Law-principles in point of suit may be reduced as is known to all skilful Lawyers Posit 2. Intail is a corrupt title of Claim For it hath no ground either in Nature or in Reason but only in the circuit of a prodigal humour for perpetuating a Name which is but grasse and the glory thereof as the flower that fadeth Thus the perpetuating of the Line in the person of the eldest son by vouchsafing the whole substance on him is no lesse unjust then prodigal Posit 3. Jure divino upon the accompt of Divine Right all Pleas ought to be composed according to Conscience and Reason without all respect to any Platform of humane Law So it was in the Primitive Institution of the Jewish Common-wealth 1 Special care was had to establish such Judges in it as were men of Conscience and Religion Exod. 18.22 25. Deut. 1.13 15. Who were to judge the People as did Moses making them know the Statutes of GOD and his Laws in judging Pleas between one and another Ex. 18.16 2 Because as they were to judge no other Judgment but what was GOD's Deut. 1.17 so they were to judge only for the Lord 2 Chron. 19.6 Posit 4. The Rigour of the Law is great injustice although the Process be secundum allegata probata For Nimium jus nimia injuria I might instance a hundred cases in which the peremptoriness of the Law is either too intense or too remisse Posit 5. Though the Law were never so just in it self it can never be justly executed a Platform being observed men not being left to their own freedom in judging Because a Platform can never be pleaded without Interpreters Who I pray shall interpret Not the Judges for they cannot both judge and plead Hoc opus hic labor est Not the ignorant Pursuers and Defenders for ignoti nulla cupido far less intellectio Therefore it only remaineth that skilful Lawyers be employed And then be sure of heavie burdens which they themselves will not touch with one of their fingers And thus a Platform's abrogation is the Law 's reformation Otherwise it is but verberatio aëris Posit 6. To day the only best way of easing the People of their burdens in point of Suit is To remit all Pleas to the Arbitration of Neighbours The truth of this doth appear thus All determination of Pleas of necessity is either upon a judicial or as I may so say arbitral accompt If upon a judicial accompt then either according to the dictates of Conscience and pure Reason or the principles of a Platform The former cannot be to day Oh! how selfish are the best of men at this time Though there be both godly and able men to day yet cannot all places of trust be filled with such as answer the Scripture qualifications of Rulers Not til the time Our Officers be peace and Exactors righteousness the Judges being restored as at the first and Counsellours as at the beginning And as the former is impossible so the other is hurtful for as Judges qualified as said is are rare and many of them to fil al places of trust cannot be found so a Platform being established swarms of Lawyers the main face-grinders do abound It therefore remaineth that Pleas be determined by way of Arbitration among friends And then be sure not one of a hundred otherwaies of little expence great moderation and great dispatch Because of the untowardness of People I must needs adde some Cautions Caut. 1. The Pursuer refusing without all reason friendly to compound by way of Arbitration it will do well if by an Act be forfeited toties quoties so much of his suit as may daunt him viz. either one half or a third part thereof as may be judged convenient Caut. 2. The Defender upon no good grounds refusing to compound by way of friendly Arbitration it will do well if an Act bind him toties quoties to forfeit an half or a third part more and above what is sued of him Caut. 3. It will do well if some of the godliest and ablest men be appointed and authorized to that end to attend a ◠Pleas which either cannot or stubborn persons refuse to be composed by way of Arbitration all due execution passing upon their Determination whether as to the deciding of the Plea or fining of the stubborn and refractory person All which as I conceive do stand with Reason for as the end of War is Peace so the end of Law is Arbitration Were all men beaten with the Law abroad be sure they would friendly agree at home And many are forced to do so when they have spent their time wits and estates upon it So old Clients can though wantons be ignorant thereof I shall not multiply words on this subject at present but willingly rest satisfied with what is spoken already though I might enlarge my self theron to which I shall be most ready whensoever called thereto being nothing but the abridgment of my thoughts in the matter and hoping the poor man's counsel may deliver the City supposing these words to be spoken in season the exigent of time calling for the like I have no more to adde at present but that I am Your Honours obedient and humble servant PET. ENGLISH To the READER THough my broken speech can adde nothing to the worth of this Treatise yet I judge it my duty to utter some few words concerning it I know Truth in all ages hath had many enemies some men asking what it is and some contradicting and apposing And surely that truth which crosseth most the vanity glory and pride of this world is most opposed by the men of this world in whom the Prince of the power of the a◠worketh Yea and any truth which in former ages hath not appeared unto the sons of light but hath been under a cloud the Sun of Righteousness in whose sight Saints see light being pleased not to make the cloud flee away is seen and scarce clearly seen but by few who are of the day and not of the night Hence is it that many who are light even oppose such a truth No wonder then though the truth spoken of here be so much opposed seing it not only crosseth the vanity of a vain-glorious age but also hath been so long over-clouded Howsoever it is very necessary to be known Doubtest thou whether it be lawful for thee to submit to the present Government the Power of the King being in thy apprehension absolute without the bounds of Law or the Kingly Government being the choicest and best and so not be altered far better then a Commonwealth or it being unlawful to resist the King and decline his Authority Thou shalt find these things fully and largely cleared from arguments of all sorts To the Law and to the Testimony of the Spirit of Truth that compleat rule they are brought In the balance of Reason they are weighed But if that shall not suffice thee who eyest much the examples
a stranger over thee who is not thy Brother Ibid. 3 He must not tyrannize over the People by Leavying Forces and by strength of hand drawing them into Egyptian slavery He shall not multiply horses to himself nor cause the People to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you Ye shall henceforth return no more that way Ibid. These words properly and in their emphatick sense can import nothing else but a discharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People that bringing them into bondage and upon their ruines he may not strengthen himself and multiply his Forces So the King of Egypt did with the People of Israel whileas they were in Egypt under his tyrannous yoke 4 Not a Leacherous King given to women for drawing him on into temptation Neither shall he multiply wives to himself that his heart turn not away Ibid. 5 Nor Covetous given to enrich himself and to build-up his own estate upon the ruins of his People Nether shall he greatly multiply to himself Silver and Gold Ibid. 6 But he must be a King acquiring the Scriptures of GOD meditating on them his whole life-time thereby learning to fear the LORD to observe his Commandments and to practise them that he may be humble and lowly not turning aside either to the right-hand or to the left And it shall be when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom that he shall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book out of that which is before the Priests the Levits And it shall be with him and he shall reade therein all the dayes of his life that he may learn to fear the LORD his God to keep all the words of this Law and these Statutes to do them That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren and that he turn not aside from the Commandment to the right-hand or to the left Ibid. Herefrom we draw this Argument The power of him is not Arbitrary and beyond the bounds of Law whose power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law Ergo the Power of the King is not Arbitrary and beyond the bonnds of Law The Major cannot be denyed unlesse men will be so bold as to deny a Regulating and squaring of their Acts and Institutions according to the Word and Law of God Sure I am none will deny it but such as will contradict Scripture it self and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions The Minor is manifest from the Text above Cited Barclay the Royallist distinguisheth between the Office and power of the King and so the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus The Office of the King quoth he is set down Deut. 17. and the King's power is spoken of 1 Sam. 8 where saith he an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King and laid upon his shoulders But this distinction serveth not for his purpose For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God or not If it be then as the Office of the King is regulated in like manner his power also is kept within the compasse of Law For his Office spoken of Deut. 17. admitteth bounds and is kept within marches That which is spoken concerning the King Dent. 17. in terminis doth subject the King to Law and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government So then that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is spoken Deut. 17. or else it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random If it be not then it is not a Divine but a diabolick power Moreover what the King doth according to his power either he doth it by vertue of his Office or contrary to it If by vertue of his Office Ergo the Kingly power cannot be absolute unlesse his Office be also absolute for so the exercise of his power dependeth from his Office In such a case he can do nothing according to his power but what he hath Authority for from his Office But his Office Deut. 17 is not absolute but Regulated according to Law If contrary to it Ergo it is not the Kings Office to exercise an absolute power and consequently the Kings Authority is not absolute Furthermore either the King as King is absolute or not If he be absolute as King Ergo the Royall Office is absolute For the King is formally King by vertue of his Royall Office If not absolute as King then we gain the point For so it followeth that the Kingly Government in it-self is not absolute and illimited and if the Kingly Government in it-self be not of a vast and absolute extent we Demand in what notion the Authority of the King is Arbitrary and illimited Either ab intrinscco i.e. As it is essentially a Kingly Authority or ab extrinseco i.e. according to some cadent and accident of the Regall Office If the former ergo the Office of the King it-self is absolute which is not onely repugnant to that Deut. 17. but also to that which Barclay confesseth himself If the latter ergo the King as King and according to his Office is not absolute for quod convenit rei accidentaliter ei non convenit formaliter Then we demand if the King as King be not absolute whether or not he be absolute as he is a Judge or as he is a Man If as he is a Judge ergo all Judges no lesse then Kings are of an absolute and Arbitrary power which Royallists themselves do altogether deny yea they make the King essentially different from other Judges under this notion because the Kings power is absolute and their's is not And consequently seing according to the Doctrine of Royallists the King is essentially differenced from other Judges as he is absolute then nolint velint the King as King is absolute Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themselves If as he is a Man ergo all men let-be Kings are of an Arbitrary and boundlesie power but sure I am no Royallist will say so Next to Barclay in-steppeth Salmasius on the floor as one minding to cut the knot if he cannot loose it This Gentleman labourreth though in vain to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. The Israelites saith he did not seek from God one King onely but a change of the government by Judges and in stead of that they required a Regall Government But quoth he the Prophet to disswade them therefrom propounded to them these incommodities which ensue upon the Kingly government this the Prophet calleth jus Regum which I quoth he call the Arbitrary licence which is granted as a lawfull power to these who govern after a Kingly manner This jus Regum saith
