it may not be thought impertinent nor vulgar if we observe that among the Jews the Pharises whose original our universally learned Sir John Marsham hath most plainly traced out in pag. 151. of his Chronic. Canon imposing only new terms upon the Philosophy of the Academics consented to the common opinion of the Greeks concerning the Soul as Josephus himself attesteth Belli Judaici lib. 2. cap. 7. who there delivers the belief of the Essens concerning the happy state of Good Souls separated from their bodies in the very words of Homer Nor is it obscure that the Jews themselves believed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Transmigration of Souls from one human body into another when some thought our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ to be St. John the Baptist some Elias others Jeremias or one of the Prophets Math. 16 v. 14. DIGRESSION How far the Souls Immortality may be proved by human Reason BUT is it not of more importance to know how strong and reasonable this Opinion of the perpetual duration of separate Souls appears to be than to investigate the age and tradition of it Certainly yes and should my Reader here require my estimate of the force and validity of the various Arguments or pretended Demonstrations brought by Plato in the precedent Dialogue to evidence the verity thereof I might justly enough make use of the licence thereby given me to examine what I designed only to translate But because it may be thought an indecency if not ingratitude in a mere Interpreter to censure the power and extent of the reasonings used and the conclusions thence drawn by his Author and because this laudable curiosity of the Reader whom I presume to be possessed with such may perhaps be more fully gratified by a frank communication of my sentiments concerning that more general Enquiry viz. How far the Immortality of the Soul may be proved by simple reason or the sole light of Nature without the illumination of sacred Writ or revelation Divine I shall therefore with the freedom belonging to a Philosopher and due submission to more elevated Wits adventure to acquaint him briefly with those my thoughts choosing rather to expose them to his severest scrutiny than by animadversions upon the arguments of Plato in particular to shew the least umbrage or irreverence towards his memory I confess then that tho I have read and with due attention of mind considered the utmost rigor of many Discourses professedly composed for and speciously promising a sufficient eviction of the sempiternal Existence of the Rational Soul after death by reasons drawn only from her own excellent nature faculties affections operations c. yet I could not perceive that any one of them taken single or all put together had the force of a perfect Demonstration so that were not the Light of the Holy Scriptures infinitely more clear and convincing as to that among many other important truths concerning the Soul I should still remain unassured of the endless Duration of my noblest part For First as to the Origine of this excellent Being the Doctrines of Natural Philosophers concerning this are no less various then their Sects and all but darksom opinions or precarious conjectures Nay even those few among them who held it to be of Divine Original tho therein they hit the very white of truth appear notwithstanding to have shot wide when they conceived it to have been Eternal ex parte ante a particle of the Divine Essence it self and pre-existent to its conjunction with the body Whereas that sacred Oracle the Word of God plainly teaches that the Soul of the first man was created immediately by God himself and united to the body then already perfectly formed and prepared to receive it Secondly As to the grand Difficulty the natural Exemption of it from the power of Death when thereby divorced from the body the Arguments brought from Physical Mediums for probation hereof do indeed suffice to convince us of the Spirituality and Seperability of the Soul but suffice not in my judgement at least to demonstrate the impossibility of its destruction or that absolutely it shall survive the dissolution of the body for ever the same I grant that some and chiefly that most rigid of Physico-Mathematicians Des Cartes in meditat Metaphysic de Anima respon ad object secund have gone so far as fairly to convince any man of competent understanding that the Soul tho in this life obliged to act for the most part by the Organs of the Senses doth yet discover its excellency by actions proper and peculiar to her spiritual nature wholly independent upon and distinct from the Senses and thence by genuine consequence inferred that the same Soul tho by a strict and intimate conjunction with the body united into one Compositum therewith is yet nevertheless a thing or substance distinct from the body I grant also that by this very Argument the Immortality of the Soul may be sufficiently proved against Epicureans and Atheists For these men taking the Soul to be not formally and truly a Substance but only a certain Modisication of body thereupon concluded that it must of necessity perish or cease to be the same when the fabrique or frame of the body from whence it resulted is destroyed by Death If therefore from some intellectual operations of this Soul such to which matter or body however modified or organized cannot possibly reach it be made appear and Des Cartes seems to have done it that she is a Substance distinct from and independent upon the body there will remain no reason much less an absolute necessity why the dissolution of the body should infer the destruction of the Soul as they imagine more especially if the latter be conceived to be what most certainly it is a simple and spiritual substance as incapable of destruction as themselves hold matter to be But I dare not grant that this Cartesian Demonstration holds good as against Epicureans and Atheists who exclude God from having any hand in the creation and conservation of the Soul so likewise against those who acknowledge God to be the sole Creator and preserver of all things For admitting the Soul to be both a substance distinct from the body and immediately created and continualy conserved by God yet can we not lawfully infer from thence that it is not possible for such a Soul ever to cease to be For what assurance can simple reason give us that God hath not ordained that this Soul as it had a beginning when it was created to be infused into the body so at the time of its separation from the body shall lose its being and vanish into its primitive nothing That the duration thereof necessarily depends upon Gods conserving power and influence is undeniable and it seems consentaneous that as the Union or Association of the Soul to the Body was at first made not by any Agents meerly Natural but upon conditions depending solely upon Gods free and arbitrary institution so
proper and peculiar method of convincing His lighter Reasons he advances partly from the Doctrine of the Pythagoreans of the transmigration of Souls into new bodies which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transanimation and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transcorporation partly from his private conceipt that knowledge is but memory and to learn only to remember From these opinions I say conjoyn'd into one complex argument he concludes first that the Soul was existent by it self before it came to be guest or inmate to the body and then that the same will exist also apart when separated from that its Lodging or Inne and is therefore immortal His more solid and Nervous arguments by which he more accurately and convincingly demonstrates the Souls eternal subsistence are drawn from the very essence of the Soul it self viz. that being simple or void of composition it must by necessary consequence be also indissoluble or incapable of destruction For presuming it to be made after the Exemplar or Image of God who is Simple Pure Immutable Invisible he thence infers that the Soul is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 congenial and homogenial to God i. e. likewise uncompound invisible immortal in fine that it is suo tamen modo of the same nature with the Supream Being which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is God Hence he concludes that though the Soul while obliged to sojourn in the Body be necessitated to use the ministry and service of its various Organs and so be neerly affected with the passions and other alterations incident thereunto by reason of the close conjunction betwixt them yet notwithstanding upon the dissolution of that ligue or conjunction it doth instantly fly away and return to that its primary and cognate Idea God in the mean time still conserving its own simple incorruptible nature And this is the substance of the first part of this sublime dispute The SECOND is a Refutation of Opinions impugning the immortality of the Soul which are chiefly two One that affirms the Soul to be an Harmony that is originally composed and resulting from the conformation and system of the corporeal senses and therefore as it hath its beginning from so it must also perish together with the body Another which allows the Soul to be indeed more lasting than the Body and so to survive it yet will not have it to be indissoluble but to decay by degrees and at length utterly to perish from its own natural weakness This last Error Plato in the person of Socrates solidly refutes further alledging that the Immortality of the Soul is clearly manifest even from the true notion of Causes i. e. of a Primary cause namely God and of Second or proxim causes by right reason duly investigated Where he opportunely evinceth it to be highly unreasonable so to acquiesce in the re-search of second causes as to relinquish the first and principal and then proceeds to teach that there are two kindes of Causes one principal or Supreme and in truth cause of all Causes which gave both being and efficacy to all others Others Secondary which are not truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Causes but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adjuvants impowred disposed and regulated by the first all such as God hath made subordinate to himself to the end that the virtue and energy of his power might extend even to us From the Reasons therefore of these different Causes Plato infers the Soul to be immortal Whence by a genuine transition he proceeds to the THIRD part of the Disputation or Conference which concerns the state or condition of the Soul after this shaddow of life is vanished or as he saith apud inferos thereby understanding 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a second Life whereof he treats more amply in Timaeo in this arguing thus Seeing that in this tumultuous Life there every day arise infinite disorders in Humane affairs and events apparently inconsistent with Equity and Justice so that good and pious men suffer various afflictions and oppressions and on the contrary unrighteous and impious men flourish in delights and prosperity reason requires that after this scene of Inequality is withdrawn after this Life the use whereof is in common to all men both good and evil is expired there should succeed another wherein is to be made a just distinction of the good from the bad that so these may be adjudged to condign punishment and those rewarded with felicity according to their deserts And hence he collects that there are but two paths wherein all Mortals walk One leading to eternal happiness the other to endless misery Thus much this our wise Ethnic plainly discerned by the meer light of nature by right reason more he could not perceive without rayes of light supernatural We are not therefore to arraign him of ignorance but rather to applaud his singular modesty in that in the close of his discourse about rewards and punishments after death he adventures upon no conjectural descriptions of the places qualities degrees c. of either but leaving all such to Poets ingeniously professeth he thought it not to be the part of a man endowed with sound Judgment to affirm any thing concerning those inscrutable secrets and reserves of Divine Justice Only he held it necessary that the minds of men be deeply imbued with established and certain perswasions of rewards and punishments to come that so they may be inflamed with love of Virtue which he defines to be the true and only way to future felicity and reclaimed from Vice the high way to future infelicity And this he declares to be the use and advantage of his Doctrine of the Souls immortality namely that we may be induced to learn and assiduously fellow the way that leads to that happy life and carefully avoid that of misery The former he defines to be true and solid knowledg of Wisdom the Noblest part whereof is this that Divorcing and Alienating our mind from all commerce with corporeal affections and sensual pleasures we fix it intirely upon the contemplation of God and hold it perpetually exercised in that Divine Meditation This being the great duty of man and most satisfactory imployment of a Reasonable Soul he opportunely admonisheth every one to make it also his principal care and study to be diligently conversant therein alwaies animating himself with this noblest of hopes that after the short and anxious race of this life is finished he shall infallibly attain unto that immortal Happiness of which he hath now discoursed And to fringe this his long Web of Speculations Philosophical with a grateful reflection upon the Heroic Virtues of his martyr'd Master Socrates after a concise Historical Narration of the manner and circumstances of his Death he concludes with this glorious Character of him that notwithstanding he had been Oppressed and Condemned by the envy and inhumanity of the Athenians he was in truth the Wisest and most Virtuous of all Man-kind PHEDON Persons of the Dialogue Echecrates Phedon
