judgdement of each particular when the law is made there depends no concern but a mans own and that respecting his inward man only Now its certain that the Magistrate in regard of such an effect as depends upon his judgement hath need indeed of the greatest wisdome and the ablest Councel and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding seeing if he be mistaken and the Consciences of the Subjects be not obliged by such a law yet are their persons liable to be compelled and they must not resist which may prove a vast inconvenience and to be avoided only by a right information at first about the matter But as for a private person who judges not what is best for the peoples good as he speaks right in regard to the Magistrate but onely judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God or the rule of his which he hath given to the world about Politicals if they forget not to minde it to wit that it be in â—eneral for their good the effect which I have said does attend such a judgement is of that nature onely as requires no greater understanding or discretion then every man hath for himself to act by in all the rest of his life and conversation He judges here according to his Rule in these things as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conscience to them And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all business whatsoever He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound and in a matter of his soul which concerns no body but him or the inward obligation of his Conscience you must leave him to God and his own Judgement His next reason is That when Men know what is conducing to their good they are not apt to do it without a Law And what does this prove or contradict It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor and that he should be wiser and better then they as Plato may urge it But does it follow they may not therefore judge whether the thing commanded be for their good Surely this will be a good reason why the people should judge of it For if the good they conceive in it is the reason they admit to have any Law and the argument to press them to obey it then must they judge of that good and whether it be conducive to that good or not In the mean while the difference of the reason and ends which is distinguished in the Magistrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not and the peoples does sufficiently declare the weakness and vanity of such speeches as this Man hath several of He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good takes away the principal power of the Magistrate And why so as if it were an act of power and that usurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of discretion over his civil actions Again if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magistrate to make them do it and that while himself too is telling us the need of Laws because men aâ—e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it before that of their own particular persons I cannot I perceive be throughly intent to answer what is insignificant but the substance in the main of these two reasons comes to this that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magistrate to the rule so as to judge whether it be for the common good or not and therefore they must act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver and consequently be no reasonable agents in their Political obedience For satisfaction therefore to this Let us conceive the Magistrate commanding something moral or Religious there are no Protestants but do hold that every man for himself must bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture and according as himself believes it consonant or not to the rule he judges it so is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and speak with integrity consider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magistrate be agreeable or not to the word of God or whether it be conducive or not to the common good suppose the Waggoner as unlearned as any man I will ask whether such a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons that is whether it be good for the high wayes and consequently whether he had best or not observe the act then to judge whether the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England or whether whatsoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Testament I suppose there is no man will have the hardiâ—sse to oppose such a manifest conviction And if in regard to his practice this man and every other that uses the Common-prayer must judge as well as he can of the lawfulness of it or else he cannot act in faith and so likewise of all those doctrines or practises he yields unto them then will there I hope be no stumbling block left here upon this account I do advance therefore and rest upon this one argument if the incapacity unfitness or little ability that some men have to judge of what is required by the Magistrate whether it be agreeable or no to the common good be a reason sufficient for the denying to the subject such a judgement then must the lesser ability of such to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God be a reason sufficient to discharge them from judging of it by the word But the consequent is false and therefore the antecedent By the way observe if any man distinguish between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good and judging of the thing commanded by a law or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded whether it be for the publick good or not I am to be understood of the last when I say the Magistrate judges of the thing in reference to his passing it into a law and we judge of it so passed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it His third reason is the same with the first The people are so far from being able to judge that the wisest Princes find it difficult only we have more words for the enlargement which consist partly in a grave kind of discourse from a passage of a Bishop Bramhall of the severall things and circumstances that the Law-giver is to weigh in
