of this Prerogative and Power of dispensing with a disability impos'd by Act of Parliament for I do not purposely dispute it in any other Case but as they are coincident with this The first that we meet with is that of 2 H. 7. fol. 6. and it was by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber The Case thus King Edward the Fourth granted the Office of Sheriff of a County to the Earl of Northumberland for the Life of the Earl and the Justices held the Patent good there being a Non Obstante in it to the Statutes Let us look into the Statutes that forbid a Sheriff to continue in his Office longer then one Year There had been several ancient Statutes made to that purpose but they all prov'd to be of little effect for Patents were still granted to hold the Office of a Sheriff for a longer time than one Year At length came the Stat. 23. H. 6. c. 8. which recites the former Statutes forbidding any Persons continuance in the Office of Sheriff above one Year and observing the great Oppressions and Abuses to the People that did arise from it and how that yet they were granted contrary to those Statutes This Statute therefore of 23 Hen. 6. ordains that those Statutes shall be duly observ'd And further ordains That if any occupy that Office contrary to those Statutes or to the effect or intent of any of them he shall forfeit two hundred Pound yearly as long as he occupieth contrary to any of those Statutes and that every Pardon granted of that Forfeiture shall be void and that all Patents made of the Office of Sheriff for Years or any longer time shall be void any Clause or word of Non Obstante in any wise put or to be put in such Patents notwithstanding and every such Person is thereby disabled to bear that Office. Nothing could be penn'd stronger than this Statute and it is a Law made by the Supream Legislative Power of the Nation and it expresses the former granting of Non Obstante's to be a great abuse and to be contrary to Law. Yet contrary to the express words and clear intent and meaning of this Statute did all the Judges resolve in 2 H. 7. That by a Non Obstante a Patent for a longer time than a Year should be good of the Sheriffs Office. The King and both Houses were of Opinion that they could make a Non Obstante in such Case void The Judges are of a contrary Opinion that a Non Obstante shall make void the Statute Here is an Inferiour Court over-ruling and controuling the Judgment of a Superiour Court. The Judges who are but Jura dicere contradict those who have the Power Jura dare as well as Jura dicere and of Correcting the Errors of the highest Court in Westminster and controuling their Judgments The Statute was a meer idle nugatory thing if it were not to restrain the granting of a Non Obstante if it did not that it did nothing The King himself alone if he had pleas'd could without any Act of Parliament have reform'd the Abuse by refusing to pass any such Patents for a Sheriffs continuing in his Office longer than a Year But the King was sensible of the Abuses and therefore willing to be restrained from passing any more such Patents and to avoid any importunity that might be used for the obtaining any such Patents and therefore consented that a Law should pass to make such Patents void And after all shall the King if he pleases still make the like Grants Why then the Act was of no manner of use and operates nothing and the Resolve of the Judges has made the Act a meer idle vain thing But the twelve Judges in 2 H. 7. have so resolv'd and the only use they would allow to all these Acts of Parliament is no more than this that if the King grant a Patent to one of the Sheriffs Office for more than one Year and there be no Non obstante in the Patent that then for want of a Non obstante the Patent should be void by those Acts of Parliament which otherwise would have been good had not those Acts made them void But how easie would it be for one that obtains such a Patent to get the Non obstante to be inserted and who would accept such a Patent without a Non obstante and to whom would the Non obstante be denied to whom such a Patent is granted the Lord Hobart in the Case of Needler against the Bishop of Winchester fol. 230. says it is denied to none and that it is in the power of the Attorney-General The Reasons given by the Judges in 2 H. 7. for that resolution are because the King had always used such a Prerogative of dispensing with the Acts of Parliament that required the true value of the Lands and the certainty of the Lands to be mentioned in his Grants of Lands and with the Acts concerning the shipping of Wool and pardoning of Murder without express mentioning of the Murder These Cases are nothing alike but of a trifling consideration in respect of the Act we have in hand of 25 Car. 2. And in these Cases the Penalty and Forfeitures are given to the King and they concern the King's profit only to dispence