought over by the Force of his Imagination The word Pedant is very Equivocal but Use if I mistake not and even Reason will have it signifie those who to make ostentation of their false Science quote all sorts of Authors right or wrong talk meerly for talking sake and to be admir'd by the Ignorant and without any Judgment or Discretion amass together Apophthegms and Passages of History to prove or at least pretend to prove things that cannot be made out by any thing but Reason Pedant is oppos'd to Rational and that which makes Pedants so odious to Men of Sense is their being Irrational for sensible Men naturally loving to Reason can't endure the Conversation of those who reason not at all Pedants are unable to reason because their Mind is little or else is taken up with False Learning and they are unwilling to reason as knowing they are esteem'd and admir'd by some sort of People more for their citing some passage of an Unknown or Ancient Author than pretending to Argument and Reasoning And thus their Vanity acquiescing in the prospect of the respect that 's paid to them fixes them to the study of uncommon and out of the way Sciences that attract the Admiration of the Vulgar Pedants therefore are vain and arrogant of great Memory and little Judgments successful and powerful in Citations misfortunate and weak in Reasons Of a vigorous and capacious Imagination but desultory and disorderly and unable to keep to any Accuracy and Exactness Having thus clear'd the Notion of the word Pedant it will be no hard matter to prove Montagne as much a Pedant as most others in this signification of it which seems most agreeable to Reason and Custom For I speak not here of the Pedant of the Long Robe it being not a Paedagogue's Gown that only makes a Pedant Montagne who had such an aversion to Pedantry possibly never wore a Gown but nevertheless could not divest himself of all his Imperfections He has labour'd much for a Gentleman-like way but has taken no great pains for exactness of Thoughts or
be Curious for New Discoveries and always unquiet in the Enjoyment of ordinary Goods Should a Geometrician go to give us New Propositions contrary to Euclide's and pretend to prove that Science full of Errours as Hobbs has essay'd in a Book he wrote against the Pride of the Giometricians I confess we should be to blame to be pleas'd with such sorts of Novelties since Truth being found we ought to be constant in embracing it our Curiosity being given us only to excite us to the Discovery And therefore 't is no common fault with Geometricians to have a Curiosity for new Opinions in their Science They would quickly be disgusted with a Book whose Propositions contradicted those of Euclid for that being infallibly assur'd of the truth of his Propositions by incontestable Demonstrations their Curiosity must cease on that respect An infallible sign that our Inclination for Novelty proceeds only from our want of Evidence as to the Truth of things we desire naturally to know and our not possessing the Infinite Goods which we naturally long to enjoy 'T is then just and equitable that men should be excited by Novelty and fond of persuing it But however there are Exceptions to be made and some Rules to be observ'd which may easily be deduc'd from our Assertion viz. That the Inclination for Novelty is only given us to discover Truth and our real Goods These Rules are three in number the first of which is That Men must not love Novelty in matters of Faith which are not under the Jurisdiction of Reason The second That Novelty is no reason to induce us to believe things to be true or good that is we must not judge any Opinion true because t is Novel nor any Good capable of contenting us because 't is new and extraordinary and we have never yet enjoy'd it The third That when we are moreover assur'd that some Truths lie so deep that 't is Morally impossible to discover them and that some Goods are so little and slender that they can never satisfie us the Novelty ought not to raise our Curiosity nor must we give way to be seduc'd by false Hopes But we will explain these Rules more at large and shew that the want of observing them engages us in a vast number of Errours We commonly meet with Men of two quite opposite humours some that will always blindly and implicitly believe others that will ever plainly and evidently perceive The former having scarce ever made use of their Reason indifferently believe whatever they hear the latter resolving always to exercise their Mind even in matters that are infinitely above it equally despise all sorts of Authorities Those are commonly of a stupid or weak capacity as Children and Women these are Haughty and Libertine Wits as Hereticks and Philosophers We very rarely meet with Men exactly poiz'd in the midst of these two Extremes who seek not for Evidence in matters of Faith by a vain and fruitless Agitation of Mind or that sometimes believe not without Evidence false Opinions about Natural things by an indiscreet Deference and servile Submission of Spirit If they be Men of Religion and defer greatly to the Authority of the Church their Faith extends sometimes if I may be allow'd to say so to Opinions purely Philosophical and they pay them the same respect as the Truths of the Gospel whilst their illegitimate Zeal too readily prompts them to censure and condemn all of a different Sentiment and Persuasion Hence they entertain injurious suspicions against Persons that make New Discoveries and 't is sufficient to pass for a Libertine with them to deny Substantial Forms that the Creatures feel Pleasure and Pain and other Philosophical Opinions which they believe true without any evident Reason only because they imagine some necessary Dependencies between these Opinions and matters of Faith But if Men are more bold and daring the Spirit of Pride carries them to despise the Authority of the Church and they are hardly brought to submit to it They delight in harsh and presumptuous Opinions and love to be thought Bold Wits and upon that prospect talk of Divine things irreverently and with a sort of domineering Arrogance dâ—spising as too credulous such as speak modestly of some receiv'd Opinions Lastly they are extremely dispos'd to doubt of every thing and are quite opposite to those who too easily submit to the Authority of Men. 'T is manifest that these two Extremes have nothing laudable and that those that require not Evidence in Natural Questions are no less culpable than others who demand it in the Mysteries of Faith But yet the former who hazard the being mistaken in Philosophical Questions by too easie a Belief are doubtless more excusable than the latter who run in danger of Heresie by a presumptuous doubting For 't is less perillous to fall into infinite Errours of Philosophy for want of examining them than into one Heresie for want of an humble Submission to the Authority of the Church The Mind reposes it self upon finding Evidence but 't is toss'd and disturb'd when it finds none because Evidence is the Character of Truth And therefore the Errour of Libertines and Hereticks proceeds from their Doubting that Truth is to be met with in the Decisions of the Church because they see it not with Evidence and hoping at the same time that the Points of Faith may be evidently known Now their passion for Novelty is corrupt and disorder'd because having already the Truth in the Faith of the Church they ought no longer to seek for it besides that the Truths we are taught by Faith being infinitely above our Reason they could not be discover'd supposing according to their false Notion that the Church was guilty of Errour But as many Err by refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church so there are no fewer that deceive themselves by submitting to the Authority of Men. The Authority of the Church must always be yielded to because it can never err but we must never blindfoldly resign to the Authority of Men because they are always liable to mistake The Doctrines of the Church infinitely transcend the powers of Reason but the Doctrines of Men are subject to it So that if it be an intolerable Vanity and Presumption to follow the Guidance of our Mind in seeking for Truth in matters of Faith without Respect to the Authority of the Church it is likewise a sordid Levity and a despicable Meanness of Spirit blindly to believe upon the Authority of Men in Subjects depending on Reason Notwithstanding which it may be said that most of those who bear the Name of Learned in the World have purchas'd their Reputation merely by getting by rote the Opinions of Aristotle Plato Epicurus and some other Philosophers and by blindfoldly embracing and wilfully maintaining their Opinions An Acquaintance with the Sentiments of some Philosophers is enough to entitle to Degrees and exteriour Badges of Learning in the Universities And provided
a Man shall swear in Verba Magistri he shall speedily commence a Doctor Most Communities have a Ped and Learning peculiar to themselves which every private Person is oblig'd to stand and fall by What is true in one Society is false in another They sometimes take pride in maintaining the Doctrine of their Order against Reason and Experience and think they are oblig'd to warp and distort the Truth or make their Authors buckle that they may be consistent with it Which has occasion'd an infinite multitude of trifling Distinctions which are so many By-ways to lead infallibly to Errour If any Truth be now a-days discover'd Aristotle must have known it but if Aristotle be against it the Discovery is false Some make that Philosopher speak one way some another for all Pretenders to Learning teach him to speak in their own Dialect There is no Impertinence but he is introduc'd as uttering nor any New Discovery but is found enigmatically treasur'd up in some corner of his Books In a word he constantly contradicts himself if not in his Works at least in the Mouths of his Professors For though the Philosophers declare and indeed design to teach his Doctrine yet 't is an hard thing to find two to meet upon his Opinions because in effect his Books are so obscure and abound with so many loose indefinite and general Terms that even those Mens Notions may with some likelihood be ascrib'd to him that are the most opposite in the World He may be made to say any thing in some of his Works because he says just nothing whilst he makes much Noise as Children make the Bells â—ound what they have a mind to because they are very noisie but inarticulate 'T is true it seems reasonable to fix and determine the Mind of Man to particular Opinions to keep it from rambling and extravagance But why must it be done by Falshood and Errour Can Errour be thought capable of reuniting divided Minds If we consider how rare it is to find Men of Sense and Parts satisfy'd with reading Aristotle and persuaded they have acquir'd true Science though grown old in poring on his Books we shall evidently perceive that nothing but Truth and Evidence can quiet the Agitation of the Mind and that Disputes Aversions Errours and Heresies are kept up and fortify'd by the Corrupt Course and Method of Mens Study Truth consists in indivisibili is incapable of Variety and nothing else can reunite Mens Minds But Errour and Falshood can only divide and disturb them I make no question but there are such as honestly believe that he whom they style the Prince of Philosophers is guilty of no Errour and that his Works are the Magazines of true and sound Philosophy There are Men who imagine that in the space of two thousand Years the Time since he wrote no Man has been able to say he has made a Blot or been guilty of a Mistake and so making him infallible in a manner they can pin their Faith upon him and quote him as infallible But 't is not worth while to stand to answer such Gentlemen as these because their Ignorance must needs be exceeding gross and meriting more to be pitied than oppugn'd I desire only of them if they know that either Aristotle or any of his Followers have deduc'd any Truth from the Principles peculiar to him or if possibly themselves have done it that they would declare it explain it and prove it and I promise them never more to speak but to Aristotle's Praise and Commendation His Principles shall no longer be calumniated as useless since they have at last been serviceable to prove one Truth But we have no Reason to hope this For the Challenge has been long since offer'd and M. Des Cartes among the rest has done it in his Metaphysical Meditations almost Forty Years ago and oblig'd himself to demonstrate the Falshood of that pretended Truth And there is great Probability no Man will ever venture to attempt what M. Des Cartes's greatest Enemies and the most zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy never yet durst undertake I beg leave then after this to say That it is Blindness Slavishness of Spirit and Stupidity thus to betray Reason to the Authority of Aristotle Plato or whatever other Philosopher That 't is Loss of Time to read them out of no other Design than to remember their Opinions and 't is to waste that of others too to teach them in that manner And I may say with St. Augustin That a Man must be sottishly curious who sends his Son to the College to learn the Opinions of his Tutour That the Philosophers cannot instruct us by their Authority and to pretend to it is a piece of Injustice That 't is a kind of Madness and Impiety to take a solemn Oath of Allegiance to them And Lastly that 't is to detain Truth in an unjust Bondage from Interest and Partiality to oppose the New Opinions of Philosophy that may be true to keep up the credit of such as are known to be either false or useless CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the same Subject I. An Explication of the Second Rule concerning Curiosity II. An Explication of the Third THE Second Rule to be observ'd is That Novelty should never pass with us as a Reason to believe things to be true We have often said That a Man ought not to acquiesce in Errour and the seeming Goods which he enjoys That 't is just he should seek for the Evidence of Truth and the True Good which he does not possess and consequently have an Inclination for things that are New and Extraordinary Yet he is not for all that to cleave to them or to believe out of a Levity of Humour that Opinions are true because novel and that Goods are real because they have not been experienc'd Novelty should only put him upon examining New things carefully which he ought not to despise because he does not know them nor rashly to believe to contain what his Hopes and Wishes aim at But here follows a thing of common Observation When Men have examin'd Ancient and Receiv'd Opinions without perceiving the bright Light of Truth when they have tasted Common Goods without finding the solid Pleasure that should attend the Possession of Good and when their Desires and Longings are not abated by ordinary Goods and Opinions If then they hear of any thing new and unexperienc'd the Idea of Novelty gives them Grounds of hoping that this is the very thing they search for And because they commonly flatter themselves and willingly believe things are as they wish them to be their Hopes strengthen as fast as their Desires increase till at last they insensibly grow into imaginary Assurances Hereupon they so inseparably annex the Idea of Novelty to the Idea of Truth that the one is never excited without the other and that which is newest seems always truer and better than what is more ordinary and common Wherein
