particulars considered the SOVL is not a number These were the ancient Philosophers opinions concerning the SOUL But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body and created in the body agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle For he took these words a substance void of body out of Plato and these created in the body from Aristotle not considering though hee was otherwise very quick witted that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together For every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time is corruptible and mortall To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable For in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense hee did not therein deliver in expresse words that the nature of things intelligible were then made But some though othersome are not of their opinion insisting upon conjectures are of that minde Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body because it was put into the body after the same was fashioned he erreth wide from the truth For neither doth Moses say that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body neither doth any reason perswade thereunto Eunomius therefore might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall as doth Aristotle and the Stoicks as affirme it is engendred in the body For if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence hee should have refused to say that it was created in the body lest hee give men occasion to thinke the soule mortall and utterly void of Reason Beside it seemes by his opinion that the World is not yet replenished but is at this present as it were no more then halfe perfected and stands every day in want of some additions For there are every day added unto it at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances And which is most unreasonable hee seemeth to beleeve that when the number of soules is finished then the whole world shall bee dissolved and the last not come to light before the day of the generall resurrection What can be more contrary to reason then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed assoone as it is fully furnished It were like the play-games of little children so to do For when they have made any workes or devises upon the sands they usually tread them out againe as soone as they have done them Now if any shall hereunto reply that the soules are now made by Providence and not by Creation and that there is no new substance brought into the world whensoever any body is replenished with a soule nor any other Essence but the same multiplyed by Providence which was before doubtlesse they know not the difference between Creation and Providence For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures by breeding them one of another I meane here all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter for the succession of such is preserved by the same providence by generating them of some other putrifaction But the chiefe operation of Creation is to make things of nothing If therfore the SOULS bee made one of another It will also follow that they are corruptible like those other creatures which are made successively one of another according to their kindes If contrariwise the SOULS be made of nothing then their making commeth by Creation and in so affirming we deny that place of Moses God ceased from all his workes But both of these opinions are absurd Therefore the Soules are not now made For that saving of the Scripture My Father worketh c. by the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe is to be understood not of the workes of Creation but of Providence Apollinarius held opinion that Soules were engendred one of another as Bodies are and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man unto all men descending from him according to the bodily succession therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning as it were stored up and from those also who thinke they are daily created For in contradiction to these tenets they affirme that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children And they further say that these words of Moses God ceased from all his works c. should be untrue if God continueth to create Souls In answer hereunto we have already shewed that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another For therefore onely they generate and are generated that the race of corruptible things might be preserved And therefore Apollinarius must either deny the successive generation of Souls or by holding such a generation he must consequently at least necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery let us leave that unto the Divine Providence whereof we are ignorant But if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable permitteth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias SECT 6. I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL and the absurdity and contradictions thereof II. The judgement of Plato touching one generall SOUL and many particular SOULS The office of the SOUL and the difference betweene things that live and Living-creatures is here also declared III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers NOw it followes that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL For they say truely that the SOUL is a substance both immortall and incorporeall But they adde also that there is but one onely Soul for all things and that it is parted and as it were peecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies as well to bodies inanimate as to those which are indued with life They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort and some in a lesse measure Things indued with life in a larger proportion Things void of life in the lesse And heavenly things in the most abundant manner and that the particular soules are portions of that soul which is universall Now if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided as that it had not been divided into parts but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers the error had been the more tolerable But their opinion is that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts and which is most harsh they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements and to be distributed together with the Elements in the making up of bodily-things and for the collecting of them againe into one when they are dissolved as
lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union For the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull and it is much the more doubtfull it Man consist not of these two parts onely but of understanding also as a distinct thing which is the opinion of some But the greatest doubt of all ariseth in this respect that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence are joyned all together in the making of that one seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing are usually so altered that they remaine not the same they were before as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL remaine still a Bodie or how can the SOUL being incorporeall and having a substance of his owne be united with the BODIE and become a part of the Living-creature preserving still his owne proper substance without corruption and confusion It seemes to be no way else possible but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other either become altered one with the other or corrupted with each other as the Elements are or else to avoid those absurdities that they should not be truly united but be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe or at best be so mixed as wine and water But we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL that the Soul cannot be laid as it were along by the Bodie because if it should be so that part onely of the body should have life in it which joyneth neare unto the soule and that the part which the soule toucheth not should be without life Moreover wee cannot say that two sundry things placed one beside the other as two pieces of timber two iron wedges or such like are one and the same thing And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water wee know it corrupts both the one and the other for there doth remaine neither pure water nor pure wine after such a mixture Yet this mixture of wine and water is but as it were a laying of them one beside another though our senses be not able to apprehend the same because they are hindred from perceiving it by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed For the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other by a sponge dipped in oyle or by paper either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine But indeed it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other those things which are exactly united If therefore the parts of MAN be neither united nor placed one beside the other nor mixed together as aforesaid what reason should move us to say that one Living creature is made of these two parts a Soul and a bodie It was the consideration hereof which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body but that he was a Soule having the use of the Body and to whom the Body served as a garment But even in affirming that he occasioned as much doubting for how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment seeing a Coat is not all one with him that wears it But Amonius who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption when they bee united as those things do which are but laid along one by another It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together must of necessity suffer alterations by their union and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto because they are thereby changed into other Bodies as are the Elements making compound bodies or as nourishment being changed into blood or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh and other parts of the Bodie But things intelligible may bee united and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue For it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things to bee altered in substance but either it departeth away or is brought to nothing and so can admit no alteration The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted or brought to nothing for then it could not be immortall It is also life it selfe and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture For if it should be changed in the union it should be altered from being life any more and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto All these arguments considered it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered it followes necessarily therupon that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things so likewise the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other That they are neverthelesse perfectly united is manifested by this that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature For the whole man grieveth as one creature if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other to the SOUL or to the Body And it is as plaine that they remaine united without confusion in that the soule being separated after a sort from the Body when wee bee asleepe and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps and only breathing into the same as it were certaine vapours of life least it should utterly perish doth worke by it selfe in dreames whilest the Body sleepeth foreseeing things to come and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things For even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things For being without body it separates it self from the whole body as things which are therewithall corrupted and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion And keeping it selfe one and alone changeth that wherein it abideth by the life which is contained in it selfe and yet is not changed by the same For as the Sun so soon as it appeareth changes the ayre into light so making it light some and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre that it is united with the same and yet not confoūded therewith Even so the soul being united with the Body remaines without confusion therwith differing in this onely that the Sunne being a Body and circumscribed within
the compasse of Place is not himselfe in every place where his light is but as fire in the wood or as the flame in a candle is confined to a certaine place It is not so with the soul For being void of all Body and not contained within the limits of any place it passeth all and whole through it own whole light and through the whole Body wherein it is neither is any part of it illuminated thereby wherein it is not fully and wholly present Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell nor compassed in by the same but the Body is rather in the soule and is thereby held in and fastned together For intelligible things such as the soul is are not hindred by bodily things but enter and pierce and passe through every corporeall thing and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place Things intellectuall have their being in places also intelligible yea they are either in themselves or else in such intellectuall things as are above themselves The soul is otherwhile in it selfe as when it reasoneth or considereth of things and otherwhile in the understanding as when it conceiveth any thing And when it is said to bee in the body it is not said to be there as in place but to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body and to bee present with it in such a sense as God is said to be in us For wee say that the soul is bound as it were by a certaine disposition and inclination as the lover is to his beloved not bound in place or as bodies are bound but by the habituall bands of affection And indeed seeing it hath neither magnitude nor massinesse nor parts how can it be enclosed by a speciall place Or within what place can that bee contained which hath no parts Where place is there must needs bee a massinesse because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth Now if any man shall thereupon conclude that his soule is in Alexandria and in Rome and in every place let him know that even in so saying hee includeth a Place For to be in Alexandria or generally to be here or there or any where pertaineth unto a place whereas the soul is no where no not in the body as in a place but habitually because as is aforesaid it cannot be contained within a place For this cause when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place or to such things as are in place wee turne the word from his proper use and say abusively that such a thing is there or there by reason of the operation which it there hath taking the name of place for the inclination or working in a place And whereas we should rather say it there worketh we say There it is SECT 2. I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body and wherein it is unlike thereunto II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie confuting himselfe and others who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body and shewes that as it was meerely of Gods good pleasure to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God that this union should be without mixture or confusion THat which is last aforesaid agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union which is betweene GOD the WORD and the Man-hood by which union the two Natures being united remained neverthelesse without confusion and so also that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity And yet this uniting is not altogether such as is betweene the soul and the body For the soul being in the number of multiplied things suffers after a sort with the Body in such things as happen thereunto and by reason of their mutuall necessities and conversation together both holds it in and is also held in by the same But GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered by that union which unites the divinity and humanity together nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other imparts his God-head unto them without participating of their frailties and becommeth one with them still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was before such an uniting This is a strange and mysterious temperature uniting For Hee is tempered with them and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion without confusion without corruption and without change Neither suffering any thing with them but only helping and furthering them nor being corrupted nor altered by them but greatly encreasing them without any diminution in himselfe because hee is altogether without mutation without confusion and without possibility of changing Hereof may Porphyrie himselfe beare witnesse who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST for the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words It is not then saith he to be judged a thing impossible that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE and be part of that ESSENCE perfecting also the same and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE both being ONE with that other thing and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe yea and which is more then this changing those things wherein it is by the presence thereof and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh and yet nothing altered in it SELFE Now Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body and if his reason hold good in the SOUL in regard it is an incorporeall substance it holds true much rather in GOD the Word who is verily without bodie and also utterly void of composition And this doth mafestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood as many of the Grecians have done Jeasting and deriding at it as impossible improbable and absurd that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-mortall-nature for it is here discovered that they may be opposed in this argument by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves The opinion of some especially of the Eunomians is this that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance but by the powers of either Nature For it is not say these their substances which are united and tempered together but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers Now they affirme according to Aristotle that the Senses are the powers of the body meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof and therefore in their judgement the Divine powers being tempered with the
