Sensations are not of her own producing in her she is induc'd to judge they are without her and in the Cause that represents them to her And she has so often made these kinds of Judgments at the time of her perceiving Objects that 't is hardly in her power at last to prevent them In order to explain more throughly what I have been saying it would be necessary to shew the unusefulness of those infinite numbers of little Beings which we call Species and Idea's which are as it were Nothing and yet represent all things which we Create and Annihilate at our pleasure and which our Ignorance has caus'd our Imagination to invent that we might account for those things which we do not understand We should shew too the solidity of those Mens Opinion who believe GOD to be the True Father of Light who alone enlightens all Men without whom the most simple and easie Truths would not be intelligible nor the Sun as bright and glorious as he is be visible who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of the Creator and who upon these Considerations have discover'd that Idea's which represent the Creatures to us are nothing but the Perfections of GOD himself which are correspondent to the same Creatures and which represent them Lastly It would be necessary to treat of the Nature of what we call Idea's and afterwards we might with greater ease discourse more distinctly of the things I have been speaking of But this would lead us too far and these things shall be reserv'd for the Third Book only because our method will require them there At present let it suffice that I bring a most sensible and uncontroverted Instance wherein we find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation I suppose there is no Man in the World who looking on the Moon does not see her about a mile's distance from him and finds her greater at her Rising and Setting than in the Meridian or when a good way Elevated above the Horizon And perhaps too he fancies he only sees her larger without thinking there is any Judgment in his Sensation However it is undoubtedly certain that if he had no kind of Judgment included in his Sensation he would not see her at that distance she appears to him and besides would see her lesser at her Rising than when in her Exaltation above the Horizon since we only see her greater at her Rising because we judge her more remote by a Natural Judgment which I have spoke to in the sixth Chapter But besides our Natural Judgments which may be regarded as Compound Sensations there occurs in almost all our Sensations a Free or Voluntary Judgment For Men do not only judge by a Natural Judgment that Pain for instance is in the Hand they judge it is by a Free and Voluntary Judgment also They not only Feel it there but Believe it there too and they are so strongly habituated to form such sort of Judgments that they find great difficulty to forbear them when they would And yet these Judgments are most false in themselves though very advantageous to the Welfare and Preservation of Life For our Senses do not instruct us but with reference to the Body And all our Free Judgments which are conformable and adapted to the Judgment of the Senses are very remote from Truth But not to leave these things without shewing how to discover the Reasons of them we must take notice that there are two sorts of Beings Beings which our Soul immediately sees and others which she knows only by the Mediation of the former When for instance I perceive the Sun arising I first perceive that which I immediately see and because my Perception of the former is only occasion'd by something without me which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and in my Brain I judge the former Sun which is in my Soul to be without me and to Exist It may notwithstanding happen that we may see the first Sun which is intimately united to our Soul though the other were not above the Horizon or though it did not Exist at all And thus we may see the first Sun greater when the other rises than when elevated high above the Horizon and though it be true that the first Sun which we see immediately be greater at the other's Rising it doth not follow that the other is so too For 't is not properly that which Rises which we see since that is many Millions of Leagues remote but 't is the former which is truly greater and such exactly as we see it because all the things we immediately see are always such as we see them And we should not be Deceiv'd did we not judge that what we immediately see is to be found in External Objects which are the cause or occasion of what we see In like manner when we see Light by beholding the First Sun which is immediately united to our Mind we are not mistaken in believing that we see it 'T is even impossible to doubt of it But herein consists our Error that without any Reason and indeed against all Reason we will have this Light which we see immediately to exist in the Sun which is without us and thus it is with the other Objects of our Senses Upon a due Attention to what has been said from the Beginning and in the Process of this Work it will be easie to see that amongst all the things which occur in every Sensation Error is only to be found in the Judgments we make that our Sensations exist in the Objects First 'T is an Error not to know that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their Parts and that That motion is communicated to the Organs of our Senses which are the two first things observable in every Sensation For there is a great deal of difference between not knowing a Thing and being in an Error in respect of that thing Secondly We are right as to the third thing which is properly Sensation When we Feel Heat when we see Light Colours or other Objects it is certainly true that we see them though we are Mad or Phrentick for there is nothing more infallibly true than that your Visionary People see what they think they see and their Error consists only in the Judgments which they make that what they see has a real Existence without them because they see it without them This is the Judgment that implies a Consent of our Liberty and which consequently is liable to Error And it is our Duty ever to refrain from making it according to the Rule which was given in the beginning of this Book That we should never judge of any thing whatever when we could avoid it and were not oblig'd to 't by the certainty and evidence thereof as it happens in this place For though we feel our selves extreamly dispos'd by a confirm'd and inveterate Habit to judge our Sensations are in the Objects as
they are communicated to others with greater Facility The Study of Nature is undoubtedly more Noble than of Books Visible and Sensible Experiments afford us much more certain Proofs of things than the Reasonings of Men and no Objection can be made to those Men whose Circumstances of Life have engag'd them in the Study of Natural Philosophy for endeavouring to excel in it by making continual Experiments provided their greatest Application be made to the more necessary Sciences We find no fault with Experimental Philosophy nor the Improvers of it but only with their Defects The first of which is that usually 't is not the Light of Reason which conducts them in the Method of their Experiments but only Chance Which is the reason that they grow little more Learned or Skilful after having wasted much of their Time and Fortune therein The second is their insisting rather upon Curious and Extraordinary Experiments than on those that are more Common when 't is plain that the Commoner being the more simple they ought first to be dwelt upon before a Man applies himself to the more Compounded and to those which depend upon a multitude of Causes The third is their earnest and diligent Search after Profitable Experiments and their neglect of those which only serve to illuminate the Mind The fourth that they are too un-exact in their Observations of all the particular Circumstances of Time Place the Quality of the Drugs made use of though the least of these Circumstances is capable of frustrating the desir'd Effect For 't is observable that the Terms the Virtuoâ—i use are Equivocal The Word Wine for instance signifies so many different things as there are different Soils various Seasons and several ways of making and preserving it So that it may be said in general there are no where two Vessels of it altogether alike And when a Chymist says To make such an Experiment take wine we have but a very confus'd Idea of his meaning For which Reason they should use a most exact Circumspection in Experiments and not descend to the Compound sort till they are very well acquainted with the more Simple and Ordinary The fifth is That they make too many Deductions from a single Experiment when on the contrary to the Establishing any one good Conclusion there should go generally many Experiments Though a single Experiment may be assistant to the inferring many Conclusions Lastly The most part of Naturalists and Chymists consider only the particular Effects of Nature They never ascend up to the first Notions of the Things Bodies are compos'd of When yet it is most certain we can have no clear and distinct knowledge of any particular Phaenomena unless we are first masters of the most general Principles and run them up as high as Metaphysicks To conclude they commonly want Courage and Constancy and are tir'd and discourag'd with the Toil and Expence There are many other Faults these Gentlemen are subject to but I design not to reckon them all up The Causes of these Faults which I have remark'd are the want of Application the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters and Men's judging of the Difference of Bodies and the Changes they undergo only from the Sensations they have of them according to the Explication given in the First Book The THIRD PART Concerning The CONTAGIOUS COMMUNICATION Of Strong IMAGINATIONS CHAP I. I. Of the Disposition we have to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of those Errors that depend on the Power of Imagination II. Two things that more especially increase this Disposition III. What that strong Imagination is IV. That there are several kinds of it Of Fools and of those that have a Srong Imagination in the Sense 't is here taken V. Two considerable Imperfections of Men of a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to perswade and impose on others HAVING already explain'd the Nature of the Imagination the Failings it is subject to and shewn how our own Imagination engages us in Error all that remains in this Second Book is to speak to the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations I mean that Sway and Power some Minds have of drawing others into their Errors Strong Imaginations are wondrously contagious They domineer over the weaker fashion them by degrees after their own Image and imprint the same Characters upon them And therefore since Men of Conceit and of a Vigorous and Strong Imagination are the least reasonable of any there are very few Causes of the Errors of Men more â—niversal than this dangerous Communication of the Imagination In order to conceive what this Contagion is and how it 's transmitted from one to another we must know that Men are under a mutual necessity of one another's Assistance and are so fram'd as out of many Bodies to compound one whereof all the Parts have a muâ—ual Correspondence For the preserving and cherishing of which Union GOD commanded them to have Charity for each other But whereas Self-love might by little and little extinguish Charity and break the Bond of Civil Society GOD thought fit for the Preservation of it to unite Men more firmly still by Natural Ties which might subsist in case Charity should fail and also defend it against the attacks of Self-love These Natural Ties which we have in common with Beasts consist in a certain Disposition of Brain which makes all Men prone to imitate the Actions of those they converse with to frame the same Judgments with them and to be acted with like Passions they see them possess'd with Which Disposition is a much straiter Obligation to bind them to each other than Charity founded upon Reason this Charity being rarely to be met with Now when a Man wants this Disposition of Brain whereby he may be affected with our Sentiments and Passions he is Naturally incapable of uniting and making up one Body with us He may be compar'd to those Irregular Stones that cannot be plac'd in a Building because they cannot be joyn'd with the others Oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque jocosi Sedatum celeres agilem gnavúmque remissi 'T is a more considerable Vertue than is imagin'd to keep fair with those who are untouch'd with our Passions and whose Notions are contrary to our own And we shall have Reason to think so if we consider that 't is a kind of Insulting when we see a Man that has just cause of Sorrow or Joy not to take part with him in his Sentiments When a Man is in Sorrow one should not come before him with a Gay and Airy look which bespeaks Joy and violently imprints the Motions thereof in his Imagination This being to disturb him from the state that is most convenient and pleasant to him for sorrow is the pleasantest of all the Passions to a Man under any Affliction There is then a certain Disposition of Brain in all Men whatever which naturally inclines
quod dicis amâ—o videmus verum esse quod diâ—o ubi quaeso id videmus Nec ego utique in te nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate Confess de S. Aug. l. 12. c. 25. See St. Austin De libero arbitrio c. Book 2. Chap. 8. Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum Lucretius Diogenes * And now O Inhabitants of Jerusalem judge betwixt me and my Vineyard Isa. 5.3 Art 6. 8. See the Fifth Dialogue of Christian Conversations See the first Illustration Est quippe supâ—rbâ—a peccâ—â—um maximum uti daâ—is taâ—quam innaris S Bern. de diligendo Deo This is omitted in some Editions Ch. 1.18 Ch. 4. â—â— Cor. 13. L. 31. c. 20 Propinquior nobis qui fecit quam multa quae facta sunt In illo enim vivimus movemur sumus Istorum autem pleraque remota sunt à mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis Recte culpantur in libro sapientia inquisitores hujus saeculi Si enim tantum inquit potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum quomodo ejus Dominum non facilius invenerunt Ignota enim sunt fundamenta oculis nostris qui fundavit â—erram propinquat mentibus nostris De Gen. ad litt l. 5. ch 16 De Trinitate lib. 8. ch 8. 1 Tim. 16.16 * St. Cyrill of Alexandria upon the words of St. John Erat lux vera St. Aug. Tr. 14. upon St. John St. Greg. c. 27. upon 28 of Job †Inaccessibilem dixit sed omni homini â—umana sapienti Scriptura quippe sacra omnes carnalium sectatores humanitatis nomine notare solet St. Greg. in cap. 28. Job Ex. 33 20. Neither is it found in the land of the living Job 28.13 Job 28.31 Now we see through a Glass darkly but then face to face Now I know in part c. 1 Cor. 13.2 The natural Man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God for they are foolishness unto him 1 Cor. c. 2.14 Ad Moysen dicitur non videbit me homo vivet ac si aperte diceretur Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui mundo carnaliter vivit St. Greg. upon the 28. of Job ch 28. Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end Eccl. c. 9.1 I judge not mine own self For I known nothing by my self yet I am not hereby justified but â—e that judgeth me is the Lord 1 Cor. â— 4.4 John 13.37 Eccl. 21.18 Book 1. Mark 12.30 For the most extraordinary of these Opinions See Suarez Metaphysicks Disp. 18. Sect. 2. Assert 2. 3. Scot. in 4. Sent. Dist. 12.1 D. 37.2 D. 17. Palaudan in 4. Sent. D. 12. Q. 1 Art 1. Perer. 8. Phys. Ch. 3. Conimbr upon Aristotle's Physicks and many others cited by Suarez See Eonseca's Metaphys qu. 13. Sect. 3. and Soncin and Javell upon the same Question Ruvio lib. 2. Ph. Tract 4. qu. 2. See Suarez Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Ch. 1. of the second Book of his Physicks See Fonsesa Suarez and others before cited * Book 1. of his Topicks C. 1. * In his Metaph. Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Assert 1. †In Metaph Arist. qu. 7. Sect. 2. See Book 4. Ch. 11. toward the end and Book 6. Part 2. Ch. 7. See Ch. 2. Book IV. Suarez ib. See Chap. the last of The Search * See the Illustration upon the Fourth Chapter of the second Part concerning Method †See the first Illustration upon the Fifth Chapter Lib. 1. de Retract 1 Cor. 10.19 * Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium peccatum Concil Araus 2. Can. 22. * In the Sence explain'd in the Chapter belonging to this Illustration * I still mean a true and efficacious Force * It seems evident to me that the Mind knows not by internal Sensation or Conscience the motion of the Arm she Animates She knows by Conscience only what she feels or thinks By inward Sensation or Conscience we know the sense we have of the Motion of our Arm. But Conscience does not notify the Motion of our Arm or the pain we suffer in it any more than the Colours we see upon Objects Or if this will not be granted I say that inward Sensation is not infallible for Error is generally found in the Sensations when they are compos'd I have sufficiently prov'd it in the first Book of the Search after Truth Gen. 1. Isa. 44.24 Job 10.8 * Vulg. totum 2 Macc. Ch. 7. v 22 23. Acts 17 25. Psal. 104 14. Engl. Poverty and Riches Eccl. 11.14 Gen. 2.19 Ch. 1.21 Omnia quippe portenta contra naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt Quomodo enim est contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum voluntas tanti utique creatoris conditae rei cujusque natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam sed contra quà m est nota natura S. Aug. de Civita De i l. 21. c. 8. Some of St. Austin's Principles are these What has never sinned can not suffer evil But according to him Pain is the greatest Evil and Beasts suffer it That the more Noble cannot have the less Noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more Noble than the Body and yet has no other End That what is Spiritual is Immortal yet the Soul of Beasts though Spiritual is subject to Death Many such like Principles there are in his Works whereby it may be concluded That Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them Ch. 44.24 2 Mac. 7.22 23. Sol homo generant â—ominem Arist. Phy. Ausc. l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon the Text. V. Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate Durand in 2 dist Qu. 5. Dist. 37. De Genesi ad liâ—eram l. 5. c. 20. In 4 Sent. Dist. 1. q. 1. D Aliaco ibid. * Book 4. c. 1. Deut. c. 6. * Acts 14.15.16 Ergo nihil agis ingratissime mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec naturae Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod a Seneca accepisses Annaeo diceres te debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Sen. l. 4. de Benef. Isa. 45.7 Amos. 3.6 â— Moses Maimonid Vide Vossium lib. 2. de Idololatriâ— Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nulâ—am belluam nisi ob aliquam 〈◊〉 quam ex ea caperent consecrâ—vâ—rant Cic. l. 1. de Nâ—tura Deorum Phil. 3.9 * No Whoremonger nor unclean Person nor covetous Man who is an Idolater Eph. 5.5 †They that worship him must Worship him in Spirit and in Truth Joh. 4.24 Nos si hominem patrem vocamus honorem aâ—aâ—i deferimus non Authorem vitae nostrae ostendimus Hier. in c. 33. Matth. 1 Cor. 9.22 10.33 Eph. 6.6 Col. 3.22 * Ep. 3. Ch. 2.28 Ch. 2.57 Ch. 6. contra Epist. Manichei Ch. 16. de Tran. l. 10. alibi Part 2. Ch. 3. Art 6. * De Quantitate animae Ch. 31 32. c. Lib. 4. de anima ejus origine Ch. 12. alibi Lins. c. 37. * Book IV. Chap. 2. Book VI. Part II. Chap. 7. Book III. Part II. Chap. 8. * Sess. 8. * Th. Pac. ch 4. †L. 3. ch 13. Cog. Nat. * By that Bull it is forbidden under Pain of Excommunication to give any Explication of the Decrees of the Council Vlium omnino interpretationis genus super ipsius Concilii decretis quocunque modo edere c. That Power is reserv'd to the Pope * Edit Strasb p. 190. Par. Edit 1. p. 172. in the second p. 190. in the third 187 in the fourth 95. * Pag. 90. Search after Truth Ch. ult Prov. 8.22 Eccl. 24.5 14. Eph. 14.21 22 23.2.10 21 22.4.13 16. Coll. 1.15 16 17 18 19. Ps. 72.17 Joh. 17 15.24 Rom. 8.29 1 Peâ— 1 2â— Apâ—c 13.8.1.8 c. Apoc. 21.23 Col. 1.18.2.20 Ephes. 1. â—2 Rom. 11.32 Gal. 3.22 Isaiah 5.3 4. 1 Cor. 8.11 * By True Cause I understand that which acts by its own Force Eph. 1.22 23.4.16 Col. 1.24.2.19 1 Cor. 12.27 Acts 1.24 c. Joh. 7.39 Heb. 7.25 Rom. 8.34 1 Joh. 2.1 Eph. 4.13 Ibid. 15 16. Joh. 5.4 5. 2 Cor. 13.2 Rom. 5.14.17 18 19. 1 Cor. 15.48 1 John 2.27 Luk. 10. Eph. 11.12 Heb. 2. 1 Cor. 12.27 Eph. 5.30 c. * Illustrations upon the Search after Truth First Illustration on the 7 th Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 3 d. Book of the Search Second Illustration Col. 2.19 Heb. 7.25.9.24 Joh. 11.42 Mat. 28.18 Chap. 4 13 15 16. Col. 2.19 Col. 2.7 Joh. 1.17 Hebr. 4. Hebr. 7.16 17. Joh. 16.7 To the Intent that now unto the Principalities and Powers in Heavenly Places might be known by the Church the manifold Wisdom of God Eph. 3.10 1 Joh. 2.1 Mat. 9.15 Joh. 11.42
which in our ordinary way of Conception is a Decree posteriour to this Order of Nature Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguish'd from things of Nature We ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence but in the concernments of Faith we must not look for Evidence as in those of Nature we ought not to take up with Faith That is with the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be a Believer 't is requir'd to Assent blindly but to be a Philosopher it is necessary to See plainly 'T is not however to be deny'd but there are some Truths besides those of Faith for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations as are those which relate to Matter of Fact in History and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth the one Necessary the other Contingent I call Necessary Truths those which are immutable by their Nature and those which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God which is not subject to Change All other sorts of Truth are Contingent Mathematicks Physicks Metaphysicks as also a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths History Grammar Private Right or Customs and such other things as depend on the changeable Will of Man contain only Contingent Truths We demand therefore an exact Observation of the Rule we have been establishing in the Search of Necessary Truths the Knowledge of which may be call'd Science and we must be content with the greatest Probability in History which includes the Knowledge of things Contingent For under the general Name of History may be concluded the Knowledge of Languages Customs as also of the different Opinions of Philosophers when Men have only learnt them by Memory without having either Evidence or Certainty concerning them The Second thing to be Observ'd is that in Morality Politicks and Medicine and in all Practical Sciences we are obliged to be content with Probability Not Universally but upon occasion not because it satisfies the Mind but because the Instance is pressing And if a Man should always delay Acting till he had perfect Assurance of Success the Opportunity would be often lost But though it falls out that a Man must inevitably act yet he should in acting doubt of the Success of what he does And he should indeavour to make such Advances in Sciences as to be able on Emergencies to act with greater Certainty For this should be the constant end of all Mens Study and Employment who make any use of Thought The Third and last thing is this That we should not absolutely despise Probabilities since it often happens that many of them in Conjunction have as convincing a force as most evident Demonstrations Of which Nature there are infinite Examples to be found in Physicks and Morality So that 't is often expedient to amass together a sufficient number of them in subjects not otherwise Demonstrable in order to come to the Knowledge of Truth impossible to be found out any other way And now I must needs confess that the Law I impose is very Rigorous and Severe That there are abundance of Those who had rather renounce Reasoning at all than Reason on such Conditions That 't is impossible to run so fast with such retarding Circumspections However it must be granted me that a Man shall walk with greater Security in observing it and that hitherto those who have march'd so hastily have been oblig'd to return upon the same Ground Besides there are a great number of Men who will agree with me in this That since Monsieur Des-Cartes has discover'd more Truths in Thirty Years than all the Philosophers that preceded him meerly for his Submission to that Law if many others would study Philosophy as he has done we should in time be acquainted with the greatest part of those things which are necessary to make Life as happy as is possible upon an Earth which God has Curs'd CHAP. IV. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error whereof there are Five Principal II. The general Design of the whole Work III. The particular Design of the First Book WE have seen from what has been said that a Man falls not into Error but for want of making a due use of his Liberty that 't is for want of curbing that eagerness of the Will and moderating its Passion for the bare appearances of Truth that he is deceiv'd And that Error consists only in the Consent of the Will which has a greater Latitude than the Perception of the Understanding since we should never err if we only simply judg'd according as we perceiv'd But though to speak properly there is no other cause of Error than the ill use of our Liberty it may notwithstanding be said we have several Faculties that are the Causes of our Errors not Real Causes but such as may be term'd Occasional All the ways of our Perceiving are so many occasions of Deceiving us For since our false Judgments include two things namely the Consent of the Will and the Perception of the Vnderstanding it is manifest that all the ways of our Perception may afford us some occasion or other of falling into Error forasmuch as they may incline us to rash and precipitate Consents But because it is necessary first to make the Soul sensible of her Weaknesses and Wandrings in order to possess Her with just Desires of a Deliverance from them and that she may with greater ease shake off her Prejudices We will endeavour to make an exact Division of her Manners of Perception which may serve as so many Heads to one or other of which may be referr'd as we proceed the different Errors whereunto we are obnoxious The Soul has three several ways of Perception By Pure Intellect by Imagination and by the Senses By Pure Intellect she perceives things Spiritual Universals Common Notions The Idea of Perfection that of a Being infinitely perfect and in general all her own thoughts when she knows them by a Reflexion made upon her self 'T is likewise by Pure Intellect she perceives Material things Extension with its Properties For 't is the pure Understanding only which is capable of Perceiving a Circle and a perfect Square a Figure of a thousand sides and such like things Such sort of Perceptions bear the name of Pure Intellections or Pure Perceptions since there is no necessity of the Mind 's forming Corporeal Images in the Brain to represent them by By Imagination the Soul only perceives things Material when being Absent she makes them present to her by forming the Images of them in the Brain This is the way whereby a Man Imagines all sorts of Figures a Circle a Triangle a Face an Horse Towns and Fields whether he has already seen them or not This sort of Perceptions we may call Imaginations because the Soul represents to her self these things by framing Images of them in the Brain And for as much as Spiritual things cannot be represented
bounds them See here what an infinite number of invisible figures present themselves in an instant which are far more numerous than those our Eyes acquaint us withal which yet induce the Mind that trusts too much to their reach and capacity and stands not to examine things to the bottom to believe these Figures don't exist As for Bodies proportion'd to our Sight the number whereof is very inconsiderable in comparison of the other we discover their figure tolerably well but never know it exactly by our Senses Nay we cannot so much as be assur'd from our Sight if a Circle or a Square which are two of the most simple figures that are be not an Ellipsis and a Parallelogramme though these figures be both in our Hands and very near our Eyes I add farther that we cannot exactly discern whether a Line be Right or not especially if it be somewhat long We must then have a Rule for it But to what purpose we know not whether the Rule it self be such as we suppose it ought to be nor can we be fully satisfy'd concerning it And yet without the knowledge of this Line we can never know any figure as is evident to all the World This is what may be said in general of Figures which we have before our Eyes and in our Hands But if we suppose them at a distance from us how many changes do we find in the projection they make in the fund of our Eyes I will not stand to describe them here they may easily be learn'd in any Book of Opticks or by examining the Figures which we see in Pictures For since the Painter is oblig'd to change them almost all to the end they may appear in their Natural site and to paint for instance Circles like Ellipses 'T is an infallible sign of the Errors of our Sight in Objects that are not Painted But these Errors are corrected by fresh Sensations which possibly may be lookt upon as a sort of Natural Judgments and may be term'd the Judgments of the Senses In beholding a Cube for Example it is certain that all the sides we see of it never cause a Projection or an Image of an equal dimension in the fund of our Eyes since the Image of all these sides when painted in the Retina or the Optick Nerve nearly resembles a Cube pictur'd in Perspective and consequently the Sensation we have of it ought to represent the faces of a Cube unequal because they are so in Perspective This notwithstanding we see them all equal nor are we in an Error Now it might be said That this is occasion'd by a kind of Judgment which we are naturally inclin'd to make namely That the Faces of the Cube which are farthest from us ought not to cast on the fund of our Eyes so large Images as the Faces which are nearer but whereas Sensation is only peculiar to the Senses and Judgment in propriety of Speech cannot be ascrib'd to them it is certain this Judgment is only a Compound-sensation which consequently may be sometimes false However since that which is only Sensation in us may in Relation to the Author of Nature who excites it be consider'd as a kind of Judgment I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments because this form of Speaking is expedient in giving an account of things as may be seen towards the End of the Ninth Chapter and in several other places Though the Judgments I speak of are serviceable in correcting our Senses a thousand different Ways and without them we should hardly ever be in the Right nevertheless they fail not to be sometimes the occasion of our Error If it happens for instance that we see the Spire of a Steeple behind a great Wall or beyond a Mountain it will appear to us to be both little and at no great distance But if we should see it at the same distance but with many Fields and Houses lying betwixt us and it it would undoubtedly appear both much bigger and more remote although in both cases the projection of the Rays of the Steeple or the â—mage of the Steeple which is pictur'd in the fund of our Eye is altogether the same Now it may be said that the reason why we see it greater is the judgment we naturally make viz. That because so many Fields lie betwixt us and the Steeple it must needs be more remote and consequently greater But if on the other hand we saw no interjacent Lands betwixt our Eyes and the Steeple tho' at the same time we knew there were many and that it was a great way off which is very observable it would notwithstanding seem to us to be very little and very near as I have said before which we may farther suppose to happen from a kind of judgment natural to our Soul whereby she sees the Steeple in this manner because she judges it to be at five or six hundred paces distance For generally our Imagination represents no greater space betwixt the objects and our selves unless assisted by a sensible view of other intervening objects and beyond which it has still liberty to imagine something more 'T is for this reason that the Moon at the Rising or Setting is seen much bigger than when elevated a good height above the Horizon For this elevation removes our view from off the objects lying betwixt us and her the dimensions whereof we know so that we cannot judge of that of the Moon by forming the comparison between them But when she is just risen or about to set we see a great many Fields betwixt her and us of whose extension we have a tolerable knowledge and thus it is that we judge her more remote and upon that reason see her so large as we do And it must be observ'd That when she is elevated above our heads though our Reason most infallibly assures us she is vastly distant yet we cannot avoid seeing her very near and very little because indeed these Natural Judgments of the Sight are founded only on the Perceptions of the same Sight and Reason is unable to correct them So that they frequently lead us into Error by making us form voluntary judgments that go hand in hand along with them For when we judge according to our Sensations we are always deceiv'd though we never err in judging according to our Conceptions because the Body is no farther instructive than is conducing to the Body and 't is only GOD who always teaches us the Truth as shall be shewn hereafter These false Judgments not only deceive us in the Distance and Magnitude of Bodies which are not the Subject of this Chapter but in representing their Figure otherwise than it is We see for Instance the Sun and Moon and other very remote Spherical Bodies as if they were flat and only circular Because at that great distance we are unable to discern whether the part opposite to us is nearer us than the others and on
