this Non obstante Matthew Paris calls a detestable addition against all Reason and Justice and when the year after King Henry urg'd the example of the Pope for Non obstantes The Prior of Jerusalem says God forbid you should use this unpleasant and absurd word as long as you observe Justice you may be King and as soon as you violate it you will cease to be King. Which shews how little Foundation in Law it then was thought to have and what the whole Nation thought of the Pope's use of it may be seen at large in Matthew Paris and Mr. Prin's Animadversions on the 4 th Institute Farther the Reasons given why the King ought to have this Power fail here upon many accounts 1. In that the Interest of the whole of which the Legislators are the best Judges when they make the Law without Exception ought to outweigh all private Inconveniences 2. The Law has provided a more certain and equal Remedy having taken as sufficient Care for the meeting of Parliaments once a Year at least and I may say sitting too as it has for the sitting of the Common Courts of Justice as appears from the several Statutes in Print and others in the Rolls which avoid the common Cavil upon the words Oftner if need be And these were like the famous Triennial Act Provisions for the greater certainty of meeting so often at least but no Recessions from the old Law which as appears both by the Mirrour and the Life of King Alfred was for the Great Council to meet twice a year at London 3. The great Reason assign'd in the Latin Quotation from the Lord Cook Propter impossibilitatem praevidendi de omnibus particularibus which is after distinguish'd as to Person Time and Place can by no means be applied to the Case in question For 1. The Law was made but very few Years before their Lordships Resolution and not grown more inconvenient by length of time to any particular Person than it was at the making of the Act. 2. The Law-makers had in their immediate prospect every particular Person of the Romish Communion and the Time when and Place where the Danger would happen if any such were Commissioned Let us now see what help he can have from his second Quotation from the Lord Cook which is 7 Rep. f. 73. but he intends I suppose f. 37. and would have it believ'd that it was the Opinion of all the Judges of England 2 Jac. 1. That the King may dispense with any particular Person that he shall not incur the Penalty of the Statute tho' it be an Act made pro bono publico and that this is a Trust and Confidence inseparably annex'd to the Royal Person of the King in which 1. He again overthrows his Distinction of malum in se and prohibitum making that Power at large in relation in any Statute pro bono publico 2. He manifestly perverts the Lord Cook 's sense whose Words are When a Statute is made pro bono publico and the King as Head of the Commonwealth and the Fountain of Justice and Mercy is by all the Realm trusted with it this is a Trust and Confidence inseparably adjoyn'd and annex'd to his Royal Person in so high a Point of Sovereignty that he cannot transfer it to the disposition or power of any private Person or to any private Use for this was committed to the King by all his Subjects for the Publick Good c. But true it is that the King can upon any cause moving him in respect of Time Place or Person c. make a Non obstante to dispense with any particular Person that he shall not incur the Penalty of the Statute Where the sole Question was of transferring over a Penalty granted to the King as entrusted by all the Realm to see the Statute put in execution by inflicting the Penalty This Trust is adjudged inseparable and not to be transferr'd over but that however the King may dispense with the Penalty granted to himself Upon which I must say our Chief Justice has made a very foul Stretch for what is this to the Informer's Part concerning which the Question before him was But surely there is a mighty difference between these two Propositions Where the Subjects have entrusted the King with a Statute made for the Publick Good this Trust is inseparable and cannot be transferr'd to another but the Statute so entrusted may be dispens'd with which is all that is to be gather'd from the Lord Cook and this Tho' an Act be made for the Publick Good yet the King may dispense with it and this is a Trust and Confidence inseparably annex'd to the Royal Person of the King which is Sir Herbert's perverse Comment In short Lord Cook says Where the King is entrusted with the Execution of a Statute made for the Publick Good he may dispense with that Statute Sir Edward Herbert says He may dispense with any Statute made for the Publick Good. Upon which 't is to be observ'd That the Question in the Lord Cook was not of Dispensing but granting over the Penalty which Penalty he says is not to be transferred over The other would make it of Dispensing and that that Power is inseparable and not to be transferr'd so apparently changes the State of the Question His next Step is to the Year-book of H. 7. f. 11 12. in which he leaves us to seek the Year which is 11. This he calls the first and great Case which he cites wherein the King 's Dispensing Power is described and limited There is a diversity says the Book between malum prohibitum and malum in se as a Statute forbids any Man to coin Money and if he does he shall be hang'd this is malum prohibitum for before the Statute Coining Money was lawful but now it is not so