TRITHEISM CHARGED UPON D r SHERLOCK's New Notion of the TRINITY AND The Charge made good in an Answer to the Defense of the said Notion against The Animadversions UPON Dr. Sherlock's Book Entituled A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity c. By a Divine of the Church of England LONDON Printed for Iohn Whitlock near Stationers-Hall MDCXCV TO ALL Professors of Divinity in the Two UNIVERSITIES OF THIS KINGDOM Reverend and Learned Sirs SInce the Work I here present you with needs so great a Patronage it were to be wished that it could bring something with it besides the Cause defended by it worthy of such Patrons as I address it to But as much below you as I know it to be I could think of none to whom I could so properly apply my self as Those whose eminent Stations in our Vniversities have made them the Fittest as well as Ablest to countenance a Defense of so high a Point and so vital a Part of our Religion Our Church's Enemies of late seem to have diverted their main Attacks from her Out-Works in matters of Discipline and Ceremony and now it is no less than her very Capitol which they invade her Palladium if I may allude to such Expressions which they would rob her of even the Prime the Grand and Distinguishing Article of our Christianity the Article of the Blessed Trinity it self without the Belief of which I dare aver that a Man can no more be a Christian than he can without a Rational Soul be a Man And this is now the Point so fiercely laid at and assaulted both by Socinianism on the one hand and by Tritheism or rather Paganism on the other For as the former would run it down by stripping the Godhead of a Ternary of Persons so the other would as effectually but more scandalously overthrow it by introducing a Trinity of Gods as they inevitably do who assert the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which I positively affirm is equivalent to the asserting the said Three Persons to be Three Gods And I doubt not of your learned Concurrence with me and Abettment of me in this Affirmation And I do moreover refer it to your profound and known Learning to consider and to judge whether ever the Catholick Church explained the Trinity by Self-Consciousness as that wherein the Personality Personal Unity and Distinction of each of the Divine Persons does properly and formally consist and by Mutual Consciousness as that wherein consists the Essential Unity of the said Persons and whereby they are all Three essentially one God together with several other such like Terms set down in the Collection immediately subjoined to this Epistle And lastly whether the Primitive Church having decreed and denounced an Anathema to all Vsers of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in these Mysteries the Church of England and the Nurseries thereof the Universities ought to suffer the greatest Mystery of our Christian Faith to be perplexed confounded and even ridiculed by this Man 's pretending to explain it by such odd Vncouth as well as new Expressions which were never entertained as Terms of any Note or Vse even in Philosophy till Des Cartes and his Followers introduced them and that without the least thought that appears of applying them to the Trinity I desire I say all our Learned Divines seriously to consider what this must tend to and will in all likelihood end in The Arguments which this daring Innovator whom I write against pretends to support his Tritheism and Innovations by are but slight and trivial or rather indeed bare bold Assertions without Arguments And those also in the Opinion of most so throughly broken and confuted already that what they need more is rather a Discountenance than a Confutation Nor indeed is there any thing formidable in the whole Book which I have here answered but that one word appearing in the Front of it viz. licensed and that I must confess looks very formidably and threatningly both upon our Church and Religion and it cannot but go to the heart of every Well-wisher to Both to consider what Advantage our watchful Enemies the Papists will be sure to make of it who in such Cases never fail to take whatsoever is given them And now Reverend Sirs what can my design be in thus applying my self to you Surely it is not so to offer you my poor Iudgment as at all to prescribe to Yours No I understand you and my self too well to be guilty of so sottish a Presumption Nor is it to put you upon writing Books against this Innovator for that I think extreamly below you But since the World has heard of such a Thing as the Decretum Oxoniense and that so justly to the Credit of that Vniversity If now Both our Vniversities would concur in passing their Theological Censure upon such Propositions as have of late so much impugned our Faith and disgraced our Church as that of Oxford had passed before upon such Doctrines as undermined and struck at our Civil Government as I think all Christians should be at least as zealous for the former as for the latter it could not but highly vindicate the Honour of the Church of England the Orthodoxy of our Clergy and of our Two great Seminaries of Learning which I assure you many Foreigners how undeservedly soever begin to be something suspicious of and dissatisfied about by reason of some late Books published amongst us and not yet answered by us And for what concerns this Author's first Discourse concerning the Trinity I have been assured from a very Authentick hand corresponding with several Persons of Note for Learning in Germany that it had given no small offence to the Divines abroad and particularly that those learned Gentlemen at Lipsick who write the Transactions would have censured the new Heterodox Notions and equally new and unjustifiable Expositions of Scripture which it is full of and those not wholly unreflected upon by them neither at much another rate than they have done in the Remarks of the Year 1691. p. 216. but that out of a peculiar respect to the Church of England they forbore in expectation that some Divine of her own Communion would undertake the Confutation of it And therefore since those Animadversions upon it came out so opportunely as an Answer to so just an Expectation as well as to so Ill a Book which had both given such offence to foreign Churches and brought such Scandal upon our own I hope this Defence of them will find an Acceptance worthy of Those Great Injured Truths asserted in that Discourse and re-asserted in this For high time certainly it is for all who heartily espouse the Concerns of our Excellent Church so Practised upon on all Hands now if ever to appear for Her Considering That from a New Christianity the Grand Project of some of late the Natural and Next step is to None And so Reverend Sirs to create
you no further trouble having with all the Respect and Reverence due to such great and renowned Bodies given you an account of the Occasion of this Address to you as a Thing well deserving your most serious Thoughts and representing the cause of our Venerable Old Religion now at stake as in truth it is I humbly leave the whole matter before you and remain As by Duty and Inclination equally bound Honoured Sirs Your most faithful and devoted Servant A. A. A Collection of several Choice New Theological Terms made use of in Two Books One Entituled A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity c. The other A Defense of Dr. Sherlock 's Notion of the Trinity c. and first Introduced by the said Doctor for giving the Church a better Explication and a clearer Notion of a Trinity in Unity than it has had for above sixteen hundred years before Which Collection is as follows SElf-Consciousness Vind. p. 49. l. 27. Mutual Consciousness Vind. p. 52. l. 4. Natural Self-Consciousness Def. p. 8. l. 7. Natural Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 18. l. 8. Intimate conscious Knowledge Vind. p. 59. l. 4. Conscious life Def. p. 60. l. 20. Self conscious Principle Def. p. 67. l. 16. Natural Principle of mutual Consciousness Def. p. 67. l. 22. Conscious Union Def. p. 9. l. 10. Natural Unity of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 33. l. 2. Communion of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 72. l. 9. Self-Conscious Love and Self-Conscious Complacency Def. p. 68. l. 2 4. Intellectual Sensation Def. p. 77. l. 16. Self-Sensation Def. p. 39. l. 24. Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 4. Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 15. Natural Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 30. Natural Mutual Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 2. Feeling each other's Knowledge Vind. p. 56. l. 24. Self-Consciousness between the Father and the Son Vind. p. 60. l. 14. The Son 's feeling the Father's Will and Wisdom in himself Vind. p. 60. l. 22. The Son the Self Conscious Image of his Father's Will and Knowledge Vind. p. 60. at the end Continuity of Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 12 13. Three distinct Infinite Minds Vind. p. 66. l. 22. One Individual Nature subsisting thrice not by multiplying but only by Repeating it self Def. p. 24. l. 2 3. The Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication Def. p. 37. l. 1. The same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences Def. p. 91. l. 8. The same Individual Nature repeated in its living Image Def. p. 70. l. 4. One Eternal Infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences Def. p. 94. l. 6 c. Which Terms with some others like-them are to be substituted in the room of Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Suppositum Person Hypostasis and Relation All which though constantly used hitherto both by Fathers and Councils yet serving only as this Author affirms to pervert and confound mens Notions and Discourses about the Divine Nature and Persons ought utterly to be exploded and laid aside as meer Gibberish and Gipsie Cant especially by such as account all Greek and Latin so too Several New Heterodox and Extraordinary Propositions partly in Divinity and partly in Philosophy extracted out of the Two forementioned Books 1. THE Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits and not to hold so is both Heresie and Non-sense Vind. p. 66. l. 25. 2. Unless every Person of the Blessed Trinity considered as a distinct Person be allowed to be a distinct Infinite Eternal Mind we shall have nothing left us but a Trinity of meer Modes Names and Postures Defen pag. 8. lin 24. pag. 30. lin 24. 3. That which makes a Spirit whether Finite or Infinite and consequently each of the Divine Persons which according to this Author are Three distinct Infinite Spirits One with it self and distinct from all others is Self-Consciousness and Nothing else Vind. p. 67. lin 11. p. 68. lin 5. 13. 74. lin 15 c. 4. A natural Self-Consciousness makes a Natural Person Def. p. 8. lin 7. 5. If the formal Reason of Personality be that which makes a Mind or Person which with this Author are always Terms convertible one with it self and distinguishes it from all others then Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality Def. p. 37. l. 8 9 10 c. 6. Mutual Consciousness is that which formally unites the Divine Persons in Nature or Essence and makes them all essentially and numerically one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6 7 8. and p. 84 l. 29 and elsewhere frequently 7. There is no other mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father called by the Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceivable or possible but by mutual Consciousness Def. p. 9. l. 15 16 c. 8. The Son and the Holy Ghost are in the Father as in their Cause Vind. p. 69. l. 29. Which Term Divines generally decline the use of using the word Principle instead thereof However this overthrows the foregoing Proposition viz. That the Son can be no otherwise in the Father than by mutual Consciousness 9. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used with reference to the Divine Persons by the Nicene Fathers is not sufficient to prove a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Essence in the said Persons Def. p. 69. l. 1 2 c. 10. The Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Divine Persons is partly specifick partly numerical Def. p. 17. l. 27. 11. It is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate Union in Nature than mutual Consciousness Def. p. 35. l. 22. Whereas an Vnion in one Numerical Essence or Nature is and must be in the very Conception or Notion of it greater and more intimate as being the Ground the Reason and Foundation of the other 12. The very Nature and Subsistence of the Father Son and Holy Ghost is wholly Relative Def. p. 27. l. 21. And for their Subsistence I grant it to be so but if their Nature be wholly Relative too I am sure there is nothing absolute belonging to the Deity 13. The Case of a Man and his living Image though even by this Author 's own confession a meer Fiction or Supposition is a plain Account of the essential Vnity between God the Father and God the Son Def. p. 21. l. 10. That is to say in a Romance we have a clear Explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the first and second Person of the Trinity And in Two who are actually separate and loco-distant from one another we have a plain Account of the Union of Two who both in their Essence and Persons are actually and absolutely inseparable 14. If the Three Divine Persons be considered as Three Infinite Minds distinguished from each other by a Self-Consciousness of their own and essentially united to each other by a mutual Consciousness which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting Minds then a Trinity
between Three Infinite Persons and Three Infinite Minds 228 A Syllogism very learnedly form'd by this Defender for his old Friends the Socinians with two Terms and no more 229 The Nature Import and Force of the Equipollency of Terms declar'd 234 235 236 The Assertion of Three distinct Infinite Minds inevitably inferrs a plurality of Gods but the Assertion of Three distinct Infinite Persons does not so and the reason of the Difference plainly shown 237 238 239 c. The Defender confuted by his own express concession 244 His New-coin'd and never before heard of Expression viz. That the Divine Nature is Repeated in Three Subsistences ought by no means to be endur'd but utterly rejected as absurd both in Philosophy and Theology 242 item 260 c. This Defender manifestly ignorant what the true definition of Substance is 247 His equally gross and ridiculous Ignorance in supposing a Res Cogitans to be a different thing from a Substantia Cogitans or Intelligens 249 Naturae Rationalis Individua Substantia an Essential Predicate indeed but not the Definition of a Person 250 The Three Divine Persons proved not to be Three distinct Substances but Three distinct Minds proved necessarily to be so 251 Proved That the Fathers by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as apply'd to the Divine Persons never meant to conclude a Specifick but only a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Substance belonging to them by shewing how far they argued against the Arians from the said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 253 254 That the Ancients never admitted three individual Substances in the Godhead proved from the Latine Churche's refusing for a long time the use of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 255 This Author 's fulsome Ignorance in supposing a Numerical Difference not to be an Essential Difference 257 It is impossible for three Minds to exist in one infinite Mind or Substance so as thereby to become essentially one 259 It is impossible for any two or more Substances to be absolutely inseparable which is another Demonstration That the three Divine Persons cannot be three distinct Substances Minds or Spirits ibid. The Animadverter's Argument against three Substances in the Godhead asserted and confirmed 262 The Defender's scandalous Assertion concerning the Divine Essence and a Divine Person