they widely differ from some others who from an Abhorrence of Heresie having join'd the Idea of Novelty with that of Falsity imagine all New Opinions false and including something of dangerous Importance Thence it may be concluded That this customary Disposition of the Mind and Heart of Man in respect of all that bears the Character of Novelty is one of the most general Causes of their Errours It hardly ever conducts them to the Truth but when it does 't is purely by Chance and good Luck and it constantly obviates their Possession of their True Good by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and falsly seeming Goods the World is fill'd with which is the most dangerous Errour Man can fall into The Third Rule against the excessive Desires of Novelty is That when we are otherwise assur'd that some Truths lie so deep that 't is morally impossible to discover them and that some Goods are so little and slender that they cannot make us happy the Novelty of them ought not to excite our Curiosity Every one may know by Faith Reason and Experience That all created Goods are notable to fill the infinite Capacity of the Will We are taught by Faith that all worldly things are Vanity and that our Happiness consists neither in Riches nor Honours Reason assures us that since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires and that we are carried by a Natural Inclination to the loving all Goods that we cannot become Happy but by possessing HIM who contains them all Our own Experience makes us sensible that we are not Happy in the Possession of the Goods we enjoy because we are still desirous of others Lastly We daily see that the mighty Goods which Princes and the most Potent Kings enjoy on Earth are incapable of filling their Desires That they have even more Disturbances and Troubles than other Men and that being on the highest Point of Fortune's Wheel they must be infinitely more shaken and agitated by its Motion than those which sit lower and nearer its Axis For in short they never fall but 't is from a Precipice they receive no little Wounds and all that Grandeur which attends them and which they incorporate with their own Being only enlarges and extends them that they may receive a greater Number of Wounds and be more expos'd to the Insults and Blows of Fortune Faith Reason and Experience thus assuring us that earthly Goods and Pleasures which we have never tasted could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them special Care ought to be taken according to the Third Rule to supersede being flatter'd with the vain Hope of Felicity which Hope insensibly increasing proportionably to our Passions and Desires will at last end in a false Confidence and an ill-grounded Assurance For when we are extreamly passionate for any Good we always imagine it excessively great and by degrees persuade our selves we shall be happy in the Enjoyment These vain Desires then must be resisted since to try to satisfie them would be a fruitless Attempt But especially for this Reason that when we give way to our Passions and spend our Time to afford them Satisfaction we lose GOD and all things with him we only run from one seeming Good to another live always in false Hopes distract and agitate our selves a thousand ways and meet with perpetual Oppositions and frustrations because the desired Goods are sought but can't be possess'd by many at once and at last we die and can enjoy nothing more For as we are taught by St. Paul They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare and into many foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition for the love of money is the root of all evil But if we ought not to be sollicitous for the Goods of the Earth which are new to us as being certain that the Happiness we are in search of is not to be found in them much less ought we to desire to know the new Opinions about a vast many difficult Questions as being otherwise convinc'd that an humane Mind can never discover the truth of them Most of the Questions treated of in Morals and Physicks are of that nature which may afford us Reason to suspect the generality of those Books we see daily compos'd upon very obscure and most perplexing Subjects For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain are solvable yet so few Truths being hitherto discover'd and so many to be known before we can come to those that are handled in these Books they cannot be read without hazarding to lose much by them But yet this is not the Method that is taken but the quite contrary Men examine not whether what is said be possible Promise them only extraordinary things as the Restitution of Natural Heat Radical Moisture Vital Spirits or other Unintelligible Matters and you excite their vain Curiosity and prepossess them 'T is enough to dazle them and win their Assent to offer them Paradoxes to make use of obscure Words Terms of Influence or the Authority of some unknown Authors or to make some very sensible and unusual Experiment though it have no reference to the thing advanc'd For Confusion is Conviction to some sorts of People If a Physician a Chirurgeon or an Empirick quote but some Greek and Latin Sentences and talk to their Hearers in new and extraordinary Terms they take them for Great Men they give them the Prerogative of Life and Death and believe them as they would an Oracle They imagine themselves too that they are elevated to a pitch above the common size and pierce to the bottom of things And if one happen to be so indiscreet as to testifie that five or six insignificative Words that prove nothing will not go down for Reason they think a Man void of Common-sense and that he denies First Principles And indeed these Gentlemen's First Principles are five or six Latin Words of an Author or some Greek Passage if they have greater Abilities It is even necessary for skilful Physicians to talk sometimes in an unknown Tongue to their Patients to purchase Reputation and to make themselves attended to A Physician who can go no farther than Latin may pass well enough in a Country Parish because Latin is Greek and Arabick to the Illiterate But if a Physician cannot at least read Greek â—o learn some Aphorism of Hypocrates he must not expect to pass for a Scholar with the Inhabitants of a City who commonly understand Latin And so the most Learned amongst them knowing this Humour of the World are forc'd to talk like Cheats and Quacks and we are not always to take an Estimate of their Parts and Learning from the Discourse they have in their Visits CHAP. V. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-love II. The Division of it into Love of Being and of Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure THE Second Inclination which the Author of Nature
see not GOD as we see and touch this Fruit nay we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves And so we judge not that GOD is the true Cause of that Sweetness nor that it is a Modification of our Soul but impute both the Cause and Effect to the Fruit we eat What I have said of Sensations relating to the Body may be understood of those which have no relation to it such are those which are incident to pure Intelligences A Spirit contemplates it self and finds nothing wanting to its Happiness or Perfection or else sees that it is not in possession of what it desires Upon the View of its Happiness it feels Joy upon the sight of its Misery it feels Sorrow It immediately imagines that 't is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self this Sensation of Joy because this Sensation still accompanies this Perception and fancies likewise that the sight of its Misery is what produces in it the Sensation of Sorrow because the latter is a constant Attendant of the former The true Cause of these Sensations which is GOD alone does not appear to it nor does it it may be think on GOD. For GOD acts in us in an imperceptible manner GOD rewards us with a Sense of Joy when we find our selves in the state we ought to be in to the intent we may continue in it that our Anxiety may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be taken up with any thing else But he produces in us a Sensation of Sorrow when we know we are not in our convenienâ— state to the end we may not stay in it but restlesly seek out for the Perfection which we want For GOD continually drives us towards Good when we know that we do not possess it but gives us a powerful Check when we see we are fully possess'd of it Wherefore 't is evident to me that the Sensations of Intellectual Joy and Sorrow no less than Sensible are not the voluntary Productions of the Mind Our Reason then should constantly teach us to discover that invisible Hand which fills us with Good and which lies disguis'd to our Mind under Sensible Appearâ—nces This Hand we are to adore and to love and also to fear since though it loads us with Pleasures it can likewise over-whelm us with Pains We ought to love it with a Love of Choice an enlightned Love a Love worthy of GOD and our selves Our Love is worthy of GOD when it proceeds from our Knowledge of his being Amiable and this Love is worthy of our selves for that being Reasonable Creatures we ought to bestow our Love on that which Reason teaches us is worthy of it But we love sensible Things with a Love unworthy our selves and undeserv'd by them whilst being reasonable we love them without any Reason for it as not clearly knowing them to be lovely and on the contrary knowing they are not But we are betray'd by Pleasure to the Love of them the blind and irregular Love of Pleasure being the true Cause of the false Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality CHAP. XI Of the Love of Pleasure with Reference to Speculative Sciences I. How it disables us from discovering Truth II. Some Instances OUR Inclination for Sensible Pleasures being misgovern'd is not only the Original of those dangerous Errours we are guilty of in Subjects of Morality and the general Cause of the Corruption of our Manners but likewise one of the main Causes of the Depravation of our Reason And it insensibly engages us in most gross but less dangerous Errours in point of Subjects purely Speculative because it disables us from bringing a sufficient Attention to comprehend and judge well of things that do not affect us We have spoken several times already of the Difficulty we find to apply our selves to Subjects somewhat Abstract the Subject of our Discourse requiring it As towards the End of the First Book where we shew'd that Sensible Ideas more affecting the Soul than Ideas purely Intellectual she was more taken up with the out-side manners than the Things themselves So again in the Second where treating of the Tenderness of the Fibres of the Brain we shew'd whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds proceeded Lastly in the Third when speaking of the Attention of the Mind it was necessary to shew that it was very careless of things Speculative but very attentive to such as affected her and made her feel Pleasure or Pain Our Errours have most commonly several Causes contributing to their Rise so that it ought not to be thought it is for want of Order that we repeat almost the same things and assign several Causes of the same Errours it is really because they have so many I still speak of Occasional Causes for we have often declar'd they have no other true and real Cause than the wrong use of our Liberty which wrong use consists in our not using it so much as we might as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Treatise We are not therefore to be blam'd if in order to make it fully conceiv'd how for Instance the Sensible Manners Things are involv'd in surprize and lead us into Errour we were oblig'd by way of Anticipation to speak of our Inclination for Pleasures in the other Books which seems fitter to have been reserv'd for this wherein we purposely treat of the Natural Inclinations and the same may be said of other things in other places All the harm that will come of it is this that we may dispense with many things here which we had been oblig'd to explain if it had not been done elsewhere All things in the Humane Nature are so link'd and twin'd to one another that we find our selves often as it were over-whelm'd with the Number of things necessary to be said at the same time to set our Conceptions in an open and clear Light We are sometimes forc'd to let things go unseparated which Nature has join'd together and to proceed against our own prescrib'd Method when this Method throws us in Confusion as it inevitably does on some Occasions And yet after all it is impossible to make others take in all our Conceptions All that can commonly be pretended to is to put others in a Capacity of discovering with Pleasure and Ease what we have discover'd our selves with great Pains and Fatigation And since 't is impossible to make any Discovery without Attention our Studies should be chiefly employ'd on Means of making others Attentive This is what we have essay'd to do though we must acknowledge but weakly perform'd and we are the willinger to confess we have been defective that the Confession may provoke our Readers to supply themselves what is wanting in us to make them attentive in order to penetrate the Bottom of Subjects which deserve to be thorowly consider'd Infinite are the Errours wherein our Inclination for Pleasures and in general
more like a Divine than Philosopher For example among other things he concludes That u if the Will had not this Liberty but must have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an appearance of Truth it would have almost ever been deceived whence probably it might be concluded that the Author of its Being was the Author of its Errours and Seducements And afterwards We have therefore a Liberty given us by God that we might avoid falling into Errour 'T is visible this reasoning is founded on the Author 's supposing God will not deceive us x But may it not be doubted whether God has not made us for the enjoyment of probability only and resolv'd to reserve the knowledge of Truth as his own peculiar or whether he designs not this as a pure accession to our Happiness y in Heaven wherefore we ought not to conclude that he would be a Deceiver if he should not afford us the means of discovering it z I leave it Sir to you to think what the Pyrronists would say if they should hear this arguing Many such there are in the process of this piece especially in the last part whereof most Chapters contain Arguments which include theological Questions a b Whether then he considers all these Suppositions as Articles of Faith or regards them as Truths demonstrable by Philosophy he ought still to distinguish them from the Fundamentals of his Work If he considers them as Articles of Faith he is very well pâ—rsuaded they are obscure If he looks on them as conclusions of Humane Science his Method ought to precede them and not imploy them as Principles to depend upon If I thought the World would be concern'd to know exactly that the Animadverter has not understood what he has pretended to encounter I would thus continue him on to the end of his Book and would make it undeniably appear that he has hardly ever taken my Sense and that he had no Idea of my Design but I believe that reasonable Men will be very indifferent in this particular and therefore not to weary them to no purpose and yet to discharge that Debt which some persons think I owe to Truth I will answer in few words all the Chapters of the Animadversions and I desire such as shall have leasure and curiosity enough to examine whether my Answers are just by confronting the Animadversions with the Search In the fourth Article or Chapter the Animadverter opposes my Opinions at large without knowing them He does not consider there are two sorts of Traces one which the Mind forms to represent things by as the Trace which accompanies the Idea of a Square the other which accompanies abstract Ideas but represents them not such are the Traces which the Sound of Words and the Sight of Characters produce in the Brain which naturally have no power to represent or raise Ideas This one Distinction overthrows the grand Reasonings of our Author In this fifth Chapter he puts upon me many Opinions which I never had 'T is not true That I acknowledge all our Ideas to be but Modes of our Soul 's existing On the contrary I have in the third Book which he reflects on given a Chapter on purpose to shew that Opinion indefensible When a Man will play the Critick 't is fit methinks he should read the Book he takes to task Nor is it true that I own that the Ideas we receive by the Senses represent only the Effects produc'd in us hy external Objects I have said the contrary in several places in the fifteenth Chapter of the first Book and elsewhere Why does he not cite or rather why does he not examine what he Criticises on For what remains I cannot distinctly conceive all the Argumentations he here