much and Fearing nothing from them whilst they keep them within those Boundaries I have prescrib'd them In this Second Book I shall Discourse concerning the Imagination as the Natural Order of things obliges me For there is so near a Relation and Affinity betwixt the Imagination and the Senses that they in no wise ought to be separated We shall see too in the Sequel of the Discourse that these two Powers are no farther Different than according to Degree of more or less This then is the Method which I have Observ'd in this Treatise It is divided into three Parts In the First I Explain the Natural Causes of the Disorder and Errors of the Imagination In the Second I make some Application of these Causes to the more General Errors of the Imagination and I Discourse of such as may be term'd the Moral Causes of these Errors In the Third I treat of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations Though the greatest part of the things contain'd in this Tract may not be so new as those I have already deliver'd in Explaining the Errors of the Senses yet their Use and Advantage will be no less considerable Men of bright and clarify'd Understandings can easily discover the Errors and the Causes of the Errors I am treating of But there are few such Men as can make sufficient Reflection thereupon I pretend not to give Instructions to all the World my design is only to Inform the Ignorant and to Caution and Remind the rest or rather I try to be my own Instructour and Remembrancer It has been said in the First Book that the Organs of our Senses were compos'd of little Fibres which terminate on one hand upon the External parts of the Body and on the Skin and on the â—ther center in the middle of the Brain But these Fibres may be moved in a two-fold manner either by commencing their Motion at those Extremities which terminate in the Brain or at those which terminate on the Surface of the Body Being the Agitation of these Fibres cannot be communicated to the Brain but the Soul must have some Perception or other if the Agitation be begun by the Impression of Objects made upon the External Surface of the Fibres of the Nerves and be communicated to the Brain the Soul thereupon receives a Sensation and judges what she has the Sensation of to be without that is to say She perceives an Object as Present but if it be only the Internal Fibres that are agitated by the Course of the Animal Spirits or in some other manner the Soul Imagines and judges what she imagines to be not without but within the Brain that is she perceives an Object as Absent And this is the difference there is between Sensation and Imagination But it ought to be observ'd That the Fibres of the Brain are more violently agitated by the Impression of External Objects than by the Course of the Animal Spirits and that for this reason the Soul is more nearly touch'd by External Objects which she judges as present and as it were capable of making her instantly sensible of Pleasure or Pain than by the Course of the Animal Spirits And yet it happens sometimes in Persons whose Animal Spirits are put in extream Commotion by Fastings Watchings a scorching Fever or a violent Passion that these Spirits move the Internal Fibres of the Brain with as great a force as External Objects so that these Persons have the Sensation of what they should only have the Imagination and think they See Objects before their Eyes which they only Imagine in the Brain Which evidently shews that in regard of what occurs in the Body the Senses and Imagination differ but in Degree of more or less as I have before declar'd But in Order to give a more distinct and particular Idea of the Imagination we must know that as often as any Change happens in that part of the Brain where the Nerves unite there happens a Change also in the Soul That is as has been already explain'd if there happens any Motion in this part which alters the Order of its Fibres there happens at the same time a new Perception in the Soul and she either Feels or Imagines something afresh And that the Soul is incapable of receiving any fresh Sensation or Imagination without some Alteration in the Fibres of that part of the Brain So that the Faculty of Imagining or the Imagination consists only in the Power the Soul has of framing the Images of Objects by effecting a Change in the Fibres of that part of the Brain which may be call'd the Principal Part as being that which corresponds to all the Parts of our Body and is the Place where the Soul keeps her immediate Residence if I may be so allow'd to speak This manifestly shews that this Power which the Soul has of Forming these Images includes two things one that has its Dependence on the Soul and the other on the Body The first is the Action and the Command of the Will The second is the ready Obedience paid to it by the Animal Spirits which delineate those Images and by the Fibres of the Brain wherein they must be imprinted In this Tract both one and the other of these two things go indifferently by the Name of Imagination nor are they distinguish'd by the Terms Active and Passive which might be given them because the Sense of the thing spoken of easily determines which of the Two is understood whether the Active Imagination of the Soul or the Passive Imagination of the Body I shall not here particularly determine which is that Principal Part of the Brain before-mention'd First Because it would be but an useless thing to do it Secondly Because it is not perfectly and infallibly known And lastly Since I could not convince others it being a Matter incapable of Probation in this place though I should be infallibly assur'd which was this Principal Part I should think it more adviseable to say nothing of it Whether then it be according to the Opinion of Dr. Willis in the two little Bodies call'd by him Corpora Striata that the common Sense resides and the Cells of the Brain preserve the Species of the Memory and the Corpus Callosum be the Seat of Imagination Whether it be according to Fernelius's Opinion in the Pia Mater which involves the Substance of the Brain Whether it be in the Pineal Gland according to the Notion of Des-Cartes or lastly in some other part hitherto undiscover'd that our Soul exercises her Principal Functions is of no great concern to know 'T is enough to be assur'd that there is a Principal Part and this is moreover absolutely necessary and that the Basis of Mr. Des-Cartes's System stands its ground For 't is to be well observ'd that though he should be mistaken in assuring us it is the Pineal Gland to which the Soul is immediately united this could no ways injure the
take up one part of their Mind and tinge and infect all the rest The Passions confound all the Idea's a thousand ways and make us generally discover in the Objects all that we have a mind to find in them Even the Passion that we have for Truth sometimes deceives us when it is too vehement But the Ambition to be thought Learned is the great Impediment to our becoming really so Nothing then is more rare and extraordinary than to find such Men as are capable of making new Systems and yet nothing is more common than to find such as have fram'd some System or other to their Humour We see few of those who study much reason upon common Notions there is ever some Irregularity in their Idea's which is an evident sign they have some particular System we are unaquainted with 'T is true all the Books they compose do not savour of it For when their Business is to write for the Publick Men are more cautious of what they say and a bare Attention is often enough to undeceive them Yet we see Books Publish'd from time to time which are a sufficient Proof of what I say And there are Persons who are proud to let the World know at the beginning of their Book that they are the Founders of some new System The number of the Inventors of new Systems is much increas'd by those who have been prepossess'd with any Author For it often falls out that having not met with Truth nor any solid foundation in their Opinions of the Authors they have read they first enter into a great Dislike and an high Contempt of all sorts of Books and thereupon fall to Imagining some probable Opinion which they hug and cherish and wherein they strengthen themselves in the manner I have explain'd But as soon as this Heat of Affection for any Opinion is boyl'd over and abated or the Design of Appearing in Publick has oblig'd them to examine it with a more exact and serious Attention they discover the Falsity of it and throw it up but with this Condition that they will never take up any other but utterly condemn all those who shall pretend to the Discovery of any Truth So that the last and most dangerous Error which Men of Study fall into is their Imagining there can be nothing known They have read many Books both Ancient and Modern and have miss'd of Truth in them They have had many fine Notions of their own which they have found to be false after a more strict and attentive Examination From whence they conclude that all Men are like themselves and that if those who fancy they have discover'd some Truths should seriously consider them they would be undeceiv'd as well as themselves And this is enough for them to condemn them without making any more particular Enquiry because if they did not condemn them it would be a kind of Confession that they were wiser than themselves a thing they cannot think very probable They look therefore upon those as Bigotted to their own Thoughts who give out any thing as certain and infallible Nor will they suffer a Man to talk of Sciences as of Evident Truths which cannot reasonably be doubted of but only as of Opinions of which it is good not to be ignorant Yet these Gentlemen would do well to consider that though they have read a great number of Books yet they have not read all or that they have not read them with all the Attention that was necessary to a perfect Understanding of them And that though they have had many fine Thoughts which they have found false in the Conclusion yet they have not had all that are possible and so 't is no improbable thing that others should have found better than themselves Nor is it necessary absolutely speaking that others should have greater Sense than they if that offends them for 't is enough to have had greater Fortune They need not be affronted to hear it said That others have Evident Knowledge of what they are Ignorant since we say at the same time that many Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths Not for want of excellent Wits but because these excellent Wits have not luckily fall'n upon them Let them not be angry therefore that a Man sees clearly and speaks as he sees but let them apply themselves to what is said to them if their Minds be still capable of Application after all their Excursions and then let them judge if they please But if they will not examine it let them hold their Tongue But I would have them reflect a little whether that Answer so readily made by them to most of the things demanded of them No body Vnderstands it No body knows how 't is done be not an injudicious Answer Since to answer so a Man must of necessity believe he knows all that all Men know or all that is possible to be known by them For had they not this Notion of themselves their Answer would be still more impertinent And why should they be so hard put to it to say they know nothing of them since in some particular junctures they acknowledge they know nothing at all And why must all Men be concluded Ignorant because they are inwardly convinc'd they are Ignorant themselves There are then three sorts of Persons that apply themselves to Study The first are such as are preposterously Bigotted to some Author or some insignificant or false Science The second are such as are prepossess'd and full with their own Fancies The last which usually proceed from the other two are such as Imagine they know all that is possible to be known and who fancying they know nothing with Certainty conclude universally that nothing can be Evidently known and regard all things that they hear as bear Opinions 'T is easie to be seen that all the Faults incident to these three sorts of Men depend on the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the X. and XI Chapters and especially of the First That all this is owing to Prejudice which choaks up their Minds and makes them insensible to all other Objects but those they are prepossess'd with It may be said that their Prejudices do in their Minds what the Ministers of Princes do in respect of their Masters for as these Gentlemen permit as little as possible any others than those of their own Party and Interest or such as are unable to displace them from their Master's Favour to come to the speech of them so the Prejudices of the former suffer not their Minds to take a full View of the pure and unmix'd Idea's of Objects But they disguise them they cloath them with their own Liveries and thus all mask'd and discolour'd present them to the Mind So that 't is next to impossible it should discover and throw off its Errors CHAP. IX I. Of Effeminate Minds II. Of Superficial Minds III. Of Men of Authority IV. Of the Experimental Philosophers I Have if
necessary for them to know we allow them to omit them and likewise to despise them but 't is not fair to judge of them out of a fanciful dislike and ill-grounded suspicions For they ought to consider that the Serious Air and Gravity wherewith they speak the Authority they have obtain'd over the Minds of others and that customary way of confirming their Discourse with a Text of Scripture must unavoidably engage in Error their respectful Auditors who being incapable of Examining things to the bottom are caught with Modes and external Appearances When Error comes cloath'd in the Dress of Truth it frequently has more respect than Truth it self And this illegitimate Respect has very dangerous Consequences Pessima res est Errorum Apotheosis pro peste intellectûs habenda est si vanis accedat veneratio Thus when some Men out of a false Zeal or a Fondness for their own Thoughts bring the Holy Scripture to countenance or support false Principles of Physicks or other of like Nature they are often attended to as Oracles by the admiring Crowd who credit them upon their word because of the Reverence they ascribe to Divine Authority When at the same time some Men of a worse Complection have taken occasion hereby to contemn Religion So that by strangely perverting its Nature Holy Scripture has been the Cause of some Men's Errors and Truth has been the Motive and Original to other's Impiety We should then be cautious says the fore-cited Author of searching after Dead things among the Living and of presuming by our own Sagacity of Mind to discover in the Holy Scriptures what the Holy Spirit has not thought fit to declare in it Ex Divinorum Humanorum malesanâ admixtionâ— continues he non solum educitur Philosophia phantastica sed etiam Religio haeretica Itaque salutare admodum est si mente sobriâ fidei tantum dentur quae fidei sunt All Men who have any Authority over others ought never to determine till they have so much the more seriously consider'd as their Determinations are more obstinately adher'd to and Divines should be more especially regardful lest they give scandal and contempt to Religion through a false Zeal by an ambitious desire of their own Fame and of giving Vogue to their Opinions But it being not my Business to prescribe to them their Duty let them hearken to St. Thomas Aquinas their Master who being consulted by his General for his Opinion touching some Points answers him in these words of St. Austin Multùm autem nocet talia quae ad pietatis doctrinam non spectant vel asserere vel negare quasi pertinentia ad Sacram doctrinam Dicit enim Augustinus in 5. Confess Cùm audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi de coelo aut stellis de Solis Lunae motibus dixerâ—nt nescientem aliud pro alio sentienâ—em patienter intueor opinantem hominem nec illi obesse video cum de te Domine Creator omnium nostrûm non credat indigna si fortè situs habitus creaturae corporalis ignoret Obest autem si haec ad ipsam dâ—ctrinam pietatis pertinere arbitretur pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat Quod autem obsit manifestat Augustinus in 1. super Genes Ad literam Turpe est inquit nimis perniciosum ac maximê cavendum ut Christianum de his rebus quasi secundum Christianas literas loquentem ita delirare quilibet infidelis audiat ut quemadmodum dicitur toto coelo errare conspiciens risum tenere vix possit Et non tamen molestum est quod errans homo videatur sed quod Authores nostri ab eis qui foris sunt talia sensisse creduntur cum magno eorum exitio de quorum salute satagimus tanquam indocti reprehenduntur atque respuuntur Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut hâ—â—c quae Philosophi communes senserunt nostrae fidei non repugnant neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata fidei licet aliquandò sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur neque sic â—sse neganda tanquam fidei contraria ne sapientibus hujus mundi contemnendi doctrinam fidei occasio praebeatur 'T is a dangerous thing positively to determine concerning matters that are not of Faith as if they were St. Austin is our Author for it in the fifth Book of his Confessions When I see says he a Christian who is un-instructed in the Opinions of Philosophers about the Heavens the Stars and the Motion of the Sun and Moon and who mistakes one thing for another I I leave him to his Opinions and Uncertainties Nor do I see what injury it can do him provided he has right Notions of Thee our LORD and CREATOR to be ignorant of the Site and Position of Bodies and the different Regulations of Material Beings But he does himself wrong in that he fancies these things concern Religion and takes upon him obstinately to affirm what he does not understand The same Holy Man explains his Thoughts more clearly yet in his first Book of the literal Exposition of Genesis in these Words A Christian should be extreamly cautious of speaking of these things as if they were the Doctrine of the Sacred Writings since an Heathen who should hear him utter his Absurdities that had no appearance of Truth would Ridicule him for it Thus the Christian would be put in confusion and the Heathen but ill-edify'd Yet that which on these occasions is matter of greatest trouble is not that a Man is found in an Error but that the Heathens whom we labour to convert falsely and to their unavoidable destruction imagining that our Authors abound with these ridiculous Notions condemn them and spurn them as Ignorant and Unlearned which makes me think it much the safer way not to affirm as the Maxims of Faith the common receiv'd Opinions of Philosophers though not inconsistent with them though the Authority of Philosophers may sometimes be us'd to make way for their reception nor to reject their Opinions as contrary to Faith lest occasion be given to the Wise Men of the World to contemn the Sacred Truths of the Christian Religion The generality of Men are so careless or unreasonable as to make no distinction between the Word of GOD and that of Men when joyn'd together So that they fall into Error by approving them both alike or into Irreligion by the contempt of both indifferently 'T is easie to see what is the Cause of these last Errors and how they depend upon the Connection of Idea's explain'd in the XI Chapter and I need not stand more largely to explain them It seems seasonable to say something here of the Chymists and of all those in general that imploy their time in making Experiments These are the Men that are in Search after Truth Their Opinions are usually embrac'd without Scruple and Examination And thus their Errors are so much the more dangerous as
