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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A71108	The reflections on the XXVIII propositions touching the doctrine of the Trinity, in a letter to the clergy, &c. maintain'd, against the Third defence of the said propositions by the same hand.	Tindal, Matthew, 1653?-1733.	1695 (1695)	Wing T1304; ESTC R4525	56,470	59

pleads they are not three Gods because there is an immediate Union in their spiritual Substances But I say no Union whatever can make three each of which is one God to be but one God because it is first saying each is one God and then denying it by saying all three are but one God so that it cannot without a manifest Contradiction be said that while each remains one God they can any way be united into one God for three of the same kind will be thrice what one of the same kind is If Union make them one God it must either identify them by making them one and the same God and consequently there can be no real distinction between them or it must make none of them God by making them parts of God which by Union compose one God For we have no other Idea of Composition but of one thing being made up of several which by being united constitute that one and which whether material or immaterial we cannot conceive but as parts of the thing they constitute For since each is not the whole it must be only a part of the whole whatever our Author pag. 54. says to the contrary I would willingly know why they are not as much three Gods though suppos'd substantially united as if they were not united since each has in himself distinctly from the others all the Perfections of the Divine Nature and they could have no more if they were separate It is as much Idolatry to adore three united as three ununited Gods since in both Cases you equally rob God of his Honour by paying it to two numerically diverse and different Gods And being Substances they are in their Natures capable of subsisting apart from one another He pag. 53. misrepresents what I say concerning Union as though I argued against the bare possibility of their being united and not of their becoming one God by Union while each remain'd God distinct from the others and then makes a long Harangue about Mystery in which he says if he do not seriously cry Mystery I know what I know of him But however to do him the fuller Justice I will mention what he further says concerning this Union In his first Defence pag. 19. He saith They are as much one with one another as they without the most apparent contradiction are capable of being one A Heathen would not have scrupled to have said as much of his Gods But he goes on and says They are much more than specifically one but then it is evident they cannot be so much distinguished as so many Men or Angels which are but specifically one But he will not allow that they are identified or numerically one p. 53. but if we cannot apprehend any Medium between numerical and specifical Oneness then in professing to believe it we profess we know not what But I suppose he will say at this turn as he does in his second Defence pag. 26. Well suppose this Is it impossible for a thing to be of which we sorry Mortals have no Idea I say no by no means but with humble Submission he 's a very sorry Mortal that requires us to believe Words without any Idea's annex'd to them But let our Author say what he will he has still a Simily to help him out This Medium between specifick and numerical Unity is as great a Unity as that between the Sun its Splendour and the Light of both But those must be either different or the same thing if different though of the same Kind there can be but a specifick Unity or if the same a numerical Unity If by the Light he means a thin Collection of minute Particles as he pag. 58. defines it then he supposes the Splendor to be a second Sun emitting a small sort of active subtile and piercing Particles but if by Light and Splendor he means those Idea's those Particles cause in us he cannot distinguish between Splendour and the Light of the Splendor because Splendour is but a greater degree of Light caused by those minute Particles in a greater Quantity or more directly striking our Eyes so that his Simily is every way faulty But because in his often repeated Similies about the Sun its Light and Heat he supposes somewhat in the Sun or which does exist by emaning from it analogous to our Idea's of Light and Heat I told him Sect. 69. That though there is in the Sun a Power to produce in us Heat and Light as well as Pain and Pleasure yet there are no such Sensations or Qualities in the Sun which though pag. 57. he argues against yet he says the very same thing but lest his Reader should perceive it he calls the Effects which when one pretends to talk Philosophically is very improper by the Names of the Causes and will not say that Heat is caused by but that Heat is a close Collection of minute subtile active piercing Particles and Light a thinner Collection of them But do Clothes and Exercise by causing Heat Produce a Collection of such Particles Why do they not sometimes produce Light which is but a less close Collection But in arguing thus he grants all I would have viz. That there are no such Qualities in the Sun or emaning from it but the Sun being a Body in perpetual Agitation there are minute Particles flowing from it which by their Figure Texture and Motion alter the Figure Texture and Motion of some of the smallest parts of our Hands and Eyes and thereby produce in us Light and Heat which are as much meer perceptions as Pain and Pleasure And I say again there has not been any Book writ these late Years on this Subject but what proves there 's nothing in Matter besides Bulk external Figure and internal Configuration of its minute Parts which by their Motion produce in us Heat Light Colour Sound Taste c. But enough of this Our Author says in his first Defence pag. 20. That outwardly and in reference to the Creation they the three Divine Natures are perfectly one and the same God as concurring in all the same external Actions though in relation to one another there is a real distinction between them But if there is no distinction between them in respect of the Creatures to whom they are one and the same God why do the Trinitarians worship them as numerically different Gods for if they adored them as the same God it would be as impossible to worship the one and not the other as to worship and not to worship the same God But can there be a real and not a real distinction between them The reason he gives why the three Divine Natures are but one God is as surprizing as the thing it self it is because they concur in all the same external Actions But if each is God does it not suppose three concurring Gods Can one and the same God be said to concur with himself Is it not directly agaisnt the Honour of the Father who