Senses is cause of that uniting But wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body For wee have already manifestly declared what things belong properly to the Body what things to the SOUL only and what to the SOUL and body both together And we therupon concluded that the Senses which worke by the instruments of the Body are to bee reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One These things confidered it is most agreeable to reason wee should affirme according to the nature of incorporeall-things and as is aforesaid that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion and in such maner that the more Divine nature is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine For a nature which is purely incorporeall can passe without stop thorow all things whereas nothing hath passage thorow that By passing through all things it is united and in regard nothing passes through the same it remaines void of mixture and without confusion It is not rightly affirmed therefore though many excellent men be of this opinion that no reason else can be given why the union whereof wee have treated should bee after such a manner but onely because it pleased God it should so be For the very nature of the things is cause thereof We may justly say that it came to passe meerely by GOD's good pleasure and choise that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe But it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD though it be also his good pleasure it should be so but of the proper nature of the Godhead that when it is united it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood Wee will speake nothing of the degrees of soules nor of their ascending and descending mentioned by Origen For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians CAP. 4. SECT 1. I. Of the Body and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof II. Of those parts of a living-creature every portion wherof taketh the name of the whole and of those parts which take not the name of the whole III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are defective in some of the parts and many in the Situation of them RIghtly may we affirme that every corporeall Essence is a composition proceeding from the foure Elements and made up of them The bodies of living-creatures having blood in them are cōpacted immediatly of the four humors Blood flegm Choller Melancholy But the Bodies of such as are without blood are made of the other three humours and of somewhat in them answering proportionably unto blood We call that immediately when any thing is made of the selfe-same things without any other thing comming between them As the foure humours are made of the foure Elements and those things are compounded of the foure humours which consist of like parts and are parts also of the body that is things having such parts every part of which parts may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole as when every part of the flesh is called flesh Melancholy is likned to Earth Flegme to water Blood to Ayre Choller to Fire and every thing which is compounded of the Elements is either a Masse or Moisture or Spirits Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-creatures were made immediately of Blood onely because the seed is ingendred of blood and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby But because it seemed somewhat absurd to imagine that both hardest bones and the tenderest flesh and fatnesse should proceed all of one thing It pleased Hippocrates to affirme that the bodies of living-creatures were immediately compacted of the foure Elements the thicke and sollid parts of the more earthly Elements and the soft parts of such Elements as are softest Oftentimes all the foure humours are found in the blood whereof wee have experience in Phlebotomy For sometime a certaine flegme like whey doth abound in it otherwhile Melancholy and sometime againe Choller Whereupon it commeth to passe that all men seem in some sort to agree with one another Now of the parts of living-creatures some parts there be every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part Othersome there are which cannot bee called by the same name whereby the whole is called As for example Every part of the Braine is called Braine In like maner of the sinewes of the marrow of the bones of the teeth of the grissells of the nayles of the thin muscles that binde the Ioynts together of all the skins throughout the body of the strings which are in the bloody flesh of the haires of the flesh of the veines of the arteries of the pores of the fat and of those foure which are in maner of Elemēts yeelding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made pure Blood Flegme Melancholy and Choller Except from these the Muscle which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joynts together and of the strings which are of the nature of sinewes The parts of the body consisting of portions whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole are these that follow viz. the head the breast the hands the feet and such other members of Mans body For if you divide the head into severall parts every part of it is not called a Head but if you divide a sinew into severall portions every portion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew and so shall it be likewise if you divide or subdivide a veine or flesh Every whole thing whose severall parts have not the same name with the whole is made of such things as impart the name of the whole to the parts when they are compounded together as the head is made of sinewes and flesh and bone and such like which are called the instrumentall parts The definition therefore of such things as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is things which consist of like parts is thus made They are things whose parts are like both to the whole and to each other as flesh braine c. and by the word like in this place we meane the same with the whole for a piece of a mans flesh is as truly flesh as the whole masse Now every living-creature hath not all the parts of a body but some of them are defective in one part and some in others for some lack feet as fishes and Serpents Some have no head as Crabs and Lobsters and certaine other water-creatures and because they want a head the seat of their sense is in the breast Some living-creatures have no Lungs namely all such as breath no Ayre some are without a bladder as birds and all such as
Beasts to Beasts and from men to men and in so saying hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opinion but of the Truth it selfe By these last words Nemesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion both of Iamblicus Plato touching Transmigration of Soules Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus rather And in so saying hee hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Platoes opinion Let the learned judge whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version though not in a strict Grammaticall sense especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally beleeved among Christians for my part till I see more cause to suspect the contrary I shall alway so conceive of it That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie is not a matter of faith or so precisely decided as that he or we are for ought I know obliged to be peremptorily for it or against it and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline or what to answer for him If any man can assure me whether part is without errour that will I embrace and I am perswaded so would Nemesius have done if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous in that point which if others beleeve of him as they have no just cause to the contrary no more needes to be spoken of this matter If any be offended that hee argues philosophically rather then by proofs of Scripture and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet but a Wiseman Let them consider that hee had such to contest withall as neither beleeved the Scriptures nor ascribed more unto Moses or any other then the Reasonablenesse of their affections seemed to deserve The alledging of Scripture therefore to such men had been to cast pearles to swine and more to the derision then to the honour of his cause This course was practiced by the Apostles themselves To the Iewes and beleeving Gentiles they brought the testimony of the Prophets but to Unbeleevers they cited their owne Poets or convinced them by Reason Had our Author argued with Christians the holy Scriptures onely should have been Judges of their Controversies For he himselfe saith Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe we must prove by Demonstration c. In these times there be many who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures yet they doe as bad or worse rather for they deny the true sense of them and make interpretations according to their owne lusts and fancies To these also the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning And some of these have so long and so violently professed against Reason as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute or to convince them by divine Authority till GOD shall forgive their deniall and abuse of his common graces upon true repentance for the same and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne and for enlightning whereof this Treatise may perhaps become helpfull Other things might bee here declared to prevent prejudice and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke but lest they make this Preface over-large I wil here conclude and commit all to Gods blessing Geo Wither PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei aut bonis moribus contrarium THO WEEKES R. P. Episc Lond. Cap. domest NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN CAP. 1. SECT 1. I. The Definition of MAN A quaere touching the Understanding and the opinions of Plotinus Apollinarius Aristotle Plato concerning the SOVL BODY of MAN II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature is a medium knitting together the whole Creation a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things III. The Agreement and comely order of GOD'S Works of all which MAN is the true Epitome GOod men and of those not a few have defined Man to consist of an Vnderstanding Soul and a Body and so true is this Definition that it may seeme he could not otherwise be well defined Yet when wee terme him an Vnderstanding soul it may appeare doubtfull to some whether the Vnderstanding comming to the soul as one distinct thing comes to another did beget Vnderstanding in the Soul Or whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding as the most excellent part thereof and as being the same to the Soul which the Eie is to the Body There be some and of this opinion is Plotinus who thinking the Soul to be one thing and the Body another doe therfore affirme that MAN is composed of these three a Soul a Body and Vnderstanding Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea For having laid this as the Foundation of his own opinion he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork Others there are who divide not the Vnderstanding from the Soul in this manner but suppose rather that the Vnderstanding is a principall of the Soules essence Aristotle conjectures that a certain potentiall understanding was made together with MAN which might become actuall in time and that the understanding which commeth to us from without and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge pertains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul but assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things By which means it comes to passe that very few or none but men addicted to the study of wisdome are thought capable of this Actuall understanding PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence that is to say joyntly of a Soul and a Body but rather that he is a soul using as it were Instrumentally such a Body and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only which is the most excellent part of Man he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of our selves and of the divine nature as might win us the better to pursue vertue godlinesse and such good things as are in the Soul or else by perswading that we are essentially nothing else but soul hee would peradventure allure us to renounce the desires of the Body as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN but chiefely belonging to him as he is a living creature and so by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man in regard Man is a living-creature And it is indeed confessed not much otherwise of all men that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul as is evident
because all things being made for MAN it was most convenient that all such things ought first to bee provided which were necessarily pertinent to his use and that he who was to have the use of them should afterward be created But in respect both intellectuall and visible substances were created it seemed also convenient that One should be made by whom those two Natures should be so united together that the whole World might become ONE and be in it owne selfe so agreeable that the same might not bee at variance or estranged from it selfe Even to this end was MAN made such a living-creature as might joyne together both Natures and to summe up all in a word therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR Now MAN being placed as it were in the Bounds betweene the reasonable-Reasonable-nature and that which is Irrationall if he incline to the Bodie setling the maine part of his affectioÌ„ upon corporal things he chuseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures and for that cause shall be numbred among them and be called as Saint Paul terms him An earthly MAN to whom it shall be thus said Earth thou art and to Earth thou shalt returne yea by this meanes he becomes as the Psalmist affirms like the Beast which hath no understanding But if he incline rather to the Reasonable part and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN he shall then be accounted a Heavenly MAN according to that saying Such as the earth is such are they that are earthly such as the heavenly are such are they that are heavenly and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the reasonable-Reasonable-Nature is to avoid and oppose Evill and love and follow that which is Good Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body of which sort the Vertues are and these have a relation unto the Soul in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body being joyned thereunto Some good things pertaine to the soul only by it self so that it should not need the help of the body as godlinesse and the Contemplation of the nature of things and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN and not onely in that he is a living creature do apply themselves to Vertue and Piety But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue and what to Piety when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body For seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof it is not yet convenient for us to treat here of those things that are wrought by it The Hebrewes affirme that MAN was made from the beginning neither altogether mortall neither wholly immortall but as it were