come to pass that the draught of poyson must be repeated twice or thrice Wish him good health saith Socrates let him take care only of what belongs to his own duty and provide enough as if he were to give the dose twice and if need be thrice This I knew before answers Crito but the Fellow hath been troublesom to me a good while suffer him saith he But I will render an account to ye my Judges by what right I became possessed of that my opinion that he who truly and seriously addicts himself to Philosophy or the love of wisdom doth die with undaunted courage and stedfast resolution furnished with that noble hope that immediatly after his death he shall certainly attain unto the greatest Goods or supreme felicity How this is Simmias and Cebes I will endeavour to explain to ye They who have rightly embraced the study of Philosophy First argument the great duty and business of a Philosopher is continually to meditate upon death therefore he ought not to dread it when it comes seem to excel in this one thing that living in obscurity and retirement from vulgar conversation they intirely and with all possible contentation of mind devote themselves to the meditation of death If this be true it will be absurd to addict our study and devoirs to the consideration of this one thing all our life long and at last when death it self comes to be offended and preturbed at it after so long and familiar a converse therewith in our thoughts * The popular scoff against Philosophers that they have death alwaies in their thoughts because they are conscious to themselves they deserve to die in respect of their nesarious lives urged to Socrates Here Simmias smiling Socrates saith he by Jove you have forced me to smile who was nothing inclined to such gayety of humor for the vulgar if they had heard this would I believe be of opinion that it is extremely suitable to Philosophers and the greatest part of our men would consequently assent that all Philosophers ought in good earnest to die and that themselves are not ignorant they very well deserve to die * Whereunto he gravely replies that it is no wonder if the ignorant vulgar give a rash and importune judgement of what they understand not This replies Socrates they might say Simmias and truly too this one thing excepted that they themselves are not ignorant how far those who are truly Philosophers both meditate upon death and are worthy of it for the vulgar are really ignorant thereof and cannot judge of what they understand not Wherefore securely pretermitting those vulgar Scoffers let us seriously pursue our discourse A Second and indeed an artificial argument drawn from the nature of death it self which he defines to be a deliverance of the Soul from the Body and puts that for the first proposition of a Syllogysm Do ye think that death is any thing Yes answers Simmias Do ye think death to be any thing else but a freeing of the Soul from the body and that to die is this when the Body being freed from the Soul remains by it self and the Soul likewise freed from the Body hath existence apart by it self or is death any other thing besides this Nothing but that answers Simmias Consider then I beseech ye whether your judgment be not the same with mine for thence I conceive light will be derived to the argument now under our consideration * Assumption but the main care of a Philosopher is to alienate and divorce his Soul from his Body and the cupidities thereof Do ye take them to be Philosophers who imploy themselves in pursuit of those pleasures as they call them of the body as of eating and drinking and other the like sensual delights By no means Socrates saith Simmias What then in Venerial pleasures Neither Hath a Philosopher any care or value for other things that appertain to the delicacy and ornament of the body as of rich cloaths fine shooes and other gaudy ornaments doth he desire to be furnished with store of these toyes Whether do ye think he esteems or contemns those things unless so far as there may be great necessity of using them My opinion is a true Philosopher contemns them all Then your opinion is that the whole study care and labour of such a Philosopher is not in pampering and adorning his body but in with-drawing as much as he can his thoughts from his body and converting them intirely upon his mind I confess it Doth it not then evidently follow from thence that the Office of a Philosopher doth chiefly appear in this that he renders his Mind free and absolute from community of his body It doth so But yet Simmias most men think that he who takes no pleasure from those sensual things deserves not the use of this life but comes nearer to death being insensible and careless of those delights that belong to the body You are in the right The first circumstance of his probation from the effects of the corporeal senses that they being not sufficiently pure and perfect cause the Soul by contagion and sympathy to be dull and pore-blind in the disquisition and discernment of truth What then when wisdom it self is to be acquired will the body prove an impediment if a man take it along as a companion in that disquisition for example the sight it self or hearing have they any truth in men or do Poets speak truth when they say that we neither see nor hear any thing clearly and intirely and if these senses of the body be not perfect or sufficiently quick and perspicuous certainly the others which are all weaker and duller than the sight and hearing must needs be less perfect and sincere Do you not think so I do saith he When then doth the Soul attain truth for when it endeavours to discern any thing clearly and distinctly by the help of the body 't is apparent that then it is seduced and circumvented by the body it self You are in the right Doth not the Soul by reasoning or some other way of discerning comprehend this perspicuously Certainly it doth And then it reasoneth best when no sense of the body offends it whether hearing or seeing or pain or pleasure but it converseth intirely undisturbdly with it self alone contemning and repudiating the body and as much as lies in its power retiring from all community and commerce therewith with certain premeditation and counsel desires things and pursues them No doubt on 't Doth not therefore the Soul of a Philosopher even in this also highly contemn the body and retreat from it and by its self inquire into the nature of things satisfied only with its own conversation So it seems Now this Operation or work of the Soul Another proof from the proper and peculiar operation of the Soul wherein withdrawing it self from commerce with the Senses it is exercised in pure and abstracted Reasoning shall
Those things therefore which are alwaies in one manner and equally comparated 't is highly consentaneous that they be simple or void of composition but those that are sometimes in one manner sometimes in another affected that is subject to alterations 't is consentaneous that they be compounded I think so Let us then return to those we noted in our precedent discourse That very Essence which by the force of questions and answers we have defined to be really existent namely God is that equally the same at all times without alteration or not Third Position God who gives Being to all creatures and is not only Good but Goodness it self not only wise but wisdom it self c. is neither compounded nor subject to any mutation but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniform knowing no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shadow of change namely the Equal it self the Beautiful the Single that is what really existeth doth it never receive any the least alteration That Essence saith Cebes must of necessity be ever the same without alteration What shall we determine of many Beautifuls as men or horses or garments or others however the like equal and beautiful or all that are comprehended under the signification of the same name are these alwaies the same or is any thing contrary to them nor they to themselves nor among themselves that I may so speak are they alwaies the same These truly saith Cebes are never exactly the same These therefore you may perceive either by your touch or sight or any other sense but those that are alwaies the same you cannot by any other way but by reasoning of your Mind comprehend for they are invisible and fall not under the power of sense You speak truly saith he in every point * Fourth position there are two kinds of things or as he speaks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 two forms of Beings Those that are alwaies thesame which are invisible and those that are mutable which are visible Will you therefore that we make two Kinds of things one visible the other invisible Let us lay down these two Kinds for a foundation saith he Let us also put the invisible to be that which is alwaies the same the visible that which is never perfectly the same And that too saith he Now saith he do we consist of any other things but Body and Soul Of no other saith he * Application of all these four positions to the present argument There are in Man two distinct things One visible not alwaies the same but obnoxious to various mutations and so compound and mortal the other invisible alwaies the same and so incompound and immortal namely the Soul whence it is evinced that the Soul is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indissoluble and consequently immortal To which of the two Kinds shall we decree the Body to be more like and more allied 'T is evident to every man saith he that the body is more of Kin to the Visible But the Soul is that visible or invisible Invisible to men saith he certainly But those things that fall under sense and those that do not did we not refer them to the nature of men or are they to be referred to any other nature think you To Human nature And what is to be concluded of the Soul that it is visible or that it is invisible Invisible This therefore is to be fixt that the Soul can by no meanes be perceived by the sight Right Therefore the Soul is more like to that Invisible Kind than the Body is and the Body more like to the Visible Of necessity Socrates * Impediments of the Soul from its so close conjunction with the body We said a while since this also that the Soul when it useth the service of the Body to consider any thing either by seeing or hearing or any other sense for to consider a thing by the body is to consider it by sense is then drawn by the body to those things that are never the same and that it errs and is amused and giddy as a Drunkard is giddy by a vertigo in his brain Altogether so But when the Soul doth contemplate by it self it aspires to what is pure to what alwaies existeth and is immortal to what is ever the same and as being of Kin thereunto is alwaies conversant therewith after it is of its self and by it self and hath power and ceaseth from error and is wholly in those things that are alwaies the same so far forth as they occur to it And this affection of the Soul is called Wisdom You speak rightly Socrates in every word To which Kind therefore both of these we mentioned