partakers thereof VII WHEREFORE we think Happiness should be seated rather in that Boniform Faculty we have spoke of since it is the most elevated and most divine Faculty of the Soul and seems to supply the same place in it as the essential Good of the Platonicks is said to do in the Deity As also because the Study and Improvement of it is common to all men For it is not above the Talent of the meanest to love God and his Neigbour very heartily And if this be done with Prudence and Purity of Life it is the Completion of this Happiness and the very natural Fruit of this exalted Faculty And let no man think meanly thereof since we are free to aver that nothing of greater Benediction can betide us either in the present or in the future life than such a testimony of the Divine Love But we shall elsewhere speak more freely thereof VIII WE do therefore mention in our Definition of Happiness the pleasure which the mind enjoys from a sense of Virtue because there are some kinds of allowable pleasure such as Aristotle calls pure and generous Nicom lib. 10. c. 6. Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 7. and laughs at those who think otherwise For such says he as will not allow that any Pleasure can be honest are like those Companions who not comprehending what Nectar is do fansie that the Gods drink Wine inasmuch as they themselves know nothing better IX NOW I affirm this pleasure to arise from a Sense of Virtue and it is erroneous to think the Fruit of Virtue should consist in such imaginary knowledge as is gotten by bare Definitions of Virtue for this amounts to no â—ore than if a man would pretend to know â—he Nature of Fire from the bare Picture of Fire which can afford no Heat All kind of Vital Goods as I may take the liberty to call â—hem are by our Life and Senses to be judged of and enjoyed And Virtue is in it self an â—nward life not an outward shape or to be discovered by the Eye According to that â—memorable Saying of Plotinus Vide in this Book L. 2. c. 2. § 5. c. 3. § 1. If you ever were the thing it self you may then be said to have seen it But being once transformed into this life of Virtue then indeed you behold the Beauties and taste the Pleasures thereof then you grow enamoured and your Soul is taken up with Joys that cannot be uttered However till you shall attain this State and while this Blessed Disposition of the Soul is not as yet awakened in you 't is fit you credit those who are in the Fruition of it Nor can that Saying of Aristotle be ever more opportunely urged than in this Case That Learners must believe For should you venture to make judgment of the Pleasure that is in Virtue being as yet void of all Experience it were to be feared you would prosecute it so faintly as never to obtain it but be left to expiate your incredulity in this Life by a too lasting punishment in the other X. AS to the preceding Words that are annexed to the Definition of Happiness Namely That it was made perfect by external Comforts How could this otherwise be For since Happiness consists in that Pleasure which good men take in the Sense of Virtue and a Conscience of Well-doing no man can possess this Happiness if any pain be so intense upon him as to distract the Mind and extinguish all present Sense of Pleasure Whence it plainly follows that we must not lie under acute Diseases or want the Food that is needful For the want of a Sufficiency for Nature or a State of Captivity or any Degree of Vassalage are able to depress as well as distract the Mind by Cares and Anxiety They hinder Happiness from being in its Perfection nor can Heroical Virtue produce so full a Crop Haud facilè emergunt quorum virtutibus obstat Res angusta domi XI Magn. Moral lib. 2. c. 8. WHEREFORE as Aristotle saith while we are Men and carry about us the Frailties we are born to we shall ever be wanting of external Prosperity For complete Happiness cannot be without those two Ingredients which the Pythagoreans termed Praise and Comfort Moral Nicom lib. 10. c. 9. meaning Praise that results from Virtue and Comfort from good Fortune This we sufficiently noted before to be the Pythagoreans Doctrine Magn. Moral And Aristotle in his great Morals strikes again upon the same Note affirming That without external Comforts it was impossible to be happy XII HOWEVER he inclines much to a Mediocrity herein and quotes Solon for it That a Man may do all things that are fit for him out of a moderate Estate For as to Excess of Wealth it rather choaks up the Way to Virtue than mends the Path. Archytas compares Wealth unto Wine and to Light saying that one blinded the Eyes and the other turned the Brains of very good Men when they were in excess Whence Aristotle when he interprets the Answer of Anaxagoras does not make his happy Man to be either a Potentate or a Man of overgrown Riches Moral Eudem lib. 1. c. 4. But the Man that was full of