The utmost their Hypothesis will allow them to pretend to is That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD According to the Schoolmen the Humane Nature of Christ subsists and is a Principium quod of all its own Actions equally with the Humane Nature of any other Humane Person they seem to me to strive to disguise the Heresy of Nestorius by saying That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD because it subsists by the Subsistence or Personality of the WORD To explain this a little The Schoolmen who under pain of Heresy assert but one singular absolute Substance in the Trinity found a great and almost insuperable difficulty so to explain the Incarnation that only the Person of the WORD and not the whole Trinity was incarnated or became Man This is an obvious enquiry What it is which was immediately united to the Humane Nature of Christ so as to denominate Christ both God and Man To assert that the singular common Divine Nature was immediately united to the Humane Nature was to assert the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since whatever belongs to the common Divine Nature immediately belongs equally to the whole Trinity it remains therefore according to them that only the Mode of Subsistence of the WORD was immediately united to the Humane Nature This Answer has visibly many difficulties in it which may be considered hereafter Now I am only to enquire how it denies the Humane Nature of Christ to be a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD The Humane and Divine Nature of Christ have say they but one singular Mode of Subsistence Well grant that possible What follows The Schoolmen say that then they are not two distinct Persons I cannot for my life see the Consequence That Maxim of the Law Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona oequum est ac si concurrerent in duobus may be as I conceive applied here If we suppose it possible for one Personality to constitute two distinct Natures each a Person it is a meer wrangle of a term to deny these two Natures to be two distinct Persons they have all the Properties of two distinct Persons they are two distinct Principia quoe equally with two other Persons The Animadverter does not barely alledge these to me unintelligible Subtilties of the Schools as the only defence of the sacred Article of the Incarnation against Nestorianism but in his third and next Argument to prove that Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in finite Persons He unwittingly I charitably presume has endeavoured to overthrow the defence which the most Learned and Orthodox Fathers of the Church have given us of this sacred and mysterious Article P. 73. N. 4. The Soul of man is Self-conscious and yet not a Person therefore c. P. 74. lin 22. If the Soul be a Person then the Body must be joined to it by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the Soul as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the composition and constitution of a man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no Body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an one as makes a compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed has in this spoke the sense of the Catholick Church For as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is one man so God and Man is one Christ that is One not by Confusion of Substance but by Unity of Person I hope no True Son of the Church of England nor indeed Candid Lover of the Article but will pardon my digression if it deserve to be called such to vindicate this Similitude whereby the most Learned Fathers of the Church have endeavoured to illustrate and defend this Article against all its Heretical Opponents The Animadverter first objects That then the Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Vnion Alas Obj. 1. How extremely afraid are some persons of having the Articles of their Faith found agreeable to the common Principles of Reason If by an Hypostatick Union he means that the Soul and Body of Man only subsist by the same singular Mode of Subsistence and that nothing but the Mode of the Subsistence of the Soul is immediately united to the Body I do assure the Animadverter that I believe not a Syllable of this I do not believe that one Mode can modify two Subjects or that a corporeal Body can be terminated perfected by a Mode of an incorporeal nature such as the Soul is Figure is a Mode of quantity and yet to me it seems unconceivable that a Giant should be terminated by the figure of a Dwarf without any alteration of his quantity or that a Dwarf should have the figure of a Giant and yet not altered in quantity Less am I able to conceive that the Humane Nature of Christ should be terminated by a Mode of Subsistence which belongs to a Divine Nature Secondly Obj. 2. If the Constitution of a Man be an Hypostatick Union then an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an One as makes a compound Hypostasis will not be quite different things then the Hypostatick Union in Christ will be also an Hypostatick Composition and then the Person of Christ will be a compound Hypostasis Well and what follows from all this why nothing but a threatning of the Animadverter's That in due time we shall be taught the Falshood of all this But not to await his due time I answer that to say that the Hypostatick Union in Christ is also an Hypostatick Composition or which is the same that Christ is a compound Hypostasis is so far from being a Paradox that it is the received Language not only of the Greek Fathers but of the Councils Syn. 5a. Constantin Can. 4. Sancti Patres docuerunt unitatem Dei verbi ad carnem animatam anima rationali intellectuali secundum compositionem Theodori autem Nestorii sequaces divisione gaudentes affectualem unitatem introducunt Sancta Dei verò Ecclesia utriusque perfidioe impietatem ejiciens unitionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur Vide Can. 7um hujus Concilii Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. Hear Petavius's Confession Christi Domini Hypostasin sive personam à plerisque Patribus dici compositam ex naturis duabus ut ab Cyrillo Damasceno Maximo aliis To which add what the Learned Suarez hath observed Suarez de
