I was going on to what is obvious and in view to every Man the union between our Soul and Body Nor was I sollicitous to find this an exact Parallel as he fancies I was obliged to do What if there be no exact Parallel Will any Man of a sober Mind or that is Master of his own Thoughts conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being whereof there is not an exact parallel in the Creation If any Man will stand upon this come make an Argument of it let us see it in form and try its strength Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the Creation is impossible in God c. He will sooner prove himself ridiculous than prove his Point by such a Medium 'T is enough for a sober Man's purpose in such a case as we are now considering if we find such things actually are or might as easily be as what we see actually is among the Creatures that are of as difficult conception and explication as what appears represented in the Enquirers Hypothesis concerning a Trinity 'T is trifling to attempt to give or to ask a parallel exact per omnia It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose if there be a parallel quoad hoc viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of Conception And tho the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures be not so many distinct Substances a Trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being than three such Natures or natural Powers in the One humane Nature And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing as the Excellent Author of the 28 Propositions speaks must also acknowledg the most real Perfections in the Divine Being tho not univocal but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us And are they no way distinct Let any sober Understanding judg will the same Notion agree to them all Is his Knowledg throughout the same with his effective Power Then he must make himself For who can doubt he knows himself And is his Will the self-same undistinguishable Perfection in him with his Knowledg Then the Purposes of his Will must be to effect all that he can For doth he not know all that he can do And the Complacencies of his Will must be as much in what is evil as good even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest and most immoral Evils For he knows both alike I know what is commonly said of extrinsecal Denominations But are such Denominations true or false Have they any thing in re correspondent to them or have they not Then some distinction there must be of these Perfections themselves If so how are they distinguisht And there appears great reason from God's own Word to conceive greater distinction of the three Hypostases in his Being than of the Attributes which are common to them as is said Sob Enq. pag. 140. In reference whereto it is not improper or impertinent to mention such Differences as we find in our own Being tho they be not distinct Substances Less distinction in our selves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but Substance What he adds concerning the Union of Soul and Body in our selves which he cannot deny to be distinct Substances is from a Man of so good sense so surprisingly strange and remote from the Purpose that one would scarce think it from the same Man but that he left this part to some other of the Club and afterwards writ on himself without reading it over or this was with him what we are all liable to some drowsy Interval For when he had himself recited as the Enquirer's words or sense If there is this Union between two so contrary Natures and Substances as the Soul and Body why may there not be a like Union between two or three created Spirits He without shadow of a pretence feigns the Enquirer again to have forgot the Question because Soul and Body are not both intelligent Substances And why Sir doth this argue him to have forgot the Question 'T is as if he expected a Man to be at the top of the Stairs assoon as he toucht the first Step. In a Series of Discourse must the beginning touch the end leaving out what is to come between and connect both parts What then serve Mediums for And so farewel to all reasoning since nothing can be proved by it self He expected it seems I should have proved three intelligent Natures might be united because three intelligent Natures might be united But say I and so he repeats if there be so near Union between things of so contrary Natures as Soul and Body why not between two or three created Spirits The Question is as he now states it himself why may not three intelligent Substances be united And hither he with palpable violence immediately refers the mention of the Union of Soul and Body and says he Why Sir are Body and Soul intelligent Substances And say I but why Sir are not the three supposed created Spirits intelligent Substances And now thinks he will my easy admiring Readers that read me only and not him say What a Baffle hath he given the Enquirer What an ignorant Man is this Mr. to talk of Soul and Body as both intelligent Substances But if any of them happen upon the Enquirer's Book too then must they say how scurvily doth this Matter turn upon himself How inconsiderate a Prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a Considerer so to represent him And I my self would say had I the opportunity of free Discourse with him in a Corner which because I have not I say it here Sir is this sincere Writing Is this the way to sift out Truth And I must further say this looks like a Man stung by the pungency of the present Question If Soul and Body things of so contrary Natures that is of an intelligent and unintelligent Nature can be united into one humane Nature why may not three created Spirits all