with them but in our Case the Safety of the Government salus populi and the maintaining of the true Religion establish'd by Law are all concern'd and so the Case is not alike And to compare this with those Cases is parvis componere magna This Opinion and Resolution of the Judges in 2 H. 7. has been the Foundation of all the like Opinions that have since that time been given of the King's Power of Dispensing with Disabilities and Incapacities impos'd by Acts of Parliament Upon what ground the Justices held the Patent of the Sheriff's Office good to the Earl of Northumberland for Life does not appear whether because it had formerly been an Office of Inheritance and so within the Exception in the Statute of 23 H. 6. or whether by virtue of a Non obstante to the Statutes as Ratclif only argues for the rest say nothing of the Non obstante Some Resolutions have been to the contrary of that of 2 H. 7. as in the Case that I cited of the King against the Bishop of Norwich in the Lord Hobart's Reports and the Case of Sir Arthur Ingram where it was adjudged that the King could not dispence with a Disability And the Book of 2 R. 3. fol. 11 12. concerning Waterford in Ireland is of the King's Power to dispence with an Act of Parliament where the Forfeiture is given only to the King so it comes not home to our Case This Resolution of the Judges in 2 H. 7. was the Precedent and leading Case to all the subsequent Opinions and was the Foundation of them and they all must stand and fall by it Now it will be very
in Hill. 11 Jac. B. R. Dominus Rex and Allen against Tooly in the Second Part of Bulstrode's Reports 186 to 191. in an Information brought upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. for using the Trade of an Upholsterer in which he had not served as an Apprentice Seven Years The Defendant pleaded That he was a Freeman of London and that by the Custom of London a Freeman might use any Trade and he alledged that the Custom was confirmed per Regem in Parliamento It was holden first that there can be no good Act of Parliament without the three Consents viz. Of the King Lords and Commons 2. That tho' divers Acts of Parliament do not specifie these Three Assents but only mention the King as Dominus Rex Statuit and as it is in the Prince's Case Dominus Rex de Communi Concilio Statuit and the like Yet when the Party will Plead he ought to Plead it according to Law and to set forth all the Assents that is of the King Lords and Commons and this was the Opinion of the whole Court. Now Pleading is an exact setting forth of the Truth We are not to raise Arguments from Forms of Speaking but rather from exact Pleading and the Resolutions of Judges And tho' Magna Charta in the stile seems to be spoken by K. H. 3. as by the word concessimus yet the Act of 15 E. 3. c. 1. recites that it was made a Law by the King Lords and Commons and that what is said to be granted was but their former Right Lambert's Archion 267 c. I hear that in speaking to the Case of Sir Edward Hales it was observed that by this Act of 25 Car. 2. there is no incapacity or disability at the first and upon the admission to the Office put upon any Person from taking of an Office but that he is well admitted to it and the Grant is good and that time is given to take the Tests and if by the times given he fail to take them then he is to be disabled and the Grants are to become void but not before Like a Condition subsequent that defeats the Estate which yet was well vested and then before the Grant is defeated and the Party become disabled the King's Dispensation steps in and prevents the Penalty and Disability And herein it was said it differs from the Case of Symony and buying of Offices where the Interest never vested but the Person was first disabled There is indeed a difference but none that is material for it is all one whether the Party be disabled to take or whether having well taken and been well admitted he is afterward disabled to hold and retain by not performing the Condition For when he is first admitted it is sub modo and under a Condition that if he fail to perform what the Law requires his Office shall be void Another Argument as I hear it reported was rais'd from the King 's being a Soveraign Prince and from thence it was inferred that he might dispense with Laws that are Poenal upon necessity whereof he is the sole Judge The ground of this Argument namely That the King is a Soveraign Prince if it serve for the Point in question it may also extend a great way further then to this question we have before us it is hard to limit the extent of it it seems to speak that we must obey without Reserve The word Soveraign is French and in Latin is Supremus id est qui in alios potestatem habet The Correlate whereof is Subditus or a Subject and is attributed frequently to some sorts of Subjects especially to the Heads or Superiours of Religious