an Objection against any thing that it is without Reason or as we apprehend contrary to reason we must first consider whether it be the proper Object of Reason otherwise it is no Objection as it is no Objection against sounds that we cannot see them nor against colours that we cannot hear them because sounds are not the object of sight nor colours of hearing This I think is plain Sense and good Reason too but this he says is no Answer to that Objection Why should reasonable Creatures be obliged to believe things without Reason Nor was it ever intended as an immediate Answer to it the Answer I give is That we are not oblig'd to believe without Reason but when such Men as this Author Object farther That to Believe things whose natures we do not understand and cannot account for by natural Reason is to believe without Reason it is a proper Answer to say That Reason is not judge of the Nature and Philosophy of things and nothing can be said to be without Reason or against Reason which is not the object of Reason as no man pretends that the pure Natures and â—ssences of things or their Essential Reasons Properties Unions Operations are Serm. p. 19. But herein it seems I was mistaken for I have met with a Man at last who makes Reason the judge of all this for if these be not the Objects of Reason Reason has no Object at all for our Reason can be no otherwise employed but either about Substances or their Unions Essential Reasons Operations or Properties p. 20. Very right we may know something of all this but I speak of the Philosophy of Nature Now can this new Philosopher tell us What the pure simple Essence and Substance of any thing is What naked Matter stripp'd of all Accidents and Qualities is How Soul and Body are United which cannot Touch each other How a Spirit should feel Pain or Pleasures from the Impressions on the Body How we Think and Reason Nay How we See and Hear How Thought moves our Bodies and excites our Passions And a Thousand such like Mysteries which could he Unriddle he would infinitely gratify the Inquisitive world But Christianity not Mysterious and the Philosophy of pure simple Nature are too great Discoveries for one Age and yet if ever this happens they must go together For as I observed this is all the incomprehensibility men have to complain of in the Doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation The first concerns the pure Nature Essence Substance of God and the Essential Distinction and Unity of the Godhead which we neither do nor can know any thing of for all Nature is a Secret and Mystery to us much more the Infinite Nature of God And the second concerns the Union of the Divine and Human Nature in the Person of Christ which is a Mystery but what we ought not to complain of since the Philosophy of all Natural Unions is a Mystery to us These things are not the Objects of Reason and therefore though we believe them upon the Authority of a Revelation without understanding the Mystery of them this is not to believe without or contrary to Reason And what now does this Socinian say to this truly not one word but falls out with Socinus and Crellius and some of his best Friends for talking so much of Mysteries which by the way shews that this is not such a new and unheard of Objection as he would pretend for now he has found out that there is no Mystery at all in the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation and he is in the right if his Socinian Explication of these Doctrines which destroys the Mystery and the Catholick Faith together may pass for the Doctrine of the Church But there has been enough said of that in the distinction between Real and Nominal Trinitarians examined which the Reader may consult and this Author answer at his leisure though I am very sensible he can never want such Answers as this for any thing 2 dly The Second Objection against such a Revelation as contains matters which natural Reason cannot comprehend is to what purpose such a Revelation serves what merit there can be in believing such Doctrines and of what good use such a Faith can be to us Serm. p. 2â— This is another Objection which he thinks no Sect of Religious ever made p. 24. but the Irreligious mâ—y make this Objection and there are more than one Sect of these As to the usefulness of it I observed That though neither Natural nor Revealed Knowledge extends to the Reasons and Causes of Nature and of Essential Properties and Operations yet both Natural and Revealed Knowledge is of as much use to us as if we did perfectly understand all the Secret and Incomprehensible Mysteries of the Nature of God or of the Natures of Creatures Both Natural and Revealed Knowledge are alike upon this account that they only acquaint us what things are and what ends they serve and then we know what use to make of them without understanding the Secret Mysteries of Nature This I shew'd both in the Knowledge of Nature and of God and added We may make all the use that can be made of this World and of every thing in