in a state betweene both those natures to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortall from the beginning he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemnation who was mortall before And on the other side if he had made Man absolutely immortall hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment for nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment Moreover it is not to be beleeved that God would so hastily have repented himself and made Him to be forthwith mortall who was created absolutely immortall For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned but according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning they remained immortall undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death but of some other punishment It is better therefore either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter or else thus to think that MAN was indeed created mortall but yet in such wise that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious progression he might become immortall that is to say he was made such a One as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become immortall SECT 3. I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden that it was at first expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature II. MAN by the Transgression attained that knowledge of himselfe which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie III. The Elementarie câ—mposition and nourishment of Mans bodie The reasons also why it needed feeding clothing curing c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible and capable of Arts and Sciences c. IT being inexpedient rather then any way helpful for MAN to know his own nature before he came to his perfection GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill For there were and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants but at the first in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation their vertues being before the curse pure and void of all mixture had in them a strong operation and it is not therefore strange that there should be by Gods providence the taste of a certain Tree that should have a power given to ingender in our first parents the knowledge of their own nature The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature before hee had attained to perfection was this lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things should as by the sequell we find it manifest labour only to supply the wants of his Body and utterly cast away the care of his Soul and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill By disobeying this Commandement MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed For according to the words of Moses as soone as he had eaten He knew that he was naked and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse whereas till then God kept him as it were in a Traunce and in such case that hee knew not himself When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection hee fell also from his immortalitie which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover againe at the last In the meane time it was granted him that hee should eat flesh whereas before his fall God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth all which hee had provided for him in Paradise yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate it was permitted him to feed as hee would Now seeing Man consisteth of a Bodie as of
is a bodie but in possibility have a possibility of life in it self Though in other things it is possible that a man should have somewhat which he never useth yet in the soul it is impossible For the soul doth not cease to worke even in them that are asleep but a man even in sleeping is nourished groweth and seeth visions and breathes which is the chiefest symptome of life It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live but it must needs have life actually in it For indeed it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul it is planted together with the Soul and it is in the bodie by participation If therefore any man shall affirme that Health answereth proportionably to Life we will reply that in saying so he tal keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body and so useth a sophisticall reasoning For the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another but in the substance which is the forme that cannot be possible Because if the difference which is the Form should be altered the living creature would be altered also It is not therefore the substantiall forme which receiveth contraries but the substance which is the subject that is to say the bodily-substance And therefore also the Soul cannot be by any means the continued motion of the bodie but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe and incorporeall for that it receiveth contraries one after another as vice and vertue whereof the very Forme by it self is not capable Furthermore Aristotle saith that the Soul being a continued-motion unmoveable of it self is moved accidentally and that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing because we see by common experience that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us But though Beautie which is unmoveable in it self may move us as hee saith yet the Beautie so moving us is a thing by nature apt enough to be moved not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable Therefore if the body had any selfe-motion it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable But it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion except it receive it from the soul seeing it cannot have any motion from it self It appeares therefore that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion hee shewed us not the first but the second For if he had moved that which of it self is not moved he had then made the first-motion But if otherwise he move that which is moved of it self hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess in regard some of them are naturally light some heavy It is not so For if levity weightinesse were kinds of motion then light and heavy things would never leave moving But they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place Therefore lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion but qualities of the Elements If it were granted that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion how can the Qualities of Reasoning of Judging and of holding Opinion be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse If they be not effects of these neither are they effects of the Elements and if not of the Elements then also not of the Bodies Beside if the soul be moved accidentally and the bodie of it self then should the bodie be moved of it self although it had no soul and if that were possible then it might be a living-creature without a soul But these things are absurd and absurd therefore is the former opinion Moreover it is likewise untruely affirmed that every thing which is moved naturally is moved also violently and that whatsoever is moved violently is moved by nature For the World being moved naturally is not moved violently Neither is it true that such things as are moved naturally doe rest naturally also For the World and the Sunne and the Moone are naturally moved and yet cannot rest naturally In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion they cannot rest naturally For Rest is the destruction of the Soul of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion It is herewith considerable also that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter viz. how the bodie whose nature is to be easily dispersed can be knit together if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance SECT 5. I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras nor as Xenocrates understands it II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul these words created or ingendred in the Bodie and the absurdity thereupon insuing III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation Providence c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules PYthagoras whose custome it was by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God and all other things to NUMBERS defined the soul also to be a number moving it self Him Xenocrates imitated not as though the soul were number but for that it is in things numbred and in such as are multiplyed and for that it is the soul which discernes things and because likewise it putteth as it were upon every thing certaine formes and distinctions For it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another and shewes how they differ both by the diversity of their Formes and by the multitude of their number thereby causing things to be contained in number And therefore betweene the soul and numbers there is some affinity He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe And that it is not a number wee may thus prove Number is in the predicament of quantity But the soul is not in the predicament of quantity but in the predicament of substance Therfore the soul is not a number Yea though they would never so faine that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding it will bee proved otherwise as it shall hereafter bee declared Againe the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another but so hath not number Therefore the SOUL is not a Number Againe a number is increased by putting more and more unto it but the Soul taketh no such increase Againe a number is either even or odd but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd Againe the SOUL hath motion of it selfe but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable Againe a number remaining one and the same in nature is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers But the Soul remaining one and the same in substance doth change his qualities altering from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to vertue therefore all these
giveth any token of Reason the Reasonable-soule would bee superfluous because the force of Reason would bee altogether and at all times uselesse unto him All men have agreed unanimously that God made no superfluous creature which being true it cannot be that a Reasonable-soule should be so superfluously bestowed as to be placed in cattle and wilde beasts which cannot exercise the same lest it might bee objected as a fault in the Creator to give an unfit SOUL to the Body For it is not the part of a good workeman or of one who knowes the order and method of working so to doe Now if any shall object that there is in beasts a certaine hidden habit of reason whereby they are moved and that their shape makes them uncapable of artificiall workes as the want of a mans fingers depriveth him of meanes to practise many Arts wherein he is experienced it makes nothing to the matter For the same absurdity still remaines implying that God applyeth SOULS unto some BODIES which are so unfit and superfluous that they are hindered throughout all the ages of those creatures from their operations Beside they confirme their propositions by things unknowne and such as are not confessed For who allowes this fancy that beasts have in them a motion according to an hidden habit of Reason It is therefore better to hold that a SOUL convenient for every Body is fitly applyed thereunto That beasts also have nothing more according to any hidden habit of reason then doth outwardly appeare in their naturall and simple actions That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likwise according to a proper instinct of their owne to such uses and to such workes as they were ordained unto from the beginning and that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accommodated for such purposes Moreover the CREATOR because hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their necessities hath placed in every one of them such an understanding as is naturall though not reasonable In some he hath placed a wilinesse representing Art and having a shadow of Reason partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers which may betide them and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another as hath beene said before Now that the brute-creatures have not the use of reasō in doing these things is evident in this that every living-creature of one kinde doth the same things and all of them in one and the same manner Their practices differ not in multitude but in this onely that some use them perhaps more and some lesse for all the whole kinde of them practise the same wiles Every Hare doth use the same subtleties every Foxe is alike crafty and every Ape imitates alike But it is not so with Man For his actions are infinitely various because Reason being a certaine thing which is free and men having also many things in their power their workings are not one and the same as it is in every kinde of irrationall creature For beasts have their motion onely by nature and such things as are in a creature naturally are in all of the same kinde But the actions proceeding from Reason are after one sort in one man after another sort in another and not necessarily the same in all men But if they should say that mans SOVL is driven into the Bodies of beasts for a punishment of those faults which i◠had committed when it was formerly in man while he lived This demonstration of theirs contrary to the rules of Logick proveth former things by such as come after For why should reasonable SOULS bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man can you say they had offended in the Body of man before they had entred at all into mans body Galen that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion to suppose that in every severall kinde of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul For in the beginning of the first booke of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts hee sayes thus Though there be many parts of a living-creature some greater some lesse and some that cannot be divided into any other kinde every one of them is usefull some way to the SOUL For the Body is the instrument of the soul and the parts of living-creatures differ much from one another because there is difference in their SOULS Againe somewhat after that in the same book he addes these words speaking of an Ape Oh thou that art so witty in finding faults I Nature can tell thee that it was convenient a ridiculous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous By this it may sufficiently be declared that Galen thought a diversitie of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of divers kindes Thus much of these matters Seeing wee have now proved even by their owne arguments who have held the contrary that the SOUL is neither a corporeall essence nor a harmony nor a Temperature nor any other quality it will necessarily follow that it is a substance incorporeall All confesse there is a SOUL and if it be neither a Body nor an accident it is mannest that it is a substance without a body and no such thing as cannot stand by it selfe without a subject For such things may without the destruction of the subject be either in the same or absent but if the SOUL be separated from the body that body must of necessity be destroyed We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortall For if it bee neither a body whose nature is subject to dissolution and destruction as is aforesaid nor a quality nor a quantity nor any thing subject to corruption then it must needs bee immortall There bee many other demonstrations both in Plato and others illustrating the immortality of the SOUL but they are full of obseurity and can hardly be understood or borne away by those who have beene trained up in the same sciences To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient to prove the SOULS immortality beare a ful credit in themselves because they were inspired by God But against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe wee must prove by demonstration that the SOUL is no such thing as is subject to corruption If it bee no corruptible thing it must needs bee incorruptible and consequently immortall And therefore to that purpose let this be sufficient CAP. 3. SECT 1. I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY and whether their Natures be altered or confounded by their union II. The mystery of the SOUL and BODIE' 's union illustrated by considering things conceivable in understanding and by a similitude taken from the Sun III. Of the admirable proprieties of the SOUL and how it is properly or improperly said to be in the BODY or in Place c. OUr purpose is now to enquire how between the SOUL and a