Orders But among us tho' now frequently used in our humble Addresses to the King or in our reverend mention of him yet we find it very rarely if ever used in our ancient Acts of Parliament or in our Law Books I find no mention of the very word among the many Attributes and Titles ascribed to Kings and Princes in Mr. Selden's Titles of Honour He hath that which is Synonimous as Supream Monarch as it signifies in opposition or in distinction to Princes that are subordinate and feudatory such as Tacitus speaks of that the Romans when their Government was Popular had instrumenta servitutis Reges But properly he is a King that is a Soveraign and hath no Superiour upon Earth According to Martial Rex est qui Regem Maxime non habeat And such we freely and cheerfully acknowledge the King to be and the best and most of his Subjects do swear that he is the only Supream Governour of this Realm and of all other his Dominions as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical as Temporal Causes and that no Foreign Prince hath any Power within this Realm And I wish that all the rest of his Subjects would heartily take this Oath but this among others is that which Sir Hales's Dispensation extends to Yet how from hence it can be argued that the King can dispense with his Laws I do not see I mean Laws of the same nature as that we have now before us Therefore those that used this Argument surely meant the word of Soveraign in another sence viz. Absolute Solutus a legibus It they mean by Soveraign a Prince that is absolute and solutus a legibus and they must understand it so or else I do not see how it is pertinent to the present Argument this is of a mighty Consequence and ought to have been well considered before it had been used I find the word in this sence as I take it propounded in an addition or saving to the Petition of Right 3 Car. 1. viz. Not to infringe Soveraign Power But it was not liked and upon Reasons given at a Conserence those that did propound it were satisfied to lay it aside It may be read in the Memorials of the English Affairs fol. 10. If the word Soveraign be meant in this sence it is oppos'd by all our ancient Authors Judges and others by plain and express Language whose very Writings I have before cited and I will but only touch upon them again Fleta says Superiorem non habet Rex in Regno nisi Deum Legem per Legem factus est Rex This fully expounds the word Sovereign Both Fleta and Bract. and Sir Gilbert Thornton who was Chief Justice in Edw. the First 's time take notice of that Jus Caesareum or Lex Regia as it is called by the Civilians Nec obstat quod dicitur quod Principi placet Legis habet vigorem For it never was received in England but in a restrained sence And with this agrees the ancient Coronation Oath That the King shall hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm which the People have chosen But King H. 8. with his own hand corrected the old Oath to the effect following viz. That he shall hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm not prejudicial
So also as the Commons may disagree thereunto at the next Parliament with this Protestation too that this their Assent being indeed a Novelty these are the very words be taken for no example This is granted with abundance of caution and jealousie and proves it is not ancient The Commons do agree to the Power granted to the King for the Moderation of the Statutes touching Provisors in the last Parliament beseeching the King that the same may not license any Cardinal or Stranger to enjoy any Benefice within the Realm It was enacted by the Lords and Commons that Tydeman late Abbot of Beaulew and Elect of Landaf by the Pope's provision should enjoy the same Bishoprick notwithstanding any Act so always as this be taken for no example That the sale of Tin may be at Lostwithiel in Cornwal and shall not continue at Calais Notwithstanding the Council may grant License to Merchants to carry the same Tin to what parts they will as to them shall seem good Here the Power of Dispensing is delegated to the Council Upon the request of the Commons the King promiseth that he will not from thenceforth dispence with the Statute of Provisions to Benefices This implies that the King had practis'd it and we know who began the practice and who taught it to others and this Record shews it was without consent and was a cause of complaint and the King promises to reform it for the future But what signifies a Promise where a Law and an Oath is too weak to secure it this Promise doth not confer a new Right but is to reform an unjust Practice I shall use one Argument more against this exercise of the Power of Dispensing with Acts of Parliament as it hath of late been practis'd and that Argument shall be rais'd from the great Inconvenience and Mischief that will ensue upon it to the Kingdom it may occasion the infrequency of Parliaments by taking much