Innocence free from Pain and who had some share of Divine Contemplation This was his happy Man CHAP. III. Of Virtue in general and of Right Reason I. VIRTUE is an intellectual Power of the Soul by which it over-rules the animal Impressions or bodily Passions so as in every Action it easily pursues what is absolutely and simply the best Here it seems fit in the Definition L. 3. c. 1. § 3. to call Virtue rather a Power than a Habit. First because the word Virtue implies as much and signifies the same thing as Fortitude And next because an Habit is not essential to Virtue For if a Man had this intellectual Power born in him he would doubtless be virtuous tho it came not to him in the way of repeated Actions such as constitute a Habit. For it is not the external Causes but the internal which make the essence of a thing Besides it is this Idea of Virtue which elevates and inclines the mind to love her and tread in her ways and which argues Virtue to be a quick and vigorous heat by which the mind is easily and irresistibly moved to do things which are good and honorable So that we esteem this very Notion of Virtue able to rowze up men from Sloth and Lethargy and make those ashamed who on a few moderate Performances think to set up for Men of Virtue II. WE term this a Power intellectual not only because of its situation which is in the intellectual part of the Soul and not in the animal part of it where that Power resides which governs the Members but also because it is always excited by some Principle which is intellectual or rational By animal Impressions we understand every motion of the Body which being
all of them may by a due and unerring Analysis be resolv'd For as all Numbers arise from Unity and by Unites are all measur'd so we affirm that by this Intellectual Love as from a Principle the most pure and most abstracted of all others all the Modes and Kind of Justice Fortitude and even of Temperance it self are to be measur'd for nothing is so detrimental to lessen and extinguish this Love as is the Exercise and Infection of sensual Delights XVII Now in the last place if any shall object that we have done amiss and that all this splendid Fabrick of the Virtues is by us laid on a weak and tottering Foundation As namely in Passion such as they may suppose this our Love to be Let them for their better Information know that this Love is not more a Passion than is Intellection it self which surely they cannot but believe to be very valuable and very Divine 'T is very true we may as to this point with Des Cartes allow that all Intellection has so much of Passion as it is the Perception of something imprinted from without However as this Perception which is made by Intellection is not from the Body but rather from the Soul exerting and exciting her self into such Action So neither is this Love from the Body but either from the Soul it self or else from God above who calls and quickens the Soul to such a Divine Effort And tho this Perception may if they please be termed a sort of Passion yet 't will derogate no more from the Dignity and Excellency of it than from Intellection it self Which because 't is an Act of Perception may on that account be also termed a Passion XVIII YET when all is said perhaps this Love which we insist upon may not so truly be termed a Passion as acknowledg'd to be the Peace and Tranquillity of the Mind nay a state of such Serenity as hath no other Motions than those of Benignity and Beneficence So that this Love may rather be thought a firm and unshaken Benignity or Bounty of the Soul such as has nothing more perfect or more approaching to the immortal Gods I mean hereby that State of the Blessed Spirits unto which we ought all to aspire and surely without this Love those very Spirits would not be as Gods but as a Race of Devils And therefore we may conclude this Love to be the most perfect and the most Angelick Thing of all others far excelling even Intellection it self And in truth more aptly deserving those lofty Words which Aristotle bestows upon the Speculative Intellect where he says Ethic. Nicom l. 10. c. 7. That according to some Doctors we are not to converse with human things altho we are Men nor with things transitory altho we are mere Mortals but as much as is possible we should affect to live as do the immortal Gods And this by performing every thing in such sort as conforms to that Principle which is the most excellent thing within us L. 10. c. 9. Now Andronicus his Paraphrast declares This most excellent thing within us to be the Intellect But I beg leave to call it rather by the Name of Intellectual Love Thus I end a Point on which some may think I have insisted too long But the whole will shew our Sense of Virtue and of its kinds and how it may be said to consist in a Mediocrity and what also is the Norma or Measure of such Mediocrity The next Step will be touching Good that is external CHAP. X. Of Good Things which are External I. 