the Printer for misplacing your Lordship's Numbers since so ranked as they are they do to me who am confounded by them lose all Order and Connection quite The next thing in the Defence which you go on with is an exception to my use of the word Certainty In the close of the Answer I had made in the Pages you pass over I add that Though the Laws of Disputation allow bare denial as a sufficient Answer to Sayings without any offer of a Proof yet my Lord to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all Satisfaction in what you apprehend may be of dangerous Consequence in my Book as to that Article I shall not stand still sullenly and put your Lordship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that Danger lies but shall on the other side endeavour to shew your Lordship That that Definition of mine whether True or False Right or Wrong can be of no dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith The Reason which I shall offer for it is this because it can be of no Consequence to it at all And the Reason of it was clear from what I had said before That Knowing and Believing were Two different Acts of the Mind And that my placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas i. e. that my Definition of Knowledge one of those Acts of the Mind would not at all alter or shake the Definition of Faith which was another Act of the Mind distinct from it And therefore I added That the Certainty of Faith if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so has nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge And to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to me as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of Speaking not easy to me to understand These and other Words to this purpose in the following Paragraphs your Lordship lays hold on and sets down as liable to no small exception Though as you tell me the main strength of my Defence lies in it Let what Strength you please lie in it my Defence was strong enough without it For to your bare Saying my method of Certainty might be of dangerous Consequence to any Article of the Christian Faith without proving it it was a defence strong enough barely to deny and put you upon shewing wherein that danger lies which therefore this main strength of my Defence as you call it apart I insist on But as to your exception to what I said on this occasion it consists in this that there is a Certainty of Faith and therefore you set down my saying That to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one as to talk of the Knowledge of believing As that which shews the inconsistency of my Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Christian Faith These are your Words here and yet you tell me That it is not my way of Ideas but my way of Certainty by Ideas that your Lordship is unsatisfied about What must I do now in the Case when your Words are expresly that my Notion of Ideas have an inconsistency with the Articles of the Christian Faith Must I presume that your Lordship means my Notion of Certainty All that I can do is to search out your meaning the best I can and then shew where I apprehend it not conclusive But this uncertainty in most places what you mean makes me so much work that a great deal is omitted and yet my Answer is too long Your Lordship asks in the next Paragraph How comes the Certainty of Faith so hard a Point with me Answ. I suppose you ask this Question more to give others hard thoughts of my Opinion of Faith than to be informed your self For you cannot be ignorant that all along in my Essay I use Certainty for Knowledge so that for you to ask me How comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with me is the same thing as for you to ask How comes the knowledge of Faith or if you please the knowledge of Believing to be so hard a Point with me A Question which I suppose you will think needs no Answer let your meaning in that doubtful Phrase be what it will I used in my Book the term Certainty for Knowledge so generally that no body that has read my Book though much less attentively than your Lordship can doubt of it That I used it in that sense there I shall refer my Reader but to two places amongst many to convince him This I am sure your Lordship could not be ignorant that by Certainty I mean Knowledge since I have so used it in my Letters to you Instances whereof are not a few some of them may be found in the places marked in the Margent And in my second Letter what I say in the leaf immediately preceding that which you quote upon this occasion would have put it past a possibility for any one to make shew of a doubt of it had not that been amongst those Pages of my Answer which for its being out of its proper place it seems you were resolved not to take notice of and therefore I hope it will not be besides my purpose here to mind you of it again After having said something to shew why I used Certainty and Knowledge for the same thing I added that Your Lordship could not but take notice of this in the 18th § of Ch. 4. of my 4th Book it being a Passage you had quoted and runs thus Where-ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our Idaas there is certain Knowledge And where-ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of things there is certain real Knowledge of which having given the marks I think I have shewn wherein Certainty real Certainty consists And I farther add in the immediately following Words That my definition of Knowledge in the beginning of the 4th Book of my Essay stands thus Knowledge seems to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas Which is the very definition of Certainty that your Lordship is here contesting Since then you could not but know that in this discourse Certainty with me stood for or was the same thing with Knowledge may not one justly wonder how you come to ask me such a Question as this How comes the Knowledge of Believing to become so hard a Point with me For that was in effect the Question that you asked when you put in the term Certainty since you knew as undoubtedly that I meant Knowledge by Certainty as that I meant Believing by Faith i. e. you could doubt of neither And that you did not doubt of it is plain from what you say in the next Page where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking Whether it be a proper way of speaking I allow to be a fair Question