THE OBLIGATION Of Human LAWS Discussed By J. H. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We are to give to Princes and the Powers that are set over us by God such Honor and obedience as may not hurt us Polycarpus Too rigorous were it that the breach of every Law should be held a deadly sin a mean there is between these extremities if so be we could find it out Hooker London Printed in the Year 1671. Reader THese Papers were prepared against Easter Term last year but the Printers failed us Nevertheless the Subject being of perpetual occasion and so long as there is any Common-Wealth and Laws there is none can say I have need of thee I see no reason to hinder the coming out now to the same publick advantage The Author I Have perused this Discourse and do judge it will be of singular use unto all such as desire conscienti-ously to order their obedience unto Magistrates in civil things For although it is written in the way of a defence of what was formerly more breifly offered unto the same purpose yet the subject matter of it is so managed and the truth asserted in it so vindicated from the opposition of another that the understanding Reader will be satisfied in the proper Rule of civil things and in the reasonableness of every Man making a Judgement of their own actions in reference thereunto J. O. THE Obligation of human Laws discussed CAP. I. WE have before us a famous question which is not only of great moment constant use and concernment but of so much difficulty and doubtful dispute as that some learn'd men of great note in the Romish Church have judged it fit only for the Pope in Cathedra to determine it I am not furnisht so much as with my own books which are from me and much less with so many others as it would require to inform my self or my Readers in the several judgements of all or the cheif Doctors in the Schools with other Divines and Lawyers who have written of this point But this I take to be notorious that there are many of very great magnitude in the Church or Schools with multitudes of several sorts of Divines who have or do hold that humane Laws bind not the Conscience whereof God only is the Lord and which can be bound be nothing but his authority as will be confessed On the contrary there be others and perhaps of no less or of greater eminence and number who yet on both sides when they oppose one another may not defend themselves from extremity but that there is a mean according to the judgement of sober and indifferent men to be sought in these things if we can light of it I must confess I should very hardly expect any thing but confusion in my own thoughts if I trusted my self altogether to books among such variety By the little I sometimes read concerning this dispute I must need say it did but serve to leave me at a loss and how I have since retired my thoughts more into my own mind to look upon that writing which is congenial with us even those principles of truth which nature and so God hath implanted in mans own heart and having proposed from the result of all a determination so plain and in the middle path being careful that neither conscience should be left loose and dissolute nor tyed by Mans command or Laws any farther then God doth tye it It hath pleased the reverend Author of the friendly debate by an opposition in a Post-script to his Appendix to draw me out to my defence and a farther explication mainly of what I have in a lesser room before written I perceive there is an expression fell from me among others of respect concerning the Debater that hath moved him to so much indignation that I know not how I shall pacific him for a man shall not lightly see two or three sheets of paper written thus tetrically upon so small an occasion I receiv'd a case from you a very weighty one it is and as weightily and solidly resolved if the casuist may be his own Judge So he goes on I must confess I lookt on this person as a Man of a most modest humble pious ingenuous calm temper and I have the same opinion as to his worth and abilities as I had but I do not like the spirit of this appendix there is in the Apologist so much gentleness and care of offending as hath seemed too much On the contrary here is in these papers such a deal of animosity indignation and that indeed which in women we call vixenish humour but especially such an inveterate espousing of a party with that disdain and contempt of every man and thing that appears against himself or cause that there is no do with him Nevertheless I must needs say for my own part I am not yet converted to his opinion but that I must think still that a Nonconformist who hath not taken the Oxford Oath may live within five miles of a corporation and yet be a good Christian or Minister of Christ And what is the ground for such an imprudent expression as this was and that he should continue the justification of it The ground of all doth lye on this single point as himself has it whether humane Laws bind the conscience In the resolving which point he is come here to an acknowledgement that there is difficulty He that finds none sayes he may well suspect that he does not fully understand it And why is he so angry then when he laid down his matter so inconsiderately in his first book without any distinction or provision for any that I should say only he was not so reflective as he ought upon all the things at least as he was to look to in so great an undertaking Alas that there should be so much vanity and elation of mind in impotent man that if you commend him never so much for what is worthy in him you must give him more then he deserves or he will accompt what is due but a disparagement to him If you will praise a Man for his valour and say he is as valiant as Hector or Judas Maccabeus it will not serve unless you say also he exceeds Hercules and make him wiser too withall then Solomon and all Kings I could be contented to have wanted his good word says he upon condition he had not said What why something that is innocently true he names but that which sticks is that I count him one more happy in his expression and other abilities then in his depth or reflectiveness on the things he offers Whether I have herein judged amiss or not I will be content to come to some tryal with him and that I may treat with this Post-script in some method it is convenient I should in the first place propose the determination of this case or question as I have tendred it together with his conception understanding or apprehension of it In
