Existence Which he has not been able to Explicate notwithstanding that he has attempted to do it with the most Refined Method of his Philosophical Science as may be seen in this Tract of his which has occasioned my Remarks and I doubt not in the Sense of a Judicious Reader precedently by me disproved But to go with him as far as his Assertions require and next suppose That the Humane Soul is a Substance but in what manner Substantial is not Defined by this Author in any Kind either as Incorporeal suitable to the Dialect of the Schools or otherwise as the Rational Sensitive and Vegetative Soul are in the Body entirely United The Proof that he offers for giving to it a Substantial Denomination is grounded on the Proprieties or Qualities he annexeth to it Because whatsoever is not something can neither have those nor any other Attributes All which in his 13 Particular he farther undertakes to Explain and where he expresses That Substance is not to be understood but as it Relates to some Attribute or other which chiefly declare its Nature and Essence and to which they appertain Adding That as Length Breadth and Depth constitute the Nature of Body so by Thought is Constituted the Nature of Substantial Thinking From whence he concludes That whatsoever can be Attributed to Body presupposeth Extension or the manner only of something Extended but what are to be found in the Mind are so many various Modalities of Cogitation The Example he gives is That Corporeal Figure cannot be understood but in the Thing that is Extended nor Motion but in whatsoever is moved contrarily Extension may be understood by the Mind without either Figure or Motion This Paragraph tho' written by the Pen of Des-Cartes cannot have so favourable an Interpretation as might render it Congruous to common Understanding That the Rational Soul may be Substantial is not Philosophically to be denied Nor so Defined does it lessen the possibility it has of being Immortal because equally in the Power of the Almighty to give the Souls of all Mankind Immortality together with the compleating of the Dust of rotten Carcasses according to the Doctrine of the Resurrection unto the same Bodies they Animated in Life-time and to Restore to them each Individual Soul that was precedently theirs But to Affirm with this Author That meer Cogitation is a Substance of it self in the Humane Intellect is a very Irrational Conjecture For how can Thought have any Similitude with Sense but as thereby it may be Imagined to Relate to some sensible Object Nor can it Actuate in any other Kind if the Soul be Substantial it being Impossible That Substantial Cogitation whatever Phrase he gives it can otherwise be Impioyed than on something that must Assimilate its own Nature And that must be either Consistent of Bodily Parts or of Substance equivalent to it Nor is it possible to apprehend how any Thing called Substance can be distinguished from what is quantitively Corporeal or not have suitable Attributes in every Consideration So that his Idea of a meer Thinking Substance in the Soul of Man can have no significant Congruity with Thought It being totally Irrational to suppose That any deliberate Conception of the Mind should be fixed on no Object Should a Man Contemplate on France or Holland who had never been personally in either of those Countries he must distinguish as he had received Information or Read of them the Nature and Situation of those Regions together with such necessary Considerations as were requisite for him to understand or he could not have any Intelligible Apprehension of any of those Places So that the Position of this Author That there is in the Soul such an abstracted manner of Cogitation or Thread-bare way of Thought which by his Notion is Defined a Thinking Substance were no other than to allow the Soul a Substantial Nature but a very Impertinent or Idle Being in the Body Or which is much the same to be capacitated to Think tho' without Cogitation of any Thing besides it self Yet on this separate way of Thought depends the whole Structure of his Idea whereby he would prompt the Intellect to distinguish betwixt Thoughts Confused or such as Intrigue with the Senses from those that have a sole and pure Residence in the Mind As frivolous if duely Examined are the Modalities of meer Cogitation delivered by him where he Intimates That whatsoever can be Corporeally applyed must be understood to have Extension and Bodily Parts and must therefore Relate in one Kind or other to the Thing moved or extended And is it possible to Imagine That the Soul should be endued with Speculative Thinking yet unperceptible of any proper Object to entertain its sensible Contemplation All which is requir'd by Des-Cartes who positively Affirms That Extension may be understood by the Mind without Figure or Motion By which he would imply That clear Cogitation may be apprehended without Application to any Imagin'd Thing or Conception by the Sense That it is really such Which Words of his if rightly consider'd imply a very singular Contradiction it not being in the Power of Thought exactly to Judge of any Thing but as it appears in Extension Figure or if mov'd in Motion How else can any of these Particulars be Mathematically computed which could not but be known to so great a Geometrician as was this Author In his 14 Particular he confidently enough offers to Explain his most sublimated Notion of Thinking in these Words It is very facile saies he to distinguish betwixt two clear and distinct Ideas the One relating to a cogitative Created Substance the Other to a Corporeal Substance if distinction be made of all Attributes of Cogitation from those of Extension And thus he supposes That a Man may have a perspicuous and distinct Idea of an uncreated and independent Thinking Substance by which he means God But should I Interpret according to him the Deity to be a Thinking Substance I must also Imagine the Deity of such a Substance as may be comprehended by sensible Cogitation And next notwithstanding all the Refin'd Caution given by Des-Cartes I can have no other than a Corporeal Notion of God or in Resemblance to Bodily Substance because in any other Consideration it were Incompatible with the Humane Soul as it Acts its Cognition by the aid of the Senses I may therefore well admire Why he Defines the Deity an Uncreated Substance and not Explicate to his Reader what Kind of Substance he intends by the Definition Which can be no otherwise Interpreted than that he took care to avoid the Critical Objection or Absurdity in the Opinion of not a few Eruditely accomplish'd by not supposing That there may be such an Existence that can be truly Denominated both Incorporeal and Substantial By reason that Matter and Form Extension and Parts are the Proprieties of Substance as it can be conceiv'd by Thought and whatsoever is said to be Incorporeal can have none of those
Tenents and Atheism of others As also to their superlative Glory conspicuously distinguish'd from such numbers of Mankind that no farther imploy their Understandings than by Indulging the sensual Satisfactions and Pleasures of Life Amongst whom may be found such an impious sort of Men that to Varnish their evil Examples and stains of Manners would seem refin'd under the Name of Wits And thereby arrogate to themselves an Arbitrary Decision or neglect of whatsoever they please to disallow or is above their Capacities to value And these for the greatest part are antipathiz'd to all polite Science or determine it as a Point resolv'd by them far inferior to their loose Drolleries Lampoons scurrilous Reflections and Abuses impudently pointed against the ingenious Desert and Performances of others as on the Feet of their ignominious Verse they run in the Nation And strange it is that such ungracious Associators should not only have their ordinary Countenancers and Abetters but also their Leaders Men of Title who as their Captain-Generals command their undisciplin'd Lists As if by their endeav urs Ignorance and contempt of Knowledge might be no less prevalent than when the barbarous Goths and Vandals demolish'd Records of precedent Literature But Heaven be thank'd the present Age does yet abound with such laudable Ingenuities and Patrons of Erudition as enough defeat the Malice and Ignorance of illiterate Opposers The only remaining means and strong reserve by which the value of Philosophy with all its Accomplishments may receive suitable Acceptance and Protection To which worthy Personages next to his Royal Highness the Prince of Denmark together with such of eminent Quality who have Incourag'd the Impression is chiefly presented the confiderable Importance of this Book Not doubting that it may be inspected by a Judicious Eye no less valuable in English where it dissents from Des-Cartes than his did receive Applause when publish'd with the best of his Eloquence and Reasons in French or Latin Notwithstanding 't is very observable That some fantastical Judgments no less propensely value French Authors than the reception they give to the Mode of Cloaths that are devis'd by Taylers at Paris But as to the Productions of the Mind by advancement of Science 't is palyably known That the most Learned and Accurate Productions and Inventions of the French have not been only Equall'd but Improv'd by English Writers To which purpose I will instead of many Insert a few Examples Vieta who is acknowledg'd the first Author of the commodious Use of literal Algebra had he liv'd contemporary with our English Harriot must have granted That the most curious Part or in which consists the main Secret of that profound Science was discover'd and compleated by him And so well perceiv'd by Des-Cartes that he in the manner of a Plagiary derives the most exquisite Part of his Algebraical Skill and Process from our Learned Harriot And so publish'd to the World in the History of Algebra eruditely compil'd by Dr. Wallis To Harriot may be added our famous Oughtred whose deep Mathematical Knowledge and Perfection of Theorems was never exceeded by any French Writer In the Judgment of Vieta it was thought impossible by knowing the simple Anomaly of the Sun or Planets Geometrically to find the Equated the contrary of which is evidently prov'd by the Learned Bp. Seth Ward in his Book Entitled Astronomia Geometrica If the Ingenious Peter Ramus was the first Deviser of the Analysis in Numbers of the Cubick Root the Operation is much facilitated by the accurate Invention of Mr. Joseph Raphson in his Converging Series to his praise now extant And what yet more superlatively Exceeds to the Honour of this Island both Ancient and Modern Inventions is admirably evident in the Structure of Logarithms Compil'd by the famous Lord Napier By which the former Difficulties of Mathematical Computations in every kind are totally wav'd and in their stead facile Calculations by Logarithms resolv'd with ease and delight If Philosophically compar'd French Authors with English or instead of more Des-Cartes be mention'd according to the Esteem allow'd him by some Persons The Works of our Incomparable Bacon may be Instanc'd as an experimental Confutation of the Failings of the other with no less assurance than that probable Truth condemns Fiction Nothing being more gracious in a Philosopher than a natural discovery of Causes and Effects Or indeed when the Parts of a Naturalist and Philosopher are duely joyn'd Which actually elevated the admirable Reputation allow'd to the Georgicks of Virgil because in them he manifestly discloses the Effects and Operations of Nature obviously agreeable to common Observation And I cannot liken any Works more eminently to the excellency of his than the natural manner of Philosophy deliver'd by unparallel'd Bacon Whereas if we confide on the Principles of Des-Cartes we must rely on fictitious Inventions instead of warantable Experience as will appear by the ensuing Remarks on the Parts I Treat of No Man can doubt that any Thing is more requisite or deserv'dly commendable than the Endeavours whereby to fathom such Depths of Science as pertinently contribute to the profoundest Search and Satisfaction of the Humane Mind Amongst which none are more considerable than such as most Emphatically conduce to the Apprehending the wonderful Manner by which the animated Being and Life with all their Proprieties exist in the Body of Man And what Parts of Contemplation or refin'd Literature can so naturally enbellish the Intellect as the rational discernment of the Being of the Humane Soul and how it operatively conspires with its Corporeal Residence The understanding of which if sufficiently acquir'd may be deem'd the Quintessence or Soul of Philosophical Knowledge as it instructs us to comprehend the Nature of the Soul that appertains to our Persons Many are the Opinions of Philosophers not necessary to be mention'd here by which they differ not more from themselves than Des-Cartes does from all of them concerning the Manner of Existence and operating of the Soul in the Humane Body The main of whose Tenent or Idea as he calls it is That the Humane Mind being a Thinking Substance committed to the Body by God may sensibly apprehend Objects without the use of the Senses or being precedently entertain'd by them By which Opinion of his he opposes common Experience together with that noted Philosophical Axiom That nothing is in the Intellect which was not first in the Senses If a Man becomes accidentally Blind there is not therefore with the loss of his Sight any such Curtain drawn before his Imagination that totally obscures the Memorial of Things formerly impress'd on his Intellect by the Senses So that the Maxim of Des-Cartes is far more Blind than a sightless Man as he states his Inference ' Tho' upon this obscure Principle he erects the main Foundation of the first Part of his Philosophy as it relates to Humane Cognition Notwithstanding he is so fond of the New-fashion'd Ideas and Notions which he there not a little
magnifies that he exposes them as he finds occasion to the view of his Reader in other Parts of his Works besides those I have to do with witness the Fourth Particular of the First Chapter of his Dioptricks or of Light and the manner of Vision by the Telescope where he has this unintelligible Expression If we consider saies he the distinction that a Man Blind from his Nativity can make betwixt the Colour of Trees Water Stones and the like meerly by the use and touch of the Staff he walks with no less certainly than seeing Men can discern Red Yellow or Blew in any visible Object although their differences could be no other in such Bodies than diversities of Motion or the resistance they make to the Blind Man's Staff It has been an undoubted Maxim That whosoever is Blind is no judge of Colours But by the quaint Philosophy of this Author it seems a resolv'd Point That a Man may see without the use of Eyes So that a sightless Man who cannot make a safe Step without a Guide may if conducted to walk to the end of a Street declare certainly of what Shape Figure or Colour every Post is that he touches with the Staff that supports him I confess as I Read this Particular I expected that he would have somewhat more exalted the Conceit by Affirming That a Blind Man might perfectly inspect through the Glasses of the Telescope he there Writes of and next give an account of the Bigness Diameters and various appearances of the Stars colours of the Rain-bow and other Meteors In Summ he might have as well Asserted that the Ear could perform the Office of Seeing as by feeling it could be executed in any kind by a Blind Man's management Nor less unintelligible is the general Definition he gives in the before-mention'd Head of Colours which he Terms no other than various Modalities by which they are receiv'd in Objects of Colour Whereas they are certain Proprieties inseparably appertaining both to animated and inanimated Bodies as sure as a Brown Horse is naturally different from a Gray or Chesnut And 't were a weak Imagination to estimate Colour otherwise than Nature has appropriated it to particular Subjects And whosoever would fancy the contrary let him try whether he can wash a Blackmoor's Face untill it becomes White Another passage he Inserts in the 4th Chapter of his Dioptricks where he states his Idea of the Soul as a distinct Substance separated from the Senses by supposing that 't is the Soul alone and not the Body that is sensibly concern'd As he would infer from Extasie or distracted Contemplation in which Circumstance he conceives that the Soul is totally abstracted from the Corporeal Parts Whilst the Body remains stupified or bereav'd of Sense no less than when by Wounds or Diseases the Brain is prejudic'd But could be Think that in any such disturbance of Body and Mind the Soul does more than live as well as the Body since in that condition 't is impossible for the Soul to act deliberately of any Thing whilst the Senses are disabled or not assisting her Operations Yet in this plight of Body and Mind he is very inclinable to determine the Soul a separate Thinking Substance but incapable of sensibly executing her Intellectual Faculty which is much the same as to allow her in this Case a nonsensical Existence or not able to apprehend any Object without the concurring of the Senses This Objection is undeniably manifest if pertinently consider'd the main Potentials by which are actually effected and compleated the essential Capacities of the Life of the Intellect and Senses as they animatively conspire in the Body of Man For as there are always Extant a sufficient Quantity of the most refin'd Spirits or Quintessence naturally extracted from the Corporeal Temperament and in a wonderful and indiscernable Method diffus'd into the Cells and Crannies of the Brain by which means as the excellent Lord Bacon observes they are able to Move the whole mass or weight of the Body in the most swiftest Operations and Exercise Yet by no search or anatomical Inspection are these admirable Particles or Quintessences of our Nature at all discernable Tho' not to be denied that they consist of quantitative Parts because nothing but Quantity can operate on quantitative Dimensions as signified by Humane Composition Wherefore the wonderful Being and active Force of the material Spirits or Quintessence of the Corporeal Temper can have no other apter Epithet than was given by Democritus to his Notion of Atoms which he conceiv'd by Reason and Experience to be Things really Existing but not to be perceiv'd by the Sense of Seeing This Notion well apprehended is more than sufficient to convict the Tenent of Des-Cartes whereby he would define the Humane Soul to be a distinct Thinking Substance in the Body of Man where it has Being Action and Life yet discharg'd in point of Thought from the Accomplishment it has in the temperial Excellency that it admirably exerts and partakes so that in that Sense it may be term'd the Soul of the Body's temperature If at any time the Seat of the Intellect in the Brain is perplex'd confus'd or detrimentally wounded or stupified the Soul is obstructed for want of its contiguous Passage in the Nerves Arteries and Sinews however subtile the contexture which they derive from the Brain to the Parts of the Body Which could not be is the Soul according to this Author were in Substance essentially distinct from the most refin'd Operations and Attributes that sensibly emerge from the Corporeal Composition Let a Man Contemplate of any Object or Employment of his Senses he shall find is duely consider'd That in the same moment there is a ready Emanation of the Spirits of the Mind to the same purpose which are most contiguous to the several Uses Parts and Temperatures of the Body tho' not otherwise Spiritual Wherefore the Soul may not be improperly term'd equivalently such as by her imperceptible Essence She has in a manner an ubiquitary Efficacy in the total Body and every of its Parts and Members If the Souls of all Mankind be committed to Bodies by God as so many Thinking Substances it must necessarily follow that they all had a precedent Creation and therefore could lose nothing of their Perfection until joyn'd to the Body But if according to the Opinion of Some the Soul is traductionally produc'd and born with the Body as the disparities and temperatures of Men both in Mind and Person seem to be exerted either from Affinity in Blood or parentally propagated by the Connexion of the Bodily Parts and Senses it must according to that Tenent be materially produc'd Wherefore 't is far more probable if the Soul be granted a Thinking Substance united to the Senses by the Ordainment of the Almighty Than to allow it as does Des-Cartes seperately and actively intelligent in the Body of Man Of what kind of Substance this Author would define the Humane Soul