above and those we now describe is the Soul more like and more allied * Conclusion that the soul is Divine and Immortal the Body gross and mortal Any man in my opinion saith he even the most ignorant will from this way and method of reasoning grant that the Soul is more alike and more cognate to the All and Whole that is to what is ever the same than to what is never exactly the same And what the Body To that which is never the same Thus observe also after the Soul and Body have come together into the same man that nature commands the body to be servant thereunto The Affections and Offices consigned by the institute or law of Nature that is of God acting by his servant Nature to both soul and body that the Soul is to rule the Body to obey and to obey the dictates of its superior the Soul and appoints the Soul to rule and give law to the Body From the reason of these things which of the two seems to you to be like unto the Divine and which to the Mortal being or is that Divine by nature qualified and made to command and govern but the Mortal to be subject and to serve I conceive so To which is the Soul like Truly Socrates the Soul is like to the Divine the Body to the Mortal Observe I pray saith he whether from all we have already alledged it be certainly evinced that the Soul is most like unto the Divine and Immortal and Intelligent and Vniform and Vnalterable but the Body is most like unto the Human and Mortal and Non-intelligent and Multiform and Dissoluble and Alterable Can we oppose any thing to these as if they were not right and convincing We cannot These things then being thus established Grand Conclusion that the Soul being indissoluble by death survives eternally is it not proper and peculiar to the body to be capable of Dissolution and to the Soul to continue indissoluble or somewhat next to this Why not You clearly see therefore saith he that when a man is dead the visible body which we call dead and to which it belongs to be dissolved and to fall asunder and be blown out doth not incontinently suffer any of these but remain some considerable time if a man hath by
pleasantness and moderation treated his Body to the time of his death For when the dead Body is fallen and enbalmed â—â—s they who are enbalmed in Egypt it continues almost intire for a very long and indeterminable time and though some members thereof shall have suffered corruption yet the bones nerves and all of the more compact sort endure if I may so say for ever Do they not Certainly * Here he explains the Emigration of the Soul out of the Body at the instant of death subjoyning that Souls after death go thither whither the similitudes of their cogitations affectâ—ons and habits leâ—d them But here the Soul â—n invisible thing goes away into another place a place noble pure not to be seen by the eyes of Mortals among the infernal shades really to a good and provident God whither indeed if God be so pleased my Soul is presently to go For the Soul it self being in this manner qualified and freed from the Body will it think you presently vanish into air and perish as many men say No Cebes and Simmias it is very far from all possibility of being dissolved But truly in that manner we have explained the matter is rather dispar aged than illustrated for the nature of it is more noble if at least the Soul depart pure carrying along with it nothing from the contagion of the body as that which did whilst it remained in this life willingly and of choice hold no communication with the Body but declined and avoided it and retired into it self imployed all its powers by cogitation to avoid it Which is nothing else but to Philosophize rightly and in good earnest to anticipate death by familiar conversation of thoughts Is not this a meditation of death Wholly * From which principle he infers that a good Soul free from the contâ—gion and delusion of the corporeal senses goes immediatly after death to a certain invisible and most blisful place where it is again conjoyn'd to God to whom it is of â—in and like Doth not therefore Felices posthac Animae quas corpora nullis Faedarunt vitiis nullaque libidine morsas Detinuere olim quae dum sub carne latebant Contemplatrices abstracte a carne volarant Saepius ad Caelos Caelis post fata quibuscum Faedera sanxerunt viventes sacra locantur Eternaque illic Laetantes luce fruuntur the Soul being so comparated go to that Divine Being like unto it self Divine I say and Immortal and Wise To which when it comes it becomes perfectly happy being freed and exempted from error from ignorance from terrors wild Loves and all other Human Evils and as men are accustomed to speak of such as have been by solemn expiations purged and initiated to Sacred Rites living eternally with the Gods Shall we speak thus Cebes or otherwise Thus in all points by Jove saith Cebes But if the Soul depart out of the Body polluted and impure as having hitherto conversed wholly with the Body and slavishly served it and being both by its own errors and by the lusts of the Body fascinated esteemed nothing true but what 's corporeal namely that gross matter hat is touched seen drunk and used to Venereal pleasures and on the contrary that which is to the eyes dark and invisible but may by the power of understanding be perceived and by the institutes and discipline of Philosophy be comprehended this I say having been accustomed to hate and abhor and dread can we imagine that a Soul thus disposed and vitiated shall depart pure and intirely collected into it self By no means saith he * From the popular Opinion of Ghosts and Spirits he adds that Souls loaden with gross earthy affections wander in grief about monuments and Sepulchres for a certain time only that is according to the Pythâ—gorean Dream they light upon other Bodies suitable to their former affections inclinations and manners I think we ought rather to decree that such a Soul departs involved in and contaminate with the stains and infection of the corporeal mass which the very conversation and familiarity of the Body because that Soul hath so continually and intirely conversed therewith and with much At tenebrosae animae nimium quae carnibus olim Demerjae jae ueresuis quos tetra libido Atque voluptates solum quas sensus alebat In terris notae posthac de carne solutae Aspectum Caeli cum quo commercia nulla Viventes habuere timent nec luce fruuntur Sed tenebris dilecta nimis prope corpora semper Ferales errant Vmbrae maestaeque Sepulchra Bustaque faedacolunt Hinc noctu spectra videntur Quae terrent homines animae sunt ista malorum Quae quaeniam crassae sunt corporeaque videntur Majus noster in Supplem Lucani lib. 4. care and cogitation imployed it self in pursuit of such things hath as it were ingrafted into it and made a part of its nature Certainly This we are to hold to be with a kind of burden gross heavy terrene visible wherewith when such a Soul is inveloped it is weighed down and carried to a visible place by fear of that invisible one and as it is vulgarly said it wanders about Monuments and Sepulchres where have been seen certain darksom Images of Souls which Apparitions such Souls represent that have not departed pure but yet retain something of that gross and visible matter and are therefore beheld 'T is very probable Socrates Nor is it less probable Cebes that those are not the Souls of good men but of Wicked and Impious that are compelled to hover and flagg about those places suffering the punishment of their former vicious Education and restlesly wandring until by desire of that corporeal following they are again intangled in and bound to a Body And bound they are as is probable to one of such inclinations and manners as they in life had imployed their thoughts upon What are these things you speak Socrates How it is probable that those who have minded gluttony railing wantonness c. nor cautiously abstained from them pâ—â—on the forms of Asses and of other wild Beasts Do not you think it probable You speak with great probability And that they who highly valued and honoured injustice oppression tyranny rapine are turned into the Kindes of Wolves Hawks Kites and other Beasts of Prey or shall we say that their Souls go to some other place Truly saith Cebes to no other We are therefore to hold that all Souls strive to go whither the similitudes of their cogitations and inclinations carry them 'T is very perspicuous truly * A consectary of the former Doctrin that the arme way to that conjunction with God is not by Politic and Theatrical virtues which are but shadows but by the serious study of wisdom and why not Are then they the happiest of men who upon deliberate purpose exercise civil prudence in a popular way of life which they call temperance and justice contracted meerly from conversation and cogitation
matter Simmias and Cebes not fearing to be in the moment of its departure from the body dissipated and blown out by winds and so to vanish as to have no longer existence any where else The second part of the disputation wherein Plato proposes the chief Opinions impugning the Immortality of the Soul observing the circumstances conducing to the grace of the Dialogue Socrates having thus spoken there succeeded a long silence And he was plainly observed profoundly to revolve in his mind the discourse he had delivered and thereupon many of us appeared to meditate upon this matter But Cebes and Simmias conferred a little betwixt themselves Whom Socrates beholding what saith he is the subject of your conference Doth any thing seem to be deficient in my discourse There remain truly many doubts and exceptions if one would with due strictness examine and pursue things more particularly If your private talk be of any other matter I ask nothing but if ye doubt of the verity of ought delivered in my discourse delay not either to declare your scruples if ye think they may be more commodiously and satisfactorily solved or to admit me to bear a share in the conference in case ye believe any thing of light or utility may arise from my assistance And I saith Simmias will ingeniously confess the truth Each of us remaining in suspense have been urging one the other out of desire of satisfaction to propose our Queries to you but fear restrains us lest we might give you trouble and our interrogations prove importune and unpleasant in this your calamity At this Socrates mildly smiling O strange saith he how hard a task shall I have to perswade others that I am far from esteeming this my present case a calamity since I cannot prevail upon you to believe I am so but ye fear lest my condition be now more afflicted and sad than at any time heretofore in my whole life Truly ye seem to think me to be inferior to Swans in the way and faculty of divining * Socrates in way of preface first positively professeth his own stedfast belief of the Souls immortality alluding to the vulgar tradition of the singing of Swans concerning which he shews himself somewhat superstitious and then declares the disquisition to be of so high moment that we ought not to be exercised therein without due attention of mind and caution lest we admit error instead of truth They when they first perceive they are to die as they sang before so they sing most at that time rejoycing that they shall forthwith come to that God whose servants they are But men being themselves afraid of death feign lies in disparagement of Swans and report that they lamenting their own death for very grief strain their voice more vehemently at the approach of it not observing that no Bird ever sings when he is displeased or pinch'd with cold or affected with any pain whatever no not the Nightingal nor Swallow nor the Hooper which they say are wont to sing for sorrow but neither these nor Swans seem to sing for grief but as I think because they are Sacred to Apollo and so being endowed with some instinct of divining when they fore-see the Goods that are reserved apud inferos they chant forth their joy and are more delighted that day than in their whole life before And for my part seriously I conceive my self to be conjoyned with these Swans in consort of the same ministry and consecrated likewise to the same Deity and that I have received from that my Lord and Master no less power of Divining and that I depart out of this life with equal quiet and calm submission Wherefore nothing remains to hinder you from speaking and interrogating whatsoever ye please concerning our former argument whilst the Eleven Officers of the Athenians permit Socrates saith well replied Simmias I