they widely differ from some others who from an Abhorrence of Heresie having join'd the Idea of Novelty with that of Falsity imagine all New Opinions false and including something of dangerous Importance Thence it may be concluded That this customary Disposition of the Mind and Heart of Man in respect of all that bears the Character of Novelty is one of the most general Causes of their Errours It hardly ever conducts them to the Truth but when it does 't is purely by Chance and good Luck and it constantly obviates their Possession of their True Good by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and falsly seeming Goods the World is fill'd with which is the most dangerous Errour Man can fall into The Third Rule against the excessive Desires of Novelty is That when we are otherwise assur'd that some Truths lie so deep that 't is morally impossible to discover them and that some Goods are so little and slender that they cannot make us happy the Novelty of them ought not to excite our Curiosity Every one may know by Faith Reason and Experience That all created Goods are notable to fill the infinite Capacity of the Will We are taught by Faith that all worldly things are Vanity and that our Happiness consists neither in Riches nor Honours Reason assures us that since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires and that we are carried by a Natural Inclination to the loving all Goods that we cannot become Happy but by possessing HIM who contains them all Our own Experience makes us sensible that we are not Happy in the Possession of the Goods we enjoy because we are still desirous of others Lastly We daily see that the mighty Goods which Princes and the most Potent Kings enjoy on Earth are incapable of filling their Desires That they have even more Disturbances and Troubles than other Men and that being on the highest Point of Fortune's Wheel they must be infinitely more shaken and agitated by its Motion than those which sit lower and nearer its Axis For in short they never fall but 't is from a Precipice they receive no little Wounds and all that Grandeur which attends them and which they incorporate with their own Being only enlarges and extends them that they may receive a greater Number of Wounds and be more expos'd to the Insults and Blows of Fortune Faith Reason and Experience thus assuring us that earthly Goods and Pleasures which we have never tasted could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them special Care ought to be taken according to the Third Rule to supersede being flatter'd with the vain Hope of Felicity which Hope insensibly increasing proportionably to our Passions and Desires will at last end in a false Confidence and an ill-grounded Assurance For when we are extreamly passionate for any Good we always imagine it excessively great and by degrees persuade our selves we shall be happy in the Enjoyment These vain Desires then must be resisted since to try to satisfie them would be a fruitless Attempt But especially for this Reason that when we give way to our Passions and spend our Time to afford them Satisfaction we lose GOD and all things with him we only run from one seeming Good to another live always in false Hopes distract and agitate our selves a thousand ways and meet with perpetual Oppositions and frustrations because the desired Goods are sought but can't be possess'd by many at once and at last we die and can enjoy nothing more For as we are taught by St. Paul They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare and into many foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition for the love of money is the root of all evil But if we ought not to be sollicitous for the Goods of the Earth which are new to us as being certain that the Happiness we are in search of is not to be found in them much less ought we to desire to know the new Opinions about a vast many difficult Questions as being otherwise convinc'd that an humane Mind can never discover the truth of them Most of the Questions treated of in Morals and Physicks are of that nature which may afford us Reason to suspect the generality of those Books we see daily compos'd upon very obscure and most perplexing Subjects For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain are solvable yet so few Truths being hitherto discover'd and so many to be known before we can come to those that are handled in these Books they cannot be read without hazarding to lose much by them But yet this is not the Method that is taken but the quite contrary Men examine not whether what is said be possible Promise them only extraordinary things as the Restitution of Natural Heat Radical Moisture Vital Spirits or other Unintelligible Matters and you excite their vain Curiosity and prepossess them 'T is enough to dazle them and win their Assent to offer them Paradoxes to make use of obscure Words Terms of Influence or the Authority of some unknown Authors or to make some very sensible and unusual Experiment though it have no reference to the thing advanc'd For Confusion is Conviction to some sorts of People If a Physician a Chirurgeon or an Empirick quote but some Greek and Latin Sentences and talk to their Hearers in new and extraordinary Terms they take them for Great Men they give them the Prerogative of Life and Death and believe them as they would an Oracle They imagine themselves too that they are elevated to a pitch above the common size and pierce to the bottom of things And if one happen to be so indiscreet as to testifie that five or six insignificative Words that prove nothing will not go down for Reason they think a Man void of Common-sense and that he denies First Principles And indeed these Gentlemen's First Principles are five or six Latin Words of an Author or some Greek Passage if they have greater Abilities It is even necessary for skilful Physicians to talk sometimes in an unknown Tongue to their Patients to purchase Reputation and to make themselves attended to A Physician who can go no farther than Latin may pass well enough in a Country Parish because Latin is Greek and Arabick to the Illiterate But if a Physician cannot at least read Greek â—o learn some Aphorism of Hypocrates he must not expect to pass for a Scholar with the Inhabitants of a City who commonly understand Latin And so the most Learned amongst them knowing this Humour of the World are forc'd to talk like Cheats and Quacks and we are not always to take an Estimate of their Parts and Learning from the Discourse they have in their Visits CHAP. V. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-love II. The Division of it into Love of Being and of Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure THE Second Inclination which the Author of Nature
management of Life that 's too trite and vulgar it not being their purpose to be useful to others or themselves but only to be reputed Learned They either alledge no Reasons of things which they advance or if they do they are so mysterious and incomprehensible as neither themselves nor any body else can evidently conceive Clear Reasons they have none but if they had they would not use them because they surprize not the Mind are thought too simple and common and suited to the Abilities of all Mankind They rather bring Authorities to prove or with pretence to prove their Notions for the Authorities employ'd seldom prove any thing by the Sense they contain but only by being Greek and Arabick But perhaps it will be pertinent to speak something of their Quotations which will acquaint us in part with the disposition of their Mind It is methinks manifest that nothing but a falsly-term'd Learning and a Spirit of Polimathy could bring these Citations into fashion as they have formerly been and are still at this day with some of the Learned For 't is usual with some Authors to be perpetually quoting long Sentences without any Reason for it whether because the things they advance are too clear to be doubted of or that they are too intricate and obscure to be made out by the Authority of their Authors since they could know nothing of them or lastly because the Citations inserted are inserviceable to adorn and beautifie their Discourse 'T is repugnant to common Sense to bring a Greek Passage to prove the Air transparent because 't is evident to all the World to employ the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that Intelligences move the Heavens because we are certain Aristotle could not know it and lastly to mingle strange Languages Arabian and Persian Proverbs with French English or Latin Books written for every body forasmuch as these Citations cannot be ornamental at least are such fantastical Ornaments as disgust most Persons and can satisfie but very few Nevertheless the greatest part of those who would fain be thought Learned are so extreamly pleas'd with this kind of Giâ—â—rish that they blush not to quote in strange Tongues which they do not understand and tug might and main to draw into their Books an Arabick Passage which they cannot so much as read Thus they puzzle themselves strangely to effect a thing repugnant to good Sense but that sacrifices to their Vanity and makes them esteem'd by Soâ—s One very considerable Fault is still behind which is that they are but in little care to seem to have read with Choice and Judgment all they desire being to be reckon'd great Readers especially of obscure Books that they may seem more Learned of Books that are scarce and dear that they may be thought to have every thing of wicked and impious Books which honest Men are afraid to read with much the same Spirit as some boast to have acted Crimes which others dare not Hence they rather cite very Dear very Rare very Ancient and Obscure Books than other more Common and Intelligible Astrological Cabalistical and Magical Books than such as are good and wholesome as if they did not see that Reading being a kind of Conversing they should rather desire to seem industriously to have sought the Acquaintance of Good and Intelligible than Wicked and Obscure Authors For as no Man in his Senses would chuse out for ordinary Converse People that want an Interpreter when the same things that are to be learn'd of them might be known another way so 't is ridiculous to read Books not to be understood without a Dictionary when the same things may be had in those that are more intelligible And as it is a sign of a deprav'd Nature to affect the Company and Conversation of the Impious so 't is the Criterion of a corrupt Heart to delight in reading Wicked Books But 't is an extravagant Pride for a Man to pretend to have read those which he has not which yet is a thing of very common occurrence For we find Men of Thirty Years standing quote more ill Books in their Works than they could have read in many Ages whilst they would have others believe they have very exactly read them But most of the Books of some of these Learned Gentlemen owe their Birth to the kind Dictionary and all their Reading may be reduc'd to the Indexes of the Books they quote and some Common Places heap'd together from out of different Authors I venture not to enter into the Particulars of these things nor to give Instances to prove them for fear of provoking Persons so fierce and cholerick as these Learned Pretenders as not caring to be revil'd in Greek and Arabick Besides that 't is needless more sensibly to evince what I have said by particular Allegations the Mind of Man being ready enough to tax the Management of others and make particular Application of this Discourse In the mean time let them hug themselves and feed upon this vain Fantom of Greatness and give one another the Applauses which we deny them For we have been perhaps already too troublesome by molesting them in their so seemingly sweet and grateful Enjoyments CHAP. IX How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Errour HOnours and Riches no less than Vertue and Science which we have already spoke of are principal Acquirements to give us the Ascendant over other Men. For there seems to accrue to our Being a Growth and Enlargement and kind of Independency from the Possession of these Advantages So that the Love we have for our selves naturally streaming out to Honours and Riches every body may be said to have some sort of Inclination for them We will explain in brief how these Inclinations obviate the Discovery of Truth and engage us in Falshood and Errour It has been shewn in several places that much Time and Labour Assiduity and Contention of Mind must go to the clearing up Compound Truths surrounded with Difficulties and depending on many Principles Whence it is easie to conclude that Men of publick Characters of great Employments who have large Estates to look after and great Affairs to manage and whose Hearts are fix'd upon Riches and Honours are not the fittest Enquirers after Truth and that they commonly err in point of all things difficultly known whenever they pretend to judge of them And that because First They have little time to lay out in the Search of Truth Secondly They take but little Pleasure in this Search Thirdly They are very incapable of Attention because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Ideas of the things they wish for which take up their Thoughts whether they will or no. In the fourth place They fancy they know every thing and can hardly be induc'd to believe their Inferiours have more Reason than themselves some Matters of Fact they may vouchsafe to learn of them but are above being taught by them solid and