is not Intelligible from any Definition given by him but as he Affirms it Active and Motional And therefore consisting suitably to his Teuent of quantitative Parts it must be Elementarily Compos'd and consequently Mortal by Nature By reason that there is no sublunary Substance that has not a mutable and perishable Being So that within the Compass of the World and Course of Providence there is no Immortal Thing that can be by Man apprehended Which may be naturally Argu'd from the Doctrine of Des-Cartes as it relates to the Humane Soul Notwithstanding to Improve his Philosophical System I will conclude That as a Learned Catholick 't was granted by him that the eternalizing of the Humane Soul however Compos'd or operative in the Body of Man was wholly to be referr'd to the Decree of the Omnipotent In his Second Part he grosly defines and mistakes the Nature of Body by Affirming That it does not consist as as one Thing may be said to be more Ponderous Hard or distinctly Colour'd than another but as it is differently extended in Length Breadth and Depth which is a very incompatible Tenent or all one as to Assert That Air Water Man and Beast are no otherwise distinguishable than as any one of them are heavier or less than another tho' absolutely bereav'd of their other Proprieties Which shews That there is neither Head or Tail in the Shape of his Treatise on this Subject In his Third Part amongst divers of his questionable Positions and Phaenomena's which I conceive are considerably tax'd by me he does in a high degree essentially debase the conspicuous Sphere of Glory and Light visibly beheld in the wonderful appearance of the Sun which according to his Definition is no other than a flaming Substance that flashingly Moves continually from one place to another within its Circumference but with such resemblance to our common Fire that it dissolves whatsoever Matter is contiguous to its Movement Notwithstanding he would distinguish it from the Notion we have of Fire as it is sed and maintain'd by consuming of such Materials as are not too hard to be dissolv'd And is not this a pretty kind of distinction by which he gives a different denomination to the flaming Substance as be terms it of the Sun from the combustible Nature of Tarrestial Fire tho' in effect he grants that the Operation is the same in both There being little difference betwixt Dossolution caus'd by a flaming Substance and burning as Matter may be understood either way alter'd or consum'd The Fuel on which be conceives the flaming Substance of the Sun to operate is no other than what be calls his first Element or imaginary material Fund as be determines and orders it of the Worlds original Being Above and Below So that by a thorough-pac'd fiction he Constitutes the Heavens and Earth materially the same And if so he must grant that their Substance may be equally subject to the variable Alterations generatively or corruptly understood no less than Terrestial Beings which is contradictory to common Experience There being no such etherial Changes as are frequently visible in Things Below Which is an undeniable Argument that the Substance of the Earth could never be derivatively the same with that of the Heavens or originally so Compos'd Of which the Reader may be satisfied at large when he Inspects my particular Remarks that confirm my general Exception amongst other Things against the Fourth Part of his Philosophy where he makes the Earth as it were a diminitive Brat engendred by Seeds descending from Skies To be plain these Parts of his Philosophy which Include the whole depend on so many fabulous Phaenomena's and improbable Conjectures diversly introduc'd by him that it is impossible to apprehend any direct Foundation on which he erects the Babel of his Hypothesis in reference to the Heavens and Earth So that it were prolixly improper should I load my Preface by discussing of such Particulars that require a more ample Debate in their proper Places It being more suitable to the Nature of a Preface to intimate briefly such Observations as may give the Reader a taste of what he is more largely to consider Wherefore I shall refer him to my Remarks as in course they are to be Read where I believe he may find them as pertinently Compendious as my endeavours could accomplish or perhaps his Ingenuity may expect And for my own Vindication I can sincerely avow that I discharg'd from my perusal of his Tractates such opinionative Reflections as usually flow from the Pens of opposite Authors Being so fully prepar'd both as to the Repute of the Person and the value that I propensly allow'd to his great Abilities That I did in a manner not doubt that I should be proselited by his Principles But finding upon a Mature and thorough Consideration that his Maxims in divers Particulars not only check'd with my Understanding but also against the Proofs that might be adjusted against them I could not but infer that in a Judicious Conception he was not the same Des Cartes or Grandee of Knowledge that had been by many attributed to his Caracter So that I might well pronounce Quantum mutatus ab illo Hectore Not that I presume on my Success farther than he contributes to his own Defeat by intruding such Notions Ideas Systems and Existency of Things that could by no Method of Providence or Nature have Being in the World Notwithstanding all which he confidently assures his Reader that he takes himself to be no Author of Novelties or Principles disagreeable to the most famous of Ancient Philosophers Tho' palpably manifest that he neither mentions Plato Aristotle or any others of Old or Modernly Renown'd that he does not sharpen his Pen to Confute Tho' the Proofs that he offers are as far short of the Validity of many of theirs as Fiction is from best Probability or experimental Assurance As may be seen by some Examples given by me To Conclude had not these Motives prevail'd on my Judgment and what is more the demonstrative Evidence that I have Instanc'd from Proof I had been far more inclinable as I consider'd on many Accounts the Learned Deserts of this Author to have annex'd to his Esteem my Praise instead of my Opposition Farwel REMARKS On the First Part of the New PHILOSOPHY OF DES-CARTES Concerning the Principles of HUMANE KNOWLEDGE PART I. NOTHING is more commendable then the Exercising of the Humane Mind in such requisite Contemplations as most Effectually conduce to the Improvement of the Understanding in things of special Importance And tho' Man do's Exist in a World whose Structure is no less admirable to his Speculation then how he came to have Being in it or Originally Ensoul'd above other Creatur's Yet Nature is no such Step-Dame as not to Communicate by her Works such plentiful discoveries to the Rational Faculty as have an ample perspicuity and genuine tendency to Improve our Apprehensions A Treasure of Science that ought
all Things of which we can in any manner doubt as also supposing them false we may easily suppose That there is no God no Heaven no Bodies and that we have neither Hands or Feet or any Bodies But not that we who so imagine are nothing because it is absurd to conceive That whatsoever thinks does not Exist at the Time of its Thinking Wherefore he concludes That he is and that he Thinks is of all the most certain Truth that can be acquired by Philosophical Order Who would not judge That so wild an Invention as this in order to Improve Knowledge might not rather proceed from some Person in Bedlam than from Des-Cartes Of whom if Interrogated how he comes to suppose That a Man may point-blank on the account of his Fiction deny the Being of a God together with all the visible Particulars already mention'd As to the Existence of the Deity he that considers the necessity of its Concession as he beholds the wonderful Conduct of the Universe with so many miraculous Objects as are contain'd therein will as soon give credit to any Forgery of Fables as to doubt of the World 's Omnipotent Creator And no less impossible to acquiesce in his other Suppositions there being no Body that has his Eyes to See and Hands and Feet can doubt That he discerns That which is called Heaven above his Head and that he feels with Hands and treads on the Earth with Feet But if you 'l pass the Supposition of Des-Cartes he will assure you That both Seeing and Feeling is not so Intelligible as Ego cogito and Ego sum Whereas in truth I neither can understand That I either Live or Think but as my Senses Conspire with my Intellect If not one may as well conclude That he may live without Thinking of whatsoever he knew before or was sensibly requisite to his Being and Life So nakedly has this Author stript the Humane Soul from the necessity of participating with the Body and This he farther undertakes to Affirm by his next Step where he positively expresses That there is no other Method of defining the Nature of the Mind and its distinction from the Body Adding That it may be done by Examining what we are and supposing all Things false that are diverse from us whence says he we may perspicuously apprehend That no extension Figure local Motion nor any Thing like these Attributed to the Body could appertain to our Nature On which account he concludes That meer Cogitation is more to be preferred in point of certainty than any Corporeal Thing that could be Apprehended To which I Answer That had it been demanded of this thinking Gentleman Whether at the time he writ This Treatise he did not Contemplate of some Bodily Notion For how could he Pen the Wording in any Kind of Extension Figure local Motion or the like and be without Thought of their Being when he nam'd them such Had he been in that Season to have Answer'd This Querie it must have posed his Contemplating in the singular way he proposes And if the Author of this Conceit could not perform what he requires it could not be Doctrinal to others It being as Impossible totally to separate the Mind from the Senses as to think of a Non-Entity or what has no Existence which were a contradiction to Nature and the sensible Impression adherent to the Intellect with the Being of Things and such s cannot be apprehended by it otherwise than as they are Compossed of quantitive and Bodily Parts Could I imagine another World as vast as This with as many Individual Beings and Creatures of all Sorts as are contained within the Compass of the Universe we Inhabit I could think of no other in all its Parts than such a One or in likeness the same with This that had with all its Particulars been the precedent sensible Object of my Understanding So heterogeneous to the Nature of Humane Comprehension is the Principle of Des-Cartes whereby he endeavours to separate the Imagination from the Commixture it has with our Senses These Discussions if duly considered are sufficient to defeat the farther Progress of his Maxims which in Effect will be liable to the same Confutation But to give him the Scope he takes together with the Advantage he can make by it let us admit the Question he makes in his Ninth Particular which he conceives very Emphatical to the purpose and where he has this passage supposing by a kind of Interlude of his Fancy himself to See to Walk and have Being and all these Corporeally performed yet makes no certain Conclusion from thence Because says he I may sleeping think I See or Walk notwithstanding my Eyes be not open and that I move not from the Place I was in and perhaps as if I conceiv'd that I had no Body All which if referred to the Operation of the Mind whereby he Imagin'd or Thought that he saw and walked he determines certain And I Affirm no less if to the Imagination be annexed the Impression made in it by the Senses For so I can Think that I saw or walk'd when I Slept which Imports no more than that there was a Residence in my Intellect conveyed by my Senses of my Seeing and observing of my walking Person when I was really Awake So that it must be a very empty Notion to conceive That I can be Personated meerly by the working of my Brain without Comprehending any concern of the Senses For Example Seeing or Moving must needs have a necessary Relation to my Bodily Parts and the Senses that appertain to Motion as I cannot move on the Ground but as on it I feel I move So that all that can be Implied from this visionary Conceit of Des-Cartes is That the Fancy imaginarily Retain'd what before had been actually performed by the Senses He proceeds to Explicate That misconception by not orderly Philosophizing is the absolute Cause that the Mind is not accurately distinguished from the Body And here methinks he imposes too critical a Task to be practically Discharged by the common Use of Humane Understanding considering how few the World affords that are philosophically Accomplished or sufficiently Instructed to that purpose Or if they were could they be therefore convinced That his manner of distinguishing the Mind from the Body is not a more refined Conceit than can be exerted by any Imagination that resides in Bodily Composition Is it not manifest that Elementary Substances are the Ingredients of our Constitutions as they temper our Flesh and Bloud And can the Soul that resides within their Circumference and Acts by them contemplate her self discharged from them yet at the same time as is acknowledged by Des-Cartes imploy her Imagination in Representing such Objects as could not be known to her but as the Senses had made their Impressions on Things on the Intellect that in their material Proprieties and Shapes had been precedently apprehended by them And it were unnaturally absurd to annex
Thought to any other Method actuated by the Brain of Man It being no less Insignificant to allow the Mind a distinct Exercise within the Body the Region of her Dominion than to suppose a Prince to Govern without the requisite Assistance of his Subjects Thus far I conceive stand sufficiently Taxed the groundless Mistakes if not Fictions of this Learned Author Whose Defects did chiefly Emerge from his attributing to his Abilities as if proceeding from him as the first of Men that by their Grandeur could remove such Difficulties that in their Nature are too perplexed for the Resolution of the eruditest Pen as they relate to the manner of Being and Acting of the Humane Soul Which if considered absolutely spiritual the Question may be How any Thing perfectly spiritual can be Inclosed Actuate and Exist in a Corporeal Substance Since in a Philosophical Construction nothing can act on Body or have Being with it in any consideration but what is composed of Bodily Parts If contrarily the Mind or Soul of Man be deemed a material Essence the Attribute of Immortality conferred on its Dignity by common Opinion will be debas'd by That Definition notwithstanding it may be affirmed That whatsoever its Substance is or manner of being in the Humane Body it is equally facile to the Omnipotent to eternilize its Existence as to Transform by Resurrection the Dust of a rotten Carkass to the material Figure and Parts of the Body that had been so consumed In the next place he takes for granted That the Mind may with that simplicity understand it self as it may doubt of all Things else But how can that bare Intelligence be Attributed to the Mind that cannot by what has been before discussed so much as Ruminate of any Thing of which it does not participate with the Senses The Reason he gives to the contrary is That the Mind finding in its self many Ideas which so long as it contemplates and of nothing without it self either Affirms or Denies it cannot be deceived But can he prove that the Mind at that time he proposes has no Comixture with the Senses The Argument he gives to make good his Assertion is That the Mind being furnished with divers Notions composeth Demonstrations to which so long as it attends it assures it self that they are true And what these Ideas are he Exemplifies by Affirming That the Mind is replenished with Ideas of Numbers and Figures besides common Notions amongst which this that if to Equals be added Equals there shall remain Equals and the like on which ground he proves That the three Angles of every plain Triangle are Equal to two Right Which cannot be denied by any Man that understands Mathematical Certainties But must every Man that Reads Des-Cartes be so skilled in that Science as to be able to Demonstrate That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Ones which many thousands of Men are not able to perform And if not they will be little advantaged by the Notions here mentioned of this Author However to treat him in his own Method and for satisfaction of such as are mathematically knowing Can it be denyed That taking the half of Four there will equally remain Two And this must properly signifie the Substracting from some Numerical Quantity as it really Relates to its Arithmetical Proportion or Measure it being impossible to take the half of Nothing Wherefore the Maxim must have reference to some substantial Thing or as the Figure of Four had been precedently seen or written to whatsoever purpose it might sensibly Relate and if so the Demonstration cannot meerly proceed from the Mind without the concurrance of the Sense as I cannot tell One Two Three and not be apprehensive that I count Something And he that would determine to the contrary may as well Affirm That a Man can tell Cash without the Use of his Feeling and Fingers or fancy Money in a Bag and be able to compute its Summ by the notional operation of the Mind according as it is applyed by this Author Who to exalt the height of his Ideas tho' far incompatible to what he designs 'em he undertakes to prove That amongst the Troops of Fancy which may be exerted by the Brain there will be found one of that sublime Tendency that the most perfect Existence or Being of a God may be implyed by it together with such a necessary and eternal Being as distinguishes it from the possible or contingent Existence that may be attributed to all other Things If This Doctrine be true I may consequently determine That the Methods of Providence by which the Universe and whatsoever it contains Subsist are but so many Contingencies or that 't was accidental that the Sun did yesterday Ascend to the Meridian if not Deified by an Idea of his Existence Whereas there must be such a determined and necessary Being of Providence by the Decree of the Almighty in the Conduct and Preservation of the Universe with whatsoever it contains that it cannot have a Period otherwise than by a total Cessation of its natural Effects and Operations as so many Bounties conferred from above on the vast Circumference of the World together with every Individual Thing that appertains to it Not that it can be denyed That by the usual Effects of Nature no Minute does pass in which there are not produced Innumerable Alterations as in course Generation and Corruption succeed one another in the various Changes of all Things that have Life and Growth Yet not to be implied That by any Idea of them that can be imagined according to This Author is to be understood that they accidentally subsist or vary in their manner of Being which would by Construction Impute Contingencies to the Incomprehensible Wisdom and Methods of Providence tending to the Conservation and Production of Men and Creatures But to return to the remaining Part of his Fourteenth Particular where he undertakes with ample Assurance to exalt his Idea of the Being of a God by the Proof that is to be made that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right from whence as a parallel certainty he concludes the Existence of God supremely Perfect But can it be Affirmed of any Idea as he terms it That because it is a Mathematical Truth That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right that it is sufficient to prove from That Theorem the miraculous Being and Perfection of Omnipotencie And thus he again supposes That all Men must be so far Geometrically Knowing or they will be deficient or without demonstrative Conviction that the Deity does Exist If This Doctrine were true it were no less requisite that all Mankind should have Recourse betimes to the School of Euclid where they might be Instructed as fully of the necessary Proportions of all the Angles and sides of that Figure together with what its Area contains in Feet Inches or the like naturally and usefully applicable to Corporeal Measures
