well begun ibid. Venetians what course they took to free themselves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces 43. That the practice of Merchandising is not to be blamed in them 116. Some of their illustrious and famous Princes ibid. What title their Dukes assumed for the taking in of Constantinople 118 How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been ibid. That had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders the State of Milan had been theirs 121. Their weighty and glorious enterprises by Sea and Land against the Saracens for the Emperors of Constantinople and against the Genoeses 129. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy 130 Why almost all Christian Princes entred into a League against them 132-180 How discreetly they have continued Neutrals in the discords of Princes that thereupon Peace might follow in these latter times 167. Why they sent into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry 172 Vertue what two vertues are necessary for him that proposeth great matters to himself and aspireth after glory 88 Vertuous To make men vertuous three things are needful 11 W. WAR brought home to the Enemies own doors how advantagious 28 When it ought to be carried on with protracting of time 31. War and not Peace was the cause of Romes ruine 46. It is subject to divers successes and chances more then any other action of ours 31-183-185 Wars made by the Romans after the subduing of Carthage 48. Made and maintained by them in many places at once 65. Particulars most necessary for them 149. The manner of Wars now used is the chiefest cause why the enterprises of modern Princes prove not equal to those of the Antients 148 The end of the second Table ERRATA Pag. lin 4-45 AFter not read only 5-7 Dele not 8-17 For licence read licentiousness 10-27 For temperance read temper 11-38 For them read those 15-25 Before what insert do ib. 48 Dele more 19-19 For of read and for and read of 25-38 Dele only 26 ult After obedience insert iâ— 35-26 After â—ighting read they 37-43 After these insert rather 38-14 After of Insert all this 39-12 Before the insert to 43 pen. After as insert if 53-12 After 〈◊〉 insert the less 55-31 After not insert only 60-3 After not insert only 73-17 Dele and the first Pag. lin 74-27 Before Goths insert great valor of the ibid. 31 For Commanders read Soldiers 82-50 For Rhodosius read Rhodanus 89-30 For Soldiers read Commanders 112-30 For where read were 113-48 Dele then by 116-20 For a read the. 124-7 For them into his read him into thâ—â— 126-34 After mens insert thoughts 152-25 Before Pope insert with Francis King of France 157-5 After if insert we 158-45 For sadly read easily 159-26 For Corâ—â—r read Corfâ— ibid. 29 For Corfee read Corfâ— 176-47 After thereof insert more 199-2 Before not insert it ibid. 3 Dele it 20â— 19 Dele be THE FIRST BOOK The First DISCOURSE What was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs having Armed people on foot THere are many who reflecting upon the Greatness of the Commonwealth of Rome wonder at her so many prosperities by which she flourished a long time and at last obtained the mastery of all other Monarchies And thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of Arms and management in Peace do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation and what blame-worthy and to be avoided But certainly these men seem not to know to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended For that is not simply the greatness of an Empire to which she at the beginning riseth by Fortune and which is increased by Injustice but that may well be said to be the true Form of Government by which people living in peace and union may work righteously and obtain Civil felicity He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth without suffering his eyes to be dazeled wiâ—h the splendor of the Roman greatness let him consider them nakedly as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchased them and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men which are more to be observed for the amendment of present Governments by their example then for imitation out of hopes of attaining any true praise or apparent good But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City then the Form of Government by which as by the soul thereof every good act is produced so of all other observations which may be had of the City of Rome there is not any more worthy or of more use then to examine what was the truest Form of her Government that we may afterwards see whether she might have been beâ—ter ordered in Civil affairs then she was without disordering her Militia and whether she could keep together the People armed and obedient to the Laws To know then what the condition of her Government was and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it as hath been thought by some men following the Rule which Philosophy teacheth us which says that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people and according to other accidents we must examine what that State was in it self and then what proportion it held with that City But because it would be too difficult a business to assign any certain condition unto her which may equally correspond to all times she not having so punctually observed one and the same Form continually but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a Popular State we must have our eys most fixt upon that Age wheâ—ein the glory of that Commonwealth did most flourish not so bearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times as may conduce to our purpose He who would diligently consider all the parts of the Republick will find not only so much diversity but even contrariety in them as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properest Form of Government For if respect be had to the great Authority of Consuls especially in Armies we may not without reason believe that that City under the name of a Commonwealth was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom since that Form of Magistracie did use such Authoâ—ity in managing of Arms in concluding Peace and in agreeing differences between potent Kings as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of those thing with more absolute power differing from Monarchy only in this that they kept this Authority but for a
a desire of their own greatness the City was reduced oftentimes into eminent dangers Thus the Roman Plebeians thinking almost that they had not a common Country but that it did only belong unto the Nobility forsook it and retired into the Aventine valuing more the increase of their own power by necessitating the Senate to yield to their desires then their putting the City into such a disorder The Nobles likewise more sollicitous to abase the People and to increase their own fortunes then to preserve peace and union in the City did nourish Civil discord by usurpiâ—g the Common goods and by reducing the People to great Poverty through Usury By this discourse it may be comprehended how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government But it may be more cleerly seen by comparing this Commonwealth with that of Sparta which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt Government and preserved it a long time free from all discord by vertue of her most excellent Laws In Sparta the Princes power ended not but with his life to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the Laws be observed he might the better do it being detained by no self-respect from deposing of Magistrates or from being judged by the People But his Authority was notwithstanding so limited as he was rather a Custos of the Common Liberty then a true Prince in the City The People had as great a share in Government as their condition required For it being they who were to make use of the Magistrates it seemed they might better know their abilities as we see it falls out in other Trades that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to use it then by the maker thereof The People had the power given them of choosing and of correcting Magistrates but greater authority was granted to the Senate which was placed as in the midst to defend the Commonwealth from the Princes power and from the peoples insolencie to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other Now let us see how in the joint union of these three Governments certain Conditions were appropriated unto every of them but neither so many nor yet such as made them of clean contrary qualities but so as they might very well be united in one and the same person The Prince had perpetuity of power but this stood so corrected by the Laws as it might easily consist with the other States The Senate which was made up of Forty eight of the prime Citizens represented a true Aristocratical Commonwealth but because they acknowledged their Dignity from the People their power was not such as bereft others of their Liberty But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punishments as it was not dangerous so it afforded place for a modest Popular State and rendred that Government more perfect by mixture of all the three best But above all things else there was a miraculous proportion observed in Sparta in sharing out those things which use to cause Civil dissentions amongst Citizens For the Noblemen had the greatest part in Honors but the People were equal to them in Wealth all the Revenues being in common so as the ambition of the one and the necessities of the other were satisfied and all of them being content they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility so as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient Reipublicks And if at the first she had been a little more large in communicating her Government by encreasing the number of her Senators so as there had been no occasion in Theopompus his time for the better regulating their too great Authority of introducing the Magistracy of the Ephori whereby the City began to be a little too popular and leaving Licurgus his antient Institutions gave it self over to licentiousness nothing could have been desired in that City to have reduced her to the highest pâ—tch of perfection Therefore as far as the Roman Government differed from this it must be confest it fell so far short of true excellencie The Consuls of Rome had great Authority and it may be more free then became any Magistracy in a Commonwealth but the little durance thereof made it less beneficial to the the Republick For their Power being soon to be given over made them less diligent and less bold in undertaking Publick Affairs For Consulship being laid aside the way was opened of revenging private 〈◊〉 by the Tribunes So Cicerâ— who freed his Country from Catalius Conspiracy when he was out of Place was banished But the Senate because it had not any Ordinary Magistracy from whence no Appeal might be made by which is might curb the Peoples Insolency had not that respect given to it by which the ignorant common people is Governed So as the people not being held back by this Bridle ran into such lâ—centiousness as they dared to commit divers Indignities even against the chief Magistracy of Counsulship as they did when they plucked the Consul Camillus Hestare from the Tribunal that they might by force obâ—aâ—â— admittance to that Supream Magistracy The weakness of the Senate was likewise the occasion of the increase of the power of some Citizens for the peoples resolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people in despite of the Senate was opened to such as were ambitious Thus did Marius cause himself to be declared Consul contrary to the Laws and Caesar to be confirmed in his Province And to suppress these mens immoderate greatness which tended towards Tyranny it was requisite since the Commonwealth had no usual means to do it to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities side whose greatness proved afterwards no less pernicâ—ous then that of those whom they thought through their Authority to suppress wherefore the City became wholly divided so that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by Sylla though he professed to vindicate the Common welfare And Pompey to maintain his Greatness put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with Caesar Wherefore betaking themselves to Arms the Commonwealth could not at last but fall These disorders were occasioned through the weakness of the Senate But the people possessing themselves of other mens Places usurpâ— the best imployments of the Commonwealth and being equall to the Nobility in pâ—â—nt of liberty would without any respect to other things purtake equally of Government So the right disposure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confused which require Geometrical and not Arithmetical proportion in such sort as the same things be not granted to all men but to every one that which is most convenient for him And certainly to constitute a City of that form as all her Citizens should be equal would be no better then to make a Consort of Musick consisting all of the same voyces for as the latter produceth no true Harmony so doth no
good concord result from the former Therefore care must be had that every Order may keep its own state and be neither too much exalted nor too much abased lest the too 〈◊〉 or too sharp Tone occasion dissâ—nance as it was seen to fall out in Rome where this just proportion was but badly kept people of unequal condition and worth being oft times made equal in Dignity which caused a Government full of confusion and disorder not bounded in any one Form but disposed to receive all Forms But if we will assign any particular State to the mixt body of this City as predominate over the rest there can be none more properly given her then popularity Which though it may be already comprehended yet it will be better known by passing to some other more particular considerations The state of the Commonwealth is known by observing in whom the chief command is found but the majesty thereof appears clearly in the creating of Magistrates in making new Laws or repealing old ones in making War in disposing of Rewards or Punishment All which things being by many examples seen to lie in the power of the People do evidently witness that the State of this Commonwealth was Popular The People were they who gave authority to Magistrates nay even to the Senate it self by authenticating and invigorating the Resolves thereof and as the soul of that Government they did in divers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations So as her truest and properest Form can only be taken from them nay it was seen that the resolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate and were of equal force with the Peoples commands prolonging Magistrates in their places and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further seen by the immoderate power of the meanest Citizens Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth which by a certain ordinary and as it were natural change of condition will shew us what her first Form was For it being changed into Tyranny which usually ariseth from a Popular State it appears that that City was formerly governed by the People and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny so as this Transition was easily made by the likeness of State For that City where the People commands with licence may be said to be subject to many Tyrants nor admits it of any change saving that one man becomes the master of those disorders which a multitude were masters of There were likewise always many popular Pick-thanks in Rome