will freely declare my doubt and Cebes here will likewise let you know how far he doth not embrace what you have delivered For I think my self to have as certain and confirmed knowledg of these things as you Socrates that either they are in the number of impossibilities or extremely difficult But as for what things are said concerning them not to examine them with every reason and all moments of arguments alledged or wholly to reject them and to leap back from them before you have endeavoured with all possible contention and equity of mind even to the last effort and to weariness to perpend them this I think to be the part of an effeminate and incurious spirit And herein this one thing is to be studiously endeavoured that either we may learn or find out how these things are or if that cannot be done choosing and fixing upon such a reason among those that occur to humane understanding as may be more firm and convincing i. e. as may be less subject to refutation set up our rest therein that being thereby as by a ship carried safely along we may escape the dangers and difficulties of this life unless any can be wafted and transmitted over in some firmer vehicle i. e. some Divine Word Truly I shall not be ashamed to ask since you say this nor will be a cause of accusing my self hereafter that I had not ingeniously explained to you what my opinion is concerning this matter For Socrates when I both by my self and with another by comparing reasons enquire into it I do not find your arguments to be perspicuous and convincing Perhaps saith Socrates this is your opinion but tell me freely how far and wherein my discourse fails of being perswasive Thus far saith he * The first contrary Opinion that the Soul is Harmony and Concent and so both results from and perishes with the Body that any man may say the same with equal reason both of Harmony and of a Harp and of other instruments of Music namely that Harmony is a something invisible and incorporeal and most beautiful and divine in a well tuned and concordant Harp or Lute but the Harp it self and the strings are bodies compound and terrene and of Kin to that Mortal nature And when any one hath broken the Harp or cut the strings if another should assert and by the same reason you urged that of necessity that Harmony doth still exist and is not destroyed for it would be no difficulty at all that the Harp is still in being and that the strings being broken are mortal but that the Harmony which was by community of nature and by cognation conjoyned with that Divine and Immortal Being died and vanished before the Mortal but continue in Being some where and that the wood and strings would rot and fall to dust sooner than the Harmony decay or suffer any thing of destruction For truly Socrates I conceive that you also have thought our Soul to be something like this Harmony as if our body being extense were hold together by hot and cold dry and moist and
from the mixture of these results a certain temperature and consent which is the Soul and this after those Elements or Ingredients have been exactly and in due proportions mixed and tempered together If therefore the Soul be a kind of Harmony namely when our Body shall be infinitely extended and so freed from diseases and other evils that then it is absolutely necessary the Soul how Divine soever should perish as other Harmonies that ' are either in Sounds or in all the works of Artificers and there the reliques of every body endure a long time until it be burned or dissolved by putrefafaction Observe then what we should answer to this discourse if any should affirm that the Soul is a certain temperament arising from the ingredients of the body and that in that dissolution which is called death it first perisheth Here Socrates after he had as he used often to do cast his eye round about and smiled Simmias hath reason saith he If therefore any of ye be more copious and better furnished with arguments than my self why doth he not answer for Simmias seems not lightly or rashly to have touched that discourse Yet before I answer I hold it convenient we first hear Cebes what he also reprehends in my discourse that gaining time for thoughts we may well consider what to reply then that having fully understood their objections we may either yeild to them or by observing their impertinency so defend and make good our own Doctrine But go to Cebes saith he declare to us what troubles you in this argument so that you cannot assent and give credit to my words I will tell you The Second contrary opinion that the Soul tho more firm and lasting than the Body because more excellent doth yet at length after it hath animated and worm out many bodies successively decay and through weakness perish which Cebes illustrates by an example saith Cebes To me your discourse seems to be involved in the incommodity and to be guilty of the same fault I observed before For that our Soul existed before it came into our Body I deny not for that hath been fairly and if it may be said without offence abundantly demonstrated But that any thing remains to us after death seems to me not sufficiently proved For that the Soul is stronger and more lasting than the Body I so hold that I shall not grant that Exception of Simmias to be true because the Soul seems to be far more noble and excellent than all these Why therefore saith Reason it self speaking to me do you yet doubt and refuse to believe since you see that when a man is dead what of him was more infirm and weak yet remains do you not conceive it to be necessary that what is more firm and lasting must at the same time remain conserved But now do you perpend and consider this also if I shall say any thing considerable for I want as much as Simmias did it seems some Image or similitude For to me these things seem to be spoken just as if one should an old Weaver being dead say thus of him the man is not destroyed but remains safe somewhere and should bring this argument for it the garment of his own weaving wherewith he was cloathed which is yet extant And if another should after refusal of assent to that argument ask whether of the two is more lasting man or a garment which may indeed be consumed by the very use of wearing and a third should answer that man is much more lasting and so should think it demonstrated that that man doth by so much the rather remain safe because what is less lasting hath not perished This I conceive not to be so Observe also what I say for any one may think it to be said foolishly and impertinently For this Weaver having worn out and woven many such garments died the last of these many but before the last and yet man is notwithstanding neither worse nor more infirm as for what concerns that matter This very Image I think the Soul shall receive by reason of the Body And he who shall say the same of them may seem to me to speak soberly and moderately if he conclude the Soul to be of long duration but the Body less firm and of shorter duration But I would say rather that the Soul consumes and wears but many Bodies though they all live many years For if the Body be dissolved and perish the man yet surviving and the Soul alwaies weaves a new what is worn out it will be wholly necessary that the Soul at that time when it shall die have the garment it last wove and that it perish before that last garment only But when the Soul once dies the Body then soon demonstrates the imbecility of its nature and quickly rotting vanisheth Wherefore according to this reason it would be highly extravagant for us to grow proud upon this perswasion and to be confident that after we are dead our Soul doth still remain some where For if a man shall grant more than what you affirm namely that our Soul was pre-existent before it entred into the Body yea that nothing hinders but the Souls of some may after they are dead survive and continue and that they are often born and die again that is they often come and go for that such is the virtue and power of the Soul as that it conserves it self through the various moments of its birth though I say a man shall grant all this he would yet be forced to confess this that the Soul doth not only endure vast labour in all those many accessions or approaches of generations but also at length is by one of those decensions or dislodgings that is by some one death wholly destroyed and abolished But this death and this dissolution of the Body which brings destruction at last to the Soul let no man say he understands For it is impossible any of us should comprehend it by sense This being thus it is absurd for any man living who cannot prove it with a certain foolish and ignorant security to be confident that his Soul is immortal and exempt from destruction Besides 't is necessary for a man drawing near to his death to fear for his Soul lest in that very present disjunction of his Body it utterly perish and be abolished When we had heard them speak thus Here Phaedo pauseth a little opportunely intimating that the immortality of the Soul is a thing both so important and so abstruse as that it ought not to be by an empty and unadvised credulity embraced but stedfastly rooted in the mind upon the conviction of solid and convincing arguments we were all cast into very great perplexity of thought as afterwards some confessed to others for that having been strongly perswaded by the precedent discourse of Socrates they seemed to trouble us by destroying that belief and by raising scruples in our minds so that we not only
abundance Socrates himself only excepted Who said what do ye my Friends truly I sent away the Women for no other reason but lest they should in this kind offend For I have heard that we ought to die with good mens and gratulation But recompose your selves and resume your courage and resolution Hearing this we blush'd with shame and suppressed our tears But when he had walked awhile and told us that his thighs were grown heavy and stupid he lay down upon his back for so he who had given him the poyson had directed him to do Who a little time after returns and feeling him looked upon his leggs and feet then pinching his foot vehemently he asked him if he felt it and when he said no he again pinched his leggs and turning to us told us that now Socrates was stiff with cold and touching him said he would die so soon as the Poyson came up to his heart for the parts about his heart were already grown stiff Then Socrates putting aside the Garment wherewith he was covered we ow saith he a Cock to * Intimating that death was most grateful to him for which and for his deliverance now granted to him he would have a Sacrifice offered to Aesculapius See Erasmus Chiliad 3. cent 3. pag. 1. Aesculapius but do ye pay him and neglect not to do it And these were his last words It shall be done saith Crito but see if you have any other Command for us To whom he gave no answer but soon after fainting he moved himself often as if suffering Convulsions Then the Servant uncovered him and his eyes stood wide open which Crito perceiving he closed both his mouth and his eyes * A most august testimony given by Plato of his Master Socrates to vindicate both his person and Doctrine from the prejudice of an ignominious death This Echecrates was the end of our Friend and Familiar a man as we in truth affirm of all whom we have by use and experience known the Wisest and most Just. Quid dicam de Socrate cujus morti illachrimari soleo Platonem legens Cicero de natura Deor. lib. 3. Quidni ego narrem ultima illa nocte Catonem Platonis librum legentem posito ad caput gladio Duo haec in rebus extremis inst umenta prospexerat alterum ut vellet mori alterum ut posset c. Seneca Epist 24. Sic longa virtute fuit mens sancta Catonis Purgata atque illi vitae immortalis honorem Jam contemplanti divini fata Platonis Phaedonem tradunt Cum laetus talia fatur Salve sancte liber superis demisse Catoni Dirige tu cursum vitaeque extrema meantis Instrue non alium moriturus quaero magistrum Nec restare alias voluerunt Numina curas c. Tho. Maius in Supplemento Lucani lib. 4. Quid Ambraciotes ille Cleombrotus videlicet qui cum Platonis illum Phaedonem perlegasset praecipitem se dedit nullam aliam ob causam nisi quod Platoni credidit Lactantius Certain General AXIOMS Collected out of the Precedent Dialogue concerning the Soul 1. Axioms Moral 1. PAin and Pleasure are of Kin and so linked together that they closely succeed each other by turns 2. No man ought upon what account soever to desert the station wherein God hath placed him but to