Incarn Q. 2. Disp 6. sect 4. p. 194. Ibid. p. 193. Alii Patres licet non apertè utantur nomine compositionis aliis tamen quoe perinde esse videntur utuntur ut adunationis copulationis ex duobus conjunctionis c. Illa vero particula ex planè designat compositionem The phrase of the Hypostatick Union is most opposite to the Heresy of Eutyches who believed that there was not an Union of Two Natures but a Confusion of One of them But the phrase of the Hypostatick Composition is most opposite to the Nestorian Heresy who asserted a kind of Hypostatic Union that is an Union of Two Persons and denied that Christ God and Man was One Person compounded of Two Natures The Animadverter shews his skill in this Controversy to oppose these two phrases and to condemn that phrase of an Hypostatick Composition which the Church has received As great an Opiniator as the Animadverter is I believe he will scarce have the confidence to say that he can teach these great Fathers of the Church how to speak in this Mystery I promise faithfully to attend him when ever he begins The Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person P. 75. lin 4. N. 5. Forasmuch as a Part is an incomplete Being and therefore in the very nature of it being designed for the completion of something else must subsist in and by the subsistence of the Whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a subject of inherence or dependence so that it is a direct Contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul a Part does irrefragably prove it not to be a Person I answer That to be a Part and a Person in a simple Person in a Person consisting of one Nature I confess to be contradictious and impossible 2dly To be the inferior part in a compounded Person to be in any Actions an Instrument a Principium quo as the Body in the mixt Actions of Sense is to the Soul is contradictory to the Notion of a Person A Person as such is the Principium quod of all the Actions which proceed from it but to be the superior Part in such Composition is very compatible with the Personality of such superior Nature For such superior Nature may very well retain its own proper Mode of Subsistence if we explain Personality with the Schools such a superior Nature retains all the Perfections all the natural Perfections of a whole and complete Being is a Principium quod not only of its own natural Actions but of the mixt Actions of the whole compounded Hypostasis Such a superior Nature may be a Person and at the same time in a large acceptation of the term a Part that is a Part as Aristotle defines that term Arist 4. Met. cap. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that into which any thing is divided or of which that consists which we call a Whole in which sense of the term Part the Learned Petavius is not afraid to call the Divine Nature of the WORD a Part laxius sumpto partis vocabulo Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. I must pass over the Animadverter's boldness in determining That a Part subsists by the subsistence of the Whole which is very near asserting an Hypostatical Union of every substantial part Others who embrace these Scholastical Subtleties chuse rather to assert That a Part subsists by a partial subsistence and that the subsistence of the Whole is compounded of the subsistence of the Parts So when the Animadverter tells us that a Person does not subsist in any other as a subject of dependence I must crave his pardon for I thought before that every Creature had subsisted in God as a subject on whom we depended that in him we live and move and have our Being P. 75. lin 16. N. 6. If the Soul in the composition of a man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the constitution of the Man then a Man would be an imperfect accidental and not a perfect natural compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Vnum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce into one Mutatis mutandis this is the Great Socinian Objection against the Incarnation of the Son of God That Infinite and Finite cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One that God and Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the name of the most unnatural compound and mixture The same Answer will satisfy both Objections To confound the two Natures of God and Man or of Soul and Body would confessedly make the most unnatural compound and mixture But we maintain an Union in both Cases and not a Confusion The Divine Nature retains all the Perfections of a Divine Person in the Composition and the Human Nature by the Composition loses none of the natural perfections of the Human Nature It cannot indeed properly be called by the metaphysical name of a suppositum as becoming an Instrument a principium quo to the superior Divine Nature but then thereby it becomes capable of being an Instrument in the noblest Acts of the Mediatorial Office which subsisting by it self it was uncapable of So the Soul in the Constitution of Man retains all the Perfections of a separate intellectual suppositum nor did any Philosoper ever assert that an Human Body was more imperfect than a Stone notwithstanding this latter is a suppositum and the former not The Human Body by the Composition is an Instrument a Principium quo to the Soul an Instrument in the mixt Actions of Sense which of it self it was uncapable of And if a Stone could speak it would never complain if God should miraculously change it into an Human Body notwithstanding the compleatness of a suppositum and the incompleatness of an Inferior Nature in an Hypostatick Composition Secondly The Animadverter mistakes that which Philosophers call Vnum per Accidens for that is when two Beings which differ toto Genere as Substance and Accident are united Such an Union say they is accidental and consequently the Compositum not Vnum per se but Vnum per Accidens Or when two Compleat Beings are united as in all Artificial Works where each part is a distinct suppositum which is more properly called Aggregatum per Accidens But the Divine and Human Nature the Soul and Body differ not toto Genere each are Substances and so are capable of a substantial Union which suffices to denominate the Compositum Vnum per se and not Vnum per Accidens Again The Divine Nature is and remains compleat in the Composition the Humane Nature subsists ad modum partis in the nature of a part of an Instrument in the