who like the Flatterers of Tyrants tracing the People in their humors went a birding after favors whereby they won credit and preferment Which as the Philosopher says is a manifest sign that in such a City the People command not the Laws Which is seen by many experiences of which Marius was an evident example who being born of very mean parents and applâ—ing himself from the begining to the Government of the Commonwealth not guided by the glory of his Predecessors or any noble action of his own which might first introduce him thereinto but confiding in a certain greatness of spirit began to think of acquiring great power so as being become Tribune of the People he betook himself wholly to abase the authority of the Nobles as he did in publishing the Law of Suffrages threatening Consul Cotta to imprison him if he forbare not to oppose him By which boldness he won so much favor with the People as he was able to dispose of them afterwards as he listed in any affair how unjust soever or in working revenge upon his Enemies as he did in banishing innocent Metellus or to aggrandise himself insomuch as he contrary to the Laws was created Consul against the Cimbrians being absent and in a contumacious time and lastly in making the Province be assigned unto him which belonged to Sylla By such means the way was opened to the immoderate power of Citizens which in the height of their prosperity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruine For these disorders being long before begun were afterwards by the spaciousness of the City so inâ—â—eased as the People being become powerful by reason of the numerousness of the Citizens and growing more free and bold by their so many prosperities not content to be equal to the Nobility would become greater then the Laws They banish'd many Citizens without hearing the cause they granted places of Magistracie before the usual time they confirm'd the Authority of those that were already out of it and disposed of all things not according to civil equity but as they liked best Which things do sufficiently manifest the imperfections of that Government For the Philosopher says that that State where the People command and not the Laws is so corrupt as it deserves not the name of a Commonwealth no sort of Government being to be thereunto assigned Which easily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful as was that of Rome But iâ— we shall then consider the Conditions of those men into whose hands that Government was put we shall thereby likewise find that amongst the several Forms of Popular States this may be thought the most corrupt as that whereinto even Artificers were admitted which being usually but ill conditioned and frequenting Assemblies only that they may talk together do constitute an imperfect State and subject to alterations And hence it may be deduced that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect Commonwealth the others must partake of the same imperfection For no such union can be framed out of two good Governments and one very bad one as is requisite to give form to a good Government neither could they continue together for never so small a time Whence it may be likewise inferred that those other parts of the Commonwealth which may seem to resemble Monarchy and Aristocracy as the Consuls and Senate came short of such perfection as is proper to those States declining to the contrary party For many things may be observed to have been done by Consuls with more authority and boldness then what became a Commonwealth To pass by many other examples Caesar being confirmed in that power which he had received as Consul usurped the Liberty of the Commonwealth There were likewise many corruptions in the Senate which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders For when the Commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection Senators were become so mercenary as Iugurth having corrupted many of them and purchased his own saâ—ety by monies it may well be said that the Citizens of Rome would have sold their City if they could have met with a Chapman for it Another Consideration may be added to wit That that Commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very Popular State which she so much affected For it is easie to frame any Government for a
and the power of some Citizens to increase too much Who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military Commands and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds nor could the Laws curb them did totally subvert that Government insomuch as it was said of Caesar that he would not have any Superior to him in the City and of Pompey that he would have no Equal And Cato had wont to say that Caesars immoderate greatness had enforc'd Pompey likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service to the end that the one might counterpoise the other So grant one inconveâ—ience others will easily follow And as too great eminencie in any Citizen although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick ought to be suspected so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the Carthaginians had without falling upon violent courses which in stead of Physick proves poison to that State The House of Medici began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in Florence by means of old Cosmo's great wealth it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of Lorenzo and so by little and little getting to a great height of power which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country but would assume unto it self the superiority of that Government So as when the Florentines were too late aware thereof they could not moderate that too immease greatness for the continued power of that Family wherein there had been excellent men for worth and eminent degrees and dignities purchased by them both in their own Country and elswhere had got them so many to side partially with them as their own Faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them The like happens also in some States wherein there is not so express a form of a Commonwealth but a supreme Prince yet also many particular Lords of great authority In such States the too much greatness of Bâ—rons hath oft-times proved too pernicious For there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater and they having means to do so where their power is not limited by the Laws and Customs of the State they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their degree to equal their authority to that of the King himself and to put for innovations prejudicial to the State Amongst many others we have a notable example hereof in the present troubles of France which were occasioned by having suffered some prime Lords to grow too great in power whence civil discords have risen in the Kingdom and the better to foment and sustain their parties and to perfect their designs they had recourse to forein forces and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet It hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some Prinâ—es to have an eye upon such whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected and to allay thâ—s their greatness by not admitting them into chief imployments by taking away or lessening their Priviledges and Immunities and by lessening their authority and universal favor by other means according as occasions have counselled Consalvâ— a great and famous Commander in the former age had done excellent service to King Ferdinandâ— and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards as having by his own worth gotten and preserved the Kingdom of Naples he was taken off from all imployment and brought back into Spain to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition That prudent Prince was moved thereunto as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up and who was so followed and applaâ—ded both by the common people and the Nobility could not but be to be suspected So as he knew it was requisite for his own security and the like of his Dominions not to suffer him to grow greater to his Masters prejudice and therefore to take from him all Command and Imployment The Instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way first by Periander to Thrasybalus and after by Tarquiâ— the proud to his Son Sâ—xtâ—â— are very observable to wit to cut off the tops of the highest Poppies oâ— ears of corn whereby they would infer that he who will rule in safety must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others for what concerns any Civil Power which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical Siâ—es yet wheâ— it is used with discretion and wisdom hath another aspect for all particular interests ought to give way where the publick good and the preservation of universal Peace and Quiet of the State which is of aâ—much greater concornment is in question But when this may be done by any ordinary way as by Law and Custom as it was among the Athenians and other antient people then this remedie proved the more just and secure There is not any mischief in the City which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the Law then Ambition for Ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force but rather the maladie increasing by length of time it makes men as it were franticâ— so as the ambitious man covets all things and is not satisfied with any thing having neither mean nor bridle Honors Dignities Preferments how great soever they be serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher then for water to quench it insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one Now to this almost natural and ordinary defect of humanity and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States as it is of it self incorrigible 〈◊〉 will prove a wholesome cure and which the Atheniâ—ns in particular 〈◊〉 their Commonwealth stood in need of For as Greece did in that Age abound 〈◊〉 men who were really valiant so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation in those times But such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly conâ—â—â—isnated by an immoderate desire of glory and haughtinesâ— The Laws of canvassing and all other provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitless for every little sparkle that remains of this fire though it be covered over with ashes may cause great Combustions It seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition then totally to rid the City or State of such men as are desirous to exceed all others Plato said that men
passing by a violent and illegal way to the driving them out of the City or State their friends or kindred may be kept low and humble whereby their power is lessened if they commit any excess in case of Justice as such men out of arrogancie often do be severe unto them take their priviledges from them declare them to be for a certain time uncapable of any Publick imployment and do some other such like things which being done upon some just occasion although the parties concerned be therewithall displeased yet not being disliked by the generality their hatching of mischievous plots against the present Government and Weal publick will have less fewel to feed upon But what shall be said of him whose worth and vertue doth exceed that of all others by what pretence can a just Prince or a well-governed Commonwealth humble such a man or keep him low or aloof from partaking of their Councels To this it may be answered that if this supposed personage be endowed with true vertue he will not be subject to any suspition nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which may be prejudicial to his Prince or Countrie but that all his endeavors shall aim at the common good and it is just and convenient that such a man should alwaies bear sway in every well-ordered Commonwealth But if the vertues which render him so great and eminent tend to policie that is when a man does that which is good and honest having his mind bent upon some other object then meer worth and honesty as most men use to do out of hopes of glory or of bettering themselves which things notwithstanding are so far vertueâ— as they are helpful to the State and have a certain resemblance oâ— true worth it will not be amiss that such a one who may be suspected to misimpâ—y his good endowments be proceeded against in manner aforesaid We may then conclude that the custom of the Athenians concerning Ostracism ought neither to be praised nor practised in relation to the act it self but may admit of commendation and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth viz. to provide that the ambition or malice of a few rob not many of their quiet nor do perturb or confound the whole State The end of the First BOOK THE SECOND BOOK The First DISCOURSE Why the Commonwealth of â—enice hath not so far inlarged her Precincts as did the Roman Commonwealth MEN may be allowed to wonder not a little if they take it into their consideration why the Commonwealth of Venice having so excellent Laws and Institutions and having so long preserved her self in power and authority hath not notwithstanding much inlarged the preciâ—cts of her Empire as did the Common-wealth of Rome in a lesser space of time and in a form of Government which was not void of many imperfections The thought thereof hath made me oftentimes desire to search into the true causes of it I find this hath been taken into consideration by some other modern Writers but to bâ—ot that his discourses are already buried in oblivion it may be the things by him alleadged have not been such as may give full satisfaction to one who shall look narrowly into the â—arrtiage of our civil actions He was of opinion that the greatness of the Roman Empires was â—oly to be attributed to the vertue of her Ordinations and Form of Government from which since the Venetian Commonwealth doth differâ—â— he thinks that the cause why she hath not been able to make so great acquisitions And he is so resolute in this opinion as without distinguishing between things things between 〈◊〉 and times he doth so equally extol all the orders and actions of the â—eman Common-wealth as he doth propound some things for example to all 〈◊〉 Princes and Commonwealths as are rather to be blamed then to be imiâ—ated and which were the reasons of the ruine of that Commonwealth as the diâ—â—enâ—ions which was between the Nobility and the Common People and other such things which are rather disorders then orders and more apt to confound then to establish States Insomuch as his opinion is That if there were a City at this day in Italy which had the same â—rom of Government as Rome had of old that City might as the other did make herself Mistress of the World As if the condition of times and the so many variouâ— accidents upon which humane actions and especially the augmenting and change of States do depend were to be held for nothing and that it be in the power of a wise Legislator to give the Empire of the World to that City which he knows how to govern by good Laws But experience teacheth us much otherwise since we have known many antient Commonwealths founded by very wise men and confirm'd with excellent Orders equally for what concerns Peace as War yet not any one amongst so many hath been able I will not say to acquire so much Dominion as did the Commonwealth of Rome but nor hardly able any ways to extend their Precâ—ncts amongst their Neighbors The intâ—insecal Orders of the State are not simply of themselves sufficient to make so great Atchievements though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto Nor ought the State of Venice her not being Mistress of larger Territories be attributed to any defect in this behalf but many other things are to be taken into consideration whereby the truest causes of such effects which amidst the uncertainty of such like affairs can be found out may be discovered by looking into To know then whence such a diversity proceeds we must take the business a little higher and examine First what was the original beginning of these two Cities Rome and Venice what their Founders were and then what their situation what the inclinations studies and vertues of their Citizens and lastly the condition of times and qualities of their neighboring Princes must be examined All which things appertain to this Consideration as well as the Orders of the Commonwealth and their Form of Government He then who shall look upon the first Founders of these two Cities willfind them even in these theâ—r first beginnings not a little differing which occasioned differing intentions and differing ends and therefore peradventure a differing state and differing condition The first Erectors of Venice where men who were peacefully given as those who having been wearied by the so many calamities of Italy occasioned by the inundation of the Barbarians had withdrawn themselves that they might shun the danger of War into that piece of marish ground in the Adriatick Sea which was then greater then now it is and the chiefest of many small Islands which by a common name were called Venetiae So as they lived for a while without any Orders either Military or Civil those first Inhabitants contenting themselves to live in peace and quiet without dreaming of any greater matter For it neither stood with the end
Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievements in Italy nor to stay long there 166 Francesco Foscari Duke of Venice said That the Republick could not much increase in power unless she made some enterprises by Land 115 Francis the First King of France how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes 152. For endowments of the mind and other qualities most eminent ibid. Though his fortune gave way to that of Charls the Fifth whom yet he put to much trouble 157. Why his furious endeavor to assault Spain prov'd bootless 159. and as much in vain his enterprises in Italy 161 G. GEnoeses conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians 118 The Goths famous for the destruction of the Empire and of many Provinces 76 Their original and why they fell down into Italy ibid. Other actions of theirs under divers Commanders 77. They also took pay under the Emperors ibid. Government how the quality of every one may be known 1-2 What the right Form of it is ibid. What it was in Rome 2. What in Sparta ibid. What in Venice 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State 2 The Form of the Government is as it were the soul of the State 131 From a Popular government men come to Tyrannie 54. The Change thereof in Rome occasioned so much the sooner the end of her Empire 90 and of the corruption of her Militia 92 Greece why the Romans strove to keep her from falling into Philips hands 45 Had a general Council called the Amphictiones like the Diets of Germany 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth 93 Not being at unity in herself could not compass any great atchievements abroad 95. By reason of her dissentions could not make use of her victories against the Persians 97. minded Arts more then Arms ibid. Whence her victories against the Persians proceeded 98. How she came to fall into the hands of the Macedonians 100. then of another Philip 101 lastly of the Romans ibid. Why after the death of Alexander she could not recover her liberty 100. For the same reasons having afterwards the Empire of Constantinople she could not preserve herself in that dignity 103 How highly her Soldiers were esteemed by Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ibid. 104 Guido Ubeldo Duke of Urbin why he would allow of no Forts in his Dominions 170-171 H. HAnnibal upon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 34 What reasons should have removed him from that resolution 35 Honorius the Emperor his cowardise and simple saying 77 Hungary whence so called 77. The occasion of the Wars for her between the House of Austria and the Turks 195 I. ITaly how much she abounded in Soldiers 84. The Romans meetly out of their own Citizens and of their other Territories in Italy were furnish'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 62. Was long obedient to the Western Emperors yet withdrew herself from under their command and submitted to Lords of her own 184 Italy through her own Princes fault at present under the Command of Strangers 140. Her late Quietness and Peace and from what causes 164 When it began 165. How it may be continued 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Teath in great misery for thirty years 182 Italian Princes whether they were well advised in setting upon Charls the Eight King of France at his departing out of Italy 140 Iugurth with a bitter saying taxed the extreme grippleness and avarice of the Romans 13 Iulius Caesar what fierce people he conquer'd in France 91. Why it was difficult and troublesome for him to tame them 159. He would always charge his Enemy first 187 K. KIngdoms large and ample why apt and subject to Insurrections 72 L. LAws what benefit they bring 17. They ought to be confirmed by good Customs 11. Their aim ought to be to take away the abuse of things not the things themselves 109 Leagues or Confederacies why they are made their force and power 146 Made by the Christians against the Infidels 147-151-156-191 Which are the firmest 147. The defects which they may and use to have 148 For what causes they are made 154. How and when men may with reason expect benefit by them 154. Why they are no better esteemed ibid. That famous one of Cambray against the Venetians why made how soon dissolved and how unjust it was 154-155 Leonidas his famous victory against the Persians 98 Lewis the Twelfth King of France his nature and qualities of minde 135 Why he conspired against the Venetians and how injuriously 132 135 Lodowick Sforza Duke of Milain how fearful he shewed himself upon the League between the French and the Venetians 139. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy and then to his own great damage repents himself of it 140 Lycurgus why his Laws proved good 11. Had many means to help him in the setling of his Laws 12. Ordered his Republick so that it should not much increase its Dominions 47 M. MAgistracies the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 3 They ought to be of limited authority and for a short time 5 Malta why it preserved it self against the assaults of Bolyman 175 Marius by what ways he began his greatness 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth 10-47 His discreet carriage in the enterprise against the Cimbri which were come down into Italy 194 Medici how that Family got the superiority in Florence and kept it 105 The Militia of the Greeks or Macedonians what it was 21. Of the Carthaginians mercenary and incommodious 39. Of the Romans proved very profitable to the Commonwealth by being in the hands of many ibid. Well understood and practised by the Romans 38-49-61-80 Afterward grew corrupted and abject 69-73-74-75 Of the Turks how numerous well order'd and in continual Pay 186-193-195-196 Of the Christians much inferior to that of the Turks 186. Naval cannot of it self much enlarge the Dominion of a State 113. The Forces thereof are increased and maintained by those of the Land 114 N. NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choise of our actions 58 Nicolo Orsino Count of Pitioliano like Fabius Maximus and not like him 135 Nobles why aâ— first of little authority in Rome 2. Opposing the Communalty and hated by it 4. Authors of the destruction of Tyrannies 12 O. OCtavianus why easily entertained by the Army after Caesars death 52 P. PEace how it remains of it self being brought into States 164. How in these last times it is established in the minds of the Italian Potentates 165 How Peace Concord and Unity amongst Citizens ought to be preserved by Laws 121 Plutarch prefers Lycurgus before Numa 11 Pompey set up by the Senate to take down Caesar 47. His triumphs ibid. After the war with Mithridates quitted the
Army 51. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities 65. The laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the Romans and facilitated his enterprises 163 The People of Rome of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How from the beginning it was of great power and increased it more and more 15 Loving liberty how it came to lose it 51. Sought by seditions to obtain from the Senate all things though never so unjust 52 The People That to curb it Severity prevails more then Meekness 16. That out of its natural fickleness it useth to favour a Forein Prince and by seditions and violent attempts to plot against the present Power 170 A Prince shall do well and wisely to have a care that no Subject of his grow to be suspected for his greatness 106. Must not for his own relief make use of Forein aids that he may be too strong for his Native forces 103 Princes what sort of Militia it is best for them to make use of in their expeditions and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of War and the choice of Commanders 145. Those of Italy have used to imploy foreign Commanders and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122 See more in States R. REpublicks how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known 18. How at last they grow to be Tyrannies 54. That a State deserves not the name of a Commonwealth or Republick where the Decrees of the People and not the Laws carry all the command 6. For the long preservation and quietness of them nothing more necessary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Dominion 112 Rome was a mixt but imperfect Commonwealth and why 3-11 Was too Popular 3. Why it could not free it self from many disorders 14 How long it held its greatness 68. When and how she might have freed herself from her many bad qualities and defects ibid. How she abounded in Soldiers and Commanders 39-64-74-80 How she made way for Monarchy 39. She scatter'd her corruptions amongst the Nobles and the Communalty 50. That those Citizens proved worst oppressors to her whom for the meer conservation of her Liberty she had too much exalted 51 Her first second and third Age 59. Her first seven Kings of what considerable benefit they were to her 60. At what time she deserved the praise of good Government 61 Romans why they refused the Carthaginians aid against Pyrrhus 26. Refused to have peace with Pyrrhus ibid. For what causes chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not so much present dangers as future 45. Out of one War they still framed another 46 Why they were invincible according to Polybius 78. The two pretences under which they made their most notorious acquisitions 161. How by Colonies they kept their new Subjects in loyalty and obedience 173 Romulus a man fierce ambitious and desirous to enlarge his Estate train'd up the People according to his genius 113 S. SCipio Africanus his worth and actions 29-33 Why he took a course differing from that of Fabius 33. His passage into Sicily of what benefit it was 35 Scipio Nafica when Carthage was taken disswaded the Senate from destroying that City 46. Whether that counsel of his were founded upon good reason ibid. The Senate of Rome what number it consisted of and when first instituted 14 Its authority 4. The generous answer she gave to the Ambassadors of Pyrrhus 26-89 Little esteemed of by Julius Caesar 46. Subject to corruptions 50. Severity in what sort of Commonwealth it doth good 57. Was very great in Cato ibid. Sylla brought into Rome licentious living 51. Increased the Order of the Senators to counterpoise the Communalty Gave honors and riches to his Favorites ibid. Soldan of Caire how and why he lost all his Kingdom in a short time 160 Solyman parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mind and fortune 157. His great atchievements 158. Why he made no great progress in Hungary 159. nor at Corfu against the Venetians ibid. Why he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms 196 Sparta a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11 That authority which the Kings had there not prejudicial to it 48. Many worthy men flourished in it by reason of the form of its government 58 For want of money could not enlarge her Empire 82 Spartans when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the rest in Land forces ibid. Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls 171 States whence their divers changes come 53. How men grow desirous of their change 72. Are augmented and preserved by the same things which gave them their beginning and corrupted by the contrary 73. Where they have been ruin'd by intestine discords the over-great height of some of their own hath been the cause 105. That they have their beginning increase stay declination and ruine 86 Sâ—ilico a Barbarian and by nation a Hun called to the command of the Roman Army betrays the Empire 89 T. THebans much esteemed of for the discipline of their Soldiers called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas famous Commanders of theirs ibid. Themistocles what his advice was and his Naval victory against the Persians 99 Tiberius Gracchus slain by the Nobles of Rome without any revenge from the People 17 Tribuneship in Rome of how great power and its insolence 6. Called Sacrosanctus 52 Triumph in Rome when first instituted and to whom first granted 62 Turks their assistance refused by the Venetians and yet sued for by other Christian Princes 136. Why they cannot so suddenly nor easily do any signal enterprises by Land 161. Are accustomed for their own security to destroy the inhabitants of such places as they take in especially those of the better and richer sort 172. Their chiefest strength consists in their Cavalry 187 Their Law promiseth everlasting reward in heaven to every one that loseth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194 V. VAlerius Publicola why in reforming the government of Rome he yielded many things to the People 14-15 That he might have order'd the City better ibid. Venice in time brought her Government to perfection 12. How she hath been able to preserve her Liberty thus long 54. What her Government is ibid. When it began 77-116 Her Founders lovers of Peace and of an intent and end differing from that of the Founders of Rome ibid. Her greatest and most difficult attempts have been either in their own Defence or for Religion or in Assistance of others 115. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations she at her first beginning underwent 117. Why she made use of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders 121. That for having accustomed to imploy Foreign Commanders she hath not been able by reason of their disloyalty to prosecute such Enterprises of hers as had been