Method of the Omnipotent Ordained by the Miracles of his Works Which enormous Mistake is evidently This Author's in a great Part of his Treatise as he mainly endeavours to Parallel his Demonstration of the Existence of God with Mathematical Certainty Which Science tho' above all to be preferred for the Dignity of its unerrable Maxims and particularly so esteemed by me Yet I cannot but judge it Incompatibly applied even by this learned Author to the purpose he would intend it and deserves a Remark accordingly He yet farther proceeds to heighten his Notion of Ideas amongst which he selects the Idea of something most exquisitely perfect by which he would have understood the necessary Existence of God I will favour the Ambiguity of his Expression so far as not to believe That he meant by his Idea a necessitated Existence which could imply that the Deity had an Exigency of Being from some other Thing Because whatsoever is necessitated cannot have of it self an entire voluntary Existence or as one Cause might Necessitate the Being of another which cannot be applied to Supreme and Infinite Perfection Nor was it possible for him or any Man to Imagine by the most Refin'd Contemplation That the necessary Existence of God can be more clearly understood then by the Actual Prospect he has given us of his All-Sufficiency and wonderful Providence annexed to the Conservation of the Universe and All it contains And if otherwise Interpreted the Being of God as separated from the Miraculous Prospect and Munificence we actually receive from the excellency of his Works that fill the World we Inhabit Were in effect to Attribute to the Deity a solitary Existence or not the Author of the Innumerable Effects of Infinite Goodness that have an Emanation from him So that 't is not any Idea of necessary Existence by which God can be apprehended but rather the necessitated Being that the Total Comprehension of Heaven and Earth does receive from his Ordainment Which appears to be very significantly the Sense of This Author as upon farther consideration he thickens his Idea in his 17th Particular where he has this Expression If any Man has the Idea of a Machine or Fabrick produced by most curious Artisice he will concede That it Merits the utmost Inquisition of his Thought whereby to be Informed of the Authentick Cause by which it was so accurately Effected and such as could by no Device or Humane Skill receive Perfection What could these Words Import other than his substantial Idea of the Constituted Being and Conservation of the Universe in Reference to God the Author And having added to his Idea the weighty Consideration of the World's Existence he might well acknowledge That it is the substantial Union of Matter and Form that gives admirable Subsistence to every Individual Thing Circumscribed by the mighty Universe wherein is visibly presented by the wondrous Proprieties of Composition and Conduct an Incomprehensible Founder Which Perfections not to be Imitated by any Parallel Structure or performed by Humane Industry or Art he fully annexeth to their Excellencies the necessary Dependency and Manifestation of Omnipotent Power By which Method according to the soundest Speculation of Des-Cartes may be perspicuously Exerted the otherwise Indefinable Being of the Almighty Because as he grants the Extent of Humane Composition in Soul and Body cannot farther Ascend than by Objects of Sense or such as have visible Limitation to the Admiration tho' not to the perfect Definition of their sublime Cause which can be no other than God as far exceeding all Imaginable expressing and height of Rational Accents And is not this Doctrine more readily apprehended by all that may if they please be ocular Spectators or by any means sensible Discerners of the Works of the World that by Omnipotent Appointment Surround them above and below than from the dry Idea of a Triangle whose three Angles amount to two Right And from thence deduce the Truth of God's necessary Existence which if possible by Mankind so to be Demonstrated 't were no less requisite for Women than Men to be able to Resolve the Problem if they would Assert their Belief of the Being of a Deity It being highly necessary in order to that especial Concern that there should be a sufficient Number of Female Geometricians Which I confess might add Certainty to their Instructions tho' not otherwise Divine when they Preach in the Society of Quakers Wherefore I may well admire That such a Confufed and Impracticable Principle should be entangled by this Author with Mathematical Verity of which Science he had as to other Uses a Learned Accomplishment It being his real mistake or too much Curiosity where he undertakes to Confirm by a Mathematical Inference That God does Exist instead of the open Evidence that is visible to Mankind from the Miraculous Consistence of the World and the Works it comprehends Wherefore 't is judiciously Affirmed by Incomparable Bacon That he had rather be Impos'd on by the Jewish Talmud or Alcaron then deny That the Universe with whatsoever it contains is without the Rule of a Mind or which is all one the Sovereignty of the Deity But the Authority of this Quotation together with the Reasons I have before Inserted are very disagreeable to the Mental Idea of Des-Cartes by which he rather Insers the Being of the Deity by his Notion of the Structure of the World than by the Prospect we have of its actual Conduct and admirable Composure On which he grounds this Interrogation from whence saies he had any Man Being that has an Idea of God's Perfections unless from something more perfect than himself Which doubtless is true if understood of the apparent means described in the wonderful Figure and Facts comprehended by the Universe as the Effects of an Omnipotent Cause And thus may Thought ascend by a miraculous Scale to the acknowledgement of the Immense Power and Providence of God actually manifest by Works But not as this Author Affirms From being as he calls it naturally Enlightned or Capacitated from a meer Idea of the Mind whereby to conclude That Man has a present or primivitive Existence from any Thing more perfect as he Insinuates Since 't is very possible That from an Idea more natural than his may be Imagined that Humane Composition and Life might be produced in a Course of Nature which some have been prone to Determine from Materials very much inferior to the Subsistence of Mankind either in Soul or Body And this is frequently discernable as from Elementary Commixtures and Operations Animals proceed from Vegetables and the contrary Insomuch that Aristotle in his last Chapter of the Generation of Animals conjectures That the Origine of Men as well as other Creatures might have in Time past an Earthly Production and which he in another Place supposes by a long backward Computation of Time to have probably been an Artifice of Nature heretofore known and omitted Yet none of these Methods however they were but
must have had the allowance of Providence without which there can be Nothing in any kind compleated Notwithstanding it cannot be Affirm'd with Des-Cartes That although we have not as he alledgeth Being from our selves 't is no assurance That we can derive our immediate Existence from something more perfect than our Natures Which if an univocal Truth relating to God the most Supreme and Perfect of Beings it may be objected whether so many Imperfections as are naturally Adherent to our Compositions could be consistent with any Perfections that were bestowed by the Almighty or by which we must not have been more excellently temper'd in the best of our Faculties than really we are If not every Individual of Mankind equally perfect in all Parts of Knowledge had the Humane Mind been so commited to our Bodies by Supreme Allowance The contrary of which may be Asserted from Common Experience as sure that Particulars of Mankind are not more different in their External Features than they are in the Internal Proprieties of the Soul However Des-Cartes is pleased so far to Dissent from the Universal Sway of Experimental Science that he undertakes to Philosophize against the Rules and Dictates of Nature by devising of Principles whereby he would totally sever the Mind from the Body And with that Parity too that he excepts no Imbecillity incident to Sex and Age if the Mind be clearly evacuated by a Dose of his Idea from Corporeal Thought should it tend to the Soul of Being Operation and Management that is ineffably conferred by Providence on the Works of Nature Yet all these mighty Limits howsoever appearing providentially impassible must be so refinedly penetrated by his Idea that it may not encounter a Substance tho' no grosser than the least Particle of Epicurus's Atoms But how to fix the Imagination on any Thing of Infinite Perfection so as to surpass the Boundaries of the Universe and in that vast Journey of Thought exempt from the Intellect all Bodily Perception were no less absurd than the Epithete of an Incorporeal Phantasme Which every Man that does Think either Sleeping or Waking may sensibly confute It being impossible to imagine by any strength of Thought the Perfections of God farther than our Compositions of Body and Soul are capable to extend Yet this manner of Humane Intelligence is so peremptorily thwarted by the Suppositions of this Author That he undertakes so to dis-joyn the correspondency that the Intellect has with the Senses That according to his Maxims Men cannot be assured that either God or their Souls Exist if their Imagination be not very singularly applied by expelling at pleasure all conception of Bodily Objects or that there is any such Thing as Corporeal Residence or Motion or that the Heavens are Replenished with Stars or that there is Earth or that Men have Bodies and sublunary Existence or at most but Moral Certainties That we sensibly perceive there are any such Things Unless by his manner of Idea the Mind may be so stript from its Corporeal Appurtenances That it may Reign with such simplicity in its Kingdom of Thought that it may have nothing to do with Dominion over the Senses or Body wherein it has Being On which distinct Method of Thinking he conceives does depend the Natural Propriety of the Soul as it may by Imagination be separated from the Body To come therefore to the Improbability of his Assertion Let it be granted That he or any other Man could reject by Speculation all Bodily Particulars that are visibly and sensibly perceived within the Compass of the World were it possible at the same time to entertain Thought by no Representation of other Things of a Corporeal Nature which would amount to the creating of Thought somewhat more Fictitious than when ensoul'd by Poets their Invention of Gods and Goddesses Because they did not transport their Fictions beyond or without the resembling of Something in Being before But exceeded by the Imaginary Suggestions of this Author who gives no rise to his Thought from any Thing by likeness precedently known to himself or any Body else Yet from this pure Conceit does he argue the clear Existence of the Humane Soul and the Knowledge that it may perfectly have of the Being of God I should not have made this Discussion here being much to the purpose of which I have already Treated had not Occasion been given by what succeeds so far to Impress its necessary Reiteration To proceed therefore with him to his 21 Particular where he undertakes to prove That from the Evidence we have of Something more perfect than our selves we may clearly determine the manner of our Duration and Temporary Continuance as also the natural Subsistence of all other Things because as he alledgeth no such Particulars depend on themselves Which is a clear Truth if he would intend by his Notion the Intermediate Conduct of Providence in the Modalities Production and Conservation it gives in a usual Course to Things within the Boundaries of the Universe In which may be discerned That some Individuals are more or less durable or subject to Decay Alteration and Periods of their Existence Yet all these Varieties are not openly to be understood otherwise than in a natural Method they may be Effects of Elementary Operations and this is no less than experimentally certain as sure as there is Heat Cold Dryness and Moisture And consequently the Ingredients of Bodies as they have temperatures from them which is notoriously manifest in the Complexions Dispositions and Tempers of Men and other Creatures But without these necessary Mediums to lift up our Imagination after the manner of his Idea to a meer Notion of a sublime Cause that gives Being and Conservation to all Things were to depart from the immediate School of Providence by undertertaking to be our own Instructers of what we cannot without its natural Information by any contemplative Thought or imaginary Speculation howsoever Refined possibly apprehend Yet on this incomprehensible Way of Thinking is generally Erected the main Fund and Tendency of his Principles whereby he undertakes to Improve Humane Understanding I find nothing more Intervenes in this Part of his Treatise that requires in Substance any farther Remark Wherefore to avoid Repitition I pass on to his 25th Head where he has this Expression If God from himself or others Reveals any Thing that exceeds the genuine strength of our Understandings such are the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation of Christ We ought not to refuse their Belief nor admire That many Things are both in the Immense Nature of God as also in those created by him that surpass our Capacities All which I readily acknowledge tho' I cannot but admire that so speculative a Person as Monsieur Des Cartes should not annex to his Belief of this Three-fold Mystery the admirable facility of Providence by which the most Essential Part of That stupendious Article of Humane Faith comprehended in Christ the Second Person in the Mysterious Creed
Omnipotent should not be proportionably compleated by his Understanding and Senses whereby there might result an unerrable Perception or Notion of Things evident from such as are confus'dly understood The Quere would doubtless pose as Learned a Thinker as was this Author As also if supposed such a positive Certainty in Humane Understanding as he undertakes to Assert Why it should be thought to be so insufficient a Gift of God that it should not at all Times be able to over-rule or not absolutely suppress the Imperfect Assaults and erroneous Temptations of the Will and Senses Notwithstanding that Experience assures That there is no Universal Humane Perfection either known or practised And as certain it is That he would not have presented the World with so many Inventions of his Brain whereby to explain the Principles he Avowes if he had thought That every Man's Intelligence or Capacity of Thinking had been evident or not wanted the Instructions of his Pen It being absurd to conceive That the Soul should be sufficiently Capacitated from God to distinguish betwixt certain and uncertain Cogitations and want any Advertisement from Man more Methodically to advantage its Intelligent Faculty Of which he amply concedes That no Man can be assured of its perspicuous Execution by reason of the powerful Reluctancy and Impediment it receives from the Will and Senses To as little purpose does he offer his Distinction betwixt the Act of Volition and the Assent to be deceived that proceeds from the Inclination that the Understanding has to be swayed by the Senses But how any Man can be said to Assent without the voluntary Freedome and Concurrence of his Will is more like a Contradiction than rationally to be Apprehended And must in his own Phrase tend to the defeating of the Amplitude of Knowledge bestowed by God on the Humane Mind if rendered conditional or subordinate to our voluntary Complyance By which manner of Discussions he has confusedly Involved the Serenity he would allye to his Principles in order to the unerrable Perception Attributed by him to the Intellectual Faculty Yet after several Passages of this Nature he seems to Recant them in his 43 Particular where he peremptorily Affirms That it is as impossible to the mistaken if we yield our Assent to such Things as we clearly understand as to believe That God is a Deceiver If this Tenent were true the Brain of every Man would as it were by Divine Decree be filled with Certainties But how assured of this Infallible Discernment the Answer that must be given from the Principle of Des-Cartes is by clearly distinguishing of Things by the perspicuous Faculty of the Humane Intellect Because saies he it rarely happens That any Man will yield his spontaneous Aslent to any Thing of which he has not a veritable assurance from his Understanding But if duely considered how numerously the World is Replenished with Mankind of all Ages and Complexions that give up their Assents to the Dictates of others as they conceive them to be more Intelligible than themselves and yet in so doing however they erre may not be less confident of direct Perception than any of their Tutors To be plain were there such an absolute Gift conferred on the Soul by Divine Appointment 't is not to be denyed That Men Women and Children would be equally Gifted and accordingly distinguish by the undeniable Clearness of their Intellects all Notions of Things certainly to be apprehended or dubiously to be rejected Because God as he Affirms Has endued the Soul with a separate Jurisdiction and perfect Determination without the Assistance or Concurrence of the Will and Senses and therefore as a compleat Donative from Above might have a ripe Discernment before the Bodily Parts grow to Perfection And if so there is more Reason to expect That it should Actuate alike perspicuously the Intellectual Faculty in the Youth Age and Sexes of Mankind than that they should be differently Judicious or disagreeably subject to the Imbecillities of their Natural Compositions as they appear to common Observation Yet this Conclusion has as near a Resemblance to his Premises as Grass to Grass This Reflection may well have a pertinent Allowance if considered with what confidence he Averrs That God has so disposed the Soul in the Body of Man that it can exactly distinguish of Truth and Falsehood in every Consideration Whereas the contrary is rather manifest as our Corporeal Existencies are providentially sustained By which it appears that in Course of Nature the Life is no otherwise Ensouled in the Body than as it is Complicated with the Affections and Tinctures of the Senses And from whence the Actâ—ons of the Mind suitably Exert their Operations And this is very apparent from the Natural Concourse of Elementary Ingredients that mix with our Dispositions and Moralities of Life So that 't is not to be doubted That by a Natural Conduct and Capacity appropriated to their Bodily Constitutions some Men are more Scientifically Intelligent Discreet and Temperate than others As contrarily the vast Numbers of Inconsiderate Imprudent Idiots and Frantick Persons in several Kinds are every where Evident which can have no other Cause than Issuing from the Irresistible Sourse of their Corporeal Tempers together with the Tides of Commotion and Disturbance on which the Soul as on so many Impetuous Billows is more or less perpetually Fluctuated Wherefore 't is not a little bold in this Author who peremptorily Affirms That there is a clear and distinct Perception on all Accounts Resident in the Understanding if as he requires the Prejudices we have from our Constitutions and Bodily Imperfections were distinctly avoided by separating the Intelligence of the Mind from all Intermixture of the Senses as a Faculty conferred by God on the Humane Intellect Which to deny according to his Notion were all one as to term God a Deceiver I call'd this his Tenent bold before and I may add to it Presumption and Ignorance beyond expectation in so Learned a Writer Might he not as well have Affirmed that a Man can have an unerrable Prospect and Conception of the manner of the Existence of the Omnipotent as also of the Original Being of the Universe together with Mankind and every Individual Animal and Thing within its total Extent had there been such a Divine Gift bestowed on the Intellectual Faculty And must have been far more Infallibly manifest in the Uniting of Religion tending to the Worship of God which doubtless as the most necessary Intelligence would have been Conferred by the Almighty whereby he might be more unanimously Adored by all Mankind But this is not so Decreed by God nor in the Power of Man to accomplish by Resisting as he Insinuates the Prejudices and Incapacities incident to our Innate Tempers of Body and Mind Not that I deny that there is a constant visible Conviction palpably discernable in the Works of the Almighty by which the total World is Miraculously Constituted from whence may be fully
