Perswasion of the Mind particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent wherein it agrees with some other Acts of the Mind and the more special and peculiar part that limits and Contracts the General and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd is the Motive and ground of this Assent 'T is it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evidence of the thing but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker 3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent Reason and Authority That is we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete that is if we perceive only in part then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary which is what we call Opinion But if the Evidence be full and perfect then we yield a firm and most assured Assent which is generally distinguish'd from the other by the Name of Knowledge which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not Formally Consist in the Assent but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else For to give yet a further Confirmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion let Assent be never so evident the evidence lies in the Perception not in the Assent which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind and can be said no otherwise to be Evident than as 't is an Assent to an Evident thing that is to what we perceive But now Perception and Assent are not only two things but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge which is an Act only of one And indeed to speak the truth Evident Assent as 't is here applied seems to me a mere jumble of Words confusely uniting together in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties one belonging to the Will and the other to the Understanding And how the result of this heterogeneous Composition should be Knowledge I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension And besides after all an Evident Assent when resolv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know and would it not be a Notable Definition of Knowledge to say that it is an Assent to what we know 4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it as consisting purely and wholely in Perception 't is plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge For 't is necessary that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in general which it cannot do if it be Knowledge for that were to pass over into another Kind Knowledge not being Assent but Perception 'T is therefore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also gone upon a wrong ground and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents which are usually reckon'd to be Faith Opinion and Science since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge is most apparently not so as differing from it no less than in the whole kind 5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Second Assent to a thing when the Evidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is supposed not to be so perfect I answer that indeed so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought there is no proper Name that I know of for it When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is complete this has been usually call'd Knowledge but certainly with the utmost impropriety knowledge as appears being quite another thing But by what name to call it or how to distinguish it I proâ—ess I know not Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing for my Thought of it is very distinct but merely because we want a word for it As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to distinguish it from Assent upon Authority in general For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd somewhat if one could tell what as every generical Idea ought to be distinguish'd by a generical Name But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the Deâ—initio instead of the Definitum and express the things at large by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incomplete though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the other which is fitly call'd Opinion whereby we denote the imperfection both of the Evidence and of the Assent 6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all but only upon Testimony or Authority then we call it Faith Which appears to be an Assent of a quite different Nature from the other two For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence and differ only as the Evidence differs and that is gradually as complete differs from incompletâ— But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind as having no Evidence at all but only Authority for its Ground And thus we have here a Threefold Assent though not such as is taught us in the Schools the Account of which in short proceeds thus All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority If the Reason be incomplete then 't is Opinion If complete then 't is another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General But if the Assent be upon Authority only then 't is Faith 7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man then the Assent that is so grounded is Human Faith If of God then 't is Divine Faith Between which two there is this in Common that they both proceed not upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the
same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. 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being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should which may consist with Evidence though it proceeds not upon it and has no regard to it as a Motive So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear as it happens according as the Nature of the thing is but as Believ'd or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence even when it has any but wholy upon another Account already sufficiently represented 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent I cannot forbear Observing by the way though a little of the soonest of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason For what though it be above Reason is it therefore above Faith Has Faith any regard to Evidence Or is it determin'd by any Rational Motive I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object Even when a thing is evident Faith is not supposed to assent to it because of its Evidence and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly consist together and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd but whatever is believ'd must be inevident But this I look upon and have already shewn to be a Mistake And 't is a Mistake in the Extremity too For I take it to be every whit as much an Extreme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident as to say that it is always evident However it is always inevident so far as Believ'd which is the Middle Point between the two extremes The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object whatever it be in its own Nature and we need no More For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevident For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence if the Principle it proceeds upon be right The Principle is and a very moderate one sure the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd The Consequence is that therefore a thing may be believ'd though inevident 'T is true indeed one of these is an Absolute and the other only a Relative inevidence But this signifies Nothing to the Argument For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd when even that which is Evident is Consider'd by Faith as inevident Why then 't is all one as to Faith as if it were so indeed For what does the Evidence signify or what real alteration does it make if Faith has no regard to it nor Consideration of it And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd especially if reveal'd by God himself and concerning himself The short is Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence I mean that of the thing and Faith as Divine has no need of it and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not understand and would be glad to Learn 24. But to return for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pursued after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine with proper Considerations upon each of them it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit Then we are said to believe Explicitly when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular distinctly knowing what that Particular thing is And then Implicitly when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority not knowing what in particular is proposed or what it is we Believe Which though it seems to carry the Appearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Reasonable Creature may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit and has Implicit Faith in it 25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider what has been already intimated that Faith proceeds upon Premisses as well as Science and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism And I further Note what perhaps may not be unworthy the Observation of the Curious that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit as may be seen in the Syllogism before set down Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Major Proposition here whatever is reveal'd by God is true is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit borrows from it its Conclusion for its Principle and begins where the other leaves off Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other so 't is here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths whereof that which is Explicit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Implicit Faith as a blind and irrational Assent since it lays a ground for Explicit which serves it self of it using its Conclusion as a Principle even as what is a Conclusion in Geometry is a Principle in Perspective And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superiour Science so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds and which it self proceeds thus Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true God is Infallible Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true Here besides that 't is plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syllogism is the Principle of the precedent One and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit it may be further noted that Implicit Faith as being the highest degree of Faith is due only to the highest that is to an Infallible Authority the reason why whatever is reveal'd by God is here Concluded to be true being