intelligent Natures be as well united into some one thing It appears you knew not what to say to it and would fain seem to say something when you really had nothing to say and therefore so egregiously tergiversate and feign your self not to understand it or that your Antagonist did not understand himself The Enquirer's Scope was manifest Nothing was to be got by so grosly perverting it Is there no Argument but à pari Might you not plainly see he here argued à fortiori If contrary Natures might be so united why not much rather like Natures When you ask me this Question Do not Body and Soul remain two Substances a bodily and a spiritual notwithstanding their concurrence to the Constitution of a Man I answer Yes And I thank you Sir for this kind Look towards my Hypothesis If they were not so the mention of this Union had no way serv'd it You know 't is only Union with continuing distinction
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or singly considered but if by negative abstraction you sever any one from the other so as to say the one is God and not the other or any one is all that is signify'd by the Name of God I deny it as before I did for so you would exclude the other two the Godhead which is but what was expresly enough said Sob Enquiry pag. 47. The Father is God but not excluding the Son and the Holy Ghost the Son is God but not excluding c. And if as this Author quotes we are compelled by the Christian Verity so to speak I wonder it should not compel him as it is Christian Verity or at least as it is Verity as well as the rest of Christians or Mankind Why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth Athanasius his word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we are necessitated and if the Considerator's own Translation grieve him he might relieve himself by considering that all Necessity is not compulsive And because he hath brought me to Athanasius I shall take the occasion to say I cannot apprehend him to have any sentiment contrary to this Hypothesis His business was against the Arians or the Ariomanites as he often called them as symbolizing also with Manes And because with them the Controversy was whether the Son and Spirit were Creatures in opposition hereto he constantly asserts their consubstantiality with the Father never intending for ought that appears that their Being was numerically the same with his but of the same kind uncreated coessential coeternal with his own For so he expresly speaks in his other or additional Questions i. e. asking Quest. 6. How many Essences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. How many sorts of Essence as the Answer will direct us to understand it do you acknowledg in God The Answer is I say one Essence one Nature one Form 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and adds one Kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which sufficiently expounds all the rest He acknowledged no different kinds of Essence or Nature in the Godhead but that One only which was eternal and uncreated agreeably to what he elsewhere says against the Followers of Sabellius 'T is impossible things not eternal Beings not partaking Godhead should be ranked or put in the same order with the Godhead Afterwards speaking of the Father and the Son he says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the One is such not the same as the other the other such as he And that the Son was not to be conceived under another Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor under a strange and foreign Character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but was God as the Father And I appeal to any Man's Understanding and Conscience If that great Author believ'd a numerical sameness of Essence common to the three Persons what should make him blame the Sabellians for making the Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when by the latter in that case he must mean the same thing as by the former In the forecited Questions he expresly says we were to acknowledg in the Deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three Individuals Answer to Quest. 7. ubi priùs And elsewhere he as distinctly asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 three things And what could he mean by three things not three Deities as he often inculcates but he must certainly mean three Entities three Essences for by three things he could not possibly mean three Non-Entities or three Nothings His great care plainly was to assert the true Deity of the Son and Spirit or their Preeternity or that it could never be said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there was a time when they were not which he inculcates in an hundred places still insisting that one Deity one Essence was common to them but still with distinction and as warmly inveighs against Sabellius and P. Samosatensis as against Arius every whit And that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt speaking how the Father Son and Spirit tho of one and the same sort of Essence are three Hypostases he plainly says the Nature wherein they partake is so One as the humane Nature is One in all Men. We Men saith he consisting of a Body and a Soul are all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of one Nature and Substance or Essence but we are many Hypostases And to the same purpose Dial. 2. de Trinitate his Anomoeos comparing the Father Son and Spirit to a Bishop Presbyter and Deacon he brings in the Orthodox saying they have all the same Nature being each of them Man as an Angel a Man and an Horse have different Natures In the mean time because Men are not inseparably and vitally united with one another as the