Proof is this We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it This is the General Principle of all the Sciences Necessary Existence is included in the Idea that represents a Being Infinitely Perfect They willingly grant it and consequently we must conclude that an Infinitely Perfect Being exists Allow'd say they on Supposition that this Being Exists But let us make a like Answer to a like Argument that we may judge of the solidity of their Answer A like Argument is this We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it This is the Principle We clearly conceive four Angles to be included in the Idea which represents a Square or we clearly conceive possible Existence to be included in the Idea of a Marble Tower Therefore a Square has four Angles therefore a Marble Tower is possible I say these Conclusions are true supposing a Square has four Angles and that a Marble Tower is possible just as they answer That GOD exists supposing he exists that is in short that the Conclusions of these Demonstrations are true supposing they are true 'T is true should I form such an Argument as this We must attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that represents it we clearly conceive necessary Existence to be included in the Idea of a Body Infinitely Perfect Therefore an Infinitely Perfect Body exists Should I form such an Argument I say I might reasonably be answer'd that it was inconcluding for the actual Existence of a Body Infinitely Perfect and that all it could inferr was this That supposing such a Body was in Being it would have an independent Existence The Reason whereof is this that the Idea of a Body Infinitely Perfect is a Fiction of the Mind or a compos'd Idea and which consequently may be either false or contradictory as indeed it is For we cannot clearly conceive a Body Infinitely Perfect because a Being particular and finite as Body is cannot be conceiv'd Universal and Infinite But the Idea of GOD of Being in General Unlimited Infinite Being is no Fiction of the Mind 'T is not a compos'd Idea that includes any Contradiction there is nothing more simple though it comprehends whatever is or whatever may be Now this Simple and Natural Idea of Being or of Infinite includes necessary Existence For 't is evident that Being I say not this or that Being has its Existence of it self and that Being connot be actually inexistent since 't is impossible and contradictory that true Being should be without Existence 'T is possible for Bodies not to be because they are such particular Beings which participate of Being and depend on it But Being without Restriction is necessary independent and derives what it is only from it self all that is proceeds from it and on that account it self is whatever is But were there not any thing in particular this would be because it is from it self and it could not be clearly conceiv'd as not Being were it not for our representing it as Being in particular or such a Being and our considering quite another Idea than belong'd to it For those that perceive not that GOD is commonly consider not Being but this or that Being and consequently a Being that may or may not exist However in order to make this Argument of the Existence of a GOD more distinctly conceiv'd and to give a clearer Answer to some Objections that might be made to it we must remember that in perceiving a created Being we see it not in it self nor by it self but as has been prov'd in the Third Book by the View of certain Perfections that are in GOD representing it So that the Essence of that Creature may be seen without seeing its Existence we may see in GOD what represents it though it does not exist And for the Reason necessary Existence is not included in the Idea that represents it it not being necessary that it exist in order to our seeing it But the Case is different with the Infinitely Perfect Being we can't see him but in himself For nothing Finite can represent what 's Infinite GOD therefore cannot be seen but he must exist The Essence of a Being Infinitely Perfect cannot be seen without seeing its Existence We cannot see it barely as a possible Being For what is there to contain it Nor can we thing of it but it must exist But 't is to no purpose to offer these Demonstrations to the Common sort of People These are Demonstrations which we call Personal because they convince not Universally If we would convince them we must apply such as are of a more sensible Nature and surely they are plentiful enough For there is no Truth that has more Proofs than that of the Existence of a GOD. This we urg'd only to shew that Abstract Truths making little Impression on our Senses pass for Illusions and Chimeras Whereas gross and palpable Truths that strike the Senses forcing the Soul to consider them induces us to believe they have much Reality because ever since the Fall they have made powerful Impressions on our Mind For the same Reason 't is never to be hop'd that the Vulgar of Men will ever submit to that Demonstration which proves Brutes to be insensible namely that since they are innocent as all the World allows and I suppose if they were capable of Sensation it might happen that under an Infinitely Just and Omnipotent GOD an Innocent Creature might suffer Pain which is a Penalty and the Punishment of some Sin Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom Sub justo Deo quisquam nisi mereatur miser esse non potest which St. Austin with a great deal of Reason urges against Julian to prove Original Sin and the Corruption of our Nature They fancy there is nothing of Strength or Truth in this nor in many other Axioms which prove that Beasts have no Sensation because as has been said these Axioms are Abstract have nothing sensible or palpable in them and make no Impression on the Senses Those sensible Actions and Motions perform'd by Beasts for the Preservation of their Life though only probable Inducements affect us more and consequently weigh more with us to believe they endure Pain when we strike them and they cry than that abstract Reason of Pure Intellect though most certain and evident in it self For 't is plain that most Men have no other Reason to believe that Beasts have Souls than the sensible View of all those things they do for the Preservation and Security of Life Which from hence is sufficiently apparent that most People fancy there is no Soul in an Egg though the Transmutation of an Egg into a Chicken is infinitely harder than the bare Conservation of the Chicken when compleatly form'd For as greater Art is requir'd to fabrick a Watch out of a piece of
Simple or Compound But I have not oblig'd my self to account for all the different Motions whereof the Mind is capable I am willing to have it known that my principal Design in all the foregoing Treatise concerning the Search after Truth was to make Men sensible how weak and ignorant they are and how subject to Errour and Sin I have said it and I say it again perhaps it will be remembred I had never design'd a Thorough particular Explication of the Nature of the Mind but I have been oblig'd to say something of it to lay open its Errours in their Principle to unfold them methodically in a Word to make my self intelligible If I have transgress'd the Bounds I had prescrib'd my self â—t was because I had methought new things to say which seem'd of moment and which I believ'd might be read with Pleasure Perhaps I was mistaken but that Presumption was necessary â—o encourage me to write them For who would say any thing if he did not hope to be attended to I have said it 's true several things which seem to have less Analogy with the present Subject than would be the particular Treatment of the Motions of the Soul and I acknowledge it But 't is not my Intention to put my self under any Constraint when I propose to my self a Method I lay down a Rule to go by but I presume it may be permitted me to turn aside as I walk when any thing falls in my way to be consider'd I presume too I have the Liberty of diverting to a Resting Place provided I lose not Sight of the Road I am to pursue Such as will not ease themselves with me may go on if they please 't is but turning to a new Page But if they take it amiss I would let them know that there are many who find that the Resting Places I have made choice of make their Journey easier and more pleasant The End of the First Volume PREFACE to the Second Volume Which may serve as an Answer to the ANIMADVERSIONS on the First SOme time since was publish'd a Book entituled Animadversions upon the Search after Truth wherein at the same time are examin'd part of M. des Cartes 's Principles being a Letter by an Academick in Paris c. 'T is said this Book attacks me and truly not without Reason for the Title shews it and the Author manifests it was his Design which gives me a Right and imposes on me a sort of Obligation of speaking my Thoughts of it For besides that I ought to disabuse some people who delight in these petty Quarrels and immediately determine on the side of the Criticks that gratifie their Passion I think my self bound to give some Answer to the Aggressor that I may not be thought to be â—ilent out of Insolence or Impotence The Animadverter may pardon me if he pleases if I sometimes seem to give him Provocation I should be very sorry so much as to design it But I cannot defend my self without wounding him nor repell the Blows he makes at me without making him feel and others know his Weakness and Imbecillity Self-defence is a natural Obligation but the Defence of Truth is absolutely indispensible See here in short his Design He supposes the Book he animadverts on is a Method for laying the Foundations of the Sciences He reduces this Method to fourteen Heads and shews that they are either Suppositions without Proof or Assertioâ—s without Foundation and consequently that the Substance of the Book is intirely useless to the Enquiry after Truth though there are here and there some Observations in it that place it in the rank of Works which have gain'd the Estimation of our Age. I answer in General that the Author of the Animadversions has not understood or has dissembled the Understanding the Design of the Book he impungs it being plain that the principal Design of it is to discover the Errours we are subject to 'T is true it treats of the Nature of the Senses Imagination and Intellect but 't is manifest and I precaution in several places that this is only to discover these Errours in their Causes This being the Method I always endeavour to observe as believing it most advantageous to the enlightning the Mind The Title of the first Page of the Book he opposes wherein are to be seen in Capitals CONCERNING THE ERROURS OF THâ— SENSES the very Table of the same Book or rather the Place where I make the Division of the whole Work might have taught him my Design if he had desir'd to know it where he might have read these words which methinks are clear enough And so all the Errours of Men and the Causes of them may be reduc'd to five Heads and we shall treat of them according to that order First We shall speak of the Errours of the SENSES Secondly Of the Errours of IMAGINATION Thirdly Of the Errours of the PURE INTELLECT Fourthly Of the Errours of our INCLINATIONS And fifthly Of the Errours of the PASSIONS And thus having made an Essâ—y to rid the Soul of the Errours which she is subject to WE SHALL Lastly LAY DOWN A GENERAL METHOD TO CONDUCT HER IN THE SEARCH OF TRUTH 'T is plain enough from this Division that the first Volume which is the subject of our Aâ—thor's Animadversions treats only of the Senses Imagination and Intellect and that the Method which he supposes I have given ought to be the Subject of the Second Volume Nevertheless as he is pleased to make me undertake a Design I do not execute that he may have the more to Charge upon my Conduct so he goes to prove it was my Design to lay down a Method in that Book I do him no Injury says he in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundations of the Sciences For besides that the Title expresses so much he declares himself upon the Point in the following manner Let us examaine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice I do a Man no Injury when I say he designs to draw an Hercules but if I shew that instead of an Hercules he takes a Polyphemus or Thersites I make him ridiculous Should I say with many others that the Animadverter is a Cartesian or that he designed by his Animadversions on my Book to defend the Doctrine of Des Cartes I should not wrong him but if at the same time I should shew that he opposes me without understanding me I should possibly offend him 'T is then injuring a Man to charge upon him Designs which he never had to render him ridiculous But a Man must be wretchedly in the wrong who imposes them on such as have like me in several places explain'd themselves clearly upon
have nothing to say to his Tenth Chapter but that what he comments on seems too clear to stand in need of his Reflexions and that I think it cannot reasonably be doubted there is a City in Italy call'd Rome though it cannot be mathematically demonstrated In the eleventh Chapter the Author does not observe that I have referred to some Books of St. Austin and the Meditations of Mr. des Cartes to prove a thing which yet is sufficiently receiv'd and which he pretends I had no right to suppose He ought to know my Design was not to establish a System and to remember that all I vigorously demand is to enter into some diffidence of our Senses as I have caution'd in the last Chapter concerning the Errours of the Senses In answer to the Consequences he infers in his Twelfth Chapter against an Example alleadg'd by me and which he will have to pass for an Head of my Method we need but say that Men ought to reason only upon their clear and distinct Ideas whithout being sollicitous about what they cannot reach and that 't is not necessary to know whether there are actually Bodies without us to conclude many Physical Truths I have no more to say to his Thirteenth Chapter but that I wish a Man would attentively read what I have said concerning the manner of our knowing the Soul in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book and the Chapter following where I speak of the Essence of Matter Last of all to do justice to the Reasonings of the last Chapter it suffices to know distinctly my manner of explaining how we see external Objects This is all I thought necessary to answer to the Animadverter as being persuaded that those who thoroughly conceive my Notion will have no need of an Illustration upon the pretended Difficulties he urges to me and others who have not read nor comprehended the things I treat of in the Book he opposes would not understand the largest Answers I could give them 'T is sufficiently manifest from the three first Chapters of the Animadversions which I have refuted more at large what we are to think of the other which I have answerd in a word or two Those who have Time and Inclination may examine them more exactly but for my own part I should think I wasted both my own time and that of others if I should stay to collect all the Paralogisms which are scatter'd through his Book to acquaint those persons with them who doubtless have little or no desire to know them The Reason and Judgment of worthy Men cannot suffer those long-winded Discourses which tend to no good but onely shew the Spleen and ill Humour of their Authors and 't is a ridiculous thing to imagine that others interess themselves in our Quarrels and to call them to be Witnesses of the weakness and vain efforts of our Adversary He that attacks me has no reason to find fault with my manner of Defence for if I answer not all his Animadversions in an ample way 't is not because I despise him He may conclude that I should not have warded off the Blows he design'd me if I did not think him able to hurt me and I think I have more reason to complain of the negligence of his Animadverting than he has to be angry at my manner of answering him Had our Author zealously buckled to engage me I am persuaded he had found me Exercise for I judge not of the Strength of his Parts by a venturous Sally of his Pen which he seems only to make by way of Pastime Thus the negligence he manifests is to my advantage and for my part I complain not of his remisness as being unworthy his Application and his Anger All that I am sorry for is that he speaks not seriously of serious things that he sports with Truth and wants some of that Respect which is due to the Publick when he trys to over-wit it several different ways as this Answer in part has manifested If I have been oblig'd to speak of him as I have done on some occasions he must thank no body but himself for I have suppress'd for fear of displeasing him many Expressions and Thoughts which his manner of acting breeds naturally in the Mind I have so great an Aversion to all useless Conâ—ests and that are prejudicial to Charity that I will never answer those who oppose me without understanding me or whose Discourses give me some reason to believe they have some other motive than the Love of Truth As for others I shall endeavour to satisfie them I see plainly that if I were oblig'd to answer all that have the good Will of assaulting me I should scarce ever enjoy the repose I desire But as there is no Law in France which hinders them from speaking so there is none which forbids me to be silent It may be whilst I am silent my Insulters may find themselves ill treated by some invisible hand for I cannot help it if the Love of Truth provokes some Wits who might do it with better Grace to defend a Work in which they had no part But I wish this promise I make and freely without any constraint may be remembred and that those Writings may not be imputed to me which I might make but which I declare I never will Mean-time I think that those that have nothing solid to oppose to me had much better say nothing than fatigue the World with Writings which break Charity and are useless to the discovery of Truth ANSWER a 'T IS because this is more certain than any thing else and that there is nothing certain if this be not For if Two times Two are necessarily equal to Four if a Whole be necessarily bigger than its Part there are necessary Truths I know not for what reason the Animadverter would have me think of proving what cannot be prov'd unless by something more obscure and difficult This is not to Philosophize after the manner of the ancient Academy b This is curious and far fetch'd All the first Philosophers except Parmenides have denied there were necessary and contingent Truths What wonder is it 'T is a fine thing this Erudition certainly Meditation can never teach us what we learn from the reading the Ancients though we understand them but by halves But 't is visible that our Author understands the old Philosophers no better than the new c I say indeed that ought to make a Question apart but he will let it have no part d The demand is pleasant but the Author would not have made it if he had but read the Third Book of the Search after Truth since I have there clearly given my Thoughts upon these things But it seems our Author takes Truths for certain little Beings which are born and die every Moment e There are two sorts of immutable Truths Some are immutable of themselves or by their Nature as that twice Two are Four and others