downe and cooled are converted into stones For every thunder-bolt consists of stone and brimstone The stone is as it were the brimstone over-baked Brimstone is as it were fire cooled and no more actually hot but having a neare possibility of heat and being also actually dry For the Elements only have the qualities actually wheras all other things have them but in possibility except they come near unto some Elements But to the end that neither the Elements should faile nor the Bodies which are to be compounded of those Elements the Creator did providently devise that they should be convertible both one into another and also into compound-bodies and that the compound-bodies should be againe resolved into their Elements By which meanes it commeth to passe that they are continually engendered one of another and perpetually preserved from being wasted For Earth being first dissolved into a mirie moistnesse becommeth water Water being thickned and congealed becommeth earth Water also being heated and resolved into vapours vanisheth into aire Aire being collected and condensed is turned into water The same aire being dryed changeth into fire Fire if it be quenched and water also if it be evaporated become aire For aire is the quenchings of fire and the moisture arising from water being heated even by both of these is the aire generated For experience doth shew us that whensoever fire is quenched or water heated aire is encreased thereby Therefore aire is naturally hot and cooled by being scituated so neare unto the water and the earth which coole the lower parts thereof as the fire heateth also the upper parts of the same And this hapneth unto the aire by reason of the softnesse thereof and the easinesse which it hath to receive impressions makes it quickly depart from its proper nature and very apt to be changed But Aristotle is of opinion that there bee two sorts of aire one like unto vapours and generated by the exhalations of waters The other smoakie and bred out of the fire when it is quenched The aire which commeth of smoke he conceiveth to bee hot and that also which proceedeth from vapours when it is first bred but in continuance of time that aire as he saith cooleth by little and little untill it is converted into water This supposition of Aristotles that the aire is of two sorts was by him devised that he might escape some absurdities which he knew not otherwise how to avoid and that things which are somewhat high and farre distant from the earth might seeme hot and that such as are very low might seeme colder SECT 2. I. Of the uniting of the Elements into a naturall body what maner of composition it is and why those bodies are againe resolved into Elements II. Plato's opinion concerning the Element of earth as also concerning the other three Elements III. Of the division of the Elements according to the Stoicks The opinion of Aristotle touching a fifth body out of which hee thinkes the heavens were made and of the contrary opinion of Plato NOw all Bodies are made by the conjunction of these foure Elements both the Bodies of Plants and of living-creatures also to the composition of which bodies nature drawes together the purest parts of those Elements These are called by Aristotle naturall bodies being compounded not by heaping of the Elements one upon another but by tempering all together throughout the whole so much of every Element as is in the Body in the uniting therof and by making of them one certaine BODIE differing from what they were before that composition For they are so united that impossible it is to sever them or to see Earth by it selfe or Water alone or Ayre or Fire distinctly from the rest because one intire thing and a thing differing from the Elements is made by the tempering of all foure of them together As a medicine consisting of foure Ingredients being once made up is a thing differing from those Ingredients But yet the composition of a naturall body is not in all things like those artificiall composures For the Elements do not make the bodies by the scituation of the thinnest parts one by another as it falleth out in a medicine compounded of foure ingredients but it is effected rather by altering themselves and by uniting of all into One. All Bodies are again resolved also into these Elements by which means it commeth to passe that all the Elements remaine continually unwasted and are kept sufficient for the making of all things in regard they neither are diminished nor abound And from hence arises this generall proposition That the generation of one thing is the corruption of another And the corruption of one the generation of another not referring this perpetuity to the Soul as is aforesaid but to the Bodie onely Plato is of opinion that the three other Elements are changed one into each other and that the Earth remains altogether without mutation as may appeare by his comparing of the firmnesse of figures consisting of streight-lines with every Element To the Earth he compares the figure called a Cube because of all other figures that is least moveable The figure Icosaedron which is hardliest moved of all the rest and consisting of twenty bases he likeneth unto water The Pyramide whose motion is easiest of all the rest he resembleth to fire And Octaedron the figure consisting of eight bases hee compareth unto the Aire whose motion is easier then that of the water and more hard then fire By these figures he endevors to prove demonstratively that the three other Elements are changed one into another but that no change hapneth to the Earth For saith he three of these figures that is to say the Pyramide the Octaedron and the Icosaedron are made of Triangles whose sides are unequall whereas the Cubicall figure is made of Triangles whose sides are equall now things which are made of Triangles whose sides are unequall being dissolved and meeting together again may be changed into another but the Cubicall-figure being dissolved cannot be changed into any other because it is made of equall-sided Triangles whereof none of the other three can be made In like manner none of the other figures can be changed into a Cube And for these reasons it is necessary that the Bodies formed of these species and the species whereof they are formed should in respect of one another be such as they were And yet the Earth remaineth not altogether impassible but is divided by bodies having thinner parts then it selfe being after a manner altered from Element to Element and yet not changed into those things which doe divide it For when it is recollected againe unto it selfe it recovereth the state which it formerly had as appeares by it in the water For if you cast a little earth into the water and stir it often up and down that earth dissolves into water but if you leave stirring of the same the water settles and the earth sinks to a residence The like is to
be thought of the whole earth and this is not a changing but a dissevering of such things as were mingled together Plato affirmes that the earth is also severed by the sharpnesse of the fire and being so dissolved is elevated and carryed away in the fire So likewise in the masse of the Aire when Aire dissolves it and in the water when it is dissolved in the water Moreover Plato mentioneth another division of the Elements affirming every one of them to have three Qualities The fire to have sharpnesse rarenesse and motion The Element which is directly in the extreame thereunto that is to say the earth to have dulnesse thicknesse and rest So in respect of these Qualities the earth and the fire be cleane contrary to each other whereas they were not so by those two qualities whereof we had formerly spoken He holdeth likewise that by qualities taken from the two extreames those Elements were made which are in the middle betweene these two For saith he two qualities to wit rarenesse and motion being taken from the fire and one that is to say dulnesse being assumed from the Earth Aire is thereof composed whose effecting Qualities are rarenesse motion and dulnesse In like manner two Qualities are taken from the earth namely dulnesse and thicknesse and one from the fire to wit motion whereof proceeds water which getteth also his forme by thicknesse dulnesse and motion Therefore the same that sharpnesse is in respect of dulnesse the same is fire in respect of aire such as rarenesse is in respect of thicknesse such is aire in respect of water That which motion is in respect of rest that water is in respect of earth Look what fire is in respect of aire the like is aire in respect of water And as aire is in respect of water so is water in respect of earth For it is the nature of things having a plaine thin ground to bee held together by one medium that is to say by a proportion betweene them whereas firme and sollid Bodies are not kept fast together but by two mediums There are yet other qualities ascribed unto the Elements Namely to the earth and water WEIGHTINESSE whereby they doe naturally incline downeward and to aire and fire LIGHTNESSE whereby they are naturally given to mount upward The Stoicks have moreover another way of dividing the Elements for some they affirme to be active and some passive By active they meane the more stirring Elements such as are the fire and the aire By passive they understand the duller Elements that is to say the earth and water But Aristotle besides these Elements bringeth in a Fifth BODIE which he tearmes Aethereall and this bee fancies to bee a BODIE having in it a circular motion because it pleaseth him not to say that the heavens are composed of the foure Elements And he calls the Fifth a Body moved circularly because it is as he imagines caried circularly round about the earth Plato is of another opinion and affirmes directly that the heavens are made of fire and of earth His words are these Every bodily shape which is made must be visible and subject unto touching but nothing can bee visible without some fire in it not subject unto touching without some firmenesse nor can any thing be firm without earth And therupon in the beginning God caused the body of the whole world to bee composed of earth and fire Now it is not possible that two things alone should bee made to unite and agree well together without a third which must be as it were a band betweene them to bring them both together and of all bands that is the chief which can most perfectly bring into an unity both it selfe and such things as are united by the same And this the nature of proportion doth best performe By the band here mentioned hee intends the two middle-Elements taken according to the proportion whereof we spake before SECT 3. I. The opinion of the Hebrewes and of Apollinarius touching the making of the heavens and of the earth II. Arguments out of Hippocrates against Thales Anaximenes and Heraclitus who say that there is but one onely Element III. The body being an instrument for the soul is made fit for the operations thereof THe Hebrewes in their opinions concerning the making of the heavens and the earth differ so much from all others that but few have conceived thereof as they doe For they affirme that they were created of no fore existing matter according to Moses who said In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth But Apollinarius thinks that God made the heaven and the earth of the depth of waters For Moses in his description of the worlds creation doth not so make mention of the depth of waters as if it had beene created but in Iob these words are to bee found He made the depth of waters Therefore hee affirmed that all other things were made out of that as out of a matter common to all Hee doth not say that this depth of waters was never made but that it was laid downe by the Creator as a foundation before any other bodily-thing was made that other things might bee made thereof For the very name of depth declares the infinitenesse of the matter And indeed whether it bee this or that way taken it is not much materiall For even by this opinion also God is confessed the sole Creator of all things and that hee made every thing of nothing Now there bee some who say that there is but one onely Element either Fire or Aire or Water For Thales affirmes that fire only Anaximenes that aire onely and Heraclitus with Hipparchus Metapontinus that water onely is an Element against whom it shall be sufficient to alleage what Hippocrates hath said in that behalfe If saith he MAN were composed but of one onely thing hee could never feele any griefe For hee being but One thing nothing could procure paine unto him or if hee should feele any griefe there could be but one thing which might heale him For that which feeleth griefe must needs bee in a mutation with some sense And if there bee but one Element there can then bee nothing whereinto the living-creature should be changed And if it were not altered but continued setled in the same state it could not possibly feele paine though it were never so sensible He saith further It is necessary that the thing which any body suffereth should proceed from some other thing but if there bee but one onely Element there can be no quality beside the quality of one Element whereby the living-creature may be afflicted And if neither can bee changed nor suffer any thing how can it bee grieved After hee had thus declared the impossibility thereof he supposeth neverthelesse the same to be granted and thereupon thus inferreth Grant saith hee it could suffer griefe and then it will follow that there is but one thing onely which can cure the same but experience
thereof HEre is one division of the powers of the soul together with which there are some parts of the body likewise divided whereunto is added another division and after another maner For the reasonable-part of the soule is divided into reason which is unexpressed in us and that which is uttered by our speech The reason unexpressed or setled in us is a motion of the soule engendred in that part of the minde wherein consisteth our discourse of reason without any utterance by voice Thereby oftentimes although wee say nothing wee throughly resolve and set downe with our selves the whole reason of a thing and otherwhile discourse in our dreames And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-creatures yea much rather in this respect then for that which is uttered by our speech For albeit some are deafe and dumbe from their births or lose their voices by sicknesse and diseases yet reasonable-creatures they are neverthelesse The utterance of reason is by the voice in the variety of tongues and the instruments used in the voice are many namely the muscles which are in the middle of the sides the breast it selfe the lungs the winde-pipe the throat and in all these those parts especially which are grisly the returning sinews the cover of the wind-pipe yea and all the muscles which move these parts are instruments of our speech The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth for therein the speech is moulded and fashioned and the tongue and the wesil-pipe which are there in stead of that wherewith wee smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument the roofe of the mouth also which is as the belly of the Lute that receives and gives back the sound The teeth and the various openings of the mouth doe stand in stead of strings yea and the nose also doth somewhat further the plainenesse and the pleasingness of speech as appeares in those that sing CAP. 15. I. Another division of the soule being threefold II. An eightfold division thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle VNto those aforegoing there is added yet another division of the soule into the powers the kindes and parts thereof namely into a vegitative power which is the same wherby plants and such like doe grow and this is called also a nourishing or passive power secondly into a sensible power and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason Zeno the Stoick assignes unto the soule eight parts the reasonable part is the first and principall the five senses make up sixe the faculty of speech the seaventh and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another But Panetine the philosopher contradicting this opinion affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature not of the soule wherein hee hath said very truly Aristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule into to five parts namely that which is vegitative sensitive movable in place that which belongs to appetite and that which is intellective He calls that vegitative which nourisheth encreaseth breedeth maketh and formeth bodies for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence This is Aristotles opinion in his Physicks but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule that is to say into parts rationall and irrationall Of the reasonable-part I have already treated now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasonable CAP. 16. I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which containes the appetite of concupiscence also of anger and of their severall instruments II. Of the divers acceptations of this word affection and the definition of an affection and of an operation or act III. The difference