Divine Persons are and cannot but be by reason of the necessary eternal perpetual emanation of the two latter from the first they cannot admit to be called one Man as the three Persons in the Godhead are and cannot but be one God Inasmuch as these three Divine Persons partake real Godhead as existing necessarily each of them they are each truly God but because they partake it in necessary eternal vital Union and so that the first is the radix the second perpetually springing from the first and the third from both the other they are therefore together one God As Branches tho really distinct from each other and the Root are altogether notwithstanding but one Tree and all omoousial or consubstantial to one another which is an illustration familiar with the the Antients And if there be any now a days that will call this Heresy tho as I said I will be no Heretick however yet if I must make a choice I had rather be an Heretick with the Ante-Nicene and Nicene Fathers and Post-Nicene for ought appears to the contrary through some following Centuries than be reputed Orthodox with P. Lumbard c. whom a German Divine not of meanest account calls one of the four Evangelists of Antichrist But having now done with what he said he would omit but did not tho he might to every whit as good purpose we come to what he overlooks not because he intimates he cannot And let us see whether he looks into it to any better purpose than if he had quite overlook'd it He is indeed the more excusable that he overlooks it not because he says he could not In that case there is no remedy Nor do I see how he well could when the Sober Enquirer had once and again so directly put it in his view and as was said objected it to himself But he thinks however to make an irrefragable Battering Ram of it wherewith to shiver this Doctrine of the Trinity all to pieces and he brings it into play with the two Horns before mentioned The Father he says for instance is either infinite in his Substance his Wisdom his Power his Goodness or he is not With the like pompous apparatus and even in
can be added thereto or be without its compass much less can there be another Infinite added to the former I only now say you talk confidently in the dark you know not what And so as to involve your self in Contradictions do what you can 1. In saying nothing can be added to what is infinite 2. In pretending to know if any thing can be added how much or how little can 1. In saying nothing can be added to or be without the compass of what is infinite For then there could be no Creation which I cannot doubt him to grant Before there was any was there not an infinitude of Being in the eternal Godhead And hath the Creation nothing in it of real Being Or will you say the Being of the Creature is the Being of God I know what may be said and is elsewhere said to this and 't will better serve my purpose than his 2. In pretending to know what can or cannot be added Or that in the way of necessary eternal Emanation there cannot be an infinite addition tho not in the way of voluntary or arbitrary and temporary production The reason of the difference is too obvious to need elucidation to them that can consider But for your part I must tell my Antagonist you have concluded your self even as to that which carries the greatest appearance of impossibility come off as you can You say a Body of an Inch square is not only not infinite in extension but is a very small Body yet it hath this infinite power to be divisible to infinity So I suppose you must say of half that Inch or a quarter or the thousandth part of it much more of two or twenty or a thousand Inches You say indeed this Body it self is not infinite Nor will I insist upon the trite and common Objection against you How can any thing be divisible into parts which it hath not in it Which yet Men have not talkt away by talking it often over Still haeret lateri Nor of an infinite Power 's being lodged in a finite and so minute a Subject But in the mean time here are Infinites upon Infinites an infinite Power upon an infinite Power multiplyed infinitely and still these infinite Powers greater and less than other as either the Inch is augmented or diminished And he saith the Mind of Man hath the Property of infinite or eternal duration Therefore so many Minds so many Infinites And he must suppose the infinite duration of some Minds to be greater than of others unless he think his own Mind to be as old as Adam's or do not only hold their preexistence but that they were all created in the same moment Which if he do I am sure he can never prove And so for ought he knows there may not only be many Infinites but one greater than another What therefore exceeds all limits that are assignable or any way conceivable by us as we are sure the Divine Being doth it is impossible for us to know what differences that vast Infinitude contains And we shall therefore but talk at random and with much more presumption than knowledg when we take upon us to pronounce it impossible there should be three infinite Hypostases in the Godhead Especially considering that most intimate vital Union that they are supposed to have each with other in respect whereof the Son is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexisting in the Father as Athanasius's Phrase is agreeably to the Language of Scripture Joh. 14. 11. and elsewhere And which by parity of Reason is to be conceiv'd of the Holy Ghost too who is also said to search all things even the deep things of God 1 Cor. 2. 