this Proposition Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas weakens the credibility of this fundament Article that there is a God And so of the immortality of the Soul because I say I know not but Matter may think Your Lordship would infer Ergo my definition of Certainty weakens the credibility of the Revelation of the Souls immortality Your Lordship is pleased here to call this Proposition That Knowledge or Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas My general grounds of Certainty as if I had some more particular grounds of Certainty Whereas I have no other Ground or Notion of Certainty but this one alone all my Notion of Certainty is contained in that one particular Proposition but perhaps your Lordship did it that you might make the Proposition above quoted viz. No Idea proves the existence of the thing without it self under the Title you give it of the way of Ideas pass for one of my particular Grounds of Certainty whereas it is no more any Ground of Certainty of mine or definition of Knowledge than any other Proposition in my Book Another thing very remarkable in what your Lordship here says is That you make the failing to attain Knowledge by any way of Certainty in some particular Instances to be the finding the uncertainty of the way it self which is all one as to say That if a Man misses by Algebra the certain Knowledge of some Propositions in Mathematicks therefore he finds the way or principles of Algebra to be uncertain or false This is your Lordship's way of reasoning here Your Lordship quotes out of me That I say no Idea proves the existence of the thing without it self And that I say That one cannot be certain that Matter cannot think from whence your Lordship argues That he who says so cannot attain to Certainty that there is a God or that the Soul is immortal and thereupon your Lordship concludes he finds the uncertainty of the Principles he went upon in Point of Reason i. e. that he finds this Principle or Ground of Certainty he went upon in reasoning viz. That Certainty or Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas to be uncertain For if your Lordship means here by Principles he went upon in Point of Reason any thing else but that definition of Knowledge which your Lordship calls my Way Method Grounds c. of Certainty which I and others to the endangering some Articles of Faith go upon I crave leave to say it concerns nothing at all the Argument your Lordship is upon which is to prove That the placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas may be of dangerous consequence to any Article of Faith Your Lordship in the next place says Before we can believe any thing upon the account of Revelation we must suppose there is a God What use does your Lordship make of this Your Lordship thus argues But by my way of Certainty a Man is made uncertain whether there be a God or no. For that to me is the meaning of those Words How can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation when he is made uncertain by his own way whether there be a God or no Or they can to me mean nothing to the Question in hand What is the conclusion from hence This it must be or nothing to the purpose Ergo my defini-nition of Knowledge or which is the same thing my placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas leaves not the Articles of Faith the same credibility they had before To excuse my dulness in not being able to comprehend this consequence pray my Lord consider that your Lordship says Before we can believe any thing upon the account of Revelation it must be supposed that there is a God But cannot he who places Certainty in the perception of the agreement and disagreement of Ideas supposes there is a God But your Lordship means by suppose that one must be certain that there is a God Let it be so and let it be your Lordship's priviledge in Controversie to use one word for another though of a different signification as I think to suppose and be certain are Cannot one that places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas be certain there is a God I can assure you my Lord I am certain there is a God and yet I own That I place Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas Nay I dare venture to say to your Lordship That I have proved there is a God and see no inconsistency at all between these two Propositions That Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement of disagreement of Ideas and that it is certain there is a God So that this my Notion of Certainty this definition of Knowledge for any thing your Lordship has said to the contrary leaves to this Fundamental Article the same Credibility and the same Certainty it had before Your Lordship says farther To suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain that there is a principle above Matter and Motion in the World Here again my Lord your way of writing makes work for my Ignorance and before I can either admit or deny this Proposition or judge what force it has