makes I know not the Reason of them those who attentively read them may think of them what they please But I scruple not to affirm that he is so far from impugning my Opinion about the manner of the Minds perceiving external Objects that on the contrary what he says in this Article shews he knows nothing of it In his sixth Chapter he imposes on me what he calls my sixth Supposition or rather he has no knowledge of my Opinion upon that Subject To me he seems not so much as to have read what I have written on it he affirms in several places that I bottom upon Mr. des Cartes 's resolution upon that Question when yet my Opinion is intirely different from his But 't is evident to all that understand Mr. des Cartes and have read what I have said upon that Question that the Author neither understands mine nor Mr. des Cartes's Opinions Mean-while he argues vehemently without knowing what he opposes and even sometimes without discovering what he aims at The Author is very much in the wrong in his seventh Chapter to require me to prove the Existence of Extension when I mean only to assault the Errours of the Senses in point of sensible Qualities and I should have repented if I had follow'd that Method I prove what is serviceable to me in the sequel and I establish nothing upon the Supposition he attributes to me Moreover I cannot tell how it came into his Head after seven years to complain of an Answer of Monsieur Rohault he should have replied to it whilst he was alive but he wanted courage for every one knows with what accuracy and force that learned Man repell'd the Blows that were offer'd him and with two or three words pronounc'd without all manner of Heat and Passion humbled the Imagination of such as being full of themselves thought to cover him with confusion In answer to the eighth Chapter I desire the Author to take notice first that there is difference between an Evil and the Representation of it and therefore the Will may fly the former and yet aquiesce in the latter Secondly that though the Will be nothing but the natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general yet the Rest or Acquiescence of the Soul in evident Truths proceeds from the Will because Rest is produ'd by Motion God will still imprint on us this natural Motion of Love when we shall intirely repose our selves upon him For the Motion of Love doth not cease by the possession of Good and by the view of Truth as Motion of Bodies is interrupted by Rest. We might say farther that even Bodies rest not as capable of Figures but with respect to Motion The rest need no Answer if the Reader will carefully consider those places in the Search which he attacks for 't is needless to answer Objections which vanish upon a distinct Understanding of what I have written though they appear considerable in themselves In the ninth Chapter the Author opposes my own Objections and neglects the Answers I have given them and not knowing there are several sorts of Liberty he fancies with a great deal of Joy that I have fallen into a Contradiction I
because they have been determin'd by the Will of God which is not subject to change as that a Bowl should move another on such an encounter 'T is easie to see he has not understood what he pretends to oppose He was not aware that the Conjuctive Particle and had sometimes the same purport as the Disjunctive or for if he had observ'd it he could with no good Grace have seriously wrangled upon the Ambiguity of a Particle He might have easily consider'd that Truths which are Necessary by their Nature as that Two times Two make Four need not the Will of God to make them such But be it granted that I had not sufficiently explain'd my self yet the place on which he criticises being but accessary to my Design it was not necessary to explain my self more at large Would a Man be at the pains of reading it he might see I needed only to say there were necessary Truths and that I was not oblig'd to examine the cause of their nececessity f For my part I know not what he drives at this is a very commodious way of criticising a Man has Reason whenever he desires it g He imposes on me three Falsities in six Lines I have never determin'd upon this Question neither in undue Circumstances nor with insufficient Proofs for I have not so much as spoken of it but if he has a mind to know my Thoughts of it I fear not to affirm that God cannot cause Contradictories to be true and false at the same time h He confounds Beings with Truths Man is capable of Reason and Sense A Globe may be divided into two Hemispheres A Man and a Globe are subject to change but these Truths are immutable l All this concerns not me but only shews the Fecundity of our Author m Consider if you please all these Flourishes endeavour to understand them and admire how the Imagination seduces Reason I think our Author may be said to resemble a Man who imagining he sees his Enemy at hand should presently charge against the Phantom should pierce it with his Sword should cut off its Head and then over-joy'd with so successful and easie a Conquest should triumphantly exclaim though my Pistols had miscarried my sword had run him through but though my Sword had missed him yet I had cut off his Head but lastly though his Head should have remained upon his Shoulders yet I found him so feeble and easily to be conquered that I had nothing to fear from him 'T is visible from all these Flourishes that our Author fancies he has severely handled me whilst yet I am as insensible of his Wounds as the Enemy the poor Man thought he had so cruelly Butcher'd n I ought in our Author's opinion to have begun with Theology to prove methodically there are necessary and contingent Truths but I do not believe that Conduct would have had the Approbation of many People and seeing it is an hard task to content the Criticks I cannot believe our Animadverter would have been well satisfied This third Head which I am going to comment on as on the preceding sufficiently shews us what he is o I know not whether what I say ought to be rank'd amongst Proverbs and Quibbles for that depends upon the Tast and I refer my self to those whom the Passion for criticising has not made over scrupulous and dainty They likewise may reflect whether this niceness suits well with the Author of this Discourse and whether he ought so much to pretend to an exquisite Tast. q Can he not see that these things are not of themselves Articles of Faith and that we may speak of the Goodness of God deprav'd Manners and corrupt Inclinations without having recourse to Faith p There 's a great difference between mingling and confounding I shall always distinguish things of Faith from those of Nature as I here say ought to be done But I never made a Resolution not to speak of God or Christian Morality in treating about the Search after Truth The Author seems not to understand me that he may play the Critick with less trouble r There are in these Animadversions some little Raileries which provoke to Pity but this might raise ones Indignation Let him know once for all that if I consented to the Publication of this Book 't was chiefly because it contains those things which he condemns as Enthusiasms s If he speaks of himself we ought to take his word for it t What he has said is true but what he goes to conclude from it is false it being Reason and not Faith which teaches us God is no Deceiver u He has here suppress'd two words which give all the force to my reasoning which runs thus If it must infallibly and necessarily have embrac'd every thing we shall see by and by what reason he had for this Retrenchment x Reason teaches us that God is no Deceiver and Faith supposes it which is quite contrary to what the Animadverter imagines y It cannot be doubted when we have Reasons for it but it is needless to stand to answer all these Questions z I do not conclude it with that Argument Mine is good and this good for nothing there is difference between INFALLIBLY and NECESSARILY forcing us to embrace Errour and not giving us the means to discover Truth Certainly these words Infallibly and Necessarily ought not to be suppress'd a He cannot shew a place in the whole Book he animadverts on where I suppose any Article of Faith as a Principle from whence to draw any Consequences Essential to the Search of Truth But he imagines if a Man speaks but of the Goodness of God deprav'd Manners and corrupt Inclinations he is treating of some Article of Faith b Methinks these two Conclusions have no other aim than to gain by surprise some little Applauses from such as give them gratis ADVERTISEMENT SInce the first Impression of this second part two Books have been publish'd relating to it The first entituled Animadversions upon the Animadversions on the Search after Truth wherein is discovered c. I am highly oblig'd to the Author of these Animadversions for the Honour he seems to do me by the Title of his Book but since this Title may make the World believe I had some hand in his Work I think my self oblig'd to say that though I am very well satisfied with his Person I am not extremely pleas'd with his Book Methinks that those who meddle in defending or opposing others ought to read their Works carefully so as to be throughly acquainted with their Opinions But the Search after Truth you 'll say merits not the Application of Men of Parts True it deserves not therefore that the Person spoken of who undoubtedly is a Man of great Sense and Worth should either impugn or defend it The Title of the second Book runs thus The Animadverter's Answer to the Preface of the second Volume of the Search after Truth wherein is examin'd c. I
Conditions might be fully treated of in general yet they are too well known by those that are conversant with the World and of all the thinking part of Mankind to increase with them the Bulk of this Book especially seeing that our Eyes may afford us a very pleasant and solid Instruction of all such matters But if any chuse to read them in Greek rather than to learn them by his own reflection on what he sees I refer him to the second Book of the Rhetoricks of Aristotle which I take to be the Master-Piece of that Philosopher because he says there few things in which he can be mistaken and that he seldom ventures to prove what he asserts It is therefore evident that the sensible Union of the Mind of Men with whatever has any Relation to the preservation of their Life or of the Society of which they are Members differs in different Persons reaching farther in those that have more Knowledge that are in a higher Station and are indued with a larger Fancy whereas that Union is stricter and stronger in those that are more sensible that have a livelyer Imagination and have more blindly given up themselves to the violence of their Passions Such Considerations upon the almost infinite Bands that fasten Men to sensible Objects are of an extraordinary Use and the best way to become a great proficient in this sort of Learning is the study and observation of our selves since from the Inclinations and Passions of which we are conscious in our selves we can be fully assur'd of all the inclinations of other Men and can make a good guess at a great part of the Passions they are subject to to which adding the Information we can get of their particular Exgagements and of the different Judgments that follow from every different Passion of which we shall speak hereafter it may perhaps not prove so hard a Task to guess most part of their Actions as it is for an Astronomer to foretell an Eclipse For though Men be free yet it seldom happens that they make use of their Liberty in opposition to their natural Inclinations and violent Passions Before the Close of this Chapter I must observe that it is one of the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body that all the Inclinations of the Soul even those she has for Goods that have no relation to the Body should be attended with Commotions of the Animal Spirits that render those Inclinations sensible because Man being not a pure Spirit it is impossible he should have any Inclination altogether pure and without mixture of any Passion whatsoever So that the love of Truth Justice Vertue of God himself is always attended by some Motion of the Animal Spirits that render that love sensible though we be not aware of their sensibility being then taken up with livelyer Sensations Just as the Knowledge of Spiritual things is always accompanied with traces on the Brain which indeed make that Knowledge more lively but commonly more confused 'T is true we are frequently inapprehensive of the Imagining Faculty's mixing in any manner with the Conception of an abstracted Truth The Reason of it is that those Truths are not represented by Images or traces of Nature's Institution and that all the traces that raise such Ideas have no Relation with them but such as proceeds from Chance or the Free-will of Men. For Instance Arithmeticians and Algebraists who apply themselves to very abstracted Objects make however a very great use of their Imagination in order to fix the view of their Mind upon these Spiritual Ideas The Cyphers the Letters of the Alphabet and the other Figures which they see or imagine are always join'd to those Ideas though the traces that are wrought by these Characters have no proper Relation to those abstracted Objects and so can neither change nor obscure them Whence follows that by a proper Use and Application of these Cyphers and Letters they come to discover such remote and difficult Truths as could not be found out otherwise Since therefore the Ideas of such things as are only perceivable by the pure Understanding can be connected with the traces of the Brain and that the sight of Objects that are beloved hated or fear'd by a Natural Inclination can be attended with the Motion of the Animal Spirits it plainly appears that the thoughts of Eternity the fear of Hell the hope of an Eternal Happiness though they be Objects never so insensible can however raise in us very violent Passions And therefore we can say that we are united in a sensible manner not only to such things as relate to the preservation of our Life but also to Spiritual things with which the Mind is immediately and by it self united And even it often happens that Faith Charity and Self-Love make that Union with Spiritual things stronger than that by which we are join'd to all sensible Objects The Soul of the true Martyrs is more united to God than to their Body and those that suffer Death for asserting a false Religion which they believe to be true give us sufficiently to know that the fear of Hell has more power upon them than the fear of Death There is for the most part so much heat and obstinacy on both sides in the Wars of Religion and the defence of Superstitions that it cannot be doubted but some Passion has a hand in it and even a Passion far stronger and stedfaster than others because it is kept up by an Appearance of Reason both in such as are deceived and in those that follow the Truth We are then united by our Passions to whatever seems to be the Good or the Evil of the Mind as well as to that which we take for the Good or Evil of the Body Whatever can be known to have any relation to us can affect us and of all the things we know there is not one but it has some reference or other to us We are somewhat concern'd even for the most abstracted Truths when we know them because there is at least that Relation of Knowledge betwixt them and our Mind and that in some manner we look on them as our Property by virtue of that Knowledge We feel our selves as wounded when they are impugned and if we be wounded then surely we are affected and disturb'd So that the Passions have such a vast and comprehensive Dominion that it is impossible to conceive any thing in reference to which it may be said that Men are exempt from their Empire But let 's now see what is their Nature and endeavour to discover whatever they comprehend CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the Changes happening either to the Body or Soul in every Passion SEven things may be distinguished in each of our Passions save Admiration only which is indeed but an Imperfect Passion The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object or rather the confused or distinct View of the Relation that Object has to