10. In respect of which Union and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may thence be collected whatever of real Perfection Wisdom Power Goodness c. is in any one is each ones as truly as any ones all being originally in the Father as the first and everliving fountain of all As was said Sober Enquiry p. 31 32. But whereas the Considerator urges If the Father be infinite in his Substance in his Wisdom his Power his Goodness he is God in the most adequate and perfect sense of the Word I say well and what then If therefore he mean the Son and the Holy Ghost must be excluded the Godhead let him prove his consequence if he can And he may find the answer to it Sob Enquiry pag. 53. I shall not transcribe nor love when I have writ a Book to write it over again His Notion may fit Pagans well enough or those who are not otherwise taught Christians are directed to understand that the Deity includes Father Son and Holy Ghost Their equality I acknowledg with the mentioned Athanasian Exception notwithstanding which that they equally communicate in the most Characteristick difference of the Deity from all Creatures viz. Necessity of Existence is conceivable enough To sum up all the Considerator I understand even by the whole management of his Discourse and specially by the conclusion of that part wherein the Enquirer is concern'd to have most entirely given up this Cause as ever did any Man The Enquirer's only Undertaking was to maintain the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in opposition to his former daring Assertion of its being impossible and nonsense He now in conclusion says the Enquirer saw there must be a Nexus intimating if there can that he hath gain'd his point but 't is added he durst not venture to say what it was To which I must say That this is most uncautiously said I will not say deceitfully tho I know 't is said untruly and he might have known or remembred too that he the Enquirer often spoke of it as a necessary natural eternal vital and most intimate Union He further says he only explains it by the Union of Soul and Body Which again 1. Is so great a Misrepresentation that I wonder he would say it here when he himself but two or three Pages off recites as the Enquirer's words If God could unite into one two such contrary Natures let any Man give me a reason why he might not much more first make and then unite two and if two why not three Spirits c. Is this only to explain it by the Union of Soul and Body But by the way that first make and then unite was none of the Enquirer's but appears thrust in to make what was manifestly possible seem impossible Sic notus Let two Substances be created entire with no natural Propension to each other they are capable of no natural Union without change of their Natures Who sees not it were a Contradiction to suppose them the same still and not the same But suppose them created with mutual aptitudes to Union and united what should hinder but they may continue united without being confounded 2. And 't is said impertinently as well as untruly for what if he had not explain'd it at all
is it therefore impossible which it belonged to him to prove or he did nothing and he hath done nothing towards it I have askt him before and now I put it again seriously to him whether he do in his Conscience believe this a good Argument Such an Union i. e. natural necessary c. hath no pattern or parallel in the Creation therefore it is impossible in the Nature of God For what he adds That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Substance or Essence nor possibly can be The Cause indeed depends not on it but lies remote from it Methinks however it is very feat and shews him pinch't that he can be brought to this Hath a Man no Substance Is he a shadow Or hath he no Essence Is he a Non-entity Or is his Essence a Body Then a Body is a Man Or is his Essence a Spirit Then a Spirit is a Man If he say either of these I wish he would tell us the quantity of those Propositions that we may know whether he means that every Body is a Man or every Spirit is a Man I am sure where the Essence is there must be the Essentiatum Or whether Soul and Body united make nothing different from either or both disunited Or whether a Man be only such a thing as a Pye Or why might not a Pudding serve as well if made up of several Ingredients He hath greatly indeed oblig'd Mankind for such an Honour done them If indeed the Cause depended on it he would have good store of Philosophers to confute and all that have any concern for their own kind before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed Union in the Deity and you have nothing for it but his bare word Which at least without the addition of his Name will not do the business Nor if he could also bring us a demonstration against the Union of Soul and Body can he thereby prove such an Union as we suppose in the Godhead impossible The case is quite another The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called essential for I well know if they were essentially united in the strict sense they could never be disunited But 't is commonly call'd a substantial Union and I called it natural in respect of the Principle Nature in contradistinction to Art As for the supposed Union we speak of in the Deity that being necessary original eternal it must be essential or none but with such distinction as before was supposed For it was Union not Identity that was meant which Union with such distinction till they be proved impossible the Enquirer's Cause is untoucht And is certainly to any such purpose not in the least touch'd by the Considerator Whether there be any such Union that may admit to be called essential among the Creatures doth neither make nor marr We have never said there was nor doth the stress of the Cause lie upon it I find indeed an ingenious merry Gentleman