any Modalities or Qualities but only Attributes because in him there can be no Variation And no less Excellency of Subsistence does he appropriate to Things Created if no different Modalities or Diversity of Existence and Duration is to be found in them and consequently exempts from thom all Qualifications and Modalities and instead of those he Dignifies their Being by the Name of Attributes annex'd to their Natures If this Doctrine could be verified there might be no distinction betwixt the Substance of God as Defin'd by this Author and any other Thing of whose Existence and Duration we have no variable Prospect Of which the Universe for ought can be prov'd to the contrary affords many And who can doubt but it may be so Affirm'd not only of Stars that have unchangeable Magnitudes above us but also of the most Durable Rocks of Adamant which by their Permanency and lasting Continuance admit of no certain Computation whereby may be Imply'd their Temporary Alteration or Change And 't is no wonder if with the Modern Philosophical Mine pretendedly discover'd by this Author there be discern'd some Rubbish amongst the Diamonds which he endeavours to polish by his Brain For what is more gross than to render as he does the Attributes of an Uncreated Substance or of God the same with Created and next to grant That there is no other Distinction betwixt Substance and Substance but as they differ in Attributes which if true there could be no exact distinguishing of Uncreated and Created Existence By reason that a Corporeal Being might according to his Affirmation have the same Attributes Nor is there any Discussion more Philosophically difficult than to explicate how Substance and Body may be differently apprehended by any Intelligible Distinction of Science But whosoever will rely upon the Opinion of Des-Cartes must wipe out of the Essence of his Intellect all actual Perception of Objects represented by the Senses and next be so far reconcil'd to his Idea as to Denominate the Humane Soul a peculiar Substance committed to the Body by God but nothing ally'd to Corporeal Nature tho' naturally actuating the Body of Man As if it were no Contradiction to determine That Substance not to be understood Body can operate on Body To evade which obvious Objection he frequently labours as may be observ'd by the Remarks precedently made on his Treatise to sublimate his conceiv'd Idea by supposing That the Faculty of separate Thought was so dispos'd by God as a perfect Thinking Substance Inherent in the Mind To which as a Gift of Perfection he Imputes unerrable Conception asking no other Conditions whereby to remove the Misapprehensions and Frailties of Thought than very considerative and discreet Thinking Which is the utmost performance that can be rationally attain'd by any Contemplative Act but not with that compleat Assurance requir'd by him whereby Thought may arrive to such a Veritable Certainty That it may not at all be Complicated with the Senses or beholding to them for any Object of their Conveyance to the Judgment-Seat of the Understanding Which is no less Inconsistent with Humane Capacity than to believe with Des-Cartes That it is possible so to Discipline the Mind as to be one of his Thinking Proselytes Tho' not able to Demonstrate That there is any sensible Certainty in that speculative Mode of Thought which by a main Artifice of his Brain he endeavours to promote Nor less discrepant from the soundest Opinion grounded on Divine and Philosophical Science is the Denomination he gives to the Deity which he defines an Uncreated Thinking Substance or as he would intend the Almighty an eternal Thinker Which is very like a Contradiction in Terms It being impossible to allow to Thought by common Acceptation other than a temporary Attribute or not to be otherwise Defin'd than Exerted in Past or Present Time Which if apply'd to God were all one as to Impute to the Deity a temporary Thought and must Imyly Solicitude and Care suitable to the Nature of Contemplating on something to be Improv'd or Perfected by Thinking that was not before exactly consider'd Which how far destructive to the Attribute of Omnipotent Perfection I suppose was not duely weigh'd by this Author when he penn'd this Paragraph I find a Conceit in Plato much more passable than what is written by Des-Cartes who being ask'd What God did His answer was That the Deity exercis'd Geometry On which the Learned Gassendus has this Comment That Geometry as it Relates either to Contemplation or Action may not be incongruously understood of God as he may be said to Contemplate and chiefly consider himself in that Act Emphatically express'd in the Being given by the Omnipotent to the Universe together with the proportional Conservation it has from Supreme Power and Conduct Which is a better Exposition than that of a thoughtful Deity deliver'd by this French Philosopher who makes no such sublime Distinction betwixt an Uncreated and Created thinking Substance as does in any kind Attribute to God what he means by Uncreated Thinking or how or in what manner to be apprehended as it may be apply'd to the Deity So that according to the Latitude of this Author's Idea of Thinking perfect Thought may be Inherently Attributed to the Humane Mind no less than to the Almighty with this only difference That Man is not an Original but a Created Thinker And 't is as possible if granted as this Writer determines That perfect Thought bestow'd on the Soul by God may be fill'd with Perfection as it solely resides in the Intellect no less Created than if it had been eternally such To conclude it is far more congruous to the Propriety of the Diety if said That he has for ever determin'd than by any Notion Affirm'd a Thinker It being not to be deny'd That Thought can have other Construction but as Imply'd by its Past Present or Future Contemplation on something in Being Which cannot be an Object of Omnipotent Thinking because nothing could really Exist that was not by him so foreseen and Establish'd Whereas Humane Reasoning must necessarily proceed from Principles deduc'd from apposite Conclusions gradually made and depending on Antecedents and Consequents of Proof in every Consideration Which can have no resemblance to the Science of God whose perfect Knowledge is perpetually the same And therefore admits of no successive Degrees or Qualifications tending to the Method of Argumentative Confirmation In his 60 Particular he attempts to surprise his Reader but how Improperly may be gather'd from the Expression he delivers in these Words Whosoever saies he does acknowledge That God could make us certainly Intelligent of whatsoever we may distinctly Apprehend must for Example grant That we may have an Idea of Substance extended or Corporeal although we do not as yet assuredly know that any such Thing does really Exist tho' certain of the possibility of its Existence And I may well Reply That 't is as far from my expectation to find in Des-Cartes so weak
an Argument in order to the Grandeur of the Matter he would prove by his Affirming That we can have no absolute Assurance unless the Intellect be immediately Impower'd by God that Bodily Substance and Extension have other than a possibility of being such Which has so very opposite a disparity to natural and sensible Conviction that it appears no less Irrational than if he had undertaken to Argue Mankind into the Belief That it is possible to have Senses and yet be destitute of their Use. Can a Man live and not be sensible That Substance in its Bodily signification has a proper Being Or can he feel and eat the Food that nourishes his Corporeal Composition and not be Knowing otherwise than by meer Cogitation that he subsists by it or that there is any such Thing but in possibility Existing Yet so determin'd by the Dictates of this Author however Contradictory to common Sense or as Unsound in his Way of Reasoning as if he had declar'd That a Man might have Corporeal Life but be dead as to all Bodily Consideration whilst by sole Ccogitation in the Mind he may have only a living Notion of the possibility of the Being of Substance and Body as they may be distinguish'd by their natural Capacities Which Opinion of his he would Confirm as he presumes with no greater difficulty Than as any Man may judge that he is a real Thinker and by that Thought exclude from himself all other Substance either Thinking or Extended On which Supposition or Consistency of Thought as he intends it he certainly concludes That every Man may distinguish himself not only from every Thinking Substance but also from all others of Corporeal Denomination Had a Poet been Author of this Conceit he had not farther surpass'd the Excesses of Fiction than this French Writer has done by the liberty he allows to his Invention deviated from Principles of Reason and Philosophy For what is more preposterous to Both than to conclude as he does That it is possible for a Thinking Man to separate himself by meer Thought from the substantial Similitude he has to all others of Humane Nature as also from whatsoever can be said Corporeally to Exist And may not the same Person by as good consequence Determine That he is a Thinker in Body without being sensible that any Bodily Life Composition or Parts appertain to him Which requires no plainer Confutation than what has been already observ'd on Passages of this Author precedently tending to the same purpose as may be discern'd by whomsoever shall heedfully inspect these Papers All which in effect is conceded by himself before he comes to a Period of the Head I Treat of where he thus Expresses That although we suppose That God has so strictly Joyn'd to the Cogitative Substance other Corporeal Substance that they cannot be more firmly Connected and from their Conjunction Constituted their Union Notwithstanding they may remain absolutely distinct because God may reserve a Power to separate their Beings tho' Corporeally Inclos'd Or to confer Conservation on both as United or separated however they participate by Existence with the Extent of the Body These words in Summ can have no other Signification than what may be conster'd a Distinction without an apparent Difference and therefore Logically Unintelligible there being no Notion more perplex'd than his manner of Uniting Substance to Substance in a Corporeal Figure and yet expect that they ought to be requisitely distinguish'd The Reason he gives in Summ is That it may be so Ordain'd by God That whatsoever are Conjoyn'd by him takes not from his Power to disunite their Conjunction by capacitating their Separation or as the Soul may singly Act without any Assistance or Concurrence of the Senses appropriated to the Body If this be the best Argument that he can Alledge by which he would heighten the Notion so much Celebrated by him of the Minds operating by a distinct and clear Idea from all Corporeal Concomitancy it is more than Intricately in this Place urg'd by him who grants the firm Union Constitated by God of Soul and Body yet will needs Imagine that their Separation is also determin'd by God And thus by Des-Cartes the Act of God is render'd contradictory to it selt Bâ—… now does he undertake to Explain his Proposition Why verily by no better Assurance than that it is possible for the Almighty so to dispose the Humane Mind that it may operate divided from the Body and sensible Parts tho' naturally United to all of them Which in effect does annex Contradiction to the Act of God it being palpably evident That the Understanding Faculty does actuate its Intelligence with the Concurrence of the Senses But no such manifest Assurance that by any separate Power of the Mind the same can be Effected Let a Man Imagine by his utmost Force of meer Thought That by the Speculative Act of the Mind is represented the Shape Proportion Likeness and Colour of any Object whether it be Moving Standing or Lying 't is not in his Power so perfectly to discern all their several Proprieties as if they were visibly perceiv'd by him and consider'd as proper Objects to entertain all other requisite Parts of his Senses But very Impossible to Contemplate of any of these by any separate Act of the Understanding distinct from Sensation Because there could be no Idea or Notion of such Things that had never been convey'd to the Intellect by the consent of the Senses as by Seeing Feeling Smelling Tasting and Hearing are occasionally compleated the useful Appurtenances to the Humane Intellect Wherefore it might be well admir'd Why the useage of Eyes Hands and Ears with other of the Senses should be naturally Incident to the Bodily Parts and Composition of Man if the Mind could solely be perfectly apprehensive without them And doubtless these Excellent Gifts had been Insignificantly conferr'd on Mankind if Thought abstracted from Sensation might be alone exactly apprehensive Nor can sufficient Reason be given Why the Mind should not have been solely bestow'd however Ordain'd to Exist if by its single Intelligence it could have perform'd the divers Operations and Actual Capacities that are joyntly Exerted by the Soul and Senses 'T is not to be deny'd that the Existence of the Mind unconfin'd to Body had been as easily accomplish'd by Providence had it been so determin'd as it is now Resident with the Society of the Senses And questionless if so establish'd had exalted Humane Felicity to a paramount degree Nothing tending more to the detriment of Mankind than the complicated and prone Inveiglement of the Soul by the Allurement of the Senses So that could the Mind have been exempted from Corporeal Conjunction it had certainly by a glorious Act of Providence been discharg'd from its Bodily Confinement together with the exorbitant and wicked Temptations it receives from the Appetites and Senses But this being repugnant to it s Decreed and natural Station in the Body of Man no room is
Person as if with the Point of a Weapon I should wound the same Part of my own Body And did not the Soul and Senses thus apprehensively Conspire there would not be that Reluctancy Defence and Prevention us'd by us for the safety of our Corporeal Parts nor should we be so actually sensible that Mortality is the inevitable consequence of unsupportable Violence Wounds and Maladies that surrender our Bodies to Death And this clearly invalidates the Allegations and Instances that he gives on this Head together with the Example he mentions of a Sword that may so hurt or dismember any Part of the Body that we may in Mind be grievously apprehensive of the local Motion of the Force or Blow as it wounds the Part tho' the Motion of the Sword and Body hurt be very different From whence he concludes That the Humane Mind by a bare speculation of local Motion together with its forcible onset made on the Body may judge of all Corporeal Afflictions and Sensations whatsoever And is not this a pretty kind of Quibble in Des-Cartes by not considering That it was not the Motion of the Blow or the wounded Part that represented to the Intellect or Mind the hurt receiv'd but as the Pain of the Member or Part assur'd the Imagination unto which it was inseparably united It being very possible for a Man to be sensibly apprehensive of a Wound or Blow tho' he does not conceive or see the Motion of the Weapon that gave it But as he is sensible of the Pain he could not doubt that it was effected by forcible means tho' no otherwise relating to the Wound or more diversified from sensible Conception than on this occasion this Author does render the Mind or what he calls a Thinking Substance by a modality of Thinking without Sense Nor is it Imaginable how any Thing that is not Elementarily Compos'd can operate on the Humane Body that is so constituted Wherefore the Word Substance applied to the Soul cannot be understood Incorporeal by the determination of Des-Cartes who wheresoever he treats of Substance appropriates unto it quantitative and dimensive Parts both in a Plilosophical and Mathematical Consideration And particularly in the last Page of this Fourth Part of his Philosophy condemns the Doctrine of Atoms deliver'd by Democritus because he allows them no Commensurable Quantity Had it been demanded of this French Philosopher What kind of Substance must be the Essence of the Soul when separated by Death from the Body in whose Elementary Composition it did precedently Exist He could not define it otherwise than quantitative as every Thing call'd Substance is by his Opinion allow'd to be and therefore the same after the period of the Body's Life And consequently no less agreeable to his Doctrine if Affirm'd That the thinking Substance call'd by him the Humane Soul must have when separated from the Body a Circumscrib'd or Elementary Being suitable to the Nature of Substance as it may be conceiv'd quantitatively Dimensive Which Objection should a Cartesian endeavour to evade by Affirming That the Soul separated from the Body is progressive to the Sphere of Spirits or Things superlatively refin'd and stripp'd from Matter and unto which some allow Definitive not Circumscrib'd Beings he must next grant That the Soul cannot have Existence there otherwise than in a Material Superficies proportionable to its Substance and there eternally Circumscrib'd where Spirits and Immaterial Beings are without such Limits which were all one as to reside temporally amongst spiritual Existencies To avoid which Absurdity he cannot be thought to mean otherwise than that the Soul upon its immediate departure from the Body is Metamorphos'd into a Spirit And next that it has a spiritual Passage through all Elementary Bodies that intervene betwixt it and its immaterial Residence appointed by God But here may arise a Querie Whether Motion can be Attributed to any Thing without Body Or in what manner it can Move where Bodies are or be in Motion without removing of them Which in that Circumstance would render a Soul however deem'd spiritual Commensurably Moving as by Parts of Time it might have an intermixt Progression with other Substances as its temporary Measure Certain it is that Stars the Luminaries of Heaven if duely consider'd their wonderful Motion unalterable Essence and continuation may be allow'd our most visible and perpetual miraculous Objects or somewhat more than in Nature can be properly worded But should those Etherial Beings be suppos'd in any Place where Elementary Substances might Exist it were impossible they could move uncommixt with Things of different Nature from theirs Wherefore it must be granted That the Orbs above together with the Stars and Planets are of one simple Essence or Manner of Existence and therefore cannot Mingle or Move with other Matter distinct from their own Tho' by Divine Appointment as Parts of the same miraculous Substance they are only Illuminated But should the Soul of Man be Assimilated by any refin'd Contemplation to the Nature to the Etherial Luminaries for want of a more obvious or excellent Comparison 't is not easie to conceive how in its Passage from the Body when Life departs it should remove to its appointed Residence separated from Intervening Substances which in their Temperatures and Parts are of the same Elementary Composition with the Humane Body that had been actuated by it Which Objection was doubtless consider'd as causing some Hesitation in the Thoughts of Des-Cartes who notwithstanding the pretended curiosity of his Imagination in reference to the Soul dispos'd according to his Method into the Original Formation by God as he delivers the Operation of the Humane Body He does not at all express the Manner of its departure from its Corporeal Station at the period of Life Or by what means transferr'd or remov'd to its Immortal Residence which was to be expected from the process he delivers Who having determin'd that the Humane Soul is a thinking Substance and notionally Active in the Conduct of the Living Body he might as well have Inserted the Method of its Progression after Death from its Bodily Habitation and how being a Substance it arriv'd to its Immortal Abode without being Complicated Mov'd or Moving in its Passage with any material Thing by any resemblance to what it perform'd when acting in the Inclosure of the Body of Man All which according to the liberty he gives to his Invention might have been as successfully deliver'd by him as the dispatch he gives to his Globuli and Vortices by variety of Schemes and Diagrams that have no better proof than the Suppositions of Des-Cartes But it seems he thought it safer for his Pen to Inscribe his Imagination of the Soul primarily convey'd by the Act of the Almighty into the Humane Body than by what subsequent Means or Pasport from above its Substance arriv'd after the Death of the Body to its determin'd Existence Of which I find no mention in any of his Works other than that he leaves the Manner of the Soul 's passing from the lifeless Body together with its Journey to its Immortal Residence to the miraculous Conduct of the Almighty And I think it devoutly Judicious if according to his Example I silence my Querie on this Incomprehensible Subject Since by the Will of the Omnipotent Disposer and Conservator of the Universal World together with the Being of Mankind in Soul and Body our rational Abilities more aptly tend to admire than determine the Manner by which we are Ensoul'd to live or after Death to remain Immortal A Contemplation sublimely incumbent on the Humane Mind that is enough Capacitated to understand its Intellectual Dignity however its Essence and Operations within us are superlative to our Apprehensions or exact Definitions to be given of them Wherefore I doubt not that my Discussions on this great Particular are no less valid where I differ from him than what I have Remark'd on not a few of his main Principles Maxims Notions Hypotheses and Schemes or demonstratively wav'd or rejected the Insufficiency of others on whatsoever account So that I dare Affirm that I have not omitted any significant or useful Animadversion And had I more particularly insisted on any Speculations or Matter seemingly varied and Instanc'd by him I had in effect but encreas'd Words to one and the same tendency And therefore where in Substance my Observations on some Things include other I desire that my Reader would ingenuously consider them as they ought to be understood And tho' this Author is very inclinable to Celebrate his own Esteem by frequently Affirming That his Assertions and Tenents are Philosophically and Mathematically certain I will boast of no Success of mine to the contrary farther than is Equivalent with the Proofs I have made and to which I refer the Judicious Peruser And thus I conclude the Fourth and last Part of my Remarks on the Plilosophy of Des-Cartes FINIS