and therefore the King can dispense with it So if a Man ship Wooll in any place but Calice it is malum prohibitum because it is prohibited by Act of Parliament But that which is malum in se the King nor no other Person can dispense with as if the King would give a Man power to kill another or license one to make a Nusance in a High-way this were void and yet the King can pardon these things when they are done Upon this Case 't is observable That the Power of Dispensing is here asserted in relation to Things and not Persons Wherefore according to this taken in Sir Herbert's Latitude the King may grant Dispensations to all in general where the Matter is only malum prohibitum whereas he himself owns that the nature of a Dispensation is particular and given to particular Persons by name 2. Many things in Magna Charta nay the most are but mala prohibita and so Magna Charta its self may be dispensed with when he himself owns that the King cannot dispense with one Tittle of Magna Charta And
seen and clearly otherwise yet he thinks my Lord Coke will bear him out and to this purpose he cites two Places one where he supposes that the Lord Coke not onely authorizes this sense of the Case but asserts the Prerogative in much higher Terms than they would presume to do and by the second he would have it believ'd that if the Lord Coke be a faithful Reporter all the Judges of England took that Case in the same sense The first is the Case of Customs 24 Eliz. which is pregnant with many Objections against its being of any force in this Case 1. The Book is of suspected Authority being printed in the late Times and what the Lord Coke never own'd or thought fit to print in his Life-time 2. This comes foisted in among Cases in the time of King James without any parallel Case which might occasion the placing of it there 3. It was when the Lord Coke was but a young Reporter it being ten Years before he was King's Sollicitor 4. It is not onely no Point in question relating to the Case where 't is cited and so extrajudicial but wholly foreign to it For the Question was Whether Goods sold before they were landed were to pay Custom within the Statute 1 Eliz. c. 11. Wherefore being barely a Memorandum of a young Reporter no way occasioned by what went before it cannot possibly have any weight 5. The fancy'd Reason there given why the King may dispense with the Statute of Sheriffs is none at all for whereas it says that the King has a Sovereign Power to command any af his Subjects to serve him for the Publick Weal and this solely and inseparably annex'd to his Person and this Royal Power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament there is no Authority cited for this but the Case 2 H. 7. which as appears to any body that reads it neither has that Reason mention'd so much as by any one Judge nor in the least goes upon the Point of the Prerogative Besides if the King can command any Subject to serve him for the Publick Weal either he is to be Judge or the Laws If the latter then no Person not qualified by Law is oblig'd to act nor tho' qualified to do any thing forbid by the Laws If the former as the Words imply then the King's Commands may be pleaded to justifie any ill Minister who has rendred himself obnoxious to the Laws But that this cannot be is sufficiently evinc'd by necessary Examples in all Ages And this by the way may shew how false as well as pernicious that Doctrine is which tells us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the New Testament always signifies the Authority of a Person not of a Law Or as another has it to the same purpose By Higher Powers it is evident we are to understand the Persons of Sovereign Princes or Governours not the Laws and Constitutions as our Republican Doctors pretend Of the same Batch is another memorable Position That the King 's most illegal Acts tho' they have not the Authority of the Law for indeed to say they have would be a Blunder with a witness yet they have the Authority of Sovereign Power Some will say that this is qualified by what follows Which is irresistible and unaccountable as if the King had this Power onely so far as it is irresistible and unaccountable Whereas it is evident the Proposition is entire before being the Medium whereby he would prove that the King 's illegal Acts are not inauthoritative in proof of which Medium he afterwards affirms That the Sovereign Power which made the Laws and can repeal and dispense with them is inseparable from the Person of the Prince Reduc'd to a Syllogism it runs thus The Authority of Sovereign Power is irresistible and unaccountable But the King 's most illegal Acts have the Authority of Sovereign Power This is an entire Proposition upon which he concludes Ergo The King 's most illegal Acts are irresistible and unaccountable This Assumption he goes to prove from the Supposition that such a Sovereign Power as he describes is inseparable from the Person of the Prince upon which or the like Doctrine another raises this comfortable Use In all Sovereign Governments and such he at large endeavours to shew England to be Subjects must be Slaves as to this Particular they must trust their Lives and Liberties with their Sovereign But for the Honour of our Gown this may be said That such Hereticks never appear'd among Lawyers till Divines began thus to wrest the Laws and Scriptures to their own damnation But as the former Quotation out of the Lord Coke