engages us to apply our selves to Subjects that are very disgusting First because that Passion is very dangerous to the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly draws us into ill Studies that have more Lustre than Use or Truth in them and Lastly because it is very difficult to moderate it and that we often become its Fool and Property and instead of enlightning the Mind we only strengthen the Concupiscence of Pride which both corrupts our Moral Powers and darkens our Understanding with an undissolvable Obscurity For it must be consider'd how That Passion insensibly increases settles and fortifies it self in the Heart of Man and when it is too violent instead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth it strangely blinds it and even persuades it that Things are just as it desires they should be Sure it is there would not be so many false Inventions nor imaginary Discoveries were not Men's Heads giddy'd by the ardent Desire of appearing Inventors For the firm and obstinate Persuasion wherein several Persons have been to have found for Instance the Perpetual Motion the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary Desire of seeming to have perform'd what others have vainly attempted And therefore 't is fitter to excite in us such Passions as are so much more useful to our searching out of Truth as they are more strong and wherein the Excess is not to be fear'd Such are the Desires of making a good Use of our Mind of freeing our selves from Prejudices and Errours of getting a sufficient Light to behave our selves in our Condition and such others as neither engage us into fruitless Studies nor carry us on to rash and inconsiderate Judgments When we have begun to taste the pleasure of making use of our Mind to be sensible of the Profit that arises from it have freed our selves of violent Passions and have disrelish'd sensible Pleasures which always prove the Masters of or rather the Tyrants over Reason in those that indiscreetly give up themselves to them we need not other Passions but such as we have spoken of to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we desire to meditate But most Men are not in that Condition they have neither Taste nor Understanding nor Curiosity for any thing but what affects the Senses their Imagination is corrupted by an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which raise none but false Ideas and as they depend upon all the Objects that resort to the Senses and Imagination so they always judge by the Impression they receive from them that is with reference to themselves Pride Debauchery the various Engagements the restless Desires of Advancement which are so common amongst the Men of the World darken the Sight of Truth and stifle in them the Sense of Piety because they separate them from God who alone is able to enlighten as he alone is able to govern us For we cannot increase our Union with sensible Things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truth since we cannot be at the same time strictly united with Things so different and opposite Those whose Imagination is pure and chaste that is whose Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces that fasten them to visible Things may easily unite themselves to God listen attentively to the Truth that speaks to them and even forbear the Use of the most just and rational Passions But as to those that live amongst the Great who depend upon too many things and whose Imagination is soil'd by the false and obscure Ideas of sensible Objects they cannot apply themselves to the Truth unless they be born up by some Passion strong enough to countervail the Weight of the Body that carries them down and to imprint Traces on their Brain that may make a Revulsion upon the Animal Spirits However as every Passion can only by it self perplex our Ideas they ought to use that Help but so far as Necessity requires and all Men ought to study themselves that they may proportionate their Passions to their Weakness It is no hard matter to find a Method of raising in us such Passions as we desire since the Knowledge we have given in the foregoing Books of the Union betwixt Soul and Body has sufficiently open'd the way to it In a word no more is requir'd than to think attentively upon those Objects that by the Institution of Nature are able to raise the Passions Thus we may almost at any time excite in our Hearts whatever Passion we have occasion for but because we can easier excite them at any time than suppress them or remedy the Disorders they cause in the Imagination we must be very sober and cautious in employing them Above all we must take care not to judge of Things by Passion but only by the clear Sight of the Truth which is almost impossible when the Passions are somewhat lively they ought only to raise our Attention but they never fail of stirring up their proper Ideas and violently driving the Will to judge of Things by those Ideas that affect it rather than by the pure and abstracted Ideas of Truth that make no Impression upon it So that we often make Judgments which last no longer than the Passion because they are not produced by the clear Sight of the immutable Truth but by the Circulation of the Blood True it is that Men are wonderfully obstinate in some Errours which they maintain as long as they live but then those Errours have other Causes than the Passions or at least depend on such as are permanent and lasting proceeding from the Constitution of the Body from Interest or from some other durable Cause For Instance Interest being a Motive of a continual standing produces a Passion that never dies and the Judgments that arise from it are very long liv'd But all the other Sentiments of Men which depend upon particular Passions are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours They say one while this another while that and yet what they say is commonly conformable to what they think And as they run from one counterfeit Good to another by the Motion of their Passion and are disgusted at it when that Motion ceases so they run from one false System into another and ardently assert a false Opinion when Passion makes it probable which the Passion ebbing they afterwards forsake By their Passions they taste of every Good without finding any really so and by the same Passions see all Truths without discovering any thing absolutely true though in the time of their Passion what they taste seems to them the Sovereign God and what they see an undeniable Truth The Senses are the second Spring whence we can draw Succours to make the Mind attentive Sensations are the very Modifications of the Soul and differ from the pure Ideas of the Mind the former raising a much stronger Attention than the latter So that 't is plain that
Lines Geometrical Consequences may be drawn from them and when those Consequences are made sensible by Lines 't is almost impossible to mistake Thus may Sciences be carried very far with great easiness For Instance The Reason why we distinctly know and precisely mark an Octave a Fifth a Fourth in Musick is that the Sounds are expressed by Strings exactly divided and that we know that the String which sounds an Octave is in double proportion with that from whence the Octave rises that a Fifth is with it in a Sesquialter Proportion or as 3 to 2 and so of the rest For the Ear alone cannot judge of Sounds with so much nicety and accuracy as a Science requires The most skilful Practitioners the most delicate and nicest Ears are not sensible enough to observe the difference betwixt certain Sounds and judging of things by the Sensation they have of them fasly imagine that there 's none at all Some cannot distinguish betwixt an Octave and 3 thirds others fancy that the Major Tone differs not from the Minor so that the Comma which is their Difference is insensible to them and much more the Schisma which is but the half of the Comma And therefore 't is Reason alone that manifestly shews us that the space of the String which makes the Difference betwixt certain Sounds being divisible into several parts there may still be a great number of different Sounds very usefull for Musick which the Ear cannot distinguish Whence it plainly appears that without Arithmetick and Geometry we should have no exact and regular Knowledge of Musick neither could we succeed in that Science but by Chance and Imagination and so Musick would cease from being a Science grounded upon undeniable Demonstrations In the mean while it must be granted that the Songs which owe their birth to the strength of Imagination are for the most part finer and more pleasant to the Senses than those that are composed by Rule And likewise in Mechanicks the Heaviness of a Body and the Distance of the Centre of Heaviness from its Prop being capable of more of less both may be figured by Lines So that Geometry is usefull to discover and demonstrate an infinite number of new Inventions very convenient to this Life and pleasing to the Mind because of their Evidence For Instance If a Weight of six pounds is to be put in aequilibrium with one of three let that Weight of six pound hang on the Arm of a Balance at two Foot distance from the Prop then only knowing this general Principle of all Mechanicks That Weights to stand in aequilibrium must be in a reciprocal Proportion with their Distances from the Prop that is That one Weight must be to the other as the Distance betwixt the last Weight and the Prop is to the Distance of the first Weight from the said Prop it will be easie to find out by Geometry what must be the Distance of a Weight of Three pounds that all may remain in aequilibrio if you find by the Twelfth Proposition of the Sixth Book of Euclid a fourth proportional Line which here will be of four Foot So that you may plainly discover all the Truths that depend upon that fundamental Principle of Mechanicks when once known by the use of Geometry that is by representing with Lines whatever can be considered in Mechanicks Geometrical Lines and Figures are therefore most proper to represent to the Imagination the Relations betwixt Magnitudes or betwixt things that differ in degree of more and less as Spaces Times Weights c. as well because they are most simple Objects as that they are imagin'd with great easiness It may even be said to the Honour of Geometry That Lines can represent to the Imagination more things than the Mind can know Since Lines can express the Relations of incommensurable Magnitudes that is such Relations as cannot be known because there is no common Measure to compare them together But that Advantage is not very considerable as to the Search after Truth because those sensible Representations of incommensurable Magnitudes discover nothing to the Mind Geometry is therefore exceedingly useful to make the Mind attentive to those things whose Relations we desire to discover However it must be granted that it is sometimes an Occasion of Errour because the evident and pleasant Demonstrations of that Science takes us up so much that we have not a sufficient Regard for the Consideration of Nature Thence it comes that the new-invented Engines do not all succeed that those Musical Composures in which the Proportions of Consonances are best observed are not always the most grateful and that the most accurate Calculations of Astronomy do not always best foretell the Incidence and Duration of Eclipses Nature is not abstracted Levers and Wheels in Mechanicks are not Mathematical Lines and Circles All Men are not pleased with the same Musical Tunes nor even the same Man at different times for their Satisfaction proceeds from the Commotions of their Spirits than which nothing can be more variable And as to Astronomy the Course of the Planets is not perfectly regular whilst floating in the vast Spaces they are irregularly carried by the fluid Matter that surrounds them So that the Errours of Astronomy Musick Mechanicks and all Sciences in which Geometry is used are not to be ascribed to that undoubted Science but to the false Application that is made of it For Instance we suppose that Planets by their Motion describe Circles and Ellipses perfectly regular And though that be not exactly true yet wâ— doe well to suppose it so that we may draw Inferences from thence and because it wants but little of being true but we must still remember that the Principle from which we argue is a Supposition Likewise in Mechanicks we suppose Wheels and Levers perfectly hard without gravity and rubbing and like to Mathematical Lines and Circles or rather we have not a sufficient consideration for the said Gravity and rubbing for the Nature of the Matter and the Relation those things have betwixt them We mind not that Hardness and Bulk increase Heaviness Heaviness fretting whilst fretting diminishes Force and causes the Engine to break or wears it out very quickly So that what often succeeds upon a small portion of Matter seldom takes effect upon a great Body No wonder therefore if we mistake since we argue from Principles not fully known nor yet because it rids us not of all Errours must we imagine Geometry useless It makes us draw from our Suppositions very true and consequential Inferences and affords us an evident Knowledge of what we consider by making us attentive We can even discover by its means the Falshood of our Suppositions for being certain of the Truth of our Reasonings which however do not agree with Experience we discover that our Principles are false But without Geometry and Arithmetick we can discover nothing that is somewhat difficult in the most accurate Sciences though we argue from
Water that feels warm to the Hands will seem cold if we wash with it any Part near the Heart Salt that is savoury to the Tongue is pricking and smarting to a Wound Sugar is sweet and Aloes very bitter to the Tongue but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the other Senses So that when we say a Thing is cold sweet bitter c. that same has no certain Signification Secondly Because different Objects can cause the same Sensation Plaister Bread Snow Sugar Salt c. are of the same Colour and yet their Whiteness is different if we judge of 'em otherwise than by the Senses And therefore when we say that Meal is white we say not any thing distinctly significative The third Reason is Because such Qualities of Bodies as occasion Sensations altogether different are however almost the same whereas such as excite very near the same Sensation are often very different The Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness differ but little in Objects whereas the Sense of Sweet essentially differs from that of Bitter The Motions that cause Smart and Tickling differ but in more or less and yet the Sensations of Tickling and Smart are essentially different On the contrary the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does however that sharp Quality is the farthest from Bitterness that possibly can be For a Fruit that is sharp for being unripe must undergo a great many Changes before it grows bitter from Rottenness or too much Ripeness When Fruits are ripe they taste sweet and bitter when over-ripe Bitterness and Sweetness therefore in Fruits differ but in degree of more and less which may be the Reason why they seem sweet to some Persons whilst they taste bitter to others Nay there are those to whom Aloes seem as sweet as Honey The same may be said of all sensible Ideas so that the Words Sweet Bitter Salt Sowre Acid c. Red Green Yellow c. of such and such a Smell Savour Colour c. are all equivocal and raise no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind However School-Philosophers and the vulgar part of Men judge of all the sensible Qualities of Bodies by the Sensations they receive from them Nor do the Philosophers only judge of these sensible Qualities by their own Sensations of them but also judge of the Things themselves from the Judgments they have pass'd about sensible Qualities For from their having had Sensations of certain Qualities essentially different they judge that there is a Generation of new Forms producing those fantastick Differences Wheat appears yellow hard c. Meal white soft c. Thence upon