'T IS not only such Things as are placed without a Man that we call External Goods but whatever is placed without in respect to Virtue I mean without which Virtue may consist in its Perfection altho such things may indeed pass as Ornaments to her and as necessary Complements unto Happiness And these are threefold either in respect of the Soul of the Body or of both We will touch upon some particulars herein and see how far they help or how short they fall as to the compleating of Happiness II. THINGS which relate to the Soul are the Dexterity or Subtilty of the Wit a vast and faithful Memory Also Science Art and Sapience To the Body Strength Agility Comliness and Health To both these as they constitute Man Wealth Liberty Nobility Authority And lastly the Friendship and Favor of many Of all these we may say in short that they are Good and more to be desired than the things that are contrary to them And yet that several of them are of such slender Account that their Absence does no more obstruct the Perfection and Integrity of Happiness than Mountains and Valleys do spoil the Roundness of the Earth whose Magnitude makes those small Inequalities of no consideration Scarce do those things add unto Happiness while present or retrench from it when absent inasmuch as they hold no Proportion with complete and perfect Virtue III. I would fain know what great matter is gotten by Subtilty of Wit if a Man be otherwise prudent if his Mind be firm and unshaken if he have Love towards his Neighbor and Good Will for Mankind I find Antoninus the Emperor when he blamed his Parts for want of sufficient Activity could yet console himself with this Reflection L. 7. § 67. That a happy Life was made up of very few things and that altho a Man were neither Logician nor Philosopher he might yet be generous modest a Lover of his Country and obedient to God On the other hand to hear one lament his Unhappiness for want of such high Subtilty or Dexterity of Wit is little other than if a Man shou'd complain he was not able to walk because not able as some Juglers to dance upon a Rope IV. As to a strong and retentive Memory which holds all fast how many an honest Man is there that has it not For as Antoninus said before so Aristotle also says That those Noble and Divine Things wherein Happiness did consist were very few Nay rather that it was but one certain thing by which the Discrimination was made of things honest or vile even as all Variety of Colors are judg'd of by the Eye And hereto may refer that of Plato That Truth was contain'd in a very narrow space For the good and perfect Man is not so much actuated by a List of Precepts gotten without Book as by living inwardly and printing in his Mind a single and sincere Sense of Things From this alone he will be able to know whatever Duty lies incumbent on him just as by one Candle a Man may see all the variety of Objects before him And as all Colors of the Rainbow do arise from the Sun so indeed the Distinction of all Duties have but the same single Source But for exterior things and such as are not reducible into this Diviner Sense Let it suffice if your Memory be as that of an old Man who as
have acted otherwise than as we have already done II. AS to the first of these Objections the Answer is not hard 'T is true we cannot otherwise think of God's Fore knowledg but to be every way clear and perfect and without possibility of Error as to those Objects about which he judges or does pronounce And firely he does always judg and determine of things according as they are that iâ— to say of â—contingent thing that it is contingent and of a necessary thing that it is necessary Whence is comes to pass that those things which are comingent and proceed from a Free Principle of Acting they are allow'd to be such by God's Consent For we ought not to confine God's Omniscience within narrower Bounds â—…n we do his Omnipotence which all Men acknowledg to be able to do whatever does not imply a Contradiction And therefore to disparch this Difficulty in afew words We say that the Fore-knowledg of contingent Effects which proceed from a free Principle of Acting does either imply a Contradiction or it does not If it does imply a Contradiction then such Effects are not the Objects of God's Omniscience nor determin'd by it or rightly suppos'd to be determin'd at all But if it do not imply a Contradiction then we actually confess that Divine Prescience and Man's Free Will are not inconsistent but that both of them may sâ—ly stand with each other Therefore by neither way can any sound or convincing Argument be drawn from God's Fore-knowledg against the Liberty of Man's Will III. AS to the other Difficulty the whole Sense thereof falls within this Proverbial Saying Nemo est lubens Malus aut Beatus invitas that is Ethic. Nicom l. 3. c. 