who speaks so slightly as if we should then care for the Princes commands not a straw when we our selves have known while we were boyes and made no conscience of the command of any yet did we observe what we were bid more certainly through coâ—rtion then the most of us God knows doe now the divine precepts through the due conscience we owe to them And if so there is the more reason for this Author to be considerate how he bends thus to this other extream wherein he brings us into that open perplexity which himself sees but cannot find the way out either with his distinction of sins or caâ—uâ—ons which will not suite his resolution of the question Obedience is not to be denyed sayes he in the first of these cautions but when a law is against the publick good This is the prime indeed of all the Drs. cautions what alone perhaps is enough to be regarded For when the Dr. and I do both make this to be the determining distinction though he hath not spoken indeed so dryly of it through his large invention and multitude of matter as I do between what does and what does not oblige the conscience in the matter of human laws if a man does but observe this caution the main of his care is over in this busines he neither will for the saving of his own damage dare to neglect the publick interest nor will he omit obedience but when he can render a reason The rest of his cautions I will not concern my self in who have the same power to alter these or frame others to the over ruling truth I offer as they had who at first did frame them but as for this which I have named the very proposing of it in the first place when the Dr. brings it in after others doth seem to carry in it some conviction on this person when otherwise it no wayes serves his purpose that if a thing be not for the common good it cannot in good earnest bind the conscience For his distinction or degrees of sin the main design of opposing my determination thereby being frustrate let us see to what use else he can put it That may stand him perhaps in some stead for his own excuse which will not stand his reader in any for his satisfaction This Debater then we know in his late books having designed to expose the Nonconformist to derision and contempt as much as he could for the withdrawing the people from Schism and recalling them to Church to speak honestly of his end hath thought it fit in his first book to bâ—gin his charge of these men with the breach of the Oxford Act the charge is very high upon this that they are not good Christians not Ministers of Christ To this end persisting in the same mind through his books even to this Postscript of his appendix he gives us these notes for the discovering of the greatness of a sin against human Laws the Issue whereof comes to this that though there may be several Instances of persons besides living in the breach of other statutes the sin of the Nonconformist against this act must come under thosâ— more hainouâ— aggravations that when such are excused yet as for thâ—se we may find he had reason to say what he did not to use any other then his own words And what is that then he will acknowledge â—e hath said I never said that no man can be a good Christian that transgresseth an Act of Parliament nor that every transgression of a statute is a deadly sin Those are inventions of his own upon occasion of a single Instance which I gave of defyance to a Law wherein some men live mark my words from whence he draws as Uninersall proposition And does â—e say so Let me turn to his book and see how he can come of thus The Nonconformist speaking of his Minister the matter is thuâ— Ushered in How can he be a Minister of Christ says the Conformist who is disobedient to his Sovereign whom Christ blas to obey And then Instancing wherein he urges this Oxford Act and concludes therefore he is not a good subject and consequently no good Christian or Minister of Christ Let any man judge here whether these words How can he be a Minister of Christ who is disobedient to his Sovereign be not aequivalent with this proposition No man that is disobedient to his Sovereign is a Minister of Christ With what face then can he accuse me with drawing an Universal proposition from his words when there is one express in the book and from thence this conclusion is deduced I never said does he mean these are not his very words away I nor do I say they are but does not what he sayes amount plainly to this very sence I prove it Therefore sayes he he is not a good subject and consequently not a good Christian I argue with him from hence this person is a man of Reason and Logick Here then is a conclusion no conclusion can be good but from an Universal proposition This Universal proposition must be this that whosoever iâ— disobedient to his Soveraign or transgresses an Act of Parliament is no good Christian And the Universal proposition in his book is this which howsoever we understand to help him out that he means whosoever transgresses any act of Parliament in such a high and hanious manner as the Non-conformist does the Oxford act yet still is a Universal proposition either this person therefore must renounce the words in his book as illogically or falsly concluded which yet he cannot do neither but by acknowledging the universallty and the denying the truth of the proposition or else he must be ashamed here of this unjust accusation of me who have done but right to him But if this denial will not serve him he is noâ— destiâ—ute of other shifts There is no occasion says he for thiâ— question whether every transgression of a Statute be no less then a deadly sin unless he is of opinion that all sins are equal By these words he does seem manifestly here to make some escape upon that term deadly sin and then he must distinguish between sin and deadly sin which no Protestant will allow him to do who say that all siâ— is mortal there was nothing else intended by a deadly sin but a sin that deserves or makes one guilty of death Indeed if this Person can tell me of any little sin in opposition to a greater which a man may knowingly and willfully live in without repentance unto death and it shall not damne him or do him hurt then I shall like well of his comming off here upon this term but if he cannot then will not this serve he must seek another shift And what is that in the next place for he is brought here into a shuffling condition that is plain why we must distinguish between a wilful living only in the transgression of a law and the