examin'd and overthrown p. 263 to 267 A notable Passage out of Faustinus against the admission of Three Individual Substances in the Godhead 268 The Animadverter's Third Argument against the Three Divine Persons being Three distinct Minds vindicated and the force of it prov'd to be founded not in the meer Opposition of the Numeral Terms One and Three but in the peculiar Nature and Condition of the Subject which they are here apply'd to 270 271 Three Infinite Minds can no more be essentially One Infinite Mind than Three Persons can upon any account whatsoever be naturally One Person 272 For Three to be One and One to be Three in respect of one and the same kind of Unity or Diversity is impossible ibid. A Ridiculous Cavil of the Defender proceeding from his gross Ignorance of the Sence and Vse of the word Attribute as apply'd to God 275 The Defender's perpetual Blunder in concluding each of the Divine Persons to be a distinct Infinite Mind because Infinite Mind belongs distinctly to each of them p. 277 to 280 To assert the Three Divine Persons to be Three Infinite Minds utterly irreconcilable to the form of the Athanasian Creed ibid. The same Individual Divine Nature belongs in common to all the Divine Persons but upon the same account on which it is common to them all it does not belong distinctly to each or any of them 279 A Notable Passage out of a Latin Tract inserted into Athanasius's Works expresly denying the Three Divine Persons to be Three Spirits 281 The Blasphemy charged upon the Passages extracted out of Dr. Sherlock's Book of the Knowledge of Jesus by the Animadverter in his Preface still insisted upon and the Charge made good against him 283 284 Good and Charitable Advice given to this Author 285 286 A summary Account of the several Ways and Shifts made use of by the Defender throughout this whole Defence p. 286 to 289 Some Instances of the extraordinary Vertues of Mr. Dean's Meaning shewing of what singular use it is to him upon more occasions than One p. 289 to 292 The Complaint made by some against the Animadverter as if he had treated Mr. Dean forsooth with too much sharpness shewn to be partial and unreasonable and consequently not worth regarding 293 294 The Animadverter's Resolution how to deal with him for the future 294 His Scurrility towards the Animadverter in six several Instances laid open and remarked upon such as for example his traducing him as One who can only make a shift to read and to transcribe and as one who must be taught to construe the Fathers calling him withal Grinning Dog c. p. 294 to 302 A brief Vindication of the Animadverter against the Objections and unprovok'd Spight of the Socinian Considerer p. 302 to 312 A memorable Saying of a certain Dean to a poor Widow desiring to renew her Lease with him 308 Dr. Sherlock and not the Animadverter a Favourite of the Socinians 302 303 304 c. A Remark or two upon the little Oxford-Excommunicate lately expell'd from Exeter College 313 This New Hypothesis sufficiently debated and confuted already and the Truth asserted against it by Argument and consequently the Exertion of the Episcopal Censure and Authority the fittest way to deal both with That and its Author for the future 315 The whole closed up with a remarkable Expression apply'd to the present Subject Some ERRATA of the Press IN the Table of New Heterod Propositions page the last lin 15. for of judge of r. to judge of p. 22. l. 5. for intire read entire p. 49. l. 12. for 26th r. 25th p. 60. l. 14. for singulur r. singular p. 73. l. 5. dele E. p. 76. l. 25. for Effential r. Essential p. 83. l. 11. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 174. l. 15. for coutradicting r. contradicting p. 236. l. 14. for Inâ—inite r. infinite p. 244. l. 31. for Thnig r. Thing p. 246. l. 27. for consist r. consist p. 251. l. 1. for Substancs r. Substance p. 280. l. 22. for is evident r. is as evident p. 302. l. 15. for 7. r. 6. Where Adimadverter occurrs r. Animadverter For and indeed r. or rather indeed p. 313. last line but two TRITHEISM CHARGED c. AS it may justly be accounted a needless so it is certainly a Nauseous Task to attempt the Confutation of a Book more than sufficiently confuted already by the very Book which it was wrote against For so much I dare and shall averr That there is not one Passage in all this Defence of Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Trinity as it is called carrying with it so much as the Face of an Argument as none carries with it
not properly and formally make him to be God nor is that wherein his Godhead does precisely consist though by Reason of the Persons including in him the Nature it does indeed imply and suppose him to be God And thus all the Ancient Orthodox Divines and Doctors of the Church distinguish in each Person Two things though intimately and inseparably United viz. The Godhead or Divine Nature and the Personal distinguishing Relation so that what agrees to the Person upon one Account does not properly belong to him upon the other and consequently to make the Personal Distinction the Proper Reason of any essential Predication is utterly false and illogical And accordingly to say that Infinite Eternal Mind which is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature as such belongs to any One Person by reason of his Personal Distinction is false forasmuch as this would inferr it to belong to that Person only since his Personal Distinction belongs only to himself It belongs indeed to him though distinct but not because distinct but wholly because of his Divine Nature which belonging equally to all the Divine Persons all the Essential Attributes of the said Nature must equally belong to all the Three Persons too From all which it follows That since Infinite Eternal Mind is an Attribute not springing from Personal Distinction even in Distinct Persons nor agreeing to the said Persons upon that account but springing wholly from that One Divine Nature which is Common to them All it can never inferr the Three Persons though Distinct to be Three Infinite Eternal Minds since as I shew before the Connexion between a Distinct Person as the Subject and between Infinite Mind as the Predicate not being causal the Multiplication of the Subject can never inferr the Multiplication of the Predicate And this I affirm to be a full and true Account of this Matter and a clear Solution of the Fallacy which this Man 's whole Argument depended upon and consequently that his Tritheistical Hypothesis That the Three Distinct Divine Persons must be therefore Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is even by his own Confession would he stand to it at an end And the Truth is there is nothing in his whole Book but pittiful wretched Fallacy join'd with gross Ignorance of the Subject he writes of from first to last And yet after all This he makes his Hypothesis the only Rule to understand most of the Scriptures by which represent to us the Vnion between the Father and the Son and particularly that about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 expressed Iohn 14. v. 11. by the Son 's being in the Father and the Father in the Son For says he That the Father should be in the Son and the Son in the Father so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended with several like Expressions is made very Possible and Intelligible by a mutual conscious Sensation but nothing else will afford us any Conception of it Def. p. 9. To which I answer what if it does not And what Christian is concern'd to have any such Conception For did the Catholick Church ever pretend to any beyond the bare Knowledge of the Signification and Sense of the Terms in which it was revealed And did not the bare Revelation of it sufficiently make out the Possibility of it to us without any further Explication What does this Profane Man mean thus to state the very Possibility of a Thing expresly reveal'd in Scripture upon his New-found Exposition of it so that unless this be admitted we must even in spight of Revelation look upon