Attributes because nothing but Body is capable of them Wherefore 't is no less naturally Improper to Assert the Being of an Incorporeal Substance than to Affirm That there may be such a Thing as body without Body which how far repugnant to the common Dictates of Reason and Sense is obvious to every Man's Understanding And which could not but be foreseen by Des-Cartes who to avoid that grand Reflection covers his Idea of God with the general Notion of an Uncreated Substance notwithstanding that it is equally Impossible to Imagine a Substantial Existence however it came to pass without the Qualifications of Body before mentioned Because the Term given by him of Substance Uncreated takes nothing from any Corporeal Propriety that might appertain to it Insomuch That whether Substance be deem'd Created or Uncreated it may be Denominated Corporeal for ought that by this Author is prov'd to the contrary Who by his Undertaking to call the Soul of Man a separate Thinking Substance tho' confin'd to the Body and perfectly Impower'd to distinguish after his Method Truth from Falsehood does in effect appropriate to God whom he supposes to have committed that Animated Substance into the Body of Man no other difference of Epithet than by denominating the Deity an Uncreated Substance The grossness of which Tenent if uncensur'd were enough to Infect the Brain of Man by Insinuating That neither the Almighty or any Humane Individual with whatsoever may be nam'd Animal or Vegetal is other than Corporeally Existing The Reasons already given being of sufficient Validity to Convict Mankind That there can be no evident Distinction made betwixt the Word Substance and Body How much more Judiciously safe had it then been for the Learned Des-Cartes had he Asserted the Infinite Consistence of the Omnipotent rather by the Epithet of Incomprehensible Admiration than to have deliver'd it s more than wonderful Being by the Philosophical Notion of something substantially Existing Because the Word Substance takes from the Immense Nature of the Almighty as it may relate to Body and Commensurable Parts whereby he has expos'd it to no small contest for Reasons already Inserted It being a far surer Aphorism to define what the Deity is not than by any Term of Science to express what it is or any clear Idea of its Miraculous Being In his next Head which is the 55 of his Discussions he farther dilates on his Thesis of meer Cogitation as he would separate it from all Corporeal or sensible Concomitancy And this he attempts to Explain by Affirming That Duration Order and Number may be distinguish'd without annexing of them to any conceiv'd Substance Which if duely consider'd are but so many Insignificant Varations of his former Positions For how can any Corporeal Thing be said perfectly to endure or to have Orderly or Numerical Being unless the Substance or Body to which they appertain be also understood in every of these Considerations Can it be properly Justified That any quantitive Thing is to be apprehended as to the time of its continuing such but as there may be perceptibly deduc'd from it a real Intelligence why it so long in that manner Remain'd or was Alter'd or Chang'd into another Is' t possible to perceive the Flame of a Candle extinguish'd and not at the same time Discern That the Matter that fed the Flame is alterable with it Yes certainly did it burn by Hours or Minutes accounted from a Watch or Dial. And is it not plainly manifest by the precedent Example that Duration Order and Number essentially appertain to the entire Consistency or Alterative Nature and Qualification of the Matter unto which they belong A Tree may be older than I can Compute tho' not to the Man who in past time did plant it But if its Decay or Withering in any of its Parts be visible to me I may be able to account the Day or Season in which I perceiv'd it did Alter Wherefore to conclude as does this Author That Duration Order and Number are but the Modalities of Substance is a very fantastical Conceit since they must have an Inseparable Tendency more or less by their Co-herent Attributes to the Perfection or Imperfection of whatsoever does Exist If a Six-pence be broken into two Parts there will remain in either of those Pieces a different Proportion in Number Orderly Figure and Duration than when it was whole And tho' this is but an Artificial Instance as it may have Reference to any Thing broken or sever'd 't is not impossible that by Time might naturally be produc'd the same Effect because whatsoever does Corporeally subsist must be subject to Alteration in all its Capacities So that what he simply calls the Modalities of Being is indeed Essential to Substance and its Bodily Parts or no other than necessitated Change sooner or later of all Individual Things that are extant to Humane Observation The Stars that Illustrate as the most Refin'd Jewels of Illumination the Firmament above and least apprehended by Thought to vary in any of their Proprieties cannot be certainly exempted from Present or Future Alteration either as they have or may vary in their Order Influence Motion or what besides may be Incident to their Essence and Nature How Insignificantly then is argu'd by this Author That neither Order Number or Continuation in any Thing that Exists is otherwise to be understood than as so many Modalities of Substance Tho' to every Man's Reason there can be no Variation or Change in any of These but there must be also a substantial Alteration in whatsoever may be call'd Body or Substance In his 56 Particular he undertakes to make out what he farther means by the Modalities he gives to Things which he grants In some respects may be Interpreted Attributes or Qualities and as Substance may be said to be Affected or Vary'd by them not Improperly call'd Modalities But most generally he allows them when consider'd as Inherent in Substance the Terms of Attributes And what would he infer from this puzzle of Words and perplexing of Terms otherwise than he has precedently mention'd For if Modalities Qualities and Attributes may be apply'd to Substance in all its Capacities Proprieties and possible Variations how is he able to make good his former Assertion where he denominates them the meer Modalities of Cogitation So that whatsoever Alteration is either Naturally or Essentially Incident to Substance is no farther Real in the Judgment of Des-Cartes than what may have the empty Notion of Modality tho' both in substance and manner of Being the Thing does not continue the same as it was before Which is a perfect Contradiction to sensible Evidence if duely apprehended the precedent Instances which as I conceive are amply satisfactory There yet remains a Part of this Head that may well be Interpreted somewhat Crazy Notwithstanding that he undertakes to explicate the soundness of its Importance as he intends To which purpose his Expression stands briefly thus In God saies he cannot be
thought a Deceiver This Passage can have no excusable Defence if judiciously Examin'd The Question he offers being so ill Stated or Inconsistent with the accurate Part of Reasoning That it cannot amount to Refin'd Sophistry For however he might conceive That the Soul together with its Mental Idea might be placed in the Body by God it could not be without assurance that the World is replenish'd with Corporeal Beings that cannot be Denominated such but as Length Breadth and Depth Colour Taste and Smell are their natural Proprieties So that where the Intellect and Senses are joyntly Illuminated in whatsoever Method by the Act of God they must be far more certain than to admit any room for Misconception or the If or Quere Inserted by Des-Cartes by which he would Infer That could a Man Ensoul'd by God Imagine by any other means that there is no such Thing as Longitude Latitude Depth and the like appertaining to Corporeal Substance he might call God a Deceiver Which were all one as to suppose That a Man duely apprehensive of any Object should by the Will of God voluntarily Determine that he is not which is no less Irrational than Impossible to all of competent Understanding But no disallowable Tenent if apply'd to other Particulars of Mankind whose Intellects are not of sufficient Ability if not naturally stupid or accidentally unsound or phrenetically distemper'd as is the condition of such as are Distracted and in a manner totally destitute of the Use of their Rational Faculty And who can doubt that not a few of these want Capacity to define Length Breadth and Depth as Inseparable to Bodily Existence Which could not have been if Mankind were Universally endu'd by an Impartial Course of Nature Ordain'd by God and so committed to the Humane Body Where it must have had a more excellent Residence than could be impedited or debas'd by Corporeal Attributes and must have likewise been compleated with as perfect an Idea in every respect as this Author endeavours to prove But not being perform'd his manner of Argument turns the point of a Dilemma against his Assertion by which he would annex a more general and perfect Idea to the Soul of Man than is experimentally Certain and whereby in effect he Terms God a Deceiver because according to his Doctrine every Soul within a Humane Body has not a patallel Idea of exact Knowledge A Blessing much to be wish'd or rather Implor'd by Prayer were it not repugnant to the Methods of Providence omnipotently determin'd by which the Intellectual Faculty is differently Impowr'd as its Corporeal Dominion is more or less Absolute either as it commands or is weaken'd in Rule by the Conspiracy of the Senses Which cannot be otherwise the Mind being surrounded and continually endanger'd by the frail Composition and Temperatures of the Bodily Parts in which it operatively Resides On the contrary were there such a clear Idea from above infus'd into the Soul of Man as is Instanc'd by Des-Cartes by which every requisite Notion or Truth might be perfectly apprehended It were not consistent with the Justice of the Almighty if every Individual of Mankind were not equally Intelligible on which account one Man might be as wise in every Consideration as any other And if so there would be less necessity for Superior Magistracy or Rule could every Man be alike Discreet in governing of Himself In the mean time Des-Cartes has introduc'd a new Character on the Stage of Philosophy more compleat in Thought than is univocally Consistent with the Figure of Humane Composition by which is Personated the Dress and Mode of the Mind as it is Cloth'd by the Senses From whence 't is apparently manifest That the Powers of the Rational Soul are frequently exerted suitable to the diversity of Tempers that sensibly Exist Improve or Decay in the Body of Man And this as Naturally Certain as Animal Creatures of the same Kind vigorously Grow or Impair or are more Subtil Active and Strong proportionable to the Elementary Mixtures by which they Subsist And therefore as highly presumptuous as to Argue against the Methods of Providence if discuss'd Why Men and Creatures are so Constituted in their Several Capacities of Being and Life Which is above the search of Man's Reasoning and only known to the Omnipotent Disposer of whatsoever the Universe contains All which if duely consider'd sufficiently explodes the Novel Scene of this Part of the Philosophy of this Author together with the Actual Character he gives to Mankind in his Modalities of Intellectual Apprehension as 't is Personated by his Pen. His Second Particular begins with a Truth but ends with a Falsehood Where he grants That the Mind or Soul of Man is more strictly United to its peculiar Body than to all other Bodies The Reason he offers is Because we have an Apprehension of Griefs and other sensible Advertencies that happen unthought on by us of which the Mind he conceives could not be Intelligent as it is meerly Cogitative but as it is Conjoyn'd to a Certain extended and moveable Substance call'd the Humane Body The Antecedent Part of this Head is undoubtedly true which signifies no more than that our Souls have more to do with our own Bodies than with any other And who could have expected that Des-Cartes could have presented his Reader with so vulgar a Speculation Which has no other Tendency than that every Man is as far apprehensive as the Compliment of his Soul and Senses will extend and thus are Griefs Passions Affections sensibly distinguish'd by us when Appertaining to others Because the Rational Faculty sympathetically complies with the Senses in Conveying their Intelligence to Things of that Kind without us as he that has felt a Wound or Pain in any of his Corporeal Parts will judge of the same in others But how to think of any Thing that appertains to our selves and not to perform it by help of the Mind as a sensible Thinker is a Riddle not to be unfolded by the Writings of Des-Cartes In his Third Particular he attempts to clear the Point but in effect weakens it by this Feeble Proposition of his The Perception of the Senses does not direct us to Discover what is really in Things but as they are render'd profitable or detrimental to Humane Composition Unless sometimes or by accident we are Taught by the Senses what those Bodies are and how they Exist And therefore saies he we must Depose the Senses and solely Judge by help of the Intellect according to the Ideas that are Incident to it by Nature Whosoever is Master of a Grain of Reason must be convinc'd That a Contradiction is Imply'd by the manner of Argument here urg'd by this Author Who grants That by the Conjunction of the Soul and Senses we perfectly Discern what is Beneficial or Hurtful to us but in that Act do not certainly apprehend what those Things are Which is all one as to Affirm That we may be Intelligent yet not undoubtedly
assur'd of what we understand Unless the Intellect be Refin'd by Idea after his manner as the most natural Way of being clearly Apprehensive and with such disparagement to the Senses That they may be in his Opinion neglected Tho' common Experience might have convinc'd him that they are by Nature Constituted Assistants and real Proofs of whatsoever is openly and demonstratively understood But it seems he omitted these Considerations And therefore in his next Particular which is his 4th he positively directs as he would intend the Use of his Idea by which he Argues That the Nature of Matter or Body does not Consist in that it is Hard Ponderous or any other Manner affecting the Senses but only as it is a Thing extended in Length Breadth and Depth And for durition or hardness the Sense discovers it no farther than as the Parts of a Hard Body Resist the Motion of our Hands meeting with it Here he would exalt his Idea to the height of Dominion in the Mind and level the Senses below the Capacities that Nature has allow'd them Nothing being more Philosophically Irrational than the Supposition he Inserts That the Nature of Body is only to be understood as it has Longitude Latitude and Depth and why not also as it is Weighty Hard and Colour'd Is not Air as much a Body as Iron and yet perfectly distinguish'd by the compact Durition of the Latter as its Essential Propriety And as absolutely different in Colour could the diaphanous Substance of Air be as visible to the Eye and although it be not we may conceive the Distinction much surer than we could by intruding on the Mind a conceited Idea because we are sensibly Assur'd That no Corporeal Thing can have Being in Nature without its colourable Property And this as familiarly Certain as that a Bay-Horse cannot be Denominated a Horse if his natural Colour could be separated from his Substance There are many Things that may be said to have Colour that are not genuinely their own And so a painted Cheek whether in Man or Woman is no Dye or Complexion of Nature but Artificically Colour'd And we Judge of Pictures as they Resemble the Life by the Colours apply'd to them by the Skill of the Painter And 't is no less evident that Des-Cartes has presented his Reader with a very Fictitious Varnish of his Pen if he meant no other distinction of Colours Relating or Apply'd to Material Substances than in this Place he mentions And in Summ concludes That Weight Colour and such like Corporeal Qualities may be separated from their Inherence in Matter so that the Nature of the Substance to which they belong does not depend on any of them And is not this a concise Manner of Idea in this Author by which he would have us believe That Bodily Substance may have Existence and be sensibly perceiv'd without being discern'd by its genuine Shape and Figure If Colour Hardness and Weight with other Qualities appertaining to Matter are defin'd Accidents in a Philosophical Sense yet allowable such as when natural are inseparable Proprieties from Bodies to which they appertain And 't is some wonder that this Learned Monsieur should forget on this occasion That noted Logical Maxim Quod omni sola et semper accidit subjecto So that the Idea of this Author as it is here Apply'd by him is so far from a Weighty or indeed a Colourable Notion That 't is as surely Confuted as a White Plum may be distinguish'd by the Act of Nature from a Black one The next Step he takes is to present his Reader with the Doubts of some Persons who Determine That Bodies may be so Rarified or Condens'd that they may have by Rarifaction more Extension than when Condens'd To which Number of Dubitants I desire to be added Because I conceive nothing more clear than the doubt he Delivers Is it not very evident That Snow when dissolv'd by Rarifaction into Water is substantially Extended farther than before as it may be observ'd falling from a Hill into a River And is it not as manifest That some Parts of Wood when Thinn'd and Rarified by Fire convert to Smoak So that 't is impossible to deny that Corporeal Alteration is not Incident to Rarifaction which gives it a variable and different Extension if compar'd to the space it Precedently fill'd and this amounts to Demonstration instead of Opinion But he that will be Proselyted by the Doctrine of Des-Cartes must in this Case be such a compliable Sceptick as to Renounce his sensible Conviction and accord with him where he contends to Argue That whosoever will attentively Think and admit nothing but what he clearly understands will Judge That no more is Effected by Rarifaction and Condensation than Change of the Corporeal Figure And this in few words is the summ of what is contain'd in his Fifth and Sixth Particular that is worth a Remark The Reason he offers is That Rarified Bodies having many Pores are there Replenish'd with other Substances and by that means become Condens'd This Conceit of his is as distant from Proof as Fiction is from Truth And nothing more obviously Answer'd since 't is Philosophically Certain That Condensation is added to Bodies which are made more or less Solid as their thinner Parts are proportionately expell'd by Rarifaction And thus a tenuous Substance is gradually render'd more compact and harden'd by the Fire as is in divers Kinds Experimentally Observable Which however producing Alteration of Figure in their Corporeal Extent 't is as they receive Solidity or Durition from the Capacity that their tenuous Parts have in order to Rarifaction So that 't is not as this Writer Infers from any Intervals or Cranies in Bodies fill'd with other Bodies that causes Condensation but so much of the Tenuity of their Compositions as being vanish'd by Rarifaction leaves them more compactly Harden'd Suppose he had been ask'd Whether the thin Substance of Air or Fluid Body of Water did Exist with any such Pores or Inlets in them that might be Receptacles for other Bodies He could not probably have solv'd the Question notwithstanding 't is very apparent That Air is Thicken'd by Moisture that exhal'd by the Sun is mingled with it But Water being a grosser Substance is Condens'd as its Thinner Parts are by Heat extracted from it and this may be discern'd in every standing Pool or Puddle All which is Equivalently acknowledg'd by him in his Entrance to his Seventh Head Where he grants That there are no Pores in Air or Water that may add to their Amplitude by giving Reception to other Bodies whereby they may be more Replenish'd Yet would have it pass in being suppos'd for a Rational Fiction but I expected his Proof and therefore must be excus'd if I reject his Fable As for Corporeal Extent caus'd by Rarifaction he seems to allow none otherwise than as he would a new Body so Extended Which is not Universally true and may be so understood from the Example