Publick and legall way Extraordinary The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punishment why are they not also lyable to the greater according to their delinquency Magis minus non variant speciem Yea Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah 2 King 9. and withall he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab 2 King 10. O but you will say These practises of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary And then It is a very bad Argument The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit Ergo Ministers who have nothing but an ordinary spirit should not preach So it doth not follow The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto Ergo those who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto should not do so It may be you will say The People can have no ordinary call to act against their kings Be not mistaken 1 Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things whileas they are wanting So Samuel killed Agag because Saul the ordinary Judge was wanting in his duty 1 Sam. 15. 2 At least it followeth that the same thing which is done extraordinarily may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow 3 Datounâ— oppositorum datur alterum And consequently seing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings there is also an ordinary call for doing it The reason of this is because esse extraordinarioe vocationis is so called and is so in it-self because it standeth in opposition to esse ordinaria vocationis as we have shewed at length curs Philosophico-theolog disp 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings unlesse there be also an ordinary call for doing so 4 Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinfull and unlawfull or not If sinfull and unlawfull then neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be punished for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin But we have shewed already that Kings may be punished by vertue of an extraordinary call And consequently it is not a sin in it-self to punish delinquent Kings If lawfull and unsinfull I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawfull and honest may not lawfully be done by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in it self lawfull or not None I am sure will say that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawfull Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily is done sinfully Which to say is absurd And if you say that the exercise of them in it self is lawfull then it is lawfull in it self by vertue of an ordinary call to punish delinquent Kings But if there be any fault and escape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hindereth but the call in it self is lawfull and commendable for such things are meerly extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self And ab extrinseco ad intrinsecum non est sequela 5 Jehu and the Prophets had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings but what those may have in proceeding against them by vertue of an ordinary call They no otherwise proceeded against them by vertue of their extraordinary call but as it was for the good of the LORD's People and for executing Justice on their delinquency that others might learn not to offend But sure we are such grounds are competent to an ordinary call foâ— proceeding against delinquent Kings And 't is an undoubted maxim Idem est jus ubi eadem est ratio juris Iâ—st That example concerning Athaliah saith Salmasius deserveth not an answer for saith he she usurped the kingdom and killed the whole Royall Family And so there was lesse executed against her then she deserved And with all according to the Jewish Lawes it was not permitted to women to sway the Scepter and sit on the Throne for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee but a King over thee Def. Reg. cap. 4. Ans That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our purpose we argue thus Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King or not If the had the right and authority of a King ergo if the King be of an absolute power and not subject to Law then Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any other King for as Salmasius and all Royallists will have it the King is of an absolute power and not subject to Law And consequently Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority she was no more subject to Law then any other of the Kings of Judah Therefore if you say that Athaliah was invested with the right and authority of a King you must either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her or else you must charge your opinion and not imagine Kings to be absolute and not subject to Law If she had not the right and authority of a King then either because she usurped the Kingdom and intruded her-self upon it contrary to the consent of the People or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom and set up her-self in the Kingdom or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern Not the first because according to the Doctrine of Royallists conquest is a lawfull title to the Crown But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-self What more I pray you did she in intruding her-self upon the Kingdom of Judah then unjust Conquerers do in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue As she intruded her-self without the free consent and election of the People so do they And yet Salmasius with the rest of his Brethren will have such Conquerers lawful heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms which they subdue Nor can you say the second because conquerers who subdue other men's kingdoms cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right claim a title to the Crown And yet Royallists will have such lawfull heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms to which they have no title but the sword Nor can you say the third because all Royallists admit Royal birth a just and absolute title to the Crown But women no less then men may be and are of the Royall Off-spring And consequently if the doctrine of Royallists be true and unless Salmasius will contradict himself women may as lawfully govern as men Therefore it doth not follow that because Athaliah was a woman she had not right to govern the People of the Jews and reign over them I confesse
Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes so it is most probable that after such a manner these three foresaid kindes of Athenian Princes were differenced each-one from another and therefore it is alledged that a Commonwealth was not erected amongst the Athenians till annuall Princes were set over them Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kinde though not of the third to be reckoned up as Kings Yet they must give me leave to say that though the Athenian Common-wealth was not fully and compleatly established till the up-setting of annuall and yearly Princes notwithstanding in some degree or other there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them from the dayes of Theseus untill some of their annuall Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage for not onely as is said already their Princes of the third kinde but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second fort were subjected to Law and the people had a ruling power over them And so all of them had the like power according to the effentiall frame of a regulated and non-absolute power though the Kings had a more vaste authority and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes and those of the first kinde then the Princes of the second or at least of the third kinde Even-as Majors v. g. have greater power then Alder-men and Alder-men then Counsellours Howsoever we find that the Princes of the third kinde are also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the rest They are said to have had the power of the battell and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the sacrifices He who had this power is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King Thus we finde that he had that same power which the Lacedemonian Kings had But it is afterward shewed that such were proper though not absolute Kings Well I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called I lose nothing by this If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths then have we the Athenian and Lacedemonian Republicks as presidents of a popular government and Common-wealth Friend this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power then what according to the fundamentall government of the Kingdome and the institution of Theseus did belong to them So Cylon endeavoured but his attempt was choked in the bud Herod lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg Phutar de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted as is storied by the same authors together with Diogenes Laertius Valerius maximus and Diodore And that usurpation continued untill Thrasybilus and Rhinon's dayes These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians against those tyrants who did keep them under bondage Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras And so their government turned meerly popular and became an even-down Commonwealth Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not nor can we say otherwise but they had not onely as great but also greater power then any of the Athenian Kings whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him And that they were of equall power at-least is evident for they did reign not as Princes but as Kings Her de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus one of these usurping Kings in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Lawes differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity But he addeth that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity And in this he acknowledgeth that he sailed and had such a power not by the Law of the Kingdom but by a Law of his own making Whence it is evident that Pisistratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus or any of his race Yea and that they had greater power is also clear for Justine storieth That after Codrus while-as the Administration of the Republick vvas given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates the King's lust became the People's law Thus he telleth us that in the times of defection and vvhile-as corruption entered the State of Athens Kings became absolute and vvere of an arbitrary povver Post Codrum administratio Reipublicae annuis Magistratibus permissacst Sed Civitatinnullae Leges tune erant quia libido Regum pro legibus habebatur And aftervvard he speaketh how they vvere reformed by Solon and hovv Pisistratus and others vvho succeeded him did tyrannize over them Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians under Pisistratus reign albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs as under the yoke of bondage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported that Cleon and those who followed him destroyed the Commonwealth Great tyranny there indeed and arbitrariness of power Her de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly how that not onely Kings in after-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law but also as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings In Corinth the Kingly Government was also regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herac. de Pol. Corinth i.e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth taking to himself a guard and at last appointing to himself a Senate Now you must not think that this Senate had not power over Periander 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senat wherein the King hath a negative voice It is but at the most a cypher far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians Carthaginians c. 2. Because Periander in his Epistle to Solon advised at him what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him And Solon in his Epistle to him advised him to lay-down his lording power It is very easie to know what hath been the cause why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off for it is reported of him that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City This could not but irritate his subjects against him and make them conspire against his life See Herod lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Periand Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's He desired him to spare none whether friend or foe but cut all off Which he did indeed as Herodot reporteth But we must think that he advised with Solon after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel for Solon in his Epistle to him telleth him That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom was not to cut-off any but to lay-down his lording power over them This infinuateth that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel and had cut-off his subjects before either Solon wrote to him or he had
And why shall we think other wayes of it seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England by blood-right but by meer Conquest having the whole Kingdom of England against him And Polydore saith Hinc colligere licet vel Edovardum non servasse sidem Gulielmo quam à principio de hereditate regni non satis considerate dedisset vel nullum qnod verisimilius est fecisse promissum Angl. hist lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus whileas he prayed GOD that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conquerours hand or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived Therefore to me it is more then apparent that the Confessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary Def. Reg. cap. 8. What Doth not Polydore tell us that because Edgarus was of young and tender years he was not admitted by the people to reigne And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown they rejoyced greatly that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room Whereat as may be learned from Polydore Edward was not displeased himself but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him Whereupon we fear not to say that not onely the power of enkinging was in the people's hands but also that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him although the contrary be alledged And is it likely that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conquerour if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir No verily for they adored him as their Law-giver It is known that Rufus was but third son to the Conquerour and yet he was created King Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother What Would they have done so if blood-right by the Law of the Kingdom had been the title to the Crown No verily It is remarkable that Rufus was ordained King and it was not so much as objected that Robert was elder then he he being but the third son to the Conquerour and Robert being the eldest Yea Rufus dying without children they appointed Henry the Conquerours fourth son King as yet passing-by Robert the eldest And which is more though Henry 1. had left in his Testament his daughter Mathildis together with her sons as heirs of the Kingdom yet not withstanding the people created Steven Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained that Steven so long as he lived should enjoy the Kingdom of England and that Henry 2. son to Marthilais daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England passing by any that was begotten by Steven Likewayes the people created John King although K. Richard dying without heirs had lest Arthure son to Gaufredus who was elder then John heir to the Crown I might speak more for clearing this putpose but I forbear judging this sufficient Whence it is more then evident that the Crown of England since the dayes of Edward the Confessour by no Law of the Kingdom is hereditary I confesse since that time now and then the Kings eldest son did succeed and was holden as Heir of the Kingdom But this was onely by custome through favour of the Race in which according to the manner of Nations which I must needs call an abuse very ordinarily the first-born is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been at least precisely hereditary to me it seemeth very probable that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands And consequently in this respect the People are simply above the King as the cause is simply above its effect Philosophers say That can a est nâ—bi◠〈◊〉 effect 〈◊〉 And so seing the King of England dependeth from the People no question they have simply a power over him and not he an absolute power over them Secondly Because according to these Laws the liberty of the subject is vindicated and the Prince is subjected to Law Because in Henry 1. his time a Parliament was holden At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority for any thing of weight was referred to it So that whatsoever was done either by the command of the King or of the People it was holden null unlesse it had been ratified by the Parliament In it every one whether King or other Members thereof have alike and equal power of speaking And withall nothing spoken in it is of validity and force unlesse it be concluded on by the major part together with the approbation of the King Polyd. Ang. hist lib. 11. It is observable That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained That Steven so long as he lived should remain King of England and that Henry 2. afterward should succeed him By whose mediation and authority the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown was decided And I pray you how could these things have been unlesse the Parliament had been above the King Inst 4. But saith Salmasius the power of convocating and dissolving the Parliament belongeth to the King of England The power of the Parliament is extraordinary and pro-tune But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual And likewise the King of England in Parliament hath a negative voice And therefore in many Acts of Parliament he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament and what is ordained is enacted in his Name And so saith he though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom and concurrence of his Parliament yet notwithstanding he is an absolute King Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute who had power to do nothing without the consent of the Sanhedrin And Artaxerxes had not been absolute who could not be reconciled to Vasthi because the Law discharged it Yea if Kings were not absolute because they act according to the Law and the advice of their Parliament then Cambyses had not been absolute who conveened a Councel whileas he intended to marry his german sister and demanded of them if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage Def. Reg. cap. 8. 9. Answ Salmasius shall do well to consider these few things 1. What the power of the English Parliament is Which is defined by Camdenus to be made-up of three Estates having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws confirming Laws annulling Laws interpreting Laws and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned Brit. chorog de Tribun Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind who Def. Reg. cap. 9. opinionateth that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Parliament under these notions First