of their power out of their hands Laws are many times made but probationers and temporary to the end that if upon experience of them they be found to be too severe or strict and to sit hard upon any persons that the Parliament at their next meeting may moderate or relax the severity or inconvenience that may arise by them But if there be another way allowed for the doing of this Work there will be the less need of a Parliament and so other Work that requires also their meeting may remain unremedied If we consider how frequently the Parliament ought to meet and and how often they did anciently meet we shall easily be convinc'd that the relaxing of a Law or giving remedy where the Law was upon experience found inconvenient was a work properly belonging unto them and there was no need of resorting to any other help for who should cure or reform a Law if any thing were amiss in it but the Law-makers See the Statute of 6 H. 8. c. 18. the Book of Statutes at large concerning Bristol Our Saxon King Alfred and his Wise Men that is the great Council of the Kingdom ordained that a Parliament twice a Year and oftner in time of Peace should meet in London Thus says that ancient Book stiled The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. sect 3. pag. 10. by 4 E. 3. c. 14. It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every Year once or more often if need be this does not abrogate not alter King Alfred's Law. By 36 E. 3. c. 10. many Laws had passed in that Parliament of 36 E. 3. which are there called Articles as anciently our Statutes were drawn into certain Articles and so passed as being Articles of Agreement betwixt the King and his Subjects as I had occasion to observe in the beginning of my Discourse and this Statute of 36 E. 3. provides that for maintenance of the said Articles and Statutes and redress of divers Mischiefs and Grievances which daily happen a Parliament shall be holden every Year as another time was ordained by a Statute referring to the Statute of the Fourth of this King. The Act of 16 Car. 2. c. 1. for repeal of the Triennial Act made 16 Car. 1. in the last Paragraph recites that by the ancient Laws and Statutes of this Realm made in the Reign of King Edward the Third Parliaments are to be held very often and this Act of 16 Car. 2. makes a new provision to the end as the words are there may be a frequent calling assembling and holding of Parliaments once in three Years at the least Now let us enquire what the proper Work of a Parliament is which the said Statute of 36 E. 3. mentions in part viz. for maintenance of the Articles and Statutes and redress of Mischiefs and Grievances that daily happen as that Statute recites Sir Tho. Smith who was principal Secretary of State in his Treatise de Republica Administratione Anglorum L. 2. c. 2. fol. 50 51. says this of the Parliament In Comitiis Parliamentariis posita est omnis augustae Absolutaeque potestat is vis veteres leges jubent esse irritas novas inducunt praesentibus modum constituunt There is the true dispensing power Incerti juris controversias Dirimunt Bracton writes of this High Court Habet Rex Curiam suam in concilio suo in Parliamentis suis ubi terminatoe sunt dubitationes Judiciorum novis injuriis emersis nova constituuntur remedia The Mirrour of Justices c. 1. pag. 9. says that Parliaments were instituted to hear and determine the Complaints of the wrongful Acts of those against whom the Subject otherwise could not have common Justice that is against great and powerful Delinquents Nihil prodest says Bracton Jura concedere nisi sit qui Jura tueatur So that there is need of a frequent resort to be had to the Law-mamakers not only to resolve difficulties of Judgments but to keep the power of Interpretation within its due bounds and the Law hath taken care for frequency of Parliaments Sir Francis Bacon in his Advancement of Learning gives this excellent Advice to Law-makers and to those to whom it belongs to defend the Laws Let not says he Praetorian Courts speaking of Courts of Equity have power to decree against express Statutes under pretence of Equity for says he if this should be permitted a Law interpreter that is a Judge would become a Law-maker and all Matters should depend upon Arbitrament that is upon an Arbitrary Power And Arbitrament would encroach upon and at last swallow up Law. The power of extending or supplying or moderating Laws little differs says he from the power of making them Courts of Equity sometimes under the pretence of mitigating the Rigor of the Laws and such is the Power of Dispensing relax the Strength and Sinews of Laws by drawing all to Arbitraments he was well able to judge of this having been Lord Chancelor And it is his 46th Aphorism That is the best Law which gives the least