the Testimony of their Eyes and Hands they infer That those Bodies are essentially different unless they chance to think on the Manner of the Transmutation of Wheat into Flower For Meal is nothing but bruised and ground Corn as Fire is only divided and agitated Wood as Ashes are but the grossest Parts of the divided Wood without Agitation as Glass is but Ashes whose Particles have been polished and rounded by the Attrition caus'd by the Fire And so in other Transmutations of Bodies 'T is therefore evident that sensible Words and Ideas are altogether unserviceable to a just stating and clear resolving of Questions that is to the Discovery of Truth Yet there are no Questions how intricate soever they may be by the equivocal Terms of the Senses but Aristotle and most part of other Philosophers pretend to resolve them in their Books without the foregoing Distinctions and without considering that they are equivocal by Errour and Ignorance If for example those Persons who have employed the best part of their Life in reading Ancient Philosophers and Physicians and have wholly imbib'd their Spirit and Opinions are ask'd whether Water be wet whether Fire be dry Wine hot the Blood of Fishes cold Water rawer than Wine Gold perfecter than Mercury whether Plants and Beasts have Souls and a thousand like undetermin'd Questions they rashly answer by consulting only the Impressions of Objects upon their Senses or the Tracks the reading of Authors has left upon their Memory They never think those Terms are equivocal 't is a Wonder to them they should need a Definition and they cannot endure those that endeavour to let 'em understand that their Procedure is too quick and that they are seduced by their Senses and though they are never at a loss for Distinctions to perplex the most evident Things yet in these Questions in which Equivocation needs so much to be removed they find nothing to distinguish If we consider that most of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians contain some equivocal Terms like to those that have been spoken of we shall not doubt but that those Learned Gentlemen that could not define them were unable to say any Thing solid and real in the bulky Volumes they have compos'd Which is in a manner sufficient to overthrow most of the Opinions of the Ancients It is not so with Des Cartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish those Things He ne'er resolves any Question by sensible Ideas and whoever shall be at the pains to read him shall see that he clearly evidently and almost ever demonstratively explains the chief Operations of Nature by the sole and distinct Ideas of Extension Figures and Motion The second sort of equivocal Words that is much in request amongst Philosophers contains all those general Terms of Logick by which any Thing may be easily explain'd without so much as knowing it Aristotle was the Man that made the most of it his Books are full of nothing else and some are but a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all Things by the specious Words of Genus Species Act Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers can hardly understand that those Words signifie Nothing and that one is not more learned than he was when he has heard that Fire dissolves Metals by its dissolving Faculty that a Man digests not because his Stomach is weak or because his Concoctive Faculty does not operate as it should do I grant that those who use such general Terms and Ideas for the Explication of all Things commonly fall not into so many Errours as those that only employ such Words as raise the confused Ideas of the Senses The School-Philosophers are not so liable to be deceived as some opinionative and dogmatical Physicians who build Systems upon Experiments the Reasons of which are unknown to them because the School-men talk so generally that they do not venture much out of their Depth Fire heats dries hardens and softens because it has the Faculty of producing those Effects Sena purges by its purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its nutritious Quality These Propositions are not liable to mistake for a Quality is that which denominates a Thing by such a Name Master Aristotle's Definition is undeniable But he speaks true only because he says nothing and if his rambling
if they were just and good And none perhaps could forbear laughing if instead of the Definitions which Aristotle gives of Hunger and Thirst when he says that Hunger is the desire of what is hot and dry and Thirst the desire of what is cold and moist we should substitute the Definitions of those words calling Hunger the desire of that which coacervates things of the same nature and is easily contained within its own Limits and difficultly within others and defining Thirst the desire of that which congregates things of the same and different natures and which can hardly be contained within its own bounds but is easily kept within others Surely 't is a very useful Rule to know whether Terms have been well defined and to avoid mistakes in reasoning often to put the Definition instead of the thing defined for that shews whether the words are equivocal and the Measures of the Relations false and imperfect or whether we argue consequently If it be so what Judgment can be made of Aristotle's Arguments which become an impertinent and ridiculous Nonsence when we make use of that Rule and what may also be said of all those who argue upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses since that Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all exact and solid Reasonings brings nothing but confusion in their Discourses 'T is not possible to lay open the foolish Capriciousness and Extravagance of Aristotle's Explications upon all sorts of matters When he treats of simple and easie Subjects his Errours are plain and obvious to be discover'd but when he pretends to explain very composed things and depending on several Causes his Errours are as much compounded as the Subjects he speaks of so that it is impossible to unfold them all and set them before others That great Genius who is said to have so well succeeded in his Rules for defining well knows not so much as which are the things that may be defined because he puts no Distinction betwixt a clear and distinct and a sensible Knowledge and pretends to know and explain other things of which he has not so much as a distinct Idea Definitions ought to explicate the Nature of things and the words of which they consist must raise in the Mind distinct and particular Notions But 't is impossible to define in that manner sensible Qualities as Heat Cold Colour Savour c. When you confound the Cause with the Effect the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation that attends it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which are not to be known by clear Ideas but only by internal Sensation as I have explain'd it in the third Book it is impossible to fix to those words Ideas which we have not As we have Distinct Ideas of a Circle a Square a Triangle and therefore know distinctly their Nature so we can give good Difinitions of them and even deduce from our Ideas of those Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by such words as are fixed to those Ideas But we cannot define either Heat or Cold in as much as they are sensible Qualities because we know them not distinctly and by Ideas but only by Conscience and inward Sensation Neither must we define the Heat that is without us by any of its Effects For if we substitute such a Definition in its place we shall find that it will only conduce to lead us into Errour For Instance if Heat be defined what congregates homogeneous things without adding any thing else we may by that Definition mistake for Heat such things as have no Relation to it For then it might be said that the Loadstone collects the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because 't is hot that a Dove eats Hempseed when it leaves other Grain because that Bird is hot that a covetous Man separates his Guineas from his Silver because he is hot In short there is no impertinency but that Definition would induce one into it were he dull enough to follow it And therefore that Definition explains not the nature of Heat nor can it be imploy'd to deduce all its properties from it since by literally insisting upon it we should draw ridiculous Conclusions and by putting it instead of the thing defined fall into Nonsense However if we carefully distinguish Heat from its Cause though it cannot be defined in as much as it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea yet its Cause may be defined since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But we must observe that Heat taken for such a Motion causes not always in us the Sense of Heat For Instance Water is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and most probably it feels warm to Fishes at least 't is warmer than Ice whose Parts are more quiet but 't is cold to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Body what has less Motion than another being in some manner quiet in respect of that And therefore 't is not with reference to the Motion of the Fibres of our Body that the Cause of Heat or the Motion that excites it ought to be defined We must if possible define that Motion absolutely and in it self for then our Definition will be subservient to know the Nature and Properties of Heat I hold not my self oblig'd to examine farther the Philosophy of Aristotle and to extricate his so much confus'd and puzling Errours I have shewn methinks that he proves not the Existence of his four Elements and defines them wrong that his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not their Nature and that all the Second Qualities are not made of them and lastly that though we should grant him that all Bodies are compos'd of the four Elements and the Second Qualities of the First his whole System would still prove useless for the finding out of Truth since his Ideas are not clear enough to preserve Evidence in all our Reasonings If any doubt whether I have propos'd the true Opinions of Aristotle he may satisfie himself by consulting his Books of the Heavens and of Generation and Corruption whence I have exextracted almost all that I have said of him I would relate nothing out of his Eight Books of Physicks because some learned Men pretend they are but a mere Logick which is very apparent since nothing but rambling and undetermin'd Words are to be found in them As Aristotle often contradicts himself and that almost all sorts of Opinions may be defended by some Passages drawn out of him I doubt not but some Opinions contrary to those I have ascrib'd to that Philosopher may be prov'd out of himself And I shall not warrant for him but it is sufficient for me that I have the Books I have quoted to justifie what I have said of him and I care little whether those Books are Aristotle's or not taking them for such as I find them upon the
the Resolution of Questions of little Use the Knowledge whereof commonly more gratifies our Pride than perfects our Understanding I think it my Duty to say that I may profitably conclude this Work that the most expeditious and certain Method of discovering Truth and uniting our selves to God in the purest and perfectest manner possible is to live as becomes true Christians to follow exactly the Precepts of Eternal Truth which unites it self with us only to re-unite us with it 'T is to listen rather to the Dictates of our Faith than Reason and to tend to God not so much by our natural Forces which since the Sin are altogether languid and inactive as by the Assistance of Faith by which alone God purposes to lead us into that immense Light of Truth which will dissolve and dissipate all our Darkness For in brief 't is much better as good Men to spend some Years in Ignorance of certain Things and find our selves enlighten'd in a Moment for ever than by Natural Means and abundance of Trouble and Application purchase a very imperfect Science that shall leave us in Darkness to all Eternity ILLUSTRATIONS UPON THE FOREGOING BOOKS The PREFACE Wherein is shewn what should be our Opinion of the several Judgments commonly pass'd on Books that encounter Prejudices WHen a BOOK is first to appear in the World one knows not whom to consult to learn its Destiny The Stars preside not over its Nativity their Influences have no Operation on it and the most confident Astrologers dare not foretell the diverse Risks of Fortune it must run Truth not being of this World Celestial Bodies have no power over her and whereas she is of a most spiritual Nature the several Positions or Combinations of Matter can contribute nothing either to her Establishment or Ruine Besides the Judgments of Men are so different in respect of the same things that we can never more hazardously and imprudently play the Prophet than in presaging the happy or unfortunate Success of a BOOK So that every Man who ventures to be an Author at the same time throws himself at the Reader 's Mercy to make him or esteem him what he pleases But of all Authors those who encounter Prejudices ought most infallibly to reckon upon their Condemnation their Works â—it too uneasie on most Mens Minds and if they escape the Passions of their Enemies they are obliged to the almighty Force of Truth for their Protection 'T is a common Miscarriage with all Mankind to be too precipitate in judging for all Men are obnoxious to Errour and only obnoxious upon this account But all hasty and rash Judgments are ever consonant to Prejudices and therefore Authors who oppugn them cannot possibly escape Sentence from all their Judges who appeal to Ancient Opinions as the Laws whereby they ought to pronounce For indeed most Readers are both Judge and Party in respect of these Authors Their Judges they are that Quality is incontestable but they are a Party likewise being disturb'd by these Authors in the possession of their ancient Prejudices for which they have the plea of Prescription and to which they have been accustom'd many Years I confess there 's Abundance of Equity Sincerity and good Sense in a great many Readers and that they sometimes are Judges rational enough to supersede common Opinions as not being the infallible Rules of Truth Many there are who retire into themselves and consult that Inward Truth which ought to be their Rule to judge of all things but very Few that consult it upon all Occasions and None at all who do it with all that Faithfulness and Attention that is necessary to judge infallibly at all times And thus though we might suppose there were nothing blameable in a Treatise which yet it would be Vanity to pretend to I am persuaded it would be impossible to find one single Man to approve it in every respect especially if his Prejudices were attacked by it since it is not naturally possible that a Judge constantly provok'd affronted and outrag'd by a Party should do him entire Justice or that he should give himself the trouble of a strenuous Application to those Reasons which at first sight appear to him as extravagant Parodoxes or ridiculous Parolâ—gisms But though a Man be pleased with many things in a BOOK if he fortunes to meet with some that are offensive he shall seldom be wanting to speak ill of it but most commonly forgetfull to give it any good Character Self-love has a thousand Motives to induce us to condemn what we dislike and Reason in this Instance fully justifies these Motives since Men fansie they condemn Errours and defend Truth when they defend their Prejudices and censure those that assault them So that the most equitable Judges of Books that fight against Prejudices pass commonly such a general Sentense as is no way favourable on their behalf Perhaps they will say there is something good in such a Work and that the Author justly opposes certain Prejudices but yet they shall be sure to condemn him and as his Judges give an authoritative and grave decision upon the point maintaining that he carries things too far on such or such an occasion For when an Author is ruining Prejudices which the Reader is not prepossess'd with whatever he shall say will seem reasonable enough But the same Author ever stretches things too far when he engages the Prejudices wherewith the Reader is too deeply ting'd But whereas the Prejudices of different Persons are not constantly the same should one carefully gather the several Judgments that are made upon the same things it would commonly appear that according to these Judgments there is nothing Good and at the same time nothing Bad in such kind of Books There would be nothing good because there is no Prejudices but one or other espouses and there would be nothing bad because there is no Prejudice whatever but some or other condemn In which Judgments there is so much Equity that should a Man pretend to make use of them to correct his Piece he must necessarily strike it all out for fear of leaving any thing that was Condemn'd or not to touch it for fear of expunging something that was approv'd So that a poor Author that studies to be inoffensive finds himself perplex'd on all hands by all the various Judgments which are pronounc'd both for and against him and unless he resolve to stand his ground and to be reckon'd obstinate in his Opinions he must inevitably contradict himself at every turn and appear in as many different Forms as there are different Heads in a whole Nation However Time will do every Man Justice and Truth which at first seems a Chimerical and ridiculous Phantasm by degrees grows sensible and manifest Men open their Eyes and contemplate her they discover her Charms and fall in love with her This Man who condemns an Author for an Opinion that he dislikes by chance meets with