it as Impossible Good God! whither are we running But to shew moreover That his Exposition is as Forced as New Our Saviour expresses this Circumincession by words importing mutual Inexistence But says this Man a Man made it seems to Correct Revelation it self by putting it into properer Words That such a mutual Inexistence cannot be conceived Possible unless we understand it of Mutual Consciousness that is of quite another Thing from what the Words signifie for certain it is that mutual Inexistence is not mutual Consciousness nor can mutual Consciousness be mutual Inexistence But in short will this Man say That the mutual Inexistence of the Father and the Son understood according to the very Letter implies in it a Contradiction I question whether he will dare say so whatsoever the Thing asserted by him may inferr For as for that pittiful Objection against the same Thing 's comprehending another Thing and being comprehended by it c. it is a meer Toy founded only in that old Maxime Omne continens est majus contento drawn off from Material Quantitative Beings and so not applicable to Immaterial and Spiritual as has been fully shewn in the 9 th Chapter of the Animadversions p. 299 and 300. But if this Author will not venture to say that such a mutual Inexistence understood according to the Letter implies in it a Contradiction then let him give the Church a Satisfactory Reason Why our Saviour's Words should not be understood in their own Natural Proper Sence but in this Man 's New Sence which is both Improper and Figurative and never heard of before But with a bold Front he says That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here spoken of is not otherwise Possible and Intelligible which Two Words he is perpetually jumbling together as if there might not be many things Possible and yet by Humane Reason not Intelligible But I must here tell him what I dare say he knew not before viz. That it is one thing Positively to apprehend and know a Thing not to be Possible which I defie him to prove this mutual Inexistence even understood literally not to be and another Thing not to apprehend or Know How or by what way a Thing is Possible And this latter I affirm ought never to supersede our Assent to any Thing if revealed to us nor to make us doubt of the Revelation nor are we at all concerned about any further Explication of the Thing so Revealed nor whether we ever know any more of it or no And this is my Opinion may serve an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man which is but another word for a Theological Quack a great deal of trouble But so far is this Man's Mutual-Consciousness from being the only Thing that can render this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intelligible That unless a Mutual Inexistence be presupposed no such Thing as a Mutual-Consciousness can here take place since it is essentially founded in that For surely Father and Son must exist mutually in one Another before they can know or be conscious to themselves that they do so But this point of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 has been so fully debated and so throughly cleared in the Animadversions both in the seventh Chapter from page 201 to the 207. inclusively and in the ninth Chapter from page 295 to 301. that there needed not to have been so much as one word said of it here But as
Vse of the Word as applied to Created Minds and Spirits but so is a Person also as much as Mind p. 16. l. 10. But stay here good Sir stay a little For this I utterly deny having before demonstratively shewn That though the word Person in the Original Use of it was actually applied to Beings of an Absolute and Separate Subsistence such as Angels and Men yet that even then they never signified them under the Proper Formality of Absolute and Separate but only of Complete Subsistences and by consequence equally agreed to all Complete Subsistences whether Separate and Absolute or only Distinct and Relative as the Divine Persons are so that here is not only the Vse of the word Person but also the Definition of it making it equally applicable to both these sorts of Subsistence viz. Absolute and Relative But on the other side I would fain know of this Author Whether the Definition of a Mind or Spirit can agree to any but to an Absolute Being Nature or Substance and if it can agree to none else how it can be applied to a Subsistence perfectly Relative as all the Divine Subsistences are so as in its Original and properest Signification to signifie that too which yet as I have shewn the Definition of a Person properly does Well but admitting though not granting that the Term Mind or Spirit may be drawn off from its Proper and Received Signification and Definition so that Three Minds or Spirits may signifie Three Distinct Relative Subsistences of one and the same Infinite and Eternal Mind or Spirit included in All or Each of them I say if the Term Three Minds may be brought to this Signification it must have been by a long received Custome which this Man calls Theological Vse And then I require this Author to shew us such a Theological Use of this word Mind that is a Concurrence of all Divines for several Ages throughout the Catholick Church expressing the Three Divine Subsistences or Persons of the Godhead by Three Distinct Infinite Minds that is to say Three Relatives by Three Absolutes The Term Persons indeed has been applied to these Three Subsistences and that both from the Original Signification and Definition of the Word as also from the constant Use of it by the Church for many Centuries But the term Infinite Minds was never plurally applied to them upon either of these Accounts by any Orthodox Divine or Writer unless this Particular Author's making use of it in his pretended Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity c. can be called the Theological Vse of the Word for I suppose That neither are all Divines included in him nor is he to be thought equivalent to them all whatsoever he may think himself Nevertheless for his own and the Worlds satisfaction I shall shew him what Theological use of the word Three Minds or Spirits instead of Three Divine Persons I meet with And first of all Theodoret in his first Book Haereticarum fabularum and the 18 Chapter tells us of a certain Sect called the Peratae who held in the Divine Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that here is one Theological use of the word Minds or Spirits thus applyed for him And Valentinus Gentilis held in the Godhead Three Eternal Spirits or Minds of which one was called by him the Essentiator and the other Two the Essentiati In which I cannot see what he differs from this Author So that here is another Theological Vse of this word for him And thirdly his Friend Stephanus Curcellaeus in his Treatise de Trinitate frequently calls the Divine Person Tres aeternos Spiritus asserting a Specifick Vnity between them which this Author also would fain be at and denying a Numerical So that here is a Third Theological use of the same word to comfort and encourage him And I wish him all the Credit and Satisfaction that such Theological Company can give him In the mean time whereas he tells the World in the close of this Paragraph That when the Dean as he calls him speaks of Three distinct Infinite Minds which are essentially and inseparably one he could mean nothing more where he gives us meaning against words again than Three distinct Intelligent but not separate Subsistences p. 16. l. 20. I must tell him in answer to This That if he here speaks of Three distinct Minds as Essentially one by one and the same Numerical Essence which is the only Essential Vnity here spoken of with reference to the Trinity it is an intolerable contradiction Forasmuch as each Mind or Spirit being one by a particular Essence of it's own constituting it such a Particular Mind or Spirit Three distinct Minds or Spirits can never be essentially one by one Numerical Essence belonging to them all which yet