Distinction and weigh the Reasons so given we shall find it is without any just ground The damage done to the particular person in the Cases past in the first part of this distinction are meerly his own proper and peculiar damage and he is intituled to his particular Action for it in his own proper personal Right and therefore if he discharge and dispense with them it is no wrong to any other man. He may do what he will with his own But the Cases in the second part of this Distinction are where the King hath a right to the Suit and the offence and damage are said to be to him only But are they so as the former in his own personal right as his Lands and other Revenues are or are they to him but as a Trustee for the Publick for which reason he is called Creditor Poenae and may he therefore upon the like reason dispense with them or dispose of them as a Subject may do with his own particular Interests Again Shall a publick Damage and Injury to the whole Nation be more dispensable by the King than the loss of one private man fuit haec sapientia quondam Publica privatis secernere And therefore in my apprehension the King cannot in such Cases of Dispensations be truly said to wrong none but himself and it is not agreeable to the Definition before given Utilitate Compensata for the King wrongs the whole Realm by it Where if he grants a Dispensation with a Penal Law of the first sort of this distinction he only wrongs some particular persons The Cases and Authorities for Dispensations in our Books that were granted in ancient times will generally be found to be only where the Penal Statutes were made for the King 's own proper interest and benefit As his dispensing with the Statute of Mortmain For in such Cases it was to the King 's own loss only in Cases where the King might by Law have given away his Lands or Services So the King may in his Patent of Grant of Lands dispense with the Statutes that require there shall be mention of the true Values of them And by a Non-obstante to those Statutes which is now generally used the King does in effect declare that it is his pleasure to grant those Lands whatever the Value of them be more or less and the Statute does by express words save a liberty to the King in that Case The King is not a Trustee for others in such Cases nor can these Dispensations be said to be directly to the damage of the Publick And such Penal Laws as meerly concern the King 's own Revenue or Profit may justly be thought to be intended to be made only to put the King's matters into an ordinary method and course and so save the King a labour as the Lord Hobart says and so prevent the King 's being surpriz'd or mis-inform'd when Patents are gained from him and not design'd to tye the King's hands or to restrain his power as out of all doubt was done and intended by the Law-makers in our Act of 25 Car. 2. But in all the late Cases and Authorities which we meet with in our Books concerning Non-obstante's and Dispensations as in the time of King Henry the Seventh and so downward to this day we shall find them practising upon such Penal Statutes as meerly concern the Publick Good and Benefit and the Laws of such a nature by the breach of which the whole Nation suffers While some particular persons it may be by giving a large Fine or a yearly Sum obtain the favour to be dispens'd with and exempt from a Penal Law while all others continue to be bound by it As for Example Where a Statute forbids the Exportation of Wool or of Cloth undyed or undress'd under a Penalty such a Law is greatly for the Publick Good and it takes care that our own People shall have Employment and Maintenance Yet this is such a Law as according to the receiv'd Distinction the King may dispense with there being no particular damage to one man more than to another by breach of such a Law although it be a mighty damage to the whole Nation For by such a Dispensation the person so dispens'd with to Export such White Cloth undyed will have the sole Trade which before the making of that Penal Statute was equal and common to all I wish the House of Commons would enquire what vast Riches have been heretofore gotten by such as have obtain'd the Dispensations with this Penal Statute besides the Sums they paid to the Crown for them These are meer Monopolies In such a Case it may rightly be applied That Sin taketh occasion by the Law. It had been better for the Nation that such Laws were never made being no better observ'd for here again the Dispensation is neither Utilitate nor Necessitate pensata Look into the Case of Thomas and Sorrell and you will find few or no Cases of Dispensations cited out of our Books but of the time of King Henry the Seventh and much more of very late times so that the ill practice is still improving and stretching The Lord Chief Justice Herbert in the next place pag. 9. proceeds to mention the great Case of 2 Hen. 7. a Resolution of all the Judges in the Exchequer-Chamber upon the King 's dispensing with the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 