it without understanding the Essential Reasons and Causes or Internal Nature of any thing This last Clause he fixes his Remarks on and that he may have something to remark he changes my Words thus We may use the World as fully and every thing in it to as good purpose as if we understood the Reasons and Internal Natures of things And then adds No Trisler not so fully nor to so good purpose as if we better understood the Natures of things Now this fully and to as good purpose are not my Words but his own nay we can make no use at all of it but only so far forth as we understand the Nature and Reasons of things in it We can use nothing to any purpose till we know or understand something of its nature and no farther can we apply it and use it than we understand its Nature and know its Properties and Powers Now this is not meerly trifling but Knavery He represents me very ridiculously asserting That we may as fully and to as good purpose use every thing in the World without knowing its Nature Vertues and Properties as if we knew them whereas I expresly assert That we must first know what things are and what ends they serve and the better we know this to be sure the better and then we know what use to make of them without understanding the secret Mysteries of Nature That is when by Experience and Observation we know what things are good for we know how to use them without understanding the secret Mysteries and Philosophy of Nature As how God created all things out of nothing how the Corn grows or our Food nourishes us and the like And thus I shew'd it was as to the Doctrine of
be not a good Objection against the Truth of any thing how comes a Contradiction to much more Fallible Reason to be so unanswerable an Objection And then we may much more safely believe a Trinity in Unity notwithstanding all their pretended Contradictions to Reason than we can believe Transubstantiation in Contradiction to Sense But in his Third Answer he seems to be in good earnest and I shall consider it as such and it is this Transubstantiation is contradicted by Sense saith his Lordship in an Object of Sense therefore 't is a false Mystery This is as much as to say That a Faculty or Power judging of its proper Object always judges truly and must determine our Belief He must say this or his Reasoning is nothing I ask now of what Faculty or Power is Almighty God the Object He will Answer God is the Object not of Sense which discerns him not but of Reason which discovers and sees this most Glorious Being Therefore Reason by his Lordship 's own Argument judges infallibly concerning God and must determine our Belief about him We must hearken to Reason when it finds Contradictions in what men affirm concerning God Now notwithstanding his vain Brags and his Triumphant Challenge to the Bishop a very little Skill will Answer this Argument For 1. The Bishop need not say because it is not true That every Faculty and Power judges as certainly of its proper Object as Sense does and then his Argument is quite lost For if Sense judges more certainly than Reason then a manifest Contradiction to Sense is a more unanswerable Objection than any appearing and pretended Contradictions to Reason I believe this Author is the first man who ever thus universally equalled the Evidence of Reason to that of Sense or that ever affirmed that Reason could judge infallibly of God And if Reason may be mistaken which I shall take for granted especially in the Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature of God some appearing Contradictions or what some men will call Contradictions are not a sufficient reason to reject a Revelation and to disbelieve what God tells us of Himself and his own Nature 2 dly Whatever certainty we allow to our Faculties in judging of their proper Objects we must extend it no farther than to what belongs to the judgment of that Faculty The same thing may be the Object of different Faculties as it is of our different Senses but every Faculty and every Sense judges of nothing in any Object but only what belongs to it self All the Objects of Sense are the Objects of Reason too but Sense judges of nothing but what belongs to Sense and Reason of what belongs to Reason and Reason can judge no farther of any Object than it is knowable by Reason and not only the Divine but even Created Nature has such Secrets and Mysteries as are not knowable by Reason and therefore it is manifest Ignorance or Sophistry to conclude from God's being the Object of Reason therefore Reason judges infallibly concerning God For not to Dispute about the Infallible Judgment of Reason God is the Object of Reason because Reason can know something concerning God but God can be the Object of Reason no farther than he is knowable by Reason and therefore if there be any thing which Natural Reason cannot know of God as I hope this Author himself will own with respect to such matters God is not the Object of Reason and Reason cannot judge at all much less judge infallibly concerning God