to prove the Proposition in question I must distinguish it into these different Senses which I think your Lordship's way of speaking may comprehend For your Lordship may mean it thus To suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain i. e. we must believe that there is a principle above Matter and Motion in the World Or your Lordship may mean thus We must be certain i. e. we must know that there is something above Matter or Motion in the World In the next place your Lordship may mean by something above Matter and Motion either simply an intelligent Being for Knowledge without determining what Being it is in is a principle above Matter and Motion Or your Lordship may mean an immaterial intelligent Being so that this undetermined way of expressing includes at least four distinct Propositions whereof some are true and others not so For 1. My Lord if your Lordship means That to suppose a Divine Revelation a Man must be certain i. e. must certainly know that there is an intelligent Being in the World and that that intelligent Being is immaterial from whence that Revelation comes I deny it For a Man may suppose Revelation upon the belief of an intelligent Being from whence it comes without being able to make out to himself by a Scientifical Reasoning that there is such a Being A proof whereof I humbly conceive are the Anthropomorphites among the Christians heretofore who nevertheless rejected not the Revelation of the New Testament and he that will talk with illiterate People in this Age will I doubt not find many who believe
the end of it is a pretty sort of Maxim That therefore which I desire to be informed here is how your Lordship knows these or any other Propositions to be Maxims and how Propositions that are Maxims are to be distinguished from Propositions that are not Maxims And the Reason why I insist upon it is this Because this and this only would shew whether what I have said in my Chapter about Maxims overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration and lays the Foundation of Scepticism But I fear my Request That you would be pleased to tell me what you mean by Maxims that I may know what Propositions according to your Lordship are and what are not Maxims will not easily be granted me Because it would presently put an end to all that you impute to me as said in that Chapter against Maxims in a Sense that I use not the Word there Your Lordship makes me out of my Book answer to the use you make of the Four above-mentioned Propositions which you call Maxims as if I were declared of an Opinion That Maxims could not be of any use in Arguing with others Which methinks you should not have done if you had considered my Chapter of Maxims which you so often quote For I there say Maxims are useful to stop the Mouths of Wranglers to shew That wrong Opinions lead to Absurdities c. Your Lordship nevertheless goes on to prove That without the help of these Principles or Maxims I cannot prove to any that doubt it that they are Men in my way of Ideas Answ. I beseech you my Lord to give me leave to mind you again that the Question is not what I can prove but whether in my way by Ideas I cannot without the help of these Principles know that I am a Man and be certain of the Truth of that and several other Propositions I say of several other Propositions For I do not think you in your way of Certainty by Reason pretend to be certain of all Truths or to be able to prove to those who doubt all Propositions or so much as be able to convince every one of the Truth of every Proposition that you your self are certain of There be many Propositions in Mr. Newton's excellent Book which there are Thousands of people and those a little more Rational than such as should deny themselves to be Men whom Mr. Newton himself would not be able with or without the use of Maxims used in Mathematicks to convince of the Truth of And yet this would be no Argument against his Method of Certainty whereby he came to the Knowledge that they are True What therefore you can conclude as to my way of Certainty from a Supposition of my not being able in my way by Ideas to convince those who doubt of it that they are Men I do not see But your Lordship is resolved to prove that I cannot and so you go on 1. Your Lordship says That I suppose that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of and this you prove out of my Chapter of Maxims where I say That every one knows the Ideas that he has and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another Answ. I suspected all along that you mistook what I meant by confused Ideas If your Lordship pleases to turn to my Chapter of distinct and confused Ideas you will there find that an Idea which is distinguished in the Mind from all others may yet be confused The Confusion being made by a careless Application of distinct Names to Ideas that are not sufficiently distinct Which having explained at large in that Chapter I shall not need here again to repeat Only permit me to set down an Instance He that has the Idea of the Liquor that Circulating through the Heart of a Sheep keeps that Animal alive and he that has the Idea of the Liquor that Circulates through the Heart of a Lobster has two different Ideas as distinct as an Idea of an aqueous pellucid cold Liquor is from the Idea of a red opaque hot Liquor but yet these Two may be confounded by giving the Name Blood to this vital circulating Liquor of a Lobster This being considered will shew how what I have said there may consist with my saying That to Certainty Ideas are not required that are in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct Because Certainty being spoken there of the Knowledge of the