the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are and must be And whereas he says That by Three Minds he means Three Intelligent Subsistences I ask him whether these Three Subsistences are Relative or Absolute If he says Relative I do here tell him that then they are not Three Minds a Mind being defined An Intelligent Immaterial Substance which imports nothing Relative in it at all But if he says that these Subsistences are Absolute I then affirm That they are not the Three Persons in the Trinity which as such both are and of Necessity must be Relative So that it is evident that this Man knows not which way to turn himself nor how to speak of the subject he is treating of with any consistency with common sence And this makes his Boldness the more unpardonable in saying That he needs ask no other Pardon for affirming the Three Divine Persons to be Three Infinite Minds but for the use of a word which the Schools had not Consecrated p. 16. l. 24. In answer to which since he here charges the non-using of it only upon the Schools I challenge him to shew me any other Writers of the Church accounted Orthodox who have made use of it or affirmed the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Minds or Spirits Let him I say assign them if he can And if he cannot the using of the word thus applyed must even by his own Confession p. 9. l. 3. be an unusual way of speaking at least that is to say a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and if it were no more than so let him shew â—ow he is able to justifie the Use of that which a General Council had denounced an Anathema to the Users of in these high Points about the Trinity and Incarnation But this is not all for I come upon him yet further and demand of him how he will answer to the Church not only his presuming to introduce such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in treating of this high Mystery and that in the Room of the anciently received Terms but his venturing to do this when he himself confesses and declares as he does in the 2â— th page lin 13. That there could not have
School-Terms in general I come in the Second place to give some account also of that particular Term the formal Reason of a Thing frequently made use of in the Animadversions which though sufficiently explained in the second Chapter of them I shall however take into some further consideration since this Author would fain avoid any Argument couched under it by pleading that the Term it self is none of his Which indeed is readily granted him but yet if he asserts the Thing as he often does and the Animadverter puts it for him into a proper Scholastical Term and so fits it the better for Argumentation the Term I assure him will affect him and his Arguments whether he will admit and make use of it or no for the Animadverter will be judged by his Reader who understands Him and not by his Adversary who does not Well then by the formal Reason of a Thing the Animadverter understands that Internal Principle which makes a Thing to be what it is And as Vnity inseparably attends Being and distinction accompanies Vnity the same is the Principle of all these since that which internally makes a Thing such or such a Being thereby also makes it one in it self and distinguishes it from all other Things besides For still according to all Philosophy Idem est Principium Constitutivum Distinctivum So that as every Thing is constituted in such an order of Being by what it is so it is distinguished also by what it is from every Thing which it is not And for this Cause the Principle here spoken of is called Formal because it is the Form taking the word in its larger sence as it comprehends also Essence which makes a Thing to be of such a Nature and withal gives it Vnity Distinction and Denomination And upon the same Account also the Term Reason is added to the Term Formal to shew That this gives the Natural and Proper Answer to the Question why a Thing is such or such thus or thus As if for Instance it should be asked why or for what Reason a Beast is said to be a sensible Creature the Answer is because it has an Internal Principle of sence which renders it so so that this Principle of sence is the Formal Reason whereby it is both constituted and denominated sensible And the like is to be said of other Things in the like Case This is the Account which I give of the meaning of the Term Formal Reason as it occurs in the Animadversions viz. That it is that Internal Principle which makes a Thing to be what it is to be one in it self and distinct from all other Things which it is not and lastly is the Natural and Proper Answer to all Enquiries à Priore why or how a Thing comes to be essentially such or such according to its respective Denomination Of all which this Author being wholly ignorant he thinks he has so entirely cleared himself of this Term and whatsoever has been argued against him under it That he declares with Triumph p. 78. l. 10. That if the Animadverter thinks fit to try his skill again upon this Argumenâ— he believes he shall hear no more of the formal Reason of Peâ—sonality and Vnion nor of other such like Termâ— But this poor Man should remember how unhappy he has been in his Prophecies For so he had said before both of the Socinians and of the most learned Answerer of the Vindication of his Case c. viz. That he belieâ—ed that he should hear from them no more when yet he has heard from them Both and that in a strain so much above his low Talent that few believe that either of them will ever hear more from him and if â—s they say sâ—â—ing is believing so fâ—â—ling be belâ—â—ving too I doubt not but by this time he Himself also is oâ— the same Opinion And accordingly I do here assure this Man of Presumption that I shall produce this and the like Terms in all Disputes with him again and again having herein the Company of all the Eminent Scholastick Writers both in Philosophy and Divinity constantly using and avowing the use of them and I doubt not but in the strength of them to break through all the Coâ—â—â—b Argumentations of this his Sophistical and slight Discourse And so I go on But before I come particularly to examine his shifting Answers to the Animadverter's Arguments I think fit to lay before the Reader the plain and true state of the Point between this Author and him as the most unexceptionable Rule whereby the Reader is desired to judge between them both Now the Chief Heads of dispute between them are these Three First Concerning Self-Consciousness and what dependance the Personality and Personal Vnity of Persons both Create and Uncreate has upon it Secondly Touching mutual Consciousness and how far the Essential Vnity of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Numerical Divine Nature depends upon it And Thirdly Whether the Three Divine Persons are Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits or no. Concerning all which severally the Reader is in the first place to observe That this Author makes Self-Consciousness both in Beings Create and Uncreate the formal Reason of Personality and Personal Vnity viz. That which makes a Person to be formally a Person and formally one in himself or in other words that wherein his Personal Being Unity and Original Distinction from other things does consist And so in the next place for mutual Consciousness he makes the Essential Unity of Nature or Essence belonging to the Three Divine Persons to consist formally in their mutual Consciousness So that it is this which renders them formally one in Nature or Essence And lastly He positively affirms that the Three Divine Persons in the Godhead are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits and that it is Heresy and Non-sence to affirm otherwise Vind. p. 66. l. 25. Thus he holds and asserts concerning these Three disputed Points as will appear from the following Passages in his Books concerning each of them And 1. For Self-Consciousness The Self-Vnity of a Spirit says he universally by the way reckoning a Spirit a Person can be nothing else but Self-Consciousness viz. That it is Conscious to its own Thoughts Reasonings Passions which no other Spirit is conscious to but it self Vind. p. 48. l. 32. This makes a Spirit numerically one Vind. p. 49. l. 2. The Self-Consciousness of every Person to it self viz. of the Father Son and Holy Ghost makes them Three Distinct Persons Vind. p. 68. l. 5. And we know no other Vnity of a Mind or Spirit but Consciousness Ibid. The Essential Vnity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness and it is nothing else which makes a Spirit one and distinguishes it from all other Spirits Vind. p. 47. l. 15. The very Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal vital Sensation Defence p. 7. l. 11. The Vnity of a single Mind or Spirit consists in a Natural Self-Conscious Sensation