betweene an operation and an affection or passion c. SOme hold opinion that irrationality or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self as though there were a soule void of reason which were not a part of the rationall soule and for these causes they thinke so First for that it is found alone by it selfe in unreasonable living creatures For thereby it seemes unto them to be perfect of it selfe and no part of the reasonable soule Secondly they so imagine because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason However Aristotle affirmes it to be both a part and a faculty of the reasonable soule dividing it in to two parts as I said before and calls those two by this one cōmon name the appetitive-faculty To which belongs also the motion of our appetite for appetite is the beginning of motion as appeares in every living creature having a desire to something for their desire causes them to move forward according to their appetite This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey or obey reason And that part which is obedient unto reason is divided into two parts concupiscence and anger The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense is the Liver But the instrument of anger is the heart which being a hard part receives a strong motion and is ordained for a hard service and for great resistances whereas the Liver being a tender entrail is made the instrument of tender concupiscence These things are said to be obedient unto reason because nature hath ordained them to obey reason and to bee moved as reason commandeth in all such men as live answerable to that which nature originally requires And these are certaine affections which constitute our Essence as it hath life in it For life cannot bee maintained without these But whereas this word affection hath divers acceptations wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath for either it pertaineth to the body as when it is sick or ulcerated in which cases we say it is so or so affected or else it belongs to the soul of which we now speake and wherunto concupiscence and anger doe pertaine But universally and generally in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts it is called an affection and followeth either in griefe or pleasure For griefe doth follow our affection but the very passion or affection it selfe is not griefe for if that were true then wheresoever passion were found there should be griefe also but things void of life may be patients and suffer yet feele no griefe Therefore it is not necessarily consequent that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing we should also bee grieved but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us Yea and that which falleth unto us must bee a thing
in death For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside This is manifest that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life and that he is partaker also of life as those living-creatures be which are unreasonable and that he is indowed likewise with understanding as are Creatures reasonable With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this that he hath a Body and in his mixture of the foure Elements He agrees with Plants not onely in that which is afore-mentioned but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power His coherence with unreasonable Creatures over and above all the former particulars is in having a certaine voluntary motion appetite anger and a power enabling him to feele and breathe for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures Furthermore he communicates with Intelligent incorporeall Natures in reasoning understanding judging and in pursuing vertue and a good life which is the chief end of all vertues These things considered MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature In respect of his Bodily powers and of his Bodily substance which is subject unto sense hee agrees both with living-creatures and with things void of life In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodilesse or spirituall as hath been said before For GOD the Creator of all things hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures that all created things should become ONE And indeed it will be a manifest proofe unto us that there is but One Creator of all things if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individuall things by their particular parts and all the severall species thorowout the world by an excellent sympathie For as in every living creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with such as have sense in them as bones fatt haire and other insensible parts to the flesh and sinewes which are sensible compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature Even so he hath joyned one to another every particular species which was created by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life neither are Plants wholy differing from sensible living creatures void of reason nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures indowed with reason as that they have no naturall allyance or similitude whereby they may be linked one to another For even in stones which are inanimate creatures not having in them for the most part so much as a vegitative life there is otherwise a certaine power making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other stones in that it both attracts Iron thereunto and also detaineth it being so attracted as if it would be nourished thereby Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone but by that one peece linketh fast another and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto yea Iron draweth Iron when it is touched by the Loadstone Moreover when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures he rushed not as we may say all at once into things whose nature is to remove from place to place and to such as are indowed with sense but he proceeded rather by degrees and by a naturall and most comely progression For the Shell-fishes called Pinnae and Vrticae are so made as if they were certain Plants having sense in them For he fastned them in the Sea with roots and covered them also with shells as with bark And as therein he made them to participate with Plants so he gave them likewise in some measure the feelingsense which is common to living-creatures They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge though it be rooted in the Rocks is of it self opened and contracted according as the passenger approcheth toward it or departeth frō it And therefore Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in English Life-plants if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature and partly a Plant. After the Fishes called Pinnae he proceeded unto those which being unable to passe far from their station doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space such as are the most part of those which have shells and are called the bowels of the earth He went further and added in the like maner something to every thing in particular as to some things more senses and to some other more ability to remove themselves from place to place and came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect Those I call more-perfect-creatures which have obtained all the senses and can also remove themselves to places far distant And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN a Creature indowed with Reason he did not perfect him in himself and as it were all at once but first ingraffed into some other living-creatures certain naturall wiles sleights and devises for the saving of themselves which make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures And having done all this he then brought forth MAN which is indeed the true Reasonable-Creature The same Order if it bee well considered will appeare in the Voice which from the noise of Horses Oxen is brought by little and little from one plaine simple sound unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales whose voices consisting of many notes can imitate what they are taught and so by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN which is distinct and perfect Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Minde and upon Reason ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde And in this wise by a sweet Musicall proportion hee collecting all things together incorporated all into ONE aswell things Intelligible as things visible and made MAN as a meanes thereunto SECT 2. I. Why MAN was first made and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectuall things and becomes either an Earthly or Spirituall MAN according as he is inclined to Good or Evill A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man and as he is meerly a living creature III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN THese things considered Moses in expressing the Creation of the World did very properly affirme that MAN was last made Not only
one of his parts and seeing every inferiour compound bodie is composed of the foure Elements it is necessary that such things should happen unto him as the Elements are subject unto That is to say Cutting mutation and flowing By mutation I mean mutation in Qualitie and I terme it Flowing when he is emptied or purged of such things as are in him For a living creature hath alway his evacuations both by such pores as are manifestly seene and by such also as we see not whereof I shall speake hereafter It is necessary therefore that so much should be taken in again as was evacuated seeing else the living creature would perish through defect of what should re-enter to supply the want And if the things evacuated be either dry or moist or spirits it is as necessary that the living creature should have a continuall supply of dry and moist nourishments and of spirits The meats and drinks which wee receive are made of those Elements whereof we also are composed for every thing is nourished with what is agreeable and like unto it and in diseases we are cured with what is contrary to the disease There he some of the Elements which we sometime receive into our Bodies immediately of thēselves and sometime use means unto the receiving of them as for example we somtime receive water of it self sometime wee use Wine and Oyle and all those that are called moist fruits as means to the receiving of water For wine is nothing else but a certain water comming from the Vine and so or so qualified In like manner we partake of Fire sometime immediately as when we are warmed by it sometime also by the means of such things as we eate and drink for all things containe in them some portion of Fire more or lesse We are in like case partakers of Aire either immediately when we breathe it and have it spread round about us or draw it in by our eating and drinking or else by meanes of such other things as we receive into us But as for the Earth we seldome or never receive it immediately but by certain meanes For we eate the corn which commeth of the earth Larks Doves and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth but Man usually feedeth on the earth by the means of feeds fruits berries and by the flesh which proceedeth from things nourished by the Earth And forasmuch as God respecting not onely a decencie but also the furnishing of us with a very quick sense of feeling in which man exceedeth all other living creatures he hath clothed us neither with a tough skin as Oxen and other beasts that have a thicke hide neither with large thicke set haire as goats hares and sheepe neither with scales as fishes and serpents neither with hard shells as Tortoises and Oysters neither with a more fleshie bark as Lobsters neither with feathers as birds and therefore wanting these coverings it is necessary wee should have Raiment to supply that in us which nature hath bestowed on other living creatures These are the causes why wee stand in need of nourishment and clothing And not onely for the same ends are our houses become necessary but also that wee may escape the violence of wilde beasts which is none of their least commodities Moreover by reason of the distemperature of qualities in the humane body Physitians and their art are likewise needfull that thereby as often as occasion requires those things which are rent asunder may be fastned againe together for the preservation of health And whereas the alteration consisteth in the quality it is necessary that wee bring the state of the body to a just temperature by the contrary Quality For it is not the Physitians purpose as some think to coole the Bodie which hath beene in a heat but to change it into a temperate estate seeing if they should coole it the disease turneth not to health but to the contrary sicknesse Now in regard of Arts and Sciences and by the necessarie use which we have of such things as they accomplish it so commeth to passe that we need the mutuall assistance one of another and by that need which wee have each of other many of us assembling together in common doe thereby the more conveniently bargaine and contract for such things as may serve to supply the necessities of life This meeting and dwelling together was anciently termed by the name of a Citie by the neere neighbourhood whereof men received aid and profit by each others arts labours without the discommodities of long and far Travaile For Man was naturally made to be such a living creature as should be sociable delighted in neighbourhood And forasmuch as men could not otherwise be so conveniently provided of useful things it is evident that the study of Arts and the necessity of traffick were the first occasions of erecting Cities SECT 4. I. Of the two Priviledges which MAN hath obtained above all other Creatures viz. to be capable of the Forgivenes of sinnes and Immortalitie the Justice and Mercy of GOD in vouchsafing the pardon of sinne of MAN and denying the same to Angels II Man only is a creature capable of learning Arts and Sciences A Definition of Man and Reasons justifying every branch of that Definition III. The World was not made for the Angels nor for any other but MAN onely To him was committed the government of the Vniverse with a limitation to use not abuse the Creatures THere are also two Priviledges which Man hath specially gotten above all other One is to obtaine pardon by Repentance the other is that his body being mortall should be brought to immortalitie This priviledge of the body he getteth by meanes of the soul and the priviledge of the soul by reason of the bodie Yea among Reasonable creatures Man only hath obtained this Peculiar that God vouchsafeth him the pardon of sin upon repentance For neither the Devils nor the Angels are vouchsafed pardon though they doe repent Hereby the most exact Iustice and admirable mercy of GOD is both fully proved and evidently declared For good cause is there why pardon should not bee granted to Angels though they doe repent because there is nothing in them which naturally allures or draws them to sin and in regard also that they of their own nature are free from all passions wants and pleasures of the body But MAN though hee be indowed with Reason yet hee is also a bodily living creature and therefore his wants in that hee is such a living creature together with his passions do often blinde and captivate his reason And therefore when he returnes againe by repentance and applies himselfe unto vertue he obtaineth mercy and forgivenesse For as it is proper to the Essence of MAN to have the ability of laughing because it agreeth to man only to all men and ever to man so in respect of those things which proceed from the grace of God it is proper unto Man above all Creatures