which he citeth out of hist de monast Steph. Cadom in Norm i. e. I have acquired the Royall Crown which none of my ancestours did bear which the grace of GOD alone and not hereditary right bestowed upon me I constitute no heir of the English Kingdom but I recommend it to the eternall Creator whose I am and in whose hands are all things for I did not enjoy such a honour by hereditary right but by dire conflicts and great effusion of mans blood I took it from the perjured King Harald and subjected it to my dominion having killed or put to flight his favourers Thus Salmasius may see that he buildeth hereditary right to the Kingdom of England upon a sandy foundation in pleading for the undoubtednes thereof from what right the Conquerour had over it Let it be so the Conquerour himself had right to it by the sword yet in his fore-going latter-wil he shaketh all his succestors loose of any right to it by succession and casteth the disposition thereof wholly over upon GOD and the people Whence was it that as is said already the people did create Rufus king in his room and passed-by Robert his eldest son 'T is remarkable that no where it can be read that the Conquerour did tie the Crown of England to his posterity Salmasius cap. 8. maketh a fashion of proving it out of Malmsburiensis Hundingtonionsis and other English histortans who say nothing but that the Conquerour subdued England and caused the people swear allegeance and sidelity to himself No other thing can be read in them And no-where can salmasius find it that ever he did tie the people of England by bath both to himself and his posterity Neither dar Salmasies conclude any thing from these Historians directly He concludeth that but by the way because of the Conquerour's full and absolute subjecting of England to himself as indeed these Historians do report Yet friend this is but a stollen dint You lose more then you gain by it As for Camden he cannot be of Salmasius judgement unlesse he contradict himself From him we have said already that the power of the Parliament is above the King Therefore whileas he faith that the King of England hath supremam potestatem merum imperium it cannot be understood of the kingdom taken in a collective body And it is true indeed taking the people sigillatim one by one the King of England is above them all and interiour to none but to GOD. And in this sense he speaketh well nec praeter Deum superiorem agnoscit In this sense the latter part of Cokius words is to purpose Because of this superiority the 24. Parl. Henr. 8. passeth a fair complement upon him saying that the kingdom of England doth acknowledge none superiour to it under GOD but his majesty and that it is governed by no Laws but what were made within it-self by the tolerance of him and his progenitors Per tolerantiam tuce gratiae tuorum progenitorum Misalmasi it had been more for thy purpose if they had said Per authoritatom tuae gratiae tuorum progenitorum This soundeth no ordinative and effective but permissive and approbative power in the King Well let this passe the former part of Coktus words doth not speak of the absoluteneste of the King but of the kingdom of England Juxa tgitur lages bajus regni antiquas saith he hoc Angliae regnum absolutum est imperium De jur Reg. eccles He saith not Angliae Rex absolutus est imperiator There is a difference indeed between the King's power and the kingdom's power So much of England We come now in the next room to demonstrate the King of Scotland according to the Law of the Nation to be a regulated and non-absolute Prince This is so clear that we need not to speak any thing of it And it is so abundantly proved by our godly 81 dear Country-man Lex Rex quaest 43. that no man in it can go beyond him Therefore we shall only glance at it by comparing in some few particulars the Lacedemonian kingdome with the Scotish in subjecting their Kings to Law 1. As the Lacedemonian King did every thing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 10 so the King of Scotland hath power to do no other wayes In the Parliament an 1560. the Nobility saith frequently to Q. Regent Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium nee unquam ad untus libiâ—inem sed ad legum praescriptum nobilitatis consensum regi solitum So it is declared Parl. at Sterl 1567. and 1578. concerning Q. Mary This was practised by Mogaldus who did all by the Parliament as the ancient custome was Whence the kings of Scotland had no power to do any thing without the advice and counsel of the Estates They had no power to establish or abrogate laws according to their pleasure This my dear Country-man proveth at length in the place above-cited In the interim take-alongst with you that decree made in Finnanâ—s Rex 10. his time viz That the king should enjoyn nothing of concernments but by the authority of Parliament and that they should not administer the Republick by private and domestick councell nor the businesses of the king and publick should be managed without advice of the fathers and that kings by themselves without the ordors of the fathers shires and governours should not make or break war peace or leagues 2. As the Lacedemonian king did bind himself by oath to govern according to the I awes of the kingdom Xenoph. de Repub. Laced N. Damasc de mor. gent. Laced so the king of Scots by Oath and Covenant is tied to do the like The plat-form of the king's coronation-oath is set-down K. James 6. Parl. 1. Whereby he is obliged to maintain the true Kirk of GOD and Religion now presently professed in purity and to rule the people according to the laws and constitutions received in the Realm causing justice and equity to be ministred without partiality This did both James 6. and Charles swear And that this is no new custome amongst the kings of Scotland you will find it more then abundantly proved by our learned Country-man in the place above-quoted 3. The Lacedemonian kings were subjected to the stroke of justice Which maketh Pausanias so to write of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. Concerning the Lacedemonian King judgment was so ordered Twenty eight in number who were called Senatours were appointed to judge And with them did sit the Ephorick magistracy together with the King of the other family So the king of Scots was censured by the Parliament made up of three Estates His neck was brought under their yoke as my learned Country-man maketh good in the place fore-quoted And so as the Lacedemonians did cut-off and turn-out many kings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. 5. cap. 10. so the Scots in old did the like as is made good already See Lex Rex loc cit
according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred because of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the species and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 1 2. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the city and all the publick matters whether at home or abroad thus the man speaketh of a governing power but arbitrary power is a misgoverning power he speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things but arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things it doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasibero there were not an all-commanding power according to Law This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent It is a fallacy ab homonymia for there is a twofold all-commanding power one according to and another above Law 'T is therefore a poor shift to conclude an arbitrary power from an all-commanding power The original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth bear an arbitrary power only by way of analogy and it is known that the Roman Dictator had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power though not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Well let it be so that Aristotle saith That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power a power above Law But I pray you what kings then doth he understand Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies or the after-Heroes and Founders of the secondary Colonies If of the first kind ergo you gain just nothing We have granted that already Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary If of the second kind we might also therein take you by the hand Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this ibid. Therfore howsoever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species I lose nothing If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power according to Law then do I gain my purpose And if you suppose his meaning to be otherwise you learn from what foregoeth that I lose nothing Thus the case is extraordinary And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary Yet you cannot deny but the first second third and fourth or the former part thereof Species of Monarchy do not speak a word of Royal power above Law Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning to put this sense upon them In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times which he expresseth in the latter part thereof But the one being opposed to the other if we speak rigorously and properly by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age which after the flood Ethnick Writers know no time before the flood lasted as some say 250 years and as others say with better warrant 131 years All which time if we speak properly and rigorously there was no kingly government at all for as is shewed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick In qua nullo ferente legem natura ipsa vivebatur Mnes Phoen. Damasc lib. 97. bist
tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty They seek nothing but their own ease and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion as the tyrant Cambyses did in seeking his german sister in marriage What Such hold will for Law They know nothing but Hoc volo sic jubeo sit pro ratione voluntas Juv. Satyr 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any They act will-way and not Law-way They were not judged because they did take power to themselves above all Law It cannot be denied but Salmasius concludeth well from 1 Son 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert that though this be true Rex judicat concerning the King of Israel according to God's institution the Law of the Nation and the practice of some of their Kings yet this is as true Rex non judicat concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings And it is very observable that Jannoeus whom they called Alexander all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews acted nothing according to Law but tyrannized over them fos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22 But in Gem. tract de Syned cap. 11. it is said that because of Jannoeus it was enacted that the king should neither judge nor be judged And if it be true that it was enacted then then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius of which the Rabbinick writers speak but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man who did not govern law-way but will-way And as Alexander so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius Jos Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments had exemption and immunity from Law This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law 1. Multrplication of wives Whereof David had very many 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2 Murder upon the back of adultery 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver 2. Horses and Charets 1 Kin. 10.2 Chron. 9.3 Wives And 4 he fell into adultery 1 Kin. 11. And yet we read no that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the 〈◊〉 And what I pray you could be the reason of this Not because the king de jure hathimmunity from Law Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes We read nothing of that And you shall not make me believe that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion if you alleadge that the Sanhedrin which de jure as both already and afterward doth appear had power over them durst not for fear of their resistance execute judgment on them That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers Which the Holy Ghost condemneth Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah And the people did so against Athaliah 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power that David and Solomon were spared Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them And why not also on David and Solomon They were all Kings alike And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death ten tribes declined the house of David because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke that therefore they did revolt from his son it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear of his power Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions because of his rare and singular qualifications Otherwise I can see nothing for it why the people did not make a mutiny against and revolt from Solomon as against and from Rehoboam 3. Because as both already and afterward doth appear the Sanhedrin both according to GOD's institution and the Law of the nation had authority and jurisdiction above the king But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it It had been all one to have wanted that authority with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served And this had been a having and a non-having power Which is ridiculous and repugnant Neither can you alleadge that they were spared because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt and knew not what it was to exerctse justice for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State that was under the reign of both these Kings Therefore seing David and Solomon were spared not because they were absolute nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute not knowing the way of exercising justice to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by because of their personall endowments The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me to voice for a David's off-cutting O! how much would my soul be grieved to sentence against a Solomon And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like I cannot think that I am singular in this In the interim observe that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them unlesse they could not have done otherwayes if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth But onely my meaning is that because of their eminent qualifications they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency Neither do I speak that they had this priviledge de jure but de facto Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists who object the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon as a ground of the King 's arbitrary power And in this none is more ready then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall
by the State for committing adultery with a privat woman and committing murder against a privat man And what if I should hold the negative of the Question as indeed I make it a great case and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time yet would Royallists gain just nothing The Question between them and us is this Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man though turned a positive tyrant and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth Friends shew me the like practice in David and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwithstanding and I shall yeeld to you Ye are so far from being able to do so that weighing David's murder in a square ballance you will find it lighter then is supposed for neither he nor his had formally but virtually a hand in the murder of Uriah This is far from a destroving of the People 'T is not like Nero's wish that all Rome had but one Neck that he might cut it off Now Royallists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air and change the state of the Question Conclus 4. The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power This we make good firstly from divine institution and God's moulding of the King Deut. 17. from which is already proved Subsect 1. Assert 2. That the power of the Jewiâ—h king is hedged-in by Law And Josephus on the place saith That he should do nothing without the consent and advice of the Priest and Sanhedrin Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'T is but vanity in Salmasius to clude Josephus speech saying That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind that seeth not this man's deceit Sure I am that which is spoken of the King Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity yea long before there was any King in Israel 'T is the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings And Josephus in the place above cited as it were commenting on Moses words giveth the meaning of them Nay but you shall further observe the fallacy of this Gentleman He studieth to put his own construction as most beseemeth his honour upon Josephus words And yet notwithstanding he refelleth Josephus and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction Yea which is more he sleeth cap. 9. to what Josephus saith as to a main ruth in respect of all the Kings of Israel both before and after the Captivity Then tell me what manner of man can he be who cap. 2. declineth from and cap. 9. enclineth to Josephus In the one place he plainly denieth That the Kings of the Jews whether before or after the Captivity were tied to do nothing without the consent of the high-Priest and Sanhedrin And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary But he loseth all his labour whether to deny what Josephus saith or to glosse it according to his own humour for as afterward is shewed Josephus was no friend to Monarchy And which is more what Josephus faith is the common judgment of Jewish Writers Rex obediat curioe senatus majoris i. e. The King let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhedrin Deut. 17. Senatus major intersiciendi gladio jus habeat i.e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword Exod. 21. Nemo sese opponat decretts sanctioris Senatus i.e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin Deut. 17. R. Mos Egypt proec aff 176. and 225. proec neg 316. It cannot be denied but the Jewish King was regulated seing not only he was oblidged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof He had not so much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much lesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The power of the sword was not in his hand but in the Sanhedrin's Thus his power was restricted as was the authority of the Lacedemonian king and the power of other Kings as is spoken-of already at length Yea Maimonides faith Qui ex familia Davidis sunc judicant judicantur And so in expounding that Rexneque judicat neque judicatur cod San. cap. 11. he saith That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel but not in respect of the Kings of Judah And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel is already explicated by us The Gematick Writers from these words Ob house of David execute judgment in the morning and deliver him that is spoiled out of the band of the oppressour Jerem. 21. move this Question Nisi in jus vocari póssent quomodo judicarent i. e. How could the house of David judge unlesse they were judged This they prove because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our wayes i.e. as they say Corrige te ipsum deinde alios corrige Salmasius rageth at this and he denieth what they infer I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences Let Salmasius impugn them as much as he will My purpose is only to shew That they are not of his opinion They are contented not only to say That the king of the Jews at-least of Judah as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus R. Lakises hath was subjected to Law but also they dispute for that and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments Secondly from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds and with every leader And David said uuto all the Congregation of Israel If it seem good unto you let us send abroad unto our brethren that they may gather themselves unto us 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this If it seem good unto you This insinuateth that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people so his acting depended from their determination For the King had taken counsel and his Priests and all the Congregation in Jerusalem to keep the Pass-over in the second moneth He doth it not of his own head without advice And the thing pleased the King and all the Congregation It is a thing done by common consent So they established a decree Mark it is not said So the King established a decree But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed The decree floweth from the joynt-authority of both Therefore it is added So the posts went with Letters from the King and the Princes 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King but also from the Princes And it is most remarkable that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes The King is not he that can do any thing against you Jerem. 38. Ergo if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes he had not an arbitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased Inst The
native liberty to him though in a larger measure he be capable of it But Democracy giveth people their full liberty which they had in the state of perfection in so much as they are capable of it It withholdeth nothing of it from them which in conveniency and without violation of the Law it can give unto them It cannot conveniently give them the whole liberty which they had in their primary condition Otherwise they should be without government And so they should become out-laws loose and dissolute Thus they should come under the dominion of sin Which is not liberty but slavery To prevent the incurable and extreame contagion of which Nature hath provided Government as a remedy And that government which advanceth Nature in the state of fallen man in as much as it is capable of to the liberty which it had in the state of innocency and before the fall no question must be the chiefest temedy against such contagion Thus Nature in the state of Corruption is advanced so neer as is possible to it's state it was in in the case of perfection But Democracy a mongst all Governments is that which advanceth Nature neerest to the liberty which it had in the state of perfection It giveth liberty not onely to one and some few but also to all It with-holdeth liberty from none in so far as it can consubsist with obedience to the Law to which Man was subjected in the very state of innocency It no otherwise with-holdeth liberty but as it preventeth Corruption's slavery Ergo of all Governments it is simply best No wonder for it advanceth Man neerest the condition he was in in the state of perfection SECT IV. Whether or not is it lawful to resist the Royal Person and decline the Royal Authority IT will be greater ease for us to remove this difficulty then those which formerly by the Lords abundant help we have fully discussed You learn our mind in this matter from that which followeth Assert 1. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly Power as the Kingly power There is very good reason for this for the King as King is ordained by God and Kingly Government in it self is God's Ordinance Therefore formally positively and directly we cannot resist the King nor the Kingly power unlesse we be found fighters against God This is at length made good by us sect 1. ass 1. Assert 2. It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power This we make good from several examples in Scripture 1. From the example of Saul's Army which in resisting him rescued Jonathan from his fury 1. Sam. 14. Royallists such as Mr. Symons and Ferne do opinionate this was done by no violence but by prayers and tears But this is salse There is not a word of prayers and tears in the text The people without and contrary to the King's consent enter in oath for rescuing Jonathan Yea which is more contrary to the King's oath they laid their heads together and did bind themselves by oath to rescue him The King's oath is God do so and more also for thou shalt surely die Jonathan The People's oath is contrary to that As the Lord liveth there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground They go not behind his back but they tell it him in his face the people said unto Saul Shall Jonathan die Thus they withstand him to his face The very highest degree of resistance 2. David resisted and withstood Saui's sury 1 Sam. 22.23 c. 1 Chr. 12. Nay but Arnisaus saith Davi's fact in resisting Saul and defending himself by arm against him was extraordinary He was anointed and designed by God as successour to Saul But the man is far mistaken for if it be lawful in an extraordinary case to resist Kings no question in it self it is lawful to resist them And so it being in it self a thing lawful it may be put in action both in an extraordinary and ordinary case See subsect 2. prop. 1. And though David was designed King by the Lord yet was he not formally called thereto by the People in the time of Saul's reign Will any deny but Saul so long as he lived was King over Israel and that David was his subject Otherwise David was very far out of it in calling him The Lords Anointed his Master Lord and King We say no more but refer you to Lex Rex quoest 32 Salmasius finding-out another starting-hole faith David with arms only defended himself against Saul's tyranny but not to cut him off as the English Rebels and bloody butchers did in cutting-off Charls 1. Def. Reg. cap. 4. This is all we say concerning David And there was very good reason for it why David did not cut him off though he was several times at his mercy Firstly because he could not do it legally Though he had power legally to resist him yet had he not power legally to cut him off The very Law of Nature teacheth self-defence though by the sinallest means But the off-cutting of the Delinquent only belongeth to the Magistrate and Judge unlesse it be in an extraordinary cafe Nature hath alwaies Law enough for self-defence but not so for punishing Delinquents The one is natural the other political Secondly no question David by extraordinary impulsion was carried-by the off-cutting of Saul Whileas Abishai went about to kill him David forbade him And told him he should be cut-off and perish another way 1 Sam. 26. Where you shall find David dehorting Abishai from laying hands on Saul from these two grounds Firstly from the non-legality of the fact He is the Lords Anointed Thus he holdeth Saul as his superiour And therefore he had not power to cut him off 'T is usurpation in the inseriour to rise against the superiour Secondly from the assurance of Saul's perishing another way As the Lord liveth the Lord shall smite him or his day shall come to die or he shall descend into battel and perish Would David say It is needlesse either for me or for thee Abishai to lay hands on Saul Assure thy self he shall be cut off another way But I belceve this man cannot say the Representative of the English Commonwealth had such reasons for them for keeping them back from cutting off Charles Stuart 3. Elishah commanded to shut the door upon Jehoram's teeth He calleth him the son of a murderer See ye how the son of a murderer hath sent to take-away mine head Look when the messenger cometh shut the doer and hold him fast at the door 2 Kin. 6. Thus he giveth orders to the Elders those who did fit in the Sanhedrin being with him in the house violently to keep it out against Jehoram and his messenger The word in the original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proporteth a most violent way of resisting it signifieth a holding fast at the door with pressing so the seventy Chaldee paraphrast Avenarius and