8. That no man should be a Sheriff above one year This is the great Leading Case and Authority upon which the main stress is laid to justifie the Judgment given in Sir Edward Hales his Case I would avoid repeating what I have already so largely said to this Authority to which I must refer my Reader by which I hope it is most evidently made out that the King neither hath nor never had any just Right or Power to elect Sheriffs But the right of Electing was anciently and originally belonging to the Freeholders of the several Counties and since it was unjustly taken from them as they have ever been on the losing hand it hath been lodged in the great Officers of the Realm as the Lord Chancellor Lord Treasurer Lord Privy-Seal and the Judges c. as appears by the several Statutes And they are to make such Choice every year in the Exchequer on a day appointed by the Statute for that purpose So that the Sheriffs are by those Statutes to continue in their Offices for one year only And the King cannot hinder such Election Only by his Patent or Commission to the Sheriff hath he used to signifie to the Sheriff himself that is so chosen and to publish to all others who the person is that is so chosen This is all the use of the Patent but it is the proper Election of those great Officers that truly vests them in their Office And it does as clearly appear that when former Kings have dispens'd with a Sheriffs continuing in his Office for longer than one year contrary to the
imports the King's Declaration and Resolution by advice of his great Council to employ none in Offices and Places of Trust but such as are most capable and fit and will most faithfully answer the great Ends for which they are so intrusted that is the preservation of the Protestant Religion which is the true English Interest And this agrees with the Rules of the Common Law That if an Office be granted to one that is Inidoneus the Grant is void though granted by the King himself Of this I have treated more largely in my Argument fol. 37. The Lord Chief Justice Herbert pag. 16. asks the Question Whether so many solemn Resolutions of all the Judges of England in the Exchequer-Chamber are not to be rely'd upon for Law And I answer That if they were ten times as many more yet they are not to be rely'd on against many express positive Acts of Parliament directly to the contrary For what words could the Parliament use more emphatical and express and more to the purpose than by saying That a Non-obstante or a Dispensation or a Grant of such a thing prohibited by that Law shall be absolutely void and ipso facto adjudged void and the person made uncapable to take And is not a Judgment in Parliament and by Act of Parliament of the highest Authority But says the Chief Justice fol. 16. the constant practice hath been to dispense with the Statute of Sheriffs I answer It hath also been a very frequent practice too for the King to make such persons Sheriffs as were none of the number nominated or chosen as aforesaid by the Chancellor Treasurer Judges and other great Officers and it passes for currant that he may so do though it be a vulgar Errour For it hath been resolv'd by all the twelve Judges to be an Errour in the King. See Sir Coke's 2 Instit. or Magna Charta fol. 559. and yet it is practis'd to this very day The Chief Justice pag. 18. seems to excuse Popish Recusants for not qualifying themselves for Offices by taking the Oaths and the Test c. for that no man says he hath it in his power to change his opinion in Religion as he pleaseth and therefore it is not their fault It is an Errour of the mind c. Answ. Here is no occasion taken to find fault with them for their Opinion let them keep their Religion still if they like it so well who hinders them This Act of 25 Car. 2. imposes no Penalty upon them for their Opinion But is there any necessity of their being in Offices Must they needs be Guardians of the Protestant Religion The Penalty upon them by this Act is not for their Opinion but for their presuming to undertake Offices and Trusts for which they are by King and Parliament adjudg'd and declar'd unfit Page 20 21. The Chief Justice Vaughan is brought in arguing for the Kings Power of Dispensing with Nominal Nusances as he is pleas'd to call and distinguish Nusances The word Nominal as there understood imports that though a Parliament declares any thing to be a Nusance as sometimes they do in Acts of Parliament to render them indispensable which yet in its proper nature would not otherwise be so conceiv'd to be that such a Nominal Nusance as he holds may however be dispens'd with by the King though regularly by Law the King may not dispense with any Nusance Answ. Shall any single or particular person though a Chief Justice presume to call that a meer Nominal Nusance which a Parliament by a solemn Act and Law have adjudg'd and declar'd to be