Selected quad for the lemma: book_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
book_n	actual_a	idea_n	sensation_n	72	3	17.0728	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A48890	Mr. Locke's reply to the right reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's answer to his second letter wherein, besides other incident matters, what his lordship has said concerning certainty by reason, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith, the resurrection of the same body, the immateriality of the soul, the inconsistency of Mr. Locke's notions with the articles of the Christian faith and their tendency to sceptism [sic], is examined.	Locke, John, 1632-1704.	1699 (1699)	Wing L2754; ESTC R32483	244,862	490

is the Proposition here to be proved would remain still unproved For I might say things inconsistent with this Proposition That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Connection and Agreement or Disagreement and Repugnancy of our Ideas and yet that Proposition be true and very far from tending to Scepticism unless your Lordship will argue that every Proposition that is inconsistent with what a Man any where says tends to Scepticism and then I should be tempted to infer that many Propositions in the Letters your Lordship has honoured me with will tend to Scepticism Your Lordship's second Argument is from my saying We have no Ideas of the mechanical Affections of the minute Particles of Bodies which hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning natural Bodies from whence your Lordship concludes That since we can attain to no Science as to Bodies or Spirits our Knowledge must be confin'd to a very narrow compass I grant it but I crave leave to mind your Lordship again That this is not the Proposition to be proved A little Knowledge is still Knowledge and not Scepticism But let me have affirm'd our Knowledge to be comparatively very little How I beseech your Lordship does that any way prove that this Proposition Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas any way tends to Scepticism which was the Proposition to be proved But the Inference your Lordship shuts up this Head with in these Words So that all Certainty is given up in the way of Knowledge as to the visible and invisible World or at least the greatest part of them shewing in the first part of it what your Lordship should have inferred and was willing to infer does at last by these Words in the Close Or at least the greatest part of them I guess come just to nothing I say I guess for what them by Grammatical Construction is to be referred to seems not clear to me Your third Argument being just of the same kind with the former only to shew That I reduce our Knowledge to a very narrow compass in respect of the whole extent of Beings is already answered In the fourth place your Lordship sets down some Words of mine concerning Reasoning and Demonstration and then concludes But if there be no way of coming to Demonstration but this I doubt we must be content without it Which being nothing but a Declaration of your doubt is I grant a very short way of proving any Proposition and I shall leave to your Lordship the Satisfaction you have in such a Proof since I think it will scarce convince others In the last place your Lordship argues that because I say That the Idea in the Mind proves not the Existence of that thing whereof it is an Idea therefore we cannot know the actual Existence of any thing by our Senses because we know nothing but by the perceived Agreement of Ideas But if you had been pleased to have consider'd my Answer there to the Scepticks whose Cause you here seem with no small vigour to manage you would I humbly conceive have found that you mistake one thing for another viz. The Idea that has by a former Sensation been lodged in the Mind for actually receiving any Idea i. e. actual Sensation which I think I need not go about to prove are two distinct things after what you have here quoted out of my Book Now the two Ideas that in this Case are perceived to agree and do thereby produce Knowledge are the Idea of actual Sensation which is an Action whereof I have a clear and distinct Idea and the Idea of actual Existence of something without me that causes that Sensation And what other Certainty your Lordship has by your Senses of the existing of any thing without you but the perceived Connection of those two Ideas I would gladly know When you have destroyed this Certainty which I conceive is the utmost as to this Matter which our infinitely Wise and Bountiful Maker has made us capable of in this State your Lordship will have well assisted the Scepticks in carrying their Arguments against Certainty by Sense beyond what they could have expected I cannot but fear my Lord that what you have said here in favour of Scepticism against Certainty by Sense for it is not at all against me till you shew we can have no Idea of actual Sensation without the Proper Antidote annexed in shewing wherein that Certainty consists if the account I give be not true after you have so strenuously endeavoured to destroy what I have said for it will by your Authority have laid no small Foundation of Scepticism which they will not fail to lay hold of with advantage to their Cause who have any Disposition that way For I desire any one to read this your fifth Argument and then judge which of us two is a promoter of Scepticism I who have endeavoured and as I think proved Certainty by our Senses or your Lordship who has in your Thoughts at least destroyed these Proofs without giving us any other to supply their place All your other Arguments amount to no more but this That I have given Instances to shew that the extent of our Knowledge in comparison of the whole extent of Being is very little and narrow which when your Lordship writ your Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity were very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of Humane Vnderstanding with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things which we are most certain of the Being of by constant and undoubted Experience Though since you have shewed your dislike of them in more places than one particularly p. 33. and again more at large p. 43. and at last you have thought fit to represent them as Arguments for Scepticism And thus I have acquitted my self I hope to your Lordship's Satisfaction of my promise to answer your Accusation of a tendency to Scepticism But to return to your second Letter where I left off In the following Pages you have another Argument to prove my way of Certainty to be none but to lead to Scepticism which after a serious perusal of it seems to me to amount to no more but this That Des Cartes and I go both in the way of Ideas and we differ Ergo the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is no way of Certainty but leads to Scepticism which is a Consequence I cannot admit And I think is no better than this Your Lordship and I differ and yet we go both in the way of Ideas Ergo the placing of Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is no way of Certainty at all but leads to Scepticism Your Lordship will perhaps think I say more than I can justifie when I say Your Lordship goes in the way of Ideas for you will tell me you do not place

Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respect of our Notions not much more remote from our Comprehensions to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should superadd to it another Substance with a faculty of Thinking From my saying thus That God whom I have proved to be an immaterial Being by his Omnipotency may for ought we know superadd to some parts of Matter a faculty of Thinking it requires some skill for any one to represent me as your Lordship does here as one ignorant or doubtful whether Matter may not think to that degree that I am not certain or I do not believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted Fancy or the heats of a disordered Imagination as Spinosa affirm'd For thus I or some Body else whom I desire your Lordship to produce stands painted in this your Lordship's Argument from the supposition of a Divine Revelation which your Lordship brings here to prove That the defining of Knowledge as I do to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas weakens the Credibility of the Articles of the Christian Faith But if your Lordship thinks it so dangerous a Position to say It is not much harder for us to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to Matter a faculty of Thinking than that he should superadd to it another Substance with a faculty of Thinking which is the utmost I have said concerning the faculty of Thinking in Matter I humbly conceive it would be more to your purpose to prove That the infinite omnipotent Creator of all Things out of nothing cannot if he pleases superadd to some parcels of Matter disposed as he sees fit a faculty of Thinking which the rest of Matter has not rather than to represent me with that Candour your Lordship does as one who so far makes Matter a Thinking thing as thereby to question the being of a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World and consequently to take away all Revelation which how natural and genuine a Representation it is of my Sense expressed in the Passages of my Essay which I have above set down I humbly submit to the Reader 's Judgment and your Lordship's Zeal for Truth to determine and shall not stay to examin whether Man may not have an exalted Phancy and the heats of a disorder'd Imagination equally overthrowing Divine Revelation tho' the power of Thinking be placed only in an immaterial Substance I come now to the sequel of your Major which is this If one who places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas does not know but Matter may Think then whoever places Certainty so cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World The consequence here is from does not to cannot which I cannot but wonder to find in an Argument of your Lordships For he that does not to Day believe or know that Matter cannot be so ordered by God's Omnipotency as to think if that subverts the belief of an immaterial intelligent Being in the World may know or believe it to Morrow or if he should never know or believe it yet others who define Knowledge as he does may know or believe it Unless your Lordship can prove that it is impossible for any one who defines Knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas to know or believe that Matter cannot Think But this as I remember your Lordship has not any where attempted to prove And yet without this your Lordship's way of Reasoning is no more than to argue that one cannot do a thing because another does not do it And yet upon this strange consequence is built all that your Lordship brings here to prove that my definition of Knowledge weakens the credibility of Articles of Faith v. g. It weakens the credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith that there is a God! How so Because I who have so defined Knowledge say in my Essay That the Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing but of God we can have only by Sensation For there being no necessary connexion of real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory nor of any other Existence but that of God with the Existence of any particular Man no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind no more proves the Existence of that thing than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History For so are the Words of my Book and not as your Lordship has been pleased to set them down here and they were well chosen by your Lordship to shew that the way of Ideas would not do i. e. In my way by Ideas I cannot prove there is a God But supposing I had said in that place or any other that which would hinder the proof of a God as I have not might I not see my Error and alter or renounce that Opinion without changing my definition of Knowledge Or could not another Man who defined Knowledge as I do avoid Thinking as your Lordship says I say That no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self and so able notwithstanding my saying so to prove that there is a God Again your Lordship argues that my definition of Knowledge weakens the credibility of the Articles of Faith Because it takes away Revelation and your Proof of that is because I do not know whether Matter may not Think The same sort of Argumentation your Lordship goes on with in the next Page where you say Again before there can be any such thing as assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an antient Book whereof the parts were delivered at distant times but conveyed down to us by an universal Tradition But now what if my grounds of Certainty can give us no assurance as to these Things Your Lordship says you do not mean That they cannot demonstrate matters of Fact which it were most unreasonable to expect but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain for your Lordship thinks you have proved That this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of the Sense because Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and the Ideas How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas All the force of which Argument lies in this that I have said