THE Survey of Policy OR A FREE VINDICATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND AGAINST Salmasius and other Royallists And ye have this day rejected your God and ye have said unto Him Nay but set a King over us 1 Sam. 10.19 I will call unto the Lord and he shall send thunder and rain that ye may perceive and see that your wickedness is great which ye have done in the sight of the Lord in asking you a King 1 Sam. 12.17 And all the People said unto Samuel we have added unto all our sins this evil to ask us a King Ibid. ver 19. But if ye shall still do wickedly ye shall be consumed both ye and your King Ibid. ver 29. The Lord of hosts hath purposed it to stain the pride of all glory and to bring into contempt all the honourable of the earth Isa 23.9 By PETER ENGLISH a friend to Freedom LEITH Printed in the Year 1653. Feb 2d TO THE Very Honourable and truly Godly the LORD-GENERAL CROMWELL Greeting My LORD WHile I was thinking to whom I might dedicat this Book in which is asserted the Authority and Non-usurpation of the Commonwealth of England I judged none more fit then him to whose patronage I might commit it who hath most promoted the Liberty lately obtained under the power and protection of the God of Israel And thus among many I made choice of your Lordship Albeit I look upon Kingly Government as that which is inconsubsistent with just Freedom and Liberty nevertheless under what Power and Authority I am be what it will I am willing to give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's And therefore I will humbly offer my judgment to your Lordship in this case which I hope will be useful to abate the seditiousness of spirit to which many as is at least pretended upon a conscientious accompt are bent It will not be amiss to distinguish between the case of Superiority and Inferiority Now the Word of God will have the inferiour subject to the superiour without any resistance not only for wrath but also for conscience-sake Rom. 12.1 The higher can never be without the lower the one necessarily pre-supposing the other And therefore that which is lower and inferiour ought to be subject to the higher and superiour Hence it is Jesus Christ his Apostles subjected themselves to the greatest of tyrants even to such whose title and right depended meetly from the sword So then put me under the Turk's command I shall not dispute his power Shew me where Christ or any of his Apostles dispute the authority of any power they lived under It is undeniable they spoke and preached against all manner of sin and vice bearing faithful witness against it And thus they witnessed against the sins of Princes aswel as of the People Howsoever there is a great difference between a Magistrate as a Magistrate and as a man As a Magistrate he cannot fail but either in tyranny or in injustice or else in bribery As a man he is subject to personal infirmities as others arâ— I must confess the Gospel witnesseth abundantly against all these failings But as I understand the Gospel doth not allow the inferiour to speak directly and by way of application against the Magistrate as he faileth in his office I do not read where Christ or his Apostles charged any Ruler with tyranny injustice or bribery in the discharge of his trust Sure I am there were many unjust Judge in their time I made that Christ called Herod a Fox and Paul called Nero a Lion But the Law could not conclude from hence that any thing was spoken against them as Magistrates Because as men they were 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 as Foxes and cruel as Lion And thus the Law could make no other but their speaking against personal taults in the Magistrate And I judge it not unlawful upon some serious accompts though not by all persons and at all occasions to speak against the personal sins of the Magistrate in a down-right way as did the Baptist to Herod If this will not satisfie then observe that Christ was not at that time subject to Herod but to Pilate And may not I speak against any tyrannous Magistrate to whose Law Government I am not subjected Yea against the great Turk though I might not being under his Authority Nâ—y but I choose rather to say as the scope of Christ's words insinuate in opposition to the disdainful bragging of the Pharisees that Christ opposeth his divine and kingly power to Herod's tyranny upon which accompt he defieth his despiaht as being impossible for him to act any thing to in s prejudice or alteration of his purpose And as for that of Paul it is not clear what he meaneth by the Lion Only this much he is pleased to be a little free with his dear friend Timothy And truly I may use so much freedom with my dear friend as with mine own heart But what is all this for the subject to call the Magistrate to his face A tyrannous and partial Judge granting he be so Shall I therefore both in private and publick speak what I will making an ordinary trade of it against his unfaithfulness in managing his office Scripture doth not allow me to think any thing against him in my Bed-chamber Eccles â—0 20 Is it fit to say to a King thou are wicked and to Princes ye are ungodly Job 34 18. Surely It is not good to 〈◊〉 Princes for equty Pro. 17.26 We must not revile the Judges nor curse to Ruler of the People Exod. 22.28 Acts 23.5 And we see how that Paul in all his arraignments maketh his constant plea that in his preaching the Gospel he spake nothing whether against the Magistrate or the Law of the Nation whereupon many times he escaped Yea John the Baptist doth not dispute the quarrel of the Romon Souldiers but waving State-matters exhorteth them to their duty as is pertinent to a Gospel-Preacher Notwithstanding I would have it seriously minded that I only speak of the duty of the inferiour toward the superiour so that whatsoever is really and properly inferiour ought without disputing the matter give due obedience to the superiour not resisting the higher power Now say I every individual subject seorsim or any inconsiderable number thereof is inferiour to the Magistrate And therefore ought not to resist his power I admire how any person or persons who are not in a capacity yea not so much as in a probability of withstanding the Mastistrat's power dare adventure to do so unless miraculously and extraordinarily assisted as were the Prophets of old even though not only to them but also revera his power is tyrannous and his commands unjust Will any rational man say I ought to resist an hundred high-way Robbers and not give them that which they seek though unjustly If I did so whatsoever evill befell me in resisting I should be accessory to it my self as none in reason can deny But if it
the consequence at least virtually is repugnant to the Antecedent for in so far as they seek a just and righteous King fit to govern them according to Law and reason in as far they abominat an absolute King one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them Thus you see that the people of Israel do neither positively nor negatively seek an unjust and tyrannous King to reign over them We hasten now to the Assumption And we observe that the man contradicteth himself in it for he saith not onely cap. 5. but also cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time subject to Law And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and II. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of his wine he recalleth to his memory what hath escaped him and laboureth to correct it And so he addeth that though Diodore storicth that the Kings of Egypt were subjected to Law yet do we never read saith he that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges And though Aristotle quoth he saith that all the Oriental Kings did govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet not withstanding they did rule with an absolute power though more remisly then did other Kings Def. reg c. 5. 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full subjection of Kings to Law yet nevertheless he is constrained by force of example to acknowledge that Kings were some way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law And he cannot deny but Diodore storieth of a most wonderful subjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law He telleth us that they were subjected to Law in their eating and drinking lying and rising yea in preserving their health they were restricted to Law And which saith he is more admirable they had not power to judge to gather Money together nor to punish anythrough pride or anger or any other unjust cause And yet saith Diodore they took not this in an evil part but thought themselves happy to be subjected to Law I trow this is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet He will have the King above Law not subject to any Law But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law and subject to it And though this immodest man doth say That the Egyptians notwithstanding did not cut-off any of their Kings yet catcheth he nothing thereby 1 Because the Egyptian Kings as Diodore telleth us were most observant of the Laws Therefore he saith Plurimi regum the greatest part of their ancient Kings lived blamelesly and died honourably Rer ant l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot strike against the innocent 'T is iniquity to kill a man who deserveth not death Diodore telleth us of three things which made the ancient Egyptian Kings to walk closely and keep themselves within bounds Firstly their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law Secondly they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Priests whose eyes were alwayes fixed on them Thirdly Kings that walked not straightly as nothing was proclaimed in their life-time to their praise but to their discredit so in their death they wanted the honor of solemn and sumptuous burials which were given to good Kings after their death The fear of this hedged-in their wayes and made them stand in awe 2 We deny not but Diadore in that same place insinuates there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings Yet we say not tyrannous as Salmasius would have it for we do not think that though many of their Kings were wicked in themselves they got liberty to tyrannize over the People The Egyptian Laws were more strict then that they would dispence such a liberty to any of their Kings Diodore saith they were tied to the Law no less then private men And withal he saith their Judges were most impartial and could not be bought-by either by favour or gain Which maketh us imagine that they hemmed-in the wayes of the most dissolute King amongst them and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People Therefore it is very observable that Amasis getting power in his hands did tyrannize over the Egyptians Whose tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate so long as Diodore saith as they wanted the opportunity of punishing him till Actisanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt And then saith the story the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels against Amasis and falling from him to Actisanes they unkinged him and set-up Actisanes in his room who governed them most gently and amicably Rer. ant l. 2. c. 1. 3 Let it be so many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them and they notwithstanding were not punished and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges What then That will never conclude their unwillingness and unreadiness to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings but that they wanted opportunity and power to do such a thing So it went as is said already with the People and inferiour Judges under Amasis tyrannous yoke But so soon as they got the opportunity they verified the old Maxim Quod differtur non aufertur Yea Diadore telleth us That the People did withstand the Priests and those who with-held honourable and solemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old Which affordeth us matter to aver That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings it was not because they were unready to do so but because the People were refractory thereto No question they would much more have withstood the off-cutting of their Kings then the want of solemnities at their death for what is it I pray you that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes but because they take them up in the notion of half-gods and far above the reach of ordinary men Whereupon they conclude that both their Persons and Authority are altogether inviolable They dote so much upon them that they think they should in no terms be resisted far less cut-off and punished according to their deserts This daily experience teacheth Therefore the People of Egypt would far more have withstood the inseriour Judges in cutting-off their Kings then in denying them sumptuous and stately burials for their offences 4 It is easie to belearned from Diadore that the Egyptians esteemed the want of honourable burials to their Kings more then any punishment could have been inflicted upon them Know this they were a most superstitious People tainted with a world of blind zeal And withall as Diadort stor eth the fear of the want of honourable and solemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumspectly and keep themselves within bounds Whereupon we conclude That both King and People thought no punishment more capitall and more hurtfull to the King then the want of an honourable buriall And so the inferiour Judges imagined that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings sumptuous and stately burials they executed more judgment upon