persist in the duties thereof contemning all opposition 3. Self-murder is a great Crime * Ac donec Deus ille Creator Qui terrena Animam primò statione locavit Evocat haud illa statione excedere fas est 4. A Wise man ought not only not to fear Death but also to desire it with submission to to the Divine Will 5. Philosophy is the perpetual meditation of Death that is to recal and divorce the Soul from commerce with the Senses and alienate it from Corporeal lusts and pleasures Which is an anticipatton of Death that is defined to be a solution and separation of the Soul from the Body 6. The Virtues of Politicians are not true Virtues but only faint resemblances of the true 7. Philosophy is the way to true Felicity and the two grand Duties of it are 1 To contemplate the perfections of God and 2 to alienate the Soul from the allurements of the Senses and from indulgence to the Body 8. Hope of future Felicity is a very great Reward that is the best way of passing through both the Temptations and Adversities of this Life with satisfaction of Mind 9. Decent Burial such as is ordained and prescribed by good Laws of the Country ought not to be neglected by a Wise man nor Funeral Pomp affected * So Epicurus in his last Will and Testament Sepeliunto nos quà videbitur in hortis commodissimum nihilq interim sumptuosiùs quod sivo ad sepulturam sive ad monumentum pertineat agunto Diog. Laert. lib. 80. II. Axioms Natural 1. COntraries are produced out of Contraries but cannot possibly subsist the same in one subject at the same time 2. To learn is to remember what the Soul knew before it came into the Body or there are naturally and congenially in the Soul the seeds of all Sciences which are only cultivated and matured by method of Discipline not implanted or ingraffed at first as Aristotle taught III. Axioms Theological 1. GOd takes care of Men for that they are his own Possession 2. God according to Plato's definition here is not only the Cause of his own Being but gives both Being and Well-being to all things else 3. The Soul of Man is the Off-spring of God in a peculiar manner participant of the Divine Nature incompound without figure or shape Incorruptible immortal as God 4. The Soul in this Life doth indeed use the service of the Body yet is not composed organically of the Senses and other Faculties thereof but simple and existeth apart by it self after separation by Death whereby the Body being compound is dissolved but the Soul goes away untouched and void of all Corruption into another Life and there lasteth Eternally 5. Of our Souls departed there is a Twofold state some are happy others unhappy 6. Seeing that in this Life things are carried on intemperately and in confusion there must be in the next Life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a certain and just Judgement of God the Supreme and Vniversal Judge whereby Good men may be distinguished from Wicked this being an Axiom evident by the very Light of Nature that God will reward every man according to his works in this life * Deus ipse sequendam Proposuit Virtutem praemia debita justis Haec quoniam justos injusta potentia fraudat Saepiùs in terris gens humanu rebellat Solvere post mortem justissimus ipse tenetur 7. Positively and with confidence to describe the places whither the Souls of the Dead go and to define what are the Rewards and Punishments they there receive is the part of a man extremely ignorant and superstitious though it be most
for ought we can learn from the weak light of Nature to the contrary one of the Conditions may be that at the dissolution of that Union both Body and Soul should cease to be Especially since to the Souls relapsing into its first nothing no more is required but Gods withdrawing his conserving influence by which alone all his Creatures are supported and their Being is preserved Here then we find our selves left in the dark by human reason so that were it not for the brighter beams of Revelation Divine how fair soever our hopes might be of Immortality we should want a full assurance of it To conclude therefore this Parergon with the concordant judgement and in the most elegant words of that most excellent Philosopher and Christian the noble Mr. Boyl In Pag. 30. of his Book concerning the Excellency of Theology all that meer Reason can demonstrate concering this Subject may be reduced to these two things One That the Rational Soul being an Incorporeal substance there is no necessity that it should perish with the body so that if God hath not otherwise appointed the Soul may survive the body and last for ever The Other That the Nature of the Soul according to Des Cartes consisting in its being a Substance that thinks we may conclude that tho it be by death separated from the body it will nevertheless retain the power of thinking To more then this Des Cartes was both too circumspect and too conscious of the dimness of human reason to pretend tho some of his Sectators mistaking the design and scope of that his discourse have conceived it to extend even to an eviction also of the Souls absolute Immortality For in artic 7. respon ad object 2. he makes this ingenuous profession Cur de immortalitate animae nihil scripserim jam dixi in Synopsi mearum meditationum quod ejus ab omni corpore distinctionem satis probaverim supra ostendi Quod vero additis ex distinctione animae a corpore non sequi ejus immortalitatem quia nihilominus dici potest illam a Deo talis naturae factam esse ut ejus Duratio simul cum duratione vitae corporeae finiatur fateor a me refelli non posse Neque enim tantum mihi assumo ut quicquam de ijs quae a libera Dei voluntate dependent humanae rationis vi determinare aggrediar Docet quidem naturalis cognitio mentem a corpore esse diversam ipsamque esse substantiam c. Sed si de absoluta Dei potestate quaeratur an forte decreverit ut animae humanae iisdem temporibus esse desiuant quibus corpor a quae illis adjunxit destruuntur solius est Dei respondere Cumque jam ipse nobis revelaverit id non futurum nulla plane vel minima est occasio dubitandi III. Of the Comments of the ancient Ethnics concerning the infernal Mansions of Souls departed THo the description of Tartarus and Elysium here in the latter part of this grave Dialogue made by Plato be by himself declared to have been borrowed for the most part from the Fictions of others chiefly Poets and that he expresly affirms that to deliver any thing positively concerning the future state of Souls and the qualities of Rewards and Punishments in the next life is the part of a rash not a wise man yet forasmuch as the design and utility of those fictions is not more conspicuous than the first invention of them is to men inconversant in the monuments of Antiquity obscure and because there are even at this day not a few who entertain and promote as gross and in many things the like superstitious conceipts of Hell I think it worth the expence of a few vacant minutes to deduce them briefly from their original as high at least as my little reading reacheth The first Natural Philosophy whereof the envy of Time hath spared some little fragments to be handed down by tradition to this our so distant age seems to be that which supposed two Contrary Principles of all things that had beginning Of these one was God the Maker in the Grecian Theology named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concerning the Etymology of which name t' will be no lost labour nor impertinent to consult the most learned Vossius in Etymologico Linguae Latinae in verbo Juvo and the Author of Life The other Matter call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which hath the power of Dissolution or Death To the First was ascribed Light and Day to the Latter Darkness and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Non-apparence for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth privation of Light Under the Empire of Zeus or Jove was placed the upper part of the World the inferior was assigned to the dominion of Pluto the middle betwixt these two contrary Principles was imagined to be agitated by perpetual reciprocations or alternate changes so that Life and Death Light and Darkness Good and Evil rule by turns Congruous whereunto is that assertion of the Prince of Physicians Hippocrates lib. de Diaeta nihil gigni neque prorsus interire That as to Matter nothing is either generated or destroyed and that to be generated is to grow out of Hade into light men thinking that to perish which from light decreased into Hade or darkness again For it hath been an universal Axiom of ancient Philosophers nihil ex nihilo fieri aut in nihilum redigi and therefore they who allowed the World to have had a beginning held the Matter of it to have been pre-existent from all Eternity Now this which the Grecians named Hades the Aegyptians call'd Amenthes which signifies a place giving and receiving viz. Souls as Plutarch de Iside interpreteth it Which notion together with the opinion of the Souls Immortality and future rewards and punishments being by the Aegyptian Priests communicated to Orpheus he from thence after his return into Greece feigned a Hell in imitation of the Funeral Rites he had observed among them as is expresly averred by Diodorus Siculus lib. 1. pag. 71. formerly quoted who addeth that the other Comments of the Grecians de inferis were in most things conformable to the manner and place of Obsequies performed by the Aegyptians even in his own time For saith he the boat wherein dead bodies are usually carried to burial is call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a half-penny is given for a fare to the Boatman who in the tongue of that Nation is call'd Charon not far from the Ferry there stands they say a Temple of Hecate the Darksom and the gates of Cocytus and Lethe made fast with brasen barrs and other gates of Verity by which stands an image or statue of Justice without a head c. And Servius in Virgil. lib. 6. ad hunc versum sic demum lucos Stygios regna invia vivis aspicies delivers that Seneca in a certain book he wrote de ritu sacris Aegyptiorum reports that about Sienes an extreme part of Aegypt is a certain
not from heat of blood nor from excess of Choler but from strength and resolution of Mind and that a good Philosopher may make an excellent Captain Had you seen him in another Expedition returning a Conquerour from Potidaea and transferring all the honours and rewards due to so signal a victory upon his beloved Alcibiades reserving to himself no other place in the Triumph but among the followers of his Friend You might have sworn he had fought so bravely rather for Conscience than for either Glory or Spoyl and that he desired no greater name than that of a good Patriot and sincere Friend When you reflect upon his fearless refusal to execute the Command he had received from the supreme Council of Athens to fetch Leo Salaminius from Salamine to be put to death according to the Sentence given against him by the Usurper Critias and his Adherents you will I presume acknowledge that he fear'd nothing but to do ill that he disdain'd to assert any power that was not just that Athens it self might with more ease have been removed to Salamine than he brought to relinquish Right and Equity and that he was more ready to accompany the oppressed in their Sufferings under Tyranny than to be a sharer in the administration of it Had some Roman been a witness of this virtuous obstinacy he would have cried out perhaps that the Capitol itself was not more immoveable than the integrity of Socrates and envied Greece the glory of so rare an Example What then would he have said my Lord had he been present at the dispute betwixt the same Socrates and his most faithful Scholar Crito wherein he being with no weak arguments urged to evade the execution of that most unjust Sentence lately pass'd upon him and deliver himself from violent death by an escape plotted and prepared to his hand nevertheless not only rejected that affectionate advice but by demonstration convinced the Author of it that the auctority of Law and Decrees of Courts of Judicature are things in their sanction so venerable and sacred as to oblige men to submission even when they are manifestly unjust and brought him at length to acquiesce in this Conclusion nefas sibi esse è carcere egredi injussu Magistratus contra legum autoritatem Herein whether Socrates were in the right or not let our Civilians determin I for my part verily believe he thought he was and this is most evident that he could never be either