5. No Man is willingly Wicked or Happy against his Will Or else into that saying of Socrates Omnis Improbus ignorat That no Man was Wicked but through Ignorance Which sounds as if the Will of Man wanted nothing but the Knowledg of what was Good and Virtuous to force him to imbrace it Nay that the Will was so fram'd as not to be able to resist that Good which it did but once understand Now if this were true there would not need so much Exhortation to the love of Virtue as to the Study of Wisdom Nor would the Liberty of Man's Will consist so much in Pre-election as in Counsels and Deliberations and these to be still so Govern'd as that nothing should prove repugnant to some Excellent End IV. WHEREFORE inasmuch as we find that Idea of the chief End which is termed Beatitude or Happiness to be but confusedly apprehended by us 't is every Man's Duty with principal Care to find out in what this chief Happiness doth consist and how we may attain it Yet whether all this be plac'd within every Man's Reach is a very hard thing to determine We see the Bulk of Mankind are like those who falling sick of a Disease and not knowing how to cure themselves ought to be visited by others that are in Health and from them take Remedies and Advice So the Generality that see little of themselves while they are dazled by false Lights and the bare Apparitions of Good can never discover What is the Ultimate Good and what the most Excellent Object of Human Life For as Aristotle observ'd all men seek after Apparent Good Ethic. Nicom l. 3. c. 5. nor are they Masters of their own â—…agination but every Man frames a different Good to himself according to his Complexion V. 'T IS in the Third Book of his Ethicks that the Philosopher proposes this Question and yet he does not otherwise clear it than by granting That it was some time or other in the Power of those who now are Blinded to have beheld what was truly Good and that Men are not less willingly Bad than Good But this does not directly satisfie the Objection Also he is pleas'd to expose it with more Words and Ornaments than is usual with him as in manner following That no Man is to himself the Cause of doing Ill but that such Things are done by Ignorance of the End and as Hoping he shall thereby attain what a Best for him That the Desire of the End falls not within our Choice but that it imports every Man to be so born as Naturally to See and Discern that what he chooseth is truly Good And he who has this Felicity by Birth is as it were Inspir'd and much oblig'd to Nature For he shall possess that High and Excellent Good which could never have been had either by Purchase or by Instruction had it not come by Birth-Right And thus to be born and under so benign a Planet is the true Perfection of Ingenuity VI. SINCE therefore this Natural Talent or inherent Aptitude which is so capable â—f Virtue and the Sense of all Good Things is antecedent to all our Industry as being the Gift of Nature and not the Reward of our Care and Diligence if a Man be destitue hereof 't is manifest that the Duties and Performances requir'd by Virtue are not in his Power Neither can the soundest Admonttions find Effect or Obedience with him 〈◊〉 less he be awak'ned by Stripes and Force or unless he be reform'd by something of Miracle from Above But whether any are so utterly depriv'd of this Natural Aptitude or by what Fate it befals them if they are so is to me so hard and perplexing a Question that I had rather wholly decline it than involâ—e my self within such Mysteries of Providence VII HOWEVER as to those who are so endow'd as to have some Native Foretast of this high and Excellent Good it seems to be plac'd within their Power either to acquire to themselves a clearer and more extended Knowledg therein or else to let that by degrees extinguish which already they have Into which Error if they shall unhappily run 't is with the same reason they may be said to be Willingly wicked as of the Intemperate man that he throws himself Wilfully into a Distemper L. 3. c. 6. And of whom Andronicus speaks in this sort Before the Man fell sick it was in his own Power to have preserv'd his Health But when Health is lost by Incontinence and Deâ—…h it is not in his Power to Recover it So 〈◊〉 Man may throw a Stone to the Bottom of the 〈◊〉 but being cast thither he cannot recover it â—…ever the Stone was willingly cast by him 〈◊〉 was in his Power either to Cast or to have â—…th-held it VIII AS for those Men who throw off all Distinction of Things Honest and Vile who have no other Sense than of the Animal life who consider only for themselves be it â—…ght or Wrong who think that Good is but of one Sort and this only referable to Animal Content or if perchance they think Good to be various yet still they six and appropriate all to themselves In such Men as these I 〈◊〉 confess their Will is perpetually determin'd to what