That he makes the Term Body to stand precisely for the simple Idea of pure Extension your Lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing but whenever he uses the Word Body your Lordship must suppose in his Mind the simple Idea of Extension as the thing he means by Body If on the other side another of those Philosophical Rational Men shall tell your Lordship That he makes the Term Body to stand precisely for a Complex Idea made up of the simple Ideas of Extension and Solidity joyned together your Lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this Thing But whenever he uses the word Body your Lordship must Think on and allow the Idea belonging to it to be that Complex one As your Lordship can allow this different use of the term Body in these different Men without changing any Idea or any thing in your own Mind but the application of the same Term to different Ideas which changes neither the Truth nor Certainty of any of your Lordship's Ideas from what it was before So those Two Philosophical rational Men may in Discourse one with another agree to use that term Body for either of those two Ideas which they please without at all making their Ideas on either side false or uncertain But if they will contest which of these Ideas the sound Body ought to stand for 't is visible their difference is not about any reality of Things but the propriety of Speech and their Dispute pute and doubt is only about the signification of a Word Your Lordship's second Question is Whether by this Idea of Solidity we may come to know what it is Answ. I must ask you here again what you mean by it If your Lordship by it means Solidity then your Question runs thus Whether by this i. e. my Idea of Solidity we may come to know what Solidity is Answ. Without doubt if your Lordship means by the term Solidity what I mean by the term Solidity for then I have told you what it is in the Chapter above cited by your Lordship If you mean any thing else by the term Solidity when your Lordship will please to tell me what you mean by it I will tell your Lordship what Solidity is This I humbly conceive you will find your self obliged to do if what I have said of Solidity does not satisfie you what it is For you will not think it reasonable I should tell your Lordship what a thing is when expressed by you in a Term which I do not know what your Lordship means by nor what you make it stand for But your Lordship asks wherein it consists if you mean wherein the Idea of it consists that I have already told your Lordship in the Chapter of my Essay above-mentioned If your Lordship means what is the real internal Constitution that physically makes Solidity in Things If I answer I do not know that will no more make my Idea of Solidity not to be true or certain if your Lordship thinks Certainty may be attributed to single Ideas than the not knowing the physical Constitution whereby the parts of Bodies are so framed as to cohere makes my Idea of Cohesion not true or certain To my saying in my Essay That if any one ask me what this Solidity is I send him to his Senses to inform him Your Lordship replies You thought the Design of my Book would have sent him to his Ideas for Certainty and are we says your Lordship sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses Answ. I cannot help it if your Lordship mistakes the Design of my Book For what concerns Certainty i. e. the Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions my Book sends every one to his Ideas But for the getting of simple Ideas of Sensation my Book sends him only to his Senses But your Lordship uses Certainty here in a Sense I never used it nor do understand it in for what the Certainty of any simple Idea is I confess I do not know and shall be glad you would tell me what you mean by it However in this Sense you ask me and that as if your Question carried a Demonstration of my Contradicting my self And are we sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses Answ. My Lord every one is sent to his Senses to get the simple Ideas of Sensation because they are no other way to be got Your Lordship presses on with this farther Question What do these Ideas signify then i. e. if a Man be sent to his Senses for the Idea of Solidity I Answer to shew him the Certainty of Propositions wherein the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is perceived which is the Certainty I speak of and no other But what the Certainty is which your Lordship speaks of in this and the following Page I confess I do not understand For Your Lordship adds that I say farther That if this be not a sufficient Explication of Solidity I promise to tell any one what it is when he tells me what Thinking is or explains to me what Extension and Motion are Are we not now in the true way to Certainty when such Things as these are given over of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection For here I make it as impossible to come to certain clear and distinct Notions of these Things as to discourse into a Blind Man the Ideas of Light and Colours Is not this a rare way of Certainty Answ. What Things my Lord I beseech you are those which you here tell me are given over of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation or Reflection 'T is likely you will tell me they are Extension and Motion But my Lord I crave the liberty to say That when you have consider'd again you will be satisfied there are no Things given over in the Case but only the Names Extension and Motion and concerning them too nothing is given over but a power of defining them When you will be pleased to lay by a little the Warmth of those Questions of Triumph which I meet with in this Passage and tell me what Things your Lordship makes these Names Extension and Motion to stand for you perhaps will not find that I make it impossible for those who have their Senses to get the simple Ideas signified by these Names very clear and distinct by their Senses Though I do say that these as well as all other Names of simple Ideas cannot be defined nor any simple Ideas be brought into our Minds by Words any more than the Ideas of Light and Colours can be discoursed into a Blind Man which is all I do say in those Words of mine which your Lordship quotes as such wherein I have given over Things whereof we have the clearest Evidence And so from my being of Opinion That the Names of simple Ideas cannot be defined nor those Ideas got by any Words