can do Sir Edward Herbert no service upon the Reasons above shewn much less can the other which is one of Sir Edward's usual Perversions He tells us That it is resolv'd by all the Judges if my Lord Coke be a faithful Reporter that it is agreed 2 H. 7. That the King may against the express Provision of the Act 23 H. 6. dispense with that Act for that the Act could not bar the King of the Service of his Subjects which the Law of Nature did give unto him He adds This is reported unless my Lord Coke had a mind to deceive the succeeding Judges and draw them in to give pernicious Opinions as the Sense of all the Judges of England in King James 's Time in the Exchequer-Chamber Whereas the Lord Coke on purpose to prevent such an abuse of his Words says in the beginning of the Case I shall give no just offence to any if I challenge that which of right is due to every Reporter that is to reduce the Sum and Effect of all to such a Method as upon consideration had of all the Arguments he himself thinketh to be fittest and clearest for the right understanding of the true Reasons and Causes of the Judgment and Resolution of the Case in question Upon which it is evident that if any one of the Judges mentioned this the Lord Coke is a faithful Reporter but had he been silent as to this matter no man could suppose that such a tedious Argument as that in Calvin's Case was the Resolution in which the Judges concurred in every Expression But Herbert's own Eyes might and ought to have satisfied him that the Judges 2 H. 7. gave no Determination upon the 23 H. 6. nor does the Book say that so much as any one Person spoke to that Statute or mention'd the Reason devis'd in Calvin's Case for that the Act could not bar the King of the Service of his Subject which the Law of Nature did give unto him Nor could Sir Edward chuse but know the absurdity of that Ground for according to that all ought to be left in the State of Nature as it was before any Law made so that not onely any Person might act tho prohibited by subsequent Laws but he might act any thing forbid by any
positive Law which would make a mad World And this would come of a Natural Allegiance due to the Person of a King without respect to the Laws of his Government And the Resolution of the Judges in Calvin's Case is quite contrary to this Supposal for it is there resolved That they who were born under King James his Allegiance before he had the Crown of England were Aliens here notwithstanding that Accession But my Lord Coke is so far from giving any real Countenance to such a Resolution as that in Sir Edward Hales his Case that he in concurrence with all the Judges of Edgland is express to the contrary for in relation to the Court of Admiralty he and the rest of the Judges declare That the Statutes of 13 R. 2. c. 3. 15 R. 2. c. 5. and 2 H. 4. c. 11. being Statutes declaring the Jurisdiction of the Court of the Admiral and wherein all the Subjects of the Realm have Interest cannot be dispensed with by any Non obstante Nay he gives another Resolution of Judges tho' not so solemn as the former yet what he says is warranted in the Books and the Resolution comes up to our Case in terminis His Words are When an Act of Parliament is made that disableth any Person or maketh any thing void or tortious for the good of the Church or Commonwealth in that Law all the King's Subjects have an Interest and therefore the King cannot dispense therewith no more than with the Common Law. All the Chimerical Foundation of Solemn Resolutions being thus destroy'd I need not concern my self with the vain aery Superstructure which must vanish in fumo and in stead of the Appeal What may be relied upon if such Resolutions may not I appeal to all Mankind Whether our Senses are not sufficient Judges against these Accidents subsisting without any Subject meer Transubstantiation Nonsense Such are Reasons devis'd for a Resolution which never was to be seen But we are told That besides the Authority of the Case we have constant Practice that this Statute has been dispens'd with ever since and if it were not so the Consequences would be dreadful illegal Convictions c. But to this I say 1. A facto ad jus non valet argumentum till there be legal Determinations on the side of the Fact. 2. The Fact cannot be shewn for any Sheriff to have enjoy'd the Office for more than one Year by the same Patent 3. However the Consequences would not necessarily follow for we know even Laws made by Kings de facto have always been look'd on as binding and so have the Admittances to Copy-hold Estates made by Disseisors and others without Title And tho' I love not to lay any great stress upon Presidents of our own time yet it may serve to Sir Edward and we well know that notwithstanding the late illegal Choice of Sheriffs in the City of London yet no Challenges were allow'd because they were Sheriffs de facto That I may not be here unnecessarily detain'd with what he says to real or fancied Objections I shall hasten to his other pretended Authorities and shall begin with his last as having the most immediate reference to the Cases above-cited and which he seems to be most proud of and that is Serjeant Glanvil's Argument delivered at a Conference between the Lords and Commons wherein he owns that in such things as are onely mala quia prohibita under certain Forfeitures and Penalties to the King and the Informer there the King may dispense This indeed is