given already of Snow Dissolv'd by Rarifaction to Water which when Snow was but Water Congeal'd So that it cannot be properly said to have a new Body but alter'd to the Fluid Substance which it had before The like may be Affirm'd of Lead or other Materials that when melted and enlarg'd by Extension do not lose the Denomination of the same Corporeal Substance in which Sense Lead when Dissolv'd is as truely Lead as it was in its precedent Existence Examples might be added on this Subject did the Reply that I have made require farther Illustration wherefore I proceed to his next Point which he thus States Quantity and Number differ only in Reason from the quantitative or number'd Thing This Position he procceds to Explicate by Affirming That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance may be consider'd as contian'd in the space of ten Feet altho' we attend not the Measure of any such Number of Feet And by Converse saies he the Number Ten may be understood as well as a Quantity of so many Feet although we are regardless of its Determinate Substance Here the gentile Monsieur renews his Address to his Mistress of Thought under the Notion of Idea Which he endeavours to Compleat by such a refin'd Mode of Philosophical Courtship That like a Platonick Lover he separates Sense from the Motives he Endears But I presume that his Amour has met with divers coy Reprimands from Reason the most Celebrated Mistress and Beauty of the Understanding And 't is no presumption I conceive if I Attribute a rational Success to my Pen which has more than often refell'd the Cartesian Idea in divers preceding Discussions Wherefore I might refer my Reply to what I have already Written Did not the respect that I have to the Abilities of this Author tho' none to his Mistakes oblige me to prolong my Inspection together with an earnest Desire of being convinc'd might I find Cause from his Proposals But instead of meeting with any Motives of his sufficient to reconcile me to his Assertions I may justly observe an Erroneous Relapse to his former Principles And thus in his 8th Particular that occasions my Debate He supposes That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance contain'd in a space of Ten or any Number of Feet may be understood without any Computation of it as locally Commensurable and this to be accomplish'd by a sole Idea of the Mind in his Opinion But is it possible to promote meer Thought by an Insensible Act suitable to the purpose he intends it Can a Man that never understood how a Plain Superficies may contain Body or is produc'd according to his Example to a space of Ten Feet Conceive or Delineate such a Figure without knowing that it is Compleated by Multiplying of 5 by 2 Should a Mathematical Tutor Inform his Pupil That it would be sufficient for his Instruction if by Mental Speculation he Imagin'd that there was in Nature such a Thing as a Plain Superficies tho' he did not apprehend that Longitude and Latitude were its Numerical Proprieties Could Science be Improv'd by such an Impertinent and Idle Idea that can signifie nothing either to Theory or Practice On the contrary every Man must be as competently Intelligent as was this Author of the Qualifications of Lines that appertain to superficial Content and as certainly too as the Dimensions of any Number of Acres may be figuratively Included in a Square or Parallelogram or he will profit little on this Question by Reading of Des-Cartes Who next proceeds to inform us That notwithstanding 't is a certain Truth and so I think too that nothing can be taken from Quantity or Extension but the Substance to which they belong must also be Leslen'd And convertibly not the least Part of Substance can be exempted but as much of Quantity and Extension will be taken from it This Opinion of his he alledges as opposite to the Tenent of others of whom he saies there are some that consider Corporeal Substance as distinct from its Quantity Which Conception of theirs causes them confusedly to think that the same Substance may be term'd Incorporeal Whether there was ever Man of such a wilde Imagination may well be question'd Since nothing can be more absurd than to Imagine That Substance might remain in any Kind Substance without its proper Quantity and next notwithstanding that Contradiction or as he calls it confusion of Thought to suppose the same Substance Metamorphos'd by a mysterious Way of Thinking to Incorporeal which is no less contradictory to the natural Being and Definition of Substance than if a Man should determine that Body could cease to be Body Because Substance is inseparable from Quantity as its Corporeal Propriety and therefore by no Notion or Object of Sense can be deem'd Incorporeal But notwithstanding that the Incomprehensible Idea of Incorporeal Substance is reprov'd by Des-Cartes as Notionally Confus'd the Sense that he delivers in the 64th Particular of his First Part or Treatise of Humane Cognition is ally'd to the same Absurdity as may be observ'd from my Remarks on that Head Where he supposes That Cogitaion and Extension may be consider'd as Modalities of Substance because as he Affirms The Humane Mind may have diversity of Thoughts by which the Cogitative Substance as he Defines it may at one time Imploy its Idea of Things clearly distinguish'd without the Assistance of the Senses at another operate in Conjunction with the sensible Parts of the Body Is not this such a manner of Idea as would render the Thinking Substance of the Mind with or without Quantity as pleases the Thinker Which little differs from the Irrational Notion of Incorporeal Substance if any Thing by excluding of Quantity might be possibly Imagin'd substantial From whence it may be inferr'd That the Criticisme offer'd by Des-Cartes in this Place in order to refell the Opinion of others does considerably reflect on his own And thus I proceed to such of his Particulars as occasion my Remarks which I shall Insert no oftner than the Subject requires In his 11th Head he reminds us of the Idea that we may have of Body by the Example he gives of a Stone from which we may reject all that is not Essential to the Nature of Body As if a Stone be melted or pulveris'd it does not therefore cease to be Corporeal We may also reject Colour because we frequently observe Stones that very pellucidly shine as if they were without Colour And so we may reject Gravity Lightness Heat and Cold with All other Qualities because they are either not consider'd in the Stone or being Chang'd the Corporeal Nature of the Stone is not alter'd with them Here methinks he makes a great Pudder to little purpose or no other than to prove that which no Man ever deny'd If there can be any Thing more Experimentally manifest than That Substance by what means soever varied or Chang'd will still retain Quantity as its Corporeal Propriety not to be separated
from it by Force or Fire So that the Essential Nature of Body cannot be destroy'd tho' it be lessen'd or divided into Innumerable Particles of the same Substance But not so continue in the Qualities of Colour Weight Heat Cold Moisture or the like that were its former Appurtenances Because Alteration must necessarily Change its accidental Qualifications consonant to the Philosophical Maxim a non esse tale ad esse tale Which signifies that it is otherwise than it was in Figure or Dimension together with such like External Qualifications as it precedently had and are naturally diversified according to Corporeal Alterations But amongst the Examples which he presents to his Reader as so many select Jewels of Thought I cannot but observe the blemish that I find in the Diamond of his Idea where he supposes That the Substance of such a Stone may be so Transparent that its Colour might not be visible But how any Thing can be so refinedly splendid as not at all perceptible by its Colour is not less absurd than to Affirm that something is seen without being discern'd It being Optically and Physically impossible to be sensible of any Object of Sight unless its Colour be sufficiently visible with its Substance True it is That a Diamond may be sever'd into Parcels of its Substance and that its Splendours will proportionably lessen with its Corporeal Parts But not suitable to the Alterations made as to Figure Colour or Extent in Bodies of weaker Complexion and Substance For Example Straw or Stubble will sooner yield in all their Capacities to the Alteration enforc'd by Fire or to any natural Method of Change than Wood or Coal So that 't is not provable as Affirm'd by Des-Cartes That with every Corporeal Mutation may equally be rejected the above-mention'd External Attributes that did appertain to their Substance and nothing continue with them but Length Breadth and Depth the common Proprieties of Body To which he adds this Incompatible Proposition That by Idea of Space not Corporeally Replenish'd may be comprehended an Idea of what is call'd Vacuity Was ever Fiction so perfectly supposititious as to Fancy That Space had a Being and not the Local Continent of Substance Or that the Universe the vast Womb of Nature might by its miscarrying admit of Vacuity Which properly Conster'd amounts to the Production of nothing Wherefore the Appellation or Word Vacuity can signifie no more than a cursory Accent of Speech Or such an empty Idea as I may modestly say is not seldom obtruded into the Writings of this Author Some of his subsequent Particulars where he differenceth Space from Place are indeed more nice if not frivolous than could be Thought to drop from the Pen of the Learned Des-Cartes who takes it for granted That if any Corporeal Thing be remov'd from the Local Being in which it was we are not therefore to conceive that its Extension does depart with it Which Position of his may be pertinently wav'd by Affirming the contrary to be true As what is more Essentially annex'd to the Comprehension of Body than its due and proportionable Extension as it Relates to the Place by which it is contain'd Wherefore if a Stone be mov'd from the Local Situation it precedently had it s Extension or proper Space as its natural Capacity does Inseparably remove with it and not remain as this Author would Imply as the same Extension or Place might be possess'd with other Bodies Or under the confus'd Notion of Space not fill'd with any Thing readily Imagin'd we may be so vain to suppose as he gives License to the Conception That Indeterminate Space if so Apprehended may be thought Vacuity Which he Infers by Reflecting on the misapprehension we may have that the same Local Extension does not Remain tho' the Body to which it appertain'd be Remov'd A manner of Inference Philosophically unfound because no Corporeal Substance can be taken from its due Place unless its proper Extension and Space to which it belongs be movable with it Not that it may not leave behind or after its Removal the like Local Capacity as it may at large be said to have been contiguous to that Substance Or instead of its continuance there the Space that it before possess'd is immediately replenish'd by the Accession of some one or more Bodies And this perpetually Executed by the Act of Nature touch'd by the Scepter of Eternal Providence Which otherwise must cease to be or vanish with the World her Universal Habitation by Annihilating her Existence And therefore exorbitantly Impossible to allow any Epithet to Vacuity That by all the Representatives of Nature is determin'd to have no Propriety within her spacious Dominion As improper is the Example he gives in the same Paragraph Of a Person suppos'd to be seated in a Ship and moves not although the Ship removes whilst he sits still But were his sole Corporeal Extensions in Length Breadth and Depth in Motion as he late in the Ship his Local Space would Remove with him without depending on the Sailing of the Ship Before he makes a Close on this Head he gives a more than ordinary Instance of a Ship under Sail and the Earth in Motion at the same time which according to the Copernican System he would Insinuate but in general Affirms That if a Ship sailes as far from East to West as the Earth Revolves from West to East according to its Motion in the Ecliptick as the Copernicans Imagine a Man sitting in the Ship does not Change his Place because the Local Determination both of the Motion of the Ship and Earth is to be consider'd as relating to some Immovable Points of Heaven This Ship according to his Supposition of the Earth's Motion must be committed to the desperate Conduct of a Copernican Pilot For if the Ocean together with all the Rivers and Streams that the World affords be Affirm'd to compleat in Conjunction with the Earth one Globulous Circumference and Figure as is the Opinion of many Learned Philosophers The rapid and mounting Motion that the Sea must have in being contiguous to the Earth's Revolution considering that it is naturally Lighter and therefore Higher than the Earth would soon overwhelm the Ship with vast Mountains of boisterous Waves in spite of the best Marriners Skill and Compass and doubtless in that Irresistible Storm the Man he supposes seated in the Ship would be totally toss'd from his Station So that if granted the Copernican Hypothesis as it Implys the Conjoyn'd and Revolving Motion of the Superficies of the Earth and Ocean 't is impossible to conceive how a Naval Voyage could be at any time perform'd or the Intercourse and Trade of Nations by Sea at this Day or heretofore practicable an Objection that gives no Inconsiderable Confutation to the Copernican System Which whether or no perceiv'd by this Author he seems at least in this Place to be Indifferent as to that Opinion by granting where he Concludes this Particular That it may
Spaces and such as contain Corporeal Substances indefinitely Extended Against which I offer a brief and obvious Exception by sensibly proving That as we cannot Imagine any Indefinite Extension or Space in the World in which we have Being so were another World equally Vast and Contiguous to this it were impossible to apprehend a boundless Corporeal Space within its total Continent By reason that uncircumscrib'd Space cannot be the Receptacle of Material Substance because whatever includes Body must have commensurable Attributes or such as in a Geometrical Sense may be defin'd a Superficies terminated by Length and Breadth Which demonstrably profligates his pretended Idea of Indefinite Space or Extension So little is in this Case the Doctrine of Nature beholding to the Philosophy of Des-Cartes His next Conception produc'd by his fruitful Idea is That Heaven and Earth are of one and the same Matter and that there is no possible Being of more than one World The first of this Head he no otherwise proves than as he takes it for granted That if there were Infinite or Innumerable Worlds they would be all of the same Matter wherefore he concludes there can be but One. The Objection that may be made against his Affirmation that the Matter of Heaven and Earth is the same is because Heaven can be no otherwise understood than as it has a Select and Primary Distinction from all Bodies of Elementary Composition Which is apparently manifest in its Figure Motion and Height absolutely different and far more Excellent than can be compar'd with other Substance Wherefore Zanchius writing of the Works of God gives to its most Sublime and Refin'd Perfection a spiritual Epithet to which purpose the Learned Pena in his Preface to Euclid defines it an Animated Spirit universally diffus'd To these may be added the Authority of Jamblichus a very considerable Author who in admiration of its Substance allows to its Perfections the nearest Attributes to Incorporeal Existence And who can doubt that the Judgment of any one of these erudite Persons in being more speculatively Refin'd and naturally suitable to the wonderful Objects Immensly distant from the Earth we tread on should not have a deference from our Understandings highly Superior to the gross Definition given them by Des-Cartes Who determines That the Substance of Heaven and Earth alike proceeds from the Heap of Nature's common Materials And whereas he Asserts in the latter Part of this Head That it is not possible to Imagine more Worlds than One. I think the contrary may be as certainly Affirm'd as that the World we reside in has a natural Confinement A Truth no less facile to Thought than 't is easie to delineate a Circle that in any Point shall touch another and yet leave betwixt them no Intervening Space that is not substantially repleted But this Speculation however readily exerted cannot be the proper Entertainment of the Mind unless I imagine a Similitude of Things and Beings Correspondent to the World in which I am As by the diligence of Thought I might observe in a devis'd World the same Persons Creatures Trees and Fields with such other Objects that had been visible to me in this Wherefore I take liberty to think contrary to the Opinion of this Author That the Intellect strengthned by the Senses is sufficiently enabled to Transport its Prospect to the plurality of Worlds To avoid which Imaginative Power of the Mind he annexes to his Idea of Matter undeterminate Extent A Notion absolutely Inconsistent with the Nature of Substance in all its Capacities which cannot have an Indefinite Being And therefore no less absurd than if suppos'd that Matter or Substance could be actually Infinite In some of his following Particulars he bestows many Words on the Motion of whatever may be deem'd Matter or Substance but finding nothing of Consequence to observe in most of them or that occasion any considerable Remark in being Dissentaneous to what he delivers I pass to his 25th Particular in which he Comprehends the main Fund of what he intends by Corporeal Movement the Instance which he gives is That any one Body or Substance in his Sense may be said to Move out of the Vicinity of other Bodies that were contiguous to it before and as at rest into the Vicinity of others By this Definition he proclaims an endless War in the Campains of Nature where the opposite Commotions and Powers of Individual Bodies endeavour to possess the natural Beings of their quiet Neighbours From which Problem could it be prov'd might be deduc'd a better Disciplin'd Argument in behalf of Exorbitant Potentates when Molesting or Intruding into the peaceable Vicinities and Provinces of others than has as yet been urg'd on their Part Because it might be dextrously grounded on the Toleration and Conduct dispens'd by Imperial Nature amongst her subordinate Dominions This War of Nature denounc'd by so Eminent a Philosophical Herald as Des-Cartes could not but Incense many Combats in the Schools of Science But how far prosperous there or disallow'd is not requisite in this Place to Discuss I shall therefore Imploy the Force of my Understanding without being oblig'd to the Assistance of any Tribe or Scholastical Association to attack his Arguments where they deserve the most Emphatical Opposition My first Assault on this Head shall be against the main Fort of his New-Modell'd Fortification where to defend his Principles he Exerts the Artillery of his Idea which according to the Level of his Notions must batter to pieces the entire Confederacies of Nature and so separate their Societies and Rooms in the Universe That unless a more pathetical Expedient can be found than what he offers Towns and Countries with whatever they contain may as soon be Remov'd out of this World and Situated in another as one Corporeal Substance can Usurp the Province or Being of another Because no quantitative Matter but must if Mov'd into the Place of any other possess the Space that naturally appertain'd to its Existence And whether could he suppose That a Bodily Thing could Remove that is by any means Expell'd by the Motion of another Substance from its proper Appartment Since neither his Brain or any other Man's can by an empty Idea so diminish the World as that any Particle of it might be conceiv'd to vanish to Vacuity Nor less Intolerably opposite to the Proprieties of Nature is the Maxim he Inserts of the Translation of Material Things into the proper Residence or Place of others Not that 't is deniable that Bodies are alterably Mov'd or Chang'd by Effects of Rarifaction or Condensation and other ordinary Methods of Nature as to their manner of Extension and Figure but not as to the Space that Circumscrib'd their Substances because it is Impossible for them for Reasons before mention'd to be naturally provided for by any other Room for their Existence And thus if any Receptacle or Vessel be suppos'd fill'd with Earth or Water and those Materials afterwards Remov'd the Air