overcome by terrors or won by allurements to recede so much as a hairs bredth from what he had once defined to be just This very Monosyllable doubtless was his whole Decalogue equivalent to the Laws of the twelve Tables among the Romans the basis of his Religion the Centre of his Counsels and rule to his actions nor can I be easily persuaded that Astrea left to dwell among men untill after his death Of his obedience to the Laws and constitutions of his City he gave this further testimony that when the Athenian Republic to repair their people much exhausted by warre and pestilence had made an Edict that every man of fit years should be obliged to espouse one woman as principal wife and have liberty to take another for procreation he notwithstanding he had his hands full of unquiet Xantippe whose peevishness and morosity was grown to be the daily exercise of his patience at home and his reproch abroad yet in conformity to the Edict fear'd not to receive into his little house and narrow bed another Consort also one Myrto daughter of that Aristides surnamed the Just but equaly poor with himself This certainly could not but be somwhat harsh and disagreeable to a man already entered into the confines of old age and understanding the pleasures of serenity and repose and yet I must not imagin it to have been at all difficult to the wisedom of our Socrates whose tranquillity appears to have been elevated like the head of mount Athos above the tempest of feminin contentions jealousies and impertinences and his Mind incapable of peâ—turbations However he put not private cares into the balance against a duty to the Public but chose to be a good Citisen by increasing Posterity though he were sure thereby to multiply his own domestic incommodities Acting by this infallible principle of Justice which is as Plato calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the greatest of human goods and Mother of all other virtues and fully persuaded of the divinity and immortality of the Soul which is the fundament of all Religion and of future rewards and punishments the wonder is the less that this admirable man was able both to trample upon all the splendid and precious things of this momentany life and to bid defiance to all the terrible for secure in his own innocence and confident of happiness to come 't was less difficult to him either to contemn dangers or resist temptations Nay to do him right neither could this Temperance nor that Fortitude be at all difficult to him who by long use and continual practice had exalted them from Virtues into Habits In the first he appear'd to be so perfect that tho as a man he could not but feel the motions and sollicitations of Corporeal Appetites yet none of them dared to rebell against the Soveraignty of Reason by whose power he alwaies both ruled and bounded them nor could even a good Soul separated from its body and delivered from all encumbrances of Matter have acted more sedately or been less incommodated with Passions In a word in his whole life he seem'd not only unconcern'd in but insensible of the vain appearance of human things Being thus impenetrable to Cupidities it may be worth our labour to enquire also how strong he was against Fear That we may therefore take the true hight of his Courage let us if it please Your Lordship observe his deportment at the bar in the prison and at his death At the Tribunal we hear his Constancy no less than his Innocency triumphing over the power and malice of his combined Accusers the greatest hurt they can do to me saith he is to think it possible to hurt me since God takes care of Good men and they therefore can never be violated by wicked men To a friend whispering in his ear that his Judges had before resolved to doom him to death he answers softly and with a smile but such a smile as retain'd an aire of Gravity and Dignity and hath not Nature passed the same doom upon them Retiring after his condemnation Adieu my friends saith he I am now going to suffer death ye to enjoy life God alone knows which of the two is better In the Prison we find him despoil'd of whatever Fortune could take from him his body covered with raggs and loaden with chains his leggs galled and cramp'd with fetters his eyes entertain'd with no objects but a wife and Infant weeping and yet for all this we hear no complaints no lamentations
we say 't is just or not Just without doubt Is it fair and good Why not But have you ever beheld with your eyes any thing of those None saith he Have you with any other of your corporal senses attained to these things I speak of all as of magnitude health strength and in a word the like which are of such a nature as they have all a real being is their most true and certain nature considered and fully discovered by the body Or is it thus that he who is most fitly and exquisitely comparated or disposed to comprehend by cogitation the nature of that very thing in the disquisition whereof he is versed shall come nearest to the knowledge and understanding of the nature thereof No doubt of it He then will perform this most purely and clearly who by that edge of his Wit by that accuteness of Spirit pierceth into everything neither making use of his sight while he thinks nor drawing any other sense into counsel together with his reasoning but imploying only his pure and simple faculty of reasoning endeavours thereby to investigate and discover the naked and true nature of the things themselves free and separated from his ears and eyes and in a word from his whole body as that which may perturb the Soul it self and hinder it from acquiring to it self verity and wisdom when it is imployed in conversation and commerce therewith Will this man think you if any other doth attain to understand the true nature of things you speak truth Socrates over and over saith Simmias Is it not then consequently necessary that to those who are truly Philosophers there be a constant and established Opinion that they may confer among themselves about these things there seems to be a plain way as it were paved to our hands which leads us with reason to the consideration of things but while we carry about this body and our Soul is immersed in so dark and incommodious a sink of evil we shall never attain to what we desire This we affirm to be truth For this body creates to us an infinity of businesses troubles and disquiets meerly for the nourishment and necessary supplies of it Besides if diseases chance to invade us they likewise hinder us from the investigation of various things and that fills us with loves desires fears various imaginations and Chimera's and many foolish whimsies so that it is a very true saying that the body will never permit us to be wise For nothing but the body raiseth wars seditions combats and the like mischiefs by its inordinate lusts and we are forced to provide monies for maintenance of the body being slaves and drudges to the necessary services of it Now while we are thus imployed in these meaner Offices we have no leisure to apply our selves to the study and search of wisdom And what is the greatest of all incommodities if we do by chance get any thing of leisure and vacancy from the cares of the body and address our minds to the serious consideration of any thing presently the body intrudes and while we are busied in that inquiry raiseth commotions and tumult and so disturbs and confounds the mind that it cannot possibly discern truth But we have already demonstrated The former assumption repeated and illustrated by a Dilemma Whence flows a certain conclusion since the grand design of a Philosopher is to discern truth his duty is to separate his Soul from his Body and so as it were to anticipate death in this life that if we desire to perceive any thing purely and clearly we must withdraw from the body and imploy only our mind which alone is capable to discern the nature and properties of Objects in the contemplation thereof for then at length as appears we shall attain to the fruition of what we desire and with love and diligence seek after namely wisdom when we have passed through the refinement of death as our precedent discourse intimates but not whilst we remain in this life For if it be impossible for us to perceive any thing pure and intire in conjunction with the body one of these two propositions must of necessity follow either we shall never attain to sapience or not until we have passed out of this life For then will the Soul be intirely divorced and separate from the Body but not before While we live here we approach indeed never to sapience if we have as little commerce and conversation with the body and be as little infected with the lusts thereof as the condition and necessities of our frail nature will permit but preserve our selves pure from the contagion of the same until God himself shall discharge and free us wholly from it And being once thus delivered and pure from the madness and seducements of the body as is reasonable to believe we shall both be associated to the like pure beings and by our selves know all purity and integrity which perhaps is truth it self For it is not possible for him who is himself impure to touch what is pure These things Simmias I conceive it necessary for all who are possessed with a right desire of understanding things both to hold and to discourse of among themselves Are not you also of the same opinion Altogether Socrates If then these be true proceeds Socrates there is truly great hope The second conclusion from the premises viz. if we then only live well i. e. exercise our faculty of reasoning when we abdicate our senses it necessarily follows that we shall then be happy and perceive truth plainly when we shall be wholly separated from the body i. e. after death that who shall arrive at the place whither I am now going will there if any where abundantly attain to the enjoyment of that for which we have in the whole course of our life past been seeking with extreme labour and study This peregrination therefore now appointed to me is finished with good hope and so it will to any other who shall have once perswaded himself to prepare his mind by rendring it pure and clean No doubt of it saith Simmias Is therefore what we said even now to be held a purification and purging of the Mind viz. as much as is possible to divorce it from the Body and to accustom it to be by it self congregated and retired from the same and to dwell as it were by it self both in this and in the future life single by it self and freed as from the chains of the body Yea certainly saith Simmias Is death then rightly called a solution and separation of the Soul from the Body It is so saith he And do they only who study Philosophy rightly most endeavour to divorce their Souls from their Bodies as we have said is not this the constant meditation of Philosophers It seems to be so What therefore we said in the beginning A third conclusion Since the principal design of a Philosopher is to attain unto truth and