Conditions might be fully treated of in general yet they are too well known by those that are conversant with the World and of all the thinking part of Mankind to increase with them the Bulk of this Book especially seeing that our Eyes may afford us a very pleasant and solid Instruction of all such matters But if any chuse to read them in Greek rather than to learn them by his own reflection on what he sees I refer him to the second Book of the Rhetoricks of Aristotle which I take to be the Master-Piece of that Philosopher because he says there few things in which he can be mistaken and that he seldom ventures to prove what he asserts It is therefore evident that the sensible Union of the Mind of Men with whatever has any Relation to the preservation of their Life or of the Society of which they are Members differs in different Persons reaching farther in those that have more Knowledge that are in a higher Station and are indued with a larger Fancy whereas that Union is stricter and stronger in those that are more sensible that have a livelyer Imagination and have more blindly given up themselves to the violence of their Passions Such Considerations upon the almost infinite Bands that fasten Men to sensible Objects are of an extraordinary Use and the best way to become a great proficient in this sort of Learning is the study and observation of our selves since from the Inclinations and Passions of which we are conscious in our selves we can be fully assur'd of all the inclinations of other Men and can make a good guess at a great part of the Passions they are subject to to which adding the Information we can get of their particular Exgagements and of the different Judgments that follow from every different Passion of which we shall speak hereafter it may perhaps not prove so hard a Task to guess most part of their Actions as it is for an Astronomer to foretell an Eclipse For though Men be free yet it seldom happens that they make use of their Liberty in opposition to their natural Inclinations and violent Passions Before the Close of this Chapter I must observe that it is one of the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body that all the Inclinations of the Soul even those she has for Goods that have no relation to the Body should be attended with Commotions of the Animal Spirits that render those Inclinations sensible because Man being not a pure Spirit it is impossible he should have any Inclination altogether pure and without mixture of any Passion whatsoever So that the love of Truth Justice Vertue of God himself is always attended by some Motion of the Animal Spirits that render that love sensible though we be not aware of their sensibility being then taken up with livelyer Sensations Just as the Knowledge of Spiritual things is always accompanied with traces on the Brain which indeed make that Knowledge more lively but commonly more confused 'T is true we are frequently inapprehensive of the Imagining Faculty's mixing in any manner with the Conception of an abstracted Truth The Reason of it is that those Truths are not represented by Images or traces of Nature's Institution and that all the traces that raise such Ideas have no Relation with them but such as proceeds from Chance or the Free-will of Men. For Instance Arithmeticians and Algebraists who apply themselves to very abstracted Objects make however a very great use of their Imagination in order to fix the view of their Mind upon these Spiritual Ideas The Cyphers the Letters of the Alphabet and the other Figures which they see or imagine are always join'd to those Ideas though the traces that are wrought by these Characters have no proper Relation to those abstracted Objects and so can neither change nor obscure them Whence follows that by a proper Use and Application of these Cyphers and Letters they come to discover such remote and difficult Truths as could not be found out otherwise Since therefore the Ideas of such things as are only perceivable by the pure Understanding can be connected with the traces of the Brain and that the sight of Objects that are beloved hated or fear'd by a Natural Inclination can be attended with the Motion of the Animal Spirits it plainly appears that the thoughts of Eternity the fear of Hell the hope of an Eternal Happiness though they be Objects never so insensible can however raise in us very violent Passions And therefore we can say that we are united in a sensible manner not only to such things as relate to the preservation of our Life but also to Spiritual things with which the Mind is immediately and by it self united And even it often happens that Faith Charity and Self-Love make that Union with Spiritual things stronger than that by which we are join'd to all sensible Objects The Soul of the true Martyrs is more united to God than to their Body and those that suffer Death for asserting a false Religion which they believe to be true give us sufficiently to know that the fear of Hell has more power upon them than the fear of Death There is for the most part so much heat and obstinacy on both sides in the Wars of Religion and the defence of Superstitions that it cannot be doubted but some Passion has a hand in it and even a Passion far stronger and stedfaster than others because it is kept up by an Appearance of Reason both in such as are deceived and in those that follow the Truth We are then united by our Passions to whatever seems to be the Good or the Evil of the Mind as well as to that which we take for the Good or Evil of the Body Whatever can be known to have any relation to us can affect us and of all the things we know there is not one but it has some reference or other to us We are somewhat concern'd even for the most abstracted Truths when we know them because there is at least that Relation of Knowledge betwixt them and our Mind and that in some manner we look on them as our Property by virtue of that Knowledge We feel our selves as wounded when they are impugned and if we be wounded then surely we are affected and disturb'd So that the Passions have such a vast and comprehensive Dominion that it is impossible to conceive any thing in reference to which it may be said that Men are exempt from their Empire But let 's now see what is their Nature and endeavour to discover whatever they comprehend CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the Changes happening either to the Body or Soul in every Passion SEven things may be distinguished in each of our Passions save Admiration only which is indeed but an Imperfect Passion The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object or rather the confused or distinct View of the Relation that Object has to
may dissipate their Errours yet their Imagination being disorder'd by Fear and their Heart corrupted by Hatred and false Zeal those Reasons how solid soever they might be could not long stop the impetuous Stream of those violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing Proofs For we ought to observe that there are transitory Passions which never return whereas there are others that are constant and permanent Those that are not kept up by the sight of the Mind but are only produced and fortified by the sensible View of an Object and the Fermentation of the Blood are not lasting but commonly die soon after their Birth whereas those that are associated with the Contemplation of the Mind are steady because the Principle that produces them is not subject to change as Blood and Humours are So that Hatred Fear and all other Passions that are excited or preserved by the Knowledge of the Mind and not raised by the sensible View of Evil must needs be durable and withal very violent and unjust However those Passions are not the most lively and sensible as we shall now shew The Perception of Good and Evil which raises the Passions is produced Three ways by the Senses by the Imagination and by the Mind By way of the Senses it produces very quick and sensible Passions by way of the Imagination much weaker but those which proceed from the Perception of Good and Evil by the Mind alone are true Passions on no other account than as that View of Good and Evil is always attended by some Motion of the Animal Spirits Passions are only given us for the good of the Body and for uniting us by it to sensible Things For though sensible Things are neither good nor bad in reference to the Mind yet they are so in relation to the Body to which the Mind is united So that the Senses and Imagination discovering much better than the Mind the Relation of sensible Objects to our Body must needs raise Passions far livelier than a clear and evident Knowledge But because our Knowledge is always attended with some Commotion of the Spirits a clear and evident Knowledge of a great Good or a great Evil not to be discover'd by the Senses always raises some secret Passion However all clear and evident Knowledge of any Good or Evil is not always followed with a sensible and perceptible Passion as all our Passions are not accompanied with an intellectual Knowledge For as we sometimes think upon Good or Evil without being conscious of any Commotion so we often feel our selves agitated with Passion without knowing or sometimes without being sensible of the Cause A Man that sucks in a good Air is affected with Joy and knows not why nor what sort of Good he enjoys that produces it And if some invisible Corpuscle mixes with his Blood and hinders its Fermentation he is taken with Sorrow and may even ascribe the Cause of it to something visible that offers it self to him in the time of his Passion Of all Passions none are more sensible nor quick and consequently less mingled with Knowledge than Horrour and Antipathy Agreeableness and Sympathy A Man sleeping under the Shadow of a Tree often starts up when a Fly stings him or a Leaf tickles him as though a Serpent had bitten him The confused Sense of a Thing as terrible as Death it self frightens him and he finds himself surpriz'd with a very strong and violent Passion which is an Aversion of Desire before he bethinks himself On the contrary a Man in want discovers by chance some small Good the Sweetness of which surprizes him and he is inconsiderately taken up with that Trifle as though it were the greatest Good in the World without making any Reflection on it The same happens in the Motions of Sympathy and Antipathy We see in a Company a Person whose Deportment and Manners have some secret Agreeableness to the present Disposition of our Body so his Sight pierces and strikes us and we are inclined without Reflection to love and wish him well Thus we are agitated by I don't know what since Reason has no Share in it The contrary befals those whose Aspect and Looks shed as it were Disgust and Aversion They have I know not what that offends and puts us back for the Mind understands nothing in it the Senses only are competent Judges of sensible Beauty and Ugliness which are the Objects of those kinds of Passions F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH BOOK VI. Concerning METHOD CHAP. I. The Design of this Book Two general Ways for the Preserving Evidence in the Search of Truth which shall be the Subject of this Tract WE have seen in the foregoing Books that the Mind of Man is very obnoxious to Errour that the Deceptions of his Senses the Visions of his Imagination and the Abstractions of his Mind lead him into frequent Mistakes that the Inclinations of his Will and the Passions of his Heart almost ever conceal the Truth from him and never suffer it to appear without being tinged with those false Colours that flatter Concupiscency In short we have partly discover'd the Errours of the Mind with their Causes Now 't is time we should shew the Way that leads to the Knowledge of Truth and give the Mind all the possible Skill and Strength to walk therein without straying or wearying it self in vain But to spare the Readers an unprofitable Labour we think fit to advise them this Last Book is only made for such as earnestly desire to seek the Truth by themselves and to make use of the Force of their own Mind for that purpose I require them to despise for a while all probable Opinions to wave the strongest Conjectures to neglect the Authority of all the Philosophers to free themselves as far as possible from all Prejudice Interest and Passion to enter into an extreme Mistrust of their Senses and Imagination In a word well to remember the greatest part of the Things that have been said in the former Books I attempt in this last Book to give the Mind all the Perfection it can naturally attain to by supplying it with the necessary Helps to become more attentive and enlarg'd and prescribing it those Rules that must be observed in the Inquiry after Truth that it may never mistake but learn in time whatever can be known Could I carry this Design to its utmost Perfection which I pretend not this being but an Essay towards it I might boast to have found out an Universal Science which would make those truly learned that knew how to make use of it since they would have the Foundation of all the particular Sciences which they would acquire proportionably as they should make use of that Universal Science For by this Treatise we endeavour to render the Mind capable of passing a true and certain Judgment upon all the Questions that are not beyond its reach
the Resolution of Questions of little Use the Knowledge whereof commonly more gratifies our Pride than perfects our Understanding I think it my Duty to say that I may profitably conclude this Work that the most expeditious and certain Method of discovering Truth and uniting our selves to God in the purest and perfectest manner possible is to live as becomes true Christians to follow exactly the Precepts of Eternal Truth which unites it self with us only to re-unite us with it 'T is to listen rather to the Dictates of our Faith than Reason and to tend to God not so much by our natural Forces which since the Sin are altogether languid and inactive as by the Assistance of Faith by which alone God purposes to lead us into that immense Light of Truth which will dissolve and dissipate all our Darkness For in brief 't is much better as good Men to spend some Years in Ignorance of certain Things and find our selves enlighten'd in a Moment for ever than by Natural Means and abundance of Trouble and Application purchase a very imperfect Science that shall leave us in Darkness to all Eternity ILLUSTRATIONS UPON THE FOREGOING BOOKS The PREFACE Wherein is shewn what should be our Opinion of the several Judgments commonly pass'd on Books that encounter Prejudices WHen a BOOK is first to appear in the World one knows not whom to consult to learn its Destiny The Stars preside not over its Nativity their Influences have no Operation on it and the most confident Astrologers dare not foretell the diverse Risks of Fortune it must run Truth not being of this World Celestial Bodies have no power over her and whereas she is of a most spiritual Nature the several Positions or Combinations of Matter can contribute nothing either to her Establishment or Ruine Besides the Judgments of Men are so different in respect of the same things that we can never more hazardously and imprudently play the Prophet than in presaging the happy or unfortunate Success of a BOOK So that every Man who ventures to be an Author at the same time throws himself at the Reader 's Mercy to make him or esteem him what he pleases But of all Authors those who encounter Prejudices ought most infallibly to reckon upon their Condemnation their Works â—it too uneasie on most Mens Minds and if they escape the Passions of their Enemies they are obliged to the almighty Force of Truth for their Protection 'T is a common Miscarriage with all Mankind to be too precipitate in judging for all Men are obnoxious to Errour and only obnoxious upon this account But all hasty and rash Judgments are ever consonant to Prejudices and therefore Authors who oppugn them cannot possibly escape Sentence from all their Judges who appeal to Ancient Opinions as the Laws whereby they ought to pronounce For indeed most Readers are both Judge and Party in respect of these Authors Their Judges they are that Quality is incontestable but they are a Party likewise being disturb'd by these Authors in the possession of their ancient Prejudices for which they have the plea of Prescription and to which they have been accustom'd many Years I confess there 's Abundance of Equity Sincerity and good Sense in a great many Readers and that they sometimes are Judges rational enough to supersede common Opinions as not being the infallible Rules of Truth Many there are who retire into themselves and consult that Inward Truth which ought to be their Rule to judge of all things but very Few that consult it upon all Occasions and None at all who do it with all that Faithfulness and Attention that is necessary to judge infallibly at all times And thus though we might suppose there were nothing blameable in a