this is rather said then proved But afterward nolis velis we shall evidence That Samuel thought no such thing Thirdly If Kings had been subjected to the Sanhedrin and ought to have been arraigned before it either to have been accused or condemned then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes But the latter is false Ergo. This is Salmasius his great gun And for proof of the Major he faith The Judges of the people of Israel did judge led forth their Armies made Lawes executed judgement and did exercise all other such-like functions which are exercised by Kings Therefore unlesse the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Israel The Assumption he maketh it good thus It had been altogether in vain saith he to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings if they had been both one Thus the difference had onely been in name and not in reality Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Assumption more largely and most pertinently There saith he the Judges amongst the people of the Jews were subject to the Sanhedrin And so he saith the Judges amongst the Jews were called in the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophetim Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes Now the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes And Festus observeth that Sufetes in the Punick language signifieth and denotateth a Consul And out of Caelidus he citeth these words Senatus censuit referentibus Sufetis So the Roman Consuls referred to the Senat and the Senat judged of their refer Therefore seing the Judges of Israel were but like Consuls who were subject to the Senat as the case was amongst the Carthaginians and Romans they were not of a kingly power but subject to the Sanhedrin though they retained the government so long as they lived whereas the Roman Consuls and Carthaginian Sufetes were only but yearly Magistrates And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghost's contradistinguishing Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech who took upon him a kingly government from the government of the rest of the Judges Yea the Israelites Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that same power over them which his son Abimelech usurped This was a kingly government that they offered to him Which Gideon refused And yet neverthelesse he was a Judge And consequently if both Judges and Kings amongst the people of Israel had one and the same power not onely the people of Israel had offered to Gideon no new power but what he had before but also Gideon had refused to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy Ans We heartily subscribe to the Minor and do much cry-up Salmasius in the probation thereof I wish the man were as solid and pertinent in all the rest as in that Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major And I think I have good reason to do so for he only differenceth absolute Kings from Judges imagining that none properly can be a King essenitally distinct from a judge but he who is absolute and unlyable to the Law He far mistaketh the point It is one thing to be an absolute King not subject to the Sanhedrin and Senat and another thing to be a non-absolute King and subject to Law And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge The non-absolute King is essentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet the Judge because he is major singulis but minor universis in syuedrie But the Judge is but of equal authority with the rest of his collegues in the Senat though because of his eminencie and personall endowments he may praeside and be as a leading man amongst the rest Such was the case of the kings and Judges amongst the Jewes as after ward shall be shewed There are some accidentall differences also between the Judges amongst the people of the Jewes and their kings as namely 1. The Judges were in a most speciall immediat and extraordinary manner designed and appointed by GOD himself to govern his people Kings were not so if we look to them in an ordinary way and for the most part 2. The Judges of Israel had no hereditary power and government over them Such had their kings 3. The kings of Israel both in their ordination and afterward were attended with prodigall sumptuous and Royall Dignities which were denied to their Judges And whereas Salmasius essentially distinguisheth Melech a king from Sophet a Judge because the one is of an absolute power and the other is not he shal do well to advert that he lose not more this way then he gaineth for so he putteth the essentiall frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power But in our first argument against this we have shewed the incongruity and absurdity thereof Which afterward shall more appear from what is spoken as followeth Fourthly There can be no example alledged in the Book of God whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law We read not that ever the Sanhedrin or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminall faults as namely David and Solomon Def. Reg. cap. 5. Ans This argument is like the first Both of them speak much de facto but nothing de jure This is a very bad consequence The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them and did set-up such a King over them Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawfull and Kings de jure are not subject to Law Friend you break-off too soon Though I should grant you the Antecedent yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence you must prove the validity of their practice You count your reckoning too soon whileas you thus conclude There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement on any of their Kings who transgressed the Law and did violate it Ergo Kings are not subject to Law What if I should grant the Antecedent You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulnesse of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence Philosophs know though many Humanists do not that à facto adjus non statim valet consequentia Aye they can tell you that argumentum negativum nihil concludit Well as I deny your consequence so I do not admit your Antecedent I illustrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture both ordinary and extraordinary Ordinary Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah and kill her 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against your purpose yet I pray you what can you say of that practice in killing Amasiah We have shewed elsewhere that such a thing was done in a
renown Gen. 6. Hence mark these two things 1. That in the 500. year of Noah's age there were men of a gigantine strength mighty men given to hard and warlike exploits minding their own honour and renown 2. That such men lived at random not subject to law nor under the command of any Their extraordinary valour and desire of renown led them on to rule and not to be ruled Therefore they took them wives of all which they chose Gen. 6. Their awless and lawles living maketh the Lord say My Spirit shal not alwayes strive with man Ibid. But the faithful Historian Berosus giveth us great clearness in this matter He saith that before the Flood there was a City called Oenon about Libanus a receptacle of Giants who did reign over the whole world from the Occident to the Orient These saith he considing in the vast strength and stature of their body having found Arms and Engins of war oppressed all and governed according to their pleasure Antiq. lib. 1. After the Flood the first King we read of is Nimrod of whom it is said And Cush begat Nimrod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the beginning or the head of his Kingdom was Babel and Erech Gen. 10. This Nimrod the holy Ghost calleth a mighy one in the earth or the mighty hunter before the Lord Gen. 10. i.e. a man matchless none like him in the earth for strength and gallantry Because of this he erected a kingdom despising the commandment of Noah Beros an t lib. 4. and disdaining to be in subjection whether to God or man Joseph an t Jud. lib. 1. cap. 5. his aspiring thoughts drew him on to build a Tower that thereby he might get himself a name to secure himself both before God and man Gen. 11. Phil. Jud. bibl an t lib. And Josephus in even-down termes telleth us that he incited his followers to pride and to the contemning of God telling them that their happinesse did not depend from GOD but from their own proper strength Whereupon at last he tyrannized and governed at randome Ant. Iud. lib. 1. cap. 5. To Nimrod succeeded Belus to Belus Ninus and to Ninus Semiramis in the Kingdome of Assyria Every one of which acted more then another for enlarging their Empire They subdued all and ruled over all libidine dominandi Ber. ant lib. 5. Mnes lib. 97. hist Archil lib. de temp Fab. Pict de aur sec c. lib. 1. Metast lib. de judic temp annal Persic Herod lib. 1. 3. Diod. Sic. rer an t lib. 3. cap. 1 2 c. And as amongst the Assyrians we find these four grand and matchlesse Heroes who governed at random without any subjection to Law so we find amongst other Nations some also of that same stamp Amongst the Egyptians Osiris who succeeded to his Father Chemesenuus in the Kingdom of Egypt commanding the whole earth except these Nations and Kingdoms that were under the Authority of Zames King of Assyria In the eight year of whose reign Osiris returned into Egypt with triumph over all the Nations beside what were under the jurisdiction of the Assyrian Empire And as Osiris did reign as an universall Monarch so did his son Hercules who succeeded Osiris in the Kingdom under the reign of Baleus the eleventh King over the Assyrians Ber. ant lib. 5. We read also of Simandius and Sesostris two Egyptian Kings who subdued the whole world Herod lib 2. Diod. Sic. rer an t lib. 2. cap. 1. But it is very easie to prove from Berosus that Simandius is Osiris and Sesostris is Hercules Amongst the Libyans Dionysius was the great Heros Herodot and Diodore report that he subdued the world and conquered many Kingdoms by battell And Berosus saith that Dionysius gave to Osiris the Kingdom of Egypt Albeit Herodot and Diodore opinionate him to be a Grecian yet I rather incline to the judgment of Berosus who saith he was begotten of Rhea by Hammon and became Jupiter to the Libyans even as his mother was the pretended Goddess of the Egyptians Hesiodus Marcianus and other Grecian Writers hold him as a God and alledge him to have been begotten of Semele by Jupiter Howsoever for valour and strength he was a most extraordinary person and swayed many Kingdomes by his Scepter Amongst the Grecians we find namely two extraordinary Herees Hercules and Alexander M. What great things were done by Hercules and how he vanquished many Kings and subdued many Kingdomes is clear from many grave Writers Hesiod scut Here. Pindar od 1. 7 Sophot Trach. Diod. rer an t lib. 5. cap. 2. Of him Herodot Theocritus and others do write The extraordinary valour and courage of Alexander Justin Plutarch Q Curtius and other grave Writers do abundantly testifie I need not to stand here in a particular and exact way to prove that these Kings had an absolute immunity from Law without all restriction and reservation But to satisfie the curious ear alittle therein we shortly make it good thus 1. These Kings came not to their Crowns whether by election or succession At least all that they commanded fell not to them either of these wayes They held the right to their Crown by their sword And so over-ruling all by force and strength of hand they could be tied to no Law by any civill sanction but as they pleased voluntarily to subject their necks to the yoke of Law But as they delighted to over-rule men no question they have thought it their glory to be I kewâ—se above the Law it-self I confesse it is very gatherable both out of Berosus and Diodore that Osiris and Hercules the Egyptian did live according to the Lawes Yet I do not think that it was by command but according to their own free and voluntary resignation That held true in them which the Reman Emperours speak of themselves Licet legibus â—eluâ—i simus attamen legibus vivimus Instit lib. 2. tit 17. Indeed there is great difference between a Kingly power had by succession and election and a Kingly power obtained by conquest and sword-right In an elective and heriditary Crown people have at least a Physicall power to binde the King to them by Oath and Covenant But the case is far otherwise between a conquered people and the Conquerour They have no power to tie him to them by Law He may put them all to the edge of the sword if he will And it is in his own goodness whether to spare them or square himself according to their Laws Experience teacheth to-day what boundless power the Turk and the King of Spain have over those Kingdomes to which they have no title but sword-right Therefore it is no wonder though these grand and matchlesse Heroes had an arbitrary and boundlesse power over the Kingdomes which they conquered by strength of hand 2. The men themselves were esteemed and honoured as Gods And so by proportion a GOD-like power was given unto them Nimrod was called the Babylonian Saturn and Dionysius
death The eminency of the man and the way of his falling would put me to my second thoughts albeit I should endeavour nothing therein but justice Well call it injustice in the Sanhedrin to have spared David and Solomon yet would I not have you to wonder too much thereat There is great difference between a David and an Ahab a Solomon and a Jeroboam Such are not all dayes men And therefore I must needs say that as the Sanhedrin spared David and Solomon from thoughts of the singularity and eminency of the men far more would Noah's posterity in the golden age have spared Noah though in many things delinquent for as the man was most eminent and singular and could not have fallen but by an extraordinary desertion and for most good and noble ends so he had a priviledge from Nature above all in his time Yea in David and Solomon's time people were well seen in Laws and politick Constitutions The Sanhedrin needed not to have spared David and Solomon through ignorance and want of skill But it was far otherwise in the golden age in Noah's time Then men were but Apprentises and spelling the first side of the Catechisme of Policy Every thing was but in its beginnings in its first rudiments Let it be so that de facto and not de jure in the golden age Noah's posterity denied not to him an absolute and uncircumscribed power I seek no more but that And I may say that though at that time de facto Noah should have had immunity from the exercise of Law against him though much delinquent yet shall I not think that ever Noah claimed such a priviledge to himself as competent to him de jure and according to the Law As for Noah's authority and power after his posterity was divided into factions before we can determin upon it you shall mark with me immediatly after the golden age that there were three divided and dist not parties 1. The godly party 2. The heroick party 3. The politick party The godly party was of the posterity of Shem. These followed Noah and walked in his wayes The heroick and politick party were of the posterity of Ham and Japhet And as the heroick party followed Nimrod so the politick party followed Ham whom the Chaldeans call Chemesenuus No question Noah immediatly after the golden age had a vast and absolute power over the godly and those who walked in his wayes You may learn the reasons of this from what is above-written And as for the heroick and politick party it would seem probable that they contemned Noah and slighted his Authority for they walked contrary to his wayes Gen. 10.11 It is known how that Ham the head of the politick yea and of the magical party did mock Noah Gen. 9. Beros an t lib. 3. Yea Nimrod the head of the heroick party contrary to the mind and purpose of Noah caused Babel to be built Gen. 10.11 Ber. ant lib. 4. But notwithstanding this we may say that at the most it concludeth that such were disobedient to Noah and walked contrary to his will But it will not conclude that such denied to Noah immunity from the Law V. g. A prodigal and riotous son may work and act contrary to his father's will But it doth not follow ergo sach a child doth strike and punish his father Nay a debording child may act contrary to his father's wil and be so far from eclipsing his power over him that he may in patience endure his