I would now gladly hear by what way you are provided to demonstrate it By this saith he Upon this we are already agreed that if a man record and recal to his memory any thing whatsoever he must have known it before True saith he * A further proof of the same supposition whereof this is the summe that from the parity or imparity of the thing we have known we come to understand other things while we mark what is like what unlike which he asserts by many Examples Do we then confess this also that when there is knowledge by this way that knowledge is reminiscence I say by this way by this example as if a man had perceived a thing either by sight or by hearing or any other sense he hath not only known that thing but thought upon some other thing also whereof that very knowledg is not but of another might we not say that he hath remembred the thing the understanding and knowledg whereof he hath perceived How say you this Let this be an example is not the knowledge of a Man one and the knowledge of a Harp another Why not Know you not that it is usual to Lovers when they behold either the Harp or Garment or any other thing which their Paramours or Mistresses are wont to use to know that Harp and to have in their mind the image of the Youth whose the Harp is Now this their Knowledg is Remembrance as a man having seen Simmias often remembers Cebes and there are found infinite other examples of the same kind There are so saith Simmias by Jove And is not that saith he Remembrance and most of all when the same hapneth to us in those things which when we have not lately seen them through length of time and discontinuance of use we have forgot yes saith he Doth it not happen that if one see the Picture of a Horse or Harp he presently remembers a Man and if he see the picture of Simmias he instantly remembers Cebes It doth And if he see Simmias his picture doth he not remember Simmias himself It doth so happen saith he * Whence it follows that Reminiscense is from the parity or disparity of things compared among themselves Doth it not then come to pass that in all these instances Remembrance is exercised partly from things alike partly from things unlike It doth * Another supposition that from this Reminiscence we do not only perceive wherein the resemblance consisteth but also what is wanting to make the resemblance perfect with respect to the thing already known Which also he remonstrates by Examples But now when a man remembers a thing upon sight of the like ought he not to be so qualified or disposed as to understand whether there be any defect of resemblance in what he so remembers Of necessity saith he Consider then saith he if these things be so Do we say that there is any thing Equal not wood to wood nor stone to stone nor any thing of that kind but besides all these some other thing viz. Equality it self shall we hold there is any such thing in nature or not yes by Jove saith Simmias but exceedingly admirable Do we know what that thing Equal is We do saith he Whence shall we derive the knowledge of it shall we not from those things we just now mentioned when we behold woods or stones or any other the like Bodies equal from these I say shall we not in our thoughts comprehend that which is quite another thing different from them or doth it not seem to you to be quite another thing Now consider this also Do not those very equal woods and equal stones which are the same still seem to you sometimes to be equal sometimes unequal They do so What Do they sometimes seem to you equal or unequal or the very Equality it self seem Inequality Not at all Socrates Are not then saith he Equals and Equality the same thing Not as I conceive Socrates But saith he * Another Supposition to the support whereof the rest are applied viz. that we come to know things Equal and Unequal by a certain Divine power which Plato here calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Equal from the reason of the comparison made understanding this simply that in our Soul is a Divine virtue or faculty by which the operations of both Memory and Science and other the like are performed tho the Equals be different from the Equality yet you have both understood and perceived the knowledge thereof You speak most truly saith he Is it not the same thing whether the object understood be like or unlike to that which occasioned the thoughts of it It is That truly makes no difference for having seen one thing and from that very sight conceiving in your mind another whether like or unlike necessary it is saith he that Conception be Remembrance Very well What then saith he are we to hold the same concerning those things of which we newly spake woods stones and the like Do the Equals seem to be so among themselves as the Equal it self is or doth something seem to be wanting therein so as they are not such as that equal is or nothing Much is wanting Do we not admit this also as certain and perspicuous when a man having beheld something * From these suppositions given and granted he infers toward the explication of the question under debate that the Soul understands both like and unlike things wherein the parity or disparity consisteth which is Science and from Remembrance as being from comparison of par and impar comprehends the same in his mind and will have it for example what I now look upon to be exactly such as some other thing but yet it fails i. e. it cannot be such but comes short of the other to which he likened it is it not of absolute necessity that he who so reasoneth hath before seen that to which he said the other is like but yet there is wanting therein somewhat to complete the similitude or resemblance It is necessary What are we in the same manner affected in the consideration both of the things that seem equal and of the equality it self Altogether Necessary it is therefore that we have first seen that Equal before that time wherein having first beheld the Equals we comprehend them in our mind and conceive that all things affect to be such as that Equal but cannot reach to a full and perfect similitude or resemblance thereof So it is * And that although our Soul doth in this life act by meanes of the corporeal Senses and so is obliged to make use of them as her instruments yet that very faculty of perceiving by them is to be deducted from a higher and nobler principle namely that Divine power essential to the Soul which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Equal so that by that name he seems to intimate God himself to the end he might
but only in respect of the magnitude wherewith he is endowed nor that he exceeds Socrates as he is Socrates but that Socrates hath smalness being compared to Simmias his greatness Right Nor that Simmias is exceeded by Phedo as he is Phedo but because compared to the smalness of Simmias Phedo is endowed with greatness Right again Thus then Simmias hath the appellation of both great and little since placed in the middle of them he exceeds the one in greatness and by reason of his smalness yeilds to the others greatness And at the same time smiling I seem saith he to be delighted with words like an Historian Is it not as I say He assented This I say out of desire that you may be of the same opinion with my self * Second Position that contraries as contraries are neither made nor capable of existing together but either give place each to other or perish when one comes upon another For I conceive that Magnitude it self is not only never willing to be both great and small at once but also that the magnitude which is in us never receives smalness nor wills to be exceeded but of the two one either vanishes and gives place when its contrary namely smalness approaches or is destroyed when the other appears for when it hath once received and put on smalness it can be no longer greatness nor is it willing to be other than what it then is As I when I have received and put on smalness and am yet the same that I am or am this same little I. But that hath not dared since it is great to be little In the same manner also that little that is in us would not be made great nor will one of two contraries while it is what it is become what the other is but either it gives place or perishes in this passion Very right saith Cebes as I conceive * Objection from the Doctrine above demonstrated which seems repugnant to this Position for it was before affirmed that Contraries are produced out of Contraries but here he saith that Contraries cannot be together Then one of those who were present who it was I do not well remember by the Gods saith he was it not granted in the precedent disputation that one contrary may have being out of the other viz. that a greater hath existence out of a less and a less out of a greater and that this is the generation of Contraries out of Contraries and now it seems tome to be said that that never is done Here Socrates having inclined his ear to the speaker you have saith he manfully remembred what was delivered but you understand not the difference betwixt what is now said and what was said before * That Objection solved by reconciliation of the two Positions seemingly repugnant Where he also distinguishes betwixt the form of a contrary and the Subject that is susceptible of a contrary making good his Thesis by various examples In the precedent dispute it was said that out of one contrary is made another but here 't is said that a contrary cannot be contrary to it self neither that which is in us nor that which is in nature Then we spake of those things that have contraries giving these the Sirname of those Now we speak of Contraries themselves whose Sirname those things wherein they are obtain And these contraries we could never affirm to be willing to receive mutual generation one from the other And converting his eyes upon Cebes he said doth any of these things trouble you Cebes Neither am I discomposed saith Cebes nor doth what you say trouble me * He returns to his Second Position and both proves and illustrates it by Examples We are then agreed saith he that a contrary can never be contrary to it self We are so saith Cebes Consider this therefore with me saith he whether you can assent to it Do you call any thing hot and cold yes What as Snow and Fire No. Is any other thing hot but fire any thing cold but Snow yes certainly But this you conceive I think that Snow while it continues Snow will never receive heat as we said above but at the accession of it either yield to it or be abolished Right And that fire at the accession of Cold will likewise go out or be destroyed but never dare after the admission of Cold to be what it was namely fire and cold You say true saith Cebes To * In Numbers and their various forms some of this sort also it usually happens that they not only perpetually account and design the same Species by the same name but some other thing too which indeed is not that though it alwaies hath the form thereof when it existeth But now perhaps what I say will be more easily explained in this manner Ought an Odd number to have this name wherewith we now mark it or not Yes doubtless This alone of all things for this I ask or somewhat else which though different from Odd ought nevertheless alwaies to call it by its own name because the nature of it is such as never to defect from Odd This I say is that very thing as the number of three and many other numbers suffer Now consider this in the number Three are Three to be called both by their own name Three and by that of Odd also though Odd be not the same with a Triad or Ternary But thus comparated is also a Ternary and Five and every half of a number so that though it be not the same as Odd yet alwaies every one of them is Odd. Two likewise and Four and again every other Series of number though it be not the same as Even yet must alwaies be Even Do you grant this or not Why should I not saith he Observe then saith he what I design to demonstrate it is this * A Third Thesis dependent on the precedents That what admits a contrary quality is One thing and the contrary quality admitted another The Contrary Subject therefore remains while contrary qualities are variously induced but so that contrary qualities cannot be in the same mode But so long as a contrary quality is present it communicates its nature and name to the subject as while an Odd number shall be present that number will be and be called Odd while Heat shall be in a body the body will be and be called hot c. It seems that not only those Contraries are incapable of mutually receiving each other but all other things whatsoever which though they be not contrary among themselves yet alwaies have contraries nor do they seem capable to put on that form which is contrary to the Species wherein they are but when that contrary form once intervenes they presently either perish or give place Shall we not say that Three will sooner perish or suffer any thing else than endure to be made Even Yes saith Cebes And yet saith he again the number Two