Truth of any Proposition and Propositions being made in Words it may be true That notwithstanding all the Ideas we have in our Minds are as far as we have them there clear and distinct yet those which we would suppose the Terms in the Proposition to stand for may not be clear and distinct either 1. By making the Term stand for an uncertain Idea which we have not yet precisely determined in our Minds whereby it comes to stand sometimes for one Idea sometimes for another Which though when we reflect on them they are distinct in our Minds yet by this use of a Name undetermined in its Signification come to be confounded Or 2. By supposing the Name to stand for something more than really is in the Idea in our Minds which we make it a sign of v. g. let us suppose That a Man many Years since when he was Young Eat a Fruit whose shape size consistency and colour he has a perfect Remembrance of but the particular Tast he has forgot and only remembers that it very much delighted him This complex Idea as far as it is in his Mind 't is evident is there and as far as he perceives it when he reflects on it is in all its parts clear and distinct but when he calls it a Pine-Apple and will suppose that Name stands for the same precise complex Idea for which another Man who newly Eat of that Fruit and has the Idea of the Tast of it also fresh in his Mind uses it or for which he himself used it when he had the Tast fresh in his Memory 't is plain his complex Idea in that part which consists in the Tast is very obscure To apply this to what your Lordship here makes me suppose I Answer 1. I do not suppose That to Certainty it is requisite that an Idea should be in all its parts clear and distinct I can be certain that a Pine-Apple is not an Artichoak though my Idea which I suppose that Name to stand for be in me obscure and confused in regard of its Tast. 2. I do not deny but on the contrary I affirm That I can have a clear and distinct Idea of a Man i. e. the Idea I give the name Man to may be clear and distinct though it should be true That Men are not yet agreed on the determined Idea that the name Man shall stand for Whatever Confusion there may be in the Idea to which that Name is indeterminately apply'd I do allow
That he makes the Term Body to stand precisely for the simple Idea of pure Extension your Lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing but whenever he uses the Word Body your Lordship must suppose in his Mind the simple Idea of Extension as the thing he means by Body If on the other side another of those Philosophical Rational Men shall tell your Lordship That he makes the Term Body to stand precisely for a Complex Idea made up of the simple Ideas of Extension and Solidity joyned together your Lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this Thing But whenever he uses the word Body your Lordship must Think on and allow the Idea belonging to it to be that Complex one As your Lordship can allow this different use of the term Body in these different Men without changing any Idea or any thing in your own Mind but the application of the same Term to different Ideas which changes neither the Truth nor Certainty of any of your Lordship's Ideas from what it was before So those Two Philosophical rational Men may in Discourse one with another agree to use that term Body for either of those two Ideas which they please without at all making their Ideas on either side false or uncertain But if they will contest which of these Ideas the sound Body ought to stand for 't is visible their difference is not about any reality of Things but the propriety of Speech and their Dispute pute and doubt is only about the signification of a Word Your Lordship's second Question is Whether by this Idea of Solidity we may come to know what it is Answ. I must ask you here again what you mean by it If your Lordship by it means Solidity then your Question runs thus Whether by this i. e. my Idea of Solidity we may come to know what Solidity is Answ. Without doubt if your Lordship means by the term Solidity what I mean by the term Solidity for then I have told you what it is in the Chapter above cited by your Lordship If you mean any thing else by the term Solidity when your Lordship will please to tell me what you mean by it I will tell your Lordship what Solidity is This I humbly conceive you will find your self obliged to do if what I have said of Solidity does not satisfie you what it is For you will not think it reasonable I should tell your Lordship what a thing is when expressed by you in a Term which I do not know what your Lordship means by nor what you make it stand for But your Lordship asks wherein it consists if you mean wherein the Idea of it consists that I have already told your Lordship in the Chapter of my Essay above-mentioned If your Lordship means what is the real internal Constitution that physically makes Solidity in Things If I answer I do not know that will no more make my Idea of Solidity not to be true or certain if your Lordship thinks Certainty may be attributed to single Ideas than the not knowing the physical Constitution whereby the parts of Bodies are so framed as to cohere makes my Idea of Cohesion not true or certain To my saying in my Essay That if any one ask me what this Solidity is I send him to his Senses to inform him Your Lordship replies You thought the Design of my Book would have sent him to his Ideas for Certainty and are we says your Lordship sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses Answ. I cannot help it if your Lordship mistakes the Design of my Book For what concerns Certainty i. e. the Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions my Book sends every one to his Ideas But for the getting of simple Ideas of Sensation my Book sends him only to his Senses But your Lordship uses Certainty here in a Sense I never used it nor do understand it in for what the Certainty of any simple Idea is I confess I do not know and shall be glad you would tell me what you mean by it However in this Sense you ask me and that as if your Question carried a Demonstration of my Contradicting my self And are we sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses Answ. My Lord every one is sent to his Senses to get the simple Ideas of Sensation because they are no other way to be got Your Lordship presses on with this farther Question What do these Ideas signify then i. e. if a Man be sent to his Senses for the Idea of Solidity I Answer to shew him the Certainty of Propositions wherein the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is perceived which is the Certainty I speak of and no other But what the Certainty is which your Lordship speaks of in this and the following Page I confess I do not understand For Your Lordship adds that I say farther That if this be not a sufficient Explication of Solidity I promise to tell any one what it is when he tells me what Thinking is or explains to me what Extension and Motion are Are we not now in the true way to Certainty when such Things as these are given over of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection For here I make it as impossible to come to certain clear and distinct Notions of these Things as to discourse into a Blind Man the Ideas of Light and Colours Is not this a rare way of Certainty Answ. What Things my Lord I beseech you are those which you here tell me are given over of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation or Reflection 'T is likely you will tell me they are Extension and Motion But my Lord I crave the liberty to say That when you have consider'd again you will be satisfied there are no Things given over in the Case but only the Names Extension and Motion and concerning them too nothing is given over but a power of defining them When you will be pleased to lay by a little the Warmth of those Questions of Triumph which I meet with in this Passage and tell me what Things your Lordship makes these Names Extension and Motion to stand for you perhaps will not find that I make it impossible for those who have their Senses to get the simple Ideas signified by these Names very clear and distinct by their Senses Though I do say that these as well as all other Names of simple Ideas cannot be defined nor any simple Ideas be brought into our Minds by Words any more than the Ideas of Light and Colours can be discoursed into a Blind Man which is all I do say in those Words of mine which your Lordship quotes as such wherein I have given over Things whereof we have the clearest Evidence And so from my being of Opinion That the Names of simple Ideas cannot be defined nor those Ideas got by any Words
your Words which you did not intend me in them But on the other side I would not willingly neglect to acknowledge any Civility from your Lordship in the full extent of it The Business is a little nice because what is contain'd in those two Passages cannot by a less skilful Hand than yours be well put together though they immediately follow one another This I am sure falls out very untowardly that your Lordship should drive me who had much rather have been otherwise imployed to drive your Lordship to do that which you were unwilling to do The World sees how much I was driven For what Censures what Imputations must my Book have lain under if I had not cleared it from those Accusations your Lordship brought against it when I am charged now with Evasions for not clearing my self from an Accusation which you never brought against me But if it be an Evasion not to answer to an Objection that has not been made what is it I beseech you my Lord to make no reply to Objections that have been made Of which I promise to give your Lordship a List whenever you shall please to call for it I forbear it now for fear that if I should say all that I might upon this new Accusation it would be more than would suit with your Lordship's liking and you should complain again that you have opened a Passage which brings to your mind Ramazzini and his Springs of Modena But your Lordship need not be afraid of being overwhelmed with the Ebullition of my Thoughts nor much trouble your self to find a way to give check to it Meer Ebullition of Thoughts never overwhelms or sinks any one but the Author himself but if it carries Truth with it that I confess has force and it may be troublesome to those that stand in its way Your Lordship says You see how dangerous it is to give occasion to one of such a fruitful Invention as I am to write I am obliged to your Lordship that you think my Invention worth concerning your self about though it be so unlucky as to have your Lordship and me always differ about the measure of its Fertility In your first Answer you thought I too much extended the Fertility of my Invention and ascribed to it what it had no Title to And here I think you make the Fertility of my Invention greater than it is For in what I have answered to your Lordship there seems to me no need at all of a Fertil Invention 'T is true it has been hard for me to find out whom you writ against or what you meant in many places As soon as that was found the Answer lay always so obvious and so easie that there needed no labour of Invention to discover what one should reply The Things themselves where there were any strip'd of the Ornaments of Scholastick Language and the less obvious ways of learned