another that approves it but condemns other Opinions which the former receives as undeniable each of them talk suitably to his Notion and each of them contradicts the other Hence they come to examine both their own and others Reasons afresh they dispute and consider and hesitate and are not so ready to determine upon what they have not examin'd and if they are brought to change their Opinion and to acknowledge that an Author is more reasonable than was believ'd there rises a secret inclination in their Breast which prompts them to speak as well of him for the future as they have formerly spoken to his dishonour Thus the Man who sticks resolutely to the Truth though at first he move their Spleen or Laughter need not despair one day to see Truth which he defends triumph over the Prepossession of Men. For there 's that difference between Good and Ill Books between those which enlighten the Mind and those which gratifie the Senses and Imagination that the latter look charming and delightful at first but they fade and wither in time whilst the former on the contrary have something of a strange and discouraging nature which troubles and sets the Mind agast but in time they are relish'd and so much the better as they are more read and digested for 't is Time generally that regulates the Price of Things The Books that encounter Prejudices leading to Truths through unbeaten Roads require much longer time than others to obtain the Reputation their Authors expect from them For because Men are frequently baulk'd in the hopes that such sort of Performances had rais'd in them but Few there are that read them Fewer still that approve them almost All condemn them whether they read them or read them not and though we be well assur'd that the trite and common Roads lead not where we design to go yet the fear of venturing upon such as have no Footsteps of former Travellers disheartens us from entring on them So that Men cast not so much as their Eye about them to conduct themselves but blindly tread in the steps of their Predecessors Company is diverting and encouraging they think not what they are doing they perceive not where they go and often forget the place where they design to arrive Men are made for a sociable Life which to preserve it is not enough to use the same Tongue we must moreover keep to the same way of Expression and the same road of Thinking as other Men. We must live by Opinion as we act by Imitation We then consult advantageously agreeably and surely for the Good of the Body and the Establishment of our Fortune when we submit to the Opinions of others and give way to be persuaded by the Air or sensible Impression of the Imagination of those we hear speak But we undergo much Pains and run the extreme hazard of our Fortune when we will only hearken to internal Truth and reject with Scorn and Abhorrence all the Prejudices of the Senses and all the Opinions we have receiv'd without Examination Thus all those Writers who combat with Prejudices are much mistaken if they think by that means to recommend themselves to the Favour and Esteem of others Possibly if they have succeeded in their Studies some few of the Learned will speak honourably of their Works when they are dead but while they live they must expect to be neglected by most People and to be despis'd revil'd and persecuted even by those that go for the wisest and most moderate sort of Men. And indeed there are so many Reasons and those so strong and convincing which oblige us to do the same as those we live with that we have commonly right to condemn as Men of fantastical and capricious Spirits such as act contrary to others And because Men do not sufficiently distinguish between Acting and Thinking they commonly are highly offended that any one should fall upon their Prejudices They suppose it not sufficient to the preservation of the Rules of Civil Society externally to comport with the receiv'd Opinions and Customs of our Country They pretend it is Rashness to examine common Sentiments and a breach of Charity to enquire after Truth because Truth is not so much the Bond of Civil Societies as Customs and Opinion Aristotle is receiv'd in the Universities as the Rule of Truth he is cited as infallible and 't is a Philosophical Heresie to deny what he maintains in a word he is reverenc'd as the Genius of Nature and after all Those that are best acquainted with his Physicks cannot account for nor perhaps are convinc'd of any thing and the Scholars when they have finish'd their Course of Philosophy dare not declare before Men of Sense what they have learn'd of their Masters Which it may be is enough with Men of Reflexion to teach them what to think of such sort of Studies for that Erudition which a Man must unlearn to become Reasonable cannot seem very solid Yet a Man would be thought rash and presumptuous who would attempt to shew the Falsity of the Reasons that Authorize so strange and unacountable a Conduct and he would necessarily make himself work with those who reap advantage by it though he were of competent Ability to disabuse the Publick Is it not evident that we must make use of things that are known to learn what is not known and that it would be imposing on a French-man to give him a Grammar in German Verse to teach him the German Tongue and yet we put into the hands of Children Despauterius's Latin Verses to teach them Latin Verses intricate on all accounts to Children that with difficulty comprehend things that are most easie Reason and also Experience are visibly against this Custom for they spend a great deal of time to learn Latin but by halves yet it would be temerity to find fault with it A Chinese who knew this Custom could not help laughing at it whilst in this part of the World which we inhabit the wisest and most learn'd cannot forbear approving it If Prejudices thus false and palpable and Customs so irrational and of so great Consequence find so many Patrons and Defenders how shall they submit to Reasons that oppose the Prejudices of a purely Speculative Nature There needs but a very little Attention to discover that the way taken to instruct Children is not the best and yet it is not acknowledg'd Opinion and Custom carry it against Reason and Experience How then can we imagine that the Books which destroy an infinite number of Prejudices will not in many things be condemn'd by those who pass for the most learn'd and wisest Part of Men It must be observ'd that those who go for the most understanding and ingenious in the World are Men that have read most Books both good and bad Men of a most happy Memory and of a most lively and comprehensive Imagination Now this sort of Persons commonly judge readily on all things
continually operates by Order represents to their Understanding as often as desir'd the clear and lively Idea of that Object So that according to this Explication the Memory and other Habits of pure Intelligences consists not in an Easiness of operating which results from any Modifications of their Being but in the immutable Order of God and in a Right the Mind obtains to those things which have been already submitted to it And all the Power of the Mind immediately and solely depends on God alone the force or facility of acting which all Creatures have in their Operations being in this Sence but the efficacious Will of the Creatour Nor do I think we are oblig'd to give up this Explication by reason of the evil Habits of Sinners and damn'd Persons For tho' God does all that is Real and Positive in the Actions of Sinners it is evident by what I have said in the first Illustration that he is not the Author of Sin Nevertheless I believe as I think I ought that after the Action of the Soul there remain some Changes which dispose it to that same Action again But as I know them not so I cannot explain them for I have no clear Idea of my own Mind wherein to discover all the Modifications it is capable of I believe by Theological and not clear and evident Proofs that the Reason of pure Intelligences seeing the Objects they have before consider'd more distinctly than others is not meerly because God represents them in a livelier and perfecter manner but because they are really more dispos'd to receive the same Action of God in them Just as the facility of playing on an Organ which some have acquir'd proceeds not from any greater Force and Action which the Animal Spirits that are necessary to the Motion of the Fingers have in them than in other Men but from the Smoothness and Glibness which the Passages of the Animal Spirits have gotten by Exercise as in this Chapter is explain'd But yet I grant the Use of Memory and the other Habits is unnecessary in those who being perfectly united to God find in his Light all sorts of Idea's and in his Will all the facility of acting that can be desired THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Seventh CHAPTER of the Second BOOK A Reduction of the Proofs and Explications I have given of Original Sin Together with the Answer to the Objections that I thought most urgent IN order to answer methodically to the Difficulties that may arise touching Original Sin and its manner of Derivation from Fathers to Children I thought fit to exhibit in few words what I have said on that Subject in several places of the foregoing Treatise Here follow my principal Proofs which I have disposed after a particular fashion to make them more sensible to those that will consider them I. God wills Order in his Works What we clearly conceive to be agreeable to Order God wills and what we conceive clearly to be repugnant to It God wills not which is a Truth manifest to all those who can consider the infinitely perfect Being with a steady and clear'd View Nothing can unfix or trouble their prospect of this Truth whilst they clearly see that all the Difficulties that can be raised against this Principle proceed but from the Ignorance of those things which are necessary to be known to solve them II. God has no other End in his Operations than himself this Order demands III. God creates and preserves the Mind of Man to be taken up with him to know and to love him as being himself the End of his own Works Order will have it so God cannot will that a Being should love what is not amiable or rather He cannot will that what is less amiable should be more beloved Therefore 't is evident that Nature is corrupted and in Disorder since the Mind loves Bodies that are not amiable and that commonly more than God Original Sin then or the Corruption of Nature needs no Proof For every one finds plain enough in himself a Law which captivates and disorders him a Law that is not given by God since it is contrary to Order by which His Will is governed IV. Nevertheless Man before his Fall was admonished by preventing Sensations and not by clear Knowledge whether he ought to unite to or separate from the encompassing Bodies Order required it 'T is a Disorder that the Mind should be oblig'd to apply it self to them for though it may be united to them it is not made for them It ought therefore to have Knowledge of God and Sense of Bodies Again whereas Bodies are incapable of being the Good of the Mind it would with Regret and Pain unite to them if it knew them to be only what they are without being sensible of something in them which is not Wherefore the Counterfeit Good ought to be discerned by a preventing Sensation that it may be lov'd with a Love of Instinct and the True Good ought to be known by a clear Knowledge that it may be lov'd with a rational Love and a Love of Choice Lastly Man being made and preserved by God to know and love him ought not to have the Capacity of his Mind either possess'd or shar'd in spight of him with the Knowledge of the infinite Figures and Configurations of Bodies about him or of that he animates and yet to know by a clear Knowledge Whether such a Fruit at such a Season be fit for Nourishment of his Body manifestly requires the Intelligence of so many things and the making so many Argumentations as would quite fill up the most comprehensive of created Minds V. But though the first Man was advertis'd by preventing Sensations Whether he ought or ought not to make use of surrounding Bodies yet he was not mov'd by involuntary and rebellious Passions and he obliterated out of his Mind the Idea's of sensible things when he pleas'd whether he us'd them or not because Order would have it so The Mind may be united to a Body but it should command it and not depend on it Again All the Love which God invests us with ought to terminate on him because he produces nothing in us but what is for himself Lastly Bodies are not amiable but below what within us is capable of loving Therefore in the first Institution of Nature Bodies could not turn our Mind towards them nor incline it to consider them and love them as its Goods VI. The Bodies about us act not on our Soul save when they produce some Motions in our Body and that these Motions are communicated to the principal Part of our Brain For it is by the Changes which happen in this Part that the Soul changes her self and finds her self mov'd by sensible Objects This I have sufficiently prov'd and Experience demonstrates the same Which being suppos'd it is clear from the preceding Article that Adam stopt when he pleas'd the Motions communicated to his Body at least those communicated to the