animadverts upon a Postscript writ against the Sober Enquiry and upon a Letter in answer to it who at a venture calls all essential Union essential Contradiction and substantial Nonsense Who this is I will not pretend to guess only I guess him not to be the same with the Considerator for this besides other Reasons that he calls the Author of the Considerations a great Man and I scarce think he would call himself so His Wit and sportful Humour I should have liked better in a less serious Affair For this heboldly pronounces in immediate reference to the Trinity it self that the World might know he hath a Confidence at least equal to his Wit I can easily abstain from asserting that any created Unions are to be called strictly essential because then they must be simply indissoluble And I see not but whatsoever things the Creator hath united he may disunite if he be so pleased Yet one might have expected this Author to have been a little more civil to him whom he stiles the late famous Dr. More who hath publisht to the World his express Sentiments in this matter that created Spirits have real amplitude made up of indiscerpible parts essentially united so as not to be separable without annihilation of the whole One would think he should not have treated him so as to make his essential Union substantial Nonsense But there are those left in the World who have that Veneration for the Doctor as to think it no indecent rudeness to this Gentleman not to put his judgment in the ballance against the Doctor 's or to distinguish between his calling it Nonsense and proving it so But if any wonder that they who think there is no such thing as an essential Union among Creatures do yet think there may be in the uncreated Being they will shew themselves mighty wise in their wonder i. e. in wondering that the Creatures are not God And if they further hereupon enquire why we will then make use of Unions not essential among Creatures to illustrate that which is supposed essential in the uncreated Being and expect very particular distinct accounts of every thing so represented they will shew themselves as wise in their Expectations i. e. that they think nothing can serve to illustrate unless it be like in all respects That Question still returns Is every thing to be judg'd by any Man of sense impossible in God whereof he hath not given distinct and explicit accounts and illustrations from somewhat in the Creatures And another will be added Is there any thing originally in God not essential to him But when the World is so full of instances of substantial Unions without Confusion or Identification that he cannot so much as name me a created Substance that he can be sure exists absolutely simple I am sure it can be no contradiction to suppose that there may be uncreated necessary eternal Union without Confusion or Identification and that it would be as he phrases it essential Contradiction or substantial Nonsense to say that things united necessarily tho distinct can possibly ever admit of Separation And if our modern Anti-Trinitarians for I will not call them by the inept Name of Unitarians which as rightfully belongs to them whose Adversaries they are pleas'd to be as to themselves and therefore cannot distinguish the one from the other would allow it to be their Method to understand the Doctrine of the Orthodox Antients before they decry and hoot at it they would find that as they allow sufficient distinction of the sacred Hypostases so the Union they assert is not such as identifies them but only signifies them to be inseparable So speaks Athanasius himself We think not as the Sabellians that the Son is of one and the same Essence with the Father but consubstantial Nor do we assert three Hypostases separated as with Men bodily lest with the Gentiles we should admit Polytheism c. So do Liberius and he agree in Sentiment The
deliciis Therefore I believe the Considerator will be so ingenuous as to perceive he hath in this part of his Discourse grosly overshot or undershot or shot wide of his own Mark if indeed he had any or did not letting his Bolt fly too soon shoot at Rovers before he had taken steady aim at any thing In short all this Dust could be rais'd but with design only because he could not enlighten his Readers to blind them But now when he should come by solid Argument to disprove the Hypothesis by shewing that three individual Divine Natures or Essences can possibly have no Nexus so as to become one entire Divine Nature and at the same time which this Hypothesis supposes remain still three individual Divine Natures and Essences he thinks fit to leave it to another to do it for him who he says if he cannot prove this can prove nothing And when we see that Proof it will be time enough to consider it In the mean time I cannot here but note what I will neither in Charity call Forgery in the Considerator nor in Civility Ignorance but it cannot be less than great Oversight his talk of these Three so united as to become One the Enquirer never spake nor dreamt of their becoming One but of their being naturally necessarily and eternally so Then he comes to put the Question as he says it is between the Enquirer and the Socinians And he puts it thus How three distinct several individual Divine Beings Essences or Substances should remain three several individual Substances and yet at the same time be united into One Divine Substance called God One would have thought when he had so newly wav'd the former Question as wherein he meant not to be concern'd he should presently have put a new One upon which he intended to engage himself But we have the same over again even with the same ill look of an equivalent Phrase