more than appears from any Case that Sir Edward Herbert has cited as I have shewn above yet is no more than what the Lord Coke saith elsewhere immediately after he has denied that Power in things made void or tortious for the Good of the Church or Common-wealth in which he says all the King's Subjects have an Interest and therefore the King cannot dispense therewith no more than with the Common Law. All that is more in Serjeant Glanvil relates onely to the Nature of those Laws which were then insisted upon if he went further it could no more be an Evidence of the Opinion of the House of Commons in that Point not being the Point put to the question than his Quotation out of Calvin's Case is of the Opinion of all the Judges But the first part of his Speech cannot be stretch'd farther than mala prohibita had formerly been taken that is in relation to new Prerogatives or at least Things wherein the Subjects in general have no Interest vested in them and he expresly restrains it to such Cases wherein his Majesty by conferring Grace and Favour upon some doth not do wrong to others as it is in my Lord Coke above and in Moor where 't is held That Statutes which give a Prerogative or restrain the Prerogative may be dispens'd with but not such as give or dispose of Interests And as to what restrains the Prerogative not coming within the mala prohibita tho' it falls not under consideration here yet we may observe the difference taken in Lord Hobart where a Statute is made to ease the Sovereign of Labour not to deprive him of Power In the first Case the King may dispense not in the other And I think no man can doubt but the Statute 25 Car. 2. c. 2. which not onely requires Officers to take the Oaths and Test to distinguish them from Papists but disables them that do not take them within three Months vests an Interest not onely in several particular Persons who may be Reversioners but in all the Subjects in general and is of the nature of those Statutes insisted on in the Petition of Right and press'd for by Serjeant Glanvil Not Laws inflicting Penalties in malis prohibitis but Laws declarative or positive conferring or confirming ipso facto an Inherent Right and Interest of Liberty and Freedom in the Subjects of this Realm as their Birthright and Inheritances descendable to their Heirs and Posterity A Freedom I may add from Popish Slavery and Tyranny Statutes incorporate into the Body of the Common Law over which with reverence be it spoken there is no Trust in the King 's Sovereign Power or Prerogative Royal to enable him to dispense with them or take from his Subjects that Birthright or Inheritance which they have in their Liberties by vertue of the Common Law and of these Statutes I may say this Statute And such a Statute it is that no man that wishes well to the Protestant Interest not onely here but thro' Christendom would consent to the abrogating or impairing the Force of it without obtaining such Laws for restoring the ancient Constitution both for the Choice of Sheriffs and Counsellors among other things as might more effectually keep out the Booted Apostles than any other Means next to the glorious Expedition of his Highness the Prince of Orange whose miraculous Successes are not
methinks he could not but observe this Contradiction Wherefore the Rule there admit it were a Judgment in Law as it was not being onely spoken obiter by one of the Judges can be applied onely to such Cases as are there cited The first is that of Coining Money which goes upon the ground in Moor's Reports where 't is said that such Statutes as give a Prerogative may be dispens'd with and that of shipping Woolls at Calice the King's Staple is of the same nature and both sufficiently shew the Distinction of malum prohibitum from malum in se to relate barely to such things as become evil by accident as they are against an accidental Prerogative Which no way interferes with the Rights of the Subjects in general or particular And I much wonder that Sir Edward Herbert should cite my Lord Vaughan in the Case of Thomas and Sorrel as confirming what he would infer from the Year-Book when Lord Vaughan says That old Rule has more confounded Mens Judgments on the Subject than rectified them and himself denies that the King can dispense with every malum prohibitum by Statute tho' prohibited by Statute onely Oh but my Lord Vaughan shews that a Dispensation does jus dare and makes the thing prohibited to all others lawful to be done by him that has it Does he say this of every malum prohibitum By no means Wherefore we must apply it to the Case then in question which concerned Wine-Licences about which the King had a Prerogative by Statute-Law And the dispensing with that falls within the Rule in Moor agreeing with the Lord Coke in the Case of Penal Statutes Yet even thus much was a Point gain'd by the Prerogative since the first of H. 7. for it is then made a Doubt before all the Judges of England in the Exchequer Chamber and adjourned over for the difficulty Whether the King could license the Shipping Woolls elsewhere than at Calice one of the very Instances which Sir Edward Herbert relies on And Chief-Justice Hussey was positive that the King could not license it tho' indeed the Chief-Baron and some others held as Fineux did afterwards Wherefore no body of less assurance than our Chief-Justice can say from these Cases results this plain Syllogism Whatever is not prohibited by