there were Wheels and Pumps to raise the Water Nevertheless I can't see why divining is not sometimes allowable provided a Man sets not up for a Prophet and speaks not in too positive a strain I rather think he is permitted to speak his Thoughts whilst he pretends not to be Infallible nor Lords it unjustly over others by dogmatical Decisions or by the help of Scientifick Terms 'T is not always divining to speak of things which are not visible and which contradict Prejudices If so be we speak no more than we easily conceive and which readily makes its way into the mind of others who desire to understand Reason I say then that supposing the general Laws of the Communication of Motions such as they are there is great Probability that the particular Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of her Infant is necessary to form its Body in a requisite manner or at least is necessary to give the Brain of the Infant certain dispositions which ought to vary according to different Times and Countries as I have explain'd in the same Chapter I confess there is no Communication between the Brain of an Hen and that of a Chicken in the Egg which nevertheless is perfectly well form'd But it ought to be observ'd that the Chicken is farther advanc'd in the Egg when the Hen lays it than the Foetus when it descends into the Matrix which may well be concluded since there goes less time to the hatching Chickens than there goes to the bringing forth Whelps though the Belly of the Bitch being very hot and her Blood in perpetual motion the Whelps should be sooner form'd than the Eggs hatch'd were not the Chickens farther advanc'd in their Eggs than the Whelps in their Cicatricles Now there is great probability that the formation of the Chicken in the Egg before it was laid was effected by the communication I am speaking of I answer in the second place that the growth of the Body of Fowls is possibly more conformable to the general laws of Motion than that of four-footed Animals and that so the communication of the Females Brain with that of her young ones is not so necessary in Fowls as in other Animals For the reason that makes that communication necessary is probably the remedying the defect of these general Laws which in some particular Cases are insufficient to regulate the Formation and Growth of Animals I answer lastly there is no such necessity to the preservation of the Life of Birds that they should have so many particular Dispositions in their Brain as other Animals They have Wings to fly harm and to secure their feed and have no need of all that particular Mechanism which is the principle of the cunning and docility of some domestick Creatures Therefore the old ones need not instruct their young in many things as they breed them nor capacitate them to be taught many afterwards by giving them a disposition of Brain that 's fit for Docility Those who breed young Dogs for the Game sometimes find those which naturally set meerly from the instruction they receiv'd from their Damm who often us'd to set with them in her Belly There is a great difference almost always observable in the breed of these Creatures some of which are much more Docil and Tractable than others of the same Species But I do not think there ever was a Fowl that taught any thing extraordinary to her young that a Hen for Example ever hatch'd a Chicken who could do any thing but what they all do naturally Birds then are not so tractable or capable of Instruction as other Animals The Disposition of their Brain is not ordinarily capable of many Changes nor do they act so much by Imitation as some domestick Animals Young Ducks which follow an Hen don't stay for her Example to take the Water and the Chickens on the contrary never betake themselves to swim though hatch'd and led by a Duck that loves the Water But there are Animals that easily and readily imitate the uncommon Motions which they see others do However I do not pretend that much stress is to be laid on these last Reflections since they are not necessary to establish my Opinion Second OBJECTION against the Twelfth Article 'T is likewise divining to affirm That the Mother before her Sin might have any intercourse with her Embryo there being no necessary relation between our Thoughts and Motions happening in our Brain And therefore that Communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is useless ANSWER It is evident That without this Communication the Infant was incapable of having any Commerce with its Mother or the Mother with her Infant without a particular Miracle Now before the Sin Order requir'd That the Mother should have notice of all the Corporeal wants of her Infant and that the Infant should resent its Obligations to its Parents Therefore since all things were in Order before the Sin and that God acts always agreeably to Order the Mother and the Child had some Commerce by means of this Communication To understand wherein this Commerce may have consisted it must be remembred That the Connexion of the Tracks of the Brain with the Ideas of the Soul may be several ways effected either by Nature or by the Institution of Men or some other way as I have shewn how in the Second Book In beholding a Square or the Look of a Person suffering any Pain the Idea of a Square or of an afflicted Person rises in the Mind This is common to all Nations and the Connexion between these Ideas and these Traces is natural When an Englishman hears pronounc'd or reads the Word Square he has likewise the Idea of a Square but the Connexion which is between the Sound or the Letters of that Word and its Idea is not natural nor is it general with all the World I say then That the Mother and her Infant must naturally have had a Correspondence between them upon all the things that could be represented to the Mind by natural Connexions That if the Mother for Instance had seen a Square the Infant would have seen one too and that if the Infant had imagin'd any Figure he would have likewise excited the Traces of the same Figure in the Imagination of his Mother But they would have had no Commerce together about things of a purely Spiritual Nature nor even about Corporeal things whenever they conceiv'd them without the help of the Senses and Imagination The Mother might have thought on GOD have heard or read the Word Square or the like and yet the Child not have discover'd what were her Thoughts thereof unless in Tract of Time she should have setled a new Commerce of intellectual Ideas with it much what the same with that of Nurses when they teach their Children to speak I explain and prove these things One would think I had sufficiently prov'd them by the Explication I gave of the Cause of
the conduiâ—s of the Nerves are widened and the Fibres recumbent after a particular manner the Spirits may easily insinuate themselves But what is it we can conceive capable of augmenting the Soul's Facility to act or think For my part I own I cannot comprehend it And in vain should I interrogate my self what these dispositions are For I could give my self no answer nor light upon the matter though I have a most lively sense of that easiness with which some Thoughts arise in me And if I had no particular Reasons to induce me to believe that I really have such Dispositions though I know them not in me I should judge there neither was spiritual Habit nor Memory in my Soul But in short seeing there is doubt and scruple about it we have an infallible Symptom that Men are not so enlightned as is pretended For Doubt can never be reconcil'd to Evidence and clear Ideas 'T is certain that a Man of the greatest Understanding cannot evidently know whether he deserves Hatred or Love as speaks the Wiseman My own consciousness of my self cannot satisfy me herein St. Paul says indeed his Conscience reproach'd him with nothing yet for all that he does not affirm he is justified On the contrary he asserts he is not thereby justified and that he dares not judge himself since he that judges is the Lord. But having a clear Idea of Order if we had another as clear of the Soul from the inward feeling of our selves we should evidently know whether she was conformable to Order We should know whether we were Righteous or not and we could exactly discover all our interiour Dispositions to Good and Evil whenever we were conscious of them But if we could know our selves just as we are we should not be so subject to Presumption And there is great likelihood that St. Peter would not have said to his Master whom he was not long after to deny Why cannot I follow thee now I will lay down my life for thy sake Animam meam pro te ponam For being inwardly conscious of his own Strength and good Will he might have seen with Evidence whether he had Resolution and Courage to conquer Death or rather the insults of a silly Maid and two or three Servants If the nature of the Soul be more known than any other If the Idea we have of her be as clear as that we have of the Body I ask only how it comes to pass that there are so many who confound her with it Is it possible to confound two clear Ideas intirely different Let us do justice to all Mankind Those who dissent from our Opinion are as rational as our selves they have the same Ideas of things and are partakers in the same Reason Why then do they confound what we distinguish Do they use on other occasions to confound things whereof they have clear Ideas Do they ever confound two different numbers or take a Square for a Circle And yet the Soul differs more from the Body than one of these Figures from the other For they are two substances which are in nothing alike and are confounded notwithstanding Which must therefore proceed from some difficulty there is to discover their difference from it s not being observable by a simple perception and from the Impossibility of concluding that one is not the other without Argument and Reasoning It must come from hence viz. That the Idea of Extension must be cautiously consulted and Extension discover'd to be no Mode of Existence of a Body but the Body it self as being represented a subsisting Thing and as the Principle and Foundation of whatever we conceive clearly in Bodies And that so the Modes of which Body is capable having no Proportion of sensible Qualities the subject of these Qualities or rather the Being of which they are Modes must needs be different from Body For such like argumentation is requisite to prevent our confounding the Soul with the Body But if we had a clear Idea of the Soul as we have of Body certainly we need not take these round-about ways to distinguish her from it Since it would be discoverable by a simple view and with as great ease as we see a Circle is not a Square I insist not longer upon proving that we know not the Soul nor her Modifications by clear Ideas Survey our selves on what side soever we will this sufficiently appears And I had not added this to what I have said in the Search after Truth if some Cartesians had not found fault with it If this will not satisfy them I shall expect they will make me sensible of this clear Idea which I am not able to find in my self do whatever I can to discover it THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Eighth CHAPTER of the Second PART of the Third BOOK Of loose and general terms which signify nothing How they are distinguish'd from others IN order to comprehend what I have said in some Places how that they give not the reasons of things who explain them by Logical Terms and General Ideas we need but consider that whatever exists is reduc'd to Being or Modes of Being whatever Term signifies neither of these signifies nothing and every Term that signifies not one or other of them distinctly and in particular signifies nothing distinct This to me seems most clear and evident but what is evident in it self is not so to all the World Words are the current Coin wherewith Men pay themselves and others All Terms that are inoffensive to the Ear have free Passport amongst them And Truth comes so rarely into the Commerce of the World that those who speak it or hear it have commonly no regard for it The gift of Speech is the greatest of Talents the language of Imagination is the surest of means and a Memory charg'd with incomprehensible Terms will always make a splendid appearance whatever the Cartesians may say of it When Men shall have no addiction but to Truth they will be Cautious of what they say they will carefully examine their own meaning rejecting with scorn senseless and insignificant Terms and closely adhering to clear Ideas But when will the time come that Men shall love Truth only We may say when they shall depend no longer on their Body when they shall have no necessary relation to sensible Objects when they shall not any more corrupt one another but faithfully consult their Master who instructs them in the recesses of their Reason But this will never happen whilst we live on Earth However all Men are not equally indifferent for Truth If there are some who speak without Reflection and hear without distinction and have no attention but to what affects them there are others who industriously labour to inform themselves and to convince others of the Truth And to these chiefly I address my self for at their Instance I entred on making these Remarks I say then that whatever is whether it actually exists or not and consequently
Ville under Ambiguous Terms advances that this Principle is not to be found in St. Austin He answers but one single passage of that Father's Works and to explain it makes that learn'd Man argue at an Extravagant rate Lastly he opposes to his constant Doctrine only the Book of Categories as if he knew not that Book to be none of St. Austin's and that it belongs rather to Logick than to Physicks I will not stand to prove this in particular for I see no necessity of answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book And I design to keep inviolably to the resolution I made and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the Search after Truth viz. That I would answer none of those who oppos'd me before they understand me or whose Discourses gave occasion to believe they were made from some other motive than the Love of Truth As for the rest I shall indeavour to content them I have no delight in disquieting Mens Minds and troubling my own repose by contentious Books or Works absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth and only proper to violate Charity and scandalize our Neighbours And if I now put Pen to Paper 't is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be call'd in Question and that I desire to make it clearly understood That no Man is permitted to charge me with Heresie for consequences deducible from the Principles I have establish'd Which is not as if I thought it possible to inferr directly any Heresie or even Error from the Book concerning the Search after Truth I am ready to answer with Charity and Respect all those who shall do me the honour to make their Animadversions without Passion and I shall always be glad to follow Truth as soon as any Man can discover it to me I disown all principles from which may be concluded any falshood But I offer to prove That we cannot justly treat as Hereticks even obstinate Defenders of such Principles as Divines may inferr impious Conclusions from provided the Embracers of these Principles disown the consequences Since if it might be allow'd no Writer whatever could escape the Imputation of Heresie My proofs of my assertion are as follow Which I do not deduce from that which is least Reasonable in the common Opinions of Phisophers with design to make them Odious or Ridiculous but choose to take for the subject of what I offer to prove universally receiv'd Opinions upon which the Peripateticks are so bold and presuming as to insult perpetually over their Adversaries ARGUMENT I. The Peripateticks and almost all Men believe that Beasts have Souls and that these Souls are nobler than the Bodies which they Animate 'T is an Opinion receiv'd in all times and in all Nations that a Dog suffers Pain when he is beaten That he is susceptible of all the Motions of the Passions Fear Desire Envy Hatred Joy Sorrow and even that he knows and loves his Master Yet from this Opinion consequences may be drawn directly opposite to what we are Taught by Faith The first Consequence opposite to Faith That God is Vnjust Beasts suffer Pain and some of them are more miserable than others Now they never sinn'd or made an ill use of their Libirty since they have none Therefore God's Vnjust in Punishing them and making them Miserable and unequally Miserable since they are equally Innocent Therefore this Principle is false That under a Righteous God a Creature can be miserable without deserving it a Principle nevertheless imploy'd by St. Austin to Demonstrate Original Sin against the Pelagians Moreover there is this difference between the condition of Men and Beasts that Men after Death may receive an Happiness which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life But Beasts at Death lose all they have been miserable and innocent and have no Future Retribution Therefore though God be Just yet Man may suffer in Order to Merit but if a Beast suffers God is not Just. It may be said perhaps that God may do with the Beast as he thinks fit provided he observes the Rules of Justice with respect to Man But if an Angel should think in like manner that God could not punish him without some Demerits and that he was not oblig'd to do justice unto Man should we like that thought Certainly God renders Justice to all his Creatures and if the meanest of them are liable to Misery they must needs be capable of being Criminal The second Consequence contrary to Faith That God Wills Disorder and that Nature is not corrupted The Soul of a Dog is substance more noble than the Body Animated by it For according to St. Austin 't is a spiritual Substance more noble than the noblest Body Besides which reason demonstrates that Bodies can neither Know nor Love and that Pleasure Pain Joy Sorrow and the other Passions cannot be Modifications of Bodies Now 't is believed that Dogs know and Love their Masters and that they are susceptible of Passions as of Fear Desire Joy and Sorrow and many others The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body but a Substance nobler than Bodies But the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body and has no other End or Felicity than the enjoyment of Bodies Therefore God makes the more noble for the less noble Therefore God Wills disorder Therefore Man's Nature is not corrupted Concupiscence is no disorder God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies and subject him to the Motions of Concupiscence c. It may be still said perhaps that the Soul of Beasts is made for Man but 't is hard to escape by this subterfuge For whether my Dog or my Horse has or has not a Soul is indifferent to me 'T is not my Horse's Soul which carries or draws me but his Body 'T is not the Soul of a Chicken which nourishes me but its flesh Now God might and ought consequently to create Horses to perform all their functions which we need without a Soul if it be true that he has made them only for our use Again the Soul of an Horse is more valuable than the noblest Body God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man Lastly God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon Swallows are of very little use to Man and they might have fed upon grain as other Birds What need then of so innumerable a number of Souls to be Annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds since the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfectest Animal Wherefore in affirming that Beasts have Souls that is to say substances more noble than Bodies we deprive God of Wisdom make him act without Order destroy Original Sin and consequently overthrow Religion by taking away the necessity of a Mediator The third Consequence contrary to Faith The Soul of Man is Mortal or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