unto becoming united into One to insinuate to his Reader as if his Antagonist thought these Three were de novo united not in but into One. Which he knew must have a harsh sound and as well knew it to be most repugnant to the Enquirer's most declared Sentiment Nor will it be any presumption if I take the liberty to set down the Question according to the Enquirer's Mind who have as much reason to know it as he and I am sure it will be more agreeable to the tenour of his Discourse now referr'd to Whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Divine Being may not possibly for ought we know contain three Natures or Essences under the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost so far distinct as is necessary to found the distinct Predications or Attributions severally given them in the Holy Scriptures and yet be eternally necessarily naturally vitally so united as notwithstanding that remaining distinction to be One God And let us now see what he hath to say First To the Enquirer's Illustrations of it as possible Secondly What he brings to prove it impossible As to the former part He first falls upon what the Enquirer had said concerning the vegetative sensitive and intellective Natures in our selves And upon this he insists so operously as if the whole weight of the Cause had been laid upon it and seems to think the Enquirer had forgot the Question when he mentioned it because he says those are only distinct Faculties not Persons or Substances tho Persons were not in his Question without ever taking any notice of the Enquirers waving it with these words That he would content himself with what was more obvious But this is is all Art To raise a mighty posse and labour to seem to those that he believed would read what he writ only not what the other did most effectually to expugne what he saw was neglected tho not altogether useless as we shall see anon In the mean time it is observable how needlesly he slurs himself in this his first brisk Onset He says No Man ever pretended That the vegetative sensitive and intellective Faculties or Powers are so many distinct individual Persons Substances or Essences we grant c. What did no Man ever pretend that these three distinct Natures the vegetative sensitive intellective were in Man three distinct Substances or Souls concurring by a certain subordination in him What necessity was there that to heighten his Triumph in the Opinion of his credulous Followers he should with so glorious a Confidence put on the vain and false shew of having all the World on his side and herein either dissemble his Knowledge or grosly bewray his Ignorance in the meer History of Philosophy And most imprudently suppose all his Readers as ignorant as he would seem What did he never hear of an Averroist in the World Doth he not know that Physician and Philosopher and his Followers earnestly contended for what he says no Man ever pretended to Or that divers other Commentators upon Aristotle have some abetted others as vehemently oppos'd them in it Not to insist also that some thought the Intellectus Agens and Patiens to be distinct Substances belonging to the Nature of Man as others had also other Conceits about the former And if he look some hundreds of Years back as far as the time and extant Work of Nemesius Bishop and Philosopher as he writes himself of the Nature of Man who liv'd in the Time of Gregory Nazianzen as appears by an Epistle of his writ to him and prefixt to that little Book of his he will find that Author takes notice there were divers that took Man to consist of Mind Soul and Body and that some did doubt whether the Mind super vening to the Soul as one to the other did not make the latter intelligent And in several other parts of that Work easy if it were necessary to be recited he speaks it as the Judgment of some That the unreasonable Nature in Man did exist by it self as being of it self an unreasonable Soul not a part of the reasonable accounting it one of the greatest Absurdities that the unreasonable Soul should be a part of that which is reasonable And he carries us yet much farther back referring us to Plotinus in whom any that will may read much more to that purpose in many places It matters not whether this Opinion be true or false but a great mistake or misrepresentation it was to say no Man ever pretended to it And be that as it will if all the Readers will suspend their Judgments That a Trinity in the Godhead is impossible till the Considerator shall have prov'd by plain demonstration the concurrence of three such Spirits a vegetative sensitive and intellective vitally united in the Constitution of Man is a thing simply impossible I believe he will not in haste have many Proselytes I for my part as his own Eyes might have told him laid no stress upon it but only mentioned it in transitu as