place which they call Philas that is the Female Friends because there Isis was appeased and attoned by the Aegyptians after her displeasure conceived for that she had not found the limbs of her husband Osiris whom his brother Typhon had slain Which being afterward found when she desired to bury them she chose the safest place of a neer Marish whereunto the access was extremely difficult and embarrass'd the Marish being full of Mudd and Papyr-flaggs Beyond this is a short Island inaccessible to men whence it was call'd Abatos and mentioned by Lucan Hinc Abatos quam nostra vocat veneranda vetustas This Mere is named Styx because it raiseth Sadness and Sorrow in all that pass over it and hither on certain daies come such who have been initiated to the sacred Rites and that it had been written that the neighbouring people carry over their dead to the other side of the Lake but if any chance to perish in the difficult passage and his body be not found his Funeral Obsequies are to be deferred untill a hundred years be expired Whence that dream Centum errant annos volitanque haec littora circum Farther well known it is even to yong Students of Homer that his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is divided into Tartarus described at the 13th Iliad v. θ and Elysium described Odyss ♌ v. 563. and both according to the doctrin of the Aegyptians who placed both the Bridewell of the wicked and the Mulberry Gardens of the Just ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a subterraneous place or region ' But where to fix his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath puzzled all his Commentators Strabo Geograph lib. 3. pag. 150. thereby understands the remotest part of Spain and contends for the placing his Elysium there More recent Poets take the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Islands of the Fortunate for the seats of the blessed whereof see Hesychius ad verbum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where you shall read this also Some say Elysium lyes in Aegypt some in Lesbos others in a place guarded with thunder and lightning and not to be approached by Mortals So that a man would think Eden to be turned into Elysium nor doth it seem to be either more or less than what Diodorus just now related from the Aegyptians that the gates of Cocytus and Lethe were secured by brasen barrs But Plutarch removes this Paradise from the Hollows of the Earth into the globe of the Moon lib. de facie in Luna So various are the conjectures of men so uncertain their imaginations so easie their credulity especialy when they are blinded by superstition What pleasure other◠may find in reading these various Comments upon Fictions I cannot divine but this I will adventure to confess that to me they appear as idle and extravagant as the works of Didymus a Grammarian did to Seneca Who in Epist 88. derides him for writing 4000 Volumes wherein he chiefly enquires about the native Country of Homer the true Mother of Aeneas whether Anacreon were more addicted to wine or women whether Sappho were a common prostitute and other the like ridiculous impertinences which were to be forgotten if you knew them Wherefore leaving these dissenting Expositors let us resume our clue and follow the trace of the Fiction it self Though Homer constituted Rhadamanthus and his brother Minos Judges in the infernal Arches Odyss 4. v. 567. and fetch'd those names from Crete yet the ground or example was derived from Aegypt as appears from this relation of Diodorus Siculus lib. 1. p. 58. Among the Aegyptians saith he when a dead body is to be interred the Kindred of the deceased give notice of the day to the Judges and to the friends and acquaintance of the defunct and proclam that he is at that time to be wafted over the Lake At the day prefix'd more then 40 Judges assembled together seat themselves in a Semicircle or Half-moon on the brink of the Lake and a Boat ready prepared for that use is lanched with a man therein to row it whom they in the Aegyptian language call Charon Then before the body is put aboard it is permitted to every man present to bring in what accusations he thinks just against the party deceased If any prove that he lived an evil life the Judges immediately give sentence upon him according to the nature and quality of his transgressions and the body is forbidden to be buried But a false and malicious accuser is obnoxious to to great penalties When no just impeachment is brought in the kindred laying aside the mourning and laments praise the defunct in their laudatory harangues not mentioning the nobility of his blood and extraction as the the Grecians use to do because they hold that all in Aegypt are equaly nonoble but his good Education in youth and the piety justice continency and other virtues of his maturer age all which they particularly recount and celebrate This funeral Oration ended they address their Oraisons to the infernal Deities beseeching them to receive him into the Society of the Pious with no small devotion making this prayer the form whereof hath been preserved and transmitted down to us by Porphyrius de Abstinentia lib. 4. Sect. 10. O Lord Sun and all ye Gods who give life to men receive me and deliver me a companion to the immortal Gods For while I lived here in this age I piously worshipped the Gods whom my Parents taught me to worship and honour'd those who begat me nor have I killed any man nor defrauded any that trusted me nor committed any inexpiable evil But if at any time of my life I have offended by eating or dtinking any thing forbidden I offended not by my self but by those bowells of mine there pointing to a little Coffin wherein the stomach and gutts are reposed apart Which said the speaker throws the little Coffin into the water as containing the offending parts and the whole assembly with loud and ingeminated applauses recommending the defunct that is him who had performed all the dueties of life as one that shall enjoy the everlasting conversation of pious Souls apud inferos the body is put into the Boat and ferried over the Lake to be inhumed Here reflecting upon this Aegyptian praier or Apology rather made in the name of the dead we may en passant observe both a touch of Pharisaical arrogancy and self-justification and precepts exactly concordant with those given first as the tradition of the Talmudical Rabbines teacheth to the Sons of Noah and afterward by Moses to the Hebrews in the second Table of the Decalogue and from them descended down to us So that that saying of Salomon that nothing is new under the Sun was true many hundred of years before his daies yea and before Moses's too But I have made a digression of a praier and must return into the little remainder of my way From these Aegyptian obsequies it was as the same Diodorus in the same place observes that Orpheus having while
without the precepts and discipline of Philosophy and do they go to the best place How can these be most happy Because 't is likely that they come again into some civil and tame kind of Animals as Bees Drones Pismires or return into men and become moderate Very likely But to pass into the kind of Gods is possible to none but who hath duly exercised himself in the study of wisdom for he having been all his life possessed with desire of learning departs out of this world pure and undefiled And 't is upon this account that Cebes and Simmias that good and genuin Philosophers abstain from all pleasures of the Body and constantly and firmly contain themselves not permitting their appetites and passions to carry them away in pursuit of sensual delights nor fearing the subversion of their private Estates and the invasion of poverty as the vulgar and avaricious do nor dreading the ignominy and reproach of mean spirited men as the ambitious and lovers of great Honours do but abstracting and alienating their minds from all such splendid trifles Nor would it be consentaneous to them to do otherwise Socrates saith Cebes No by Jove would it not saith he Therefore Cebes saith he again A lively and remarkable description of that Philosophical life the ground whereof is the contemplation of God and its work to instruct men to renounce all exorbitant affections of the body c. all who take care of their Souls and imploy not their life in pampering and adorning the body neglecting and repudiating all those things they walkt not in the way of those we mentioned before who are wholly ignorant whither they are to go But Philosophers being perswaded they ought to do nothing contrary to the precepts of Philosophy or to the solution and expiation thereof leave the common road of the multitude and proceed in the way that Wisdom hath shewn to them and follow the conduct thereof as of their Leader How Socrates I will tell you saith he Men studious of Discipline know that Philosophy when it undertakes their Soul really bound and glewed to the body which Soul is constrained to contemplate things themselves through the body as through a Bride-well and not single by it self able to contemplate it self and when it wallows in all ignorance and perceives the power and efficacy of that bond which exserts it self even by lusts themselves namely that the Soul thus bound and imprisoned doth imploy all its force and powers to be by lusts and desires more closely enchained I say men studious of Discipline know that Philosophy when it hath found their Mind or Soul so disposed is versed chiefly in this by degrees to mitigate and compose the Soul and to deliver it from those Fetters teaching that that consideration which is performed by the service of the eyes is full of error and that the information of the Ears and all other senses is likewise full of error perswading it to retire from them and not to use them unless when necessity compels and declaring and exhorting it to recollect and congregate it self and to give credit to none but it self seeing that it self alone can by â—â—self understand and comprehend that which existeth by it self and that what it considers by other things because subject to alteration it ought not to account true but only such as the Senses represent it but that what it self clearly perceives is intelligible and unperceivable by Sense * Description of a profane and vicious life Whereof the greatest Evil is that such men are insensible both of their sins and misery When therefore the Soul of a man truly a Philosopher conceives that it ought not to oppose this deliverance and infranchisment comes thus to abstain from pleasures and lusts and as much as it is able from griefs also and errors thus casting up its account When a man is possessed and even transported with great joy or astonished with excessive grief or inraged by the stings of Lusts he doth not by those passions suffer so much of evil as one would by common and vulgar judgment think whether for example that he should pursue those Lusts feel those Diseases and undergo loss of his Estate in vain but what is the highest of all Evils he suffers this that he perceives not nor takes notice that he suffers What mean you Socrates saith Cebes Because every mans Mind is constrained to rejoyce and delight vehemently up-an occasion of some things and to esteem that wherein he suffers that affection to be most manifest and most true though the same be not such Now are these things discernable by the sense or are they not Wholly But in this affection is not the Soul obliged to sympathize with the Body In what manner Because every pleasure and every grief as if armed with a nail affixeth and as it were with a buckle fastneth the Soul to the Body and makes it corporeal thinking all things to be true that the body dictateth For that it is constrained to agree with the Body in opinions and to be delighted at the same time with it as I conceive comes from the conjecture of the one with the other and thence the Soul is carried about by the common force of education and customes so as it cannot go to the shades below i. e. to a second life pure and undefiled but departs polluted with stains and infection derived from the body and then presently falls into another body and as if sowed therein grows to it remaining void of that divine pure and uniform conversation You speak great truths Socrates saith Cebes * Conclusion monitory With what care and circumspection a Philosopher ought to beware lest he be intangled in the snares of Lusts and Corporeal pleasures against which by his profession he proclaims open War By reason of these things Cebes they who are truly studious are modest and valiant but not by reason of those that are in the opinion of the vulgar What think you Not by reason of vulgar things certainly For the Soul of a Philosopher will not hold it self obliged to free it self from the institutes of Philosophy and letting loose the bridle of its precepts give it self up to the desires either of pleasures or pains and permit it self to be again chain'd to the body and so render its work imperfect weaving and unravelling its web like Penelope as they say but will resolve it to be most decent to compose all those desires and follow the conduct and mandates of reason and to be alwaies conversant herein to contemplate things true and divine and such as may not be carryed about by temerity of opinions and being bred up and nourished with them conclude it ought in this manner to live while life lasteth and when death comes to go to a place agreeable and cognate to its nature and be delivered from human evils From this Education it can fear nothing grievous by its own institution studiously labouring in this