Treatise which yet it would be Vanity to pretend to I am persuaded it would be impossible to find one single Man to approve it in every respect especially if his Prejudices were attacked by it since it is not naturally possible that a Judge constantly provok'd affronted and outrag'd by a Party should do him entire Justice or that he should give himself the trouble of a strenuous Application to those Reasons which at first sight appear to him as extravagant Parodoxes or ridiculous Parolâ—gisms But though a Man be pleased with many things in a BOOK if he fortunes to meet with some that are offensive he shall seldom be wanting to speak ill of it but most commonly forgetfull to give it any good Character Self-love has a thousand Motives to induce us to condemn what we dislike and Reason in this Instance fully justifies these Motives since Men fansie they condemn Errours and defend Truth when they defend their Prejudices and censure those that assault them So that the most equitable Judges of Books that fight against Prejudices pass commonly such a general Sentense as is no way favourable on their behalf Perhaps they will say there is something good in such a Work and that the Author justly opposes certain Prejudices but yet they shall be sure to condemn him and as his Judges give an authoritative and grave decision upon the point maintaining that he carries things too far on such or such an occasion For when an Author is ruining Prejudices which the Reader is not prepossess'd with whatever he shall say will seem reasonable enough But the same Author ever stretches things too far when he engages the Prejudices wherewith the Reader is too deeply ting'd But whereas the Prejudices of different Persons are not constantly the same should one carefully gather the several Judgments that are made upon the same things it would commonly appear that according to these Judgments there is nothing Good and at the same time nothing Bad in such kind of Books There would be nothing good because there is no Prejudices but one or other espouses and there would be nothing bad because there is no Prejudice whatever but some or other condemn In which Judgments there is so much Equity that should a Man pretend to make use of them to correct his Piece he must necessarily strike it all out for fear of leaving any thing that was Condemn'd or not to touch it for fear of expunging something that was approv'd So that a poor Author that studies to be inoffensive finds himself perplex'd on all hands by all the various Judgments which are pronounc'd both for and against him and unless he resolve to stand his ground and to be reckon'd obstinate in his Opinions he must inevitably contradict himself at every turn and appear in as many different Forms as there are different Heads in a whole Nation However Time will do every Man Justice and Truth which at first seems a Chimerical and ridiculous Phantasm by degrees grows sensible and manifest Men open their Eyes and contemplate her they discover her Charms and fall in love with her This Man who condemns an Author for an Opinion that he dislikes by chance meets with
Ville under Ambiguous Terms advances that this Principle is not to be found in St. Austin He answers but one single passage of that Father's Works and to explain it makes that learn'd Man argue at an Extravagant rate Lastly he opposes to his constant Doctrine only the Book of Categories as if he knew not that Book to be none of St. Austin's and that it belongs rather to Logick than to Physicks I will not stand to prove this in particular for I see no necessity of answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book And I design to keep inviolably to the resolution I made and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the Search after Truth viz. That I would answer none of those who oppos'd me before they understand me or whose Discourses gave occasion to believe they were made from some other motive than the Love of Truth As for the rest I shall indeavour to content them I have no delight in disquieting Mens Minds and troubling my own repose by contentious Books or Works absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth and only proper to violate Charity and scandalize our Neighbours And if I now put Pen to Paper 't is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be call'd in Question and that I desire to make it clearly understood That no Man is permitted to charge me with Heresie for consequences deducible from the Principles I have establish'd Which is not as if I thought it possible to inferr directly any Heresie or even Error from the Book concerning the Search after Truth I am ready to answer with Charity and Respect all those who shall do me the honour to make their Animadversions without Passion and I shall always be glad to follow Truth as soon as any Man can discover it to me I disown all principles from which may be concluded any falshood But I offer to prove That we cannot justly treat as Hereticks even obstinate Defenders of such Principles as Divines may inferr impious Conclusions from provided the Embracers of these Principles disown the consequences Since if it might be allow'd no Writer whatever could escape the Imputation of Heresie My proofs of my assertion are as follow Which I do not deduce from that which is least Reasonable in the common Opinions of Phisophers with design to make them Odious or Ridiculous but choose to take for the subject of what I offer to prove universally receiv'd Opinions upon which the Peripateticks are so bold and presuming as to insult perpetually over their Adversaries ARGUMENT I. The Peripateticks and almost all Men believe that Beasts have Souls and that these Souls are nobler than the Bodies which they Animate 'T is an Opinion receiv'd in all times and in all Nations that a Dog suffers Pain when he is beaten That he is susceptible of all the Motions of the Passions Fear Desire Envy Hatred Joy Sorrow and even that he knows and loves his Master Yet from this Opinion consequences may be drawn directly opposite to what we are Taught by Faith The first Consequence opposite to Faith That God is Vnjust Beasts suffer Pain and some of them are more miserable than others Now they never sinn'd or made an ill use of their Libirty since they have none Therefore God's Vnjust in Punishing them and making them Miserable and unequally Miserable since they are equally Innocent Therefore this Principle is false That under a Righteous God a Creature can be miserable without deserving it a Principle nevertheless imploy'd by St. Austin to Demonstrate Original Sin against the Pelagians Moreover there is this difference between the condition of Men and Beasts that Men after Death may receive an Happiness which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life But Beasts at Death lose all they have been miserable and innocent and have no Future Retribution Therefore though God be Just yet Man may suffer in Order to Merit but if a Beast suffers God is not Just. It may be said perhaps that God may do with the Beast as he thinks fit provided he observes the Rules of Justice with respect to Man But if an Angel should think in like manner that God could not punish him without some Demerits and that he was not oblig'd to do justice unto Man should we like that thought Certainly God renders Justice to all his Creatures and if the meanest of them are liable to Misery they must needs be capable of being Criminal The second Consequence contrary to Faith That God Wills Disorder and that Nature is not corrupted The Soul of a Dog is substance more noble than the Body Animated by it For according to St. Austin 't is a spiritual Substance more noble than the noblest Body Besides which reason demonstrates that Bodies can neither Know nor Love and that Pleasure Pain Joy Sorrow and the other Passions cannot be Modifications of Bodies Now 't is believed that Dogs know and Love their Masters and that they are susceptible of Passions as of Fear Desire Joy and Sorrow and many others The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body but a Substance nobler than Bodies But the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body and has no other End or Felicity than the enjoyment of Bodies Therefore God makes the more noble for the less noble Therefore God Wills disorder Therefore Man's Nature is not corrupted Concupiscence is no disorder God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies and subject him to the Motions of Concupiscence c. It may be still said perhaps that the Soul of Beasts is made for Man but 't is hard to escape by this subterfuge For whether my Dog or my Horse has or has not a Soul is indifferent to me 'T is not my Horse's Soul which carries or draws me but his Body 'T is not the Soul of a Chicken which nourishes me but its flesh Now God might and ought consequently to create Horses to perform all their functions which we need without a Soul if it be true that he has made them only for our use Again the Soul of an Horse is more valuable than the noblest Body God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man Lastly God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon Swallows are of very little use to Man and they might have fed upon grain as other Birds What need then of so innumerable a number of Souls to be Annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds since the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfectest Animal Wherefore in affirming that Beasts have Souls that is to say substances more noble than Bodies we deprive God of Wisdom make him act without Order destroy Original Sin and consequently overthrow Religion by taking away the necessity of a Mediator The third Consequence contrary to Faith The Soul of Man is Mortal or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
First That I have retracted that pretended Errour about Original Sin The same Proposition being found in the same Words in the Eddition he cites and in all those that are Printed at Paris Secondly That Proposition is not my peculiar Opinion since it is the common Doctrine of the Schools But though it were not at present taught yet 't is certainly no Errour much less a most pernicious one as he elsewhere stiles it The two Errours he supposes me to substitute in the Room of this recanted one are Two things I never said and which he puts upon me 'T is but reading his own Words relating to the Question to discover the Truth of what I say and therefore I shall not stand to prove it especially since 't is done sufficiently by an unknown Hand I could only wish this unknown Person had alledg'd the Reasons which I had for saying That an Infant at the time of Baptism was justified by an Actual Love and which I have given in the Illustration upon Original Sin Let a Man judge then after he has examin'd the candid and sincere Advertisement of Monsieur de la Ville whether I have not reason to require the Equitable Readers not to credit him on his bare Word For if we believe him he is the most sincere and courteous Man in the World but we cannot find all the Marks of Sincerity and Candour when we carefully examine him At the End of his Advertisement he protests he has endeavour'd as much as possible to observe all the Moderation which he ought that he has no ill Will but to the Errours of his Adversaries and for their Persons all Esteem and Respect Whilst yet one cannot consider that Advertisement without discovering at least the Symptoms of a disingenuous Spirit and a Malign Temper which surprizes and irritates Mens Minds I pray God to pardon him his Outrages to Regulate his Zeal and to inspire him with the Spirit of Meekness Charity and Peace towards his Brethren I know not whether he finds Pleasure in abusing me so hainously as he does but I desire to assure him That it is Matter of much Sorrow and Trouble to me That I am forc'd in the Defence of Truth to give some Suspicion of his Probity and that I should on the contrary be extreamly joyful if he could know how sincerely I honour respect and love him in Him in whom we all are Brethren Noverit quam euâ— non contemnam quantum in illo Deum timeam cogitem caput nostrum in cujus corpore fratres sumus Aug. ad Fortunianum Epist. 3. FINIS F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE CONCERNING Light and Colours BEING AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE Fourth CHAPTER of his Sixth BOOK Never before Printed This being suppos'd let there be imagin'd a small Hole to be made at the Point A I say that all the Parts of the Water as RSTV contain'd therein will tend towards the Point A by the right Lines RA SA c. For all the Parts which were equally press'd before cease to be so on that side which answers to the Hole They must therefore tend towards it since every Body that is press'd must tend to move it self that way where it finds the least Resistance But if a Stopple be put in the Orifice A and it be hastily thrust inwards the same Parts RS TV c. will all tend to remove themselves from the Hole directly by the same Lines AR AS c. Because upon the advancing in of the Stopple they are more press'd on the Side wherein it enters Lastly If we conceive the Stopple moved hastily backwards and forwards all the Parts of the subtile Matter which exactly fills the Foot-ball whose Elasticity is very great and which difficultly contracts or extends it self will receive infinite Vibrations from the Pressure Let us now suppose an Eye at T or elsewhere directed towards a Torch at A the Parts of the Torch being in continual Motion will constantly press the subtile Matter on all sides and consequently quite from A to the Fund of the Eye And the Optick Nerve being vehemently press'd and shaken by very quick Vibrations will excite in the Soul the Sensation of Light or of a lively and glittering Whiteness If we suppose at S a dark Body M the subtile Matter being not reflected towards the Eye that way directed nor vibrating the Optick Nerve the Body will appear black as when we look into the Mouth of a Cave or the Hole of the Pupil of the Eye If the Body M be such as that the subtile Matter vibrated by the Torch be reflected towards the Eye without any Diminution of the Quickness of the Vibrations the Body M will appear White and so much the more White as there shall be more Rays reflected It will likewise appear Luminous as Flame if the Body M being polish'd shall reflect all or almost all the Rays in the same order But if the Body M be such as that the subtile Matter reflected has its Vibrations less quick in certain Degrees that cannot be exactly determin'd the Result will be one of the primitive Colours Yellow Red Blue provided all the Parts of the Body M diminish equally the Vibrations caused by the Flame in the subtile Matter and all the rest of the Colours made up of a Mixture of the primitive will arise according as the Parts of the Body M shall unequally diminish the Quickness of the said Vibrations This is what I meant when I advanc'd in some Places of my Book that Light and Colours consisted only in the Vibrations of Pressure as they were more or less quick produced by the subtile Matter on the Retina This simple Exposition of my Opinion will perhaps make it seem probable enough to those at least who are acquainted with M. Des Cartes's Philosophy and who are not satisfied with the Explication which that Learned Man gives of Colours But that a more solid Judgment may be made on my Opinion it is not enough to have barely propos'd it it is requisite to produce some Arguments to confirm it To that End it is necessary to observe First That Sound is rendred Sensible only by the Vibrations of the Air which shake the Ear for upon the Air 's being drawn out of the Air-Pump Sound is no longer heard Secondly That the Difference of Tones proceeds not from the Strength of these Vibrations of the Air but from their Quickness as it is more or less Thirdly That though the Impressions which Objects make upon the Organs of our Senses differ sometimes but according to more or less the Sensations which the Soul receives from them differ essentially There are no Sensations more opposite than Pleasure and Pain and yet a Man that scratches himself with Pleasure feels Pain if he scratches a little harder than ordinary There is great probability that Bitter and Sweet which cause Sensations essentially different differ only by more and less For there are those who taste that