Writings seemed to me to carry their Answers visibly with them This permit me my Lord to say That however fertil my Invention is it has not in all this Controversie produced one Fiction or wrong Quotation But before I leave the Answer you dictate permit me to observe that I am so unfortunate to be blamed for owning what I was not accused to disown and here for not owning what I was never charged to disown The like Misfortune have my poor Writings They offend your Lordship in some places because they are new and in others because they are not new Your next Words which are a new Charge I shall pass over till I come to your Proof of them and proceed to the next Paragraph Your Lordship tells me You shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions and come immediately to the matter of my Complaint as it is renewed in my Second Letter What your Lordship means by unnecessary Repetitions here seems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing Page for having said too much in my own defence and this taken altogether confirms my Opinion That in your Thoughts it would have been better I should have replyed nothing at all For you having set down here near twenty Lines as a necessary Repetition out of your former Letter your Lordship omits my answer to them as wholly unnecessary to be seen and consequently you must think was at first unnecessary to have been said For when the same Words are necessary to be repeated again if the same reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be repeated too it is plainly judged to be nothing to the purpose and should have been spared at first 'T is true your Lordship has set down some few Expressions taken out of several parts of my Reply but in what manner the Reader cannot clearly see without going back to the Original of this Matter He must therefore pardon me the trouble of a deduction which cannot be avoided where Controversie is managed at this rate which necessitates and so excuses length of the Answer My Book was brought into the Trinitarian Controversie by these steps Your Lordship says That 1. The Vnitarians have not explained the Nature and Bounds of Reason 2. The Author Of Christianity not Mysterious to make amends for this has offer'd an account of Reason 3. His Doctrin concerning Reason supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Mind 4. Your Lordship calls this a new way of Reasoning 5. This Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning in his First Chapter says something which has a conformity with some of the Notions in my Book But it is to be observed he speaks them as his own Thoughts and not upon my Authority nor with taking any notice of me 6. By vertue of this he is presently entituled to I know not how much of my Book and divers Passages of my Essay are quoted and attributed to him under the Title of The Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning for he is by this time turned into a Troop and certain unknown if they are not all contained in this one Author's Doublet They and These are made by your Lordship to lay about them shrewdly for several Pages together in your Lordship's Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity c. with Passages taken out of my Book which your Lordship was at the pains to quote as Theirs i. e. certain unknown Anti-trinitarians Of this your Lordship's way strange and new to me of dealing with my Book I took notice To which your Lordship tells me here you replyed in these following words which your Lordship has set down as no unnecessary Repetition Your Words are It was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon my Grounds and made use of my Words although your Lordship declared withal That they were used to other purposes than I intended them and your Lordship confessed that the Reason why you
quoted my Words so much was because your Lordship found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went and that he had nothing that looked like Reason if that Principle were removed which made your Lordship so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold and so you supposed the Reason why your Lordship so often mentioned my Words was no longer a Riddle to me And to this Repetition your Lordship subjoins That I set down these Passages in my Second Letter but with these Words annexed That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing of this Matter Answer I say so indeed in the place quoted by your Lordship and if I had said no more your Lordship had done me Justice in setting down barely these Words as my Reply which being set down when your Lordship was in the way of Repeating your own Words with no sparing Hand as we shall see by and by these few of mine set down thus without the least intimation that I had said any thing more cannot but leave the Reader under an Opinion that this was my whole Reply But if your Lordship will please to turn to that place of my Second Letter out of which you take these Words I presume you will find that I not only said but proved That what you had said in the Words above repeated to clear the Riddle in your Lordship's way of writing did nothing towards it That which was the Riddle to me was That your Lordship writ against others and yet quoted only my Words and that you pinn'd my Words which you argued against upon a certain sort of These and Them that no where appeared or were to be found and by this way brought my Book into the Controversie To this your Lordship says You told me it was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon my Grounds and made use of my Words Answer He that will be at the pains to compare this which you call a Repetition here with the place