was are they who change our temperatures by their art of Physick Therefore the soule which is the essence of a living-creature cannot be the temperature Neither is the Soule a quality of the body For the qualities of every body are subject to sense But the soule is not subject to sense but to understanding onely and therefore it is not a Quality Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits accompanied with flesh and sinewes and such other things is strength And that the good temperature of hot and cold dry and moist things is health And that the measurable proportion of the members with a fresh colour is cause of the beauty which is in the Body Now if the soul be a certaine harmony of health and strength and beauty It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him can neither be sick nor weake nor deformed But wee see by often experience that even while the living-soule continueth in them many men are deprived not only of one but of all these good temperatures insomuch that the very same man is deformed and weak and sick all at once Therefore the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie Some will aske perhaps how it comes to passe if the soule be not the temperature of the body that men are vitious or vertuous according to their naturall constitutions and complexions and they may demand also whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature We answer that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature For as there bee some naturally healthfull or sickly by reason of their constitution So othersome naturally abounding in bitter choller are froward and some other cowardly or leacherous more or lesse according to their complexions But there bee some who overcome these naturall inclinations and by getting the victory over them doe evidently manifest that these temperatures may bee suppressed Now that which overcommeth is one thing and that which is overcome is another thing Therefore the temperature is also one thing and the soule which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature is another thing and not the same The body being an instrument which the soule useth if it bee well fitted for the same is a helper unto the soule and she the better useth it to her own contentment But if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule 's use it becommeth her hinderance and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument Yea so much that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument even as a musitian misseth of true musick when his harp is out of tune The soule therefore must be carefull of the body and make it a fit instrument for her selfe which may be done by ordering it according to Reason and by accustoming the same to good manners as in Harmony otherwhile slackning and sometime winding up according as necessity requires By the neglect whereof shee her selfe may else as it often happeneth become as faultie and as perverse as her Instrument SECT 4. I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes Hee shewes what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live before the SOVL commeth unto it as Aristole hath also affirmed III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe nor accidentally moved nor bred in the Body as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered ARistotle affirming that the Soule is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetuall motion is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them who say that the SOUL is a quality But first let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to say a perpetuall motion He divideth a substance into three parts The first is matter which is as it were the subject and this matter is in it selfe nothing but a generating power out of which another thing may bee formed The second part of the Essence is forme or speciall kinde by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme The third part consisteth both of matter and forme united together and endued with life The matter being a thing in possibility only and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes That is to say either as you consider of a science or of a contemplation according to the science as a habit or as working by that habit It is considerable as a science because in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde as wee may call it both of sleepe and of waking This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation and sleepe represents the having of this habit without any working thereby The Science is before working according to that science and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is the first continued motion The working according to this forme he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion As for example The eye consisteth of a materiall subject and of a certaine forme This materiall subject is in the eye it selfe even that which containeth the sight I meane the matter of the eye and this matter is equivocally called the eye But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned hath yet an aptnesse to receive such a motion Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body it perfects the living-creature So then in a perfect living-creature neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie neither the Body without the Soul For the SOUL is not the Body it selfe but it is the SOUL of the BODY and therefore it is in the Body yea and in such a kinde of body for it hath not an existence by it self Aristotle first calls the possible inferiour part of the soul by the Name of the soul severing the Reasonable-part from it wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together and not have given his judgement of the whole by a part much lesse by the weakest part there of Aristotle hath affirmed also that the body hath an aptnesse to live even before the soul commeth unto it For he saith that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live Now the body which hath in it self a possibility to live must first be actually a body before it receives that form For such a body is a matter void of all qualities Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it If it be a bodie and hath in it self no other being but in possibility only how can that which
void not urine And creatures which have thick shells are destitute of so many members that some of them have but few appearances of being living-creatures There bee also some living-creatures which although they have such things as are in our bodies yet seeme to want them As the Stag which seemes to have no choller because hee hath it not in one place but so dispersed abroad in his entrailes that it is no where apparant But MAN hath all the parts of a living-creature every part also perfect and all in so goodly order that it could not possibly have beene better composed Beside their want of some parts there is likewise among other living-creatures much difference in the scituation of the parts For some have their dugs in the breast some on their bellies and some under their thighes Some againe have two dugs some foure and some have more Nature hath so provided for the most part that the number of dugges is answerable to the number of young-ones which every creature brings forth at a time But let him that would bee more exactly informed of these things reade the hystory which Aristotle hath written of living-creatures For it pertaineth not unto the discourse which I now purpose to treate at large of such things but only to point at them or to speak briefly of them CAP. 5. SECT 1. I. Of the foure Elements of their simple and mixt Nature of their foure qualities Heat Cold Moisture and Drinesse of their contrarieties and of the meanes of uniting them into one body II. Of the Circular motion and changeablenesse of the Elements one into another and a reason why God made them of such a nature III. The opinion of Aristotle concerning the nature of the Ayre c. GOe we now on to the Elemēts which are consequently to be next handled in this Treatise An Element of the world is a most small part in the composition of bodies They are these foure Earth water ayre and fire and if you begin at the lowest and so passe to the highest body of them they are placed in such order as I have named them The bodies of these Elements are the first bodies and simple bodies in respect of other bodies And every Element is of the same kinde with those things whose Element it is For principles as matter forme and privation are not of the same kinde with the things which are made of them But an Element is necessarily of the same kinde Now it is manifest that these foure Earth water ayre and fire are the Elements and it is as evident that the foure first qualities that is to say Hot cold moist and dry bee in those Elements in the highest degree both potentially and actually also And yet there is not one of these Elements which we can discerne by our senses to bee altogether void of temperature and mixture with some other Element For indeed all those which wee are sensible of are in a sort somewhat counterfeit and participate each of other more or lesse even when in their mixture their severall natures continue most apparant Moreover every one of these Elements hath two coupled qualities which constitute the species or nature of it For EARTH is dry and cold WATER is cold and moist AIRE is hot and moist and FIRE is hot and dry Yet these qualities by themselves cannot be Elements For qualities are void of bodie and of things incorporeall things corporeall cannot be made Neither is it possible that other bodies should be actually Elements w ch have not actually each of these qualities in the highest degree For if those things which have these qualities more or lesse should bee Elements there would be an infinite number of Elements and we should never bee able to discerne the Elements of each particular thing because every thing hath some quality in it more or lesse It followes therefore necessarily that every Element is a BODIE and a simple-body and such a one as hath actually in it in the highest degree these qualities HEAT COLD MOISTURE and DRINESSE because of all qualities these onely and no other doe make a whole change in the whole substance Whitenesse comming neare unto a Body cannot make it white thorow and thorow as wee say neither can such a change bee wrought by any other thing whereas Heat or cold can warme or coole a body not onely superficially but quite throughout the same Those Elements are accounted contraries which are directly contrary to one another in both their qualities Thus WATER is contrary to FIRE For water is cold and moist and Fire is hot and dry In like maner EARTH is contrary to AIRE For Earth is cold and dry and Aire is hot and moist And forasmuch as things which are so repugnant could not bee fitly joyned one unto another without a middle-band ordained to knit them together The wise Creator hath placed water as a meane between the Earth and the Aire which are contraries induing it with her two qualities cold and moist that being the medium betweene those which extreamely differ they might be united thereby For by reason of the cold it agrees naturally with the earth and by meanes of moisture it is fitly joyned unto the aire Againe in the middle betweene the water and the fire which are also contraries in themselves hee hath placed the aire which by his moist-qualitie doth very well accord with water and with fire by the quality of heat Thus God hath linked every one of them each to other as in a chaine by placing betweene things contrary such other things as may both unite the said contraries to themselves and to such things also as are bound one to another by them Yea which is an excellent kind of band hee hath joyned together every one of the Elements by the one of his qualities to that which went before and by the other to that which followed after For example the water being cold and moist is joyned unto the earth which if you beginne at the lowest and ascend is next beneath it by his coldnesse and by his moisture to the aire which is next above it The aire likewise by the moistnes of it is joyned to the water which is next beneath it and by heat to the fire which is above it The fire also by the heat thereof is joyned to the aire which is beneath it and by drynesse to the earth to which being the lowest it declineth it selfe as it were in a circular motion The earth by coldnesse is united to the water and by drynesse to the fire which declineth towards it For that the Elements should not have onely an inclination to ascend and descend directly upward and downeward but incline also to a circular motion God bowed them as it were and made the two extreame Elements fire and earth to turne one toward the other For the fire if it lose heat is no longer fire but becommeth earth as is manifestly proved by thunder-bolts which being thrown
altered and the sense discernes this alteration Now many times the name of the sense and of the seats of the sense are confounded But sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe but of the workings of the sense And therefore some define it thus Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde unto the bodily instruments It is thus also defined Sense is a power of the soule which taketh hold of sensible things and the seat of the sense is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible Plato sayes thus Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things For the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule but the instrument pertaines to the body and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded othersome to rule and bear sway The part which hath in it understanding and knowledge was ordained to rule Those which appertaine to sense and to the motions by appetite as also our ability of speaking are made to serve and bee at command For our voice and our motion by appetite are obedient to reaon most speedily and almost in a momēt of time For wee Will and are moved together and at once so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion as we may see in the moving of our fingers Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason as those which wee call perturbations CAP. 7. SECT 1. I. Of the sense of sight and the opinions of Hipparchus of the Geometricians of Epicurus and Aristotle concerning the same II. The opinions of Plato and of Galen touching the same sense and of the cause of seeing III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification for sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight and some time the power of the sense it selfe Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes take hold as it were of outward things with the farthest ends of them even as if a man should lay his hand on them and presents or yeelds those things whereof they have so taken hold to our sight But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures which are called Cones broad at the first and growing to a narrow top made by the meeting of the eye-beames in one point And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye being darted forth to the left-side and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together at one view and then more exactly perceives them when the beames are met closely one with another And this is the cause that oftentimes when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence For untill it so fall out that the beames meet in that very place where the money lyeth wee still overlooke the same but then wee presently attaine the sight of it as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us are brought to our eyes Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible unto the sight by an alteration of the aire which is round about Plato sayes that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together that is to say partly by the light of the eyes which flowing out some part of the way into the aire which is of like nature with it selfe partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye affecting the aire which comes betweene them and easily spreading every way or turning to any side Galen agreeing with Plato speaketh of the sight here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts much to this purpose If saith hee any part or power or quality of bodies that are visible should come unto the eye wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen For if a very great mountaine were the object it were quite contrary to reason to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes yea and the spirit belonging to the sight being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object It remaines therefore that the aire wherewith we are encompassed is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire which encloseth us round For the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire distributes his power into the whole aire And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight hath his essence of the nature of the spirits This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us makes an alteration even at the very first injection and shootes forth very farre yet so that it containes it self undispersed untill it happen upon a reflecting body For the aire is such an instrument unto the eye to discerne visible objects as the sinew is unto the braine and look in what case the braine is in respect of his sinew in like case is the eye in respect of the aire after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun Now that it is the nature of the aire to become like unto those things which enter into it appeares manifest by this that whensoever any bright thing be it red or blew or of the colour of silver shall bee conveyed through the aire when it is light the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same But Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses affirms that neither the making of the Figure Conos neither any shape nor any other thing is cause of our seeing but only this that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible doth perceive and know that all those things which are seene be contained in her selfe because it is she only which holds them together to their preservation For as he saith whatsoever is in the world is nothing else but the soul holding together divers bodies And it were not untruly said that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe by