prejudicial to permit private men to grow to such immoderate riches as equalling therein the most Potent Kings there was a Citizen of Rome who arrived to such greatness as he said He ought not to be esteemed rich who could not out of his own Revenue maintain an Army Whence it arose that the Nobility being much envied and suspected by the people the way was opened to the Gracchi to excite those hemous disorders which ended not but with the utter ruin of the Commonwealth Provision was long before hand by the Law against such disorders Licineus the Tribune having instituted so to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobility that no Citizen should possess above Five hundred Acres of Land But these Orders in Civil Affairs were so weak and imperfect as one Law might easily be broken by introducing a contrary custom The Nobles therefore little esteeming the Licinean Law did very much increase their wealth and fraudulently usurping the publick Territories which were wont to be kept for the benefit of the people brought in Forainers to manure them so as the people being become very poor and seeing the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia did very unwillingly suffer such an injury and did very willingly listen and adhere unto any one who would feed them with hopes of bringing things to a just equality wherefore such as were seditious took occasion to try Novelties so as at last in the times of the Gracchi recourse must be had unto Arms and civil Differences must be thereby decided which as shall by and by be more clearly shewn might have been long before foreseen for such Customs did much disorder the Commonwealth not onely in that they partook not of civil modesty but by their being clean contrary to the Laws of that City which lent most towards a Popular State all Authority being given by them to the People in their suffrages and also in the most important State-resolutions So as it seemed respect was only had to the liberty of dividing the Government amongst Citizens All places of Magistracie were equally common to all and small means kept not any one far from the Commonwealth they might marry togethâ—r Foreiners were easily made Free Denizens the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magistrates the manner of living was not free but very licentious And the supreme Authority of the Tribunes doth of all other things most cleerly shew what that Government was who being greatly respected and reverenced by all men and called by the superstitious title of Sacrâ—sancti they were so insolent in their office as a Tyrant could hardly have used more severity in his commands See how boldly a Tribune of the People made Marius Violaâ—â—â— a Nobleman be seised on commanding that he should be suddenly thrown head-long down the Tarpeian Rock for no other reason but that in a Speech which he had made he used some harsh words against the People But the Tribune Sulpitius using more violence came one morning into the Piatza with many armed men and driving away the Consuls who would have opposed such an action made Marâ—â—â— be decreed for the undertaking against Mithridates not caring though therein he went against the Laws which not being in any thing observed all good Institutions were made in vain whilst the Laws were violated and destroyed by the Tribunes too great power He then who shall consider these things will not say that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular yet many things were contrary to these as hath been considered in perpetuating the Government of the Armies and in the excessive Riches of some Citizens Some Popular Commonwealths as that of Athens used by a quite contrary advice to banâ—sh such Citizens ten years from the City who did for some excellent quality far exceed the rest In some others because they did in some sort partake of popularity the equallity of means or levelling was introduced so to content and please the people as in Sparta and certainly to grant but a limited power and but for a short time to Magistrates are excellent precepts of such Legislators as will constitute a free City For so all the Citizens may have their share of Government but none freely dispose thereof to his own proper use and then indeavour to bring things to an equality or at least provide so as they may not increase so immoderately as any one Citizen may be envied or suspected by the rest for his too great Power It is then no wonder if Rome were much divided since these things were not observed in her for by such a diversity of Orders she became a Body with two Heads and of two several shapes which occasioned continual domestick disorders in her For the Nobility glorying in the dignity of Consulship wherein they used great Authority and which they for the most part kept amongst themselves and being also proud of their wealth would usurp all the Government to themselves And on the other side the people bearing so great a sway in all things and relying much upon the Magistracy of the Tribunes were so insolent as they would acknowledge no obedience nor bear any respect to the Laws or to the Magistrates thereof but would resolve all things according to their own fancy and as made most for their advantage which made that City which was so potent in Military and Foraign Affairs very weak in such as were Civil and Domestick for such a division of power in men of contrary minds keeps the forces of the City with much prejudice divided whilst the one of them contesting with the other they hinder the resolutions and executions of important Affairs as it often fell out in Rome for necessity urging to list Forces to march against the Enemy the Tribunes were presently ready to incense the people so as there was none that would give a name to the Militia which Insolencies were increased by the peoples being able to do it safely For the Tribunes minding nothing else but how to make their Faction powerful accepted of the Appeals of every popular man though in unjust causes to the end that the people might be the more respected by the Nobility and more ready and bold to raise seditions whereby they did always increase their power and had by these means obtained many things from the Senate The Nobles likewise no less sollicitous to increase their authority that they might keep back the Peoples insolencie sought always to keep them low and did with like endeavours maintain those of their own Order in all Judgments So as in punishing or in absolving of faults it was oftentimes a thing of greater consideration whether the party concerned were a Nobleman or a Plebeian then whether he were guilty or innocent And hence great prejudice arose unto the Commonwealth for all Justice was soon corrupted without which no good Order can be kept and each Party valuing the publick welfare but a little out of
short time in any whatsoever Estate but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker and the excellencie of Laws is found by the long continuance thereof Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased cannot be said to be truly Popular but such may be so esteemed whereby the State is long preserved Wherefore many things being ordered in Rome without this temperance in favor of the People they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity Thus Licentiousness of living frequent Meetings Appeals to the Tribunes Freedom in accusing and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People served for the building up of Tyranny and wrought Romes final ruine Which was formerly seen in Athens which being constituted by Solon in a too Popular condition soon lost her Liberty and was possest by a Citizen of hers named Pisistratus who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him by attributing too much to the People So what is intended for good proves often fatal if not well understood But having discoursed sufficiently of the Form of the Government it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions by which the perfection of every State may be the better known In ordering a City respect is to be had to two things to what belongs to War to what belongs to Peace to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them but by certain Laws and may be equally preserved from forein plots and from home discords and to endeavour that as she cannot always enjoy Peace so she should not be continually molested with War But he who will consider the Actions of the Romans and the Institutions of their City will find them so seriously addrâ—st to Military affairs as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves then how to increase Empire by making one War beget another wherefore many Armies were instituted and many rewards for military valor to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy but not any thing wereby to accustom them to Justice Temperance and to other civil vertues whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity 'T is therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire and such Glory in times of War and in times of Peace like rusty Iron lost all her lustre So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no sooner ceased but much greater were excited at home by dissentions amongst the Citizens which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of War to the same Warlike order and discipline in which the City was excellently well instituted Which might for a while preserve her but when through the want of occasion of War she could not by that means correct her many disorders nor reduce herself to any setled condition for any space of time being still agitated by storms of Civil sedition she must at last be miserably lost when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity For this cause Scipio Nasica a very wise man would not consent to the destruction of Carthage knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war could not last long in idleness How can that Government then be termed good which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuously not the inlarging of her Empire Therefore the Philosopher said well That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from astions which relate to things abroad but from those which are used amongst Citizens It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth that she overcame the whole world since the perfection of Government lies in making a City vertuous not in making her Mistress of many Countries Nay the increasing of Territories as it is commonly coupled with some injustice so is it remote from the true end of good Laws which never part from what is honest Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived which denotes their imperfection Which happens not onely because they were not better accommodated in times of Peace but that for the great inlarging of Confines it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in Citizens and such as are too desirous to domineer which are easily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its self For it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick and bad in private Affairs For the general felicity of the whole City and the particular good of every Citizen is one and the same thing they onely differ in some certain respects Then taking ones argument from these things the end of this great Commonwealth might easibly be conjectured which as one said well was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk But grant that the lives of such States may be prolonged it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers Let Marius his example serve us to see what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate desire of Glory and Dominion who being alwaies bred up in Arms and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by ensuing Peace raised Mithridates King of Pontus against the Commonwealth to the end that being to make use of his Vallor he might recover his former Repute Thus Athens who once inâ—oyed a peaceful condition under Pericles his good Government when she turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet to Arms and Dominion and would change her manner of life she reaped the like Fruits of Ambition which by such Orders she had sowed in the minds of her Citizens For Alcibiades out of too immense a desire of Glory was he who of himself did incite the Lacedemonians against his Country by whom she was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire For all this you hear me not say that the study of Arms ought to be neglected which are very necessary in what soever State to defend ones self against the Injuries of Neighbors and to preserve Freedom and Liberty Nay Aristotle reprehends Plato for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the first but onely when they began to have Dominion But though they may be useful for some other respects Citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon Military Exercises as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the Militia and to place their greatest and chiefest Good and the welfare of their City therein But they must know that a man must travel further to find out felicity which is derived onely from vertuous actions reserved in Peace as the true fruits of the labours of War Let us then conclude that this part which was very excellent in Rome lost much of that praise which otherwise it might have deserved for the exquisiteness of its Orders because true use was not made thereof as
Commonwealth of Venice hath gotten an excellent Government but was not at first governed by those Laws which she now is But diversity of Occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her Citizens who adding new Orders to the old have brought her to such a height of perfection Which might the easilier be done because that City was free-born and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end to wit to Peace and Concord and to the Union of her Citizens But on the contrary other modern Republicks the Cities wherein such Governments were formed having been formerly long accustomed to obey Emperors since they got their Liberty by many Accidents they knew not as not being well acquainted therewith how to use it by reason of the Citizens various dispositions of mind So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government they in process of time return'd under the command of one These Considerations being applied to the City of Rome will prove that the prudence of her Citizens though they were very wise and valiant men was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth but they might have amended many great disorders in her which did much shorten her life For he who will consider the conditions of the people of Rome will find them to be such as no Form of Government could better agree with them then a Popular State for they were all warlike men bred up even from the very first foundation of the City in the exercise of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongst these which may have a certain similitude to an Aristocratical State when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws partake every man more or less of that Government according to their worth For Military discipline hath a certain species of Vertue though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a City yet this Government is very seldom met with and though it want the true and proper Form is commonly called by the usual name of a Commonwealth So as though at first the City of Rome leaned much thereunto in a short time the People had a great share therein who not knowing how to moderate themselves made it grow licentious But he who will look back even to her first beginning will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the City For the Peoples power and liberty was great not only after the driving out of the Tarquins but even when it was commanded by Kings that City seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the Form of a Commonwealth then of a Kingdom For after the death of Romulus the People being powerful as having the weapons in their hand and as being the first Founders of that City usurped the authority of choosing Kings who on the contrary