distinction so as to be really and truly One thing If they cannot I would know why i. e. Why they cannot as well or much rather than the Soul and Body so as to be one entire Man If they can such a created Union is acknowledged possible which is all that part of our Discourse contends for And 't is enough for our present purpose for this will be an Union of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. of things of the same nature the Soul and Body are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. things of very different Natures And it sufficiently prepared our way as was intended to advance further and add That if such a created or made Union be possible it cannot be understood why a like uncreated or unmade Union should be thought impossible And if it be possible the noisy Clamour that a Trinity in the Godhead is impossible or that it will infer Tritheism must cease and be husht into everlasting silence Or if it shall still be resolved to be kept up to carry on the begun Humour can only serve to fright Children or unthinking People but can never be made articulate enough to have any signification with Men of sense For when the Father is acknowledg'd on all hands to be the Original or Fountain-Being existing necessarily and eternally of himself the Son existing by eternal Promanation necessarily of and from and in the Father the Holy Ghost of and in them both These because they all exist necessarily cannot but be each of them God and because they exist in necessary natural eternal Union cannot but be one God And he that shall attempt to make Tritheism of this will sooner prove himself not the third part of a wise Man than from hence prove three Gods We may truly and fitly say the Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God But that form of Speech the Father is a God the Son is a God the Holy Ghost is a God I think unjustifiable The former way of speaking well agrees with the Homoousiotes of the Deity the Substance whereof is congenerous You may fitly say of three drops of the same Water they are each of them Water But if you should say they are each of them a Water one would understand you to mean they were all drops of so many different sorts of Water I do upon the whole judg the Substance or Essence of the three Hypostases to be as perfectly One as can possibly consist with the emanation of some from other of them But now next In his way to his second Topick of Argumentation he is guilty of a strange sort of omission i. e. he twice over says he will omit what he greatly insists upon as a mighty matter that this meaning the Enquirer's Hypothesis is Heresy among those of his own Party whether they be the nominal or the real Trinitarians who all agree That each of the Divine Persons is perfect God in the most adequate and perfect sense and this too as such Person is considered sejunctly or as the Athanasian Creed speaks by himself c. To this I only say in the first place that if this weigh any thing it ought in reason to be as heavy upon him as me for I believe the same People that will call this account of the Trinity Heresy will call his denial of it Heresy much more But if he be not concern'd at that I am the more obliged to him that he hath a kinder concern for me than himself And if he really have let it ease his mind to know that let the Opinion be Heresy never so much I for my part am however resolv'd to be no Heretick as he and they may well enough see by the whole tenour of that Discourse But yet I humbly crave leave to differ from him in this as well as in greater Matters I am apt enough indeed to think that the Nominal Trinitarians will judg the Opinion of the Real Trinitarians to want Truth and the Real will perhaps more truly judg theirs to want Sense But neither the one nor the other will say that each of the Divine Persons is perfect God in the most adequate and perfect sense For both cannot but agree that God in the most adequate and perfect sense includes Father Son and Holy Ghost but they will none of them say that each or any of the Persons is Father Son and Holy Ghost And I am very confident he that shall so represent them will betray them by it into such inconveniencies and so much against their mind and intent that if ever they did trust him as I believe they never did this Considerator to express their sense for them they never will do it more As for Athanasius himself whose Creed he mentions tho he often speaks of an equality of the Persons in point of Godhead yet he also often Tom. 2. p. 576. most expresly excepts the Differences which I take to be very important of being unbegotten begotten and proceeding And which is a Difference with a Witness in his Questions and Answers He asks how many Causes are there in God Q. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and answers One only and that is the Father And then asks Q. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How many effects or things caused And answers two the Son and the Spirit And adds The Father is call'd a Cause because he begets the Son and sends out the Spirit The Son and Spirit are said to be caused because the Son is begotten and doth not beget the Spirit is sent forth and doth not send Now can he be thought all this while to mean an absolute equality And whereas he uses the Term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which our Author renders sejunctly or by himself that he may make it seem opposite to what is said by the Enquirer pag. 50. I for my part say as Athanasius doth that each of these Persons is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 singly God and Lord but I say not as he doth not and he denies what the Sober Enquiry denies in the mentioned place That any one of the Persons sejunctly is all that is signify'd by the Name of God which words this Author slily leaves out for what purpose he best knows But his purpose be it what it will can no longer be served by it than till the Reader shall take the pains to cast back his Eye upon pag. 50. of the Sober Enquiry And I must here put the Considerator in mind of what I will not suppose him ignorant but inadvertent only at this time That one may be sejoin'd or abstracted from another two ways or by a twofold abstraction precisive or negative That we may truly say of the Father Son or Holy Ghost that the One of them is or is not God abstracting from both the other according as you differently abstract If you abstract any one of the Persons from both the other by precisive abstraction and each of them is God or Lord