correction over him So we read that Ham did not repine against his father's reproving and cursing him Gen. 10. Yea Berosus storieth that Noah did shut him out from his presence and he did so accordingly ant lib. 3. And beside that he telleth us that Noah Nin. an 19. gave him liberty to stay beside him three years in Italy But finding how he did corrupt the Colonies there he commanded him to be gone and he did so And yet at this time he was the Saturn of Egypt a mighty King and of great power both in Egypt and in Italy Ant. lib. 5. I think there is very good reason for it to say that Noah in so far had an absolute power over them as that none of them in a direct and positive way would have acted against his commandment despising him as an enemy and as one on whom they would and did execute their fury The most we can call them is disobedient but not rebels to Noah They acted against his will but not in despight of his will They took not liberty from him to do his will though they took liberty to do their own will also We can not think that the light of Nature was so far extinguished in them that they did not honour him as their father A debording son as Esau can entertain Isaac with Venison though he walk not in his wayes And I do not think if they had not honoured him as their common father unlesse they had been extraordinarily restrained they had destroyed him and all his followers Sure I am they wanted not power to do so The godly party was but an handful in respect of them What then I pray you could be the ordinary mean of their restraint but their natural respect and affection toward him Nay they honoured him so much that they esteemed him their Coelum their Sol their Chaos the semen mundi yea and the father both of the greater and lesser gods Ber. ant lib. 3. And what we have spoken of Noah the like also may be said of Adam Before the Flood there was also a golden age 1556 years Wherein men lived as under one common father each of them knowing the intimate relations one to another until Monarchy was erected till the close of the 500 year of Noah's age as is shewed already Before which time Adam had died 626 years and Seth 514 years But so long as Adam lived what superiority Noah had over his posterity in the golden age after the Flood Adam had it rather in a more then leste measure then he Adam was not onely their common father but also he was their first and primary father As we have evinced the truth of this point from examples in Scripture so we may evidence it from examples in humane Histories V. G. The Mitylenians gave to Pittacus an absolute power of governing because of his personal endowments Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. de Pit Arist Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. The like power did the Athenians confer upon Solon upon the same accompt Diog. La. de Sol. Plut. in Sol. So it is alledged that James 6. because of his pretended personal endowments obtained an absolute power and a negative voice in Parliament In the interim observe That those who allow absolute Monarchy because of personal endowments do not imagine that Kings have an absolute power because they are Kings but as they are such Kings i. e. Kings not only in respect of station but also in
Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested is referred to it Secondly Whatsoever is done at the command whether of King or People is of none effect unless it be authorized by the Parliament Thirdly It establisheth and taketh away Laws as it judgeth fit Fourthly Every Member of it hath a-like power and freedom in voicing And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament he calleth it the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom Seing then the Parliament is the most sovereign and supream power in the Kingdom of England according as it was in old how can it be said That the King of England hath power over it If it be so then you admit two Supream powers and a power above a Supream power which is contradicent The Lacedemonian Ephori were no otherwise above their Kings but because they were invested with the highest and supream power All things were referred to the Parliament even as the Roman Consuls as Festus out of Coelidus saith did refer every thing to the Senate Now because of this the Senate had the highest power and was above the Consuls Ergo seing all matters of the Commonwealth in old in the Kingdom of England were referred to the Parliament no question it had power above the King The Roman Senate is therefore said to have been of the supreamest power Fenest de Magistrat Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings nor Consuls nor Dictators nor any other Magistrate could do any thing without their advice and counsel Ergo seing whatsoever the King of England or any other of that Kingdom did in old was to no purpose without the authority and approbation of Parliament without all controversie the King of England was subjected to the Parliament Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament because he alledgeth the Parliament can do nothing without the King Why may not I then conclude the Parliament to be above the King because re ipsa and according to the Law of the Kingdom the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament Where then I pray you is the King 's negative voice There is not a Member in Parliament cui oequa loquendi potesias non competit So saith Polyd. Angl. hist lib. 11. What Do you imagine that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement between Steven and Henry 2. unlesse they had had power above the King What they did therein was a direct acting both over Steven their present King and Henry 2. their future King But will you tell me whileas the States of England did seek of K. John to be governed by the ancient Lawes made by Edward the Confessour whether or not were these Lawes Acts of meet pleasure giving the King a liberty to do as he would either to tyrannize over the people or not You can not hold the affirmative because what they demanded of the King was to be restored to liberty to be freed of tyranny Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part then do the ancient Laws of England pull absolutenesse out of the king's hands and subject him to Law Magna charta saith The King can do nothing but by Lawes and no obedience is due to him but by Law And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at randome and not according to the ancient Lawes of the kingdom that contrarywise they combined against him entering in oath together to pursue him still on till he should govern according to Law and establish the ancient Lawes of the kingdom Yea albeit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms and though upon their deniall thereof they were declared enemies by the Pope they notwithstanding followed-on their purpose and cryed-out that they would be avenged by fire and sword on such a wicked tyrant who did so much slight the people Aye which is more they sent into France and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son and created him king notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary Thus they never rested till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave Where I pray you is the absolutenesse of the king of England whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but according to Law and in denying to do so pursued him in arms unkinging him enkinging another in his room and bringing himself in sorrow to the grave This is far from the arbitrary and infinite power of kings Salmasius speaketh of And whereas he saith the parliament is but extraordinary and pro tunc this is either because Kings were long before Parliaments or because the Parliament hath not power to intermeddle in every businesse of the Common-wealth but is conveened pro re nata for ordering the weightiest Affairs of the kingdom If you say the former we do not deny it We heartily confesse that of all Governments Monarchy was first established And Aristotle giveth the reason of it because saith he in the beginning it was hard to find-out many men fit and able to govern And therefore necessity moved them to lay the government on one for though in the beginning it was hard to finde-out many yet was it easie to finde-out one endowed with qualities and gifts for governing Polit. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. But though this be granted yet doth it not follow but Senats or Parliaments being established they have even according to the custome of the Nations more power then kings as is shewed already And therefore Aristotle saith in the places fore-cited that by processe of time the number of Common-wealth's-men increasing kings at last went close out of request and were denuded of all power And Pol. 3. cap. 10. he saith that in after-times the power of kings was extremely lessened partly because of their own voluntary demitting and partly because of the people's detracting from their greatnesse Nay any king Aristotle alloweth he alloweth no more power and greatnesse to him but to be greater and more powerful then every one separatim and many conjunctim but to be of lesse power and greatnesse then the peoople Pol. 3. cap. 11. But I pray you what is the Parliament but the Representative of the people If you say the other we deny it as is shewed already And it seemeth very strange to me that the Parliament hath not power in small matters and yet hath power to manage and go about matters of highest concernment If Salmasius will ask Philosophs they can tell him Qui potest majus potest minus He imagineth that he gaineth the point because the King of England had power to conveen and dissolve the Parliament as he judged fit This is but a singing of the triumph before the victory for the Roman Consuls had the same power over the Senat. Alex. ab Alex. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. But who will say that they had an absolute power over the Senat
to this purpose Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects who did steal Helena but also what he did therein either firstly or lastly was according to the advice and counsel of the Senatours Dict Cret de bel Tro. lib. 1. 5. Dar. Phr. ae excid Tro. lib. And though Dares Phrygius reporteth that Priamus determined and voiced otherwise then they who followed Antenor and Aeneas who appear to us to have been the major part of the Senat for we gather from both these Historians that not only the greatest part of the Senate but also the whole body of the People were for the concluding and drawing up peace with the Grecians I confesse Dares Phrygius in plain terms faith that Priamus voiced against peace and truce taking-up with the Grecians and what he voiced was established and holden as a thing concluded-on by all Indeed he carried it contrary to all who opposed him as Dares will have it Yet Dictys storieth the just contrary and saith that Priamus followed the advice and determination of the Senat. And indeed Q. Calaber lib. 12. and Tryphiodor de Il. exc insinuate no lesse for they observe Dictys way which he hath in storying the Grecian stratagem which ensued upon terms of peace concluded on between the Trojans and Grecians Howsoever albeit I think my-self rather oblidged to encline to Dares relation yet lose I nothing thereby if I do so I am not of that opinion to think that Priamus was so hemmed-in by Law as the Lacedemonian Kings Let it be so he had a negative voice in Senate as Dares in sinuateth yet sure I am none will say that the Senate was a cypher having no authority at all You will learn from these fore-cited historians the contrary of that And in so far as Priamus did act according to the advice counsel of the Senat in as far he did act according to Law Thus he did not simply act according to pleasure and in an arbitrary way No verily In this his power was somewhat limited And this is all that both Aristotle and we do crave And so we must not think but Alcinous was some way or other regulated by his Princes and Rulers as you may read Hom odys 8. And how much Agamemnon was subjected to Law is shewed already Of him is made good that which Aristotle speaketh of the tying of the King to the People by the elevation of the Scepter as by Oath and Covenant Hom. Il. 2. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 5. cap. 10. We need not think it strange to say that in the dayes of the Heroes Kings were some what subjected to Law for not only Agamemnon but also Theseus were no leste subjected to Law as is shewed already then the Lacedemonian kings 'T is observable that Orestes son to Agamemnon and King of Mycenae was judged and absolved by the Councel of Areopagus Him Mnestheus son to Theseus and King of Athens could not get set free till firstly he was examined by the Areopagites whom Dictys calleth most strict Justiciaries de bel Tro. lib. 6. Mark that the Mycenan King was judged by the Athenian Judicatory Then tell me seing a King of another Kingdom in the dayes of the Heroes was subjected to the Law and Judicatory of Athens shall we not think that Kings in those dayes in some things at least were restricted and subjected to Law Verily this is an argument from the greater to the lesser But hear what Alexander ab Alexandro faith Tantique Areopagus fuit ut Heroas semideos illuc in judicium advocatos dicerent Pisistratus in eo judicium subire non dubita it lib. 3. cap. 5. i. e. And Areopagus was of such power that they cited into judgment the Heroes and Semidei and Pisiâ—atus doubted not to undergo judgment there And I would have Royallists to observe that in this matter I give them more of their will then Aristotle doth for according to this last sense and exposition his words insinuate That all Kings in the dayes of the Heroes in some things were restricted Yet we say that many of them had a vast and arbitrary power Yeâ— in the latter part of the fourth species he saith That Kings in ancient time had but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-governing power But we go further-on with the Malignant and say That they had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Yet preciâ—ely and properly their power was but Pambasilick an all-governing and not arbitrary and illimited We shall stand here a while to speak of the Kingdom of England for it is not only the chief subject of our discourse in order to which we drive all that we speak but also it falleth-in here by a string-line Already we have spoken of it at length from the dayes of the Conquerour or a little before until now It therefore remaineth we speak of it as it was from its beginning unto the reign of the Normans And so we consider it under these notions 1. As it was in its first beginning and original And though I will not say that Britain was inhabited so soon as other Kingdoms which lie in and about the middle and chief part of the Earth No question such parts were firstly inhabited as both history and reason doth teach Yet I may very conveniently say that the chiefest Kingdoms and those which he next Armenia being planted after people were extreamly multiplied on the earth they did seek out to inhabit the uttermost Isles of the world There was a physical necessity for this People daily multiplying could not dwell all in one part but of necessity they behoved to depart one from another for residence sake Yea there was a moral reason for it also No question desire of great lands and possessions so soon as people were greatly multiplied on the earth after the flood could not but set them a work to seek-out the remotest parts This is confirmed by what the holy Ghost faith The sons of Japhet Gomer by these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands every one after his tongue after their families in their nations Gen. 10. I pray you tell me whileas the holy Ghost speaketh there indefinitely of the Isles of the Nations if he doth exclude the Isle of Britain What more reason is there to exclude it then any other And for my self I think there is more reason to include it then any of the rest Firstly because it is the chiefest Isle in the world And therefore in it self the more delectable and the more to be sought after Secondly because Gomer whom Berosus calleth Comerus Gallus did come into Italy and erected Colonies there Ant. lib. 5. Now tell me is it not most probable that Gomer did translate Colonies from Italy into France and from thence into Britain every-one of them lying contiguously one with another We find as much in his name as pointeth-out this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gomer signifieth to end And is not Britain