side that they might the better confirm themselves in their new Kingdom endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the People and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals as appeared in Horatius his case who being condemned by the Magistrates for his Sisters death appealed to the People and was by them freed In favor of them likewise the City was divided into Centuries with a certain Order of a very small Tax according to which the Degrees of the Militia and the Authority of the Publick Courts things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State were to be distributed To boot with these Laws the great number of Citizens which did even then arise to One hundred and thirty thousand made the Peoples party very powerful as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the Commonwealth without receiving any pay for their pains But the Nobility was a long time very weak and in but little esteem For the first Founders of the City being Shepherds and all of the same condition there was no distinction of degree amongst them save what was soon after brought in 〈◊〉 Romulus who choosing the Senate out of all that former number that they might be assistant to the King in providing for things requisite for the State by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the People in this new City from the rest who gave the rise to the Roman Nobility But even this Order was very weak for it was at first instituted by Romulus but of a small number of men and though others were afterwards added thereunto yet till such time as the City got her liberty 〈◊〉 never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators nay even these were much lessened by the cruelty of Tarquinius Superbus and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoise of Regal power So as when the City put herself into Liberty there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of Optimati in this case did Publius Valerius find the City of Rome after the driving out of the Tarquins when he through Brutus his death remaâ—ning sole Consul was to constitute Laws and new mould the Commonwealth Wherefore desirous to introduce a State differing from the former under the name of Liberty it behoved him not to lessen but to encrease the Authority of the People For else they would not have indured it and by fiding with the Tarquins they might easily have confounded that Government and reduced the City again under the power of Kings For which reason also Brutus though he was first created Consul not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well established perswaded his Colleague Tarquinius Collatinus that to give satisfaction to the People to whom the name of Tarquin was become odious and suspitious to lay down his Consulship By these Reasons it appears that Valerius was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People as were the Appeals from the Consuls The order that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of Magistracy without the Peoples approbation the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the Consuls commands which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep Moreover he eased the poor of many grievances and made many other very Popular Laws whence he purchased the name of Publicola But which 't is understood that in ordering of the Commonwealth respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times yet if we shall consider other Accidents we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity for the new Legislator was not Prince as was Licurgus but possest a place of Magistracy for a short time the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known and not much valued So as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a Popular
the Magistracie of Consuls which occasioned many disorders which might easily have been corrected by a just fear as is cleerly seen by many examples but chiefly by this that the People being in insurrection and contumacious against the power of Consulship the creating of a Dictator a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult And what more manifest sign could there be given that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates then that which was given upon the occasion of Appius his Decemvirate For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny yet the authority of this Magistracie from which there was no Appeal to be made and the severity wherewith it was administred did so bridle the people as they patiently endured all injuries nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery till the Senate interposed it self and that Horatius and Valerius declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the Decemviri There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority or else if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be offâ—nded with the Nobles when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws this arising amongst many other beâ—efits from the Laws that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one being condemned by order of Law not by the Judge his will But what hath been noted of Publicola in this first beginning may also be known at all other times and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens who through ambition siding with the People were the cause of their pride and insolencie So the Consuls Valerius and Horatius not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate sought to have it from the People and the whole Senate not to multiply examples by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls Titus Quintus Cincinnatus and Geneus Iulius Mento who opposed them therein had recourse unto the Tribunes who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor But they were so blinded by Ambition as not knowing or not caring for such errors they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People by Presents Shews and submiss comportment And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of Rome themselves For it was ofttimes seen that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them And certainly amongst other things the Judgment which followed upon the cause between Menimiuâ— and Spurius Servilius was very remarkable who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes to wit that being Consuls they had opposed the Agrarian Law Menimius who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution was condemned but Spurius Servilius stoutly withstanding the Tribunes fury and speaking severely to the People was acquitted And Furius and Manilius who had both of them been Consuls being not long after accused the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them which did so affright his Colleagues and the People as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased all of them did willingly subscribe the Militia Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People and amongst other of his actions the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable for he made them be decimated very tenth man be put to death which was submitted unto without any the least tumult by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection Which was sufficient so far to curb them all as though they were all of them then in Arms every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends and of their own doubtful chance and which peradventure is a greater wonder and doth the better confirm this truth Appius being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes after he had laid down the Consulship using the same severity in defending himself he was not held less guilty for having been formerly Consul So as the People neither willing to absolve him nor daring to condemn him the cause was put off and he suffered to depart And in the latter times when the Peoples power was greatest Tiberius Gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the Licinian Law the Nobles changing their habits and shewing great humility labored to win favor from the People but since they saw they could do no good by this means they resolved for their last refuge to use force and kill'd the Author of those seditions Which action of theirs did so astonish the People as they suffered the Tribunes death whom they had so dearly loved and who had lost his life in defence of their cause to go unrevenged And soon after Caius Gracchus reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured the Nobles using the same cunning sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor making use of another Tribune to this purpose by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate But humility avail'd no more at this time then it had done formerly so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms they slew Caius Gracchus in the Aventine and after the death of two Brothers annull'd all the Laws made by them nor did the People ever seem to resent it Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate as hath been touched upon doubtless these ruder remedies as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth might have freed her from many mischiefs This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof threatening to create a Dictator it kept the Terentilla Law from being made of creating a Magistracie of five men who were to correct the Consuls power But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunities it did only invite them
to endeavour more novelties so as Humility made them not more quiet but more insolent Wherefore having obtained Appeals they would have a Magistrate of their own endowed with supreme authority and having gotten the power of the Tribunes they could not stop there but would be admitted into the Consulship into the Dictatorship and to all other sort of Dignities and having obtained all sort of Honors they began to aspire to the Estates of the Nobles who being too late aware of their Error to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing and not being able to remedy themselves by the Laws or by Magistracy they were forced to have recourse to Arms to moderate the Peoples Insolencie Whence it may be concluded that the Romans not having used those means neither at the first making of their Laws nor almost at any other time in any of their Actions which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth was the reason why remaining alwaies as it were a distempered body wherein ill humours did continually encrease she was alwaies sickly perplext by so many civil Discords and and came to a shorter period of life then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions The example of this powerful and famous Republick if we will well obserserve her civil Orders and what proceeded from thence and if they shall be measured by truer and more general Rules may instruct us excellently well how to discern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States And say it will not serve to correct Errors already too much confirmed by corrupt Customs it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every Government and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto holding notwithstanding that Disorder for a truer Rule then all Orders which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Accidenâ—s upon which our civil Actions do depend not onely regulated by humane wisdom but subject for ought that appears to us in many things to a certain casualty though they be indeed directed by assured though hidden causes reserved in the bosom of Divine Providence whereunto our Reason cannot reach Therefore if following the usual manner of speech we shall in these our Discourses make often use of the names of Chance and Fortune let them be understood in this true and pious manner The Second DISCOURSE What Success the Roman Affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his Victorious Army into Italy THE Republick proved more fortunate then any other State in many things so as he had reason on his side who said That Fortune who was usually an Enemy to vertue had made Truce with her that she might exalt that City to the highest pitch of Greatness But this may chiefly be acknowledged from her being freed from the necessity into which the course of time had brought her of making trial of her Forces against those of Alexander the Great who after having conquered Darius and subjugated Persia together with other Nations did not bethink himself of turning into Europe and chiefly into Italy rather then into the utmost parts of the East Or that from having accomplished so many famous Interprizes in Arabia and in the Indies being as yet but in his youth he lived no longer to carry his Victories over the other parts of the world not as yet concerned in his Forces though invaded by his immense desire of Dominion It will certainly be worth the consideration whether if Alexander had at first had any such thought or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect to think what influence he would have had upon the Affairs of Rome This doubt was put by Livy who in the Ninth Book of the first Decade of his Histories betook himself to discourse of what might have happened if the Roman Commanders had been to have made War against Alexander But without considering any thing which might make against his opinion he bends all his reasons to prove that the Roman Forces would have proved Victorious if they had chanced to have fought against those of Alexander the Great which he resolves for as great a certainty as if the effect had ensued Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of those things which Livy relates of his Romans We can take no surer way to know what would have been the success of things not done then to consider what hath been done which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things if occasion should have served Let us then cast an eye upon what Alexanders actions were in those times and what those of the Roman Commonwealth and we shall see what might have been expected from the worth of Force and either of them if trial had been made thereof Alexanders Enterprizes were sufficiently famous and known to all men since the recounting of them hath wearied so many Writers And Plutarch who writ the Lives of the valliantest and most magnanimous men of so many ages In his Preface to that of Alexander excuseth himself with he doth not in relating the lives of any others if he be not able sufficiently to write all his actions by reason of their number and worth But the Romans Enterprizes in that age were not in themselves very great nor very greatly cried up by others Though those which they afterwards performed did for glory out-do what ever was done by any other Potentate So as Reputation and Fame which bear so great a sway in all our operations but chiefly in what belongs to War was without all doubt greater in Alexander then in those Roman Captains who flourished in his time when the greatness of the Roman Commonwealth was but in its rise and first beginning But let us come to some further particular The Commonwealth had not as then inlarged her Confines further then into Latium into some parts of Umbria and into Picenum amongst people who were very near the Volsci and the Aequi. Their Armies were not yet marched out of Italy which they did not till they made War with the Carthaginians Whence it is to be gathered that the Commonwealth was as yet but weak and not accustomed to those more weighty and important Actions of War wherein in after Ages it must be confest she did great and wonderful things But at this time many vertues in the Citizens of Rome and the customs of the City not as yet corrupted were more to be exalted then their Military valour which though their souls might be full of yet they wanted illustrious occasions to exercise it And those so many famous Commanders which as Livy says may be paralelled with Alexander Fabius Maximus Valerius Corvinus Lucius Papyrius Titus Manlius Torquatus and others of that Age what great Fears of Arms did they The War was as yet made as it were