the Law of God but was lawful before any Act of Parliament made to forbid it the King by his Dispensation may make lawful again to that Person who has such Dispensation tho' it continues unlawful to any body else c. In which if we grant his Major I will own the Conclusion to bring it to Sir Edward Hales his Case is not criminal Yet the Proposition is so pernicious striking at the very Foundations of our Government that if there were a Resolution in stead of an extrajudicial Opinion giving that Countenance which even that loose Opinion does not yet it ought to be rejected For if all Acts of Parliament contrary to Magna Charta are void as some have held I am sure much more so would such Resolutions of Judges be and that such an one would be contrary to that Great Charter is evident for no Man can say that all things prohibited by Magna Charta are prohibited by the Law of God. To come to Sir Edward's next Great Case as he calls it but indeed the onely one which has colour'd the Resolution to the World which is that 2 H. 7. Notwithstanding his Promise he has not been so fair to give the Words of that Case or so much of them as is material lest every body might judge of how little use it would be to him nay lest Men should be for satifying their own Eyes he has not directed to the Folio The English of the material part is thus In the Exchequer Chamber all the Justices were shewn for the King how King Edward the Fourth by his Letters Patents had constituted the Earl of N Sheriff of the same County and had granted the said Earl the Office of Sheriff of the said County for the Term of his Life with all the other Offices thereto belonging rendring to the King at his Exchequer annually 100 l. without any Account or any other thing to be given for it c. Now 1. Whether this Patent was good And also 2. How this Patent shall be intended were the Points in question And as to the first Point the Justices held the Patent good for it is a thing which may well be granted for Term of Life or Inheritance as divers Counties have a Sheriff by Inheritance and this commenc'd by a Grant of the King. Then was shewn a Resumption and then was shewn a Proviso for H. Earl of N. so that the Patent remains in its force Radcliff shews the Statute of 28 E. 3. c. 7. and 24 E. 3. c. 5. That no Sheriff shall be more than one Year c. altho' he had a Non obstante And notwithstanding this that the King shall always have his Prerogative as of the Value and the Certainty of the Land and other things granted by the King and of Woolls shipp'd and of Charters of Murder and many other Cases where the Statutes are That Patents that want these things shall be void yet the Patenrs are good with a Non obstante But without a Non obstante the Patents are void by reason of the Statutes so here the Patent with a Non obstante c. This is all that is said in the Book upon the first Point upon which 't is observable 1. By the Book it would seem that this Radcliff was but a Serjeant at Law for at the end of the Case Brian Justice demands of Brian Radcliff c. Yet indeed I find upon search that he was a Baron of the Exchequer 2. What Radcliff says is after the Resolution of the Judges over and no way influenc'd that 3. Whereas Sir Edward Herbert says the Resolution was upon 23 H. 6. c. 1. Radcliff who should better know the Subject of Debate discourses only concerning the Statutes 28 E. 3. c. 7. and 12 E. 3. c. 5. which are barely prohibitory without any mention of Non obstantes or any voiding or disabling Clause Indeed Radcliff it being upon a sudden Discourse as the Book shews mistakes the Statutes as if they had such Clauses and Brook who cites part of the Patent which it seems he had seen says there was in it a Non obstante to the Statutes 28 E. 3. c. 7. and 12 E. 3. c. 9. Fitzherbert indeed says R. objected the 23 H. 6. but for that sit liber judex 4. But above all tho' our Chief-Justice calls them the Judges Enemies who say the Point of Non obstante is not resolv'd in this Case which he calls Confidence and that they may as well deny one of the ten Commandments 't is manifest beyond contradiction that the Resolution ended at issint que le Patent demurr en
Authority of Lord Cook pleading expresly and unanswerably for that injur'd Hero of whom the Age was not worthy the Lord Russel Nor was the Proof in Lord Brandon's Case less defective than the Matter for besides the scandalous Sexton who swore to Designs against another King there was but one Witness in the Eye of the Law he indeed so far Legal as that he might be heard being an Approver but no way credible considering how far he had been drawn with his Fetters about his Heels even to contradict himself The other by no means Legal being under an Outlawry for High Treason unrevers'd For tho' the Execution of that Judgment for so in Law it is was pardon'd by the King yet the Crime was by no means purg'd to set him right to Fame Which tho' the Counsel offer'd to make good they were not suffer'd to speak to it and yet the Point is very clear by ancient Authorities and confirm'd by later without any thing really to the contrary Nay farther tho' besides all these things another Matter was urg'd in Arrest of Judgment upon which Judgment had formerly been arrested yet without enquiring whether the Fact were true or the Book Law that with the rest was over-rul'd to come at the Life of a Person obnoxious to the Government as some call'd themselves