according as the Thing is which it belongs to For all these Three necessarily go together and essentially imply one another and consequently there must be one and the same Principle of them all And now if we would see whether or no this Author applies all this to Self-Consciousness with reference to Minds or Spirits which he constantly makes to be Persons let the Reader cast his Eye back upon some of the fore-alleged Passages particularly upon that in Vindic. p. 49. l. 12. That this Self-Consciousness makes a Spirit numerically one with it self And in Vind. p. 68. l. 6. That the Self-Consciousness of every one of the Persons viz. in the Trinity to it self makes them Three distinct Persons And again Vind. p. 74. l. 13. That the Essential Vnity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness and that it is nothing else which makes a Spirit one and distinguishes it from all other Spirits Likewise in this Defence p. 7. He tells us expresly That the Nature of a Spirit consists in Sensation which with him is only another word for Self-Consciousness Nay and to go no further than the very next page to that in which he here so positively declares That he no where makes Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality viz. Defence p. 43. He roundly affirms That Self-Consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits And that such a distinct and separate Self-Conscious Mind is a Natural Person Now I would have this Man in the first place tell us whether all these Passages have not in them a causal sence but only an Illative or Probative and no more And in the next place I would have him shew me whether there be any Thing more signified by the formal Reason of Personality than what the forecited Passages fully contain in them and if he cannot prove that there is any more signified by it as there is not then let him for the future leave off shuffling and own that by what he has asserted in the said Passages he has made Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality with reference to Minds or Spirits which he Universally affirms to be Persons And by this I hope the Judicious Reader will see with both Eyes what a slippery Self-Contradicting Caviller the Animadverter has to dispute with In the mean time the sum of the Animadverter's Argument against him stands thus This Author asserts every Mind or Spirit to be a Person He places this Personality in Self-Consciousness he holds this Self-Consciousness to be Essential to and Inseparable from a Mind for as much as he positively asserts the Nature of a Mind or Spirit to consist in it Defen p. 7. l. 11. whereupon it does and must follow That since our Saviour in assuming the humane Nature assumed an humane Mind Soul or Spirit he assumed an humane Person too for as much as its Personality was as Inseparable from it as its Self-Consciousness from which it necessarily resulted was Nor will it avail him to allege the Interposal of Supernatural and extraordinary Power in the present Instance since such Power though never so extraordinary and Supernatural never destroys the Essence or Essentially necessary Connexion of Things And therefore if the Personality of a mind be implied in the very Nature of a Mind a Mind can be no more without its Personality than without its Nature which would be a direct Contradiction to the effecting whereof the Divine Power it self does not extend But on the other side when we state the Personality of an humane Nature upon the compleat Subsistence of it which is a mode not necessarily implied in it the Humane Nature of Christ might very well by the Divine Power be made to exist without it and so in a supernatural way be taken into and supported by the Personal Subsistence of the Eternal Word And all this with full accord to the strictest Principles of Reason without the least necessity of making Two Persons in our Saviour whereas according to this Author's Hypothesis it is impossible for all the Reason of Minkind to keep off an Humane Person as well as a Divine from belonging to our Saviour by his Incarnation or Assumption of the humane Nature As for his taking shelter in Boetius's Definition of a Person that will not help him neither since the utmost that can be proved against it is that Boetius was under a mistake and one Man's mistake certainly cannot make another in the right For all both Schoolmen and other Divines agree that this Definition strictly taken is defective and that instead of substantia Individua alone it should be substantia Individua completa Incommunicabilis or something Equivalent to the Two last Terms For otherwise this Definition also would infer Two Persons in Christ since there are Two Individual Substances belonging to him viz. an Humane and a Divine But after all we have great reason to believe that Boetius here uses the word Substantia for Subsistentia as several of the Ancient Fathers of great note did and particularly St. Hilary in his Books of the Trinity very often and St. Austin sometimes And then the Boetian Definition is perfect and good and no such Consequence of a double Personality in our Saviour can be drawn from thence For as much as the Son of God took our humane Nature without its proper Subsistence into the Subsistence of his own Eternal Person And so I proceed to the Animadverter's Third Argument proving Self-Consciousness not to be the formal Reason of Personality in Created Beings which is this The Soul in its separate state is conscious to its self of all its own Internal Acts or Motions c. and yet the Soul in such a state is not a Person and therefore Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality for if it were it would constitute a Person wheresoever it was This Argument is of the same Nature with the former each of them being brought as a Particular Negative against an Universal Affirmative And how does this Defender confute it Why by the easiest way of Confutation that it is possible for Ignorance to give it viz. by saying That it is nothing to the Purpose But does he know what is and what is not an Argument and what is to confute an Assertion or Position and what is not Let him know then That to confute an Argument is properly to conclude the Contradictory Proposition of that which is held by the Respondent or Defendant and is called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by the Latines Redargutio And here I would have this hardy Ignoramus own before the World if he dares That one Negative Instance does not overthrow an Vniversal Affirmative as really and effectually as Ten Thousand But possibly one who can be of all sides may be for both sides of the Contradiction too and hold That Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality Personal