will as compleatly replenish the same Compass or Space as if it had been fill'd by the others before The last Example given by me ought to be understood of a preternatural or violent Motion enforc'd by the Hand of Man or other Accident by which a Substance that might be precedently in its proper Sphere or Place of Rest is forcibly dispossess'd of its Room by some other when Nature to prevent Vacuity her main Abhorrence supplys the Place of the Body Irresistibly Remov'd with another Substance Which in her natural Method is never effected by her ordinary Alterations caus'd by Generation Corruption Rarifaction Condensation and the like or by which the more Weighty Body is Expell'd by the Lighter No more possible then that the Earth or any Part of it should mount from its Center unto the Ambient Air above it Wherefore the general Maxim of Des-Cartes by which he would Infer the Transition of Bodies into the Vicinities and-Spaces of others is no less absurd than contradictory to the Establish'd Course and Laws of Nature in order to her Preservation of Things either as they Move or Rest Which should 〈◊〉 otherwise admit or according to this Author there must be a Confus'd Interruption if not a Penetration of Bodies Philosophically impossible not only of those that surround the Earth we Inhabit but also of the Celestial Luminaries that Immensely Move above our Heads if they Revolv'd into higher or lower Vicinities and Orbs than are naturally their own So perplexedly Inconsistent is the Opinion of this Writer with the Beings of whatsoever the World contains As Incompatible to common Understanding is the Notion that he delivers in his 26th Particular where he undertakes to prove That there is not more Action requir'd to Motion than to Rest Which seems at first sight a Paradox of a Novel Edition But had he seriously consider'd after the Inscribing of this Sentiment and next had been ask'd whether his Pen had not been more commodiously Inclos'd in his Desk and his Hand in his Pocket than acttually Imploy'd when he Writ this uneasie Sense he would have clearly distinguish'd betwixt Motion and Rest as Words that Imply their difference both in Name and Nature And 't is some wonder that Des-Cartes who largely abounds with Fanciful Niceties should have so narrow a Perception as not to discern the broad Contrariety that Interprets Motion and Rest sensibly opposite To which purpose Aristotle defines Rest as the privation of Motion in whatsoever is naturally apt to Move Wherefore the proper tendency that Things in Motion have to acquiesce in their genuine Place is render'd by some Philosophers as their final Perfection Because nothing can be said to Move but it does also to its utmost Power expedite its Innate Propensity to be sedate in its due Station If a Stone falls from any considerable Height Experience assures that it swiftest Moves when nearest to the Earth the Center of its Being But of its self incapable of Active Movement when it comes to its resting Place all which is Heterogeneous to the Doctrine of this Author who allows to the Acquiesence of any Thing no less Motion than it had when it Mov'd The Instance he gives is Because we perswade our selves that our Bodies at our Will Move and Rest for no other Reason than that they adhere to the ground in being heavy And continues to say That our Corporeal Weight and other Causes not Animadverted by us resisting the Motion that we would incite in our Members effect our Fatigues or Weariness whilst we Impute more Action or greater Force to Instigate our Motion than to cause it to Cease Here he creates an Idea not unlike to the Poetical Fable of Ixion's embracing of a Cloud instead of Juno for what can be more obscure to sensible Conception than to Infer as he does That the Body by suspending of its Motion does as indefatigably Move as when tir'd by Action Which is much the same as if he had undertook to prove that 't is possible for a Man to feel as uneasie a Movement sitting still as when he was weary of Walking Nor is the Weight of the Animated Body as to it self or as it may be Diseas'd by Motion the only Cause of the Appetite it has to be reliev'd or eas'd by Rest but as Nature compells it in being ponderous to promote its lowest Acquiescence in its Immoveable Place Essentially Center'd in the Bosome of the Earth as the Body has Room or Capacity to Descend Nor would its Motion till thither arriv'd be Impedited or Fatigu'd by the Labour of its Corporeal Parts any more than a Stone as it falls downward can be weary of the Motion of its Substance So totally Irresistible is the Power of Nature that no longer appropriates either Rest or Life to any Individual Thing than is necessarily consistent with its Place and Being If by her Indulgence she has Impower'd Mankind and other Animated Creatures with Corporeal Faculties and Parts whereby they may diversly Execute their Local Movements as her gracious Distinction and necessary Endearments peculiarly conferr'd for the convenient Support and continual Subsistence of Living Individuals 't is contrary to the gross Allay of their Bodily Compositions Thus the Body of Man or Animal may Move on the Surface of the Earth or by the extraordinary Energency of Life be exalted towards a Mountain's top when their Corporeal Substances could they depart from the Conduct of Life would with far more Acceleration tumble downwards Let a Man of the most expert and vigorous Agility take a Leap upwards his Person shall come to the ground by swifter and easier Degrees than his Activity by its utmost Force could Ascend Wherefore 't is no painful Action as this Author Insinuates by which a living Substance acquires its Rest but rather a natural and Irresistible Motion that inclines it to attain its proper Residence Which proceeds from no other Cause than the Quantitative Magnitude and Weight that Imposes the Descent of every Corporeal Thing as near as it can be promoted to the Inferior Place of its Repose If a Feather falls from any Height allowing for the hinderance that its Levity may receive from the Commotion of the Air it will Descend no less proportionably to its Weight than a Lump of Lead must do if dropt from the same Altitude And this is Mathematically certain because no Substance whatever can be said to Move but as it has Commensurable Parts These Examples are sufficient to Totter his Arguments on the Fund he erects for them Of which there remaineth One that he concludes this Head with and in his Sense very apposite to his purpose I wish that I had so found it because I love not to Dispute where it can reasonably be avoided His Words are these There is as much Action requir'd to the Removing of a Ship that stands Still on Water any Length Forward as it is to Move it as far Backward From whence he would conclude That a
That all Motion does of it self proceed in a right Line 't is broadly untrue if consider'd that 't is no less Naturally than Mathematically Certain That whatsoever Moves must be progressive with the Proper Superficies and Space in every Kinde that appertains to its Substance When a Man Walks does he not suitably Move to the Height Breadth and Depth which at that Instant expos'd the Proportions of his Figure The same may be Affirm'd of the Motion of Animate or Unanimated Bodies On which ground Geometricians determine That a Line of it self has no Commensurable Proportion compar'd to a Superficies and therefore to no substantial Velocity or Motion in any Consideration otherwise than as betwixt two different superficies lines may be allow'd a Relative Proportion as in Squares Parallelograms and other Figures that assimilate in Height and Breadth Wherefore to Assert as he does That by Intendment of Nature all Corporeal Motion is comprehended in a streight Line were all one as to Affirm that a Mathematical Line which by Euclid is defin'd to consist meerly of Points that have no Parts otherwise then suppos'd should singly Measure a Superficies the Continent of Body Not but in a genuine Philosophical Sense a Material Composition may have a direct Motion allowing its requisite Extension Place and Superficies transferr'd with it either upwards or downwards according to the Nature of its Substance but no other lineal Rectitude as is already Demonstrated Where I Instanc'd the natural Tendencies that Things Light or Ponderous have to their proper Stations and therefore Inconsistent with the Example he gives in the Diagram of a Stone Enforc'd by other Material Thing or in a manner sling'd from its direct Movement into the obliquity of a winding Figure which must so detain it as never to depart or 't is not to be doubted that the Weight of the Stone would cause it to Move downward towards its resting Place On which account the Stone may be suppos'd to be taken from the Sling and flung at the Head of his Argument As intolerably extravagant is his other Principle or rather Conceit that he annexes to the Law of Nature whereby he would take it for granted That whatsoever does circularly Move has in its self an Inherent proneness to Recede from its Center Which is totally opposite to the Supreme Perfection of Circular Motion if compar'd with whatsoever is directly Lineal Because it is the Measure of Lineal Movement without separating its Terminations as the other does Which is obviously evident in the Motion of a Wheel where the Terms of its Motion are not so distinct that any one can be thought separated from the other But when a weighty Thing directly Move's from a Superior Place to an Inferior it may truly be Affirm'd that the Terms of any such direct Motion are by their Interval and Distance considerably separated which Separation Imports Composition of Terms but none to be found in Circular Movement as is manifest by the precedent Example Wherefore Aristotle acutely Defines the excellency of Circular Motion by considering that it is more Absolute or simply Compleat than can be Attributed to any other Figure by reason it is more Equal and therefore less obnoxions to Irregularity and consequently more durable From whence he concludes That it was the most perfect and first of Motious As likewise a possibility of Being Eternal because no Part of a Circle can be said to be its Beginning or Period and where neither the First and Last of any Thing is discernible it may be allow'd in a manner Eternal To which purpose the Poet Virgil compendiously expresses the admirable Revolution of the Hours Days and Seasons of the Year by no more Words than In se ciroumvolvitur Annus Which shews that Circular Motion is not effected by any forcible Cause or Inclination that any Thing Mov'd can by that means be endu'd with whereby to depart from its Center according to the devis'd Maxim of this Author But rather a continu'd Providential and Natural Method in order to the Computation of Time together with the Innumerable Benefits that from thence accrew to Mankind with whatsoever the World Comprehends And if otherwise reputed 't were as easie to believe that Providence might receive a forcible Period or that the Sun and Planets have as natural a propensity to drop from the Orbs in which they Revolve as the Stone might have to fall out of the Sling in the precedent Diagram So that the Principle which he would Entitle to the Law of Nature does more concenter with the Tenent of a Philosophical Renegado out-law'd by her regulr Ordainments than could be expected from the Pen of Des-Cartes I endeavour'd to be as piquant as I might be in my Remark on this Subject because he owns it for a main foundation on which he Erects not a few of his ensuing Discussions The Third Law that he gives to Nature is That any one Substance meeting with a Stronger loseth nothing of its Motion by its Occurrence to one of greater strength but lessens its Motion by as much as it Transfers to the other Here he continues a perpetual War amongst the Subjects of Nature and with that exorbitant violence that he allows Victory to the Stronger on all considerations Whereby he Interprets the ordinary Course of Things tending to the Universal Preservation and Conduct of Nature no other than so many Hostilities Executed by the Strong against the Weak If Bodies are alter'd by the movable Effects of Rarifaction and Condensation they are not so Mov'd or Produc'd by a preternatural and varied Violence but rather usefully Convey'd and Dispos'd to such Receptacles of Nature where their Beings were wanted and could not be supply'd without the convenient Alterations of Material Things The like may be said of Generation and Corruption Incident to all Elementary Compositions And tho' Nature in some Sense may have the Artribute of Perpetuity there can not be the same permanency allow'd to Particulars within her Dominion whereby they might be equally Everlasting with her self which would level her Incessant Prerogative in common with her Subjects or imply the Dissolution of her superlative Dominion Too profound to be fathom'd by the most skilful Brain of Man or be disorder'd by any Speculation inconsistent with her Perfections Which had this Author requisitely consider'd he would not have enterpriz'd the Imbroyling of her Rule with so many turbulent Diversities or Anarchical Violence that may be Imputed to his Principles as they derogate from her operative Contrivements and Motion of Things in Reference to their due continuations and apt disposure agreeable to the Capacities of their Existence But notwithstanding he has frequently Catechis'd Nature according to the Model of his invented Principles and especially in this Place where he attempts to enact Laws as if Confirm'd by the touch of her Scepter As also to present his Reader with several subsequent Rules by which he would be understood to have prevented what might be
Alledg'd against them All which I inpected with the clearest Eye of my Understanding being no less desirous that my Pen should have been convinc'd by his than he endeavours the Estimation of his own But finding by the strictest Inquisition I could apply to his offer'd Probations That I was led into a Wilderness of Notions out of which no Thought of mine could give me Passage I concluded That it would be no small ease to my Reader and my self if I omitted such of his Intricate Discussions and delineated Schemes as might have perplex'd the utmost Diligence of the considerate Peruser For which I have in some Part his own consent as may be seen in his 53d Particular where he acknowledges that his precedent Rules as to the Nature and Motion of Corporeal Substances are not easily understood And where there is not a facility of Perception relating to the intended purpose it can have no other Construction than Impertinent or Trivial or at least not worth a labour'd Explanation And thus I pass to his Conclusion where I observe in general That he is more confident of his Premisses than was to be expected from so Ingenious a Writer In the Assertion he closes with he delivers this Affirmation That no other Principles are admitted by him than are both Physical and Mathematical Certainties because by them not only all the Phaenomena's of Nature are explain'd but also Certain Demonstrations given from them If this peremptory Assurance be true the Author of these Remarks has taken no small pains to little purpose but if not so the commendation he has bestow'd upon his Undertaking will be as little to his advantage as the Indulgent Applause usually is that Men Attribute to their peculiar Wit or Science To which I might Reply without disrespecting this Author or the Modesty that becomes my Pen That I am not more in the Right than he is in the Wrong wheresoever I have differ'd from him either on the Philosophical or Mathematical Account As in reference to both I may without Ostentation Aver That his Idea's Propositions and Allegations as they are tax'd by me are rather Improbabilities if not fictitiously introduc'd by him than naturally Ally'd to Proof or the Being of Things For tho' Mathematical Operations cannot be Refin'dly Contemplated but as they have an Immaterial or Spiritual Eminency relating to the proportionable Dimensions which they unerrably give to whatsoever may be regularly Defin'd of substantial Existence Yet by a distinct Excellence partake not at all of Matter howsoever Commensurated by them And thus may a Proposition in Euclid be prov'd if only in Thought delineated But when apply'd to any Material Being the Substance unto which it Relates must as really and in the same manner Exist as is suitable to the Certainty of its Demonstration But not to be so understood by the Doctrine of Des-Cartes who sets Nature at Work as he fancy 's her Operations Insomuch that a Substance cannot directly Move towards its proper Place of Being but he conceives it more or less obstructed by some other Body or whirl'd in a Line of a different Denomination to another Point of the Compass or not to be Imagin'd whether Much of the same Similitude with the Figure of the Stone in the Sling as it is inserted in the preceding Diagram All which exorbitant Modalities and Motions of Things as he supposes them to Act as they are either Hard Flexible Condens'd or Fluid are rather singular Fictions or forcible Contrarieties Complicated by his Brain than concentring with the prone Facility of Natural Operations Absolutely Inconsistent by a Philosophical Maxim with the prodigious and continual Violence impos'd on Causes and Effects as by this Author is devis'd the Conduct of Nature Yet after all he is no less confident than to Affirm that his Philosophical Hypothesis is Mathematically Certain in every Consideration Which without other rebuke to the Phrase of his Boasting is as far from being prov'd by Rules of Science as Fiction may be from undoubted Truth Or as if he had undertook to have delineated out of Euclid a Coat for the Moon that should have demonstrably fitted her Figure in every Change of her Appearance If I have dealt freely with Des-Cartes where his Notions and Proofs were questionable 't is agreeable to his Example who spares no Author where he thought him Taxable Tho' I have been favourable in not extending my Exceptions so far as I might have taken occasion Which I hope the Reader will excuse or think himself oblig'd because I Entertain'd him with no more Words than I thought sufficient to give a Period to my Remarks on the Second Part of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes REMARKS On the Third Part of the New PHILOSOPHY OF DES-CARTES As they Relate to the VISIBLE WORLD PART III. IF admirable even to extasie of Thought by what manner of natural Operation or superlative Act of Providence the Humane Composition in Soul and Body was Originally produc'd to that transcendent Degree That his Intellectual Faculty by lineal Descent and Right continues him an absolute Monarch of Understanding in Reference to the Government of himself and other Creatures 'T is highly incumbent on Man to be not only gratefully considerate of his being such but also to acknowledge his utmost Celebration of the Supreme Cause of his wonderful Existence Which mighty Consideration ought to transport the Prospect of Thought far beyond the Excellency conferr'd on Mankind in Soul and Person Which can be but narrowly compar'd with the vast complex of the Universal World and the Innumerable Wonders surrounded by it Wherefore if the best Inspection made by the Humane Intellect in Contemplating the manner of its rational Being be pos'd by its own Riddle above its Power to unfold How stupendiously must then be Involv'd the most elaborate Attempt of Man's Understanding when to the peculiar Wonder that is Exerted from his own Existence he adds the Innumerable Miracles conspicuously visible in the Structure of the Universe And what is yet more Transcendent the admirable Author of what we are and all we behold seems Envelop'd from the Eye by his wonderful Fabrick and Works If the Learned Des-Cartes in the beginning of this Treatise seems not a little fond of his own Applause by signifying to his Reader That he has Invented certain Principles by which he conceives That Nature is unveil'd in her as yet unknown Recesses He is far more modest in his subsequent Expressions where he bows the Knee of his Philosophy to the Infinite Power Amplitude and Beauty of the Works of the Almighty Concluding withall That it is highly requisite to avoid all such confident Imaginations whereby we might undertake by uncertain Suppositions to limit Omnipotent Power or Abstract in any Kind from its Incomprehensible Performance This Conclusion I submit to but cannot approve the confidence of his Introduction contain'd in the Entrance he makes into this Paragraph as the Reader may perceive by the Remarks I have made