Composition So is the Soul compleat and the Human Body the Instrument or incompleat in the constitution of Man so that according to the strictest Rules of Philosophy both the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Man are Vnum per se not Vnum per Accidens Thirdly As little can I allow the Animadverter that every Vnum per Accidens must be an unnatural Compound According to these Philosophers a Learned Man a Pious Man is Vnum per Accidens ought we therefore to avoid Piety and Learning that we may not become an unnatural Compound Fourthly The Union of a Subject and its Adjunct is according to all Philosophers an accidental Union the Adjunct as I observed before predicated of the Subject more Accidentis This Objection therefore falls strongest upon his own Head who denied the Human Nature of Christ to be a part of Christ and affirmed That it was an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD Cap. 1. N. 10 which is in consequence to affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is Vnum per Accidens P. 76. lin 4. N. 7. If the Soul in a state of Separation from the Body be a Person then it is either the same Person which the Man himself was while he was living and in the Body or it is another Person But to assert either of them is extreamly absurd and therefore equally absurd that the Soul in such a State should be a Person c. This also is a Socinian Objection The Animadverter may be satisfied That no wise Man will chuse the later part of the Disjunction viz. that the Soul in a state of Separation is a different Person from the Man himself or that the WORD before the Incarnation is a different Person from Christ God and Man or the WORD incarnated For the Objection is equal against both Articles as by a small variation of the immediate following words will appear And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of Soul and Body as a Man is and a simple uncompounded Person as the Soul if a Person at all must needs be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts compounding it And a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Person and his Soul after Death be a Person too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Person with the Man And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of the Divine and Human Nature as Christ is and a simple uncompounded Person as the WORD is acknowledged to be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts and a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if Christ God and Man be one Person and the WORD before his Incarnation be a Person too it is impossible for the Word before the Incarnation to be one and the same Person with Christ God and Man Now thanks be to God this formidable Objection of the Socinians and the Animadverter is founded upon a mistake in Philosophy viz. That those things which differ from one another as Simple and Compound differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other There may be a thousand instances brought to confute this pretended Axiom A Man learned is the same Man with himself before he was learned and yet in the Confession of all Philosophers A Man and a Man learned differ as Simple and Compound A Man learned is an accidental Compositum an Vnum per Accidens So a Man cloathed is the same Man with himself naked and yet a Man cloathed and a Man naked differ as Simple and Compound A Soul in a state of Separation is the same Soul with the Soul cloathed with an Human Body I am ashamed to be obliged to prove so plain a Conclusion In an Hypostatical Union the inferior Nature is so far an Adjunct to the superior Nature that what the WORD was before the Incarnation or the Soul before its cloathing with a Body the same each remains after the Union or Conjunction It is in some sense a Part otherwise the Union could not be substantial but accidental The WORD could with no more propriety be said to be a Man than a Man may be denominated an evil Angel because he is possessed of such Had the Divine and Human Nature of Christ been confounded or the Soul and Body of Man so mixt as to have denominated the Compositum of a different Nature from the component Parts then the WORD and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not be one Person nor the Soul and the Man the same Person But we maintain an Hypostatical Union and not a confusion of Substance or Nature That which has obscured the Analogy betwixt the Union of the two Natures in the One Person of Christ and of the Soul and Body in Man is for that in this latter instance Custom has prevailed with us to say That an Human Person has but one viz. an human Nature Whereas an Human Person properly consists of two unconfounded Natures the Nature of the Soul and Body are not confounded in the Hypostatical Composition of Man The Learned Damascen Vide Damasc lib. 3 de Ortho fide cap. 3. if I remember aright gives the reason of this form of Speech Because we see many distinct Persons possess the same common Nature whence we say That two or more Human Persons are of one and the same nature As also That if the Holy Spirit had been incarnated equally with the WORD we might have said that the WORD incarnate is of the same nature with the Holy Ghost incarnate To conclude All Philosophers assert That a totum differs only ratione from all its parts united if therefore it be possible for the superior part in an Hypostatick Union to retain all the Natural Perfections of a suppositum in the composition and for an inferior part to be united to the superior without confusion of its Nature and yet not as a distinct suppositum but as an instrumentum or principium quo to the superior part It will then evidently follow That the whole compositum is but one suppositum but one Person and the very same Person which the superior part was before the composition and that a simple and compounded Person is in such instance not two Persons but one and the same Person differing not really but modally from himself by such difference by which a Learned Man differs from himself before he was Learned And here I