Mithridates Iugurth and so many others where the then almost lost name of the Carthaginians did not concur But if it had proved true that the Commonwealth of Rome when Carthage should be destroyed should have remained in idleness so harmful to her liberty if Scipio's counsel had proved successful and those evils had been taken away which be feared would befall the Commonwealth Carthage was not only not to have been undone but her power should have been suffered to increase for it is seen by what hath been said that War of it self was not able to keep the Citizens united but was rather that which did divide them But this peradventure might have been done by War wherein their own defence had been only conceined and the keeping of themselves from danger And yet it is an absurd thing to say that an Enemy must be preserved and men must be continually in trouble and danger of War for the conservation of a City But say I beseech you was thâ—re not forty three years between the first and second Carthaginian war And yet though Rome was free from dangers and from being troubled by the Carthaginians nay for some years every where more quiet then she ever was at any other time yet fell she not upon those great mischiefs of civil contentions which she afterwards incurr'd in the greatest heat of her â—orest Wars This was occasioned because the City was not as yet corrupted as it was afterwards because it grew old and because there was not any that knew by correcting her disorders to return her to her first principles What danger can ensue unto or can harm the common liberty or authority of Citizens either in War or in Peace whilst the Laws are observed And when the Laws are trampled under foot what State can be free from the snares of the Enemy The Spartan Kings had not supreme authority in War but War being governed by good Laws could never injure them Power intrusted in Citizens with due measure and temper was never prejudicial And behold an example thereof On the one side Agesilam King of Sparta being Commander in chief of the Army against Farâ—â—bassus and being entred Asia with great hopes of signal victories when he was called home by the Magistracie of the Ephori readily obeyed On the oâ—her side Caesar being already returned into Italy from the French enterprise will contrary to the will of the Senate keep the Army together and despiseth the authority thereof Cato's counsel of destroying Carthage might then have proved good not of it self but when the Romans being safe for these Enemies and setled in a condition of not being to fear any Forein forces could have ordered unto themselves a firm and quiet Civil State It was known by experience that the other agreement made with the Carthaginians had done but little good For they keeping still the same mind though not the same fortune did not let slip any occasion of throwing off the yoke of slavery which the Romans had put upon them So as the only means to rest secure from their Forces since their words were not to be trusted was to put them out of their antient nest and to make them live far from the Sea as they were commanded to do after that their Country was destroyed so to bereave them of the opportunity of the Sea by means whereof that Commonwealth was grown great and powerful But wherein was the quiet of Rome bettered by the ruine of Carthage if they would have to do with more barbarous Nations and Nations further off not moved thereunto through fear nor provoked by any injury thinking their Empire was only to be bounded by the Confines of the Earth What had the Parthians of common with the Commonwealth of Rome what injury had they then done her to make the Romans take up arms against them yet Crassus had a mind to find them out in those far distant parts whereby to draw upon himself and the Roman Armies so many great losses and ruines as they were to undergo in that War The overthrow of Carthage should peradventure have taken from the Citizens of Rome their desire of continual warfaring as it took from them the occasion of being in Arms but it did not so for the cause which produced and nourish'd these thoughts was internal not external So as they were not provoked to Arms but did rather provoke others and when they fought not for the welfare they fought for the glory of the Empire For all the Orders of that City consisted only in the exercise of the Militia But how could a City be long preserved which was wholly bent upon those things which were the means to bring her to her end how could she enjoy true civil felicity if she knew not what it was and did not value it but did abhor that peace and quiet which begers civil felicity Therefore if that Commonwealth had been well instituted in civil Orders and that when Carthage was destroyed she had known which she did not how to lay down Arms this had been the way to bring her to much good nay to the true and chief good of civil felicity not to the ruine and perdition thereof So as if Scipio doubted that the introducing of Idleness into Rome might bring with it such notable disadvantage it was perhaps because knowing the imperfections of that Government he feared not that Idleness which the laying down of Arms is wont to produce but that which is born and doth increase with the corrupt customs of Cities by which contrary but wholly pestiferous effects are begot en as the making of some Citizens love pleasures and hate labor and toil and others strangely proud lovers of brawls and novelty The Athenians endeavoring to banish this sort of Idleness from out their City committed the care thereof to the chief and most severe Magistrate called Areopagus But that true and vertuous Quiet which is opposed unto Toil and which as a thing to be desired ought to be sought for in a City doth not banish but doth nourish true generosity of mind which makes men willingly enter when need requires into the dangers of War for honesty sake and for the defence of their Country not out of ambition and desire of self-greatness And to free the City from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies the Carthaginians was not contrary to this So as I may conclude That it was not the destruction of Carthage but the ill Government of Rome which wrought her ruine The Eighth DISCOURSE Why Rome could not regain her Liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquins first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri MAny do not without reason wonder why the City of Rome which after having droven the Tarquins out who had reigned for above Two hundred and forty years And which having afterwards made Appâ—us Clandius and the other Decemvirl lay down their Magistracy who usurpâ—d
as depended on him which was that which made his faction so potent And truly he who will consider it well will finde that as long as Rome retained any Form of a Commonwealth Cato's power was no less then was Caesars for he oftentimes bore it even against Caesar As when the business of those that were Complices with Câ—iline in his conspiracy was in hand in the Senate they being accused by Cato and defended by Caesar were condemned to be put to death And also another time when he opposed the publishing of the Law proposed and favoured by Caesar touching the division of Lands in Latium wherein Cato's authority appeared to be the greater by making Caesars amâ—â—tious designs fail of success is so popular things as were the Agrarian Laws The same success had the things maintained by Caesar against Poâ—â—pey though he was more powerful then any other Citizen for having stoutly opposed Metellus who moved at the time of Cataline's conspiracy that Pompey should together with his Army be recalled back to Rome he carried the business which was the cause why these two prime Citizens endeavored the friendship and good will of Cato for they doubted of compassing what they desired without his good will so great was his Authority Caesar when Cato appeared to be his bitterest enemy procured Cato's releasement when he was imprisoned by order from the Senate And Pompey that he might be fastened to him by the bond of Alliance endevored to have his Neece for Wife Whence it is conceived that Cato's austere behaviour had purchased him more Authority though unarmed in the management of the Commonwealth then the reputation of having commanded Armies and their so much obsequiousness to the people had done to Pompey and Caesar. A just occasion then offers it self here of consideration whether was the better and safer course taken to arrive at Glory and Civil Greatness or that which Caesar or that which Cato took Caesars comportments seem to have been more noble and better defitting a Civil life as also more easie to be imitated and what indeed is of more importance for the happiness of a City then quietness and concord amongst Citizens What more proper to produce and preserve this then Magnificence Grace and Affability all which vertues were proper to Caesar and which by a straight and speedy way guided him to the height of greatness and glory He who desires to obtain this favour from Citizens must abstain from doing any injury must seek out all occasions of doing good must attribute much to others must speak moderately of himself must do good things and make them appear to be so so as he may help not onely by his actions but by his example Rigor Severity the neglect of all other respects where there is onely an upright mind to do well things which are sufficiently commendable in Cato may of themselves peradventure border nearer upon true vertue but bear a less proportion with civil vertue if respect be had to that which is found not to that which is desired Who does not value the love of his Citizens or will not endeavor the acquisition thereof save by very upright ways which are not always possible meets with continual occasion of contention from whence great and open enmities do often arise which do at last put the City into confusion So as such men do first ruine themselves and then the Commonwealth When laws are observed with such extremity of rigor it seems to be done to oppress Citizens not to preserve Justice Wherefore such a Government is but little acceptable and therefore easier to receive alteration upon any accident that shall happen This was seen in Cato's actions for his way of proceeding got him many enemies who that they might make themselves able to bulk with his Authority made themselves strong by Alliances and Friendships and became not onely formidable to him but even to the Commonwealth If Cato had not despised the Parentage offered him by Pompey Caesar had not joyned alliance with him by giving him his Daughter Iulia for Wife which was the occasion of both their too excessive greatness by which they ruined the Commonwealth The people were not pleased with Cato's severe way of proceeding which made them the more easily adhere to Caesar and his Associats and so not perceiving it became enemles to the Commonwealth Therefore Caesar might still continue in the peoples good opinion and long preserve his Authority and Power But Cato though his counsels did sometimes prevail yet was not his Dignity and Power grounded upon so sound foundations as that he could alwaies keep himself in the â—â—me condition Nay sometimes things were born against him in the choyce of Consuls when people much more unworthy then he were Corrivals with him The little pleasingness of his proceedings was also cause though under pretence of honor and publick imployment why he was sent from the City and in a manner banished being sent by Sea to Cyprus for some concernments of that Kingdom so as the Common-wealth suffered by his absence and particularly Cicero who was formerly upheld by Cato's authority and held for a Defender of the publick Liberty was banished By these things the question seems cleerly enough decided that Caesars way of proceeding is much more easie and certain to bring a man to dignity and greatness then the way which Cato took Yet he who on the other side shall examine Cato's manners and actions as he will find them more praise-worthy so will he think that they may lead by a righter and more direct way to true Honor and to that greatness which is to be desired by him that lives in a Commonwealth For he takes a safer and a more noble way to arrive at Dignity who walks by the way of true Vertue of Justice Modesty and Temperance then he who endeavors the like by Popular Favor For that Favor which is won by a good repute and by vertuous actions is easily preserved by herself and of herself nay the cry'd-up Honor which ariseth from publick Imployments and Places if it be not grounded upon true worth soon vanisheth and leaves that in obscurity which did before shine forth so bright But he who deals uprightly doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion and confirms himself more and more in the habit of well-doing So that Favor which hath so good a leaning-stock is more firm and stable whereas that which is purchased by extrinsecal appearances as it is easilier gotten so is it upon any slight occasion more easily lost For those who are moved to favor for such reasons are incited so to do rather out of their own humor or for their own advantage then out of any true affection that they bear to such persons And therefore growing either glutted of the same things they did so like at first or thinking that they may receive them in a larger proportion from others they change their minds and turn their liking