only a warning because as I have said elsewhere Adam might whenever he pleased stop the Motion of the Animal Spirits that produce Pain So that if he ever felt pain 't was because he consented to feel it or rather he never felt any because he never had a mind to feel it Heb. iv 12 13. * See Dial. 5. of Chrisâ—ian Conversations about the end Act. 5.41 * Amor sicut nec Odium veritatis Judicium nescit Vis Judicium Veritatis audire Sicut audio Joan. 5.30 sic judico non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est Judicium Odii Joan. 19.7 ut illud Nos Legem habemus secundum legem nostram debet mori Est Timoris Joan. 11.48 ut illud Si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent nostrum locum gentem Judicium verò Amoris ut David de filio parricidâ 2 Sam. 18.5 Parcite inquit puero Absalom S. Bern. de grad humilitatis * Concil Aâ—gl per Spelman Aâ— 1287. * Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. * Lest any should mistake what I call here voluntary Motion I desire him to read the first Illustration on the first Chapter It would intricate my Conceptioâ—s should I say whatever relates to it to satisfie the Nicety of some Persons Joh. 11.47 Joh. 12.11 Act. 4.16 17. Act. 5.28 * Lib. I. †Lib. II. ‖ Lib. III. ⸪ Lib. IV. * Lib. V. * Ego enim ab anima hâ—c corpus animari non puâ—o nisi intentione â—acientis nec ab isto quicquam illam pati arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. Muâ—c c. 5. See also De quantit Anim. c. 34. Amos 3.6 * Psal. 33 9. * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimicis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religio Christiana ut COLATVR VNVS DEVS NON MVLTI DII QVIA NON FACIT ANIMAM BEATAM NISI VNVS DEVS Aug. Tr. 23. in Joan. * By Equator I understand the greatest Crooked Line which the Matter of the Vortex describes * That is are driven towards the Centre of the Earth * Princ. Part. 3. §. 45. * Sup. Ch. 4. * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make a Pun in Greek as in English Finis and finished Thus that Philosopher proves that an infinite Line is not perfect because 't is not finished * De Coelo l. 3. c. 3. L. 2. 3. de Gene. Corrup De Gener. Corrupt l. 2. c. 2. See Book I. from ch 11. â—o ch 15. * See Illustration X. of Book I. Lib. 4. de Anima ejus Origine Cap. 23. de quantitate Animae alias * M. Des Cartes his Principles Art 55. Part. II. * Art 43. ibid. †Art 63. * Art 33. Part. II. I imagine here only God my self and one Bowl * By a Body in a Vacuum I understand one so separate from others whether hard or liquid as that there is none either to aid or hinder the Communication of Motions * Art 5. * Art 63. Art 55. 43. of the second Part and elsewhere * General Rules of the Commuication of Motions †See M. des Cartes's Rules in the second Part of his Principles See the 6th Chap. of Book 3. and its Illustration See the Ilstration upon Ch. 3. Part 2. Book 6. where I explain my meaning more distinctly * See the 7th Chap. of the 3d Book and the Illustration upon it †Nâ—mo scit utrum amore vel odio dignus scit Eccl. 4.1 * In some Editions it is thus But we love a particular Good True but Sin consists not precisely in that For all Good is amiable and ought to be loved Our Love is in it self good and even in our loving that particular Good we follow the Impression which God gives us Our Sin precisely consists in our fastening upon that particular Good the Impression which God gives us to love all Good or universal Good at the time when we both might and ought to love it Therefore Sin is nothing and though God does all he does it not Now whilst c. This Illustration relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search In the Objection to the Article of the Illustration upon the seventh Chapter of the second Book I explain what I here say in general of the loss of Power Man had over his Body * See the Illustration upon the 6 â—h Chapter of Part II. Book III. * Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur S. Aust. de Trin. lib. 7. cap. 4. And in another place Cum quaeritur quid tres Magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat Eloquium Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur Ibid. lib. 5. cap. 9. * Chap. 10. Book I. †See Ch. 7. Book III. and its Illustration Fortissimo quippe dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet Aug. de Corrupt Grat. cap. 12. See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the End of the Brussels Edition Chap. 3. Book V. The Mâ—on when beheld with a Telescope looks much like what is here represented * See Ch. 3. Part II. of Book VI. with the Illustration †See Ch. 6. Part II. of Book III. with its Illustration See the Illustration upon the 7th Chap. of Part II. Book III. See the 5. Dialogue of Christian Conversation Aug. in Jul. lib. 6. cap. 3. See Ch. 7. Part II. of Book II. with its Illustration At every Objection turn to the Article it is made against Answer to the sixth Objection against his Meditations Art 6. Art 8. See the Illustration upon the 6th Chap. of Part II. Book III. And calls them all by their names Ps. 47. Chap. 1.19 See the Illustration upon the 3d Chap. Book V. * In the Illustration about the nature of Ideas I shall more particularly explain what is Order and why God necessarily loves it See the Fifth Dialogue of Christian Conversations Rom. c. 7. As by one Man sin entred into the World c. Rom. 5.12 I was shapen in Iniquity and in sin hath my Mother conceiv'd me Ps. 51.5 Ec. 25.23 Luke 2.48 Gen. c. 3. La Samaritaine upon Pont neuf in Paris Chap. 2. Part 2. * Lib. 1. de Napt Cap. 25 26 27 in Jul. l. 6. c. 19. alibi †Ep 23. lib. de peccator meritis c. 19. alibi ‖ Innocent III. in Decret 3. de Baptismo ejus Effectu Et in Concil Viennensi generali 15. sub Clement V. Invidia postea contumetiis Claricorum Romanae Ecclesiae ad Monrani dogma delapsus in multis libris novae prophetiae Meminit Hieron in Catalogo de Script Eccles. Siambo videmus verum esse
quod dicis amâ—o videmus verum esse quod diâ—o ubi quaeso id videmus Nec ego utique in te nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate Confess de S. Aug. l. 12. c. 25. See St. Austin De libero arbitrio c. Book 2. Chap. 8. Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum Lucretius Diogenes * And now O Inhabitants of Jerusalem judge betwixt me and my Vineyard Isa. 5.3 Art 6. 8. See the Fifth Dialogue of Christian Conversations See the first Illustration Est quippe supâ—rbâ—a peccâ—â—um maximum uti daâ—is taâ—quam innaris S Bern. de diligendo Deo This is omitted in some Editions Ch. 1.18 Ch. 4. â—â— Cor. 13. L. 31. c. 20 Propinquior nobis qui fecit quam multa quae facta sunt In illo enim vivimus movemur sumus Istorum autem pleraque remota sunt à mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis Recte culpantur in libro sapientia inquisitores hujus saeculi Si enim tantum inquit potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum quomodo ejus Dominum non facilius invenerunt Ignota enim sunt fundamenta oculis nostris qui fundavit â—erram propinquat mentibus nostris De Gen. ad litt l. 5. ch 16 De Trinitate lib. 8. ch 8. 1 Tim. 16.16 * St. Cyrill of Alexandria upon the words of St. John Erat lux vera St. Aug. Tr. 14. upon St. John St. Greg. c. 27. upon 28 of Job †Inaccessibilem dixit sed omni homini â—umana sapienti Scriptura quippe sacra omnes carnalium sectatores humanitatis nomine notare solet St. Greg. in cap. 28. Job Ex. 33 20. Neither is it found in the land of the living Job 28.13 Job 28.31 Now we see through a Glass darkly but then face to face Now I know in part c. 1 Cor. 13.2 The natural Man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God for they are foolishness unto him 1 Cor. c. 2.14 Ad Moysen dicitur non videbit me homo vivet ac si aperte diceretur Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui mundo carnaliter vivit St. Greg. upon the 28. of Job ch 28. Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end Eccl. c. 9.1 I judge not mine own self For I known nothing by my self yet I am not hereby justified but â—e that judgeth me is the Lord 1 Cor. â— 4.4 John 13.37 Eccl. 21.18 Book 1. Mark 12.30 For the most extraordinary of these Opinions See Suarez Metaphysicks Disp. 18. Sect. 2. Assert 2. 3. Scot. in 4. Sent. Dist. 12.1 D. 37.2 D. 17. Palaudan in 4. Sent. D. 12. Q. 1 Art 1. Perer. 8. Phys. Ch. 3. Conimbr upon Aristotle's Physicks and many others cited by Suarez See Eonseca's Metaphys qu. 13. Sect. 3. and Soncin and Javell upon the same Question Ruvio lib. 2. Ph. Tract 4. qu. 2. See Suarez Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Ch. 1. of the second Book of his Physicks See Fonsesa Suarez and others before cited * Book 1. of his Topicks C. 1. * In his Metaph. Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Assert 1. †In Metaph Arist. qu. 7. Sect. 2. See Book 4. Ch. 11. toward the end and Book 6. Part 2. Ch. 7. See Ch. 2. Book IV. Suarez ib. See Chap. the last of The Search * See the Illustration upon the Fourth Chapter of the second Part concerning Method †See the first Illustration upon the Fifth Chapter Lib. 1. de Retract 1 Cor. 10.19 * Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium peccatum Concil Araus 2. Can. 22. * In the Sence explain'd in the Chapter belonging to this Illustration * I still mean a true and efficacious Force * It seems evident to me that the Mind knows not by internal Sensation or Conscience the motion of the Arm she Animates She knows by Conscience only what she feels or thinks By inward Sensation or Conscience we know the sense we have of the Motion of our Arm. But Conscience does not notify the Motion of our Arm or the pain we suffer in it any more than the Colours we see upon Objects Or if this will not be granted I say that inward Sensation is not infallible for Error is generally found in the Sensations when they are compos'd I have sufficiently prov'd it in the first Book of the Search after Truth Gen. 1. Isa. 44.24 Job 10.8 * Vulg. totum 2 Macc. Ch. 7. v 22 23. Acts 17 25. Psal. 104 14. Engl. Poverty and Riches Eccl. 11.14 Gen. 2.19 Ch. 1.21 Omnia quippe portenta contra naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt Quomodo enim est contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum voluntas tanti utique creatoris conditae rei cujusque natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam sed contra quà m est nota natura S. Aug. de Civita De i l. 21. c. 8. Some of St. Austin's Principles are these What has never sinned can not suffer evil But according to him Pain is the greatest Evil and Beasts suffer it That the more Noble cannot have the less Noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more Noble than the Body and yet has no other End That what is Spiritual is Immortal yet the Soul of Beasts though Spiritual is subject to Death Many such like Principles there are in his Works whereby it may be concluded That Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them Ch. 44.24 2 Mac. 7.22 23. Sol homo generant â—ominem Arist. Phy. Ausc. l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon the Text. V. Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate Durand in 2 dist Qu. 5. Dist. 37. De Genesi ad liâ—eram l. 5. c. 20. In 4 Sent. Dist. 1. q. 1. D Aliaco ibid. * Book 4. c. 1. Deut. c. 6. * Acts 14.15.16 Ergo nihil agis ingratissime mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec naturae Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod a Seneca accepisses Annaeo diceres te debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Sen. l. 4. de Benef. Isa. 45.7 Amos. 3.6 â— Moses Maimonid Vide Vossium lib. 2. de Idololatriâ— Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nulâ—am belluam nisi ob aliquam 〈◊〉 quam ex ea caperent consecrâ—vâ—rant Cic. l. 1. de Nâ—tura Deorum Phil. 3.9 * No Whoremonger nor unclean Person nor covetous Man who is an Idolater Eph. 5.5 †They that worship him must Worship him in Spirit and in Truth Joh. 4.24 Nos si hominem patrem vocamus honorem aâ—aâ—i deferimus non Authorem vitae nostrae ostendimus Hier. in c. 33. Matth. 1 Cor. 9.22 10.33 Eph. 6.6 Col. 3.22 * Ep. 3. Ch. 2.28 Ch. 2.57 Ch. 6. contra Epist. Manichei Ch. 16. de Tran. l. 10. alibi Part 2. Ch. 3. Art 6. * De Quantitate animae Ch. 31 32. c. Lib. 4. de anima ejus origine Ch. 12. alibi Lins. c. 37. * Book IV. Chap. 2. Book VI. Part II. Chap. 7. Book III. Part II. Chap. 8. * Sess. 8. * Th. Pac. ch 4. †L. 3. ch 13. Cog. Nat. * By that Bull it is forbidden under Pain of Excommunication to give any Explication of the Decrees of the Council Vlium omnino interpretationis genus super ipsius Concilii decretis quocunque modo edere c. That Power is reserv'd to the Pope * Edit Strasb p. 190. Par. Edit 1. p. 172. in the second p. 190. in the third 187 in the fourth 95. * Pag. 90. Search after Truth Ch. ult Prov. 8.22 Eccl. 24.5 14. Eph. 14.21 22 23.2.10 21 22.4.13 16. Coll. 1.15 16 17 18 19. Ps. 72.17 Joh. 17 15.24 Rom. 8.29 1 Peâ— 1 2â— Apâ—c 13.8.1.8 c. Apoc. 21.23 Col. 1.18.2.20 Ephes. 1. â—2 Rom. 11.32 Gal. 3.22 Isaiah 5.3 4. 1 Cor. 8.11 * By True Cause I understand that which acts by its own Force Eph. 1.22 23.4.16 Col. 1.24.2.19 1 Cor. 12.27 Acts 1.24 c. Joh. 7.39 Heb. 7.25 Rom. 8.34 1 Joh. 2.1 Eph. 4.13 Ibid. 15 16. Joh. 5.4 5. 2 Cor. 13.2 Rom. 5.14.17 18 19. 1 Cor. 15.48 1 John 2.27 Luk. 10. Eph. 11.12 Heb. 2. 1 Cor. 12.27 Eph. 5.30 c. * Illustrations upon the Search after Truth First Illustration on the 7 th Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 3 d. Book of the Search Second Illustration Col. 2.19 Heb. 7.25.9.24 Joh. 11.42 Mat. 28.18 Chap. 4 13 15 16. Col. 2.19 Col. 2.7 Joh. 1.17 Hebr. 4. Hebr. 7.16 17. Joh. 16.7 To the Intent that now unto the Principalities and Powers in Heavenly Places might be known by the Church the manifold Wisdom of God Eph. 3.10 1 Joh. 2.1 Mat. 9.15 Joh. 11.42