down in that Preface nor has he in the Defence of that wretched Book answered any one of them saving that at the latter end of it viz. p. 529. l. 14. of his Defence of the Discourse concerning the Knowledge of Iesus Christ he seems to knock under Board and to own that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 due to the discoursing of Things Sacred be the Case what it will Which Apology declares that even by his own Confession he had treated of these Things in a most scandalous unbecoming manner as in truth he did and not only so but whosoever set him upon it in a most Profane and Devillish way too So that whereas he here says That he had by that answer silenced his Adversaries so that he heard from them no more Def. p. 94. l. 24. I must tell him that some silence their Adversaries because they cannot be answered by them and some because they are not thought worth the answering which was this Author's Case here For his Adversaries as inconsiderable as they were having effectually baffled and overthrown his whole Book and broken the strength and sinews of it if it had any little concerned themselves at any Insignificant Replies he did or could afterwards make though never so many but were willing to let him have the last word considering that as Rector of Billingsgate at that time he might claim it by his place But the following Instruction to his Friend is certainly very diverting Def. p. 98. at the end in these words Where the Animadverter says he charges the Dean with Absurdities and Contradictions turn to the place and read it with it 's context and tell me what you cannot answer and I will to which he should have done well to have added If I can But the whole Passage is just as if he had said Sir If you find not Absurdities and Contradictions enough in my Book to satisfy your Curiosity that way pray come to the Fountain Head and consult me and you shall be sure of a more plentiful supply But he goes on If you or any Body else says he can be perswaded by the Animadverter that the Dean understands neither English Latin or Greek Logicks Metaphysicks c. I need wish you no other punishment than when ever you write to fall into the hands of such an Adversary p. 99. l. 1. In answer to which I am bid only to tell him that touching his Qualifications as to the forementioned respects the Animadverter is perfectly of the same mind which he was of when he wrote the ninth and tenth Chapters of the Animadversions but thinks it not worth his while to use many Arguments to perswade the Reader to be of the same opinion but only refers him to two Irrefragable ones viz. his own two Eyes to convince him In the mean time it may be some diversion to him to observe how that because most Parts of Philosophy viz. Physicks Metaphysicks Mathematicks Ethicks Politicks c. are always expressed plurally therefore this Author very wisely expresses Logick so too calling it Logicks Def. p. 99. l. 3. which I dare say no Scholar ever called so before and in my poor Judgment he might have forborn to speak of Logicks in the Plural till he had better understood one But 't is evident that he knew no better and we must not expect that any one should speak better than he knows But since he is such a grand Exemplar of Pride and Disdain towards all whom he ever wrote against that he may not however lie too open to them when they turn upon him again as in all likelyhood the way being now opened to them they will I would advise him in time though I confess it is something with the latest to procure himself some good honest Systems in all the forementioned sorts of Learning adding to use his own Dialect Grammaticks withal since I would not direct him to Books too much above his reach at first And when he has once got them about him I would have him ply them hard assuring himself which all know though scarce any one is so much his Friend as to tell him so that he has a great deal more need of studying than the World has or can have of his Writing Nevertheless if Writing be so absolutely Necessary to him that his health requires it and that Nature cannot be at ease nor enjoy it self unless the Scripturient humour has sometimes vent by throwing it self off into Paper let him at least make choice of proper Subjects and forbearing all Controversial Discourses about Christ's Satisfaction God's punitive Iustice and the Trinity which he was never cut out for let him rather jog on in the old beaten Track of Church Communion and of Death and Iudgment and upon these and such like heads the Two last especially he may continue on Writing and Printing and Printing and Writing and the World never the wiser for either even till his Subject overtakes him I have now gone through his whole Defence and having done so cannot but think it very proper and equally for the Reader 's Satisfaction to lay before him a Brief Scheme or Analysis of it together with those pittiful mean ways and methods by which with much ado it has been patched up and put together that so he may see what a kind of Antagonist the Animadverter has had to deal with and that in these following Particulars As First That for the better salving of his Credit he imposes his Book upon the World under the specious but false Title of an Answer to the Animadversions whereas it is but a very small Part of that Discourse which he attempts to answer passing over the main body of it without answering examining or so much as medling with it at all Secondly That he boldly and positively denies several Things in this Book which he had as positively affirmed before For which compare what he had said of the Term Substance in his Vindication with what he says of it in this his Defense In the former he explodes it from all our Discourses of God for that as he affirms the Mind of Man cannot form any conception of Substance either without matter or without a Beginning upon which score I am sure it cannot be applicable to God Vind. p. 69. l. 1. and 70. l. 7. and yet here in this Book he allows of it in our Discourses of God as a Term not only very Good but Vseful and Necessary Def. p. 3. l. 27. which two let the Reason of all Mankind reconcile if it can Likewise for Subsistence compare what he says for the utter rejection of this Term from all discourses about the Trinity Vind. p. 138. line the last and 139. line the first with what he says in behalf of it in this Defense p. 25. l. 13. affirming that there could not be a more proper word used to express an Vnity in Trinity by But all Instances of this kind falling under the Head of
with the Socinians and that therefore the Socinians would not concern themselves with him p. 12. Col. 2. towards the end and at last closed up by him with this affirmation also That he had given the Animadverter on disrespectful Language at all p. 25. Col. 2. l. 36. and consequently that he ought not to take the foregoing Reproaches ill but to embrace and accept them all as pure perfect Socinian Courtship and Civility Though in the Judgment of all that I can meet with these things clash so irreconcileably both with themselves and some other Passages in the same tract and carry in them so much of Sherlocism and Self-Contradiction that they evidently shew how hard if not impossible it is for any one to write for Dr. Sherlock without writing like him too In fine I believe the whole World can hardly shew another Instance of such Bitter Virulent Reproachful Language given and that even by the Confession of him who gave it without the least Provocation Nevertheless I have thought fit to treat this Considerer in a very different way from that in which I treated Dr. Sherlock and much more from that in which He himself has to the Amazement of all sober Persons treated the Animadverter not but that I am sufficiently sensible of every one of his Reproaches But since they are only Personal and designed against the Animadverter alone and wrote as I am well satisfied by Order too he may easily Command me as he 〈◊〉 done to slight and overlook them But Dr. Sherlock is to be looked upon as a common or rather an Universal Adversary and deserves to be treated as such and that in a due Vindication of all those worthy suffering Reputations those of the Fathers themselves reckoned for the chief which he has so rudely and illiterately and in a word so like himself made an invasion upon And so having represented the Invectives of this Socinian Writer against the Animadverter without returning them upon himself howsoever I have turned them upon him for whose sake