But as Sense leaves room for Reason in the same Object so Reason leaves room for Faith But must we not hearken to Reason when it finds Contradictions in what men affirm concerning God Yes most certainly as far as God is the Object of Reason and knowable by Reason but no farther for in such matters as Reason cannot judge of at all it cannot judge of Contradictions Sense and Reason can judge of Contradictions only for themselves or as far as their judgment reaches but may appear Contradictions themselves to each other As for instance Reason assures us that Man consists of Soul and Body which are closely united to each other and yet the Union of Spirit and Matter is no better than contradiction to the judgment of Sense for Sense knows no Union but by Contact nor any Contact but between Bodies which have extended and solid Parts that can touch each other so that an Union without Contact is one contradiction to the judgment of Sense and a Contact without extended solid parts which a Spirit has not is another and yet Reason does not matter these Contradictions to the judgment of Sense because Sense is not the Judge of such things And it is the same Case between Reason and Faith which receives its information from a Divine Revelation concerning such Matters as are not knowable by Natural Reason should Reason contradict Faith in such Matters as Reason is no Judge of this is no more an Objection against the Superior Evidence and Authority of Faith than the Judgment of Sense is against the Evidence of Reason such Contradictions are not in the nature of things but are owing to our ignorance of Nature and presumption in judging of what we cannot understand The Example he gives of such a contradiction to Reason is a Trinity of Persons every one of which is perfect God and yet all of them but One God but for my life I cannot see this plain Contradiction That Three Persons each of which has all the Perfections of Divinity and is perfect God should be so essentially united in the sâ—me One Eternal and Infinite Nature as to be but One God This is not a Contradiction in terminis it is not Three Persons and but One Person or Three Gods and but One God but Three Divine Persons and One God If the Unity of the Godhead consisted in the Unity of a Person I grant it would be a flat Contradiction to say Three Persons and One God which would be equivalent to Three Gods and One God but if the Unity of the Godhead consists in the Unity of Nature that there is but One Eternal and Infinite Nature which is the One God and this Unity and Identity of Nature be perfectly and entirely preserved in Three Divine Persons it is so far from a Contradiction to say That Three Persons are One God that it would be a Contradiction to say That Three Divine Persons who have the same One Identical Nature should be more than One God for that is to say That One Divine Nature which can be but One God is Three Gods Now this is all that Natural Reason tells us of the Unity of the Godhead That there is and can be but One Eternal Infinite Nature which is but One God this we expresly teach and therefore do not contradict Reason but then Scripture tells us That there are Three Father Son and Holy Ghost to whom the Name and Attributes of God and therefore this One Infinite
Undivided Nature belong This Reason boggles at and Socinians call a Contradiction but it is such a Contradiction as Sense would judge the Union of Spirit and Matter to be At most it is an imaginary Contradiction in the Subsistence of the Divine Nature which Reason knows nothing about and therefore can make no judgment of and such appearing-Contradictions are no Objections because they may be no Contradictions as we are sure they are none when the Doctrines charged with these Contradictions are taught in Scripture There is one distinction which seems to me to set this matter in a clear light and to answer all the Pretences of Contradictions and that is The distinction between Contradictions in Logick and Philosophy A Contradiction in Logick is when two Propositions in express terms contradict each other and all men grant that both parts of such Contradictions cannot be true as that there are Three Gods and but One God which is to say that there are and that there are not Three Gods that there is and that there is not but One only God A Contradiction in Philosophy is when any thing is affirmed concerning the Nature or Essential Properties of any Being which seems to contradict all the Notions and Ideas we have of Nature in other Beings and such Contradictions as these may be both true for the Natures of things may be contrary to and contradict each other and yet both of them be true and real Beings There are infinite Instances of this in all Nature the Ideas of Hot and Cold of White and Black of Light and Darkness of solid and fluid Bodies of Matter and Spirit are direct Contradictions in this notion of a Contradiction to each other And had we known but one of these Opposites by our Natural Ideas and the other