them accordingly by confining my Observations to a cursory Consideration of some Particulars that I judge most useful and therefore fit to be separated from the rest The Primitive Ingredients annex'd by this Author to the Original Consistence and forming of the Visible World together with every Individual Substance within its vast Circumference are comprehended in three Elements no otherwise different than as they are more or less fluid The First of which he conceives so forcibly acting that in meeting with other Bodies it is divided into very diminutive and numberless Particulars Accommodating its various Figures to the replenishing of all Angles that were caus'd by them The Second Element he supposes divided into very small spherical Particles but of certain and determinate Quantity and divisible into many less The Third he defines more Gross or Thick consisting of Figures not very inclinable to Motion Of the first of these he conceives the Sun and fix'd Stars Compos'd the Heavens or Firmaments above of the Second the Earth together with the Planets and Comets made up of the Third Which Catalogue of Elements he thinks very significant because as he conceives that only the Sun and fix'd Stars properly emit Light the Heavens transmit it and by the Earth Planets and Comets remitted which difference he judges may be discern'd and therefore believes it well referr'd to Three Elements If Nature has accommodated us with Four Elements of which we are as certainly Intelligent as that Heat Cold Moisture and Dryness are incident to her genune Production of Things This Author has exempted one out of her Catalogue and what is more has complicated a Trinity of Elements into one Substance which he no otherwise distinguishes than as in some Operations and Capacities it is more Fluid than in other as he applies it to the primary Production of the Visible World and whatsoever had Being in it So that the First Star that twinkled in the Universe was in his Judgment but such a refin'd Part of Fluid Matter which if sufficiently thicken'd might have grosly produc'd an Elephantick Constellation in the Firmament But of such Particulars more hereafter or when I Inscribe my intended Remarks on the Fourth Part of his Philosophy where he Treats of the Earth and its Appurtenances In the mean time I shall briefly Elevate my Observations to the height of his Suppositions as they tend to the Method deliver'd by Des-Cartes whereby he would conceive in what manner the fix'd Stars and Sun might be Originally form'd and compleated In the beginning he means of the World the Matter of the First Element increas'd by reason that the Particles of the Second Element by their assiduous Motion did impair one another From whence it ensu'd that the Quantity of the Second Element was greater in the Universe than was necessary to fill up such exiguous Spaces that were between the spherical Particulars of the Second Element as they were mutually Incumbent So that whatsoever did remain after those Spaces were so replenish'd had a Recourse to certain Centers And there Compos'd the most Fluid spherical Bodies the Sun on one Center and six'd Stars on others But afterwards when the Particulars of the Second Element were more attrited or worn and receding equally from their Centers they left such spherical Spaces as were from all Circumjacent Places by the flowing thither of the First Element exactly fill'd His Words I have deliver'd in as clean English as I could fit or contract them to his purpose but that being done I must confess that I cannot Conster their meaning It being very unconceivable how he could furnish his Brain with a speculative Idea of such Particles of Nature separately and fluidly Moving since whatsoever is Fluid must necessarily Imply a continu'd material Emanation of the same Substance as in purest Water it is impossible to imagine any separate Fluidity in any of its Particles no more than the most diminutive Bubbles when discern'd on a flowing Spring or River can be said to be separately Fluid And next to Affirm as he does That such Materials could movingly Atteriate or Rub one another less there being no such Capacity in any Fluid Substance Wherefore if he had us'd the Epithet of washing or dashing of greater into smaller Particulars tho' somewhat Improper the Expression had been more pardonable than his calling them Rubbers of one another into any Fluid Diminution And what is more he undertakes by their reciprocal Motions to fill up every Corner amongst them But how to find an Angle in any continual Fluid Matter cannot be understood by Geometrical Delineation wherefore I wonder to find in so knowing a Mathematician as was this Author so undemonstrable a System But howsoever Interpreted he undertakes abundantly to Replenish with such petit material Quantities no less than three of the Superior and vastest Heavens And next by his Invented Vortices which in a Grammatical Sense may be denominated Whirl-pools he Circumvolves Clusters of them until he has dispos'd them capacious enough to be Metamorphos'd by Motion into the Figures of the Stars and Sun Against the main of his Opinion that the Heavens are fluidly Compos'd on which the rest of his Phaenomena's depend there is farther to be objected That it is unnatural and clearly Inconsistent with undeniable Philosophical Principles and as contradictory to ocular Evidence By which we are assur'd as perfectly as by Sight we can discern that the Sun and Stars must be of the same Celestial Substance with the total Heavens and which is not denyed by Des-Cartes otherwise than as he supposes some Parts of it which he calls the first or most fluid Element and therefore ought not to be so defin'd by him Because whasoever is Fluid is also dissipable and consequently may be more Extended Dilated or Contracted but neither of these are to be observ'd in the Figure or Appearance of the Sun that always continues exactly Spherical tho' at some times the clearness of his Figure is not equally perceivable by reason of Exhalations and Vapors that interpose betwixt his Splendors and the Eye of the Beholder Moreover if any Part of the Celestial Substance were fluidly dissipable Nature would be necessitated to prevent Vacuity the detested Opposite to her Existence that some inferior Matter or Body should Ascend to supply that place in the Heavens where the Parts were separately remov'd Which were repugnant to Providence that has ordain'd that no other than the Substance of Heaven by any Natural Motion shall possess the Supreme Part of the Universal World If it could the Elementary and Corporeal Mixture of Bodies below might be corruptly intermingled with the refin'd Nature of the Heavens which are apparently unalterable undiminish'd and as totally uncorrupted In which Sense it may be concluded That the Heavens are Immutable and therefore Impatible as being of supremest Excellency or not at all partaking with the distemper'd Compositions or Ingredients that constitute other Bodies If the Heavens are determin'd to
of Nature should be either operative or motional before the Sun Stars World or any Elementary Composition a main Cause of Motion Version and Alteration of Bodies as naturally they ought to be understood did really Exist Because nothing can Move upwards or downwards but what is Corporeally mixt and therefore consisting of Commensurable Parts whose Movements must be gradually computed by Time Nature's unerrable Accountant But by the Incomprehensible Phaenomena's of this Author the World was fill'd with temporary Motions before it or Time was or could be summ'd by computable Progression of any Thing that could be its porportionable Measure according to his Suppositions Which Impossibility is so disregarded by this Writer that Time were his Notions true might have continu'd some thousands of Ages before it could be understood to have Being or his small Globuli Circumvolv'd by their Vortices could have constituted and fill'd the local Situation of one Mile of Earth with all its Materials from top to bottom with their diminutive Particulars Which Absurdities if well consider'd might have deterr'd as Learned a Person as Des-Cartes from posing his Intellect with so many unexplicable Imaginations whereby he would assimulate however far above Thought the stupendious Consistence of the World to miraculous Systems invented by his Brain As for the Elements that he undertakes to deliver as the first Principles whereby the Earth was Constituted which as I have already prov'd are neither Philosophical or Natural he tells us in his 13th Particular That the more Solid or thicker of them are not always Inferior in Place or Motion to those that are thinner the Reason he gives is That notwihstanding they are uniformly Revolv'd they so adhere to one another by the Irregularities of their Figures that the Globuli of one Element cannot extricate themselves from the Compulsions upwards or downwards of another This Gentleman who had no otherwise differenc'd his principal Materials by which he would Constitute the Structure of the Earth than as the Parcels of his small Globuli were more or less extended begins now in effect to grant them Elementarily mix'd as every Thing must be that is Thinner or Thicker than another or different in Weight and Measure But so as by his turbulent Vortices the lighter were mingled with the heavier in such a complicated manner that they could neither Ascend or Descend as they ought to have done by their Qualifications But gives no certain reason why they might not always have continu'd so Intermingled and Confus'd and therefore never have separated from one another Since he determines no Cessation of the impetuous Movement of them caus'd by his whirling Vortices How then could the Earth be Compos'd or Constituted by such Irregular Particles of Nature that neither by their Motion or different Temperatures could be disincumber'd from one another and consequently so exactly Embodied as might compleat the total Substance of the Earth In his 14th and 15th Particulars he undertakes to Describe what he means by diversities of Bodies which he supposes form'd in that which he denominates his Third Region of the Earth and these he believes might be produc'd as the Globe of the Earth distinguish'd into three Regions having been devolv'd towards the Sun and the Vortex in which it was before taken from it variety of Bodies were distinguish'd in it Whose Productions he designs to explain afterwards but first he delivers three or four Axioms on which they depend The First is the general Motion of his Celestial Globuli The Second is their Gravity The Third Light The Fourth Colour His First Position I am oblig'd to reflect on and more severely could it be avoided than I am willing to do out of the respect that I have to this Learned Author But having Geometrically prov'd by what I have Written on the Third Part of his Philosophy That there can be no Motion either Diurnal or Annual to be Attributed to the Earth the Copernican way instead of the Sun I cannot but add That it is far more egregiously Supposititious that the imperfect Agitation of his Globuli which he Inserts in the Page I write of should perform their Annual or Diurnal Motion about the Sun correspondent to his Imaginary System It being highly improbable that such different Particles which he defines Globuli both in Substance Bigness Quantity and Measure as also irregularly Moving by his Concession should compleatly finish the Diurnal or yearly Motion of the Sun because not to be thought that they could Revolve suitable to any Figure Geometrically computable And therefore impossible even to Absurdity the fictitious Circumvolution that he appropriates to his Region of Globuli than if without them he directly had Asserted the Motion of the Earth Because the Earth allow'd by the Learned to be Circularly Form'd is more capable of Revolution than that such diminutive Substances as are disagreeably Compos'd both in Quantity and Figure should so perfectly unite their Movements as exactly to Represent or Conspire with the Earth's Motion in the room of the Sun either Hourly Dayly or Yearly appertaining to Ecliptical Circulation In order to which performance of his devis'd Globuli he makes yet more gross their Incomprehensible Phaenomena's by Affirming That they incline to Move in a streight Line tho' he grants them not figuratively such as if Things could be propense to Move directly if naturally oblique in Proportion and Figure Notwithstanding that 't is impossible that whatsoever Moves should describe any other Superficies or Figure than is suitable to its Corporeal Parts Nor can any Thing be said in a proper Sense to incline to Move in a streight Line but as it must be either upwards or downwards according to the Nature of its Gravity or Levity To be plain the most favourable Salvo that can be apply'd to this Broken Head of his Hypothesis is that he judges it safer for his manner of Copernicanism to substitute his whirl'd Globuli as Assistants by their Movements to the Motion he allows the Earth Because as I conceive he might apprehend that Objections to be made against the Earth's Revolution as also that by such an Hypothesis the Situation of Countries and the Elevation of the Pole must infallibly alter as has been already demonstrated might be rebated or not so unanswerably Alledg'd Tho' to Men of competent Apprehension the Absurdities are the same whether the Earth alone or his Globuli and the Earth in any Kind Intrigue or conjoyn their Circulations Can a Man that has season'd his Intellect with the least Relish of Mathematical Principles conceive it possible for the confus'd Phaenomena's of Vortices and Globuli mention'd by Des-Cartes to absolve the mean or equal Motion which Astronomy assures is annually consummated in the Ecliptick Or that the ponderous Structure of the Earth should be so regularly elevated from her Center as that any Point of its Superficies or its Vortices and Globuli in the Sense of this Author might at one time have an Apogaeon
Matter that contain'd it And if so he must be very obscurely conceited that would imagine a blind Fire uselessly Constituted in the first Humane Body by Omnipotent Power The Material Substance out of which he concludes the primary Being of Man's Corporeal Shape and Proportion is doubtless abstracted by him from his primary invented Element and which he denominates the sole Materiality of whatsoever the World contains But that Element according to his Definition being exceedingly Fluid and Tenuous and no room left by reason of its plenary Existing for any other Thing or Substance throughout the Universe as I have precedently mention'd 't is very Incompatible with common Understanding that this simple Matter and therefore incapable to produce any other Substance different from its own should by Des-Cartes be presum'd if pardon'd the Expression to fill the Hands of the Almighty in order to Constitute the total World withall it s admir'd Particulars in a natural Method Which seems no less Improbable than if a Man should undertake by grasping of Air to make it of as solid a Substance as is the Flesh and Bones of Man But waving that Absurdity as also that Fire without Light was originally convey'd by God according to his Supposition into the then unliving Heart of Man only to warm that principal Part If Fire could be thought so to reside contrary to its elementary Nature and consuming Propriety untill this Author imagin'd the whole Humane Body first Animated by the infusing of the Soul by the Act of the Almighty What could be imply'd by it more than that Fire was Ineffectually dispos'd into the lifeless Heart of Man by Divine Appointment yet not at all operative otherwise than by impertinently warming of the Part without either vegetative or sensitive Heat as he defines it Which were all one as to conceive That the Omnipotent seem'd to do something by an extraordinary Method tho' nothing farther Excellent in reference to the Original Figure of Man's Corporeal Being than if a skillful Statuary had Compos'd the likeness of the Humane Body in any Material Substance Wherefore the Fable of Prometheus tending to his forming of Man out of Elementary Ingredients not a little resembles the devis'd Part of the Almighty as it is deliver'd by this French Philosopher with this difference that Prometheus is said at once to compleat by a Celestial Expedient his Artificial Man whereas several Operations are allow'd by Des-Cartes even to the Work of the Omnipotent tending to the primary Production of the Humane Body and Soul Nor do I preceive That this Author if allow'd the fineness of his Invention does more sublimely Celebrate the introducing of the Soul of Man into his imaginary Material Machine than is Divinely Attributed to the Fable of Prometheus the Son of Iapetus in the Metamorphosis of Ovid where 't is thus Express'd Natus Homo est sive hunc divino semine fecit Ille opifex rerum mundi melioris origo Sive recens tellus seductaque nuper ab alto Aethere cognati retinebat semina coeli Quam satus Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum This Fable may be taken as an Imitation of Providence by the Artifice of Prometheus Who having moulded the Statue of Man could not perfect his Work untill he had stole Celestial Fire and by conveying it into the Material Figure which he had Compos'd the Life and Soul of Man was at once produc'd Which was very agreeable to the Religion of the Ancients which Celebrated their Gods and Goddesses in the Form of Men and Women and Ensoul'd them wth no greater difference compar'd with Mankind than as they allow'd to their Deities Immortal Reason and Life To which Ovid seems refin'dly to allude in one of his Elegies where as a sublime Encomium of the excellency of the Faculties and Gifts incident to the Humane Soul he derives its Descent from above by Affirming That Sedibus aethereis spiritus ille venit This Expression of the Poet is not more Poetical than Admirable as he intends the Soul to the Perfection Reason and Conduct evidently discernable in Stars the shining Ornaments of Heaven But should the Soul be suppos'd originally Infus'd by God as a thinking Substance into the Body of Man suitable to the Imagination of Des-Cartes and not absolutely capacitated to discharge it self from the innate Depravations and prone Allurements of the Senses 't were some disparagement to its Accession to the Body by the Gift and Ordainment of Divine Providence Yet such an uncertain and complicated Soul is by this French Writer appropriated to the Body of Man where in some Actions he makes it a meer thinking Substance but in the sensible execution of Thought he allows it Co-operative and inseparable from the Senses And this to the utmost force of his Brain he Asserts in the 187th Particular of this Part I Treat of where he delivers these Words The nature of the Mind is such that by it alone may be apprehended divers Corporeal Motions as also Sensations in many respects The Example he gives is of Words spoken or written which may affect us with Troubles Griefs Perils Sadness or the like as also how their contrary Accents in reference to Content Pleasure and Satisfaction are verbally understood by us Which signifies no more however he strains his Inferences than that there is an Inseparable Concomitancy of the Contemplations of the Mind and their applications to the Senses If I open a Book and view in it a whole Page of Letters by a meer superficial Inspection of what is there Written or Printed I can understand nothing but if I Conster those Words as their tendency and meaning Imply I am soon Intelligent whether they relate to Sorrow Gladness Pain or Grief either as to my self or any other Person Because I am perfectly apprehensive of their Motives Causes and Effects as they sensibly Incite my Conception of them The Reason is plain if consider'd the reciprocal Allowance and Reference that any one of our Senses has to another it being as easie for me to determine by seeing a Bone or Lump of Flesh at distance that they are really such as if they had been touch'd or handled by me If I hear of an Arm or Leg by any means sever'd from the Body of Man the Connexion that the Senses have with the Imagination as undoubtedly assure me of the manner of the Wound Grief and Part cut off as if I had occularly beheld it Not that I can directly judge the Quality or full extent of the Pain that is not distinctly felt by my self Yet as the Part is an Object of Sense and in which I as well as another Man may be in the same kind grievously Afflicted 't is very possible that by a natural Sympathy which is reciprocally Conferr'd on the sensitive Parts of the Bodies of Men I may in effect be as sensibly Intelligent of the Pain or Grief in any Member of another