painting For it is the painters cunning to deceive the eye with counterfeit shadowings either of an Embost or hollow worke as the nature of the things requires To the discerning whereof the sense of touching is especially usefull and sometime of the tast and smell also as appeared in the example of the apple made of wax Yea and otherwhile at no great distance the sight it selfe maketh some things appeare unto us to bee that which they are not For if a towne which is foure-square bee but a pretty distance from us it will seeme unto the sight to be round The sight erres likewise when wee looke through a thick aire or through smoake or some such things as otherwise trouble the sight by the thicknesse thereof In like maner when we see things in the water being stirred for in the Sea an Oare seemeth broken when it is whole So is it also when wee looke in or through some transparant bodie as looking-glasses or other glasses and the like things or when the visible object is moved swiftly For a swift-motion so distempers the sight that those things are thereby made appeare to be round which are nothing so and those to bee fixed which are moved The same happeneth when the minde is busied about other matters as when a man purposing to meet his friend passeth by without heeding him whom hee went to meet though hee met him in the way by reason he had his minde busied with other thoughts But indeed this is not properly an error of the sight but of the minde For the sight beheld his friend and gave warning but the minde heeded not that which was brought unto it Finally the sight needeth foure things for the cleare discerning of all visible objects namely A whole and sound seat for that sense a proportionable measure of motion a fit distance and the aire to bee pure and cleare CAP. 8. I. Of the sense of touching why the seat of it is in all parts of the body and why every living-creature enjoyes that sense whereas many are defective in other of the senses II. Of the proper objects of this sense and of such as it hath in common with other senses III. In which of the senses Man excelleth and in what senses other creatures excell him IT was by the Creator of the world so ordered that hee made the seats of all the other senses two-fold and confined them to a certaine circuit of place in some parts of the body For example hee hath made two eyes two eares two passages for the sense scituate in the nostrill yea and hee hath planted in every living-creature as it were two tongues In some they are evidently parted as in serpents and in some other they are joyned and united as in men And for this cause hee made onely two former-pans of the braine that the sinewes which serve for the senses being sent downe from either of these braine-pans might make the seats of the senses to be twofold Now hee made them twofold in respect of that exceeding tender love which hee bare unto us that when the one of them tooke harme the other which remained might preserve the sense And yet though most of the seats of the other senses perish the living-creature may be alive but as soone as the sense of touching is extinct the living-creature doth instantly perish For onely the sense of touching among all the rest of the senses is common to all livingcreatures and every living-creature is indued therewith whereas all of them have not every one of the other senses but some have these and some have others except those which wee call the more perfect creatures and they indeed have all the senses Now seeing the living-creature loseth life by the losse of this sense the Creator hath allotted unto the sense of touching not one part of the body onely but almost the whole body of the living-creature For except the bones and the hornes and the nailes and the binding-sinewes and the haires and certaine other such like things each part of the body is partaker of the sense of touching Thereupon it hath so hapned that the seat of every sense hath two senses in it one of such things as are properly the object of every particular sense and another in respect of the sense of touching For the sight discerneth colours and yet is partaker both of hot and cold things participating of heat and cold as it is a body and discerning of colours as it is the sense of sight The like may be thought also of the tast of the smelling and of the hearing It may hereupon bee questioned how the touching can bee spred over the whole body seeing that the senses proceed from the former braine-pans for indeed the sinewes come downe from the braine and being dispersed into every part of the body doe there occasion the sense of touching And some were of opinion because the haire stands up as it were with a sudden horror when the foot is casually pricked with a thorne that the griefe or at least the feeling of the griefe ascended up unto the brain and was there felt Which being true it might then be concluded that there could bee no griefe in any part of the body that were wounded but in the brain only It were better therefore to make this answer that the sinewes which bee dispersed as aforesaid are the braine it selfe For they are a certaine portion of the braine containing in them the vitall spirits and diffusing them throughout the whole body of the living-creature in such manner as fire is contained in burning-iron And wheresoever such a sensible-sinew is planted it makes the part wherein it is ingraffed to be partaker of sense and to be so qualified that it may feele things Neither were it improperly spoken to say that not the passion but rather a certaine partaking of the griefe and a denunciation of the same is conveyed up to the braine where all the sinewes have their beginning Now the proper objects of the sense of touching are hot cold soft hard slimy stiffe heavy and light For by touching only we attaine the knowledge of these things whereas these next following are common both to the touching and the sight to wit sharp dull rough plaine dry moist thick thin high low yea and place it selfe So likewise is magnitude when it can bee comprised within one attempt of the touching fogginesse clearenesse roundnesse if it be but in small things as also the shape of other figures yea and it fooleth likewis the motion of bodies comming neare unto it being assisted by memory and understanding Moreover it is sensible of number as farre as two or three but no farther and those things must also be of no larger magnitude then may easily bee comprehended by the touch And these are better discerned by sight then touching as are also such things as bee equall or unequall they being of the same kinde with smooth and rough things for
pleasure be divided into corpereall and mentall-pleasures For some belong onely to the minde as to be delighted in knowledge or in the contemplation of things Others are called corporeall-pleasures because they proceed from the conjunction of soul and body and they are the pleasures which wee have in eating drinking carnall-copulation and the like There is no pleasure proper to the body alone For they that seem to be such are passions rather then pleasures as certaine cuttings and flawings qualities pertinent to the temperature of the body For all pleasure hath sense joyned with it and as we have shewed before all sense belongeth to the soule There be divers kindes of pleasure Some are good some naught some false some true some pertaine to the minde only some depend upon knowledge some belong to the body and are judged by the sense Among pleasures tryed by sense some be naturall and some not so To that pleasure which is in drinking the griefe which commeth by thirst is opposed but to the pleasure which ariseth from contemplation there is nothing opposite And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations Among those which we call bodily or corporeall pleasures some are both necessary and naturall and without them it is impossible to live such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent and in necessary clothing Some are naturall but not necessary pleasures as naturall and legitimate copulation For though this bee necessary for the preservation of the whole kinde yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man but that he may live in his virginity without it but some pleasures are neither necessary nor naturall as drunkennesse lasciviousnesse and feeding in excesse For these neither assist in propagating the succession of our kinde as lawfull copulation neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life but are on the contrary harmefull unto us Hee therefore that would live according to the law of God must pursue those pleasures onely which are both necessary and naturall But he that will content himself in the second order of vertues may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures and therewith such also as are naturall but not necessary observing a conveniency in measure manner time and place the rest hee must by all meanes eschew Those pleasures are generally to be accounted good which are neither intangled with griefe nor occasion repentance nor procure other harme nor depart from the mean nor draw us from good workes nor bring us into bondage But those are properly pleasures w ch are in some sort exercised in the consideration of God and of knowledge and vertue And these are to bee placed amōg those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pursued above all the rest which are profitable unto us not because they are pertinent unto our being or for the continuation of our kinde but for that they constitute our well-being and make us to bee honest to bee lovers and beloved of God and to have the utmost perfection of man which perfection consisteth in the soule and Vnderstanding These pleasures are neither the remedies to avoid diseases as eating drinking and those other which doe supply our wants neither have they any griefe at all preceding them following them or contrary unto them but are pure immixt and free from every material composition because they pertaine onely to the soule For according to plato's opinion of pleasures there bee some of them false and some true Those are false unto the procuring whereof sense and a false opinion is needfull and such also as have grief annexed unto them True pleasure is that which pertaines to the soule onely even the soule by it selfe together with science understanding and prudence and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of griefe or subsequent repentance at any time Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplation and good actions not passions but sweetnesses and others call them Ioy as by a proper name They define pleasure to be a generation into a nature subject unto sense But this definition seemeth to agree onely to corporeall pleasure Seeing by that pleasure the wants of our body are supplyed and cured together with such griefes as we sustained by those wants For when we be cold or thirsty wee are delighted in the warmth and in the drinke whereby that griefe is cured which proceeded from cold and thirst Therefore these pleasures are not good naturally or of themselves but accidentally for as to be in health is good naturally and by it selfe whereas to be healed is but an accidentall good so these pleasures are onely accidentally good because they are but remedies for the curing of other things But the pleasure taken in contemplation is good naturally and of it selfe because it is not used in respect of any want Hereby it is plain that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants and if this be true that cannot bee a good definition which defines pleasure to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense for it comprehendeth not all pleasure but leaveth out the best even the pleasure that is in contemplation SECT 2. I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus and another definition equivolent thereunto II. A definition of pleasure according to Aristotle III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures of their operations of such as are proper to man as hee is man and of such as are common to him with other living-creatures EPicurus the Philosopher defines pleasure to be The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man and in so defining it he sayes the same thing with him who affirms it to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense For hee sayes that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleasure But seeing no generation consists of the same proprieties with those things which proceed thereof we must not thinke that the generation of pleasure is pleasure but some other thing beside pleasure For the generation it selfe is conversant about ingendring but of all things which are begotten there is nothing which is at once in begetting and perfectly begotten seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act are distinct things perfected by degrees But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once therefore pleasure cannot be a generation Furthermore every generation is a making of things which are not formerly in being but pleasure cōcerneth such things as have their being already therefore pleasure cannot be a generation Again generation may bee said to be speedy or slow but so is not pleasure said to be Moreover of good things some be the habit some the operation and some the instruments The habit as vertues the operation as the action agreeable to vertue Again the habit is as the faculty of seeing the operation as the seeing it selfe and the instruments whereby wee worke as the eye riches and such like Now all
it all the dregs of the blood and is nourished thereby The bladder called the gall which receives the choller drawes unto it selfe the sharpnesse which remained in the juyce of our food The reines doe as it were straine out that thin humour which is like whey and the sharpnesse also which temaineth in that humour After all which the blood becomming pure and good is distributed for a nourishment unto all other parts of the body by such veines as are dispersed abroad into every mēber By this meanes every part of the body drawing blood unto it retaineth and converteth so much thereof as is proportionable into it own substance the rest it sendeth to the next part and so to the next that it may yeeld nourishment unto them Thus all the body is in every part nourished and hath growth and continuance by the blood which is distributed from the liver And this part is termed irrationall and said not to bee obedient unto reason because that which it performeth is not executed according to our choice or as we our selves will but naturally and according to it owne nature CAP. 24. I. Of the pulses and of their offices II. Of the excellent and usefull disposition of the sinowes the veines and arteries and of the severall fountaines of these III. Of the mutuall benefit and assistance also which these three are to each other THe motion of the Pulses is called a vitall power For having beginning from the heart and especially from the left portion thereof which is called the place of the spirits it distributes unto every part of the body an ingraffed and a vitall-heat by meanes of the arteries even as the liver distributes food by the veines If therefore the heart be inflamed above the due measure which nature doth require the intire living-creature is forthwith brought into an unnaturall heat and is in like maner cooled if the heart be cooled beyond a just proportion because the vitall-spirit is dispersed from the heart by the arteries into every part of the body For it is ordered in such maner that for the most part these three the veine the artery and the sinew bee so divided that they goe all together proceeding from the three principall parts which governe the intire living-creature From the braine which is the fountaine both of motion and of sense proceeds the sinew From the liver which yeeldeth a beginning to the blood and the nourishing-faculty comes the veine which is the vessell wherein the blood is caried And from the heart which is the root of our vitall-faculty comes the artery which is that vessell wherein the spirits are conveyed These three accompany one another and receive profit and assistance each from other For the veine administers a certaine nourishment of blood to the sinew and to the artery The artery imparts naturall heat and vitall-spirits to the veine and therefore it is not possible to finde either an artery altogether voide of a thin kinde of blood or a veine without spirits of a vapoury nature The artery is forcibly opened and contracted againe with a certain harmony and proportion having the beginning of that motion from the heart And when it is opened it sucks and draws a thin kinde of blood from the veines