had been revealed to us we might as justly have cried out of Contradictions as the Socinians now do when you mention a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature For Heat contradicts the Idea of Cold and Fluid of Solid as much as Three Persons in the Unity of Nature contradicts the Unity of Nature in the Unity of a Person This latter indeed is the natural notion we have That there is but One Person in One Subsisting Intelligent Nature for we have no example of any thing else and therefore can have no natural Idea of any other Unity but this does not prove that it cannot be otherwise for there may be Oppositions and Contrarieties in Nature and did we but consider what an infinite distance and unlikeness there is between God and Creatures we should not think it reasonable to judge of the Divine Nature by the Ideas of Created Nature This is a very real and sensible distinction between Contradictions in Logick and in Nature and Philosophy and there is a certain way to know them Logical Contradictions are always immediately reducible to is and is not for they affirm and deny the same thing in the same sence The Contradictions in Nature and Philosophy are only the opposition and contrariety there is between the Ideas of several Beings which can never be reduced to a Contradiction in Logick but through Ignorance or Mistake by changing the sense and use of words Let any Socinian try the Experiment in the Doctrine of the Trinity in Unity and reduce it to such a Contradiction if he can A Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature is a Contradiction to that Idea we have of the Unity of Person and Nature in created Beings but this is no Contradiction in Logick for it is not a Contradiction in the same Nature and Being as all Contradictions in Logick must be but it is a Contrariety or Contradiction if we will so call it between the Unity and Personalities of two very different Natures the Divine and the Created Nature and all the Contradiction that can be made of it is no more than this That the Unity of the Divine Nature which is perfect and undivided in Three distinct Persons contradicts the Notion of Unity in a Created Nature which admits but of One Person in One Individual Nature But there are a thousand such Contradictions in Nature that is different Natures whose Ideas are opposite and contrary to each other and yet all of them real Beings But could they make a Trinity in Unity contradict it self that the Trinity should in express terms destroy the Unity and the Unity the Trinity this would be somewhat to the purpose for it would prove a Contradiction in Logick when the Terms destroy each other but then the Trinity and Unity must be the same a Trinity of Persons and but One Person or a Trinity of Natures and but one Nature But a Trinity of Persons true proper subsisting Persons in the Unity of Nature which is the Catholick Faith is not a Contradiction in Logick though it contradicts the Notion of Human Personalities which it may do and yet be very true This is abundantly enough to shew the Weakness and Folly of this Socinian Cant about Transubstantiation the Impiety Prophaneness and mischievous Consequences of it let others consider His Third Charge is That I say That as we are Christians and unless we will be understood to reject the Supreme Authority of Divine Revelation we must believe those Doctrines which are thought to be most mysterious and inconceivable notwithstanding any Objection from Reason or from Philosophy against ' em He that believes no farther than Natural Reason approves believes his Reason not the Revelation he is a Natural Philosopher not a Believer He believes the Scriptures as he would believe Plato or Tully not as Inspired Writings but as agreeable to Reason and as the result of wise and deep Thoughts p. 14. Here he has taken some of my Words and so put them together as to conceal the whole Force of the Argument which he always takes care to do My business P. 10 11 c. was to prove That we ought to believe those Doctrines which are thought the most mysterious and inconceivable notwithstanding any Objections from Natural Reason and Philosophy against them And this I proved from the Nature Use and Authority of Revelation That Revelation as to such matters as are knowable only by Revelation must serve instead of Sense Natural Ideas and Natural Reason That if we believe upon God's Authority which is the strict Notion of a Divine Faith we must believe without any Natural Evidence merely because God has revealed it and then we must believe such things as are not evident to Sense and Reason That to believe no farther than Natural Reason can conceive and comprehend is to reject the Divine Authority of Revelation and to destroy the distinction between Reason and Faith He that will believe no farther than his Reason approves believes his Reason not the Revelation and is in truth a Natural Philosopher not a Believer Here any man may perceive that our Socinian was plainly baffled for he has