you quote for it viz. 1. Answ. p. 46. will I humbly conceive find it a new sort of Repetition unless the setting down of Words and Expressions not to be found in it be the Repetition of any Passage But for a Repetition let us take it of what your Lordship had said before The Reason and the only Reason there given why you quoted my Words after the manner you did was Because you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon These are the Words in your Lordship's first Letter and this the only Reason there given though it hath grown a little by Repetition And to this my Reply was That I thought your Lordship had found that that which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon and for which he was made one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity was that he made or supposed clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty But that was not my Notion as to Certainty by Ideas c. Which Reply my Lord did not barely say but shew'd the Reason why I said That what your Lordship had offered as the Reason of your manner of Proceeding did nothing towards the clearing of it Unless it could clear the Matter to say you joined me with the Author of Christianity not Mysterious who goes upon a different Notion of Certainty from mine because he goes upon the same with me For he as your Lordship supposes making Certainty to consist in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas and I on the contrary making it consist in the perception of the Agreement of Disagreement of such Ideas as we have whether they be perfectly in all their Parts clear and distinct or no. It is impossible he should go upon my Grounds whilst they are so different or that his going upon my Grounds should be the Reason of your Lordship's joining me with him And now I leave your Lordship to Judge how you had cleared this Matter and whether what I had answer'd did not prove that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it This one Thing methinks your Lordship has made very clear that you Thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my Book where you were arguing against that Author that he might be the Person and mine the Words you would Argue against together But 't is as clear that the particular matter which your Lordship made use of to this purpose happen'd to be somewhat unluckily chosen For your Lordship having Accused him of supposing clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty which you declared to be the Opinion you opposed and for that Opinion having made him a Gentleman of a new way of Reasoning your Lordship imagined that was the Notion of Certainty I went on But it falling out otherwise and I denying it to be mine the imaginary tie between that Author and me was unexpectedly dissolved and there was no appearance of Reason for bringing Passages out of my Book and arguing against them as your Lordship did as if they were that Author 's To justifie this since my Notion of Certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with as opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity he at any rate must be brought to agree with me and to go upon my Notion of Certainty Pardon me my Lord that I say at any rate The Reason I have to think so is this Either that Author does make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty and so does not go upon my Notion of Certainty And then your assigning his going upon my Notion of Certainty as the Reason for your joyning us as you did shews no more but a willingness in your Lordship to have us joyn'd Or he does not lay all Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas and so possibly for ought I know may go upon my Notion of Certainty But then my Lord the Reason of your first bringing him and me into this Dispute will appear to have been none All your arguing against the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning will be found to be against no Body since there is no Body to be found that lays all Foundation of Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas no Body to be found that holds the Opinion that your Lordship opposes Having thus given you an Account of some part of my Reply to what your Lordship really answer'd in that 46th Page of your first Letter to shew that my Reply contained something more than these Words here set down by your Lordship viz. That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing this Matter I come now to those parts of your Repetition as your Lordship is pleased to call it wherein there is
nothing Repeated Your Lordship says That you told me the Reason why I was brought into the Controversie after the manner I had complained of was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon my Grounds and for this you quote the 46th Page of your first Letter But having turned to that place and finding there these Words That you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which that Author went upon Which are far from being repeated in the Words set down here unless Grounds in general be the same with Notions as to Certainty by Ideas I beg leave to consider what you here say as new to me and not Repeated Your Lordship says That you brought me into the Controversie as you did because that Author went upon my Grounds 'T is possible he did or did not But it cannot appear that he did go upon my Grounds till those Grounds are assigned and the places both out of him and me produced to shew that we agree in the same Grounds and go both upon them when this is done there will be room to consider whether it be so or no. In the mean time you having brought me into the Controversie for his going upon this particular Ground supposed