restoreth us nearest thereto without all controversie is simply best In making good the Assumption we lay-down these two Conclusions Conclus 1. No man by nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government Firstly If Nature tied man formally and in an antecedent way to Politick subjection we demand Whether or not in such respect it layeth bonds of subjection upon all men If it doth then Kings no lesâ—e then subjects are tied by Nature to jurisdiction 1. Because that which agreeth to a thing formally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also competent to it universally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. If Kings were not also subjected to Authority by nature it would inevitably follow all men and not all men were subjected to it Which is implicatory If not then it followeth That some men by nature formally are born subject to Authority and some not Both which are repugnant for if Nature as Nature subjecteth man to Authority it giveth exemption to none more then to another Otherwise you shall either admit a simple contradiction or else you shall deny all men to be natural Therefore of neccssity the Royallist must either admit all men according to Nature to be born free or else both King and People by Nature to be born subject to Government He must either admit the one or deny the other also Which he proudly affirmeth See what Philosophy this is Man by nature is formally born subject to Government So will the Royallists have it This will be the Conclusion Ergo man by nature is not formally born subject to Government A plain contradiction indeed The reason is If nature subject man formally to Government then it subjecteth all men thereto And if all men I demand Whether or not doth nature subject one to another If it doth ergo either committitur circulus or else one by nature is not subjected to another Otherwise all according to nature are not subjected thereto as is shewed to be If not ergo none by Nature are borne subjects for so by Nature there is none to whom they are subjected Non. entus nulla sunt accidentia Therefore it inevitably followeth either all to be born free or else all to be born subjected to Government and not to be born subjected thereto Secondly If Nature laid formal bonds of subjection upon Man to Politick Authority we judge it very strange how there have been and may be many families and societies of men void and free of such subjection We can scarcely think that the interveening of any accidental cause could obstruct the current of such a formal stream of Nature from issuing and streaming forth its formal effect We can hardly digest it how Nature formally bending its strength to produce Politick subjection doth not also erect Government amongst Beasts and subject one of them to another See we not by experience how natural predominants do alwaies produce effects suitable to their temper Why may we not then with as good reason alleadge that Nature producing Government and subjection to Policy would have also through its natural sourse drawn all natural creatures to the erecting of Government and Policy amongst them How cometh it to passe I pray you there is not King-Lion King-Eagle King-Elephant c. Thirdly If Nature formally tied some men to subjection and formally derived power of governing and reigning to others then the constitution of Judges and Governours would be a formal and natural act Physically and formally flowing from Nature's principles not contingently but necessarily Which taketh away the freedom of God Deut. 17.1 Sam. 12. Ps 75. and Dan. 4. in setting-up Governours and Rulers according to his pleasure excluding all formal and physical necessity from Nature And not only so but also it solloweth that both Rulers and ruled are eternal and unchangeable Which is repugnant both to Experience and Reason The Gymnosophists and Indian Philosophs did enact it by Law That all by Nature were free-born and none were servants but to be of equal authority and alike dignity Diod. Ant. lib. 3. cap. 10. Dionysius Halicarnassius saith In all men the desire of liberty is innate Lib. 5. 6. Julius Caesar averreth All men study to liberty Lib. 2. 3. de bel Gal. And Gregory affirmeth All men by Nature to be free whom Nations have subjected to bondage 12. quaest 2. The Law speaketh much for us in this and in positive terms saith what we affirm L. manumiss F. de just jur Lib. 1. digest tit 1. lib. 1. Inst tit 5. Ulpian Justian distinguish between the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations The one is particular only relating to man the other is general relative both to man and beast Ulp. lib. 1. sect ult Just dig lib. 1. tit 1. Inst lib. 1. tit 2. But I pray you Wherein can the Law of Nature be common both to man and beast if you affirm Nature to have laid strait bonds of subjection upon one to another We find by experience that Lions are not subject to King-Lion Boars to King-Boar Eagles to King-Eagle And so you annul this community of the Law of Nature to Man and Beast if you understand subjective authority formally to flow from Nature They do as yet more clearly difference these Laws calling the one slavery and the other liberty Ulp. lib. man D. Just dig lib. 1. Hence Ulpian Inst lib. 1. and Justinian Dig. lib. 1. say That all by Nature being free-born Manumission to Nature is unknown It is the consequent of servitude according to the Law of Nations See also Just Inst lib. 1. tit 5. Whence is it out of Florentine he defineth liberty from Nature and servitude from the custom of Nations Dig. lib. 1. tit 5. Where liberty is expresly opposed to Government and Authority The one is called humane constitution and the other Nature's birth But the Lawyer Prate would make us beleeve by the Law of Nations Ulpian and Justinian do understand a humane universal Law and Sanction and by servitude praedure and tyrannous form of Government And so faith he the Law of Nations must not alwaies be opposed to the Law of Nature as Livius saith Neither must we think faith he that all Civil Constitution is contrary to Nature but such as draweth the subjected into slavery The Lawyer Baldwin seemeth to take him by the hand whileas he calleth the Law of Nations the particular Law of Nature But the man com in Justit Inst lib. 1. 2. seemeth neither to be much for it nor much against it Nay but Mr. Prate wresteth Ulpian and Justinian their meaning for if the Law of Nature were taken by them for any humane Law then should humane Law be common both to man and beast Do not they say the Law of Nature is common to both Therefore you shall either conclude beasts to be men and affected with humane faculties or else you shall restrict your universal within the bounds of a particular But if you shall say
others do render it 'T is a vain thing in Royallists to imagine Elishah and the Elders with him did not resist the King but his messenger 1. The text maketh clear against this 1s not the found of his masters feet behind him Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger because the King was backing him and coming-in immediatly after the cut-throat This intimateth to us the shutting of the door and the out-keeping of the house was mainly against Jehoram himself His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger is the ground of shutting the door and keeping-out the house They alleadge also this to be an extraordinary act Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary Away with this elusion 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name is done by him as in the King's person and authority And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary and to resist the King himself Salmasius would loose the knot another way And faith he the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from thus for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him to cut-off Jehoram That was done by Jehu whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this He only raileth and shifteth the Question The Question between us now is not concerning the off-cutting but the simple act of resisting Kings And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram yet he cannot deny but he withstood him and defended himself against his violence This is all for the present we crave Neither can he deny but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets to anoint Jehu King Whereupon he went forth and did cut-off Jehoram executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab From which example is shewed already to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings It is the Magistrat's part and not the Prophet's unlesse it be by extraordinary impulsion to cut-off the delinquent And so as from the example of Elishah it is lawful to resist so from the example of Jehu whom Elishah caused to be anointed for cutting-off the house of Ahab it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings 4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram and revolted from him 2 Kin. 8.2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this yet he faith nothing against it but what others of his own tribe said before him And faith he Libnah's revolt in respect of God the Judge of all the earth was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins But in respect of the revolters it is no where justified in all the text Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave the text insinuateth the contrary This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah with the revolt of the Edomites So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day There is nothing added to that The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand This is added as a reason because be had for saken the Lord God of his fathers Thus is abundantly holden-one unto us that Edom and Libnah revolted from Jeboram in a different way No question in respect of God the cause and ground of the revolt of both is one God caused both to revolt to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes The Edomites revolted because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah The text faith they chose a King of their own And from that which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt it is more then apparent to us it revolted from a principle of Religion And these who comment upon the text say Libnah revolted because Jehoram pressed the people of the Land to Idolatry I suppose upon good reason Libnah's revolt is far more justifiable then the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam The one revolted upon a natural and the other upon a spiritual accompt And yet as is shewed already the ten Tribes revolted allowably 5. Uzziah was withstood by Azariah accompanied with fourscore valiant Priests of the Lord. And in this contrary to the doctrine of Royallists we shall make good these three things 1. That they resisted him violently 2. allowably 3. that they dethroned him The first is evident from the text Firstly because it is said they withstood him They withstood Uzziah the King 2 Chron. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are words of violent resistance signifying to stand against And for this cause the fourscore Priests are called men of valour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of strength So the Seventy and Arius Montanus translate them It maketh us imagine they were purposely selected from amongst the rest of the Priests because of their valour and strength to withstand Uzziah in facrificing Secondly because they did thrust Uzziah violently out of the Temple Azariah the chief Priest and all the Priests thrust him out from thence Ibil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signisieth to thrust out with violence They hurried him out of the Temple as the word importech The second is also manifest because the Lord attended the undertaking of the Priests with miraculous and extraordinary succesfulnesse They no sooner laid hands on the King but beyond all expectation the Lord did put hand in him also He did back them notably They no sooner did resist the King but assoon the Lord from Heaven did strike him with Leprosie And is it imaginable but the Lord one way or other had plagued them also if they had failed in their-duty to the King I can see no reason why he should have spared them in failing in their duty more then he did not spare Uzziah in failing in his duty And which is more the Priests do not groundlesly withstand him They argue from the King's duty and from their duty They tell him in plain terms It did not become the King to sacrisice Num. 18. but the Priests Ex. 30. Upon these grounds they set-to to withstand him and keep him back from burning incense Which insinuat that their act of resisting him was in no part of his duty and that which was proper to his kingly charge but only in maintaining their own liberties and what according to God's Law was due to them Would they say We will withstand thee O King and have reason to do so because as thou dost that which is not incumbent to thee so thou encroachest upon the peculiar liberties of our charge The third is beyond controversie though Royallists start much at it 1. Because he was cut-off from the house of the Lord. This was because of his Leprosy for according to the Law the Leper was cut-off from the Congregation Thus the Priests spare not to execute the Law upon the King though Royallists estecm him to have exemption and immunity therefrom And Uzziah the King was a leper unto the day of his death and dwelt in