a real Nusance Are we not all concluded by what a Law says This Arrogance is the Mischief now complain'd of The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 22. at the lower end says That from the abuse of a thing an Argument cannot be drawn against the thing it self I agree this is regularly true yet we have an Instance to the contrary in the Scripture in that point of the Brazen Serpent But in our Case the abuse doth arise from the very nature of the thing it self from the constitution of it For the King practises no more in dispensing than what these Resolutions of the Judges allow him to do by this pretended Prerogative The Errour is in the Foundation They have made his Power to be unlimitted either as to number of persons or as to the time how long the Dispensation shall continue Sir Edward Coke says and so the other Books That the King is the sole Judge of these Nec Metas Rerum nec Tempora Ponunt The Chief Justice Herbert fol. 24. cites two clear Concessions as he is pleas'd to call them of all the Commons of England in Parliament which he esteems much greater Authorities than the several Resolutions of all the twelve Judges But how far these are from Concessions will easily appear to an indifferent Reader They are no more than prudent and patient avoiding of Disputes with the several Kings And there are multitudes of the like in the old Parliament-Rolls It is but an humble clearing of themselves from any purpose in general to abridge the King of any of his Prerogatives which have always been touchy and tender things but it is no clear nor direct allowance of that dispensing there mention'd to be any such Prerogative in him However I am glad to see an House of Commons to be in so great request with the Judges It will be so at some times more than at others Yet I do not remember that in any Argument I have hitherto met with a Voteâ— or Order or Opinion of the House of Commons hath been cited for an Authority in Law before now Will the House of Peers allow of this Authority for Law It will be said That this is but the acknowledgment of Parties concern'd in Interest which is allowed for a good Testimony and strongest against themselves Answ. I do not like to have the King and his People to have divided Interests Prerogative and the Peoples Liberties should not be look'd upon as Opposites The Prerogative is given by Law to the King the better to enable him to protect and preserve the Subjects Rights Therefore it truly concerns the People to maintain Prerogative I could cite several Parliament-Records wherein the poor House of Commons have been forced to submit themselves and humbly beg pardon of the King for doing no more than their Duty meerly to avert his displeasure See the Case of Sir Thomas Haxey whom the King adjudg'd a Traytor for exhibiting a Bill to the Commons for the avoiding of the outrageous Expences of the King's House 20 R. 2. num 14 15 16 17 and 23. and the Commons were driven to discover his Name to the King and the whole House in a mournful manner craving pardon for their entertaining of that Bill No doubt as good an Authority against the Commons for so sawcily medling in a matter so sacred and so far above them Yet afterwards
and where it is a collateral Suit not depending upon that Record An Action against the Sheriff for an Escape of one taken in Execution this is a dependant Action and is grounded upon the Record of the Judgment given against the Party that escap'd The Sheriff cannot aver any thing against that Record and examine it over again nor can he take any advantage of Error or erroneous proceeding in obtaining that Judgment Saunders Rep. 2 part 101. So in an Action of Debt grounded upon a Judgment or in an Audita quaerela to be reliev'd upon a Judgment And so in our Case this Action of Debt for the 500 l. is grounded upon the Conviction which must stand for truth as long as it remains in force not avoided by Error or Attaint A Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment is a dependant Action In error the Plaintiff may not averr any thing against the Record Mullens versus Weldy Siderfin's 1st part 94. Error was sued in the Kings-Bench to reverse a Judgment given in the Palace-Court And the Plaintiff in Error assign'd for Error that the Duke of Ormond who is principal Judge of that Court by Patent was not there It was agreed by the Court that it might not be assign'd for Error for it was contrary to the Record But per Cur. in an Action of Trespass or false Imprisonment which says that Report are collateral Actions he may falsifie and assign that if he be taken upon such Judgment So if a man be indicted and convict of an Assault and Battery and afterwards the person so assaulted brings his Action for the Battery this hath no dependance upon the Indictment or Conviction for it may be sued though there were no Indictment but is a distinct and collateral Suit. The