the Commonwealth was to honor him with the name of Pater Patriae and to compare his actions to those of Romulus and of those that followed next after him from whom as from the first Founders of the City of Remâ— it was generally granted that the rest had received power and vertue to imitate them The custom was therefore always observed in Rome of honoring her Birth-day with solemn sacrifices as that which by its happy Auspices had not only given excellent Auguries but as it were a certain vigor to the so many other Felicities which did at all times accompany her And it was particularly interpreted for an excellent Augury of the City of Rome's greatness and of her increase in power and authority over all the Latines that she was born and increased from the ruines of Alba most of the Latines having been Colonies of the ruined City of Alba. Now if we shall consider what may be alleadged on the behalf of the second Romans we shall find such and so many things to be said for them as the first Garland of the glory of Rome's greatness may seem to be due to them without offence to any others For he who shall weigh things well shall find that this Age brought forth more noble and truer Examples of real worth then any other so as they did not only excell themselves but even all Foreiners For the military valor which flourished in the Citizens of Rome of this Age was accompanied with other excellent vertues and especially with vast charity towards their Country not for their own glory but out of love to her greatness and prosperity Danger was so despised by some of them as some famous men amongst them did even sacrifice themselves and their lives for their Countries welfare as the examples of Curtius and of the two Decii do even at this day much to their glory shew The generous Commanders in that Age did contemn riches as well as danger so as they overcame not only their Enemies but even themselves things which were praised and admired in Quintus Cincinnatus in Fabritius and in Paulus Aemilius But how famous did they prove in matter of War and worthy of that praise which is given to excellent Commanders He who shall consider how Enterprises were managed by the two Papyrii the Father and the Son against the Samnites what the Forces of the conquered Enemies were of what advantage their victory was to the Romans will confess that their merits came not short of any neither in those nor in the following times This Age was often to withstand the Galls who were powerful and bitter Enemies to the Romans by whom the very City of Rome was assaulted and indangered for the delivery whereof Furius Camillus grew so famous But this was not the only occasion of trying the Roman Forces against the French in those times Quintus Servilius Ala and Q. Fabius withstood them when the French returning more powerful then before neer to the City of Rome by means of these illustrious Commanders their whole endeavors proved vain In this Age divers Pâ—ople of Italy did sundry times jointly conspire against the City of Rome which the more formidable she grew to her neighbors the more did a common apprehension make them arm against her And notwithstanding she did not only seem not daunted amidst those dangers but having still the better of those by whom she was infested she increased by the ruine of others For these reasons Forein forces were called in by the very Italians and Pyrrbus was received into Italy that he might wage war with the Romans whose renown was so great as the chief honor in matters of war was given by Hannibal to Pyrrbus And he who in a few words will conceive the worth of the Commanders in this Age let him say that Livy who was much versed in the Roman affairs did attribute so much to the Commanders of this Age as he esteemed them not only equal but superior to Alexander the Great holding for certain that if Alexander after he had conquered Darius had turned into Italy he would have left the glory that he won in Persia when he should have met with the Roman Forces commanded by Fabius Maximus Valerius Coâ—vinus Papyrius Cursor and Titus Manlius But above all things it is worth consideration that in this Age the City of Rome was confirmed and established with more certain and useful orders as well in Civil as in Military Affairs whereby she long after was governed and by vertue whereof she chiefly arrived at such a height of greatness Great were the rewards which were given in Rome to military worth and those Citizens were much egg'd on by glory to great undertakings and sharp sufferings Triumph was a great ornament and glory to victorious Commanders which was first used to honor the Consul Post humius for the Victory he wan over the Sabins The first equestral Statuâ—s were likewise an invention of this Age which were granted to Consuls who overcame the Latins in Battel In this Age the Mural and Civick Garlands were first used to the end that there might be rewards for every mans worth The wintring of Soldiers in the Fields and under Tents was begun to be used by the Romans in this Age a thing which proved so useful and necessary afterwards in greater and farther distant enterprises What did more advantage the City of Rome in her greatest dangers and weightiest occasions then the authority of Dictator a Magistracy of reverend majesty and which proved so often the true and onely remedy to maintain the affairs of Rome in their less prosperous times This was first created in Rome to resist the forces of Forty Populi Latini who were joyned in league together against the Romans and against whom Posthumius was created the first Dictator But how reverend and unviolable the observance of military orders were with the Commanders of this Age may be demonstrated by the famous examples of the severity of Posthumius and of Manlius Torquatus against their own Sons who for not obeying the command of their Superiors though it were accompanied with noble daring and happy success was punished by death And as this age was busied in perpetual Wars new Wars being perpetually raised up by the same people of Latium and Toscany whom they had often overcome so to it that Fortitude Vertue of mind and Military Discipline is chiefly to be attributed by which the people of Rome proved more excellent then all other Nations For this so continual exercise of Arms for so many years together did so accustom the City to Military Affairs as it was not onely easie for those that followed after to tread in the footsteps of these their Predecessors but almost necessary for the preservation of the City which being long accustomed to labor and warlike occupations could not nor would not without intestine disorder live in idleness And as for the orders in Civil Affairs certainly no small praise is likewise
that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors whom by reason of the said Armies all Provinces were to obey there being no Militia like to that of the Romans or which could resist them or withdraw themselves from their yoke But great was the diversity in all things almost in all Ages for the height of Empire was arrived at by several ways Some got it by Inheritance as Tiberius Caligula Nero and in the following Constantinus Constantius and many others some though very few were câ—â—sen by the Senate many by the Emperors themselves who in their life-time chose some one for their Companions and Successor in the Empire calling him Caesar to whom after the former Emperors death the Title of Emperor and of Augustus was given But their number were most who got the Empire through favor of the Solâ—iery wherein one and the same respect did not always prevail but many much different considerations regard sometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former Emperors sometimes to worth and to some singular action of War sometimes to favor which Commanders knew some way or other how to come by from their Armies and sometimes to some other such like things Whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition but even of divers Nations were made Emperors of Rome Trajan and Theodotius were Spainards â—robus Giovinianus and Valentinus Hungariaâ—s Dicclesian a Dalmarian Cato a Slavonian and some others But that which made the difference greater was that this Empire as it was diversly gotten so was it diversly administred By some so tyrannically as there is no so infamous and wicked vice whereof you find not shameful examples in the lives of Tibeâ—us Caligula Nero Commodus Caracalla Heliogabolus and other of those Emperors whereas the Empire was governed by some others with such Wisdom and Justice as no more perfect Regal Government can almost be imagined And what excellent vertue not to speak of Augustus was there to be desired in Vespatian Titus Trajan Adrian Antoninus Marcus Aurelius Alexander Severus and such like Whence it was that there having been good and bad Emperors in divers Ages as much of Dignity Authority and Power as this Empire lost through the bad Government of those wicked Princes it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of these good and vertuous Princes And this may be alledged for the first reason why the Empire was able to preserve it self for so long a space of years For being for a while run into many disorders sâ—ch as were introduced by the baseness and negligence of other their Predecessors were by the worth of generous Princes amended and returned to their first channel The Romans antient and confirmed use of good military orders did likewise help well towards this Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy persons yet finding the usual Armies already raised and ready for any enterprise they were able by means of their Commanders to wage war successfully and to quiet such rising and rebellions as continually arose in so great an Empire Thus Tiberius did not onely return France which had rebelled to obedience but subjugated Comagena and Cappadocia and driving out their Kings reduced them to Provinces Nero drove the Parthians out of Armenia and placed King Tigranes there making that Kingdom Tributory to the Empire Claudius did not onely reduce Mauritania which by means of her Commanders made insurrection against the Empire but did himself in person pass with his Army into England to appease the Risings of that Island and yet these Princes were not thought to have of themselves any great worth in them These and some other such like causes may perhaps be alleadged why this Empire could maintain it self in that greatness to which it was arrived But to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after as a thing very strange of it self as also for many other notable consequences to wit to the causes of its declining and ruine Three may in my opinion be chiefly alleadged The immeasurable greatness of the Empire the simplicity and wickedness of those who governed it and the corruption of customs which were far different from those with which it was first founded and wherein it grew great Humane imperfection is the cause why mans vertue as it is not onely finite and bounded but weak â—â—d brittle so hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded but circumscribed within no very large limits which were it otherwise it would loose it self in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to escape safe And of this to omit the examples of many other of our actions we will onely consider for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand That his worth must be exceeding great who is to rule and command over others Phylosophers have affirmed That such a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth as he doth in Dignity and Power nay that his worth and vertue ought to weâ—gh against that of all those that he will rule over But let us pass by these supreme Eminences which are rather to be desired then ever hoped to be found 'T is very certain that it is very hard to govern an Empire well and the greater it is the greater is the difficulty of governing it Wherefore Lycurgus a very wise Legislator knowing that the quiet of a City and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition and with a certain Form of Government ought to be the true cause of ordaining good Laws would of his own election so dispose of his Spartans and of the orders of that Commonwealth as she should not be able much to enlarge her Confines But on the contrary Rome as all the constitutions of the City and the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the Common-wealth so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace not onely by reason of foreign Forces but not by occasion of discord between the Citizens The bounds of her Empire grew to be almost immense and she marcht with her Forces to the utmost parts of the Earth subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous Nations But at last not having almost any foreign Enemies to fight with her Citizens begun to make use of their Armies which had conquered other Nations in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves till at last the worth and fortune of Caesar prevailed so as Augustus remained sole Lord of the World and Tiberius who succeeded him entered peaceably into so great an Empire wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers train'd up in a perpetual Militia and by reason of Civil Wars accustomed to live very licentiously The greatest acquisitions of the largest and farthest distant Provinces were very lately made there having been above 1700 Cities taken by two onely Commanders Caesar and Pompey and powerful Nations vanquished So as it behoved to
Men but amongst bruit Beasts yea even amongst Vegetables Then since this Equality is not to be found amongst Men it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a Government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal For in conferring of honors or pâ—eferments in a City or State a Geometrical not an Arithmetical proportion must be observed It is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed He who is richer then another may be serviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick He who hath many Clients and Friends may by his power and authority dispose 〈◊〉 Peoples minds to believe â—ell and act well in the Cities occasions and affairs He who is advanced above others in glory must have deâ—erâ—â—d it well of the Commonwealth by some noble action and 〈◊〉 confirâ—t himself therein by some other like action And he Who is â—â—â—re generally given to any Vertue be it or Warlike or Civil is always 〈◊〉 then others to serve his Country and Prince upon all occasions So as to drive 〈◊〉 men as these out of the City is no better then to cut that member from the body which is loveliest and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto Such an Instiâ—uâ—ion then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments And the examples alleadged of Thrasâ—â—alâ—â— and Tarquin are examples of Tyranâ—â— who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominionr were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men and endeavor to be quit of thâ—â— for their greater security But a just Prince must not imiteate such examples â—ay even in a Politick Government these Proceedings would be pernicious For he who will thereby preserve himself must change the Form of the whole Government and reduce it to a Despoâ—ical and servile condition with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie as it hath done to the Turks in these later times and formerly in some other Nations wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount without any respect to the good of the Subject and more according to will then to Law Nor is it true that the power of Citizens or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom proves alwas harmful it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State But this may be ill uâ—ed as many other things are the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City would ruine it not bring it to perfection Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things not the things themselves when they are not simply and in themselves evil And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated and their continuing is their military Commands moderated by a shorter time Caesar could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army and in the same Province Nor had they needed to have raised Pompey to such a height to oppose Caesars greatness But when when they had let it run on too long to declare him an Enemy to his Country and drive him out of Italy proved a violent remedy and mortal to the Common-wealth Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended by the banishment of so many Citizens who being become too great are for suspition drives out of their Country of securing themselves from their power rather Injury added to Ambition serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State to râ—ise some revolt in it for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd is rather increased then diminished We have infinite examples in all Ages of those who being driven by banishment out of a City or State have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto For though it cannot be denied but that the â—o great power of Citizens in a City or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom begets suspition and is dangerous and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State yet some other remedy thâ—◠〈◊〉 may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do 〈…〉 For that is only to suffer a â—ore to grow old and to gangrene that they 〈…〉 wards forcâ—d to 〈…〉 or sword to heal it In a well-govern'd State 〈…〉 be had and caâ—â— taken both by the Law it self and by the Prince who rules is chief therein not to suffer any one to grow to too 〈…〉 And if any 〈◊〉 do arrive at such a condition as he begins too far to overtop the reâ—â— the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away and of his ploting thoughts so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties or disturb the publick peace Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same imployments and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place such things ought not to be left in their power which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughâ—â— to the prejudice of the publick good which may be done under a pretence of honor so as the Princes may not be noted for injustice nor can the particular persâ—nages account it as an injury done them If any one do abound in riches let him have expensive imployments that he may lessen that wealth which made him appear more eminent then others If he be of too great authority in the Court or amongst the People as having had the management of important affairs along time send him to some place of Magistracie or other imployment a far off and change him often from place to place If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him give him hard and difficult imployments wherein if he succeed not well his reputation will soon grow less with the people who judge by the events But if such a one appear too much ambitious and be so as many men are seen to be out of a certain vain-glory but without any malice of heart he may be contented and kept quiet by confering honors upon him of glorious appearance but little profit But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended and of better blood then others fâ—r many several respects meet often times in them to make them great and powerful yet even against these remedies may be found without