Such was Sir Edward's great scrupulousness and tenderness where the Life of Man was concern'd He adds a Scruple in a Case before himself and the other Usurpers of the High-Commission Court but his singularity therein can be no Excuse for his acting at all upon a Commission apparently against the Statute which took away not onely the Power of Fining and Imprisoning which that Court illegally pretended to but the Spiritual Authority which it really had and such a Commission it was as never receiv'd countenance till the Act long since repeal'd which not onely made H. 8. Head of the Church but gave him Power which he afterwards delegated to Lord Cromwel to redress all Errors Heresies and Abuses by Spiritual Authority I suppose it is by this time pretty evident that Sir Edward's Crime will admit of no Extenuation but the Aggravations are many it appearing 1. That he and his Brethren were the Inventers of this Dispensing Power in such extent as he contends for in the Print but much more in his real Resolution 2. That the Error was not an Error in that single Case but of large and mischievous Consequences and if the King could dispense with that Statute upon the Reasons given and Circumstances appearing in Sir Edward Hales his Case others may well conclude from thence That therefore he has a Power to dispense with all other Statutes even such as confer or vest in any of the Subjects any manner of Interest whatsoever in their Lives Liberties and Estates and there being a Conviction and consequently a Disability actually incurred before the Dispensation therefore by reason of this Case the King may dispense with such Statutes where a precedent Disability is actually laid upon a Man as there is upon the Members of both Houses till they have taken the Oaths and Tests prescrib'd These are not Consequences which may flow from the heated Imaginations of angry Men but such as have Warrant and Foundation from their Judgment 3. His so far undervaluing the Wisdom of the Nation as to make the benefit of a Law against the undue continuance of Sheriffs equal nay go beyond what they could devise for the security of their Religion or rather so to undervalue the Holy Religion which I think he yet professes when however it would not come up to the Point according to the Differences which himself receives Speaking of the Statute 23 H. 6. c. 1. he says The Recital in the Preamble and the whole Purview if compar'd with our Statute of 25 Car. 2. c. 2. equals it in every Particular and in some goes beyond it For the Mischiefs recited in this latter Statute are onely in these Words For preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants and quietting the Minds of his Majesty's Good Subjects The other for preventing the importable Damage of the King and his People by Perjury Manslaughter and great Oppression Then he goes to the Purview express against Non obstante's and creating a Disability but according to his usual haste he stays not here to make the Comparison but hastens to his Sham-Resolution as has been sufficiently evinc'd already The Questions here will be 1. Whether the Mischiefs intended to be prevented are equal in both 2. Admit they were equal in Degree whether they are in Extent which if they are not still the Resolution if real will fail him according to the Difference which he himself receives of pro bono populi complicati and singulorum populi 1. For the first I suppose he thinks the Epethite importable gives the odds as if Popery wanted an Epethite to represent it to Protestants for what they ought to do their utmost to prevent as if it did not carry in the Belly of it Perjuries Manslaughters and great Oppressions by whole-sale or that Mischefs more remote and accidental as the Continuance of Sheriffs may habituate to Corruption and that occasion the other fatal Train could equal the more immediate and certain Consequences unless by good Laws prevented of French Conversions proceeding from fixt Principles But then to give Judgment to frustrate this necessary Law at a time when the Papists had a King of their own Superstition to head them is to make the King as much above the Law as our ancient Lawyers tell us the Law and his Court by way of Eminence that is the Great Council or Parliament are above him 2. As this proves the Interest of the Subject in the Law about Sheriffs to be neither equal nor so immediate as in our Statute there needs not many words to shew the difference of the extent the Peace only of particular Counties and thaâ— by small insensible degrees is there concern'd nay admit the King had this Power and should so violate that Trust which Sir Edward will have to be repos'd in him as to extend it to all Counties where he puts in the Sheriffs yet this could not affect all the People because there might be a Retreat to London Middlesex and Westmorland in neither of which has it been pretended that the King had such a Power till the late Violence of some and Treachery of others gave that unhappy Inlet of Perjury Manslaughter I may say Murder and Oppression before which London was a perfect Goshen in an Egyptian Kingdom 4. But what can excuse our Justice's so apparent falsifying both Records and Law-books or if not at least his shameful Negligence in not going to the Fountain-heads but setting up the Recitals of Cases against the Cases themselves and the extrajudicial Opinions or Arguments of Judges nay the very Annotations of