Indictment and Verdict is no Estoppel nor can so much as be given in Evidence as is held by the whole Court in the Case of Sampson versus Yardley and Tothill 19 Car. 2. B. R. Kebles's 2 part 384. The like in an Appeal of Murder Kebele's 2 part 223. Another Penalty upon the Offender against this Statute of 25 Car. 2. is That he shall be disabled to sue in any Action Now suppose a person convict at the Assizes sues an Action may not the Defendant in that Action take the advantage of that Disability and plead the Conviction As in Case of an Outlawry pleaded in Disability there need not be set forth all the proceedings in that Suit wherein the Plaintiff was outlawed but he may plead the Record of the Outlawry and rely upon it and it shall not be examin'd whether there was any just cause to sue him to the Outlawry or not The Indictment the Defendant's Plea to it and the Verdict upon it have determin'd the matter of Fact that the Defendant is guilty of the Offence against this Act of Parliament The Act it self hath pronounc'd the Judgment which consists of many particulars one whereof is That the Defendant shall forfest 500 l. to him that will sue for it And the Action of Debt for the 500 l. brought by the Plaintiff grounded upon all these is in the nature of an Execution And all these put together are not several and distinct Suits but in effect all but one Suit and Process one depending upon the other The second Point is Whether the Dispensation pleaded by the Defendant be a good Bar to the Action of Debt And this is properly called The Matter in Law and the great Point of the Case for which I refer the Reader to my Argument at large POSTSCRIPT BEING SOME Animadversions UPON A Book writ by Sir EDW. HERBERT Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas ENTITULED A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Hales's Case SINCE the finishing of my Argument about the Power of Dispensing with Paenal Statutes a Book came to my hands touching the same subject entituled A short Account of the Authorities in Law upon which Judgment was given in Sir Edward Hales his Case written by Sir Edward Herbert Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in vindication of himself And although I am of opinion that the substance of all the Arguments contained in the said Book are fully answered in my aforesaid Discourse yet I hold it necessary to make some Animadversions upon the said Book and to point out readily to the Reader the several Pages of my Discourse wherein the Arguments of the Chief Justice are more directly and particularly treated of and answered And there being great Reverence justly due to a Person that bears so high a Character as also to a Judgment given in that Superiour Court of the King's Bench and by advice of all but two of the rest of the Judges as I now hear some short Apology had need be used for that freedom I have taken to animadvert upon it being as I am but in a private station In short therefore I have not undertaken it out of any vain conceit of my own Abilities but out of a sincere desire to inform such as in the approaching Parliament are like to have this great Case in Judgment before them and some may possibly not be at leisure as I have been to study the Case the matter being of a mighty importance Nor have I entred the Lists upon any contentious humour or taking any advantage of the late Happy Change of publick Affairs I am I thank God more inclin'd to commiserate the Distress that may befal any persons by the change of the times it having been my own case so lately although they differ from me in Judgment or Interest I am very far from insulting over any whatever hard usage I my self have met with Nemo confidat nimiûm secundis Nemo desperet meliora lapsus My Apology is this 1. I was engaged in the Argument before the coming forth of this Book and it happening into my hands before my publishing of my Discourse I could not decline the observing something upon it without being suspected to have given up the Cause 2. The Lord Chief Justice himself hath by his Book given fresh occasion fairly to discuss the point again by declaring that he expects as we all do that it will receive a disquisition in Parliament 3. And as the Chief Justice hath endeavour'd with as much as can be said to give the World satisfaction in the justice and right of the Case to maintain the Judgment given so he is well known to be of that ingenuity and good temper and candour as willing to receive a satisfaction if any further Argument to the contrary may be so happy as to convince him The Chief Justice Herbert pag. 6. gives us the Definition of a Dispensation out of Sir Coke's 11th Report fol. 88. viz. Dispensatio mali prohibiti est de jure Domino Regi concessa propter impossibilitatem praevidendi de omnibus particularibus And again Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxacio utilitate ceu