Province it so fell out that aspiring either wholly or chiefly thereat they minded not the annoying of other Nations by their Forces In Africa the Carthaginians were very strong the power of Carthage being almost at the same times as much increased as was the like of Rome in Italy So as she had the Dominion of many provinces of Europe and did possess the greatest part of Spain but this power did not any waies molest the Romans first designs not did it hinder them from making qcquisitions in Italy not from confirming therein those Forces with which she afterwards did subdue the World For the Carthaginians came not near the Romans for little less then Five hundred years till such time as both the Commonwealths inlarging their Confines they grew to be neighbors Whereupon at last they commenced War out of the envy and jealousie that each 〈◊〉 of other This was the condition and 〈◊〉 of times wherein the Commonwealth of Rom◠had 〈◊〉 rise and encrease Whence it may be observed that though there might be some great 〈◊〉 then yet was there none which might compare with the Roman Emperors who had a greater Monarchy then all the rest besides they were so far off as their greatness could not impede Romes increasing though she were as yet but a new-begun City But she met with the like prosperous condition both of affairs and times in relation to her neerest neighbors For Rome had not only not any great contestation with any powerlike Prince in her first and weakest beginning but for the space of three hundred and sixty years till the first French war she had no occasion of making trial of her Forces against any powerful people for then Italy was not only not subject to any one Prince alone who might be greater by other Forces and other States as it happened afterwards in the Venetians times but being divided into many parts as well in respect of dominion as of other separations each Country contained many people of differing government and power So as Latium alone of herself which is now called Campagna di Roma contained four Nations or rather Communalties the Hernici Latini Volsci and Equi with whom the People of Rome did for a long time make war I mention not the Cecinensi the Crustumeni Antinati Sabini Albani and other Nations of less esteem against which in her beginning she exercised her Forces whilst she learned as a man may say the first rudiments of her Militia Tuscany though being taken all together she were very powerful and whose Confines were then much larger yet was she divided into so many Signories or Lordships as the Forces of every People apart by themselves must needs be weak and of small moment which may easily be known by this that bare Three hundred men of the Family of the Fabli were able to wage War with the Veienti who were the chief of that Region with whom they oft times fought with display'd Banners and with dubious event and were at last supprest more by the fraud then force of their Enemies So likewise the other parts of Italy which were neerer Rome were so weakly inhabited as it is not much that a new City but yet well instructed in weapons might get unto herself State and Dominion Nay he who shall consider what the increase of that Commonwealth was from time to time will wonder how that People who got afterwards the dominion of the whole World was so late in enlarging the Confines of her Territories upon her Neighbors when they were to contend in War with those that were weaker then they and that the bounds of their Empire did extend to beyond Italy For for above the space of four hundred years when the City was so much increased in Citizens as she raised Armies of Forty thousand Foot besides Horse the affairs of Rome were notwithstanding in such condition as they made War even under the Walls of Rome with the Equi Volsci and Veientes her first Enemies And this wonder is not a little increased when you shall consider that Military discipline did flourish even from the very first in Rome and was ever afterwards held in great esteem by her Citizens who were bent with all their might to augment the power of their City not being content as were the Venetians to enjoy peace and security Wherefore the Romans gave easily way for friendship to all Foreiners that they might by the multitude of their Citizens render their City more powerful and fitter to worst Adversaries And their first King Romulus set up a Sanctuary where all sorts of men whether free or slaves good or guilty might have receptacle But that Commonwealth had also her imperfections whereby being troubled with perpetual civil discords she found many impediments and much difficulty in effecting her Citizens generous designs But being gotten to a great height of power the Counterpoise of forein Forces ceasing by her own greatness she was able for a time to bear with her so many discorders till at last she was brought to her final ruine We must now be permitted to take some other things into consideration which appertain to particular order of this Commonwealth A City which aspires unto Empire must above all things else be well provided of Arms so as she want not any thing that is requisite for War but she stand◠no less in need of good Laws which are for many respects of great importance in all Governments as also for that when the licentiousness of Arms intrusted in the hands of Citizens is not corrected by the authority of Law that which was destin'd for the good and preservation thereof it turns at last to her ruine Therefore it is requisite that a City be constituted with such Laws as may result both to safety from foreign Enemies and to union between her own Citizens by which civil agreement the strength and reputation of a Commonwealth is much increased Of these two conditions which ought to make a City powerful and so as that power may continue long the Commonwealth of Rome had the first in perfection but was very faulty in the second On the contrary excellent provision was made by the Founders of Venice for the second but much remains to be wish'd for in the former Thus then had Rome a naturally warlike people which she kept continually exercised in Arms observing exactly Military discipline and orders But she was much disorderly and confused in Civil affairs nor knew she how to keep any setled from of Government leaving too much authority in the People and wanting usual means to suppress the immoderate power of Citizens Whereas in Venice the form and order of Civil Government is in every particular well disposed of and excellently well understood so as she is the only example which in so many Ages and so many accidents both of good and bad fortune hath never been troubled with any important domestick discords But then as for Military orders they are
not altogether such as are requisite for the acquiring of a large Command for at 〈◊〉 beginning she applied herself as hath been said to maritime affairs not with any intent of subjugating other Cities and Nations but rather as the condition of those times and businesses did require for what concerned Traffick and Merchandising to which the preservation of Peace did much conduâ—e and the keeping of open and free Commerce with all men but having since had some such thoughts too late they were not very sevently pursued neither but only as necessary or some occasion did dictate For the City was nor disposed and established with certain and perpetual Orders not with any very ambitionâ— ends for what concerned War and for Landâ— Militia it hath already been said that for a long time the Commonwealth was totally a stranger unto it And therefore when at last she made it her business for want of any fitting preparation for it in her own people and Citizens she had recourse for help to Foreiners and this 〈◊〉 growiâ—g stronger by time she hath always made use for the most part of Forein Commanders and Soldiers brought under her Pay from elswhere which as experience shews hath turn'd much to her damage and disorder for her Forces being under the command and power of **** other men she hath not beeâ—able upon many fiâ—â—ing ccasions to make good use of the Victories which she with great danger and 〈◊〉 hath â—on And not to mention many other things it is a thing very well known that had not the 〈◊〉 great fidelity of the Commandess 〈◊〉 the Commonwealth of her just hopes in the 〈…〉 The Romans did not thus who being to rig out Fleets against the Carthaginian did not seek out Sicilians or Grecians or people of other Nations to command over them but made use of their own Citizens as well by Sea as by Land Cinciâ—natuâ— was taken from the Plough and made Dictator against the Subins Cicerâ— being taken from pleading at the Bar was sent to the government of Cilicia and to make War against the Parthians Scipio who parted a fresh Soldier from Rome is said to have gotten the knowledge of the militarie Art by the way before he arrived at the Enemy Sylla being sent Questor into Africa with the Consul Marius being till then Puney in the Militia became in a few daies so well instructed therein and raised so great an opinion of valor and military Discipline of himself as the Commonwealth did very soon put their chiefest hopes in him in all their weightiest affairs In brief people that are of a ready wit and noble spirit do easily accustom themselves by exercise to all things and prove excellent therein the experience whereof hath been seen amongst our selves for those few who have betaken themselves to Land-service have given such proof of their valor which is witnessed by particular Histories as it may very well be known that the Commonwealth might have promised unto her self all gallantries from her Citizens if she had known how to make use of them But she was run into this error because she would as the conjuncture of times did almost require follow the example of the other Princes of Italy who long before and chiefly at that time when the Commonwealth did most apply her self to Land-affairs made use of mercinary Militia's which was then heightned to a great esteem by two famous Commanders of that Age Braccio and Sforza who were afterwards imitated by others in this sort of Militia Wherefore the Captainâ— whose Troops did ordinarily consist of horse led them along to the service sometimes of one sometimes of another Prince So the Venetians who were but learners in this sort of Militia saw that the Popes and Kings of 〈◊〉 the Dukes of Miâ—an the Florentines who bore great sway and authority in Italy made use of this sort of Forces they began no follow the footsteps which were 〈◊〉 out unto them by others Another respect may be added hereunto which hath already been touched upon that the Commonwealth having then put her self in a certain course which she had for a long time observed of making use of her people and her Citizen in Sea-affairs it seemed dangerous to some to make such an innovation in a City ordained for civil Government and which was greatly â—ixt therein by long custom But it is not to be denied but that when the aggrandizing of a State or Empire is in question this which hath been spoken of is a great faâ—lt in a City which doth aspire thereunto And it is to be observed in the Roman Monarchy that the happy success of their famous victories is chiefly attributed to the discipline of their Malitia because it was excellent and because it was exercised by their own Soldiers and particularly in the Carthiginian Wâ—rs which were 〈◊〉 then all the rest which the Romans did ever make it is observable that the Carthaginians being equal to the Romans both for the reâ—â—ration and wâ—rth of their Commanders and superior to them in the numbers of their Soldiers to boot with the strength of their Elephants which they made use of in their Battels yet thâ—ir Armies were overcome which consisted of 〈◊〉 people and assembled out of many 〈◊〉 and yet not by the greater worth but by the greater fidelity constancy and love of the Roman Soldiers towards their Countrie But for such abuses as 〈◊〉 it may be alledged in behalf of the Commonwealth of 〈◊〉 that she did it to 〈◊〉 thâ—se mischiefs into which 〈◊〉 Commonwealth of 〈◊〉 can by giveng these military commands to 〈…〉 yet he who will truly examine the state of affairs will find that the 〈◊〉 which is granted limited and corrected by the Laws cannot be prejudicial to the publick good and the experience of the very City of Venice confirms this where so great authoritie being so often granted in commands at Sea to her own Citizens yet it was never known that the Commonwealth suffered any mischeif thereby and certainly a great mistery lies in the well disposed orders of a City by which Citizens are easily kept within their duties wherein if any one chance to fail he is soon chastised without any disturbance to the peace of the City Which if by nothing else is sufficiently proved in the City of Venice by the long duration of that Commonwealth So as these things were very well understood and ordained by her and she might the more easily do it by reason of the conditions of those her first inhabitants as hath been said But such freedom and licentiousness was given in Rome to that warlike people together with the government of their Forces as the Laws were not so reverenced as they ought to have been and the orders of the Militia being instituted by Româ—lus before those of Religion and civility by Numa Poâ—pilius military discipline was alwaies in greater esteem then the study of civil affairs By all which considerations it is manifest That