that are neare unto it which blood being resolved into exhalations becommeth a nourishment to the vitall-spirits when it is closed againe it empties the sowltry heat which is in it by certaine invisible pores throughout the body even as the heart sends from it selfe the sowltry heat which oppresseth it by evaporations both at the nostrills and the mouth CAP. 25. I. Of the propagating or generating faculty and how farre the same is in mans power II. The instruments of propagation and their offices III. The opinions of Aristotle Democritus and Galen concerning the seed of the Woman EVen the faculty of generatiō pertaineth also to that part of the soule which is not obedient unto reason For we yeeld seed in our dreame or sleepe whether we will or no and our desire of copulation is so naturall that the desire is moved in us even against our wills But the act it selfe is indeed and without question in our owne power and pertaineth to the minde for it is brought to passe by those instruments which are serviceable to the naturall-appetite and to abstain from our appetite or to master the same was by God naturally placed in our power and may be so continued if timely endeavour hath not beene omitted The instruments of a potentiall generation are first the veines and arteries For in these the first humor that is not fully perfected into seed is ingendred and the blood there changed even as milke in the dugs And forasmuch as they were first made of seed this humour is a nourishment unto those vessels and the veines and arteries doe concoct the blood into a moisture like unto seed that they might be nourished thereby And when they have due nourishment that serveth for generation which remaineth For it is first caried up into the head by a large circuit and from thence brought downe againe by two veines and two arteries Therefore if a man cut the veines which are about or neare the eares it makes the living-creature unfit for generation Of these veines and arteries is compacted that folded skin which riseth like a swollen veine in the Cod and where this moisture comming neare unto the nature of seed falleth into either of the Testicles There is one veine and one artery full of seed In these it is perfected and is driven forth by the folded seminall veine which is behinde the Testicles by a winde That winde proves that an artery sends it forth and that it is caried by a veine may appeare by those who are overmuch addicted unto Venerie For they that use carnall-copulation overmuch therby wasting their seed and that seminall humour which commeth near unto the nature of seed if they further provoke themselves pure blood is then strained from them Women have the same parts which men have this only is the difference men have them outwardly and they inwardly But Aristotle and Democritus were of opinion that the seed of the woman is no way usefull in the generation of children For they conceive that which proceeds from the woman to bee a sweating of the place rather then any seed of generation But Galen condemning Aristotles opinion affirmes that women have their seed also and that the mingling of both seeds together is the cause of conception and thereupon saith hee their accompanying together in that act is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a copulation Yet he judgeth not the seed of the woman to be so perfect as the mans but to be moister and somewhat lesse concocted and as it were a nourishment unto the seed of the man Of that seed those parts are composed which are about the utmost places of the wombe and which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 skin wrapped about
with any violent motions And the flesh was made to be a covering to the other parts that it might coole the living-creature in the summer by being as it were a morning dew thereunto and that it might in the winter bee as it were a quilt of wooll to the parts of the body The skin was ordained as a covering both for the tender flesh and all those parts that are inward The flesh is of a nature hardened like a scar by reason of the aire which compasseth it about and by meanes of those other bodies wherewithall it is conversant The bones are an undersetting to the whole body and especially the chine of the back which is termed the foundation of a living creature The nailes are most commonly used to scratch withall by every living-creature which hath nails and they are also for sundry particular uses to divers living-creatures For they are given to many for a defence as to those which have crooked talons and they be as it were an instrument to execute anger Many have them both for a weapon of defence and also for a strengthening to their feet as horses and all such as divide not the hoofe But nailes are bestowed on men not onely to scratch themselves withall and that they might by so doing disperse the sharp moisture which is under the skin but that they might also take the firmer hold of small things For by help of them a very small thing may be taken up because their meeting one against another at the very ends of the fingers enables to the taking of firme hold The haires grow out accidentally with other things by the meeting together of such fumy vapours as ascend out of the body and yet the Creator made not their accidentall generation without some profitable use for they serve both to cover and beautifie living-creatures They are a covering for goats and sheep they are an ornament unto men and they are both a covering and an ornament to Lions CAP. 29. I. Of things done voluntarily and against our will II. Of the definition of an action and of the circumstances which accompany and follow an action III. Of the marks both of a voluntary and involuntary action I Have often made mention of things done voluntarily and by constraint of which somwhat must be now expressed lest errors may be occasioned through want of an exact knowledge of these But hee that undertaketh to discourse of things done voluntarily and against our will must in the first place set downe some assured rules and certaine tokens wherby it may be well discerned whether the thing done be unquestionably voluntary or against our will Seeing therefore that every voluntarie thing consisteth in some action seeing moreover that all those things which are said to be done against our will consist in action also as shall bee anon declared and seeing likewise some think that the thing which is done against our will consisteth both in action passion we wil before we proceed further define what an action is An action is the actuall doing of any thing with the use of reason After all actions there followeth either praise or dispraise Some actions are exercised with pleasure and some with griefe Some are to bee chosen by the doer and some are to be avoided Of thē which are to bee chosen some are at all times to be made choice of some at one time rather then at another The same circumstances are considerable in such actions as are to bee eschewed also and this moreover is observable that some actions are pittied some pardoned some hated and some punished Now then let these be the markes to discern the things which are willingly done namely that praise or dispraise alwaies follow them that they are done with pleasure and that the actions are to bee chosen by the doers of them either at all times or at those times in which they are done The notes of involuntary actions are these They are vouchsafed pardon or they are pittied or they are done with griefe and they are not done by our owne choice These things being thus defined and ordered wee will first speake of such things as are done against our will CAP. 30. I. The definition of an involuntary act II. The solution of certaine questions concerning mixt actions and an advise what is to bee done when we know not what action to choose III. Things done by inconstancy by intemperancy or anger are not to be reputed things done against our will SUch things as are done against our wil are either done by constraint or of ignorance The beginning of those actions which are done against our will by force is without our selves that is some other thing and not we our selves is the cause thereof and therefore this is the definition of that thing which is done against our will by force It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it and he which is forced thereunto doth nothing to further the same of his owne will Wee meane in this place by the beginning the cause-effecting the thing done Hereupon it may bee questioned when Shipmen cast their lading into the sea when they are endangered by a tēpest or when a man is contented to suffer or doe some dishonest thing to save his friend or his country whether these actions may be said to bee done against their will or no. And according to this clause added to the definition Hee that is forced doth nothing to further the matter of his owne will these actions do seeme to be voluntary because to the executing of such things the actors doe of themselves move their instrumentall parts even of their owne accord Such is their case who cast their lading into the Sea and theirs who offer themselves to abide any shame or danger to bring to passe a greater good as did Zeno who bitt off his owne tongue and spit it out into the face of Dionysius the tyrant because he would not utter unto him what was to bee kept secret or as did Anaxarchus the Philosopher who chose to be tormented unto death by being rowled up together like a wheele rather then hee would disclose the secret of his friend unto Nicareon the Tyrant Therefore generally when a man either chooseth a lesse evill through feare of some greater evil or when a man accepts the lesse Good in hope of a greater Good which he cannot otherwise attaine according as hee would that thing which in such cases he doth or suffereth is not utterly against his will for he doth or suffers by his owne advise and choice and such things are to bee made choice of at that time though they be not to bee chosen of their owne nature These are mixt actions partly voluntary and partly against our will For they are voluntary in respect of the circumstances but they are involuntary in regard of the actions themselves and were it not for the circūstances no man would make choice of doing
is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted For he had demonstrated that when we doe learne we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us And therefore taking this unto him as a thing granted hee thereupon confirmes his Argument in this maner If saith hee the learning of things be nothing else but the recalling of them to minde then our soule had a being before it was in the forme of MAN Now if it were a Harmony it was not before the body but came after it when the body was harmoniously joyned together Such of necessity must the composition bee as the things are whereof the composition is made For composition is a certaine common joyning together of those things which are compounded having a harmony in the same and it cannot bee otherwise in reason but that the Harmony must follow and not precede those things whereof it is compounded These matters considered this saying That the SOUL is an Harmony is contrary to this other saying That the learning of things is the recordation of things But the opinion concerning recordation as is aforesaid is true even in their judgement who affirme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony according to their owne Principle Againe the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body and is in stead of a Ruler exercising a government over the same But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body neither is any way repugnant thereunto therefore the SOUL is not an Harmony Moreover one Harmony may bee more or lesse Harmony then another according as it is slackned or stretched forth wee meane not to bee understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission in the very nature thereof but wee meane Harmony as it consisteth in joyning together of the notes For if a shrill and a base-sound being matched together shall afterward bee made more slack there will bee a diversitie in the Harmony by reason of joyning together of the notes more or lesse reached forth though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then another therefore the SOUL cannot be a Harmony Futhermore the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another is a substance and a subject But Harmony is a Quality and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing and the predicament of Quality is another therefore the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things It is indeed no absurdity to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it howsoever it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony Because though the SOUL hath vertues in the same it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue SECT 3. I. It is here declared that the SOUL is not as Galen implicitly affirmeth a Temperature in generall II. It is here proved also that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality III. And it is likewise demonstrated that the SOUL is rather governesse of the temperatures of the Body both ordering them and subduing the Vices which arise from the bodily-tempers GAlen hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL yea hee himselfe affirmeth plainly in his writings of demonstration that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same But it may bee collected by some of his expressions that he could be best pleased to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature For he saith that the diversitie of manners followes the temperature of the Body and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippocrates Wherein if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh then doubtlesse hee beleeveth also that the SOUL is mortall not the whole SOUL but that onely which is irrationall for hee maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul as his words declare Now that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL it may be made evident by these reasons First every body aswell that which hath life in it as that which is void of life is made of the temperature of the foure Elements for the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body there can be no body with out life For if the Soul be the temperature then every body hath life in it because every body hath his temperatures And if every Body hath life in it then there is no body void of life So consequently neither stone nor timber nor iron nor any other thing can be without life But he did not meane perhaps to affirme in generall that every temperature of the body was the SOUL but rather that some such or such a temperature Wee then demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature and standeth instead of the SOUL For let him name what temperature soever hee can devise we will finde him out the like in things without life There are as hee himselfe hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS nine temperatures eight distempered and one in good temper by which as he likewise affirmeth every man is tempered whose temperature keepeth a meane But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed every one according to the severall kinde thereof with a certaine intension and remission to the more and to the lesse Yea and all the nine temperatures are found also more or lesse in things void of life as he himselfe hath taught in his booke of simple-medicaments Moreover if the SOUL be a temperature then is the SOUL subject to alteration for the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages Seasons and Dyets And if the SOUL be altered then wee have not at all times the same SOUL but a Soule varied according to our temperatures sometime the soule of a Lion sometime of a Sheepe and sometime of other creatures which were absurdly affirmed Againe our temperature doth not oppose it selfe against any lusts of our bodies but rather helps to provoke them or effect them for it is that which stirreth up the desires But the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires therefore our temperature is not the SOUL Furthermore the temperature is a quality and a qualitie may be in the subject or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject Now if our temperature bee our soule it will then follow by the reason afore-mentioned that the soule may be separated from the body which is the subject thereof without the destruction of the same But this is universally knowne to be false therefore the SOUL can be neither temperature nor qualitie None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature into the contrary thereof and yet preserve the living-creature then in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse and yet still continue the fire But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary that such as Galen