videbimus eum sicuti est Joh. Ep. 1. ch 3. v. 2. * Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam Sap. 9.10 Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore Sap. 9.15 †Deus intelligibilis lux in quo a quo per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia 1. Sol. Insinuavit nobis Christus animam humanam non vegetari non illuminari non beatificari nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei August in Joh. Illa autoritas divina dicenda est quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quousque se propter ipsum depresserit non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda sed ad intellectum jubet evolare simul demonstrans quanta hic possit cur haec faciat quam parvi pendat Aug. 2. de Ord. 9. * Tract in Joan. 27. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum jam non secundum carnem novimus 2 ad Cor. Nolite putare quenquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae si non sit intus qui doceat inanis fit strepitus noster Aug. in Joan. Auditus per me factus intellectus per quem Dixit aliquis ad cor vestrum sed non eum videtis Si intellexistis fratres dictum est cordi vestro Munus Dei est intelligentia August Johan Tract 40. Noli putare te ipsam esse lucem Aug. in Psal. Sicut audio sic judico judicium meum justum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam Johan cap. 5.30 Qui hoc videre non potest oret agat ut posse mereatur nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset ut quod not legit legat sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet valeat Epist. 112. cap. 12. Supplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat ut intelligat Conf. Ep. Fund cap. 33. Nullo modo resistitur Corporis sensibus quae nobis sacratissima disciplina est si per eos inflictis plagis vulneribusque blandimur Ep. 72. * See the 6 th Book Of the Nature Properties of the Vnderstanding II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and of its Liberty * See the Illustrations * See the Illustrations I. Of our Judgments and Reasonings II. That Judgments and Reasonings depend upon the Will Geometricians love not Truth but only the Knowledg of Truth tho' it be otherwise said III. What use should be made of our Liberty that we never may be deceiv'd IV. General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin A necessary Reflexion on the two Rules I. The Answer to some Objections II. Observations on what has been said concerning the necessity of Evidence See the Illustrations I. Of the Occasional Causes of our Errors and that there are five principal II. The General Design of the whole Work III. The particular Design of the first Book I. Two ways of explaining how our Senses were corrupted by Sin S. Gregor Homil. 39. upon the Gospels * Fr. Son â—â—ur †Fr. Son Esprit See the Illustrations Deus ab initio constituit hominem reliquit illum in manu Consilii sui adjecit mandata praecepta sua c. Ec. 15.14 A Remedy for the Disorder which Original Sin has caus'd in the World and the Foundation of Christian Morality * See the Illustrations II. That our Liberty not our Senses is the true cause of our Errors III. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses I. Of the Errors of sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd * See the Journal of the Learned Nov. 12. 1668. Fr. Le germe * The Cicatricle or the Sperm of the Egg is a little white spot upon the Yolk See Malpigh de Formatione Pulli in Ova †See Swammerdam 's Miraculum naturae II. A Continuation of these Errors about Invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of sight touching Extension relatively consider'd I. Of the Errors of sight about Figures II. We have no knowledge of the least of them III. The knowledge we have of the greater is not exact IV. An Explication of some Natural judgments which prevent our deception V. That these very judgments deceive us in some particular junctures See the 9. Chapter towards the end See the 3 d. Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 6 Book I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest. I. A general Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion III. The Mediums whereby we know the Distances of Objects are examined The Soul does not make all those judgments I aâ—tribute to her these Natural judgments are nothing but Sensations and I only speak thus the better to explain things The second Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objctes The third Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects The fourtâ— and fifth Mediums The sixth Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects * Seethe Illustrations * I call by the Name of Idea here whatever is the Immediate Object of the Mind I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Fibres of the Organs of the Senses centre IV. An Instance to explain the effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is that Objects produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fiâ—res of the Body This confus'd Reasoning or this Natural Judgement is only a Compound Sensation See what I have said before of Natural Judgements and the first Ch. of the 3 d. Book VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation I. Of the Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses III. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions or Vibrations of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensations of our Soul and sometimes have no Perception of them III. An Experiment that proves it IV. An Explication of three sorts of Sensations of the Soul V. The Errors that accompany the Sensations I. The Definition of the Sensations II. That a Man knows his own Sensations better than he thinks he does III. An Objection and Answer IV. From whence it proceeds that a Man imagines he has no knowledge of
only a warning because as I have said elsewhere Adam might whenever he pleased stop the Motion of the Animal Spirits that produce Pain So that if he ever felt pain 't was because he consented to feel it or rather he never felt any because he never had a mind to feel it Heb. iv 12 13. * See Dial. 5. of Chrisâ—ian Conversations about the end Act. 5.41 * Amor sicut nec Odium veritatis Judicium nescit Vis Judicium Veritatis audire Sicut audio Joan. 5.30 sic judico non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est Judicium Odii Joan. 19.7 ut illud Nos Legem habemus secundum legem nostram debet mori Est Timoris Joan. 11.48 ut illud Si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent nostrum locum gentem Judicium verò Amoris ut David de filio parricidâ 2 Sam. 18.5 Parcite inquit puero Absalom S. Bern. de grad humilitatis * Concil Aâ—gl per Spelman Aâ— 1287. * Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. * Lest any should mistake what I call here voluntary Motion I desire him to read the first Illustration on the first Chapter It would intricate my Conceptioâ—s should I say whatever relates to it to satisfie the Nicety of some Persons Joh. 11.47 Joh. 12.11 Act. 4.16 17. Act. 5.28 * Lib. I. †Lib. II. ‖ Lib. III. ⸪ Lib. IV. * Lib. V. * Ego enim ab anima hâ—c corpus animari non puâ—o nisi intentione â—acientis nec ab isto quicquam illam pati arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. Muâ—c c. 5. See also De quantit Anim. c. 34. Amos 3.6 * Psal. 33 9. * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimicis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religio Christiana ut COLATVR VNVS DEVS NON MVLTI DII QVIA NON FACIT ANIMAM BEATAM NISI VNVS DEVS Aug. Tr. 23. in Joan. * By Equator I understand the greatest Crooked Line which the Matter of the Vortex describes * That is are driven towards the Centre of the Earth * Princ. Part. 3. §. 45. * Sup. Ch. 4. * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make a Pun in Greek as in English Finis and finished Thus that Philosopher proves that an infinite Line is not perfect because 't is not finished * De Coelo l. 3. c. 3. L. 2. 3. de Gene. Corrup De Gener. Corrupt l. 2. c. 2. See Book I. from ch 11. â—o ch 15. * See Illustration X. of Book I. Lib. 4. de Anima ejus Origine Cap. 23. de quantitate Animae alias * M. Des Cartes his Principles Art 55. Part. II. * Art 43. ibid. †Art 63. * Art 33. Part. II. I imagine here only God my self and one Bowl * By a Body in a Vacuum I understand one so separate from others whether hard or liquid as that there is none either to aid or hinder the Communication of Motions * Art 5. * Art 63. Art 55. 43. of the second Part and elsewhere * General Rules of the Commuication of Motions †See M. des Cartes's Rules in the second Part of his Principles See the 6th Chap. of Book 3. and its Illustration See the Ilstration upon Ch. 3. Part 2. Book 6. where I explain my meaning more distinctly * See the 7th Chap. of the 3d Book and the Illustration upon it †Nâ—mo scit utrum amore vel odio dignus scit Eccl. 4.1 * In some Editions it is thus But we love a particular Good True but Sin consists not precisely in that For all Good is amiable and ought to be loved Our Love is in it self good and even in our loving that particular Good we follow the Impression which God gives us Our Sin precisely consists in our fastening upon that particular Good the Impression which God gives us to love all Good or universal Good at the time when we both might and ought to love it Therefore Sin is nothing and though God does all he does it not Now whilst c. This Illustration relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search In the Objection to the Article of the Illustration upon the seventh Chapter of the second Book I explain what I here say in general of the loss of Power Man had over his Body * See the Illustration upon the 6 â—h Chapter of Part II. Book III. * Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur S. Aust. de Trin. lib. 7. cap. 4. And in another place Cum quaeritur quid tres Magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat Eloquium Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur Ibid. lib. 5. cap. 9. * Chap. 10. Book I. †See Ch. 7. Book III. and its Illustration Fortissimo quippe dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet Aug. de Corrupt Grat. cap. 12. See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the End of the Brussels Edition Chap. 3. Book V. The Mâ—on when beheld with a Telescope looks much like what is here represented * See Ch. 3. Part II. of Book VI. with the Illustration †See Ch. 6. Part II. of Book III. with its Illustration See the Illustration upon the 7th Chap. of Part II. Book III. See the 5. Dialogue of Christian Conversation Aug. in Jul. lib. 6. cap. 3. See Ch. 7. Part II. of Book II. with its Illustration At every Objection turn to the Article it is made against Answer to the sixth Objection against his Meditations Art 6. Art 8. See the Illustration upon the 6th Chap. of Part II. Book III. And calls them all by their names Ps. 47. Chap. 1.19 See the Illustration upon the 3d Chap. Book V. * In the Illustration about the nature of Ideas I shall more particularly explain what is Order and why God necessarily loves it See the Fifth Dialogue of Christian Conversations Rom. c. 7. As by one Man sin entred into the World c. Rom. 5.12 I was shapen in Iniquity and in sin hath my Mother conceiv'd me Ps. 51.5 Ec. 25.23 Luke 2.48 Gen. c. 3. La Samaritaine upon Pont neuf in Paris Chap. 2. Part 2. * Lib. 1. de Napt Cap. 25 26 27 in Jul. l. 6. c. 19. alibi †Ep 23. lib. de peccator meritis c. 19. alibi ‖ Innocent III. in Decret 3. de Baptismo ejus Effectu Et in Concil Viennensi generali 15. sub Clement V. Invidia postea contumetiis Claricorum Romanae Ecclesiae ad Monrani dogma delapsus in multis libris novae prophetiae Meminit Hieron in Catalogo de Script Eccles. Siambo videmus verum esse
that Heat is in the Fire and Colours in the Pictures yet we can see no evident and convincing Reason or forcible enough to oblige us to believe it And thus we voluntarily subject our selves to Error by the ill use we make of our Liberty when we freely form such Judgments as these CHAP. XV. An Explication of the Particular Errors of the Sight which may serve as an Exemplar of the general Errors of our Senses I Have if I am not mistaken given a sufficient inlet to the Discovery of the Errors of our Senses in respect of sensible Qualities in general of which I have spoken on the account of Light and Colours which our Method oblig'd us to explain It may now be expected I should descend to Particulars and examine the respective Errors into which each of our Senses casts us But I shall not insist long upon these things because after what I have already said a little Attention will do the business of those tedious Discourses I should be oblig'd to make I shall only recount the general Errors our Sight occasions us to fall into touching Light and Colours and this Example will I believe suffice to give us an insight into the Errors of all our other Senses When we have fixt our Eyes upon the Sun for some moments this is what occurs both in our Eyes and in our Soul and these are the Errors into which we fall Those who are acquainted with the First Elements of Dioptricks and with any thing of the admirable Contexture of the Eyes know that the Rays of the Sun are refracted in the Crystalline and in the other Humours and that they are thence recollected upon the Retina or the Optick Nerve which cloathes all the Fund of the Eye in the same manner as the Rays of the Sun passing through a convex burning Glass reunite in the Focus or in the burning point of the Glass at three or four Inches distance from it in proportion to its convexity Now we are taught by Experiment that if we place in the Focus of the Glass a piece of stuff or brown Paper the Rays of the Sun make so great an Impression on the stuff or on the Paper and agitate the little parts thereof so violently as to break and separate them from one another or in a word to burn them and reduce them into smoak and ashes So we ought to conclude from this Experiment that if the Optick Nerve were black and the Pupil or the Aperture of the Vvea through which the Light enters into the Eyes should widen and enlarge it self to take in freely the solary Rays instead of which it contracts and straitens it self to prevent their passage the same thing would happen to the Retina as to the stuff or the black or brown Paper and its Fibres would be so violently agitated as to be speedily broken and burn'd in pieces And for this reason it is that the generality of Men feel great Pain in beholding the Sun for a moment because they cannot so closely shut the Aperture of the Pupil but there will still pass Rays enough to agitate the Fibres of the Optick Nerve so violently as to give us Reason to apprehend their breaking The Soul is altogether ignorant of all this we have said and when she beholds the Sun she neither has any Perception of her own Optick Nerve nor of any Motion in the Nerve But this cannot be call'd an Error 't is purely Ignorance The first Error she falls into is her judging the Pain she feels to be in the Eye If instantly upon a Man's beholding the Sun he withdraws into a dark place with his Eyes open that Concussion of the Fibres of the Optick Nerve caus'd by the Rays of the Sun decreases and wears off by little and little and this is all the alteration we can conceive in the Eyes But the Soul perceives nothing of this in them but only a whitish or a yellowish Light and the second Error is her judging this Light which she sees to be in her Eyes or in the Neighbouring Wall Finally The Agitation of the Fibres of the Retina constantly decreases and dwindles away by degrees For after a Body has been vibrated or shaken we should consider nothing in it more than the Diminution of its Motion But this is not the thing the Soul is sensible of in her Eyes She sees the whitish Colour metamorphos'd into Orange after chang'd into Red and lastly into Blue And the third Error into which we fall is our judging there are in our Eye or on the next Wall such alterations as differ more than Secundum magis minús because the Colours Blue Orange and Red which we see have a more considerable difference than according to degrees of more or less These are some of the Errors into which we fall in point of Light and Colours and these are the occasion of our falling into many others as we are going to explain in the following Chapters CHAP. XVI I. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of general and very fruitful Principles from whence to draw false Conclusions and these Conclusions again become other Principles in their turn II. The Origine of Essential Differences III. Concerning Substantial Forms IV. Of some other Errors of the School-Philosophy I HAVE I think given a sufficient Explication to unprejudic'd Persons and such as are capable of Thinking any thing Attentively of the Nature of our Sensations and of the general Errors that accompany them It is not amiss to shew at present that these general Errors are made use of as uncontroverted Principles to explain all things by That infinite false Consequences have been drawn from them which in their Turn have serv'd as Principles for a train of other Consequences and thus by little and little those imaginary Sciences void of Body and Reality have been establisht which have such multitudes of blind Followers but which like Fantoms leave nothing in their Embraces but the Shame and Confusion of suffering themselves to be seduc'd or that Brand and Character of Folly which makes Men delight to feed on Delusions and Chimera's This is what we must shew in particular by some Examples It has been already said that we are us'd to attribute to Objects our own Sensations and we judge that Colours Smells Tasts and other sensible Qualities are in the Objects which we call Colour'd and so of the rest We have found this to be an Error At present 't is our Business to shew that we make use of this Error by way of Principle to deduce false Consequences from which last Consequences afterwards we respect as other Principles upon which we go on to found our Reasonings In a word we shall here manifest what Progress and Advances an Humane Mind makes in the Search of some Particular Truths when once this false Principle has been taken for granted That Our Sensations are in Objects But in order to render this more