they were written I leave it to the Reader and all Mankind to judge from the forementioned Passages what a share the Animadverter has in the Socinians Friendship and how much he is the object of their Admiration But the Animadverter has been attacked by Enemies from more Quartels than one and amongst the rest by that Diminutive Oberon in Divinity the little Oxford-Excommunicate A Person little indeed in every thing but Spight and Heresie He in his poor Still-born Pamphlet published against the Animadversions endeavours to set off his small Ware with the specious Title forsooth of the Trinity placed in its due light Though I must tell him That his Naked Gospel has much the Advantage of this Piece as having been placed by the Execution done upon it at Oxford not only in its due light but in its due heat too But has not this Man think we found out a very odd way of explaining this high Mystery to us viz. by first setting his College all in a Flame and then pretending to show us the Trinity by the Light of it But how in the name of all the Fairies amongst whom he is no small Prince comes he to be so fierce and furious against the Animadverter For the Animadverter never deposed against him nor does he know that he ever disobliged this pettit Doctor either by word or deed Nevertheless since there are some Tempers that can be spightful purely for Spight 's sake This Man was resolved to vent his Spleen though I believe it would put him hand to it to give a good Reason why whether we respect the Person whom he wrote against or whom he wrote for Accordingly several sourvy Passages of no small Rancor occur in his Discourse which I assure him might easily be returned upon him and that with shrewd Advantage But that I scorn to foul my Paper 〈◊〉 indeed my very Ink upon one of such a Character by quitting Scores with him in his own way Nor shall I step so low as to engage against a Book wrote in an entire Ignorance of the Subject which it was wrote upon or think that worth answering which hardly any Man of fence thinks worth Reading as his Bookseller by woful Experience finds However in Case the Learned and Judicious shall at any time judge it needful to have so slight a piece replied to which I could never yet find the way is so far already prepared for it That the Author is more than sufficiently known how little soever he is taken notice of we have his mark and his measure there being scarce any one but sâ—eâ— and sâ—es through him too For since the World has been acquainted with his Naked Gospel thanks be to his good Stars for it he may be distinguished by the stroke of his hand as well as by the mole on his foot There are others also who have discharged their Potgâ—ns at the Animadverter but he does not think it worth his while to fight with every one who can shooâ— Paper And thus having at length brought the work intended by me to a Conclusion after the Churche's and the Reader 's Pardon begged for all failures that shall appear in it I cannot but own and declare that many wise and good Men and hearty Lovers of our Church to my Knowledge are of Opinion That this Important and Fundamental Point has been sufficiently argued and the truth effectually proved against this Innovator whom I have been hitherto dealing with already and that the properest way of proceeding against him for the future is not by Argameâ—â— but Authority And that his Bishop would admonish him of his Heresy once and again and if he persists in it resolutely Excommunicate him and that all sober Christians who make Conscience of their Duty and their Holy Christâ—â—n Profession would thereupon shun and abandon and refuse all converse with him according to the Rule of Scripture and the practice of the Primitive Church towards Persons obstinately persisting in any Heresy and Excommunicated thereupon In the mean time let him and his Partisanâ— put the best Face they can upon the matter yet I know no true Sons of the Church of England who account of him otherwise in his present station and condition than as of a Flag of Defiance to our old established Religion Nor could I ever imagine from the very first what his design could be in writing that wretched Book and of others in approving it but to confound and embroil that great Article of our Faith in order to the laying in quite aside And most certainly it cannot be for nothing that even the Socinians themselves as great an opposition as they profess to Tritheism are yet so very fond of and zealous for this Tritheist that as it has been shewn they could almost tear the Animadverter in pieces for having wrote against him He tells us at the latter end of the Preface to his former Book called his Vindication
c. That his New Hypothesis of the Trinity cost him many thoughts and that it must cost others many too if they will understand it And I must confess that it has cost me several Thoughts also But since it is certain that a Man may throw away his Thoughts as well as his money upon that which will never quit Costs I must profess likewise that I grudge every Thought which I have spent upon it For to hear ones Brains upon such a dull senceless Hypothesis having nothing to recommend it but it's Novelty is but just as if a Man should beat his head against a Post which being a dry wooden hard Thing and upon that account a lively though not living Image of this Man's work may break one's head indeed but can never improve it And therefore did not my duty to and concern for our Excellent and now suffering Church oblige me to serve her even in the lowest if lawful Offices I would never trouble my thoughts with his Heretical stuff more especially since I can truly say of this New Hypothesis what a certain Divine of a very voluble Conscience and known to this Man as well as he knows Himself said of the New Oath before he took it The more I think on 't the worse I like it FINIS Advertisement ANimadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Book Entituled A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity c. Together with a more Necessary Vindication of that Sacred and Prime Article of the Christian Faith from his New Notions and false Explications of it Humbly offered to his Admirers and to Himself the Chief of them By a Divine of the Church of England The Second Edition with Additions The Objection about the derivation of a Mystery prov'd only a Blunder of the Objector See the Preface to the Animadvers p. 7. See a Pamphlet Entitled The Trinity set in its true Light p. 5. lin 28. Non accipienda est processio secundùm quod est in Corporalibus vel per motum localem vel per actionem aliquam causae in exteriorem effectum ut calor à calefaciente in calefactum Sed secundùm Emanationem intelligibilem uâ—poâ—e Verbi intelligibilis à Dicente quod manet in ipso sic fides Catholica processionem ponit in divinis Aquinas 1â— P. Q. 27. Art 1. in C. Answer to the Antapology p. 19. l. 6. Argum. 1. Arg. 2. Arg. 3. Arg. 1. Arg. 2. Arg. 3. Arg. 4. Arg. â— Arg. 2. Arg. 3. Arg. 4. The state of the Question concerning Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness with reference to the Divine Persons changed and falsified by the Defender from what it is as deliver'd by Dr. Skerlock in his Vindication c. The true state of the Question concerning Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness with reference to the Divine Persons taken from Dr. Sherlock's own words in his Vindication c. Arg. 2. Arg. 3. Arg. 4. The wonderful Vertues of a skillfully managed meaning * Dr. W. * See the meaning of these extraordinary words in Chap. 10 of the Animadversions A Specimen of the Friendship of the Socinians to the Animadverter objected to him by this Defender together with some remarks upon a Socinian Tract Entituled Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity c. So far as they concern the Animadverter See the Animadv p. 329 330. ☞ See Serm. on Ps. 39.9 p. 17. l. 11. ☞ A Remark or Two upon the Little Oxford-Excommunicate who also has had a Fling at the Animadverter The Conclusion